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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Swapnil Ade on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Swapnil Ade on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Swapnil Ade on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[$4500 Local File Inclusion: The Tiny Parameter That Exposed an Entire Infrastructure]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@cyberknight/4500-local-file-inclusion-the-tiny-parameter-that-exposed-an-entire-infrastructure-74f7d3cc669c?source=rss-b2832fa31485------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lfi-vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[application-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Swapnil Ade]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Nov 2025 03:26:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-13T03:29:37.363Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Wx0cxTk0hiv5cUwG5e2cYw.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Summary:</strong></h3><p>Me and my hunting partner <a href="https://medium.com/u/491f9af79cca">Krishna Agarwal</a> were hunting on a target which was basically a cloud service providing platform. I had gone through every functionality of the application for potential attack vectors.</p><p>A support-ticket “download attachment” feature accepted a user-controllable URL parameter which the server used to fetch and stream content. The application did not restrict URL schemes or validate the requested path, allowing an authenticated user to request local files.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8LkzG_peCiWXk8h3UIT_uw.png" /><figcaption>Normal Request used to fetch and stream content</figcaption></figure><p>Meanwhile the rtm.php endpoint accepted a download_url parameter and treated it as a generic resource to fetch. By swapping that parameter for a file:///… style URI, the server returned raw local file contents. <br>In short: a helper that should have only streamed attachments happily read arbitrary local files a classic Local File Inclusion (LFI) with serious impact.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6tggCFhzp2-x1002CXFkdA.png" /><figcaption>LFI</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Critical (9.9)</strong> — CVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H.</p><p><strong>So what happened here? </strong><br>The server treated user-supplied resource references as first-class fetches and didn’t block filesystem schemes.<br><strong>Request body:</strong></p><ul><li>action=download_file</li><li>token=[REDACTED_TOKEN]</li><li>download_url=[USER-CONTROLLED VALUE]</li></ul><p><strong>Vulnerable behaviour:</strong> the application treated the value of download_url as a fetch target and streamed the result back to the requester. There was no scheme whitelist (for example https only), no server-side mapping from token→ file path, and no canonical path validation limiting reads to an attachments directory.</p><p><strong>Observed exploitation pattern:</strong> an attacker-controlled download_url referencing a local file caused the server to return that file&#39;s contents in the response body and we got LFI here.</p><h3>Hunting this pattern- What we should look for in an application during testing?</h3><p>If you want to find similar mistakes quickly, here’s how I approach it when reversing an app or scanning a codebase:</p><ul><li>Grep/scan for endpoints and parameters named download, fetch, attachment, url, file, or proxy. Those are likely to feed a generic fetch helper.</li><li>Find the helper that perform network or filesystem reads. See how they handle schemes and whether they canonicalize inputs.</li><li>In interception proxies, look for download POSTs that include url style parameters.</li></ul><p>This pattern is often hiding in plain sight because developers use shared utility functions for fetch/stream behaviour and assume callers will sanitize inputs.</p><p>After responsible disclosure, the issue was acknowledged by the company as a serious security finding and a bug bounty reward was granted a good example of how coordinated vulnerability disclosure works when both sides act responsibly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dLyRQ5JZjlDrSncRBcYpHg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Want to learn more about LFI? Find the resources below.</p><ul><li><a href="https://www.invicti.com/learn/local-file-inclusion-lfi?utm_source=">Local File Inclusion (LFI)</a></li><li><a href="https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/content/local_file_inclusion.html?utm_source=">Local File Inclusion</a></li><li><a href="https://portswigger.net/web-security/file-path-traversal/lab-simple">Lab: File path traversal, simple case</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=74f7d3cc669c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How a Chatty JSON Response Let Me Take Over an Entire Company’s Infrastructure.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@cyberknight/how-a-chatty-json-response-let-me-take-over-an-entire-companys-infrastructure-9afa8d2267cd?source=rss-b2832fa31485------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Swapnil Ade]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 27 Jul 2025 17:57:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-27T19:11:26.129Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>🎬 Scene 1: The ISO Button That Spoke Too Much</h3><p>After clicking “Boot from ISO,” I started monitoring network activity. I love watching what kind of requests go out — it’s like eavesdropping on the frontend talking to the backend.</p><p>A request was fired off:</p><pre>POST /eq.php HTTP/1.1<br>Host: panel.[REDACTED].com<br>Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>module=eq&amp;action=boot_dev&amp;media=cd&amp;attempts=50&amp;timeout=1000&amp;token=b68cefcf4349d9c9e45ec1132da3e4e4&amp;id=82674&amp;api_key=MY_API_KEY<br></pre><p>Totally expected — this was just the VM being told to boot from the mounted ISO.<br>Then came the polling request to check the boot status:</p><pre>POST /eq_callback.php?action=check HTTP/1.1<br>Host: panel.[REDACTED].com<br>Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>Referer: https://panel.[REDACTED].com/controlpanel.html?key=MY_API_KEY</pre><h3>👀 Scene 2: The Callback Response That Gave It All Away</h3><p>I opened the JSON response and casually scrolled through it.</p><p>Then I saw something weird in the scope field. Instead of just a status update, it contained… what looked like a full HTTP request.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kzQJnCUyNwOzcuyJGwRD1A.png" /><figcaption>The Callback Response That Gave It All Away</figcaption></figure><p>I stared harder.<br>Yep. There it was:</p><p>{<br> &quot;result&quot;: &quot;OK&quot;,<br> &quot;scope&quot;: &quot;{\&quot;result\&quot;:\&quot;OK\&quot;,\&quot;message\&quot;:\&quot;VM is boot for cdrom\&quot;}<br> &amp;{POST https:\/\/ovr-client-nl2.[REDACTED].com\/ovirt-engine\/api\/vms\/...\/start HTTP\/1.1 <br> Authorization:[Basic aW52YXBxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxndZaA==] ...}&quot;,<br> ...<br>}</p><pre>Authorization:[Basic aW52YXBxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxndZaA==]</pre><p>Wait… WHAT?</p><p>They had literally included the <strong>internal Authorization header</strong> from the backends&#39; own API call.<br>I base64 decoded it instantly:</p><pre>echo &quot;aW52YXBxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxndZaA==&quot; | base64 -d<br># invapi@xxxxxxxx:t8C5n5xxxxxZFUzwYh</pre><p>Live credentials.<br>Just… sitting there. In a client-facing response.</p><h3><strong>Following the Trail to the Admin Panel</strong></h3><p>The same debug string in scope also revealed the full internal API endpoint.</p><pre>https://ovr-client-nl2.[REDACTED].com/ovirt-engine/webadmin/sso/login</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bWn0UWtxFp2HKPIwf9tFZQ.png" /></figure><p>I opened the URL. A login form appeared. No VPN. No firewall. Just… public.<br>I entered:</p><ul><li><strong>Username:</strong> inxxxpi</li><li><strong>Password:</strong> t8C5n5xxxxxZFUzwYh</li><li><strong>Profile:</strong> internal</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rByhP5tcbrtEitShLcNrxw.png" /><figcaption>Take-overed oVirt Admin Panel</figcaption></figure><p>Hit <strong>Login</strong>… and boom! I was in.<br>I had full access to the entire virtualization control plane.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*O-VS6Px7tMZsiEi0ppwFPg.gif" /></figure><h3>📉 What Went Wrong</h3><p>Let’s break this down:</p><ul><li>A customer-facing feature (booting a VM) triggered a backend request.</li><li>The status-checking response leaked <strong>internal server behavior</strong>, including a raw internal HTTP request.</li><li>That raw request included <strong>sensitive credentials</strong> in headers.</li><li>No access control was applied before exposing this data.</li><li>No redaction or filtering was done in the JSON output.</li></ul><p>This is the equivalent of giving a customer a receipt and accidentally including <strong>your internal admin login and password</strong> on the printout.</p><h3>📊 CVSS Score: 9.9 Critical</h3><pre>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H</pre><h3>🛡️ Recommended Fixes</h3><ol><li><strong>Immediately revoke</strong> the exposed credentials.</li><li><strong>Sanitize all debug or trace data</strong> before returning it in production.</li><li>Do not expose <strong>raw internal HTTP requests</strong> to external users — ever.</li><li>Conduct a <strong>full audit</strong> of similar endpoints.</li><li>Rotate any other internal secrets that may have been exposed by this pattern.</li></ol><h3>💰 Bonus:</h3><p>This vulnerability earned me a <strong>$1500 bounty</strong> after responsible disclosure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*W52dL5Bd1hVAIiyjqfOdfQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Got <strong>$1500 bounty</strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/1*nO2KKvaOYeMxQCxpYMNo5Q.gif" /></figure><p>Why? Because the issue exposed <strong>an entire customer cluster to the public </strong>and could’ve led to a complete infrastructure compromise if left unchecked.<br><em>One leaked JSON field, one admin panel, and one exposed header that’s all it took.</em></p><p>💥 This bug wasn’t caught alone!<br>Massive shoutout to my partner-in-pwn: kr1shna4garwal.com 🛠️👾<br>Teamwork made the exploit work 😎💻🔥</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9afa8d2267cd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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