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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Cyberknow on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Microsoft DDoS attacks — Hacktivism or Vendetta?]]></title>
            <link>https://cyberknow.medium.com/the-microsoft-ddos-attacks-hacktivism-or-vendetta-6ccec8a04faf?source=rss-34a7437bc1aa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[russia-ukraine-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[anonymous-sudan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberwar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyberknow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Sep 2023 13:38:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-25T13:38:33.213Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Microsoft DDoS attacks — Hacktivism or Vendetta?</h3><p>Anonymous Sudan and Zarya Legion</p><h4>TLDR</h4><ul><li>Anonymous Sudan’s most high-profile DDoS attack was against Microsoft in June 2023, below we review insights that reveal they may have had help from another pro-Russian hacktivist group, Zarya Legion.</li><li>Zarya Legion may have been linked to Zloader botnet. Microsoft shut-down Zloader botnet in April 2022 — Zarya Legion spent a year possibly rebuilding their botnet for a revenge attack in June 2023.</li><li>Zarya Legion unlike every other pro-Russian group values discretion and on several occasions have backtracked when accused of actions instead of bragging like most others.</li><li>Zarya Legion has also placed more privacy controls on their telegram page, blocking screenshots — they appear to only be communicating with their followers instead of looking for attention from the West like other groups.</li><li>Anonymous Sudan possibly leveraged a botnet that Zarya Legion was running to target Microsoft.</li><li>Many argue that Anonymous Sudan would struggle to achieve such an attack without paying large sums for botnet access — what if they were supplied the capability to conduct the attacks?</li><li>Zarya Legion on several occasions made reference to a relationship with Russian intelligence services.</li></ul><h4>Summary</h4><p>Anonymous Sudan started operating in January 2023 and since then has quickly captured the interest and curiosity of threat researchers and the global media, thanks in large part to their successful DDoS attacks on Microsoft in June 2023.</p><p>As someone who has been tracking and monitoring the cyber component of the Russia-Ukraine War since February 2022 I have a decent understanding of the hacktivist landscape. What has stood out about Anonymous Sudan is the fascination by researchers, maybe even more so than for Killnet, this might center mostly around the narrative driven by Anonymous Sudan themselves that they are Sudanese hacktivists. In contrast a large part of the community believe they are Russian state-supported, realistically they could be both or neither of those things.</p><p>So, come along for a ride as we explore this new angle into Anonymous Sudan and their successful DDoS attacks on Microsoft in June 2023.</p><h4>Disclaimer</h4><p>This report looks at the subject material from the perspective of intent and the opinions of the threat actors involved, where possible I have tried to correlate claims.</p><p>This report will likely raise more questions than answers, if you have any insights or challenges to its contents please reach out.</p><p>Crowd-sourced intelligence with a diversity of thought will always beat siloed echo chambers.</p><h4>Report</h4><p>The following report will outline why it is possible that Zarya Legion, a group who openly claims to have engaged with Russian Intelligence services may have helped Anonymous Sudan target Microsoft and why, it might even have been an act of revenge.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/409/0*mAarIqpSNG41R2S2.png" /></figure><h4>Who is Zarya Legion?</h4><p>Zarya Legion started their telegram account in the early period of the Russia-Ukraine war, on 3 March 2022. They state their specialty is to ‘gather information’. I will point out early that unlike all other pro-Russian hacktivist telegram groups, Zarya legion locks the page to avoid screen shots — in that regard they appear more interested in showcasing to their supporter base then having their exploits shared with ‘Russophobic’ countries. However, most of their comms are in English.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/606/0*Wx1gjq3IWbtKnG-O.png" /></figure><p>Now, for many this might cause some confusion — let me clarify that there are two Zarya groups who both state they have links to Killnet. I will differentiate them by calling one Zarya and one Zarya Legion. (Both have been added to the cybertracker in different versions) Where as Zarya was a unit from the original Killnet, Zarya Legion is a group that claims to support Killnet.</p><p>Zarya was one of the original special forces groups of Killnet back in March 2022 and is arguably the most capable of any Killnet group, conducting a series of alleged breach and leak attacks against Ukraine. The group has also conducted multiple interviews with Russian media and welcomed Western attention. They sought attention and notoriety like all Killnet collective members. Which is a key point of difference between the notably ‘shy’ Zarya Legion and the overt Zarya.</p><p>Zarya confirmed in April 2023 that they are separate to Zarya legion. They also importantly recognize Zarya Legion as a legitimate group. This is important as establishing the legitimacy of not well-documented groups can be difficult.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KrfqmRe5-IucLCfn.png" /></figure><p>Zarya Legion also pointed out in April 2023 that they are confused with Zarya.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/735/0*ykwQnojIzsHFzeLD.png" /></figure><p>Translation: <em>Hello dear friends! Lately we have been confused with another project Zarya. We are on the same side, but our projects are different. We ask you to be more careful in the future and don’t confuse us with other teams.</em></p><p>What happened in April 2023 that had both Zarya and Zarya Legion want to clarify who is who? It was revealed in leaked US government documents by the New York Times that a Russian intelligence officer had been informed by ‘Zarya’ that they had hacked a <a href="https://therecord.media/russia-hacktivist-threat-to-canadian-pipelines-a-call-to-action">Canadian</a> pipeline and could manipulate the system.</p><h4>Analyst Note:</h4><p>Neither group accepts responsibility for these claims. Zarya would normally brag about this kind of attack — Zarya Legion on the other hand would not advertise it openly.</p><p>Now we have touched on that, let’s get into Zarya Legion. The only way we can confirm that Zarya Legion was actually related to Killnet (outside of Zarya Legion stating it) was in April 2022 when Killnet gets angry that they are being blamed for a Zarya Legion attack in Italian news. ( Zarya Legion did not claim to conduct the attack directly, but does recognize it after the event)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/906/0*mUtWT9DfXkhAD6tH.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Analyst Note</h4><p>While Killnet does have the Legion group, in this scenario they appear to be talking about Zarya Legion — who appears to be a support group that was not created by Killnet.</p><p>As you can see Killnet was not as happy about claiming any and all attacks as much when they started as they do now. To clarify that Killnet is talking about Zarya Legion and not Zarya — a review of Zarya activities shows they have never mentioned Italy. While Zarya Legion posted the following after the Killnet post.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/440/0*lWn7tHFw7VOEXb_F.png" /></figure><h4>Zarya Legion runs into trouble — April 2022</h4><p>Zarya Legion started on Telegram in March 2022, but by April 2022 they suffer some issues. As you will see below they discuss Microsoft and then complain about having their botnets destroyed. At this point they stop posting and do not post again until July 2022. This is a long period of silence for most pro-Russian hacktivist groups.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/520/0*kbuZzdkKPT8T4Nvs.png" /></figure><p>While correlation does not equal causation — the timing of the posts of Zarya Legion are directly after Microsoft revealed publicly that they had dismantled the <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/04/13/zloader-botnet-disrupted-malware-ukraine/">Zloader</a> botnet. It is difficult to confirm if the members of Zarya Legion were involved with Zloader botnet, but it is a fascinating point of coincidence. As you will see below, hate towards Microsoft is a constant theme for Zarya Legion.</p><p>Zarya Legion then continues with more months of sporadic activity — possibly while they fix whatever happened to their botnet.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/437/0*xKsKVeEA6tyIYtdr.png" /></figure><p>This sporadic activity then continues until February 2023. As you can see they once again claim ‘to be back soon’ then vanish for three months.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/429/0*C9pUv-t6oCfHYZ9F.png" /></figure><p>They do provide a short video which is notably in Russian, compared to almost all their written comms which are in English. I sought out one of the finest translators I know, who said the great majority of the video is inaudible.</p><p>After they post the video they shift into a period of promotion of their botnet. They don’t previously mention much about botnets other than it getting shutdown almost a year before.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/0*w5eDDu1IxLgzHMyd.png" /></figure><p>Then, on February 26 they once again mention Microsoft, there is a recurring theme since the announcement of the botnet shutdown in 2022 that they have issues with Microsoft.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/433/0*bpNKDDzvcWzh4oRt.png" /></figure><p>For the first time Zarya Legion now offers their services for payment, really the usual offerings for most groups. What it might indicate is that after a long period they have been able to reestablish their product to now sell to customers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/755/0*8ZHAwAFWcF7uka6R.png" /></figure><p>Oh, they once again mention Microsoft — As I said above the theme of hatred towards Microsoft is consistent throughout the groups postings.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/461/0*wM9KjfkVVzTJ4idN.png" /></figure><p>On March 8 Zarya Legion provides a screenshot of their botnet in action.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/838/0*BqE_0GeFckItsGeo.png" /></figure><p>They provide a range of services, similar to the type mentioned by Microsoft as being used in the DDoS attacks by Anonymous Sudan. This also shows that the botnet in use has at least 34784 bots at this time.</p><p>They then conduct a series of DDoS attacks on various government websites (unclear if any where successful) this is likely to showcase the ability of their services.</p><p>Then on March 21 they announce:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/430/0*VqGcvq9KERwKBJYN.png" /></figure><p>While they on occasion mention their support for Killnet they have not shared or cross-posted Killnet activities, which is a common practice for groups linked to Killnet.</p><p>Zarya Legion then increases their claimed DDoS attacks and for the first time since the page was created in early 2022 they are regularly posting and are very active.</p><p>On April 7 2023 they provide another screenshot related to their botnet:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/718/0*k131pvifP2RtMrFt.png" /></figure><p>At this time we can see that they have increased the bots in their botnet to at least 54649. This increase in capability might be why the sudden increase of activity on the groups telegram.</p><p>All this new activity once again comes to a stop in late April 2023 when the revelation is made via the leaked US documents that a ‘Zarya’ hacktivist group has attempted to sell Canadian company access to possible Russian intelligence members. Remember neither Zarya and Zarya Legion claim this.</p><p>It isn’t until April 20 that Zarya Legion posts again referencing the release of the New York Times article which was on April 13.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/433/0*pRwbvAlzBZKJGVYi.png" /></figure><p>This is also the same time that they clarify they are not Zarya but are instead a different group.</p><p>After this event they release a heap of NATO and US government documents — which all look unclassified and are possibly from an earlier breach. They also interestingly post information and make, for the second time a claim that they are working with or sharing information with the Russian intelligence services.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/443/0*5T5hMqZ5HFBXlvcC.png" /></figure><p>Remember, this is a smaller and private telegram page than all other pro-Russian hacktivist groups.</p><h4>Zarya Legion and Anonymous Sudan</h4><p>On 25 April 2023 Zarya Legion posts <em>‘let’s help them’</em> they then follow that post up by forwarding a post from Anonymous Sudan. Up until this point Zarya Legion had not shared or forwarded any other attacks relating to any other pro-Russian groups, including for Killnet.</p><p>As you will recall just above on March 21 they reference that they are planning to start working with hacktivist groups, now less than a month later Anonymous Sudan is being mentioned.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/491/0*mtlDPLEizCTvcdgJ.png" /></figure><h4>Analyst note:</h4><p>From April until July Anonymous Sudan conducted its most impactful DDoS attacks, with confirmed impact against SAS airlines, allegedly the Israel Iron dome and of course Microsoft. All these attacks took place with possible support of Zarya Legion.</p><p>On April 7 Anonymous Sudan brags about the capability they can leverage against Israel — this comes after the March 21 Zarya Legion announcement that they would help Anonymous Sudan.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/351/0*7p9_pLbXSa7H4zQm.png" /></figure><p>This does not confirm that Anonymous Sudan is using the Zarya Legion botnet.</p><p>Zarya Legion then randomly clarifies that they support Killnet in attacks but conduct separate operations — this would explain why they don’t cross-promote or declare they are joining attacks. Once again Zarya Legion wants to distance themselves from public exposure and highlight they operate in the shadows.</p><p>They have little interest in being mentioned by Western media unlike other groups who crave the exposure.</p><p>On April 30 Zarya Legion discusses testing their botnet to make sure it works during attacks. Despite the screenshot being hard to read, there is one part which provides capabilities — assuming this means bots in the botnet then the number appears to be 63487 — which would suggest the botnet has been growing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/446/0*iqpCki1nsHsRAy8e.png" /></figure><p>Zarya Legion announced on April 30 that they were continuing to collaborate with Anonymous Sudan and that two companies would be targeted in particular, these likely being Microsoft along with possibly UPS.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/430/0*b6y6ma7cPGWAYnz5.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/456/0*opdFH_j0WEcuv-Ts.png" /></figure><p>Zarya Legion repeats that they are supporting Anonymous Sudan attacks, the wording is worth noting, they always state they support Anonymous Sudan or support Killnet, not that they are conducting attacks for them.</p><p>However, this appears to change round 11/12 May when Zarya Legion conducts DDoS attacks against Italy, Spain and several other countries. Using a trip made by President Zelensky to those countries as a cover to test their new capability.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/439/0*97DyELStc70UOyD7.png" /></figure><p>It was reported at the time in the media that Killnet claimed the attacks, however they explain that it was testing by their Legion. As I mentioned above when they mention ‘Legion’ is appears to reference Zarya Legion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/951/0*zw4bNK0JDZqbtYYs.jpeg" /></figure><p>Some key takeaways from this post:</p><ul><li>This is forwarded from a private ‘We are Killnet’ account to the public group, this is ultra rare and might be the only case that a private account has posted into that group.</li><li>Killnet does not claim the attacks as they do others, instead they speak of their ‘Legion’ this is the same way they referenced Zarya Legion in 2022.</li><li>They call this a training exercise to improve their skills — according to Bleeping computer, the Italian CERT stated the attacks were using a ‘<a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/italian-cert-hacktivists-hit-govt-sites-in-slow-http-ddos-attacks/">Slow HTTP</a>’ attack technique. This is an attack that Microsoft said was used against them in June- that attack would take place a month from these attacks.</li><li>It is possible that Zarya Legion was training with a new ‘Slow HTTP’ attack technique and Killnet was keen to clarify that?</li></ul><p>Zarya Legion then continues to conduct DDoS attacks which are not declared by any other pro-Russian hacktivist group up until around 25 May when they announce.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/440/0*ac2G6AAWt5v2QoGW.png" /></figure><h4>The Microsoft Attacks</h4><p>Up to this point we have had Zarya Legion possibly have a botnet disrupted by Microsoft in April 2022. After that possible incident Zarya Legion continues to vent frustration towards Microsoft. Then after over a year, in April 2023 they get a botnet that appears to be able to provide DDoS attacks. Not only this but its possible they were testing out capabilities with attacks on Italy and other sites in late May 2023.</p><p>They also mention they are working with Anonymous Sudan to target two organizations. This all leads, from what I can see to the attacks on Microsoft in June 2023.</p><p>I think the story has been well covered by now — but some quick points:</p><ul><li>6 June Anonymous Sudan starts to target Microsoft with DDoS attacks.</li><li>Thousands of US based customers are impacted.</li><li>They continue the attacks until at least 10 June.</li><li>The narrative by Anonymous Sudan was overtly personal towards Microsoft, which in isolation doesn’t seem like much.</li><li>At the time Microsoft had no obvious actions that would trigger a geopolitical or religious response, which Anonymous Sudan often claims to use as motivation.</li></ul><p>Zarya Legion didn’t share any Anonymous Sudan posts about the Microsoft attacks — but, they did post their own separate post</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/458/0*7mKQ0v5RyDqoqrKZ.png" /></figure><p>Anonymous Sudan posted something similar but with different wording. This would mark the first time that Zarya Legion would post a statement like this — It is unclear if they conducted this attack on Microsoft themselves or if they simply supported Anonymous Sudan. Below is the post that Anonymous Sudan put up relating to Microsoft lying about the attacks. You will note the differences.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*7vGSzS2U3AL6kMXV.jpeg" /></figure><p>Another thing that Zarya Legion posted was the impact of the attacks to Microsoft’s share price, again highlighting this had more a revenge vibe about it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/435/0*lKjtiYcRTKdmpTLF.png" /></figure><p>Its as if Zarya Legion really wanted to make Microsoft suffer, for no really obvious geopolitical reasons. Yes, Microsoft has been a strong supporter of Ukraine, but nothing recent was announced around the time of the attack.</p><p>After this post Zarya Legion post one more time on 16 June then go offline until August. When they return on 15 August they post about taking down a crypto exchange and then exposing Twitter credentials of people who used the exchange. Since then the telegram group has had no activity.</p><p>Finally, it is worth noting that Anonymous Sudan did try and attack Microsoft again in July — but this time they openly declared they were using Skynet and Godzilla botnet — they had little success that time.</p><p>Is this because Zarya Legion stopped providing them with capability now that Microsoft has been impacted?</p><p>Notably, Two targets, SAS and Microsoft were targeted outside of possible Zarya Legion support but were not as successful.</p><ul><li>SAS was targeted in February with less impact than during the May attacks.</li><li>Anonymous Sudan tried to target Microsoft again in July but with less success.</li></ul><h4>Thoughts on the Microsoft Attacks</h4><p>One overarching thought about the Microsoft attacks was why them? There was nothing notable in the media at the time about Microsoft that would trigger Anonymous Sudan to attack, sure Microsoft supports Ukraine, but there was no clear trigger point that would provide the justification Anonymous Sudan often claims. Is that because it was an act of revenge by the operators of Zarya Legion? Or, was it simply that they had the opportunity to target a big US company?</p><p>The fact that they were able to impact Microsoft makes it a fascinating event and one that I am sure people will explore and debate for sometime. I hope this report inspires debate and further research — Hopefully not a series of DDoS attacks.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ccec8a04faf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Australia Cyber Update #2]]></title>
            <link>https://cyberknow.medium.com/australia-cyber-update-2-e881836ebf94?source=rss-34a7437bc1aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e881836ebf94</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyberknow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Aug 2023 12:13:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-14T12:13:46.742Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A fortnightly insight into the Australian cyber threat landscape</p><p>After a busy few weeks we felt that more value might be delivered via this blog as a fortnightly installment, instead of weekly. With that we present the second edition of the Australia Cyber Update.</p><p>As a reminder this information is provided in the guest to inform in the spirit of Situational Awareness which continues to be a vital and sometimes overlooked component of threat intelligence and cyber security more broadly.</p><p><strong>August 1</strong></p><p>Play ransomware gang posted AAPD to their leak site. AAPD is an adult product distribution company. At time of reporting they have not posted any data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*r2JJNcgkr6Kuqmpc.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>August 6</strong></p><p>A user on Telegram offers two new Australian scams for purchase — one related to PAYID and one related to Harvey Norman. Whilst scams are regular place if we see them we will share them here in the spirit of awareness.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*rZOufZtQ6rCiSqiF.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Yif5X6B0NbcvxYua.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>August 6</strong></p><p>A user on Exploit forum is selling sms leads of Australians and asking for 20 dollars for a thousand leads. This provides insights into the value of data on underground forums and the often opportunistic collection of cyber criminals.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DRl2dIGN-E-QeVUC.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>August 9</strong></p><p>A user on Exploit forum is seeking personal information of Australian citizens (this is not uncommon, but is a good reminder that interest in Australian data remains persistent) Worth noting that value of data can range from 5 cents up to 50 dollars.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-oXVsMfnOJLymLuM.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>August 10</strong></p><p>Rhysida ransomware gang posted Optimum Health Solutions as an alleged victim to their leak site. Optimum Health Solutions is a large preventative health company in NSW. They have not posted any data at time of posting, as noted by the image the countdown ends on 16 August.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/631/0*HduWioO72x_9vhWg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>August 11</strong></p><p>A user on Breachforum has posted alleged data from iabaustralia for sale. Iabaustralia is a marketing company. The reputation of this threat actor is questionable, they are offering the data for sale and appear to have limited sales on other data offered.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*aayd8Rnhi6pO6M0c.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>August 16</strong></p><p>Play ransomware gang posted Algorry Zappia &amp; Associates, a engineering company from Sydney to their leak site. They have not posted any data at time of reporting.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Fm5NeiWBBgkbcAmg.jpeg" /></figure><p>If you found this useful, or have any suggestions/edits/additions or want to know more please reach out to our X (Twitter) accounts :</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/arb0ur">https://twitter.com/arb0ur</a></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20">https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e881836ebf94" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Australia Cyber Update #1]]></title>
            <link>https://cyberknow.medium.com/australia-cyber-update-1-29c8461b7bd?source=rss-34a7437bc1aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/29c8461b7bd</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyberknow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Aug 2023 10:11:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-01T10:11:40.103Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Weekly coverage of cyber events of interest in Australia</p><p>Hello and welcome to the start of a weekly newsletter that myself and another Australian threat researcher, arb0ur (<a href="https://twitter.com/arb0ur">https://twitter.com/arb0ur</a>) are putting together.</p><p>The goal of this weekly newsletter is to provide an overview of cyber events of interest related to Australia over the previous week and when time permits, additional context and insights. This has been inspired by our drive to uplift the situational awareness and understanding of the threat landscape across Australia.</p><p>We are deeply passionate about informing and supporting the Australian community in understanding the ever evolving threat landscape and hope this will be of benefit to you regardless of your cyber maturity.</p><h4>Cyber Events 8–31 July 2023 ( first edition so will include additional days)</h4><p><strong>July 8: </strong>Ventia reported a cyber incident impacting some of its systems. The company provides services to the Australian defence industry and a large number of critical infrastructure organizations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/427/0*hweyuQSkIBRs_a7j.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>July 8:</strong> The recently activated leak site for Cyclops ransomware gang posted Superloop — an Australian internet service provider to its leak site. Cyclops ransomware posted data at time of victim posting of Superloop.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bIAfaqfuB0PC6IHK.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>July 16: </strong>Stormous (alleged ransomware) group posted a small Melbourne video production company — The Jasper picture company. At time of writing the Stormous leak site is down (it is one of the less reliable leak sites on the dark web)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/495/0*E9kKYkHbv3OaEJ2N.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>July 17:</strong> Clop ransomware gang as part of the Moveit campaign posted Fortescue Mining group one of Australia and the worlds largest mineral companies. As of writing they have not yet released any data. Fortescue has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/jul/18/iron-ore-giant-fortescue-metals-targeted-by-russian-ransomware-group">confirmed </a>the cyberattack, describing it as “a low-impact cyber incident” that occurred on 28 May, with the information stolen reportedly “was not confidential in nature”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Ie_Qypr_Q0aRDw4l.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>July 17: </strong>New Zealand Parliament and several other government websites were targeted by Noname057(16) in the first time New Zealand had been targeted by pro-Russian hacktivists during the Russia-Ukraine war.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HPOT0JBln60jIiHE.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>July 18: </strong>AlphV ransomware gang posted all the data stolen from FIGG securities an Australian bonds company. The incident took place in June.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xOSL4MbobbkvYyZz.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>July 20:</strong> A newly created account on Breached forum called ‘Telstra’ claimed to be selling stolen data from Australia’s biggest telco. Telstra quickly declared the data was in fact scrapped from the reverse Australia directory and there networks were not impacted. The user deleted the post on breached forum and then their account.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*CT_HI-VVeZ5bm2Jr.png" /></figure><p><strong>July 20:</strong> Noname057(16) targeted the Australian government ‘Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ — this was the second time in several months that the pro-Russian hacktivist group had targeted the same website. As a result the site was down for maintenance for several hours.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/927/0*X6g_VAHNch5Mq-sL.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cz2_13P8ptRvMUS-.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>July 20: </strong>A member of underground forum Xss <strong>blackh4t </strong>advertised Citrix access to the network of an Australian organization with a revenue of USD $25 million. The access allegedly includes databases and invoices and appears to be domain joined. The user <strong>blackh4t </strong>has a low reputation, with no previous sales or endorsements from other forum members. At the time of writing the advertisement has had no engagement from forum users.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/965/0*oyQ7C0CSYXoy0luJ.png" /></figure><p><strong>July 23:</strong> A user on Breached forum was attempting to sell access to an S3 bucket of an Australian company with revenue over $10 billion, asking for 0.4btc — they have since offered to reduce the price.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*nMRIA-ZJS3CUAPmA.jpeg" /></figure><p>July 27: 8base ransomware gang posted BoomData, an Australian analytics consultant company to its leak site.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/693/1*GBSfUCrdG8ghw4TYi-CwPA.png" /></figure><p><strong>July 28:</strong> Clop ransomware gang posted Aristocrat Leisure Limited to their leak site. At the time of writing, no data has been leaked on the site however it is alleged that Clop has access to 347GB of archived data from the organization. Aristocrat is a global gaming content and technology company and mobile games publisher headquartered in Australia.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Pihfj0VCkuu7F87g.png" /></figure><p><strong>July 29: </strong>A member of the underground forum Xss, <strong>SGL </strong>advertised Citrix access to the network of an Australian organization with a revenue of less than USD $5 million. The compromised host is joined to a domain of 57 other hosts and uses ESET Server Security. The user has a high reputation and has had 9 successful sales using the forum’s escrow service to date, which have included 2 other Australian networks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/714/0*T9DvjE_DyygE5SYv.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/966/0*lsiU9PF564PfL3ma.png" /></figure><p><strong>July 31:</strong> Garuda Security, a hacktivist collective, claimed to have ’25 billion Data Australia’ on their telegram page with a video that skimmed through a large volume of personal information. It has nothing to do with Australia and instead could be data from Austria. It is likely to be merged previously exposed data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/272/0*Tr3YTgXu48xzXx97.png" /></figure><p>If you found this useful, or have any suggestions/edits/additions or want to know more please reach out to our X (Twitter) accounts :</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/arb0ur">https://twitter.com/arb0ur</a></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20">https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=29c8461b7bd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Update 24. 2023 Russia-Ukraine War — Cybertracker. 20 JULY.]]></title>
            <link>https://cyberknow.medium.com/update-24-2023-russia-ukraine-war-cybertracker-20-july-ec64cfef38a0?source=rss-34a7437bc1aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ec64cfef38a0</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyberknow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Jul 2023 12:26:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-20T12:26:18.635Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Update 24. 2023 Russia-Ukraine War — Cybertracker. 20 JULY.</h3><p>It’s been a while — a quick reminder: The Cybertracker I produce for the Russia-Ukraine war is based on Intent of the cyber threat actors, not capability.</p><p>I just wanted to quickly thank all those who read/use/enjoy the cybertracker I produce, really makes the long nights worth it. When I decided to make a list of cyber groups involved in the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022 I did not think i would still be doing it in July 2023, or that it would be so popular and valued — so thank you.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JMLVIz0npnlJbc65.png" /><figcaption>CyberTracker 24–20 July 2023 — Cyberknow — Russia-Ukraine War</figcaption></figure><p>Some notes from the 24th cybertracker:</p><ul><li>pro-Russian groups continue to outnumber pro-Ukraine (that does not include impact of attacks — purely groups numbers)</li><li>Pro-Russian groups continue to seek improved capabilities to match their high intent.</li><li>There continues to be new groups join the hacktivist activities. Telegram continues to be the dominate form of comms for pro-Russian groups.</li><li>Usersec has created its own collective, which at its peak had at least 15 members.</li><li>Anonymous Sudan continues to shift away from geopolitical motivations to religious motivations. — Update: Anonymous Sudan now combines both its alleged grievances to target both ‘russophobic’ countries and middle-eastern countries.</li><li>Noname057(16) and the DDosia project remain the most active pro-Russian hacktivist group.</li><li>pro-Ukraine groups continue to be smaller in number due to 2 reasons. 1, IT Army Ukraine is well organized and accounts for a large amount of people who would support Ukraine in hacktivist activities. 2, many Anonymous affiliate groups continue to operate on other targets and don’t exclusively target Russia.</li><li>There were several Pakistan linked hacktivist groups who targeted Russia — this was part of retaliation due to a feud with Phoenix.</li><li>Several Middle-Eastern and Indian hacktivist groups joined the Usersec Collective to support Russia. (It’s not clear if this was a retaliation after Pakistan groups targeted Russia)</li><li>The ‘Richard W’ group is the alleged Wagner affiliated group/individual who targeted the Russian satellite comms provider — it marked one of the first Russia V Russia campaign.</li><li>Killnet had a period of inactivity after Killmilk its leader was away — when they returned most Killnet associated groups reactivated, including Anonymous Russia who is now under the control of User1, the operator in charge of Usersec. Killmilk appears to have considerable control over killnet operations and those of other affiliate groups.</li></ul><p>I have included the original version of the cybertracker below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*FYIBYH7vDrfNGAYM.png" /><figcaption>Original cybertracker — Update 24 — July 20 2023. Russia-Ukraine War.</figcaption></figure><p>For real-time updates please see: <a href="https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20">https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ec64cfef38a0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Update 23. 2023 Russia-Ukraine War — Cybertracker. May 03.]]></title>
            <link>https://cyberknow.medium.com/update-23-2023-russia-ukraine-war-cybertracker-may-03-efeb21056713?source=rss-34a7437bc1aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/efeb21056713</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia-ukraine-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybertracker]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyberknow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 May 2023 13:17:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-03T13:17:33.669Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Update 23. 2023 Russia-Ukraine War — Cybertracker. May 03.</h3><p>Second #cybertracker for 2023</p><p>A quick reminder: The Cybertracker I produce for the Russia-Ukraine war is based on Intent of the threat actors, not capability.</p><p>I will start this with an apology, I have had many reach-out to ask when the next cybertracker would be released as I missed March and April for updates.</p><p>To all those waiting my apologies, hopefully the May edition provides the insights and information you need. I will have likely missed something as it gets harder and harder for one person to monitor the whole situation, if you see anything that should be added please reach out — either via email or Twitter DM.</p><p>Some notes from the 23rd cybertracker:</p><ul><li>pro-Russian groups continue to outnumber pro-Ukraine (that does not include impact of attacks — purely groups numbers)</li><li>Pro-Russian groups continue to seek improved capabilities to match their high intent.</li><li>Increased shift into cyber-crime for pro-Russian groups.</li><li>Killnet now has access to Titan Stealer and a new botnet — Tesla botnet — expect improved attack capability from them.</li><li>AS Sudan continues to shift away from geopolitical motivations to religious motivations.</li><li>noname057(16) would be the most active of all the pro-Russian groups.</li><li>pro-Ukraine groups continue to be smaller in number due to 2 reasons. 1, IT Army Ukraine is well organized and accounts for a large amount of people who would support Ukraine in hacktivist activities. 2, many Anonymous affiliate groups continue to operate on other targets and don’t exclusively target Russia.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*oK87qyTt5XJ6WqXP.png" /><figcaption>CyberTracker 23 — May 2023 — Cyberknow</figcaption></figure><p>For live updates on the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war cyber events please follow — <a href="https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20">https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=efeb21056713" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[#OpAustralia — Hacktivist Campaign Against Australia — March 2023]]></title>
            <link>https://cyberknow.medium.com/opaustralia-hacktivist-campaign-against-australia-march-2023-3c09e5380a21?source=rss-34a7437bc1aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3c09e5380a21</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacktivism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyberknow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Apr 2023 05:31:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-19T05:31:05.733Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>#OpAustralia — Hacktivist Campaign Against Australia — March 2023</h3><p>A look at recent targeted cyber-attacks against Australia</p><p><strong>TL:DR</strong></p><ul><li>Australia was targeted by multiple allegedly religiously motivated hacktivist groups over several days during March 2023.</li><li>There were close to 300 attacks including DDoS, Defacement, Doxxing and Breach and Leak attacks.</li><li>Around 200 attacks were successful — meaning they achieved the goal of the attack, despite overall impact.</li><li>Some attacks were unsuccessful or in the case of the breach and leak and dox attacks were fake — using open source information and claiming they were private.</li><li>Unlike recent opportunistic ransomware and cyber-criminal attacks in Australia this was a genuine targeted campaign to try and impact the day-to-day lives of Australians.</li><li>While the majority of the groups involved were religiously motivated it did also spread into the pro-Russian hacktivist groups engaged in the Russia-Ukraine war, however this involvement was confined to one group.</li><li>Most significant attacks were the DDoS attacks that took down the Port of Melbourne and Royal Adelaide Hospital websites.</li><li>#OpAustralia has now ended with all groups involved shifting to targeting other countries they have grievances with.</li></ul><h4>Caveats</h4><p>#OpAustralia like most other hacktivist campaigns is an exercise is intent over capability. When we talk in terms of threat-actors the often accepted measure is their capability, however when I look at hacktivist groups and more broadly any threat actor I look at intent first. The reason for this is that:</p><ul><li>Intent leads to capability which in turn provides more opportunities.</li></ul><p>One argument against reporting like this is that the goal of these campaigns is to generate media attention, while that is the case it is also worth providing insights and situational awareness about these campaigns as they are part of the cyber threat landscape.</p><h4>#OpAustralia</h4><p>On March 17 2023 the first reported group to declare #OpAustralia as an active campaign was Team_Insane_pk. A collective of hacktivists from Pakistan who are driven by religious motivations to target countries they believe are offensive to the Islamic religion. They were then joined by dozens of other groups, who operate in a loose collective — it also included Anonymous Sudan, a sub-group of the Killnet collective of pro-Russian hacktivists.</p><p>The trigger for the campaign was a Melbourne based <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/lifestyle/fashion/discourtesy-disrespectful-festival-apologises-for-allah-garments-on-runway-20230312-p5crfu.html">fashion designer</a> who created a dress that displayed the Arabic text ‘Allah’. This news was spread by several fashion bloggers which then triggered the start of #OpAustralia by a large collective of hacktivist groups.</p><p>For more details see the <a href="https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20/status/1636685375564566529">thread</a> I ran on Twitter during the campaign.</p><p>There was also a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b-2klMMOZUM">video</a> released at the height of the campaign to call out the Australian government.</p><h4>DDoS Attacks</h4><p>There were over 200 successful DDoS attacks against Australian websites during the #OpAustralia campaign. A good amount of these were small and medium businesses which may not have any cyber security capability in place.</p><p>There were several regional airports, universities, some local councils and at least one small internet provider who were impacted by DDoS attacks.</p><p>However, there were three successful DDoS attacks on pieces of Australian critical infrastructure:</p><ul><li>Royal Adelaide Hospital — The largest hospital in Adelaide, South Australia.</li><li>Royal Children’s Hospital — The largest children’s hospital in Melbourne, Victoria.</li></ul><p>Both of these DDoS attacks saw the sites impacted for a limited time, but the fact they were impacted raises concerns.</p><p>The most significant attack was on:</p><ul><li>Port of Melbourne — The busiest port in not only Australia but also in Oceania — it handles one-third of Australian contain trade.</li></ul><p>The DDoS attack was conducted after-hours at night, but it does raise concerns. If the countries busiest port was to suffer a significant cyber-attack then it would quickly impact day-to-day living in Australia.</p><h4>Website Defacement</h4><p>The defacement attacks, which were largely successful, provided the groups involved in #OpAustralia the greatest opportunity to promote their cause. However, these attacks were almost exclusively against small and medium businesses despite the defacement message being directed to the Australian government.</p><p>Below is a sample of some of the posts:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*H9OVnT9ojuiY1XIL.jpeg" /><figcaption>Eagle Cyber website defacement post</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/748/1*_SUUHW_iWqvBcotcdef-yQ.png" /><figcaption>SynixCyberCrime website defacement post</figcaption></figure><h4>Attempted Doxxing:</h4><p>One of the lesser active groups involved in #OpAustralia attempted to dox (the act of publishing private information of an individual) two high-profile Australian Defence Personnel. The result appeared to be a mix of highly generic details and publicly known information, however, the intent behind the attempts highlights an ingrained appetite to expose or threaten those who make high-level decisions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/959/0*GRDBV_BRdG-Gya--.png" /><figcaption>Blackshinchan attempted dox of Australian Defence Official</figcaption></figure><p>I have redacted some information, while it is not private information and has been scraped from open sources I don’t think providing all the details value adds. The redacted version provides enough insight into the intent of the group.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*aJwR9ORvusNARRsD.png" /><figcaption>Blackshinchan attempted dox of Australian Defence Official</figcaption></figure><p>The second attempt was even more generic and leveraged information not even related to the alleged dox target.</p><p><em>Note: This group appears to attempt a large amount of dox attacks, these are not isolated to these two individuals.</em></p><h4>Claimed Breach and Leak Attacks</h4><p>There were at least five reported breach and leak attacks (when a threat actor gets access to data and leaks it without seeking a financial payment). Of the five alleged all appeared fake, using documents, in particular PDFs that can be found with a simple google search. The most high-profile of these was the alleged Australian Councils leak — which turned out to be a series of public PDFs.</p><p>Below is the alleged leaked data:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/604/0*OwpvlzrwGup9Y3wd.png" /><figcaption>Alleged breached data of an Australian government organization</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see these are a series of PDF documents.</p><p>A very quick search on the Australian Councils website for ‘Harradine Report’ and it is confirmed that:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*LsNA70orsUzrjcix.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://australiacouncil.gov.au/about-us/corporate-documents/disclosures/harradine-reports/">https://australiacouncil.gov.au/about-us/corporate-documents/disclosures/harradine-reports/</a></figcaption></figure><p>The reports are publicly disclosed every six months.</p><p>One of the interesting leaks was the alleged leak of student data from the University of Western Australia — which actually turned out to be data that was part of a project run by the university.</p><p>This is the data that was claimed to be exposed data ( I have still redacted usernames)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/883/0*zZkvqIvmwS_xQi1c.png" /><figcaption>Alleged University of Western Australia data</figcaption></figure><p>This is a screenshot of the project from the University:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*zuJ0kgfAb1T6LiAu.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://teaching.csse.uwa.edu.au/units/CITS1402/projects/">https://teaching.csse.uwa.edu.au/units/CITS1402/projects/</a></figcaption></figure><p>What does this tell us? It tells us that these were not legitimate data breaches. What it also tells us is that hacktivists out there have been motivated enough to collect this open source data and package it. Highlighting an intent to inflict damage and impact the day-to-day lives of Australians.</p><h4>Confirmed Unsuccessful Attacks:</h4><p>Some of the attacks were easier than others to confirm unsuccessful, these were often when a ddos or defacement attack was attempted against a piece of hardened Australian infrastructure such as the following:</p><ul><li>Australian Department of Defence — Attempted DDoS.</li><li>Australian Department of Health — Attempted DDoS.</li><li>Police Federation of Australia — Attempted DDoS.</li><li>news.com.au — Attempted DDoS.</li><li>magohsc.sa.gov.au — Attempted DDoS.</li><li>directory.gov.au — Attempted DDoS.</li></ul><p><em>Note: It can be difficult to confirm or deny DDoS attacks without getting confirmation from the targeted organization as the site can be down for different time lengths. However, I was able to monitor these sites during the alleged attacks and from what I saw the sites were not impacted.</em></p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>Intent drives capability and it will always lead to opportunities. The #OpAustralia campaign was a mix of successful attacks on small/medium businesses and unsuccessful or fake attacks against more high-profile targets. This campaign had limited day-to-day impacts on Australia, but it does showcase that under the right conditions we can be a target by highly motivated threat groups.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3c09e5380a21" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Killnet 2023 ORBAT]]></title>
            <link>https://cyberknow.medium.com/killnet-2023-orbat-a9584d5c6e66?source=rss-34a7437bc1aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a9584d5c6e66</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia-ukraine-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[killnet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyberknow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Mar 2023 11:23:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-08T11:23:05.469Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The most infamous Russian Hacktivist group’s operational structure</p><h4>TL:DR:</h4><ul><li>Killnet has grown their umbrella organization considerably since March 2022.</li><li>Killnet continues to rally new groups to their large scale campaigns, such as the targeting of Germany and NATO in recent months.</li><li>Killnet and its creator Killmilk continue to have success in impacting the information space of the Russia-Ukraine War.</li><li>Killnet has rallied at least 22 groups to join in various campaigns, highlighting their growing influence and reputation.</li><li>Killnet is a good example of why Intent needs to be a factor for consideration when monitoring threats in cyberspace.</li><li>Killnet will continue to grow as an organization with the likeness of increased and more dangerous capabilities a growing possibility in 2023.</li></ul><h4>Background:</h4><p>For those not aware of my work I have been monitoring and reporting on the cyber landscape of the Russia-Ukraine War since the start of the large-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. The main product for this is the cybertracker, which continues to provide insights into the scale of cyber activity of all levels. While many speculated that we would have large scale ‘cyber-war’ what we have instead seen is large volumes of hacktivist activity from both pro-Russian and pro-Ukraine groups who leverage DDoS, Defacement, Doxing, ransomware and breach and leak attacks to not only inflict cyber damage but also to manipulate the information space.</p><p>No greater example of this is Killnet, the now infamous pro-Russian hacktivist group who has caused trouble across North America and Europe since February 2022 and continues to grow its network and improve capabilities. Killnet is driven by extremely high intent and with that they are leveraging opportunities without arguably high capabilities.</p><p>They are an excellent example of the risk the re-emergence of hacktivism poses to organizations globally, considering we now live in an ‘as-a-service’ world, if a group is motivated and has high intent they will either find opportunities with the capability they have, or simply purchase what they need.</p><p>The Russia-Ukraine war has now shifted the threat landscape for both hacktivist cyber activity and norms and also information operations.</p><h4>Killnet ORBAT:</h4><p>Below I have provided the most comprehensive ORBAT (order of battle) that I have been able to create from monitoring Killnet for over a year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qftw28k5M3EKsKCxmd638g.png" /><figcaption>Killnet ORBAT 2023 — Cyberknow</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see it is vast and shows that despite Killnets perceived reputation as a bunch of ‘skids’ they are well organized and have a decent structure. Some key takeaways:</p><ul><li>Killnet has its own crypto-exchange, this likely helps them fund ongoing operations — they were originally a financially motivated group.</li><li>Killnet has its own forum — Infinity Forum which was created by Killmilk with support from Deanon and possibly Solaris Forum.</li><li>Killnet had a small organization last year with Legion and its ‘special forces’ groups, most of which are now shut-down.</li><li>Killnet now has active groups who are all capable on their own, such as Anonymous Russia and Phoenix. It is worth noting that all the active groups will conduct operations independent of Killnet as well as in support of them.</li><li>Killnet also has huge influence over other pro-Russian groups, this was most noted with the #RIPGermany campaign that saw 22 separate groups join Killnets attacks on German networks.</li><li>Killnet continues to grow in size and support and it is likely this will continue into 2023 as they no doubt have created a strong reputation. In Russian media they conduct interviews and are praised across many Russian media outlets and Telegram groups.</li><li>Killnet continues to use DDoS as its main weapon and this is also true of its many groups, however deface, dox with an interest in ransomware and breach and leak attacks are increasing.</li><li>I am sure I have missed something with my ORBAT, as Killnet sees my work I am sure they will correct any mistakes.</li></ul><p>If you have anything to contribute to this ORBAT or further insights on Killnet or any hacktivist group pro-Ukraine or Russian please reach out.</p><p>I am just one crazy Australian doing this in my spare time.</p><p>For continued updates: <a href="https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20">https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a9584d5c6e66" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Update 22. 2023 Russia-Ukraine War — Cybertracker. February 20.]]></title>
            <link>https://cyberknow.medium.com/update-22-2023-russia-ukraine-war-cybertracker-february-20-ee1162c67c67?source=rss-34a7437bc1aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ee1162c67c67</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia-ukraine-war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyberknow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Feb 2023 10:28:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-20T10:28:23.403Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Update 22. 2023 Russia-Ukraine War — Cybertracker. February 20.</h3><p>This is the first cybertracker for 2023. I have held off posting as there was a stagnant period across the holidays, but now with a considerable uptick mostly from pro-Russian groups I felt it was time to release an update.</p><p>For this addition I am sharing two different versions, hoping one is at least easy to use for those that need it.</p><p>It is becoming increasing harder to continue the cybertracker, I have been releasing these for almost a year and it seems there is no decrease in groups.</p><p>You will see a huge increase in Pro-Russian groups, this is mostly due to Killnets recent Germany campaign which is resulted in 16 groups joining the attacks. There has also been a reduction in activity by groups related to the #OpRussia, with many groups shifting to Iran and other locations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*fufitmklCwNF3E35.png" /><figcaption>Cybertracker 22. Russia-Ukraine War. Cyberknow 2023</figcaption></figure><p>Cybertracker 22. Russia-Ukraine War. Cyberknow 2023</p><p>I have also included the older version of the cybertracker:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xJknDoOZ16PyM7734xn9SQ.png" /><figcaption>Cybertracker 22. Russia-Ukraine War. Cyberknow 2023</figcaption></figure><p>Cybertracker 22. Russia-Ukraine War. Cyberknow 2023</p><p>If you do find this useful, please let me know as it would be great to hear of it benefiting the community.</p><p>For updates: <a href="https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20">https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ee1162c67c67" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Update 21. 2022 Russia-Ukraine War — Cyber Group Tracker. December 19]]></title>
            <link>https://cyberknow.medium.com/update-21-2022-russia-ukraine-war-cyber-group-tracker-december-19-24c61f3349e3?source=rss-34a7437bc1aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/24c61f3349e3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia-ukraine-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyberknow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2022 11:32:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-19T11:32:51.765Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Update 21. 2022 Russia-Ukraine War — Cyber Group Tracker. December 19</h3><p>All groups tracked since February 2022</p><p>As we approach the end of the year I felt it would be worth providing an overview of all the groups I have tracked that have been engaged in some capacity in the Russia-Ukraine war in cyberspace.</p><p>You may have noticed i refuse to use the term ‘cyber-war’ as I do not think this is what we are seeing, instead we are seeing supportive operations in cyberspace which as a subset of information warfare is not new. It is however fascinating and as far as I am aware this is the most comprehensive and complete list ever collated of groups engaged in a war zone.</p><p>Below is what I have seen since February 2022 and includes 201 groups in total.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mrokV6pvzJ0hRGaScU_o2A.png" /><figcaption>December 19 Russia-Ukraine CyberTracker — Cyberknow.</figcaption></figure><p>December 19 Russia-Ukraine CyberTracker — Cyberknow.</p><p>A Caveat: These are only the groups that I have tracked since February, my key metric is intent, it would be almost impossible to verify every group on this list as to their credibility for claimed attacks, however measuring intent gives an idea of just how congested and contested the battle space is.</p><p>Some insights:</p><ul><li>Ukraine has had the largest amount of support, the majority of this was early on in the war — mostly from groups who have now moved to other causes, such as Iran.</li><li>Russia has seen the largest increase of support later in the war.</li><li>The majority of groups use Twitter and this is mostly used by Pro-Ukraine groups. Most Pro-Russian groups use Telegram, Telegram is also used by the main hacktivist groups that support Ukraine.</li></ul><p>If you use my work or find it interesting please provide a shout-out it would be greatly appreciated.</p><p>For real-time updates:</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20">https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=24c61f3349e3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Update 20. 2022 Russia-Ukraine War — Cyber Group Tracker. November 28.]]></title>
            <link>https://cyberknow.medium.com/update-20-2022-russia-ukraine-war-cyber-group-tracker-november-28-3400878e8cc5?source=rss-34a7437bc1aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3400878e8cc5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybertracker]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia-ukraine-war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyberknow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2022 11:45:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-28T11:45:17.018Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Update 20. 2022 Russia-Ukraine War — Cyber Group Tracker. November 28.</h3><p>My apologies, this update was delayed.</p><p>Here we are, it is November 2022 and this is the 20th cybertracker, not something I expected when I started putting them together.</p><p>It’s a lot of work but feedback tells me it is valuable to a wide-range of people so It is worth maintaining.</p><p>In this edition there were a few changes but nothing significant, it appears many Anonymous related groups really have shifted to other areas of focus such as Iran, which has been a growing trend.</p><p>It also appears the communications of choice has shifted to Telegram, which is a favorite of groups near the geological theater of war.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zprQ9OyNUZ048y6EMz8NAQ.png" /><figcaption>November 28 Russia-Ukraine CyberTracker — Cyberknow.</figcaption></figure><p>From here I will aim to create an 2022 cybertracker, which will have all the groups regardless of activity levels to showcase the amount that have been involved in some capacity.</p><p>For real time updates: <a href="https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20">https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3400878e8cc5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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