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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Hamzadz38 on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Hamzadz38 on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@dahel792?source=rss-1950d3df74d2------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Hamzadz38 on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dahel792?source=rss-1950d3df74d2------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:36:46 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I Found an Application Resurrection Vulnerability (Deletion Bypass)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dahel792/how-i-found-an-application-resurrection-vulnerability-deletion-bypass-10188cc6696b?source=rss-1950d3df74d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/10188cc6696b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hamzadz38]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2026 11:14:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-22T11:14:05.011Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>How I Found an Application Resurrection Vulnerability (Deletion Bypass)</strong></p><p>When testing access control and state management in web applications, common logic flaws often hide in lifecycle transitions. Specifically: <strong>what happens to downstream permissions and pending API requests when an object is deleted?</strong></p><p>In this article, I’ll walk through a state-validation bypass I discovered in TARGET ’s application management backend that allowed lower-level administrators to resurrect previously deleted applications by replaying stale modification requests.</p><h3>The Flaw at a Glance</h3><p>When an organization administrator deletes an application, the frontend UI removes the application, rendering it inaccessible via standard navigation.</p><p>However, the backend API endpoint responsible for editing application metadata (/account/&lt;ACCOUNT_ID&gt;/app/&lt;APP_ID&gt;) verified user authorization without checking the target application&#39;s active lifecycle state. As a result, replaying a captured POST/PUT edit request would succeed, restoration of access would occur, and the deleted application would effectively be <strong>resurrected</strong>.</p><h3>The Attack Scenario</h3><p>This vulnerability introduces a business logic inconsistency between organization-level privileges and application-level permissions.</p><ul><li><strong>Account A:</strong> Organization Owner / Administrator</li><li><strong>Account B:</strong> Invited user granted the lower-level <strong>App Admin</strong> role</li></ul><pre>[Account A] Deletes Application  ---&gt; Application marked deleted in UI<br>                                                    |<br>[Account B] Replays Old Request  -------------------&gt; Backend accepts state edit<br>                                                    |<br>[Result] Application Restored   &lt;--- Application resurrected in DB/UI</pre><h3>Step-by-Step Reproduction</h3><ul><li><strong>Setup Roles:</strong> Account A creates an organization and an application, inviting Account B as an <strong>App Admin</strong>.</li><li><strong>Capture Baseline Request:</strong> Account B modifies the application name in the UI, capturing the legitimate HTTP edit request in Burp Suite, and forwards it to <strong>Repeater</strong>.</li><li><strong>Execute Deletion:</strong> Account A (Organization Owner) deletes the application from the dashboard.</li><li><strong>Verify Deletion State:</strong> Account A and B confirm the application is gone. Navigating to the direct URL yields an error:</li><li>Could not obtain App data because of a technical problem. Please contact support.</li><li><strong>Replay &amp; Resurrect:</strong> Account B goes to Burp Repeater and replays the previously captured edit request against the deleted &lt;APP_ID&gt;.</li></ul><h3>Key Findings &amp; HTTP Response</h3><p>Upon replaying the request, the backend failed to return a 404 Not Found or 410 Gone error. Instead, it responded with 200 OK and returned the application payload:</p><p>JSON</p><pre>HTTP/1.1 200 OK<br>Content-Type: application/json</pre><pre>{<br>  &quot;app_id&quot;: &quot;12345&quot;,<br>  &quot;name&quot;: &quot;Resurrected_App_Name&quot;,<br>  &quot;created_at&quot;: &quot;2026-08-15T04:26:00Z&quot;,<br>  &quot;status&quot;: &quot;active&quot;<br>}</pre><p>Refreshing the UI showed that the application had been restored into an operational state, allowing Account B to effectively override the deletion enforced by the Organization Owner.</p><h3>Root Cause &amp; Remediation</h3><ul><li><strong>Root Cause:</strong> The backend authorization layer checked whether Account B had rights to modify the application, but lacked a secondary check ensuring the resource wasn’t soft-deleted or marked inactive.</li><li><strong>Fix:</strong> Ensure backend endpoints enforce strict state validation before applying updates:</li><li>IF application.is_deleted == True: RETURN 404_NOT_FOUND</li></ul><h3>Disclosure Timeline</h3><ul><li><strong>Aug 15, 2026:</strong> Vulnerability identified and reported with PoC video.</li><li><strong>Aug 15, 2026:</strong> Additional impact escalated (deletion bypass / state resurrection).</li><li><strong>Aug 16, 2026:</strong> Support responded marking the report as a duplicate of a previously known issue.</li></ul><p><em>Even though the report was marked as a duplicate, highlighting logic flaws like resource resurrection serves as a useful reminder: </em><strong><em>always validate object states alongside user permissions on every API request.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=10188cc6696b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ I Revoked a Role… and Accidentally Killed the User’s Account ]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dahel792/i-revoked-a-role-and-accidentally-killed-the-users-account-67bbe754ade5?source=rss-1950d3df74d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/67bbe754ade5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hamzadz38]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2026 10:21:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-22T10:21:06.444Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>🐞 <strong>Bug Bounty Story: “I Only Revoked Your Role… Why Did Your Account Die?” 😂</strong></p><p>While testing a SaaS application with two accounts, I found an interesting authorization/business-logic issue.</p><p>The setup was simple:</p><p>👤 <strong>Account A</strong> → Organization admin<br>👤 <strong>Account B</strong> → Invited organization member</p><p>Account A invited B to the organization and assigned a role.</p><p>So far, everything worked as expected.</p><p>Then A revoked B’s organization role.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6sKOUk8yi0HwmXN0WuPegQ.png" /></figure><p>i can remove the user normal from accessing the org but what i did just revoke his role and the user revoked from org</p><p>I expected:</p><blockquote><em>❌ B loses access to A’s organization.</em></blockquote><p>Instead:</p><blockquote><em>💀 B got logged out… and couldn’t log back into B’s own account.</em></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/547/1*_kGutlwvmXOpk-nDkrzLPQ.png" /></figure><p>That was the interesting part.</p><p>An organization administrator should normally control <strong>access to their organization</strong>, not whether another user’s independent account can authenticate.</p><h3>🧠 Lesson</h3><p>This wasn’t about SQLi, XSS, or some fancy payload.</p><p>It was about <strong>trust boundaries and business logic</strong>.</p><p>When testing SaaS applications, always ask:</p><blockquote><em>“What exactly should this permission control?”</em></blockquote><p>And then test what happens when that permission is <strong>granted → revoked → changed</strong>.</p><p>Sometimes the most interesting bugs are hiding in the boring-looking buttons. 😄</p><p>🔐 <strong>Bug class:</strong> Improper authorization / account lifecycle logic<br>🎯 <strong>Impact:</strong> Organization admin could cause another user’s independent account to become inaccessible</p><p>Always test with accounts you control and stay within the program’s scope.</p><p>#BugBounty #WebSecurity #CyberSecurity #AppSec #Pentesting #BugHunting #SaaS #BusinessLogic #WebHacking</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=67bbe754ade5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ How I Found a Stored HTML Injection !]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dahel792/how-i-found-a-stored-html-injection-327ae7224d27?source=rss-1950d3df74d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/327ae7224d27</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hamzadz38]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Jan 2026 18:32:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-19T18:32:52.917Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>🚀 How I Found a Stored HTML Injection !</h3><p>Hello everyone! this my first write up . And, I want to share a quick story about how I found a <strong>Stored HTML Injection</strong> leading to <strong>Open Redirect</strong></p><p>The best part? This was a simple but effective bug that allowed me to redirect users to any malicious site just by sending a chat message! 💸</p><h3>🧐 What is HTML Injection?</h3><p>For those who don’t know, <strong>HTML Injection</strong> occurs when an application doesn’t properly “clean” (sanitize) the input you send. This means you can inject your own HTML code, and the website will render it as if it belongs there!</p><p>I was exploring the target section when I noticed the “Personal Meeting Room” chat. I wondered: <em>“What happens if I send a link instead of a message?”</em></p><ol><li>I created two accounts — one for the <strong>Attacker</strong> and one for the <strong>Victim</strong>.</li><li>From my attacker account, I navigated to the inbox and sent this simple payload:</li></ol><p>&lt;a href=&quot;https://evil.com&quot;&gt;evil&lt;/a&gt;</p><p>I logged into the victim account and opened the inbox. Instead of seeing the raw code, I saw a professional-looking link!</p><p>Once clicked, the victim was instantly redirected to evil.com. <strong>Boom!</strong> Stored HTML Injection. 💥</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QWvG7Mgilpcgmu7jO7BlHg.png" /></figure><h3>⚠️ The Impact</h3><p>This isn’t just a “broken link.” Because it is <strong>Stored</strong>, the malicious link stays in the chat history. An attacker could:</p><ul><li><strong>Phishing:</strong> Redirect users to a fake login page to steal passwords.</li></ul><h3>💡 Lessons Learned</h3><p>Always check the chat features! Developers often forget to encode HTML tags in private messages or meeting rooms. A simple &lt;a&gt; tag can be the difference between a secure site and a phishing playground.</p><p><strong>Thanks for reading! If you enjoyed this write-up, don’t forget to clap 👏 and follow for more bug bounty stories!</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=327ae7224d27" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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