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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Daniel Conrad on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Daniel Conrad on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Daniel Conrad on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Speech, by Scott Deatherage]]></title>
            <link>https://danielconrad.medium.com/the-speech-by-scott-deatherage-3b84ee792b32?source=rss-3bf8f36913aa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[debate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[advice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy-debates]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Conrad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Jan 2021 01:45:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-26T01:45:37.171Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>discoveries from a dusty Drive folder</h4><p>High school debate made a great impact on my life. I spent a lot of time talking about debate with other students across the country on the Cross-X forums, which are unfortunately dead. One of the most useful things shared on that forum was Scott Deatherage’s lecture, The Speech.</p><p>I never knew Scott Deatherage, the legendary debate coach for Northwestern University who <a href="https://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2009/12/deatherage.html">died before his time</a> in 2009. But I knew his speech, and I revisited it before every tournament my senior year. You can <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WwAFviyyv0M">watch</a> the hourlong lecture on YouTube, but recently I found the notes I wrote when I watched the video myself. These notes are no substitute for the viewing experience, but they helped me remind myself of what’s strategically important in debate. I hope they can help today’s debaters too.</p><h3><strong>The Speech — Scott Deatherage</strong></h3><p>Your success isn’t on how many debate tournaments you win. Championship is based on four pillars of greatness: <em>Character, Commitment, Teamwork, </em>and<em> Hard Work.</em></p><p>This is what distinguishes best debate teams from their competitors. There is a process of great rebutting — thirteen steps.</p><h4>(1) Choose.</h4><p>The first, most essential part of effective rebutting is to <strong>choose. </strong>Doesn’t matter if it’s the K, a Politics DA, case, CP — you must be able to choose which are the best and strongest point to make you the champion. Consider your alternatives — different ways of considering how you can win the debate in the 2NR. Choose, for the judge, the best road to conclude for the negative or the affirmative. Do not convince the judge of a lot of <em>nothing,</em> but of a <em>little</em> of a <em>lot.</em> Extending every position will not make you win.</p><h4><strong>(2) Offense, offense, offense.</strong></h4><p>Don’t ask — argue. Defensive argumentation, to “fend off” what the other side brings — there is no such thing. <strong>Anticipate </strong>your opponent’s warrants and<strong> </strong>undermine their credibility, <em>before your opponent develops an explanation.</em> This is key.<strong> Anticipate your opponent’s warrants.</strong> 1NCs are always full of brief cards, few internal links, generic Ks, bare counterplans — your 2AC must not only <em>wonder</em> what the relationships of these arguments are, but <em>anticipate</em> the negative block and <em>undermine</em> the arguments before the negative gets to develop in the first instance.</p><p>(On the high school healthcare topic): Against the politics DA, a typical 2AC would say “what is the link between health care and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?” Instead, say “<strong>no link — </strong>CTBT will be decided on the bases of relations with India and China, and <em>health care is completely irrelevant </em>to the calculation of what the Senate thinks about nuclear testing.”</p><h4><strong>(3) Clash.</strong></h4><p>Clash lets the judge reach a conclusion when they set side-by-side two alternatives of what the world should be. You offer this for their consideration — but they consider the <em>other</em> side with similar credibility. By what measure must they decide which team is right when there’s a “close call?” Almost <em>all</em> calls in debate are close calls — tons of gray areas with no black &amp; white. Argument resolution is successfully achieved by the team that best defines the <em>essential difference</em> on the <strong>nexus question</strong> — the tipping point of the debate, the singular question that comes before all other issues. That team is most likely to sway the panel.</p><p>Back to that Politics DA scenario — it sounds like the CTBT DA is now impossible to win right? Chinese-American relations aren’t relevant to healthcare. But the neg has no cards that say otherwise — what do they do about the nexus question here? How are the two related? A 2NC might say:</p><p>“In order to accomplish passage of the aff, Obama will have to face opposition from the Democrats even though they’re the majority in both the House &amp; the Senate — that means he has to pull all the stops to get the plan to get through — voting on the aff means they give up all the political capital necessary in the short term for all future political movements the president desires — he’s used it all up and now he has zero capacity to accomplish the CTBT.”</p><h4><strong>(4) It’s all about the link.</strong></h4><p>The debate is first and foremost a fight for control of the ground of the debate — it’s about framework and offensive arguments. For the aff — case arguments are offensive, performance criteria are offensive, framework is offensive. For neg — competitive counterplans, disads, and kritiks are offensive. Strengthen the link to your offensive argumentation as much as possible.</p><p>Judges are paid to work in a state of disbelief — don’t preach as if you’re gospel &amp; your opponents are nonsense; understand what you offer is something they seek to understand and know more about that they begin from a skeptical positioning. This goes for evidence or analytics, aff or neg. This skepticism typically starts at the first argument — the link. Cause &amp; effect need to be strongly established to even craft advantages in the first place — it’s not the impacts that matter, but the way you access them — the link stories.</p><p>Remember the way you first reacted to hearing a K or a DA — then realize that that’s the same way the judge will react. “Calling them impoverished makes them impoverished? But they were impoverished already before I started calling them that!” etc. etc. You’re gonna need the link wall, esp. in the negative block — tell a big story that weave the speeches together.</p><p>What if the aff reads thumpers on your political capital disad? You’ve got to still explain to the judge that the plan is the critical breaking point to the impact. <strong>Read more link arguments in the negative block with your generic arguments (like politics), even if the links are NOT challenged in the 2AC. </strong>Of course, this doesn’t apply when all they do is impact turn your argument and read no defense. But in any other circumstance — when the aff barely challenges the link card — don’t pretend the judge believes you, they just won’t. Politics DAs are dumb arguments and the judge knows that, so you have to hammer it home. Use specific warrants precisely.</p><p>Scratch the phrase “the affirmative talks about” from your vocabulary. Say “the Smith evidence says,” then say exactly what the evidence says. Use exact phrases to beat back their cards and warrants. It’s not “our evidence says …” it’s “our Jones evidence says, and I quote, ‘_____.’” As the aff, <strong>never</strong> let the neg get away with characterizing the plan with generic link arguments. Don’t let them tell the judge what the link arguments in the aff are.</p><h4><strong>(5) Control the framework of the debate.</strong></h4><p>In football, there are thousands of inches covered, but very few make the difference. In debate, the outcome of a good debate comes down to a single strategic decision or a particular tactical argument. To prove the advantages outweigh the disads, you must convince the judge to look at the impacts in a way that make your disadvantages win. If you’re wanting the DA to win, you want to highlight the magnitude over the probability analysis. <strong>This is key to almost every K debate. </strong>Who controls the rules for which team should be the one that governs decision-making criteria for the debate?</p><h4><strong>(6) Cover smart.</strong></h4><p>Debate at first may seem easy — you’re pretty smart, you read and get all these cards from your older debaters or some online resources, and you read your blocks — and maybe your material is better than the other team, or you speak faster. But then the other jerks on the other side figure out how to get better too — they speak quicker and they figure out how to deal with the block and now you’re knocked back.</p><p><strong>The outcome of the debate is about substantive questions, not technical ones. </strong>Technique will never trump substance in an ultimate sense. Learning how to do everything above means coverage will never hurt you. <em>It’s okay to be slow against a fast team</em> — you have to make argument choice and clash in a way that sheds light on the nexus question so that the judge can say “The aff won a lot of arguments, but the neg won the most important arguments,” or vice versa.</p><p>Form cannot substitute for substance — all your taglines can’t make up for a lack of meaning</p><h4><strong>(7) Make every argument count.</strong></h4><p>If you can’t visualize how any particular 1AC/1NC argument could be employed in the 2AR/2NR as a winning strategy, then don’t invest in it in the first place. Be aware that violating this limits your strategic arguments. The first speech isn’t a random collection of items and arguments. That’s not a strategy. In an effective strategy, all of your arguments are essential to the win. Every argument must end up being useful.</p><h4><strong>(8) Anticipate and know.</strong></h4><p>The best debaters know their opponent’s arguments better than their opponents do. Strategies are not generic at the top level. The more specific they are at the top level, the greater your odds of winning debates are. <em>Defend</em> what you have to say against what they want to say. Make specific references to exact phrases &amp; evidence. Effective strategies demand specifics based not on tricks but rather on depth of literature and differences between the two sides and what they advocate.</p><p>Understand that the better off you know your arguments, the better off you are against your opponents. <strong>Success is measured by what we have done to prepare for a competition.</strong></p><h4><strong>(9) Style and substance.</strong></h4><p>These are fundamentally inseparable. Aristotle said there is ethos, logos, and pathos: ethos is the credibility or believability of the argument, logos is the logic or reason of your argument and pathos is the evidence or support for your argument. Of these, Aristotle said ethos is most important.</p><p><strong>The judge has to want to vote for you.</strong> They have to know, hear, feel, <em>believe</em>. The judge is a person with real experiences — not an information processor — with knowledge, with interaction, with experience. In that regard, they bring a willingness to hear and listen to any angle or approach to the issues in the debate. They have to want to believe you.</p><p>Confidence is born in demonstrability — you can not fabricate confidence or wish it, you have to accomplish it.</p><h4><strong>(10) Narrate and judge the debate.</strong></h4><p>Write the ballot for the judge. Understand the other side’s strengths. Here’s a good drill: consider the last speeches, and explain why your <em>opponent </em>has won the debate. That gets you into the judge’s mind, and lets you see the debate as they must have to. Take the first 30 seconds of your prep in the last rebuttal and ask —<strong> if we were to lose this debate, why? </strong>Then prepare your rebuttal around the answer to that question.</p><h4><strong>(11) Teamwork.</strong></h4><p>Michael Jordan said that talent wins games, and that teamwork wins championships. The past is only important insofar as it <em>informs</em> future strategy, argument choice, and debates. Your partner and your elders have reasons as to why they do what they do — it is ultimately their choice to do what they do. One person has to make a call, and it may be your partner.</p><p>Respect both your teammates and your opponents.</p><h4><strong>(12) Prepare to win.</strong></h4><p>Preparing to win is starting your topic research as soon as you know the topic. Preparing to win is using your prep time effectively. Preparing to win is practicing and researching regularly. Be detail-oriented. Know your strengths and weaknesses — take advantage of the one and correct for the other.</p><p><strong>Prepare for each game as if it were your last.</strong></p><h4><strong>(13) Focus and concentration.</strong></h4><p>These are the keys, and they unlock the secrets to the fundamentals: choice, offense, clash, controlling ground of the debate. These skills let you overcome the most demanding obstacles — together they let you arise to the most challenging situation you can imagine. Single-mindedness wins.</p><h4><strong>In conclusion:</strong></h4><p>Greatness is not defined by a topic, trophy, or tournament — it’s defined by those four characteristics at the top. Three closing thoughts:</p><ol><li>“When I try to single out from the long line of students one group who will stand out as intellectually the best, the best in college work, the best in promise of future intellectual achievement. As much as I would like to do so I cannot draw the line around my own favorite students of philosophy, nor those of mathematics, biology, or other fields. Nor could I fairly award the palm to the accomplished students of Phi Beta Kappa. It seems to me that stronger than any other group in intellectual fiber, keener in intellectual interest, better equipped to do battle with the coming challenges, are the debaters. Those who band together with friends from other schools searching for the solutions to great challenges.” —Alexander Mickleback.</li><li>“Never be afraid of taking calculated risks in your own personal life. Be willing to work longer and harder at your craft than the next person. Never settle for being good at something when you can be great. Learn to be hard on yourself when you don’t quite give it your best, and easy on yourself when your best isn’t quite good enough. Know that feeling means only that you did not achieve your desired good, and the sooner as you take the word ‘can’t’ out of your vocabulary, the better.” — anonymous University of Northern Iowa graduate.</li><li>“I would do it all again. Not for any particular tournament or trophy, not for specifics of any topic, not even for the intellectual benefits that debate bestows upon its participants critical thinking, and so forth. I would do it all again for the chance to work with hardworking, dedicated, and committed students like those assembled in this room.” — Scott Deatherage.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3b84ee792b32" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Roger Scruton on Judging Beauty]]></title>
            <link>https://danielconrad.medium.com/roger-scruton-on-judging-beauty-9574db9cc844?source=rss-3bf8f36913aa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[roger-scruton]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aesthetics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[art]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[beauty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Conrad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 Nov 2019 17:15:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-11-13T00:22:04.254Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>aesthetics</h4><h4>Notes from his monograph “Beauty”</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/290/1*vO_ot3-brh_WxB84fxMR9g.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Beauty and value</h4><p>For Plato and Plotinus, “beauty is an ultimate value.” Like truth and goodness, it justifies rational judgments.</p><p>But can’t beauty be “the enemy of truth”? The attractive yet untrue myth or urban legend, for example. And immoral things are sometimes beautiful. Kierkegaard and Wilde chastised “the ‘aesthetic’ way of life” for its vice. At least it is unclear if beauty is an ultimate value.</p><p>Perhaps “beauty is a matter of appearance, not of being,” and “we are investigating the sentiments of people, rather than the deep structure of the world.”</p><p>(I don’t love this analysis. Let’s grant that truth, goodness and beauty are ultimate values. That doesn’t mean they need to be commensurable. Maybe they rule over their own domains: truth is binding on what we ought to believe, goodness is binding on what we ought to do and beauty is binding on what we ought to admire, in purely aesthetic terms. I can admire the beautiful lie without believing it.)</p><h4>“Platitudes”</h4><ol><li>Beauty pleases us.</li><li>One thing can be more beautiful than another.</li><li>Beauty is always a reason for attending to the thing that possesses it.</li><li>Beauty is the subject-matter of a judgment: the judgement of taste.</li><li>The judgment of taste is about the beautiful object, not about the subject’s state of mind. In describing an object as beautiful, I am describing it, not me.</li><li>Nevertheless, there are no second-hand judgments of beauty. There is no way that you can argue me into a judgment that I have not made for myself, nor can I become an expert in beauty, simply by studying what others have said about beautiful objects, and without experiencing and judging for myself.</li></ol><p>(This last one condenses the “autonomy” and “acquaintance” principles other aestheticists argue about.)</p><p>Beauty-judgments are supplemented with critical reasoning about the object we’re judging. We’re judging <em>it</em>, not ourselves; our judgments aren’t just us reporting how we feel, but they are statements — perhaps truth-apt ones — about the object.</p><p>(This is a similar view to those metaethicists who oppose non-cognitivism and emotivism in particular. The first lecture in C.S. Lewis’ <em>The Abolition of Man</em> and Alasdair MacIntyre’s <em>After Virtue</em> strongly argue the point.)</p><h4>Minimal beauty and some consequences</h4><p>“There is an aesthetic minimalism exemplified by laying the table, tidying your room, designing a web-site.” They can “look right” and “not by pleasing the eye only, but by conveying meanings and values which have weight for you and which you are consciously putting on display,” which Scruton interestingly characterizes as “the way that beauty generally matters.”</p><p>Minimal beauties enhance magnificent beauties, the experience of which can be hampered by unbeautiful surroundings. Scruton variously calls it neighborliness, appropriateness, soothing, harmonious, unpretentious, nice, tasteful, fittingness, continuousness, civility, humility… it all concerns what I’d call “presentation.”</p><p>“Too much attention to beauty might defeat its own object. … If you want to stand out, then you have to be worthy of the attention that you claim.” Not everything can be a masterpiece: they would be “jostling for attention side by side, would lose their distinctiveness, and the beauty of each of them would be at war with the beauty of the rest.” In a way, scarcity is necessary.</p><p>Beauty is more than elegance, delightfulness, intricacy, fineness, expressiveness, discipline, orderliness, prettiness, charm, attractiveness: “To speak of beauty is to enter another and more exalted realm.”</p><h4>Two concepts of beauty</h4><p>Scruton offers “a distinction between the judgment of beauty, considered as a justification of taste, and the emphasis on <em>beauty</em>, as a distinctive way of appealing to that judgment.” A work might be beautiful, but it might be decidedly unbeautiful in being beautiful: “harsh” music, “ugly” paintings, “unprincipled” photographs… And works may be “<em>too</em> beautiful: that they ravish when they should disturb, or provide dreamy intoxication when what is needed is a gesture of harsh despair.”</p><p>We can set aside “beauty” as “a supreme aesthetic value” — it is an open question whether there is one —and turn our attention to <em>the aesthetic</em>, to “beauty in its general sense, as the subject-matter of aesthetic judgment.”</p><h4>Means, ends and contemplation</h4><p>There is an eighteenth century distinction between fine arts and useful arts. Useful arts objects have functions and they are judged by their fulfillment of their functions. But a functional object is not necessarily beautiful because it functions well. To call it an art or an artwork means that it is appreciated as an end in itself and not only as a means. Oscar Wilde: “All art is quite useless.”</p><p>This is modern. Greek <em>poiesis</em> is “the skill of making things”; Roman <em>artes</em> “comprised every kind of practical endeavor.”</p><h4>Wanting the individual and a caveat</h4><p>If something is beautiful, no substitute will do. You want <em>that thing</em>, not something like it. (What about works that admit of many instances? If they’re the same work — different copies of the same book or poetry collection, say — there is no issue. Sometimes what work is desired is unclear: <em>this </em>performance of a same work of music by performers, or <em>that </em>performance of the very same work by the very same performers.)</p><p>Your interest in its beauty is inexhaustible: “there is no point at which her desire could be satisfied, nor is there any action, process or whatever, following which the desire is over and done with. … Here is a want without a goal: a desire that cannot be fulfilled since there is nothing that would count as its fulfillment.” (I don’t know about that. Sometimes we tire of beautiful things. Not an objection but a good note: some wants-sans-goals, namely gameplay and philosophy, are not necessarily beautiful thereby.)</p><p>You need to know what the thing is before you can properly evaluate it. “Suppose someone places in your hand an unusual object, which could be a knife, a hoof-pick, a surgeon’s scalpel, an ornament or any one of a number of other things. And suppose that he asks you to pronounce on its beauty. … Learning that it is a boot-pull you might then respond: yes, as boot pulls go, it really is rather beautiful, but how shapeless and clumsy as a knife.”</p><p>The architect Louis Sullivan argued that “form follows function” and that is the source of beauty in architecture. Wrong, Scruton says: “Beautiful buildings change their uses; merely functional buildings get torn down. Sancta Sophia in Istanbul was built as a church, became a barracks, then a stable, then a mosque and then a museum. The lofts of Lower Manhattan changed from warehouses to apartments to shops and (in some cases) back to warehouses — retaining their charm meanwhile and surviving precisely because of that charm.”</p><h4>Beauty and the senses</h4><p>One ancient view is of beauty as a sensory, not intellectual, delight. Kant, Aquinas seemed to endorse this. But is the beauty of a novel, sermon, theory, proof sensory? Consider them “presented <em>through</em> the senses, <em>to</em> the mind.”</p><h4>Disinterested interest and disinterested pleasure</h4><p>A tentative conclusion: “we call something beautiful when we gain pleasure from contemplating it as an individual object, for its own sake, and in its <em>presented form</em>.”</p><p>An interested approach relegates things to our interests, consider them means to satisfy ends. A disinterested approach is “entirely <em>devoted</em> to the object.” As the mother cradles her baby — no other baby would do! — the baby is no end to some interest of the mother; her interest is in the baby <em>tout court</em>.</p><p>So it’s a certain kind of interest, one that suspends “all desires, interests and goals.” But didn’t we say earlier that beauty pleases us — doesn’t it satisfy a desire, interests of ours? Our pleasure in a work is the result of our interest in it.</p><p>Malcolm Budd, as paraphrased by Scruton: “disinterested pleasure is never pleasure <em>in a fact</em>.<em>”</em> The fact <em>that</em> you read the poem might please you, but this is a different pleasure than the pleasure you took <em>in</em> the poem. The prepositions we use — pleasure in, pleasure from, pleasure that — are instructive.</p><p>Disinterested pleasure is a pleasure-in, but it has an intentionality and therefore a cognitive life. You take pleasure in seeing your son win the race, but this pleasure is quashed when you realize it was not your child but a lookalike. Intentional pleasures “can be neutralized by argument and amplified by attention.” No wonder we spend so much time deliberating about art, engaging in aesthetic appreciation in community with others.</p><p>“My pleasure in beauty is therefore like a gift offered to the object, which is in turn a gift offered to me.” Remember that beauty is inextinguishable, curious, and we aim to consider, reconsider and ultimately understand beauty — though this ultimate understanding is unattainable.</p><p>“Hence it tends towards a judgment of its own validity,” and as Kant thought, the judgment is expressed “not as a private opinion but as a binding verdict that would be agreed to by all rational beings just so long as they did what I am doing, and put their own interests aside.”</p><h4>Objectivity</h4><p>The judgment is <em>expressed</em> as if it is binding on everyone, <em>presented</em> as such. It may turn out that judgments are not truth-apt, even if they do beg for justification. And we do engage in debates and disputes over aesthetic judgments, and we do try to achieve agreement and consensus. There are laws that govern buildings’ aesthetics, for example. That’s worth keeping in mind.</p><h3>Artworks Referenced</h3><ol><li>“Wordsworth invokes the beauty of the Lakeland landscape; Proust the beauty of a sonata of Vinteuil; Mann the beauty of Joseph and Homer the beauty of Helen of Troy.” (8)</li><li>Baldassare Longhena’s <em>Santa Maria della Saulte </em>in Venice. (10)</li><li>Sir Christopher Wren’s <em>Saint Paul’s Cathedral</em> in London. (11)</li><li>Bartok’s score for <em>The Miraculous Mandarin</em>, Botticelli’s <em>Birth of Venus</em>, Keats’ <em>Ode to a Nightingale</em>, Susanna’s aria in the garden in Mozart’s <em>Marriage of Figaro</em>, Tennyson’s <em>In Memoriam</em> and Faure’s <em>Requiem</em>. (15–16)</li><li>Sancta Sophia in Istanbul and the lofts of Lower Manhattan. (22)</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9574db9cc844" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Furniture is real: an essay against global social constructivism.]]></title>
            <link>https://danielconrad.medium.com/furniture-is-real-an-essay-against-global-social-constructivism-a4b5001b580b?source=rss-3bf8f36913aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a4b5001b580b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[social-construct]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[realism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reality]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Conrad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Oct 2019 05:46:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-29T03:50:13.742Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>anti-anti-realism</h4><h3>Furniture is real: an essay against global social constructivism</h3><p>Social constructivism is everywhere. Here’s a short list by André Kukla, in his 2000 book <em>Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science</em>, of some of the things that have been called socially constructed: “gender (of course), illness, women refugees, quarks, Zulu nationalism, Indian forests, Japan, Ireland, the past, emotions, reality, serial homicide, authorship, the child viewer of television, the Landsat satellite system, dolomite and the self.” That’s a lot of very different things!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/333/1*seXJFZpgCCcyE-eoEam7KA.jpeg" /><figcaption>A <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Social-Constructivism-Philosophy-Science-Philosophical/dp/0415234190">pretty great book</a>, if you ask me.</figcaption></figure><p>There are pretty good empirical and philosophical arguments for claiming that some things, such as race or gender, are socially constructed — depending on what you take “socially constructed” to mean. But one sort of argument takes aim at the reality of <em>everything</em>. This sort of argument has its root in linguistic and rhetorical theory, and in my opinion is typified in an article called <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ad4f/ef8094175b1c82e3faa8a7af06164e32ce70.pdf">“Death and Furniture,”</a> jointly written in 1995 by Derek Edwards, Malcolm Ashmore and Jonathan Potter.</p><p>Edwards, Ashmore and Potter are what I’ll call <em>global social constructivists</em>, that is, socially constructivists about everything. They found their radical skepticism toward reality in arguments from representations: they say there is no objective world “distinct from processes of representation” or “independent of any particular description,” and conclude that “the world is like text. It <em>all</em> has to be represented and interpreted.” They think that the world does not exist outside of human activity, namely language. (They also think that values do not exist outside of our activity, but that is a metaethical claim that I will not address here. I’ll only concern myself with their metaphysical view.)</p><p>I think their argument is awful, and views like it are awfully popular in certain corners of academia, and thinking through why their approach fails is fun and illuminating. So let’s consider realism, anti-realism and the social construction of everything. First we should clarify our terms.</p><h4>Realism and its discontents</h4><p>If you’re a metaphysical realist, you think there’s a “real world” out there, full of entities and facts, and that it exists independently of humans’ minds or our social activities. There’s a world that constitutes and sustains those things’ existence.</p><p>If you’re a metaphysical anti-realist, you think that the world, or its features or its contents — or some combination thereof — exists by virtue of the mental or social activities of humans, taken individually or collectively. If humans were to stop existing, the anti-realist believes, so too would the rest of these things — or at least some of them.</p><p>What I mean is, realism and anti-realism can be global or local in scope. It’s perfectly reasonable to be an anti-realist about certain things, say gender, and a realist about others: the furniture in your room, maybe.</p><p>Social constructivism is a kind of anti-realism. A social constructivist about some domain believes that the entities and facts in that domain exist by virtue of human beings’ activities. The value of a dollar is undoubtedly determined by humans’ social activities, for example; if there were no human beings, there would be no such thing as the value of a dollar. Now you’re a social constructivist about the dollar’s value; welcome to the club.</p><p>That’s a local social constructivist view that is very easy to swallow. Global social constructivism is not so easy to secure, but it is somewhat fashionable, maybe because it’s kind of cool to deny the reality of everything. Global social constructivists hold that all purported facts and entities could have been otherwise, had the activities of humans been different in turn. Consider what Bruno Latuor, the French sociologist and anthropologist, writes in his 1987 textbook on the sociology of science, <em>Science in Action</em>:</p><blockquote>Since the settlement of a controversy is the <em>cause</em> of Nature’s representation, not its consequence, we can never use this consequence, Nature, to explain how and why a controversy has been settled.</blockquote><p>Contrast the aforementioned Kukla’s more conservative view.</p><blockquote>I think that it’s rational to adopt the view that nothing can be constructed, in the constitutive sense of the word, except facts about our own society.</blockquote><p>Latour the global social constructivist, Kukla the mostly realist.</p><p>It’s worth clarifying that realism and social constructivism make claims about the <em>constitution</em> of things, about what <em>sustains their existence</em>, not about their efficient causes. Of course the table exists because a carpenter, a human being, built it. This is no trouble to the realist, nor is it a point in the constructivist’s favor, because it is beside the point of their debate: they’re worried about whether the carpenter’s creation would cease existing if there were no humans at all.</p><h4>Language against furniture</h4><p>Back to Edwards, Ashmore and Potter, the rhetoric scholars who take aim at the reality of everything. They respond to what they call “bottom-line” arguments against social constructivism: imagine a realist, frustrated by global social constructivism, who bangs her fist on a table in order to demonstrate its reality. She “invokes the objective world as given, as distinct from processes of representation; as directly apprehended, independent of any particular description.” Her gesture challenges the constructivist to explain “the contingent, could-be-otherwise, socially constructed, really-not-real character” of the table before them.</p><p>Edwards, Ashmore and Potter are undeterred by the bang; they think the bang puts the realist in dilemma. “The very act of producing a non-represented, unconstructed external world is inevitably representational, threatening as soon as it is produced, to turn around upon and counter the very position it is meant to demonstrate.” But they accept the challenge nonetheless. Allow me to quote them at length.</p><blockquote>It is surprisingly easy and even reasonable to question the table’s given reality. It does not take long, in looking closer, at wood grain and molecule, before you are no longer looking at a ‘table’. Indeed, physicists might wish to point out that, at a certain level of analysis, there is nothing at all ‘solid’ there, down at the (most basic?) levels of particles, strings and the contested organization of sub-atomic space. Its solidity is then, ineluctably, a perceptual category, a matter of what tables seem to be like to us, in the scale of human perception and bodily action. Reality takes on an intrinsically human dimension, and the most that can be claimed for it is an ‘experiential realism’ (Lakoff, 1987).</blockquote><blockquote>So let us remain at the human scale. When the table is assaulted it is not the whole of it that gets thumped, but only a bit of it under the fist or hand or fingers, or tips of (some of) the fingers. What exactly is warranted by this — just the bits hit? What makes it a bit of a <em>table</em>? And for whom? How does the rest of the table get included as solid and real? And how does even that part that is hit, get demonstrated as real for anybody but the hitter? And how exactly is this demonstration, here and now, supposed to stand for the table’s continuing existence, then and later, and for all the other tables, walls, rocks, ad infinitum, universally and generally? A lot is being taken on trust here, however ‘reasonably’.</blockquote><p>Where a realist might claim “There is a table, and it is solid,” the authors scrutinize the statements, questioning what it takes for something to be a table or to have the property of solidity. Showing solidity and tableness to be anthropocentric concepts, Edwards <em>et al. </em>analyze the gesture itself, doubting whether the realist has really shown that the entire table is solid for anyone and anything that hits it at any time during its existence. They recognize the excruciatingly pedantic nature of their analysis, but stand by it:</p><blockquote>Realism … asks us to take the table-hitting as an existence proof for tables-as-such (and much more), while relying on the audience’s cooperation in commonsensically ignoring how it is done: letting bits of tables stand for wholes (metonymy), instances stand for categories (this is a ‘table’), one experience (and one person’s) stand for many (and acknowledged by everybody). What we have, on closer examination, is a demonstration not so much of out-there reality, but rather the workings of consensual common sense.</blockquote><p>They think that realists both depend on and disavow the rhetorical tools that global social constructivists such as themselves embrace. If something as basic as a table cannot escape textual interpretation, this is because “the world is like text. It <em>all</em> has to be represented and interpreted.” Reality does not exist independently of human social activity, for our representations of reality to one another and to our ourselves are exactly what constitute reality.</p><p>I’d call that conclusion bold — and brash.</p><h4>More like belongs in the trash</h4><p>Let’s grant them this: if anything exists independently of social construction, tables do. If their arguments against the human-independent constitution of tables fail, then we are without reason to doubt the reality of at least one thing, so global social constructivism fails too.</p><p>They first argue that tables do not exist, as they are really just “wood grain and molecule.” Solidity is not demonstrated by table-thumping because it does not exist “down at the … level of particles, strings and the contested organization of sub-atomic space.”</p><p>That is silly because physicists’ descriptions of the “level of particles” are not descriptions of how things <em>really are</em>; they are explanations for why certain things possess certain powers — the power to resist fists, say. Call it solidity.</p><p>Sure, solidity is defined in terms of human perceptions. But that doesn’t mean solidity exists only by virtue of humans’ representations. It may be the case that conceptual categories such as solidity are themselves understood in terms of what humans perceive — macro objects’ inability to pass through other macro objects, for instance — but “solidity” describes a property of things, and that property exists by virtue of facts <em>about</em> those things: namely, being composed of tightly bound atoms.</p><p>Are those facts, ones about microscopic entities’ relations to one another, of an “intrinsically human” character? That’s doubtful. Our understanding of tables may change depending on whether we consider them from a micro or macro perspective, but the table would still exist independently of how we consider it.</p><p>Edwards, Ashmore and Potter have another argument about solidity. When the realist pounds the table, inevitably only parts of it are hit and therefore tested for solidity. They forward a series of skeptical questions: Are only the bits of the table that are hit solid? What makes those hit bits parts of a table? How does anyone other than the hitter know that those parts are even solid? Even if those parts of the table are solid, hwo can anyone know that they will continue to be solid in the future, or that they were solid in the past? How does this demonstration show the solidity of other inanimate objects, or even of other tables?</p><p>Are you annoyed yet? I am, and only partly for good philosophical reasons. Here’s one. These are, at best, epistemological concerns. Most of the questions are just specific instances of the problem of induction: how can we <em>ever</em> be certain that some perceived regularity is in fact timelessly regular? The authors are making a point, but not one that provides good reason not to believe in the existence of tables. They might provide reason to be uncertain that we understand tables — and regularities, and the constitution of wholes from parts, and the reliability of others’ experiences and so forth.</p><p>Besides this, some of the questions are either asked in bad faith or admit inconsistencies in the authors’ global social constructivism: if we are willing to admit that the realist has shown particular parts of the table are solid, then we must admit that those parts are independently existing things, and the realist has done her job.</p><p>Consider Edwards, Ashmore and Potter’s claim that the world “is like text” and that “<em>all</em> has to be represented and interpreted.” That’s an interesting epistemological thesis, that all cognition, perception and understanding is a matter of interpretation and representation. But the world’s contents could exist independently of representation and still require representation for us to understand it. The authors are missing a crucial premise: they have not shown that everything <em>must </em>be represented by humans in order to exist. It’s unclear why that would be the case.</p><p>Even less clear is how anything could be available to human interpretation or representation prior to the very interpretive or representative act. They seem to get the process exactly backwards: things must exist before they can be represented, so it can’t be the case that representation is a necessary condition for anything’s existence.</p><p>Consider the distinction between <em>using</em> words and <em>mentioning</em> them. Consider this sentence: “The sentence ‘It is raining’ is true only if it is raining.” You can make sense of that sentence because we can distinguish between the mention of the phrase “it is raining” and the use of that phrase to assert a proposition, the assertion that it really is raining.</p><p>It’s as if Edwards, Ashmore and Potter have forgotten this distinction. They use arguments about the constructedness of our conceptual categories — solidity, say — as if those arguments’ conclusions were about the constructedness of what those conceptual categories are used to describe. Showing our theories of tables to be socially constructed does not demonstrate the social constructedness of tables themselves. Entities and events are described in language, mentioned, but this is no reason to think there exist no actual, language-independent things that our use of language refers to.</p><p>Earlier I called their argument <em>awful</em>. Here’s why: the mistake they make is so simple, yet brings the authors to the absolutely nuts conclusion that nothing is real just because we must represent things via language. The mistake is exemplified in what Latour had said in his textbook: “Since the settlement of a controversy is the <em>cause</em> of Nature’s representation, not its consequence, we can never use this consequence, Nature, to explain how and why a controversy has been settled.”</p><p>This is a circular argument, and a <em>non sequitur </em>to boot, because regardless whether the resolution of any scientific issue is the cause and not the consequence of Nature’s representation, this would not impact whether we can appeal to <em>Nature itself </em>to explain the resolution of controversies. It’s right there in his own words: he slides from “Nature’s representation” to “this consequence, Nature,” as if those aren’t different things. (The nerve!) To reply that Nature is constituted by its representation, as global social constructivists such as Edwards <em>et al.</em> may want to, is question-begging.</p><p>Edwards, Ashmore and Potter do not show that humans construct reality; perhaps they show that we construct our methods for discussing it, the words we use. OK, we might understand the world on anthropocentric terms. But it still exists!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a4b5001b580b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[MacIntyre against rights and utility]]></title>
            <link>https://danielconrad.medium.com/macintyre-against-rights-and-utility-53b0f1c34210?source=rss-3bf8f36913aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/53b0f1c34210</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[metaethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[moral-philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[alisdair-macintyre]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Conrad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Oct 2019 05:09:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-10T05:09:04.987Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>moral philosophy</h4><p>For my own future use, I’m going to reproduce here a sizable portion of <em>After Virtue</em>, by Alisdair MacIntyre. This is from pages 68–71 of the second edition, published in 1984 by University of Notre Dame Press. All stylings are his own, except for anything that appears in brackets, which contain my own clarifications. I’ve edited his misspellings.</p><p>“Contemporary moral experience as a consequence [of the Enlightenment Project’s failure and the subsequent prevalence of emotivism] has a paradoxical character. For each of us is taught to see himself or herself as an autonomous moral agent; but each of us also becomes engaged by modes of practice, aesthetic or bureaucratic, which involve us in manipulative relationships with others. Seeking to protect the autonomy that we have learned to prize, we aspire ourselves <em>not</em> to be manipulated by others; seeking to incarnate our own principles and stand-point in the world of practice, we find no way open to us to do so except by directing towards others those very manipulative modes of relationship which each of us aspires to resist in our own case. The incoherence of our attitudes and our experience arises from the incoherent conceptual scheme which we have inherited.</p><p>Once we have understood this it is possible to understand also the key place that three other concepts have in the distinctively modern moral scheme, that of <em>rights</em>, that of <em>protest</em>, and that of <em>unmasking.</em> By ‘rights’ I do not mean those rights conferred by positive law or custom on specified classes of person; I mean those rights which are alleged to belong to human beings as such and which are cited as a reason for holding that people ought not to be interfered with in their pursuit of life, liberty and happiness. They are the rights which were spoken of in the eighteenth century as natural rights or as the rights of man. Characteristically in that century they were defined negatively, precisely as rights <em>not</em> to be interfered with. But sometimes in that century and much more often in our own positive rights — rights to due process, to education or to employment are examples — are added to the list. The expression ‘human rights’ is now commoner than either of the eighteenth-century expressions. But whether negative or positive and however named they are supposed to attach equally to all individuals, whatever their sex, race, religion, talents or deserts, and to provide a ground for a variety of particular moral stances.</p><p>It would of course be a little odd that there should b such rights attaching to human beings simply <em>qua </em>human beings in light of the fact, which I alluded to in my discussion of Gewirth’s argument, that there is no expression in any ancient or medieval language correctly translated by our expression ‘a right’ until near the close of the middle ages: the concept lacks any means of expression in Hebrew, Greek, Latin or Arabic, classical or medieval, before about 1400, let alone in Old English, or in Japanese even as late as the mid-nineteenth century. From this it does not of course follow that there are no natural or human rights; it only follows that no one could have known that there were. And this at least raises certain questions. But we do not need to be distracted into answering them, for the truth is plain: there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns.</p><p>The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no such rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no witches and the best reason which we possess asserting that there are no unicorns: every attempt to give good reasons for believing that there <em>are</em> such rights has failed. The eighteenth-century philosophical defenders of natural rights sometimes suggest that the assertions which state that men possess them are self-evident truths; but we know that there are no self-evident truths. Twentieth-century moral philosophers have sometimes appealed to their and our intuitions; but one of the things that we ought to have learned from the history of moral philosophy is that the introduction of the word ‘intuition’ by a moral philosopher is always a signal that something has gone badly wrong with an argument. In the United Nations declaration on human rights of 1949 what has since become the normal UN practice of not giving good reasons for <em>any</em> assertion whatsoever is followed with great rigor. And the latest defender of such rights, Ronald Dworkin (<em>Taking Rights Seriously</em>, 1976) concedes that the existence of such rights cannot be demonstrated, but remarks on this point simply that it does not follow from the fact that a statement cannot be demonstrated that it is not true (p.81). Which is true, but could equally be used to defend claims about unicorns and witches.</p><p>Natural or human rights then are fictions — just as is utility — but fictions with highly specific properties. In order to identify them it is worth noticing briefly once more the other moral fiction which emerges from the twentieth century’s attempts to reconstruct morality, the concept of utility. When Bentham first turned ‘utility’ into a quasi-technical term, he did so, as I have already noticed, in a way that was designed to make plausible the notion of summing individual prospects of pleasure and pain. But, as John Stuart Mill and other utilitarians expanded their notion of the variety of aims which human beings pursue and value, the notion of its being possible to sum all those experiences and activities which give satisfaction became increasingly implausible for reasons which I suggested earlier. The objects of natural and educated human desire are irreducibly heterogenous and the notion of summing them either for individuals or for some population has no clear sense. But if utility is thus not a clear concept, then to use it as if it is, to employ it as if it could provide us with a rational criterion, is indeed to resort to a fiction.</p><p>A central characteristic of moral fictions which comes clearly into view when we juxtapose the concept of utility to that of rights is now identifiable: they purport to provide us with an objective and impersonal criterion, but they do not. And for this reason alone there would have to be a gap between their purported meaning and the uses to which they are actually put. Moreover we can now understand a little better how the phenomenon of incommensurable premises in modern moral debate arises. The concept of rights was generated to serve one set of purposes as part of the social invention of the autonomous moral agent; the concept of utility was devised for quite another set of purposes. And both were elaborated in a situation in which substitute artifacts for the concepts of an older and more traditional morality were required, substitutes that had to have a radically innovative character if they were to even give an appearance of performing their new social functions. Hence when claims invoking rights are matched against claims appealing to utility or when either or both are matched against claims based on some traditional concept of justice, it is not surprising that there is no rational way of deciding which type of claim is to be given priority or how one is to be weighed against the other. Moral incommensurability is itself the product of a particular historical conjunction.</p><p>This provides us with an insight important for understanding the politics of modern societies. For what I described earlier as the culture of bureaucratic individualism results in their characteristic overt political debates being between an individualism which makes its claims in terms of rights and forms of bureaucratic organization which make their claims in terms of utility. But if the concept of rights and that of utility are a matching pair of incommensurable fictions, it will be the case that the moral idiom employed can at best provide a semblance of rationality for the modern political process, but not its reality. The mock rationality of the debate conceals the arbitrariness of the will and power at work in its resolution.”</p><p>That’s the big quote. A few paragraphs later, MacIntyre refers to rights, utility and a couple of other concepts as “the major protagonists of the distinctively modern moral causes of the moral world” and notes that his claim — that they “offer a rhetoric which serves to conceal behind the masks of morality what are in fact the preferences of arbitrary will and desire” — is unoriginal. He traces it to Freud at least, and would not deny that it’s part of the Nietzschean project as well: “<em>Unmasking </em>the unacknowledged motives of arbitrary will and desire which sustain the moral masks of modernity is itself one of the most characteristically modern of activities. It was Freud’s achievement to discover that unmasking arbitrariness in others may always be a defence against uncovering it in ourselves.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=53b0f1c34210" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Several short sentences about “Several short sentences about writing”]]></title>
            <link>https://danielconrad.medium.com/several-short-sentences-about-several-short-sentences-about-writing-71679bed9e3?source=rss-3bf8f36913aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/71679bed9e3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[editing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[noticing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[style]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Conrad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Oct 2019 04:43:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-14T05:59:59.650Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>not quite a book review</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lgGA4bD062xxadh67m2a2g.jpeg" /></figure><p>Verlyn Klinkenborg’s book on writing is really special.</p><p>I’ve been taking the bus to work for the past couple of months, which has afforded me more time to read. For years I’d told myself I’ve no time to read for pleasure; really, I wasn’t making the time for it. I’ve knocked out a few novels, a philosophy tome and most recently Klinkenborg’s <em>Several short sentences about writing</em> since mid-July — and saved a significant amount of gas money to boot.</p><p>All this reading has reminded me to keep my writing skills sharp. I write for a living, sure, but the concise, legalistic language my day job involves isn’t terribly inspiring. So I’m going to try and update this blog with fresh updates, beginning with this non-review of <em>Several short sentences about writing</em>.</p><p>Klinkenborg’s book is not a style guide. He does not lend his voice to the choir of dicta dished out by the likes of Strunk and White, Bryan Garner and Benjamin Dreyer. In lieu of correctives and rules, Klinkenborg explains what should we should be doing in our heads when we think about writing. It is not worth trying to summarize this, because his musings on method are better experienced than explained. You should read it yourself, preferably aloud (quietly if need be), like I did on the bus this month. I recommend it.</p><p>But I’m used to style guides and dicta dished out by the likes of Strunk and White, Bryan Garner and Benjamin Dreyer. So I noted some lessons I learned, which I’ll bullet-point in millennial fashion, for my benefit and, hopefully, yours too.</p><ul><li>Brevity is valuable.</li><li>Adverbs are dangerous; prefer strong, illustrative verbs.</li><li>Noun phrases usurp strong verbs. Don’t let them.</li><li>Trust your reader to understand. Then see if they do. If they don’t, revise your prose. Clarity is key.</li><li>“As” lends itself to weak sentence construction and passive voice. Use it sparingly.</li><li>Center the subject and give it a strong verb.</li><li>Carefully evaluate each sentence as you write it. Don’t write or type an unrevised sentence. Consider each sentence before you commit it to page. Sentences will volunteer themselves to you; be wary of them and consider how to improve them first.</li><li>Write with <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Websters-World-College-Dictionary-CD-ROM/dp/0544165535">a good dictionary</a> on hand. Attend to it frequently, even if you think you know the meanings of the words you use. You may be surprised, and you’ll never be disappointed.</li><li>Powerful word choice lends itself to rhythmic writing. Read your work aloud and consider how it sounds. Your ears are excellent editing assistants.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=71679bed9e3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[I’m a national award-winning journalist, but I don’t feel great about it.]]></title>
            <link>https://danielconrad.medium.com/im-a-national-award-winning-journalist-but-i-don-t-feel-great-about-it-7e4e45fb0b06?source=rss-3bf8f36913aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7e4e45fb0b06</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Conrad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Apr 2019 22:35:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-18T22:35:28.185Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>an achievement, an apology</h4><h3>I’m a national award-winning journalist, and I’m not sure how to feel about it.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/962/1*l21XYRa4yj3kBWDlX0SGiw.png" /></figure><p>I am honored, humbled and unsure how to announce that Grace Frye, Kathleen Creedon and I are national award-winning journalists.</p><p>The Society of Professional Journalists recognized our March 1, 2018 news story for the Trinitonian — <a href="https://www.trinitonian.com/mandadi-case-after-months-an-arrest-and-some-answers/">“After months, an arrest and some answers in Mandadi case”</a> — as the national winner of its 2018 Mark of Excellence award for Breaking News Reporting, Small School Division. Of all student newspapers at American colleges enrolling fewer than 10,000 students, our story stood out to the judges as the exemplar of breaking news journalism that year. It was first selected as the best in Oklahoma and Texas, then it was picked as the best of the best: the best in the nation.</p><p>I am overwhelmed by today’s news, which also generates deeply conflicted feelings in me, considering the circumstances. I am so proud of Grace and Kathleen, who carried the day — from the affidavit’s release until 8 a.m. the next morning, when we finished the story, set it on the page and sent the paper to print — and produced with me what I truly believe is an illuminating guide to a disorienting, horrifying sequence of events. I am indebted to my advisor, Katharine Martin, who patiently helped me navigate the most ethically fraught challenge I’ve ever encountered. I owe so much to my family and my friends, who helped me through unfamiliar and emotionally treacherous territory. I hope I can be for another what you all were to me.</p><p>That year, as editor-in-chief of the Trinitonian, I spent countless hours agonizing over how to respectfully do my duty to my community and to the historical record. I lost a close friend, others quit the paper, staffers expressed doubts, personal relationships were — maybe irrevocably — damaged. I spent many long hours with the bereaved and the outraged, listening to their grievances and refining my paper’s policies for writing about tragedies so deeply affecting at such a small school. I know this news may anger or sadden them.</p><p>I recognize those feelings in myself. I feel so strange, because this accomplishment is borne of a moral horror. The story is reactive in nature, predicated on a violence that never should have happened. I hate that. I hate that we had to do this, and I wish we didn’t have the chance to win this award. I don’t know how to feel, being told that we did an excellent job. It makes me feel exploitative, or parasitic on the pain of others. But I also know that if the campus’ paper of record weren’t doing the reporting, our campus’ story would be told only by outsiders. Who wants to be part of a community that doesn’t ask questions and seek answers when one of its own is killed? Why would anyone settle for a landscape of gossip, rumors and closely guarded narratives, when we could endeavor toward a common ground of publicly presented and verified facts?</p><p>Friends, strangers, teachers and staff would reassure me of the Trinitonian’s noble role and our good work. At the time I couldn’t help but disregard their words as mere niceties, polite but empty platitudes. They ring truer to me now than ever. I thank everyone who offered us kindness in a stressful time, and I apologize if I was ever too self-conscious to recognize your sincerity.</p><p>This is an extremely selfish post. The difficulty I bore is of such a different kind, of such a different tenor and intensity, than the grief and suffering my neighbors and loved ones faced last year and continue to face, as we prepare to watch the accused stand trial. Every pang of pride is accompanied by one, just as strong, of guilt and ambivalence. All I can do is hope my future work on this developing story rises to the standard set by Grace’s diligent reporting, Kathleen’s keen editing and my own contributions, sparing and supervisory though they were.</p><p>There is a court date set for the charges against Mark Howerton. On Friday, May 3, at 9 a.m., in the 144th Judicial District Court of Bexar County, proceedings on the state’s charges — of aggravated sexual assault, murder, kidnapping and criminal mischief — are meant to begin. The last four times a court date was set, there was only a short bench conference, as attorneys conferred with the judge to explain that the trial wasn’t ready to begin due to discovery issues; the Texas Department of Public Safety’s crime labs are severely backlogged. But witnesses have been subpoenaed, so we’ll have to wait and see.</p><p>Thanks for listening. You can read the full list of Mark of Excellence winners and runners-up <a href="https://www.spj.org/moe18.asp">here.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7e4e45fb0b06" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Texas Appeals Court Guts Part of Open-Meetings Law]]></title>
            <link>https://danielconrad.medium.com/texas-appeals-court-guts-part-of-open-meetings-law-1b235549fc38?source=rss-3bf8f36913aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1b235549fc38</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[texas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freedom-of-information]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[supreme-court]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Conrad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2019 05:16:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-19T05:16:51.619Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>news report</h4><h4><a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/texas-appeals-court-guts-part-of-open-meetings-law/">Published</a> in Courthouse News Service on Feb. 27, 2019.</h4><p>In a 7–2 <a href="http://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/open-meetings-tx.pdf">decision</a> Wednesday, a Texas appeals court struck down a provision of the state’s open-meetings law that made it a crime for officials to hold meetings without quorum to conduct secret deliberations outside the public eye, calling that part of the statute unconstitutionally vague.</p><p>The Texas Open Meetings Act requires meetings of government bodies to be open to the public if a quorum is present — that is, if enough members are in attendance for the group to vote or take other formal action.</p><p>In the case before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state prosecuted former Montgomery County Judge Craig Doyal for convening a closed meeting of some of the county’s commissioners to discuss a road bond package. County judges in Texas are not judicial officers — they are the county’s executive officers, and preside over county commission meetings.</p><p>The section of the law that was struck down Wednesday made it illegal for members of a government body to “knowingly conspire to circumvent this chapter by meeting in numbers less than a quorum for the purpose of secret deliberations in violation of this chapter.”</p><p>“More clarity is required of a criminal law when that law implicates First Amendment freedoms,” Presiding Judge Sharon Keller wrote for the court’s majority.</p><p>She later added, “The statute before us is hopelessly indeterminate by being too abstract. … The statute has little in the way of limiting language and notably lacks language to clarify its scope.”</p><p>Attorney Rusty Hardin, who represented Doyal in the case, said it is “a great day for public officials in Texas.”</p><p>“You couldn’t figure out what conduct was criminal and what conduct was innocent” under the law, Hardin said in a phone interview. “The way this thing reads, it just captures as much innocent conduct as it would criminal, and so on its face there’s no way the public official can figure out what he can and can’t do.”</p><p>Hardin said the law created a chilling effect among elected officials.</p><p>“If one commissioner, for instance, wanted to go down the hall and say, ‘Hey Bill, do you think we want this particular issue on the agenda, for people to discuss? What’s your view?’ — they were all afraid to do even that for fear that somebody would say they were violating the Open Meetings Act,” Hardin said. “So the particular portion of the act that was struck down had an incredibly restrictive impact.”</p><p>Of the two dissenting judges, only Judge Kevin Yeary filed a separate <a href="http://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/yeary-dissent.pdf">opinion</a>.</p><p>“Yet another perfectly good statute falls today,” Yeary began his dissent. “The court’s decision to strike the law relies on opinions from the United States Supreme Court that are, in the first place, less than a model of clarity, and that, in any event, are not at all like the case before us. It is also a product of the court’s failure to perceive the rather plain import of the Legislature’s choice of words.”</p><p>Though Judge Keller subjected the statutory provision at issue to greater scrutiny because it imposes criminal sanctions for government officials who “knowingly conspire” to “circumvent” the law by holding meetings at less than quorum — the two terms in the law the majority found unconstitutionally vague — Yeary argued that the punishment was reasonable.</p><p>“To provide a true disincentive, the stigma of a criminal penalty is necessary,” Yeary wrote. “Besides, the fact that a violation is only a misdemeanor shows that even the criminal penalty has been narrowly tailored. Misdemeanors are the least restrictive criminal stigma available and adequate to do the job.”</p><p>Yeary also warned that striking down this section of the law could permit “walking quorums,” a tactic by which members of a governing body cycle in and out of a meeting such that a majority of the group attends the meeting, but not all at the same time. This means there is never a quorum and therefore at no time is the group required to allow the public’s attendance.</p><p>“That is an insane concern,” Hardin said in the interview. “Nowhere in the country is a walking quorum considered criminal. This would be the only statute that would say that’s criminal. The walking quorum is a recent invention that has made its way into some civil cases that would carry a civil penalty if somebody could prove it. It’s never been in a criminal statute, and it shouldn’t be in a criminal statute, because what the hell is a walking quorum?”</p><p>Hardin also agreed with a concurring opinion written by Judge Michelle Slaughter, who <a href="http://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/slaughter-concur.pdf">found</a> the law was not unconstitutionally vague but did violate the First Amendment.</p><p>“How in the world can public officials have communications if what they say, or what somebody said to them while they’re listening, is potentially criminal?” Hardin asked. “They’re afraid to express themselves, for fear they’re going to be criminally prosecuted. I can’t think of anything more basic a violation of the First Amendment than that.”</p><p>Joe Larsen, who helped represent the state at trial, says this view misconstrues the provision.</p><p>“[Officials] have to knowingly conspire to circumvent the Open Meetings Act” to be held criminally liable, Larsen said in a phone interview.</p><p>He later added, “What we’re actually addressing here is the governmental body acting through a quorum, by the artifice of deliberately keeping their members in any one space below a quorum.”</p><p>Kelley Shannon, executive director of the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas, expressed disappointment in the court’s ruling.</p><p>“Some people will use it as a chance to try to get around the spirit of the law,” Shannon said in a statement. “But the vast majority of people want to follow the law and want the public to understand government and participate in government. The vast majority of public officials know they can’t go around in secret and deliberate.”</p><p>Larsen said he will request a rehearing and is hopeful that his team can “peel off” some of the judges from the majority view.</p><p>“This is a big deal. This case has nationwide impact,” Larsen said. “Every single state has open-meetings laws, and a lot of them are written quite like this one. I can see a government official in New York or Florida or wherever, saying ‘Look at what they decided in Texas. This is very persuasive, this is what should be decided here.’”</p><p>The Texas Open Meetings Act contains other criminal provisions: it is a misdemeanor to call for, organize or participate in a regular meeting that is improperly closed to the public, for example, and it is also a misdemeanor to knowingly disclose a meeting’s agenda or recording if that information was lawfully closed to the public.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1b235549fc38" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Second Competency Test Ordered in ‘Angel of Death’ Case]]></title>
            <link>https://danielconrad.medium.com/second-competency-test-ordered-in-angel-of-death-case-6e607048993f?source=rss-3bf8f36913aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6e607048993f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[san-antonio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mental-health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[murder]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[competency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Conrad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2019 05:14:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-19T05:14:26.542Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>news report</h4><h4><a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/second-competency-test-ordered-in-angel-of-death-case/">Published</a> in Courthouse News Service on Feb. 14, 2019, and co-authored with Erik De La Garza.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*xHegy-79qGGBOAEnajnzqA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Former Texas nurse Genene Jones, who spent the last three decades in prison for the murder of a 15-month-old girl, was ordered to undergo a second competency evaluation Thursday after a first evaluation concluded she can stand trial on five new murder charges.</p><p>Bexar County Magistrate Judge Andrew Carruthers ordered both competency and sanity evaluations for Jones, 67, last May at the request of her attorney, Cornelius Cox. The motion came after Cox said Jones may not be competent to stand trial due to strokes she suffered in the mid-1980s, and concerns that she hears voices in her head.</p><p>Wearing large, black-rimmed glasses and a blue two-piece prison outfit, Jones clutched tissue due to an apparent cough but remained emotionless. She spoke only to her two attorneys during the hearing, which lasted less than 10 minutes.</p><p>Cox said outside the courtroom that if a disagreement arises with the second competency assessment, “we will go forward” to trial.</p><p>“It wouldn’t be that far in the future and the citizens of Bexar County will make a determination as to her competency,” Cox said.</p><p>A San Antonio grand jury in 2017 indicted Jones in the murders of five young children dating to the early 1980s, reopening a dramatic legal saga that prevented her release under a 1977 mandatory release law meant to curb overcrowded prisons.</p><p>She has long been suspected in the deaths of up to 60 infants and young children while she worked in the pediatric intensive care unit at a local hospital, earning her the nickname “Angel of Death.” Prosecutors have said Jones would be held accountable for as many children’s deaths as the evidence will support.</p><p>A judge in 1984 sentenced the ex-nurse to concurrent prison terms of 99 years and 60 years for the death of 15-month-old Chelsea McClellan and for injecting a 4-week-old boy with Haparin. The boy survived the attack.</p><p>She was grandfathered under a 1977 mandatory release law that would have let her out of state prison. That changed when former District Attorney Nico LaHood approved a task force to investigate Jones, who he called “pure evil” in a 2017 news conference announcing the new charges.</p><p>LaHood lost his position in a Democratic primary last year. Current District Attorney Joe Gonzales has rebuffed LaHood’s offer to assist in Jones’ prosecution.</p><p>After the hearing Thursday morning, Gonzales said while the evaluations have caused some delay, he doesn’t consider it “unreasonable.”</p><p>“We want to make sure that she gets her day in court as well as our victim’s families,” Gonzales said. “We are ready to go forward.”</p><p>Jones’ attorney said his client is “doing as well as she could be,” adding her health is “deteriorating a little bit.”</p><p>He added, “I imagine it’s very stressful for her.”</p><p>Jones faces up to 99 years in prison if convicted. She has been transferred from prison back to San Antonio to await trial on the five new charges.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z_rghMklRQbgWDoI9ZoBbg.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6e607048993f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hundreds of Couples Tie the Knot at Bexar County Courthouse on Valentine’s Day]]></title>
            <link>https://danielconrad.medium.com/hundreds-of-couples-tie-the-knot-at-bexar-county-courthouse-on-valentines-day-e307957616f4?source=rss-3bf8f36913aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e307957616f4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[marriage]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[weddings]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[photography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[san-antonio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[photojournalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Conrad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2019 05:02:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-19T05:10:03.952Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>photo gallery</h4><h4><a href="https://www.sacurrent.com/sanantonio/hundreds-of-couples-tie-the-knot-at-bexar-county-courthouse-on-valentines-day/Slideshow/19956254">Published</a> in the San Antonio Current on Feb. 14, 2019.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GU0n1gGL7HG-e5J0qh4JRA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The San Antonio Current purchased 42 of my photographs from the Bexar County Courthouse on Valentine’s Day 2019, when more than 200 couples were married at a discount on the historic building’s steps.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*w07vpVFjeawmaZC4l7Zxcg.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.sacurrent.com/sanantonio/hundreds-of-couples-tie-the-knot-at-bexar-county-courthouse-on-valentines-day/Slideshow/19956254">View my full gallery here.</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vdkjn4MLOJIf-CWFj_kdEw.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e307957616f4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Soccer Mommy’s Approachable Vulnerability Enthralls Crowd at the Paper Tiger]]></title>
            <link>https://danielconrad.medium.com/soccer-mommys-approachable-vulnerability-enthralls-crowd-at-the-paper-tiger-ce4b8f37c0e0?source=rss-3bf8f36913aa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ce4b8f37c0e0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[photography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[music]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[concerts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[san-antonio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soccer-mommy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Conrad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2019 04:51:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-19T05:08:58.916Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>concert review</h4><h4><a href="https://www.sacurrent.com/sa-sound/archives/2019/02/11/soccer-mommys-approachable-vulnerability-enthralls-crowd-at-the-paper-tiger">Published</a> in the San Antonio Current on Feb. 11, 2019.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1oY7awCTsRqJxL2EBFn6Nw.jpeg" /></figure><p>“Yeah, let’s dance. This one’s an angry one.” The next words from Sophie Allison, the Nashville musician best known by the stage name Soccer Mommy, fulfilled the promise as everyone at the Paper Tiger last night mouthed in unison:</p><p>“I don’t wanna be your fucking dog / That you drag around.”</p><p>Even though Allison’s just 21, Soccer Mommy’s debut full-length album <em>Clean</em> topped a <em>New York Times</em> pop critic’s Best of 2018 list, and she’s spent much of the past year being profiled by Rolling Stone, the Fader and even Forbes.</p><p>But before she embarks to play some West coast shows with Vampire Weekend this fall — a worthy followup to her previous stints touring with such contemporary indie-rock titans as Mitski, Kacey Musgraves and Slowdive — she graced the Alamo City with her first show since a performance at 502 Bar last April.</p><p>Motiongazer, the solo project of Soccer Mommy guitarist and fellow Nashvillain Julian Powell, opened the evening with a short set that oscillated between atmospheric, ethereal post-rock and jaunty folk-rock reminiscent of the War on Drugs. Downtempo and meditative, Powell’s opener evoked a stand-out mood: dreamy guitar tones over synths that lapped like waves against the shore.</p><p>Hovvdy, an alternative rock band hailing from Austin, took the stage next. Founding bandmates Will Taylor and Charlie Martin sang in low, melancholic tones, as if to lull you in with almost angsty, emo lullabies. Later in their set, they shared new material much sunnier than their earlier, introspective work — but it wasn’t long before we were back to music that well matched the past week’s gray skies and isolating weather.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KmJWgyvDKpSaEL_HoTVYCg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Perhaps the best way to describe Soccer Mommy’s sound is “approachably vulnerable.” Behind her glittery mic and sparkling pink Stratocaster, Allison assumed a blank expression as she crooned about desire (“Try”), love lost (“Still Clean”) and jealousy (“Last Girl”) — no matter how upbeat the melody.</p><p>The crowd loved her.</p><p>The five-piece band dipped offstage so Allison could perform the most mournful cover of Bruce Springsteen’s “I’m On Fire” there ever was. Music is rarely so effectively sad, but her treatment of this <em>Born in the U.S.A.</em> single peeled it back and exposed it for the dour tale masked by the ’80s sensibilities of the Boss’ original recording.</p><p>The rest of the group returned with good news: Kacey Musgraves had just won Best Album at the Grammys for last year’s <em>Golden Hour</em> — to everyone’s applause and Allison’s delight. I’m not saying the morale boost was exactly why the following performance of “Scorpio Rising” was so good. I’m just saying the choruses built to the most satisfying, cathartic crescendos of the night.</p><p>The night ended pretty early, 11 o’clock sharp, after the least suspenseful encore delay ever witnessed.</p><p>“I don’t like making you wait very long,” Allison joked from the stage before closing out the set.</p><p>Let’s hope her next visit to San Antonio isn’t too far out, either.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TdTbNZ4mODqIsnWifjoFHg.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ce4b8f37c0e0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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