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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Dan Bounds on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Dan Bounds on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@danbounds92?source=rss-c3cc63431948------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Dan Bounds on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@danbounds92?source=rss-c3cc63431948------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[How does Sartre metaphysically account for our freedom?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@danbounds92/how-does-sartre-metaphysically-account-for-our-freedom-855135f2f163?source=rss-c3cc63431948------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[existentialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jean-paul-sartre]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dan Bounds]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2017 16:45:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-30T16:45:58.243Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For Sartre, what is described as an action is always an act of consciousness. So to understand the nature of action, an analysis of the nature of consciousness is required. For consciousness, “existence precedes essence”<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>, meaning that we are not constrained by an essence and the creation of one is entirely down to us. What is also distinctive about consciousness its intentional nature i.e consciousness is always consciousness <em>of</em> something else which is external to consciousness. This is what Sartre means when he says that consciousness is “a being such that in it’s being, its being is in question in so far as this implies a being other than itself”<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>. The fundamental attitude that consciousness takes towards the world is negative — it is a ‘not’. Sartre makes a distinction between the ‘in-itself’ and the ‘for-itself’. The for-itself refers to this non-being which is consciousness and such as it is constituted is absolutely free. The in-itself refers to any entity that has being in and of itself, in other words things that we are conscious of but are separate from consciousness i.e trees, buildings, the sky and even, Sartre claims, other people. Sartre uses this ontological duality to refute a deterministic denial of human freedom. What past philosophers have misunderstood, according to Sartre, is that the argument that a secession of causal events produces an act of consciousness stands only if you assume that the two event possess the same mode of being as each other. Sartre appears to allude to a philosophical axiom first advocated by Parmenides ‘<em>ex nihilo nihil fit’</em> — that non-being cannot produce being and similarly being (the causal events) cannot produce non-being (consciousness). One problem if we are to accept this however is that how do we account for the nature of action? If consciousness is pure negativity how can it have any effects in a world that world that is constituted by positivity? According to Sartre the structure of action is always as a negative — this is because it an attempt to negate the world as it is (the in-itself). One problem that may make actions appear unfree is the problem of motivations. Motivations and reasons appear to pull our decisions in one direction or other. Sartre deals with this problem by dividing consciousness up into pre-reflective consciousness and the deliberative consciousness. For Sartre the actual choice takes place on the plane of pre-reflective, or primordial, consciousness. It is only after a fundamental project has already been chosen that the idea of deliberation comes in or is even made sense of. Sartre says “causes and motives have only the weight which my project-i.e., the free production of the end and of the known act to be realized confers upon them… and if I am brought to the point of deliberating, this is simply because it is a part of my original project to realize motives by means of deliberation rather than by some other form of discovery”<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> J.P Sartre, <em>Existentialism is a Humanism</em>, (Methuen Publishing Ltd 2007), p.29</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> J.P Sartre, <em>Being and Nothingness</em>, (Module reader), p.109</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a>Ibid, pp.450–451</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=855135f2f163" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How does Merleau-Ponty’s conception of freedom differs from Sartre’s?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@danbounds92/how-does-merleau-pontys-conception-of-freedom-differs-from-sartre-s-23848f526810?source=rss-c3cc63431948------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[existentialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[merleau-ponty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jean-paul-sartre]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freedom]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dan Bounds]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2017 16:34:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-30T16:34:05.415Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For Jean-Paul Sartre, freedom is something that is unconditional and something which we possess absolutely. Consciousness is free because it exists totally outside the in-itself. For Sartre, we are free because we are free to choose our projects to pursue. This does not mean however that is it always within our power to accomplish projects to which we set ourselves (freedom/power distinction). On this view things that make an appearance in the world as obstacles to freedom are only obstacles have been given the meaning of obstacles in light of a chosen project. For example mountains only appear as unclimbable if we have taken up the initial project to climb it. Merleau-Ponty agrees with Sartre on this fundamental ability of humans to give meaning to the world (<em>sinngebung</em>). However Merleau-Ponty points out that Sartre only entertains the centrifugal aspects of <em>sinngebung </em>and not the centripetal aspects of it. In other words we emanate meanings but then the meanings are echoed back at us in the world. To take up the example of climbing a mountain again Merleau-Ponty says “<em>whether or not I decide to climb them, the mountains appear high to me, because they exceed my body’s power to take them in its stride…Underlying myself as a thinking subject there is therefore, as it were a natural self which does not budge from its terrestrial situation..what is more, my projects as a thinking being are clearly modelled on the latter.”</em><a href="#_ftn1"><strong><em>[1]</em></strong></a> So it is true that the mountain is seen as unclimbable because I have taken up a particular project in relation to it but the meaning that the mountain has within my project depends on a relationship we have taken up with in mountain that has already been pre-established independently of that project. That pre-established relationship is based on my experience as a lived body. Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Sartre goes right to the heart of his rejection of Sartrean transcendentalism, i.e the rejection of the in-itself/for itself distinction, and his belief in worldly immanence — of our being-in-the world as a body. Sartre’s concept of freedom leads to a kind of radical individualism whereby projects are only chosen by individuals and group projects become an impossibility. Merleau-Ponty struggles to reconcile this with his Marxism as it appears to negate the possibility of class solidarity. Merleau-Ponty at this point appear to draw upon another Heideggerian concept as a weapon against Sartre, which is that of ‘thrownness’ (<em>geworfenheit)</em> — <em>“I exist in order to experience my life as full of difficulties and constraints — I do not chose so to experience it.”</em><a href="#_ftn2"><strong><em>[2]</em></strong></a> We find ourselves cast into a world with a nexus of meaning which we did not chose, and therefore we can find ourselves, because of our social situation, engaged in a group project with others. Class is one such project which is not an objective structure of the world. According to Merleau-Ponty “<em>class is coming into being</em>”.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> M.Merleau-Ponty, <em>Phenomenology of Perception</em>, (Module Reader), p.188</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Ibid, p. 191</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Ibid.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=23848f526810" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How does Heidegger contrast his own view of truth to the conventional view of truth?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@danbounds92/how-does-heidegger-contrast-himself-to-the-conventional-view-of-truth-5035eab8abe2?source=rss-c3cc63431948------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dan Bounds]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Nov 2017 10:00:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-03T10:01:39.975Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How does Heidegger contrast his own view of truth to the conventional view of truth?</p><p>Throughout the history of philosophy a general thought has been accepted, Aristotelian in it’s origin, that what bears truth in the world is our language. A person can utter a proposition made up of various linguistic items, each with their own referentiality that can be said to in some sense line up with what is actually the case in the world (which would make them true) or they do not line up (in which case they would be false).</p><p>Heidegger criticizes this traditional conception of truth. For Heidegger “<em>to say that a statement is true means that it discovers the being in itself. It asserts, it lets beings be seen “be seen” (apojansiz) in their discoveredness”</em><a href="#_ftn1"><strong><em>[1]</em></strong></a><em>. </em>In other words what is true is what has reveal or disclosed itself to <em>Dasein</em>.</p><p>Heidegger decides to take the unusual approach (although consistent with his philosophy) that the traditional conception as truth as judgement agreeing with object is not entirely false. Heidegger is reluctant to perform an annihilation of a millennia-old philosophical traditional — he says “must we not pay for this dubious gain by letting the good old tradition fall into nothingness?”<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>. His answer is no. He is certainly not content with mere definitional victories. Philosophers of the past have been dealing with a conception of truth which is not necessarily false but is of a derivative nature from what Heidegger calls the ‘primordial phenomena of truth’. Part of this explanation traces the genealogy of truth as ‘agreement’ back to Aristotle. Aristotle identifies the <em>logos</em> (logoz) with<em> apophansis </em>(<em> apophansis)</em> (a propositional statement) that is the “aletheia (truth) in the manner of a apophainesthai (bringing to light)”<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a>. This is a somewhat etymological problem with the greek word <em>alethia</em>, which is often translated as ‘truth’ but also means ‘disclosure’.<em> Logos</em> also has a primary derivative meaning — to make something manifest with discourse. A true proposition has the being of making manifest the beings that it refers to.</p><p>The ‘discoveredness’ of beings in the world by which they can be said to be true, is grounded in a world that has already been opened up by <em>Dasein</em>. <em>Dasein</em> is truth in its primordial form. But at the same time <em>Dasein</em> is “equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth”<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a>. What does it mean to say <em>Dasein</em> is also in the ‘untruth’? The duality of truth and falsity is a duality that exists only when we consider the propositional interpretation of truth, however on the primordial level, innerworldly beings cannot be false but can said to be “untrue” in the sense that they remain concealed. Heidegger talks about <em>Dasein</em> ‘falling prey to’ the world meaning that <em>Dasein </em>becomes so absorbed in the world that no longer becomes fully accessible to it. Heidegger talks about how absorption into the ‘they’, the ‘public way of interpreting’ is one of ways that truth can be distorted.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> M.Heidegger, <em>Being and Time</em>, (Module reader ), p.62</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Ibid</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Ibid</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Ibid p.63</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5035eab8abe2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Explain Dasein’s everyday interactions with the world]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@danbounds92/explain-daseins-everyday-interactions-with-the-world-6d93f420a997?source=rss-c3cc63431948------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6d93f420a997</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dan Bounds]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Nov 2017 15:48:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-02T15:48:24.662Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Explain Dasein’s everyday interactions with the world</p><p>For Martin Heidegger part of our everyday occupancy of the world in which we find ourselves consists in exhibiting a particular approach to the “inner-worldly” objects in which we encounter. Heidegger suggests that the objects have “pre-thematic being” — they have not yet been encountered as objects of theoretical cognition (as is required for the scientific enterprise). Heidegger describes this interaction that <em>Dasein</em> has with things in the world as a “taking care of” — the world is considered as being there for us. Heidegger famously uses the example of a hammer “hammering with a hammer” he says “neither grasps these beings thematically as occurring things, nor does such using even know the structure of useful things as such. Hammering does not just have knowledge of the useful character rather it has appropriated the utensil in the most adequate way”<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>. This illustrates that it is not that the hammer is seen as useful on the basis of the ‘ontic’ properties i.e it’s design or molecular structure, but derives it’s being from being ‘ready-to-hand’ for us to use. Tools like hammers though for Heidegger have a context of significance from which the ‘handiness’ (<em>Zuhandenheit</em>) is derived from. For example the utility of the hammer is dependent on the utility of the nail, in which it hammers, and also the plank on wood which the nail is being hammered into etc and all of this form an ‘equipmental whole’.</p><p>However the nexus of significance can break down sometimes. There are two ways in which this can happen. One is that there is a problem with a piece of equipment — either it breaks or it simply absent. This is what Heidegger refers to as obtrusiveness. Secondly there are certain objects or events that occur in the world which “gets in the way” of <em>Dasein’</em>s taking care of things. For example a thunderstorm might strike whilst I am in the process of building a shed and this ‘unhandy’ event forces me to abandon my activity. Heidegger calls these occasions ‘obstinate’. In both obtrusive and obstinate cases items that were once handy can become unhandy and that causes the items that we were involved with to become conspicuous to us. According to Heidegger; “Conspicuousness presents the thing at hand with a certain unhandiness. But this implies that what is unusual just lies there; shows itself as the thing of use that has this or that appearance and which is always also objectively present which this or that outward appearance in its handiness.”<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> What Heidegger calls ‘objective presence’ is possible when one steps out Dasein’s primordial way of interacting with the world. The hammer then becomes thematised, and we notice aspects of the hammer, for example the material, the shape, which were noticeable to us when we had engaged with the hammer initially. Heidegger however warns that the theoretical objective presence or ‘present-at-hand’ is not an alternate way of seeing to the world being ‘ready-to –hand. He says “The character of objective presence making itself something known is bound to the handiness of useful things”<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> M.Heidegger, <em>Being and Time </em>(Module reader), p.40</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Ibid p.42</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Ibid</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6d93f420a997" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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