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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Daniel Williams on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Monetary power, climate breakdown: how China finances the green transition while European monetary…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/areas-producers/monetary-power-climate-breakdown-how-china-finances-the-green-transition-while-european-monetary-5047ee4b1fad?source=rss-412162597383------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 12:15:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-01T13:24:54.611Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Climate Breakdown</h3><h4>How China finances the green transition while European monetary policy blocks renewable energy investment</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*oVEMu7XR9QFBGats" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@lucasgallone?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Lucas Gallone</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>China’s renewable-energy and hydrogen industries are developing at a pace Europe cannot match because China’s monetary and financial system is built to mobilize cheap, patient, large-scale capital for strategic industries. Europe, despite stronger climate targets and <a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/top-50-criticisms-of-the-commissions-rfnbo-rules-ea2f4f3faf2f?source=friends_link&amp;sk=a1d64cdae19c1ace607a90a7117f425f"><strong>complex regulatory frameworks</strong></a>, asks private investors to finance capital-intensive decarbonization at market rates—just as monetary tightening has made that capital more expensive.</p><p>The consequence is not simply a competitiveness gap. It is a widening gap between the speed at which Europe must decarbonize and the speed at which <a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/in-depth-what-is-going-on-in-the-ecb-and-how-monetary-policy-is-vital-to-avert-climate-collapse-ab146d461d39?source=friends_link&amp;sk=71cf15c1f05e2e7df49ef517f3a45139"><strong>its financial system allows it to do so</strong></a>.</p><h3>The economics of delay</h3><p>Climate change is no longer a distant balance-sheet risk. <a href="https://www.triodos.com/binaries/content/assets/tbho/research-and-insights/triodos-bank_hot-summer-economics.pdf"><strong>Triodos Bank’s <em>Hot Summer Economics</em></strong></a> report estimates that Europe’s extreme heat in 2026 could reduce EU GDP by around 1%, or roughly €180 billion—effectively erasing much of the growth forecast for the year.</p><p>The damage operates through four channels: lower agricultural output and higher food prices, constrained energy production and higher electricity prices, transport disruption, and reduced labour productivity. Labour productivity alone is estimated to reduce EU GDP by around 0.6%, while agricultural output is expected to fall by 3–7%.</p><p>These are the macroeconomic costs of climate breakdown in real time. Every delayed wind farm, transmission line, solar farm, industrial electrification project and hydrogen retrofit leaves Europe more exposed to such losses.</p><p>All credible projections <a href="https://www.pik-potsdam.de/en/news/latest-news/38-trillion-dollars-in-damages-each-year-world-economy-already-committed-to-income-reduction-of-19-due-to-climate-change"><strong>see these losses rising to 20% of GDP by 2050</strong></a><strong>, and </strong><a href="https://actuaries.org.uk/media/qeydewmk/the-emperor-s-new-climate-scenarios.pdf"><strong>rising further still beyond this point</strong></a>.</p><p>The question is therefore not whether Europe can afford green investment; it is whether it can afford not to make it quickly.</p><h3>Why green investment is rate-sensitive</h3><p>Renewable energy and hydrogen are capital-intensive. A solar farm or onshore wind project has low operating costs but requires most expenditure before it produces electricity. Offshore wind, grid reinforcement, battery manufacturing, and hydrogen infrastructure are even more front-loaded. Their profitability depends heavily on the discount rate applied to revenue streams arriving over 20 to 30 years.</p><p>The European Central Bank has acknowledged that the large upfront costs of capital-intensive green expenditure are especially sensitive to the cost of credit, and that higher interest rates can slow decarbonisation by making green technologies more expensive to finance. Crucially however, the ECB have dropped the tools at their disposal to correct the situation.</p><p>A <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2026/779881/ECTI_STU(2026)779881_EN.pdf"><strong>landmark 2026 European Parliament ECON study</strong></a><strong> </strong>argues that undifferentiated monetary tightening disproportionately blocks long-maturity, capital-intensive renewable and cleantech investments, while fossil-fuel investments are structurally promoted as a result of shorter payback periods. It warns that this perpetuates inherent fossil-fuel dependence that makes Europe vulnerable to energy-driven inflation in the first place.</p><p>This creates a structural contradiction. When inflation rises—nearly always because of fossil-fuel price shocks and climate-related supply disruption—the ECB <strong>raises rates to restore price stability</strong>. But those rate increases raise the cost of the investments that would reduce future fossil-fuel dependence and climate vulnerability.</p><p>In effect, <a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/the-cost-of-climate-change-in-the-eu-to-2030-climate-breakdown-in-real-time-8ea7ae46da75?source=friends_link&amp;sk=ad9aacb481b23773f132f04be48d704d"><strong>the ECB’s monetary response to climate-driven inflation deliberately slows the transition</strong></a> that would mitigate future climate-driven inflation.</p><h3>China’s monetary-industrial model</h3><p>China approaches the problem differently. Its central bank does not merely set the price of money; it creates targeted channels through which money reaches priority sectors.</p><p>The clearest example is the People’s Bank of China’s <strong>Carbon Reduction Supporting Tool</strong>, introduced in November 2021. Banks making qualifying loans for clean energy, energy efficiency, environmental protection, and carbon-reduction technology can obtain central-bank funding worth 60% of the loan principal at a one-year rate of 1.75%.</p><p>The mechanism is simple but powerful. The PBOC lowers the cost at which commercial banks fund themselves, and banks pass that advantage on to clean-energy borrowers. The facility was explicitly designed to leverage social capital, meaning public liquidity was used to pull in larger volumes of private and commercial finance.</p><p>This is monetary policy as industrial policy. It does not replace markets; it reshapes the terms on which markets allocate capital. A Chinese solar developer, wind operator, battery producer, or hydrogen company can plan expansion with greater confidence because the financial system is institutionally committed to funding the sector.</p><h3>Why China’s central bank can act</h3><p>A recent <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/working-paper-431-Larsen-Jackson-1.pdf"><strong>LSE Grantham Research Institute working paper</strong></a> argues that the People’s Bank of China is the only major central bank conducting genuinely material green monetary policy. Based on 93 interviews and comparative analysis of the PBOC, Federal Reserve, ECB, and Bank of England, it finds that Western central banks mainly encourage financial institutions to consider climate risk indirectly, whereas the PBOC intervenes directly through monetary and credit policy.</p><p>The PBOC accepts green loans and highly rated green bonds as collateral, incorporates green performance into its macroprudential assessment, and operates the Carbon Emission Reduction Facility. By mid-2024, that facility had supported financial institutions in lending around USD 153 billion.</p><p>The PBOC is not legally independent in the Western sense; it is governed by the Chinese Communist Party and State Council, which direct it to support national decarbonization goals. Yet it retains substantial operational independence in executing those directives. The authors describe this as “government directing with operational independence.”</p><p>By contrast, the ECB’s legal independence and mandate constrain the scale and directness of its climate action. The study finds that the ECB’s most financially significant green measure—tilting corporate bond purchases—<a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/in-depth-what-is-going-on-in-the-ecb-and-how-monetary-policy-is-vital-to-avert-climate-collapse-ab146d461d39?source=friends_link&amp;sk=71cf15c1f05e2e7df49ef517f3a45139"><strong>was limited in scale and ended in 2023</strong></a>. The result is a gap between ambitious climate rhetoric and comparatively limited monetary intervention.</p><p>This does not mean Europe should abandon democratic accountability or copy China’s political system. But it shows that institutional design matters: a central bank can be operationally competent while still being directed by government to pursue a strategic climate objective.</p><h3>Green credit at national scale</h3><p>The Carbon Reduction Supporting Tool sits within a much larger green-finance system. China’s green-loan balance reached RMB 36.6 trillion (EUR 4.7 trillion) by the end of 2024, with nearly 70% allocated to projects with carbon-reduction effects.</p><p>Bank of China reported RMB 4.07 trillion (EUR 522 billion) in mainland green-credit balances in 2024, a 31% year-on-year increase, directed toward clean energy, clean production, green infrastructure, and low-carbon industrial upgrading.</p><p>China’s 2025 <strong>Green Finance Endorsed Project Catalogue</strong> further unified definitions of eligible activities, helping banks identify and finance projects across renewable energy, energy efficiency, pollution control, and low-carbon industry. The state’s 2025 white paper on carbon peaking and neutrality commits China to promoting green hydrogen, biomass, geothermal, and ocean energy, and to developing the full chain from production to end use.</p><p>The result is a financial ecosystem in which clean technology is treated as a national strategic asset rather than a risky, optional investment class.</p><p>That does not eliminate failure or overcapacity. But it enables firms to build capacity before every project has proven commercially mature—precisely the approach needed in industries where scale itself lowers costs.</p><h3>Deployment: the measurable gap</h3><p>The results are visible in deployment data. In 2024, China added more than 340 GW of solar PV and about 80 GW of wind, representing almost two-thirds of global renewable capacity additions.</p><p>In 2025, China added nearly 370 GW of solar and 117 GW of wind—13% and 48% higher than in 2024.</p><p>The EU added a record 85 GW of renewables in 2025. That is a meaningful achievement, but it is less than one-fifth of China’s total. The International Energy Agency expects China to install 3,207 GW of new renewable capacity between 2024 and 2030, more than tripling its 2017–2023 growth.</p><p>The gap is not mainly technological. European firms and research institutions remain highly capable. The gap is financial and institutional: China can convert a strategic target into bankable projects at speed, while Europe must assemble finance project by project, often across multiple national jurisdictions, regulatory regimes, and risk assessments.</p><h3>Hydrogen: patient capital decides the winner</h3><p>Hydrogen illustrates the stakes most clearly. Green hydrogen is not yet broadly competitive with fossil-based hydrogen in many uses. It requires cheap renewable electricity, electrolysers, storage, pipelines or shipping infrastructure, and industrial customers willing to pay a green premium.</p><p>It is therefore exactly the kind of sector that conventional finance struggles to support at speed.</p><p>China has treated hydrogen as an industrial system to be financed end to end. Its policy framework promotes production, storage, transport, and end uses, including green ammonia, methanol, and sustainable aviation fuels. By the end of 2024, China led the world in green-hydrogen production capacity, exceeding 150,000 tonnes annually.</p><p>A leading case is Sinopec’s Kuqa project in Xinjiang, one of the world’s largest green-hydrogen facilities. It links a large solar installation directly to electrolysis and supplies hydrogen to a nearby refinery, demonstrating how state-backed energy firms can integrate renewable generation, hydrogen production, and industrial demand in one coordinated investment.</p><p>Projects of this kind are difficult to finance in Europe because they combine technological risk, offtake uncertainty, and long payback periods.</p><p>China’s momentum is continuing. In 2025, electrolyser orders were expected to more than double from 2024 to more than 5 GW, with an additional 7 GW of engineering, procurement, and construction projects in development. A National Development and Reform Commission guideline expanded national funding eligibility for green hydrogen and hydrogen-linked industrial applications, reinforcing the financial bridge between demonstration projects and industrial scale.</p><h3>Europe’s response is too small and too slow</h3><p>Europe is not inactive. The European Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal aims to mobilize more than EUR 100 billion to support EU-made clean manufacturing, while changes to InvestEU are intended to mobilize up to EUR 50 billion for clean technology, clean mobility, and waste reduction. The Commission has also proposed strengthening the Innovation Fund and creating an industrial decarbonisation bank with EUR 100 billion in funding.</p><p>But these sums must be placed against the scale of the task. The European Commission estimates that meeting the EU’s 2030 climate and energy targets requires total energy-system investment of approximately EUR 570 billion per year between 2021 and 2030.</p><p>Even if EU programs mobilize private capital several times their nominal value, they remain modest relative to annual investment needs—and they do not directly solve the core problem: the high cost and short duration of private capital.</p><p>The European Parliament ECON study argues that the ECB should respond to fossil-fuel-driven inflation directly, and rather than <strong>applying the single-lever interest rate mechanism across the board</strong>, use differentiated instruments to shield renewable and cleantech investment; precisely as China is doing with great success. It proposes green Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations as one available mechanism — <a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/in-depth-what-is-going-on-in-the-ecb-and-how-monetary-policy-is-vital-to-avert-climate-collapse-ab146d461d39?source=friends_link&amp;sk=71cf15c1f05e2e7df49ef517f3a45139"><strong>something the ECB have already applied</strong></a>, but somehow have now forgotten about.</p><p>The Clean Industrial Deal is therefore a necessary but insufficient response. It improves guarantees, state-aid flexibility, and innovation funding, but it does not fundamentally alter the interest-rate environment in which European developers operate.</p><p>China’s advantage lies not only in subsidy volume but in the institutional ability to lower the cost of capital for strategic sectors continuously.</p><h3>The real-time cost of financial caution</h3><p><a href="https://actuaries.org.uk/media/qeydewmk/the-emperor-s-new-climate-scenarios.pdf"><strong><em>The Emperor’s New Climate Scenarios</em></strong></a>, published by the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries and the University of Exeter, argues that many climate-scenario models used in financial services significantly underestimate climate risk because they omit tipping points, second-order impacts, sea-level rise, involuntary migration, and other systemic effects.</p><p>The report finds that some models implausibly show a hot-house world as economically positive, while others estimate a 65% loss of global GDP by 2100 or a 50–60% downside to existing financial assets if climate change is<strong> </strong>not mitigated. The authors argue that these estimates may themselves be conservative because they exclude tipping points and other unprecedented changes in the climate system.</p><p>The report also warns that carbon budgets may be smaller than assumed and that risks may emerge faster than expected. It notes that the remaining carbon budget for limiting warming to 1.5°C may already be zero under plausible assumptions.</p><p>These figures expose a deeper institutional failure. Financial institutions may report modest portfolio impacts under “hot-house” scenarios because their models are backward-looking and exclude ruinous, irreversible, or cascading risks. The report warns that artificially benign results can become an excuse for delaying action.</p><p>The implications for Europe are direct. If financial models understate physical climate risk, then they also understate the expected return on prevention: renewable energy, grid resilience, electrification, energy efficiency, and green hydrogen.</p><p>Capital is therefore allocated as though delay is cheap, when the evidence suggests that delay may be extraordinarily expensive.</p><p>Triodos’s estimate that extreme heat could erase around €180 billion of EU growth in a single year makes the point concrete. This is approximately the size of the entire collective EU budget. Europe is not choosing between spending money on the transition and saving money. It is choosing between investing in resilience now or absorbing recurring, compounding losses later — vastly outweighing our first experience of increased climate impacts witnessed in recent years.</p><h3>What Europe should change</h3><p>Europe does not need to replicate China’s authoritarian industrial model. But it does need to learn its central lesson: capital-intensive decarbonization requires mission-oriented finance.</p><p>The EU could introduce green targeted longer-term refinancing operations, giving banks lower-cost central-bank liquidity conditional on lending to credible decarbonization projects. European Parliament research has identified this as one way to soften the impact of high rates on green investment.</p><p>It could also expand public development-bank equity and guarantees for hydrogen retrofit, offshore-grid, and industrial-electrification projects; use carbon contracts for difference to stabilize revenues; and coordinate EU-level procurement of clean steel, cement, hydrogen, and batteries.</p><p>The goal would be to reduce financing risk and lower the weighted average cost of capital, not merely to offer grants after projects have already struggled to reach financial close.</p><h3>The choice Europe faces</h3><p>China has turned monetary policy into a tool of climate industrialization. It supplies low-cost credit, state-backed risk-bearing, and long-term planning to the sectors that will define the next energy system.</p><p>Europe has set<strong> </strong><a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/goals-and-reality-how-likely-is-the-eu-to-meet-its-climate-targets-and-what-is-necessary-to-ba678c0a823b?source=friends_link&amp;sk=2f072a163c9883285d023f0e32991e91"><strong>ambitious targets</strong></a> but still relies on a financial architecture that prices green investment as if climate breakdown were a distant externality.</p><p>The evidence suggests that this is no longer sustainable. Europe is already losing growth to extreme heat, while China converts financial capacity into renewable and hydrogen industrial power.</p><p>Unless the EU aligns its monetary, banking, and investment institutions with the urgency of decarbonization, it will continue to pay twice: first for climate damage in real time, and then for the clean technologies it failed to build quickly enough.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5047ee4b1fad" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/areas-producers/monetary-power-climate-breakdown-how-china-finances-the-green-transition-while-european-monetary-5047ee4b1fad">Monetary power, climate breakdown: how China finances the green transition while European monetary…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/areas-producers">Areas &amp; Producers</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[T&E block hydrogen to preserve value for fossil shareholders]]></title>
            <link>https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/t-e-block-hydrogen-to-preserve-value-for-fossil-shareholders-a46ca382e1b4?source=rss-412162597383------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[eu-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hydrogen]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lobbying]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 11:24:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-28T05:43:14.228Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/484/1*Y-sjcr5hGsn8SsGDf_QRfw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Transport &amp; Environment (T&amp;E), one of Europe’s most influential transport and climate NGOs, has built a lobbying record that <strong>systematically undermines hydrogen’s role</strong> in genuine emissions mitigation. While T&amp;E presents itself as a defender of climate integrity, its positions on <a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/in-detail-the-rfnbo-delegated-act-reports-dbe9c0851c38?source=friends_link&amp;sk=b0741c6b7139f1ec97f85c6b512877b6">Renewable Fuels of Non-Biological Origin</a> (RFNBO) subsidy rules, hydrogen imports, and the EU’s own hydrogen strategy reveal a pattern of obstruction that threatens the ability of a range of industries (beyond passenger vehicles) to decarbonise — heavy industry, aviation, shipping, seasonal energy storage and many others.</p><h4>Hydrogen’s established role in EU policy</h4><p>Hydrogen is not an optional extra in EU decarbonisation planning; it is a primary component. The <a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-07/hydrogen_strategy_0.pdf">EU Hydrogen Strategy (2020)</a> explicitly identifies hydrogen as essential for seasonal storage, “backup and buffering functions,” and as a vector connecting renewables production to distant demand centres. The European Parliament’s 2021 briefing underlines hydrogen’s “key role in a future climate-neutral economy,” enabling emission-free long-distance transport, heating, industrial processes, and inter-seasonal energy storage. <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/topics/energy/repowereu_en">REPowerEU (2022)</a> set targets of 10 million tonnes of domestic renewable hydrogen plus 10 million tonnes of imports by 2030, recognising that large-scale hydrogen is needed for hard-to-abate sectors and system resilience.</p><p>All EU policy strategy confirms this. The Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking’s 2025 work programme states that “hydrogen will have to be used for seasonal storage,” and that in aviation, “synthetic fuels produced from hydrogen are the only option to reduce carbon on a large scale.” The EU Parliament, EU Council, all 27 Member States through their NECPs, and both major European TSOs — ENTSO-E and ENTSOG/<a href="https://ennoh.eu/">ENNOH</a> —<strong> explicitly position hydrogen as the second pillar of a net zero economy alongside electrification</strong>. The <a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-07/hydrogen_strategy_0.pdf">EU Hydrogen Strategy</a>, the <a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/hydrogen-and-decarbonised-gas-market_en">Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market Package</a>, the <a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/infrastructure/european-grids_en">Grids Package (COM(2025) 1005)</a>, and the <a href="https://www.entsos-tyndp-scenarios.eu/">TSO TYNDP</a> all reflect this. The hard-to-abate industrial sectors — steel, cement, chemicals, shipping, aviation — cannot be electrified at scale. Green hydrogen is not a preference; it is a physical necessity for net zero.</p><h4>T&amp;E’s opposition to RFNBO revisions</h4><p>RFNBOs — renewable liquid and gaseous fuels of non-biological origin — include green hydrogen and hydrogen-derived e-fuels such as e-ammonia, e-methanol, and e-kerosene. The EU’s RFNBO Delegated Acts (2023) set rules for additionality, temporal correlation, and geographical correlation among other constraints to ensure that hydrogen counted as renewable truly adds new clean capacity.</p><p>T&amp;E has consistently lobbied to tighten these rules beyond what is technically or economically feasible, and to block any revision that would improve bankability or scale-up. In June 2022, T&amp;E submitted a consultation response opposing the grandfathering clause for pre-2027 installations, arguing it “undermines the regulatory framework.” This clause would have allowed electrolyser operators to be exempt from the &#39;additionality&#39; requirements beyond 2027, specifying only new non-grid-connected renewables that have not received any subsidies or state aid. In February 2026, T&amp;E co-signed a letter urging the Commission to “refrain from reopening or accelerating the review” of RFNBO requirements before 2028, even as <a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/top-50-criticisms-of-the-commissions-rfnbo-rules-ea2f4f3faf2f?source=friends_link&amp;sk=a1d64cdae19c1ace607a90a7117f425f">industry and parliamentarians called for a mid-2026 review</a> to align the rules with system realities.</p><p>More recently, T&amp;E has campaigned to bar renewable hydrogen used in biofuel refining from counting toward the e-SAF sub-mandate under ReFuelEU Aviation, arguing this would let refiners “meet obligations without producing genuine RFNBO-based fuels.” While framed as integrity protection, this position narrows the pathways for scaling e-fuels and delays deployment in aviation — exactly where hydrogen-derived fuels are the only viable decarbonisation option, and clear pathways to cost reduction are obvious.</p><h4>Blocking prospective hydrogen imports</h4><p>REPowerEU’s 10 million tonne import target depends on partnerships with third countries such as Chile, Egypt, Morocco, Namibia, Norway, and Oman. T&amp;E’s 2024 briefing “Hydrogen hype” explicitly calls for these ambitions to be “revised downwards, as these targets are unrealistically high,” and recommends that imports “should only be allowed if” stringent human rights and environmental conditions are met.</p><p>While due diligence is necessary, T&amp;E’s framing effectively blocks near-term import projects by setting conditions that few partner countries can currently satisfy. The briefing warns against “countries with bad track records” and insists that “industrial-scale deployment of renewable sources” must benefit local populations — criteria that, if applied rigidly, would disqualify most prospective suppliers and delay infrastructure for years. This stance <strong>contradicts the EU’s own strategy</strong>, which identifies neighbouring countries and global partners as essential to meeting 2030 targets and securing supply chains, and all independent and in-house studies show that <a href="https://afry.com/en/newsroom/news/gulf-europe-hydrogen-pipeline-joint-afry-and-rina-study-indicates-feasibility-and">cost reductions are a matter of course</a>.</p><h4>Obfuscation of hydrogen’s necessity</h4><p>T&amp;E’s public communications often present hydrogen as a marginal or overhyped solution, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Their policy papers emphasise risks, costs, and “unrealistic” targets while downplaying hydrogen’s unique capabilities in heavy industry, aviation, shipping, seasonal storage and other sectors. This narrative obscures the fact that batteries cannot provide multi-day or seasonal storage, that sustainable biofuels are limited by feedstock, and that electrification alone cannot decarbonise high-temperature industrial processes or long-distance transport.</p><p>By framing hydrogen as optional or secondary, T&amp;E creates political space for policies that prioritise <strong>short-term electrification at the expense of long-term system adequacy</strong>. This is not climate leadership; it is a form of obfuscation that delays the very investments needed for deep decarbonisation.</p><h4>T&amp;E within the broader lobbying context</h4><p>As outlined in my discussion piece <a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/policy-groups-ngos-and-lobbyists-a38cb486bfaa?source=friends_link&amp;sk=7d102dbe51d821e0264c89ef56ab201e"><em>Policy groups, NGOs and lobbyists</em></a> (Medium, 2026), influential NGOs and lobby groups often shape EU policy through targeted advocacy, coalition-building, and strategic framing. T&amp;E’s positions on RFNBOs, imports, and hydrogen’s role fit this pattern: they leverage their reputation for climate integrity to <strong>advance narrow policy preferences that, in practice, block scalable solutions</strong>.</p><p>This is not to say that all NGO input is harmful — rigorous standards matter. But when an organisation <strong>systematically opposes the tools that make decarbonisation physically possible</strong>, it ceases to be a constructive actor and becomes a barrier to progress.</p><h4>Why this matters for emissions mitigation</h4><p>Heavy industry, aviation, shipping, and seasonal storage account for a large share of Europe’s residual emissions. <strong>Without hydrogen, these sectors cannot reach net-zero</strong>. Blocking necessary RFNBO revisions delays e-fuel deployment in aviation and shipping. Blocking imports constrains supply and raises costs. Blocking hydrogen’s stated role in EU policy undermines investor confidence and slows infrastructure build-out.</p><p>T&amp;E’s lobbying may score short-term rhetorical victories, but it undermines the long-term goal of genuine emissions mitigation. If Europe is to meet its climate targets, hydrogen must be scaled — not blocked behind the scenes by a group <strong>purporting to support decarbonisation goals</strong>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a46ca382e1b4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Top 50 criticisms of the EU Commission’s RFNBO rules]]></title>
            <link>https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/top-50-criticisms-of-the-commissions-rfnbo-rules-ea2f4f3faf2f?source=rss-412162597383------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ea2f4f3faf2f</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 11:12:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-22T14:25:16.021Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0OgoXOt2eyBce0fwt_D4QQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1184 requires hydrogen producers using contracted power to conclude PPAs with new renewable capacity that came into operation no more than 36 months before the electrolyser and received no operating or investment aid. Production must also be matched to renewable generation in time and place. The Commission has now committed to a targeted review of these production criteria, but its energy director-general told MEPs in July that the proposal would slip to the autumn. The fifty criticisms below, all arguing that the rules are too strict or that their revision is too slow, are grouped by who made them.</p><h3>Governments and heads of state</h3><p><strong>1. Robert Habeck, German economy minister (September 2024).</strong> In a leaked letter to Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson, Habeck argued for postponing additionality until 2035 and hourly temporal correlation until 2031.<br> Reference: King &amp; Spalding, “News on Potential Relaxation of EU Green Hydrogen Rules,” 23 September 2024<br> <a href="https://www.kslaw.com/news-and-insights/news-on-potential-relaxation-of-eu-green-hydrogen-rules">https://www.kslaw.com/news-and-insights/news-on-potential-relaxation-of-eu-green-hydrogen-rules</a></p><p><strong>2. Olaf Scholz, German Chancellor (January 2025).</strong> In a letter to von der Leyen on cutting bureaucracy, Scholz singled out the “excessively strict requirements for green hydrogen” as a brake on European competitiveness.<br> Reference: FuelCellChina / Hydrogen Insight, “German chancellor calls on EU to shelve ‘excessively strict’ green hydrogen definition”<br> <a href="https://www.fuelcellchina.com/Industry_information_details/5543.html">https://www.fuelcellchina.com/Industry_information_details/5543.html</a></p><p><strong>3. Katherina Reiche and the German economy ministry (2025).</strong> Reiche said EU hydrogen regulation had been so tough that the industry had no chance to develop, and called for changes to time matching and additionality. Her ministry said the strict definition should be dismantled and replaced with pragmatic criteria.<br> Reference: energate messenger, “Reiche wants to change criteria for green hydrogen”<br> <a href="https://www.energate-messenger.com/news/253161/reiche-wants-to-change-criteria-for-green-hydrogen">https://www.energate-messenger.com/news/253161/reiche-wants-to-change-criteria-for-green-hydrogen</a><br> Reference: gasworld, “Germany backs calls to relax EU green hydrogen criteria”<br> <a href="https://www.gasworld.com/story/germany-backs-calls-to-relax-eu-green-hydrogen-criteria/2243506.article/">https://www.gasworld.com/story/germany-backs-calls-to-relax-eu-green-hydrogen-criteria/2243506.article/</a></p><p><strong>4. Twelve Member States (by June 2025).</strong> When the European Parliament voted its resolution (item 9), it was reported as joining calls already made by twelve Member States to reassess the delegated act.<br> Reference: Hydrogen Insight, “European Parliament formally urges European Commission to propose changes to controversial green hydrogen rules,” 20 June 2025<br> <a href="https://www.hydrogeninsight.com/policy/european-parliament-formally-urges-european-commission-to-propose-changes-to-controversial-green-hydrogen-rules/2-1-1835764">https://www.hydrogeninsight.com/policy/european-parliament-formally-urges-european-commission-to-propose-changes-to-controversial-green-hydrogen-rules/2-1-1835764</a></p><p><strong>5. Emmanuel Macron, French President (11 February 2026).</strong> At the Antwerp Industrial Summit, Macron said the EU had fragmented the hydrogen market by design. He argued that the renewable-power sourcing requirements had created needless complexity and slowed market development.<br> Reference: gasworld, “Macron urges overhaul of EU hydrogen rules in competitiveness push,” February 2026<br> <a href="https://www.gasworld.com/story/macron-urges-overhaul-of-eu-hydrogen-rules-in-competitiveness-push/2244215.article/">https://www.gasworld.com/story/macron-urges-overhaul-of-eu-hydrogen-rules-in-competitiveness-push/2244215.article/</a></p><p><strong>6. Five Member States’ Directors-General (late March 2026).</strong> Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria and Poland told the Commission that renewable hydrogen costs under the RFNBO criteria remain prohibitively high in some cases, and that the cost gap with fossil hydrogen has widened, partly because of the framework itself.<br> Reference: Joint letter published by Table.Media<br> <a href="https://table.media/assets/europa/rfnbo-delegated-act.pdf">https://table.media/assets/europa/rfnbo-delegated-act.pdf</a></p><p><strong>7. France, the Netherlands and Denmark (spring 2026).</strong> All three submitted formal communications urging revision. The Danish and Dutch submissions stressed the constraints of geographic correlation.<br> Reference: Capstone DC, “The European Commission’s Hydrogen Pivot,” 20 May 2026<br> <a href="https://capstonedc.com/insights/the-european-commissions-hydrogen-pivot/">https://capstonedc.com/insights/the-european-commissions-hydrogen-pivot/</a></p><p><strong>8. Germany’s domestic hydrogen overhaul (2025–26).</strong> Germany effectively dropped the RFNBO label in its own hydrogen policy, pledging equal support for all low-carbon hydrogen rather than only hydrogen meeting the EU renewable definition.<br> Reference: Advanced BioFuels USA / FuelCellsWorks, “EU to Accelerate Renewable Hydrogen Review”<br> <a href="https://advancedbiofuelsusa.info/eu-to-accelerate-renewable-hydrogen-review">https://advancedbiofuelsusa.info/eu-to-accelerate-renewable-hydrogen-review</a></p><h3>European Parliament</h3><p><strong>9. Plenary resolution (June 2025).</strong> Parliament suggested the framework may be limiting scale-up and keeping costs high. It called for a science-based but flexible revision and an assessment of options to simplify or phase in the rules.<br> Reference: gasworld, “European Parliament calls for flexible revision of RFNBO rules,” June 2025<br> <a href="https://www.gasworld.com/story/european-parliament-calls-for-flexible-revision-of-rfnbo-rules/2243071.article/">https://www.gasworld.com/story/european-parliament-calls-for-flexible-revision-of-rfnbo-rules/2243071.article/</a></p><p><strong>10. Letter from 55 MEPs (June 2025).</strong> The MEPs argued the rules are too rigid and could shut many countries out of supplying hydrogen to the EU, deterring investment.<br> Reference: Hydrogen Fuel News, “European Parliament Pushes for Cleaner Hydrogen Future with RFNBO Rule Revisions,” 2 July 2025<br> <a href="https://www.hydrogenfuelnews.com/european-parliament-pushes-for-cleaner-hydrogen-future-with-rfnbo-rule-revisions/8571522">https://www.hydrogenfuelnews.com/european-parliament-pushes-for-cleaner-hydrogen-future-with-rfnbo-rule-revisions/8571522</a></p><p><strong>11. MEPs’ letter (December 2025).</strong> A group of MEPs wrote to the Commission asking for the production rules to be revised in 2026.<br> Reference: Quantum Commodity Intelligence, “MEPs call for 2026 review of RFNBO production rules,” 23 December 2025<br> <a href="https://www.qcintel.com/biofuels/article/meps-call-for-2026-review-of-rfnbo-production-rules-55560.html">https://www.qcintel.com/biofuels/article/meps-call-for-2026-review-of-rfnbo-production-rules-55560.html</a></p><h3>Industry associations</h3><p><strong>12. Hydrogen Europe impact assessment (July 2023).</strong> Hydrogen Europe warned that restricting access to renewable assets could backfire. Industrial users whose power needs exceed local renewable potential might choose CCS instead, producing fewer RFNBOs and fewer additional renewables.<br> Reference: Hydrogen Europe, “Impact assessment of the RED II Delegated Acts on RFNBO and GHG accounting”<br> <a href="https://hydrogeneurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Impact-Assessment-on-the-RED-II-DAs.pdf">https://hydrogeneurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Impact-Assessment-on-the-RED-II-DAs.pdf</a></p><p><strong>13. eFuel Alliance (June 2023).</strong> On the acts’ entry into force, managing director Ralf Diemer called them too late and too bureaucratic. He said the restrictive additionality and correlation conditions would keep hampering first projects.<br> Reference: eFuel Alliance press release, 12 June 2023 (German)<br> <a href="https://www.efuel-alliance.eu/fileadmin/Downloads/Pressemitteilungen_2023/20230612_PM_DelegatedActs_DE_Final.pdf">https://www.efuel-alliance.eu/fileadmin/Downloads/Pressemitteilungen_2023/20230612_PM_DelegatedActs_DE_Final.pdf</a></p><p><strong>14. Fertilizers Europe (January 2025).</strong> The fertiliser industry called for an urgent evaluation of the act. It said the strict rules were already having an alarming effect on investment, and asked for low-carbon PPAs to be brought into scope.<br> Reference: Fertilizers Europe position paper, January 2025<br> <a href="https://www.fertilizerseurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Fertilizers-Europes-position-on-the-RFNBO-DA-earlier-review-.pdf">https://www.fertilizerseurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Fertilizers-Europes-position-on-the-RFNBO-DA-earlier-review-.pdf</a></p><p><strong>15. eFuel Alliance (March 2025).</strong> The e-fuel lobby formally called on the EU to relax the RFNBO criteria.<br> Reference: Quantum Commodity Intelligence, “e-Fuel Alliance urges EU to relax RFNBO criteria,” 5 March 2025<br> <a href="https://www.qcintel.com/biofuels/article/e-fuel-alliance-urges-eu-to-relax-rfnbo-criteria-37162.html">https://www.qcintel.com/biofuels/article/e-fuel-alliance-urges-eu-to-relax-rfnbo-criteria-37162.html</a></p><p><strong>16. HYTEP, the Czech Hydrogen Technology Platform (early 2025).</strong> HYTEP argued the rules disproportionately disadvantage countries with lower renewable potential, such as Czechia. It also said hourly correlation prevents electrolysers from reaching the capacity factors their high capex requires.<br> Reference: HYTEP, “Policy Paper_RFNBO”<br> <a href="https://www.hytep.cz/images/dokumenty-ke-stazeni/Policy%20Paper_RFNBO_HYTEP.pdf">https://www.hytep.cz/images/dokumenty-ke-stazeni/Policy%20Paper_RFNBO_HYTEP.pdf</a></p><p><strong>17. Hydrogen Europe on PPAs (February 2026).</strong> Hydrogen Europe argued the act contradicts the Draghi report’s call for liquid PPA markets. It said the act limits PPA supply by excluding state-aided projects, restricts resale of power, and limits the use of intermediaries.<br> Reference: Hydrogen Europe contribution to call for evidence, February 2026<br> <a href="https://hydrogeneurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/PPAs-for-RFNBO_call-for-evidence_v5.pdf">https://hydrogeneurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/PPAs-for-RFNBO_call-for-evidence_v5.pdf</a></p><p><strong>18. Hydrogen Europe on the post-2030 RED (April 2026).</strong> The association cited slow implementation and rule complexity as reasons investment has slowed. It noted that most Member States still hadn’t transposed RED III’s hydrogen provisions almost a year after the deadline.<br> Reference: Hydrogen Europe, Post-2030 RED Framework consultation response, April 2026<br> <a href="https://hydrogeneurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Post-2030-RED-Framework-Consultation_Call-For-Evidence_Hydrogen-Europe_-April-2026.pdf">https://hydrogeneurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Post-2030-RED-Framework-Consultation_Call-For-Evidence_Hydrogen-Europe_-April-2026.pdf</a></p><p><strong>19. eFuel Alliance (June 2026).</strong> Of more than 300 announced e-fuel projects globally, only 6% have reached FID, according to the Alliance. It argued the 2030 RED and ReFuelEU targets need urgent political adjustment of the stringent production rules.<br> Reference: eFuel Alliance, “Aligning RFNBO Production Criteria with Industry Realities,” June 2026<br> <a href="https://www.efuel-alliance.eu/fileadmin/Downloads/Positionspapiere/260625_eFuel_Alliance_new_position_RFNBO_DAs.pdf">https://www.efuel-alliance.eu/fileadmin/Downloads/Positionspapiere/260625_eFuel_Alliance_new_position_RFNBO_DAs.pdf</a></p><p><strong>20. Eight-association coalition (July 2026).</strong> CO2 Value Europe, the eFuel Alliance, the eNG Coalition, Eurogas, Hydrogen Europe, the Methanol Institute, VDMA and ERGaR called for additionality relief and monthly matching until at least 2035, robust grandfathering, and a completed amendment by the end of 2026.<br> Reference: ERGaR, “ERGaR co-signs a joint letter calling for the targeted revision of RFNBO production criteria,” 8 July 2026<br> <a href="https://www.ergar.org/2026/07/ergar-co-signs-a-joint-letter-calling-for-the-targeted-revision-of-rfnbo-production-criteria/">https://www.ergar.org/2026/07/ergar-co-signs-a-joint-letter-calling-for-the-targeted-revision-of-rfnbo-production-criteria/</a></p><p><strong>21. Eurofer, the European steel association (July 2026).</strong> Eurofer said it is unrealistic to expect near-full decarbonisation of steel on the original timeline without guaranteed access to affordable clean power and green hydrogen. It said the EU has yet to deliver the enabling conditions it promised.<br> Reference: gasworld, “Steel industry slams EU ETS reform, says clean hydrogen still won’t arrive in time,” July 2026<br> <a href="https://www.gasworld.com/story/steel-industry-slams-eu-ets-reform-says-clean-hydrogen-still-wont-arrive-in-time/2254884.article/">https://www.gasworld.com/story/steel-industry-slams-eu-ets-reform-says-clean-hydrogen-still-wont-arrive-in-time/2254884.article/</a></p><h3>Manufacturers, developers and certifiers</h3><p><strong>22. Electrolyser manufacturers’ letter (29 September 2025).</strong> The CEOs said Europe had deployed less than 1 GW against its 6 GW target for 2024, and that more than 50 projects had been cancelled in 18 months, at least 80% of them early-stage RFNBO projects. Signatories included Nel, Siemens Energy, Sunfire, Topsoe, thyssenkrupp nucera and Bosch.<br> Reference: Letter to President von der Leyen, hosted by Nel<br> <a href="https://nelhydrogen.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/FAO_President-von-der-Leyen_Electrolyzer-manufacturers-H2-reg-framework.pdf">https://nelhydrogen.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/FAO_President-von-der-Leyen_Electrolyzer-manufacturers-H2-reg-framework.pdf</a></p><p><strong>23. Electrolysers for Europe (early 2026).</strong> The new manufacturers’ alliance highlighted the gap between potential and reality: 84 GW of potential capacity, but only 2.8 GW under construction.<br> Reference: Industrial Info Resources, “Europe’s Hydrogen Industry Bands Together”<br> <a href="https://www.industrialinfo.com/news/article/europes-hydrogen-industry-bands-together--353324">https://www.industrialinfo.com/news/article/europes-hydrogen-industry-bands-together--353324</a></p><p><strong>24. Shell (October 2025).</strong> Anna Mascolo, executive vice-president for low-carbon solutions, said hourly matching would kill electrolysers through degradation.<br> Reference: Argus Media, “EU RFNBO rules divide hydrogen industry,” 3 October 2025<br> <a href="https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2738521-eu-rfnbo-rules-divide-hydrogen-industry">https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2738521-eu-rfnbo-rules-divide-hydrogen-industry</a></p><p><strong>25. Repsol, Orlen and Yara (October 2025).</strong> Repsol’s hydrogen director Tomas Malango estimated hourly correlation could add about a third to hydrogen costs. Orlen and Yara raised similar concerns.<br> Reference: Hydrogen Central, “EU RFNBO rules divide hydrogen industry”<br> <a href="https://hydrogen-central.com/eu-rfnbo-rules-divide-hydrogen-industry/">https://hydrogen-central.com/eu-rfnbo-rules-divide-hydrogen-industry/</a></p><p><strong>26. Envision (June 2026).</strong> A major producer told Hydrogen Insight that certified-renewable cargoes planned for later this year are still not cleared to enter the EU without punitive carbon charges. It blamed disjointed rules and a lack of official auditors.<br> Reference: Hydrogen Insight, “Disjointed EU rules — and lack of official auditors — is putting RFNBO imports in jeopardy,” 9 June 2026<br> <a href="https://www.hydrogeninsight.com/production/exclusive-disjointed-eu-rules-and-lack-of-official-auditors-is-putting-rfnbo-imports-in-jeopardy/2-1-1996419">https://www.hydrogeninsight.com/production/exclusive-disjointed-eu-rules-and-lack-of-official-auditors-is-putting-rfnbo-imports-in-jeopardy/2-1-1996419</a></p><p><strong>27. CertifHy (July 2026).</strong> CertifHy’s head warned that more projects would delay FIDs unless the Commission quickly gave certainty, after the proposal slipped from June to the autumn.<br> Reference: gasworld, “‘The target keeps moving’: CertifHy boss warns EU rules delay threatens hydrogen investment,” 20 July 2026<br> <a href="https://www.gasworld.com/story/the-target-keeps-moving-certifhy-boss-warns-eu-rules-delay-threatens-hydrogen-investment/2254802.article.article/">https://www.gasworld.com/story/the-target-keeps-moving-certifhy-boss-warns-eu-rules-delay-threatens-hydrogen-investment/2254802.article.article/</a></p><h3>Exporters and third-country developers</h3><p><strong>28. Legal concerns over exports and delegated authority (September 2023).</strong> King &amp; Spalding reported industry arguments that the state-aid ban on renewable generation applies even to support given outside the EU. They also flagged the requirement for PPAs to run directly between producer and generator. Some in industry went further, arguing the Commission may have exceeded its delegated authority, since RED II’s additionality recital is less strict than the final test.<br> Reference: King &amp; Spalding, “EU regulatory challenges complicating the development of international green hydrogen projects,” 5 September 2023<br> <a href="https://www.kslaw.com/insights/articles/eu-regulatory-challenges-complicating-the-development-of-international-green-hydrogen-projects">https://www.kslaw.com/insights/articles/eu-regulatory-challenges-complicating-the-development-of-international-green-hydrogen-projects</a></p><p><strong>29. Solar Energy Corporation of India (October 2025).</strong> Director Sanjay Sharma said hourly matching would prevent efficient battery use at hydrogen and ammonia plants. He also said geographic correlation leaves it unclear whether India’s grid counts as one bidding zone.<br> Reference: Hydrogen Central, “EU RFNBO rules divide hydrogen industry”<br> <a href="https://hydrogen-central.com/eu-rfnbo-rules-divide-hydrogen-industry/">https://hydrogen-central.com/eu-rfnbo-rules-divide-hydrogen-industry/</a></p><p><strong>30. Colombian case study (March 2026).</strong> A GIZ-backed programme found that a Colombian developer had no clarity on how additionality applied to its project, which relied on a decades-old hydropower plant.<br> Reference: International PtX Hub, “H2Uppp EU RFNBO Compendium 2026”<br> <a href="https://ptx-hub.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/H2Uppp_EU-RFNBO-Compendium_2026.pdf">https://ptx-hub.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/H2Uppp_EU-RFNBO-Compendium_2026.pdf</a></p><h3>International bodies and auditors</h3><p><strong>31. European Court of Auditors (2024).</strong> The ECA found that the Commission did not carry out an impact assessment before proposing the rules, because none is legally required for a delegated act.<br> Reference: ECA Special Report 11/2024, “The EU’s industrial policy on renewable hydrogen”<br> <a href="https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2024-11/SR-2024-11_EN.pdf">https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2024-11/SR-2024-11_EN.pdf</a></p><p><strong>32. International Energy Agency (September 2024).</strong> Speaking generally rather than about the EU specifically, the IEA said additionality and correlation requirements should be applied with caution. It warned that very restrictive criteria in the early scale-up phase risk delaying investment.<br> Reference: HydroNews, “Also according to the IEA, overly strict criteria on RFNBOs…,” 26 September 2024<br> <a href="https://www.hydronews.it/en/also-according-to-the-iea-too-strict-criteria-on-rfnbo-such-as-the-european-ones-could-hinder-the-scale-up-of-theh2/?amp=1">https://www.hydronews.it/en/also-according-to-the-iea-too-strict-criteria-on-rfnbo-such-as-the-european-ones-could-hinder-the-scale-up-of-theh2/?amp=1</a></p><p><strong>33. IEA at the World Hydrogen Summit (May 2026).</strong> Even as Middle Eastern exporters argued against revising the rules, the IEA warned against overly restrictive regulation as the market grows.<br> Reference: Hydrogen Insight, “Middle Eastern green hydrogen exporters argue against revision of European RFNBO rules,” 19 May 2026<br> <a href="https://www.hydrogeninsight.com/policy/middle-eastern-green-hydrogen-exporters-argue-against-revision-of-european-rfnbo-rules/2-1-1991512">https://www.hydrogeninsight.com/policy/middle-eastern-green-hydrogen-exporters-argue-against-revision-of-european-rfnbo-rules/2-1-1991512</a></p><h3>Analysts, consultancies and trade press</h3><p><strong>34. Aurora Energy Research (April 2025).</strong> Aurora found that even the lowest-cost regions, the Nordics and Iberia, achieve RFNBO costs of €5.4–10.6/kg. That is above the Commission’s own €4–8/kg estimate.<br> Reference: H2 View, “Nordics and Iberia offer Europe’s lowest-cost RFNBO hydrogen: Aurora Energy Research,” 17 April 2025<br> <a href="https://www.h2-view.com/story/nordics-and-iberia-offer-europes-lowest-cost-rfnbo-hydrogen-aurora-energy-research/2124703.article/">https://www.h2-view.com/story/nordics-and-iberia-offer-europes-lowest-cost-rfnbo-hydrogen-aurora-energy-research/2124703.article/</a></p><p><strong>35. Wood Mackenzie (January 2026).</strong> Wood Mackenzie said the rules have slowed project development, distorted investment decisions and add around $1–2/kg to production costs.<br> Reference: gasworld, “EU hydrogen market set for non-RFNBO shift in 2026, analyst says,” 8 January 2026<br> <a href="https://www.gasworld.com/story/eu-hydrogen-market-set-for-non-rfnbo-shift-in-2026-analyst-says/2244064.article/">https://www.gasworld.com/story/eu-hydrogen-market-set-for-non-rfnbo-shift-in-2026-analyst-says/2244064.article/</a></p><p><strong>36. EY Hyvolution index (February 2026).</strong> EY noted that 80% of capacity from the first Hydrogen Bank auctions was cancelled. It reported the Commission’s own acknowledgement that aiming for 100% RFNBO compliance can impede industry development.<br> Reference: EY, “Hyvolution European Hydrogen and Derivatives Index 2026”<br> <a href="https://www.ey.com/content/dam/ey-unified-site/ey-com/fr-fr/insights/climate-change-sustainability-services/documents/ey-hyvolution-european-09022026.pdf">https://www.ey.com/content/dam/ey-unified-site/ey-com/fr-fr/insights/climate-change-sustainability-services/documents/ey-hyvolution-european-09022026.pdf</a></p><p><strong>37. Capstone (May 2026).</strong> Capstone estimated that delaying additionality and hourly correlation could cut RFNBO prices by about €2/kg, from roughly €6/kg to €4/kg.<br> Reference: Capstone DC, “The European Commission’s Hydrogen Pivot,” 20 May 2026<br> <a href="https://capstonedc.com/insights/the-european-commissions-hydrogen-pivot/">https://capstonedc.com/insights/the-european-commissions-hydrogen-pivot/</a></p><p><strong>38. Stibbe (2026).</strong> The law firm described a chicken-and-egg problem: offtake needs competitively priced supply, and the strict criteria make such supply hard to achieve in the short term.<br> Reference: Stibbe, “Renewable hydrogen in the EU: a framework under pressure”<br> <a href="https://www.stibbe.com/publications-and-insights/renewable-hydrogen-in-the-eu-a-framework-under-pressure">https://www.stibbe.com/publications-and-insights/renewable-hydrogen-in-the-eu-a-framework-under-pressure</a></p><p><strong>39. Hydrogen Insight on the delay (July 2026).</strong> Hydrogen Insight reported that developers were left in limbo after the Commission missed its end-of-June target.<br> Reference: Hydrogen Insight, “EU review of RFNBO Delegated Act delayed until autumn…,” 15 July 2026<br> <a href="https://www.hydrogeninsight.com/policy/eu-review-of-rfnbo-delegated-act-delayed-until-autumn-but-new-hydrogen-strategy-due-by-year-s-end/2-1-2017250">https://www.hydrogeninsight.com/policy/eu-review-of-rfnbo-delegated-act-delayed-until-autumn-but-new-hydrogen-strategy-due-by-year-s-end/2-1-2017250</a></p><p><strong>40. gasworld analysis (July 2026).</strong> gasworld wrote that the delay had reignited concerns about regulatory instability in the sector.<br> Reference: gasworld, “Analysis: What the hydrogen sector actually wants from Brussels’ RFNBO review,” 27 July 2026<br> <a href="https://www.gasworld.com/story/analysis-what-the-hydrogen-sector-actually-wants-from-brussels-rfnbo-review/2255308.article.article/">https://www.gasworld.com/story/analysis-what-the-hydrogen-sector-actually-wants-from-brussels-rfnbo-review/2255308.article.article/</a></p><p><strong>41. FuelCellsWorks (August 2026).</strong> It reported that only 3 GW of 31 GW of European green hydrogen capacity had reached FID, with projects held back by financing problems and regulatory delays.<br> Reference: FuelCellsWorks, “Europe’s Electrolyser Factories Sit Underused…,” 13 August 2026<br> <a href="https://fuelcellsworks.com/2026/08/13/electrolyzer/europe-s-electrolyser-factories-sit-underused-as-less-than-10-percent-of-2030-hydrogen-projects-reach-fid">https://fuelcellsworks.com/2026/08/13/electrolyzer/europe-s-electrolyser-factories-sit-underused-as-less-than-10-percent-of-2030-hydrogen-projects-reach-fid</a></p><h3>Academic and policy research</h3><p><strong>42. <em>Journal of World Energy Law &amp; Business</em> (2024).</strong> The article argues that an exaggerated focus on RFNBOs, at the expense of other forms of hydrogen, undermines the aim of building a hydrogen market quickly.<br> Reference: “Realism at the end of the rainbow? An argument towards diversifying hydrogen in EU regulation”<br> <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jwelb/article/17/4/217/7656876">https://academic.oup.com/jwelb/article/17/4/217/7656876</a></p><p><strong>43. <em>Energies</em> (January 2025).</strong> This review identifies complex certification requirements among the barriers holding back large-scale RFNBO adoption.<br> Reference: Graczyk et al., “Hydrogen as a Renewable Fuel of Non-Biological Origins in the European Union”<br> <a href="https://doaj.org/article/4033bd61f3e546c88cd6c33b8a46a3d3">https://doaj.org/article/4033bd61f3e546c88cd6c33b8a46a3d3</a></p><p><strong>44. EMPIRE model study (February 2025).</strong> Meeting the criteria would raise European system costs by €82 billion between 2024 and 2048, with additionality the most expensive requirement. The authors also found it the most effective at accelerating renewable deployment.<br> Reference: arXiv 2502.10859<br> <a href="https://arxiv.org/html/2502.10859v1">https://arxiv.org/html/2502.10859v1</a></p><p><strong>45. <em>Fuel</em> (2025).</strong> The study found the RFNBO rules conflict with the Energy Efficiency Directive and the waste hierarchy, and that the resulting regulatory inconsistency raises investment risk.<br> Reference: “Locked in on RFNBOs”, <em>Fuel</em><br> <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016236125029060">https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016236125029060</a></p><p><strong>46. EWI Cologne (October 2025).</strong> EWI modelled that the full criteria, including hourly matching, would raise average European hydrogen costs by about €10/MWh, driven mainly by additionality and hourly matching.<br> Reference: EWI, “Green Hydrogen Production under RFNBO Criteria,” 28 October 2025<br> <a href="https://www.ewi.uni-koeln.de/cms/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/20251028_EWI_GreenHydrogenProduktionUnderRFNBOCriteria.pdf">https://www.ewi.uni-koeln.de/cms/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/20251028_EWI_GreenHydrogenProduktionUnderRFNBOCriteria.pdf</a></p><p><strong>47. Ruhnau and Schiele (2023), as summarised in a 2025 review.</strong> Enforcing hourly matching raised the levelised cost of hydrogen from €3.3/kg to €4.5/kg. The same review notes other work finding only a 7–8% increase over monthly matching when cheap storage is available.<br> Reference: arXiv 2507.20702<br> <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.20702">https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.20702</a></p><p><strong>48. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (2026).</strong> Researcher Adrian Odenweller described the rules as intricate, with most details clarified only recently, which leads to delay. He nonetheless defended the need for regulation that ensures hydrogen cuts emissions.<br> Reference: Chemistry World, “Clean hydrogen project cancellations point to narrower future”<br> <a href="https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/clean-hydrogen-project-cancellations-point-to-narrower-future/4023051.article">https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/clean-hydrogen-project-cancellations-point-to-narrower-future/4023051.article</a></p><p><strong>49. Weather-variability study (August 2026).</strong> Robust hourly matching added $1.29/kg to hydrogen costs compared with annual matching. Matching 80–90% of hourly demand kept most of the emissions benefit at lower cost.<br> Reference: TechXplore, “New study highlights the weather-driven costs of 24/7 clean power matching,” August 2026<br> <a href="https://techxplore.com/news/2026-08-highlights-weather-driven-power.html">https://techxplore.com/news/2026-08-highlights-weather-driven-power.html</a></p><p><strong>50. German Bundestag lobby-register submission (29 April 2026).</strong> A filed statement argued that monthly correlation is sufficient and that additionality should not be required at all. It said renewable expansion should be driven by its own support schemes rather than loaded onto electrolyser projects.<br> Reference: Bundestag Lobbyregister, “RFNBO revision considerations”<br> <a href="https://www.lobbyregister.bundestag.de/media/19/79/761075/Stellungnahme-Gutachten-SG2606160061.pdf">https://www.lobbyregister.bundestag.de/media/19/79/761075/Stellungnahme-Gutachten-SG2606160061.pdf</a></p><h3>How far from target</h3><p>These criticisms carry weight because the gap between ambition and delivery is large.</p><ul><li><strong>The missed interim target.</strong> The 2020 Hydrogen Strategy’s goal of 6 GW of electrolysis by 2024 was not met. REPowerEU then set a 2030 target of 40 GW, producing 10 million tonnes domestically plus 10 million tonnes of imports.</li><li><strong>Where capacity stands now.</strong> As of Q1 2026, about 648 MWel was operational in Europe and 4 GWel had reached FID. That is roughly 1.6% of the 2030 capacity goal. For the EU27, the Joint Research Centre estimated between 514 and 800 MWel at the end of 2025.</li><li><strong>The industry’s own outlook.</strong> Hydrogen Europe expects about 1.7 Mt of electrolytic hydrogen by 2030, from 10–20 GW of electrolysers. That is less than a fifth of the domestic target.</li><li><strong>The legislated demand.</strong> Even RED III’s binding demand amounts to only about 2.8 Mt by 2030, needing around 26 GW.</li></ul><p>The Commission itself now concedes that production is “far, far away” from what was collectively expected.</p><p><em>[Note: this post was written entirely by Claude with zero editing; it is not nuanced with minimal prompting]</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ea2f4f3faf2f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[In depth: what is going on in the ECB and how monetary policy is vital to avert climate collapse]]></title>
            <link>https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/in-depth-what-is-going-on-in-the-ecb-and-how-monetary-policy-is-vital-to-avert-climate-collapse-ab146d461d39?source=rss-412162597383------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab146d461d39</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 10:40:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-14T10:45:24.720Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BhfKv38syEIWs8CWFYRewA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The ECB headquarters in Frankfurt</figcaption></figure><h4><strong><em>Part one: Who moves between the ECB, the Commission and the asset managers</em></strong></h4><h4><strong><em>Part two: ECB candidates 2026–27 and their stance on climate to date</em></strong></h4><h4><strong><em>Part three: The legitimate tools the ECB has to shift investment to renewables</em></strong></h4><p><em>Note: this is an extrapolation of the previous two-part series focusing on the cost of climate change and the role of monetary policy. This 3-part sequence was written entirely by Claude with minimal-to-zero editing.</em></p><h3>Part one: Who moves between the ECB, the Commission and the asset managers</h3><h4><em>Revolving doors</em></h4><p>I ended the last piece saying the group is not a list of names but a position in the capital structure. True, and a convenient place to stop. The position has to be occupied by people, and those people publish enough about themselves that the pattern can be assembled without speculation.</p><p>Three things first. Nothing here alleges illegality: almost every move below was authorised and disclosed, and most were cleared by the relevant ethics procedure. That is the point, not an excuse — a system producing these outcomes through its own compliance processes is worse than one producing them through corruption, because corruption can be prosecuted. Second, I am not claiming individuals hold fossil interests and act on them; I have no evidence for that. The claim is narrower: the people staffing Europe&#39;s financial and climate institutions are drawn from, and return to, a professional world with a shared model of how the economy works, and that model filters the policy options before anyone votes. Third, the pattern is not uniform. Some people do not walk through the door.</p><h4>Who is in the room</h4><p>Corporate Europe Observatory&#39;s work on DG FISMA — the Commission directorate writing Europe&#39;s banking and sustainable finance rules — found that across 2008 to 2017 roughly a third of its senior officials had arrived from or left for the financial industry, and that four of the five people who directed it in that period went on to work for financial firms or lobby on their behalf.</p><p>At the ECB the equivalent is the advisory group system, whose membership CEO&#39;s audit found dominated by the large financial institutions its decisions affect. The ECB&#39;s answer is that it needs market expertise, which is true. What it has never answered is why expertise is only ever sourced from one side of the market — why the people who would pay more under a differentiated rate regime are in the room and the people who would pay less are not.</p><p>This is the quiet part of capture. It requires only that &quot;somebody who understands this&quot; and &quot;somebody with an interest in the outcome&quot; be allowed to converge.</p><h4>BlackRock</h4><p>In March 2020 the Commission awarded a contract to BlackRock&#39;s Financial Markets Advisory arm to study the integration of ESG factors into EU banking rules. BlackRock is the largest asset manager in the world and among the largest shareholders in both the European banks the rules would govern and the fossil companies those banks lend to. Its bid for the roughly €280,000 contract was, the European Ombudsman later noted, exceptionally low — low enough to read as an attempt to buy influence rather than win a fee.</p><p>Emily O&#39;Reilly&#39;s November 2020 decision found the Commission had not provided sufficient guarantees to exclude legitimate doubt about conflict of interest, and that a company applying to write a study feeding into regulation of its own business should have triggered far more scrutiny. She recommended tighter guidelines and stronger conflict provisions in the Financial Regulation.</p><p>The Commission observed that the Ombudsman had not identified maladministration, stated the rules had been applied fully and fairly, and kept the contract. That is the system in one paragraph: the watchdog identifies the conflict, is technically correct in a way that carries no consequence, and the work proceeds.</p><h4>Why the rules don’t work</h4><p>In 2020 the European Banking Authority&#39;s executive director, Adam Farkas, left to run AFME, the principal lobby for the wholesale financial industry the EBA regulates. The EBA initially cleared it. The relevant statistic from that episode: roughly one in two hundred applications by departing officials to take up new employment is refused. A regime rejecting half a percent is not a filter, it is a paper record of having considered the question.</p><p>Against which, fairly: Mairead McGuinness, financial services commissioner to 2024, went to an unpaid non-profit role, not a bank. The argument is not that every individual is compromised. It is that the system needs only enough of them, often enough, to set the ambient expectation of what a sensible policy looks like.</p><h4>The ECB’s five-year attrition</h4><p>The most instructive case is not a personnel move. The ECB&#39;s climate programme reads as a timeline in which every instrument that would have imposed a cost was removed, and every instrument that survived costs nobody anything.</p><p>2021: the strategy review commits to climate in monetary policy, collateral and disclosure.</p><p>October 2022: tilting of corporate bond reinvestments begins, and works.</p><p>2023: the reinvestments end, the balance sheet moves to run-off, and the tilting mechanism is switched off along with the thing it operated on.</p><p>July 2024: the Governing Council rejects concentration limits on high-carbon collateral for lacking technical preconditions, announcing a &quot;climate factor&quot; instead.</p><p>July 2025: the collateral reform containing it is announced.</p><p>2026: still being calibrated.</p><p>Five years, one instrument deployed then discontinued, one rejected as premature, one still in development. No differentiated rate, no targeted operation, no capital charge — not rejected on the merits, never seriously tabled.</p><p>And the honest part: Frank Elderson and Isabel Schnabel pushed this from inside. The reformers exist. They lost — not to a conspiracy but to a Governing Council where a measure repricing real balance sheets could not carry the room while a haircut methodology adjustment could. Capture from the inside does not feel like corruption. It feels like the responsible option repeatedly turning out to be the one that hurts nobody in particular.</p><h4>The ledger, 2019–2026</h4><p>Set the biographies aside. Omnibus I entered into force in March 2026: CSRD now applies only to firms with 1,000+ employees and over €450m turnover, listed SMEs are out of scope, mandatory ESRS data points are cut by roughly 70%, taxonomy reporting is optional for anyone descoped — around 80% of the intended reporting population gone. CSDDD is deferred to 2027–28. The 2040 target was adopted on 5 March 2026 at 90%, with up to 5 points meetable through international credits, so 85% domestic. ETS2 is pushed from 2027 to 2028, roughly €50bn in forgone auction revenue. In May 2026 Hoekstra told the environment committee the ETS review would assess a slower phase-out of free allowances.</p><p>Seven years. Every one moved the same direction. Not one moved the other way.</p><p>Each has a defensible independent rationale — SME burden is real, ETS2 would have hit energy bills, Poland&#39;s objections were not manufactured. But a coin landing the same way seven times is not evidence about any individual toss. It is evidence about the coin. When every close call resolves for the incumbent, the explanation is not in the decisions but in the structure that generated the options.</p><h4>What the group is</h4><p>Not a committee. A professional class with a common formation — central banking, finance ministries, asset managers, consultancies, lobby associations — who move between these posts over a career and hold in common one assumption: that private finance&#39;s participation in the transition must be attracted, never required.</p><p>Everything follows. Incentives, disclosure regimes, de-risking facilities, taxonomies. Excluded: mandates, price differentials, capital charges, caps. Install that assumption and the entire menu contains nothing a shareholder need fear, and the people choosing from it can do so in good faith and still arrive, seven times from seven, at the same place.</p><p>That is why the revolving door matters more than anyone passing through it. It is not primarily a mechanism for buying people. It is a mechanism for ensuring the assumption never has to defend itself in a room where somebody disagrees.</p><h3>Part two: ECB candidates 2026–27 and their stance on climate to date</h3><h4><em>The appointment process now under way, the candidates in circulation, and what their published positions actually say.</em></h4><p>There is a decision being taken over the next eighteen months that will do more to determine Europe&#39;s emissions trajectory than anything agreed at a COP, and almost nobody outside a small professional circle is watching it.</p><p>Between May 2026 and December 2027, four of the six seats on the ECB&#39;s Executive Board change hands. Luis de Guindos has already gone, replaced as vice-president by Boris Vujčić on 1 June 2026. Philip Lane&#39;s term as chief economist expires in May 2027, Lagarde&#39;s presidency in October 2027, Isabel Schnabel&#39;s seat in December 2027. Only Frank Elderson and Piero Cipollone carry over.</p><p>That is the largest reconfiguration of European monetary policy since the euro&#39;s creation, and it will decide who sets the price of capital through the decade in which climate damages become the dominant fact of the European economy. It will be settled by heads of government in summer 2027, on criteria including nationality, size of member state, gender balance, hawk–dove equilibrium and how many other top jobs a country already holds. Climate will not be among them. The word will not be spoken in the room.</p><h4>How it is decided</h4><p>Formally, the European Council appoints by qualified majority after consulting the Parliament and the Governing Council. The Parliament&#39;s opinion is non-binding and it has never blocked an appointment.</p><p>Really, these seats are traded against the other top jobs in one package. In 2019 a Financial Times poll of European economists had Finland&#39;s Erkki Liikanen as favourite to succeed Draghi. The job went to Lagarde, proposed by Macron, as part of a settlement that simultaneously installed von der Leyen at the Commission. The appointee was not on most shortlists and had no monetary policy background. The published field is a poor guide to the outcome, and the variable being optimised is not domain competence but the balance of the package.</p><p>The vice-presidency is settled and constrains what follows. On 19 January 2026 the Eurogroup nominated Vujčić through secret ballots, beating Finland&#39;s Olli Rehn and Portugal&#39;s Mário Centeno. He is a trained monetary economist from a small, recent euro member, and leans hawkish — which by the arithmetic of balance strengthens a large member state&#39;s claim to the presidency, and marginally a dove&#39;s.</p><p>One further piece of timing. Macron&#39;s second term ends in spring 2027. The president who assembled the 2019 package, and the loudest mainstream voice calling for a green rate and a brown rate, will not be at the table when his own appointee is replaced.</p><h4>The field</h4><p>What is striking is not what I expected to find.</p><p><strong>Pablo Hernández de Cos</strong> leads the FT’s poll, with the caveat that the same exercise got 2019 wrong. Governor of the Bank of Spain 2018–2024, chair of the Basel Committee from March 2019 to June 2024, general manager of the BIS since July 2025. His climate record is the strongest in the field and it is easy to get wrong: in November 2023, under his chairmanship, Basel opened a consultation on a Pillar 3 — mandatory — disclosure framework for climate risk. The framework that emerged in June 2025 was voluntary, after sustained US pushback, and it emerged under Erik Thedéen, who had succeeded him a year earlier. The retreat is not his. What is his is the institution he now runs: the BIS, whose research arm produced the &quot;green swan&quot; work and has been conspicuously quieter since.</p><p><strong>Joachim Nagel</strong>, Bundesbank president since 2022, has the most directly relevant published doctrine because he states it plainly. Governments and parliaments have both the instruments and the democratic legitimacy for climate policy and therefore go first; central banks should stick to their lane; and by pursuing price stability the Eurosystem is itself supporting the green transition.</p><p>That last claim is the one I argued against in part two, and Nagel is not being evasive — he believes it. The argument is that inflation is corrosive to long-horizon investment, so restoring price stability restores the conditions for green capital formation. Coherent, and wrong in the specific case, because the instrument used is a uniform policy rate, and a uniform rate across asset classes of radically different capital intensity is a transfer to the incumbent. Nagel&#39;s framework contains no mechanism for noticing this, because within it the composition of credit is someone else&#39;s file.</p><p><strong>Klaas Knot</strong> has the most advanced published position of anyone in circulation. In a keynote in May 2021, as president of De Nederlandsche Bank, he argued that market neutrality may conflict with both the primary and secondary objectives of the ECB’s mandate, that climate causes demand and supply shocks with direct consequences for inflation volatility, and therefore that climate sits inside the monetary policy horizon. He set out options including proactively shifting monetary portfolios away from carbon-intensive assets. That is, almost word for word, the case this series has been making — delivered by a serving central bank president five years ago. Two cautions: it was 2021, an era of zero rates and no political cost to saying so; and he left DNB in 2025. Positions held when free are not evidence of positions held when expensive.</p><p><strong>Isabel Schnabel</strong> is the most intellectually consequential figure and her trajectory is the argument in miniature. In March 2022 she put climateflation, fossilflation and greenflation into the permanent vocabulary of central banking. In January 2023 at Stockholm she addressed tightening and the green transition directly, acknowledging that rising global rates risked reversing the investment the transition requires. She has confirmed that green lending facilities and differentiated rates are legally available to the ECB.</p><p>Then, on 7 May 2026, she delivered a lecture titled *The quiet erosion of central bank independence*, arguing that preserving independence rests not only on legal foundations but on a clear commitment to operate within the boundaries of the mandate.</p><p>She is not wrong about the threat. With the US administration attacking the Fed&#39;s independence and the Fed withdrawn from the NGFS entirely, the danger is real. But look at the cost. The way to make independence unassailable is to narrow the mandate to something nobody disputes, and what gets narrowed out is the secondary objective — the obligation to support the Union&#39;s general economic policies, of which climate neutrality is one. The secondary mandate dies not through argument but as collateral damage in a defensive action against a threat originating in Washington, defended by nobody because defending it now reads as an invitation to politicisation.</p><p>That is how a live legal obligation becomes a dead letter without a vote.</p><h4>The finding</h4><p>I expected to find climate scepticism somewhere in this field. There is none.</p><p>De Cos built the disclosure architecture. Knot said market neutrality conflicts with the mandate. Schnabel named fossilflation and confirmed differentiated rates are lawful. Nagel accepts climate as a structural challenge to price stability. Nobody denies the threat, the tools, or their legality.</p><p>What every one of them holds is that the tool belongs to somebody else. Governments first. Fiscal policy leads. The mandate must not be overstretched. And the fact that the instrument for price stability is the single most powerful determinant of whether decarbonisation gets financed is treated as an unfortunate externality of a well-designed division of labour.</p><p>That is harder than denial. Denial can be refuted. What operates here is a jurisdictional reflex so deeply installed it survives complete acceptance of the substantive case against it. Any of these people could read part two, agree with most of it, and change nothing — because the argument never reaches a person who believes the instrument is theirs to use.</p><h4>The one lever</h4><p>The Parliament&#39;s ECON committee holds a public hearing for every nominee. Non-binding, never used to reject anyone, and the only public proceeding in the entire process.</p><p>The question is not whether they accept climate science; they all do. It is this: <em>you have acknowledged that climate and fossil dependence are inflationary, and members of the current board have confirmed that differentiated refinancing rates and targeted operations are within the ECB’s legal powers. Will you table either for a Governing Council decision during your term — and if not, on what grounds, given that you accept the risk?</em></p><p>Asked in writing, it has no comfortable answer. Either the nominee commits to something, or it goes on the public record that they accept a quantified systemic risk, hold a lawful instrument, and decline to use it. Both are useful. MEPs can table written questions as a matter of course. It costs nothing, and between now and summer 2027 it comes around four times.</p><p>After that the price of capital in Europe is set for eight years, run by people who were never asked.</p><h3>Part three: The legitimate tools the ECB has to shift investment to renewables</h3><h4><em>What a green refinancing operation would look like — and why the technical objections don’t survive contact with the ECB’s own record</em></h4><p>Every time the case for differentiated rates is put to the ECB, the answer comes back in the register of engineering rather than politics. Not that we disagree, but that the tool is unavailable, the data absent, the legal basis contested, the technical preconditions missing.</p><p>This is an attempt to settle that by description — not by arguing the ECB should build a new instrument, but by pointing at the one it built, operated at a scale of two trillion euros, and already used to do the thing it now says it cannot.</p><h4>The machine</h4><p>Targeted longer-term refinancing operations have been in the toolkit since 2014. The ECB lends to banks for several years and makes the rate conditional on how much they lend onward to the real economy. Hit the benchmark, get the cheap rate.</p><p>Under pandemic terms, TLTRO III raised how much a bank could borrow from 30% of its eligible loan book to 50% in March 2020 and 55% that December, and cut the rate to 50 basis points below the deposit facility — banks borrowing at -1%. They were paid to take the money provided they lent it on. Take-up peaked above €2 trillion.</p><h4>The part nobody mentions</h4><p>Eligible loans under TLTRO — the lending that counts toward your benchmark — are defined as loans to the euro area non-financial private sector <em>excluding loans to households for house purchase</em>.</p><p>Mortgages are carved out. Since 2014, across three series, through multiple recalibrations, under three presidents.</p><p>So the ECB has run a refinancing programme for twelve years in which the rate a bank pays depends on what kind of lending it does. It decided, as policy, that mortgages would not qualify, because the objective was credit to the productive economy and the Governing Council did not want a subsidy flowing into house prices. A sectoral judgement about the composition of credit, embedded in the operational design of a monetary instrument, applied without a treaty amendment, without a market neutrality crisis, and without anyone suggesting the mandate had been exceeded.</p><p>Every argument that the ECB cannot differentiate between types of lending has to explain the last twelve years of its own lending operations.</p><h4>What the money funded</h4><p>Chiara Colesanti Senni, Maria Sole Pagliari and Jens van &#39;t Klooster measured it, combining confidential loan-level data on EU bank lending to non-financial corporations with TLTRO III participation data and sectoral emissions. Loans granted over the reference period carried an emissions content of roughly 151 megatonnes of CO2 — around 8% of total euro area emissions in 2019 — with more than 80% of cumulated lending going to high-emitting firms.</p><p>The largest subsidised credit programme in the institution&#39;s history, deliberately excluding mortgages, with the money going overwhelmingly to the carbon-intensive economy. Not because anyone chose that, but because having made one judgement about composition the Governing Council declined to make any others, and the default composition of European corporate credit is what it is.</p><p>The choice was never between intervening in credit allocation and staying out. The ECB was already in.</p><h4>How you would build it</h4><p>The proposal is not new. Eric Lonergan set out the dual rate logic in early 2020; van &#39;t Klooster and Rens van Tilburg developed it into a full green TLTRO design for Positive Money Europe and the Sustainable Finance Lab later that year. The ECB discussed it in the 2021 and 2025 strategy reviews. Lagarde expressed support more than once. Macron endorsed the principle. It has been on the table six years.</p><p><strong>Architecture:</strong> unchanged. A longer-term operation, a bank-specific lending benchmark from the bank’s own prior lending, a rate that falls when the benchmark is exceeded. Only the definition of eligible lending changes.</p><p><strong>Eligibility</strong> is the real decision, and there are three routes. Taxonomy alignment is most precise, grounded in law the legislature wrote rather than a definition the central bank invented, and most data-hungry. Exclusion is crudest and where I would start: rather than define green, remove fossil extraction, refining and thermal coal generation from the eligible loan book, exactly as mortgages are removed. This needs no new data — the ECB already holds loan-level borrower sector classifications through AnaCredit, and it could be operational in a quarter. Emissions-intensity tiering sits between them, and its feasibility is not speculative: it is precisely the method the Colesanti Senni paper used to measure the existing programme. If researchers can compute the carbon content of TLTRO III after the fact using ECB data, the ECB can compute it in advance.</p><p><strong>The differential:</strong> 100 to 200 basis points. Not exotic — the pandemic special rate was 25 then 50 basis points below the deposit facility, on operations already priced below the main refinancing rate.</p><p><strong>Anti-gaming</strong>: conditionality attaches to net lending, so relabelling achieves nothing; a bank has to lend more on net in the qualifying category. TLTRO participation already requires audited reporting with retrospective correction.</p><h4>Cost</h4><p>Illustratively: €500 billion of qualifying lending at a 150 basis point discount is roughly €7.5 billion a year in forgone Eurosystem income. My arithmetic, and the real number depends entirely on take-up.</p><p>Set against remuneration paid to euro area banks on reserve holdings of something in the order of €140 billion in 2023 — conditional on nothing, in return for no lending, no investment and no behaviour change. And against the ECB&#39;s own estimate of climate physical risk at around 15% of euro area GDP.</p><p>The cost objection is not a cost objection. It is a preference about who receives the transfer, expressed as prudence.</p><h4>The objections</h4><p><strong>This is credit allocation</strong>. The mortgage exclusion is credit allocation. The question was settled affirmatively in 2014. What remains open is not whether but for what.</p><p><strong>Market neutrality</strong>. The corporate bond programme had a documented carbon bias arising directly from buying the market as it exists. The mortgage exclusion is by definition non-neutral. And in May 2021 Klaas Knot, then DNB president, argued publicly that market neutrality may conflict with both objectives of the ECB’s mandate. It is not a constraint the institution operates under; it is a position it adopts selectively.</p><p><strong>We cannot define green</strong>. The EU has a taxonomy in law. And on the exclusion route you need not define green at all, only what is out — which is what a central bank does routinely every time it sets collateral eligibility.</p><p><strong>Terms cannot be changed once contracted.</strong> On 27 October 2022 the Governing Council decided that from 23 November the rate on all remaining TLTRO III operations would be re-indexed to average applicable key ECB rates — changing, mid-contract, terms on which banks had already borrowed. Analysts called it a retroactive application that damaged the tool’s credibility. Banks repaid at the fastest rate the Eurosystem had recorded. It went ahead, because the Governing Council judged the monetary case sufficient. The institution cannot now claim the terms of its refinancing operations are beyond adjustment.</p><p><strong>Banks wouldn’t take it up</strong>. Take-up exceeded two trillion euros.</p><p><strong>There is no operation to attach it to.</strong> This one is correct, and it is the strongest thing the other side has. The TLTROs were repaid, largely early, by end-2024, and the balance sheet has been in run-off since. A green operation today means launching a new facility rather than modifying a running one — a larger political ask than a design tweak would have been in 2021. The window in which this was easy closed while the proposal sat on the table through two strategy reviews. The 2024 operational framework review did retain structural longer-term operations in the toolkit, so a hook exists. But the cheap moment was 2020 to 2022, and it was not taken.</p><h4>The loop that has closed</h4><p>When Positive Money Europe modelled a renovation version of this in early 2021, they identified the binding constraint on the ambitious taxonomy-based design. Not law, mandate or appetite — data. An operation priced on what a loan finances needs verifiable information about what companies do and emit. The taxonomy and corporate disclosure regime were that infrastructure, and the assessment was that the ambitious version would take years because the reporting framework was still being built.</p><p>That framework has since been substantially dismantled. Omnibus I entered into force in March 2026: CSRD applies only to firms with 1,000+ employees and over €450 million turnover, listed SMEs are out of scope, mandatory ESRS data points cut by roughly 70%, taxonomy reporting optional for anyone descoped.</p><p>So the data infrastructure a taxonomy-aligned operation requires was under construction from 2021 to 2024, was cited throughout as the reason the instrument was not yet feasible, and has since been taken apart by the same institutional complex citing it.</p><p>I do not claim this was the purpose; I have no evidence of intent. But the effect is not in doubt, and neither is what happens next: when the case is put to the next Governing Council, the answer will be that the data is not there, and it will be true — true because of decisions taken in Brussels in 2025 and 2026, by people who will not be in the room when the monetary answer is given.</p><p>Nobody had to conspire. The disclosure file and the monetary file sat in different institutions, on different timetables, each decided on its own reasonable-sounding terms. That gutting the first forecloses the second was nobody&#39;s responsibility to notice, so nobody noticed.</p><p>Which is why the exclusion route matters more than it appears. It is the one design that does not depend on the reporting regime, because excluding fossil extraction and coal generation from an eligible loan book needs only sector codes the ECB already holds. Cruder than anything the taxonomy could deliver — and the only version that survives what has just been done to the data.</p><h4>Where this leaves it</h4><p>Built in 2014, operated at two trillion euros, deliberately excluding an entire asset class on policy grounds, terms rewritten mid-flight in 2022 when the Governing Council judged it warranted, then wound down. Every component of a differentiated rate regime is precedent, not innovation.</p><p>What is missing is not a tool, a legal basis, a definition or a verification method. What is missing is a Governing Council that regards the composition of European credit as its concern rather than adjacent to it.</p><p>Which brings us back to four seats, decided in summer 2027, by heads of government, on criteria that include none of this.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab146d461d39" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The cost of climate change in the EU to 2030 and beyond: climate breakdown in real time]]></title>
            <link>https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/the-cost-of-climate-change-in-the-eu-to-2030-climate-breakdown-in-real-time-8ea7ae46da75?source=rss-412162597383------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8ea7ae46da75</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 05:26:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-11T15:26:15.348Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OzA_CmsSnCEntEZinFi5WA.webp" /></figure><h3>The cost of climate change in the EU to 2030 and beyond: climate breakdown in real time</h3><h3>Part two of two: we are being screwed by central banks and the financial industry</h3><p>The conventional framing of climate economics — that warming will cost Europe some percentage of a future, larger economy — assumes the larger economy exists, and that by 2050 the EU GDP has increased as normal and climate damages take 7%, or 12%, or 15% out of it. The problem is that this projected business-as-usual 2050 is not coming. Growth is already being cancelled by climate costs in 2026 and the structural conditions that could facilitate stability as climate impacts worsen are being actively blocked.</p><p>Once you accept that, the interesting question stops being <em>how much</em> is lost and becomes <em>who holds what remains</em>. A contracting economy is not a neutral event where losses are experienced evenly across a population. It is a redistribution, and like every redistribution it has a direction. The direction is upwards, and the mechanism and instruments that determine it are <strong>monetary policy</strong> and <strong>the structure of the financial industry</strong>.</p><p>This is the part of the argument I have been writing about for the past few years and it is worth stating plainly. The conjecture is not that a committee met and decided to warm the planet: it is that the institutions that set the price of capital in Europe operate a system whose consistent net effect is the transfer of wealth from wage-earners, borrowers and public balance sheets to asset-holders and creditors . <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2026/779881/ECTI_STU(2026)779881_EN.pdf">This system has been shown</a>, repeatedly and in detail, to be blocking the energy transition as a side effect of doing so. The people who benefit understand this — they have been told, they fully understand, and they have declined to change the situation now coming into sharp focus.</p><h3>The interest rate as a distributional instrument</h3><p>Let’s start with the mechanism that is least contested and most consequential.</p><p>Central banks have one primary tool: the policy rate. When inflation rises, interest rates rise. The stated theory is that higher rates cool demand and bring prices back to target. The theory assumes demand-pull inflation — an economy running hot, wages chasing goods.</p><p><em>“Central bankers will have to look beyond interest rate hikes as a price stabilisation tool or they will face repeated charges that they are feeding inequality, exacerbating debt distress, stalling the green transition and threatening financial stability, resulting in further deterioration of the public’s trust in central banks.” — Simon Dikau, Director at the London School of Economics</em></p><p>The inflation Europe has actually experienced since 2021 was not that. It was energy prices, then food prices, then supply chains, and now increasingly climate impacts arriving directly inside these supply side costs: crop failure, heat-driven productivity loss, transport and grid disruption, and insurance repricing. None of these respond to the cost of borrowing because you cannot raise interest rates to combat a drought.</p><p>What raising rates <em>does</em> do is precise and predictable. It transfers income from borrowers to money lenders: from mortgage-holders to banks, from indebted governments to bondholders, and from firms with capital expenditure to firms with cash — basically, from the poor to the rich. In 2023 alone, ECB remuneration of commercial bank reserves reached roughly €140 billion across the euro area — a payment from the central banking system to the commercial banking system, of which the overwhelming majority was passed through to shareholders rather than retained as capital against future losses. And this was well noted at the time; MEP Paul Tang described it at a European Parliament plenary as “an extraordinary act of generosity toward bankers paid for by taxpayers”. It’s a perennial story.</p><p>That is the basic effect of monetary policy favouring a particular group, and it would be objectionable on its own, but it is the second-order effect that is the one that matters for climate.</p><h3>Why the same instrument is a fossil fuel subsidy</h3><p>Renewables, grids, electrolysers, hydrogen infrastructure and industrial electrification share a financial structure: almost all of the cost is capital, paid up front, followed by decades of near-zero fuel cost. Fossil energy has the opposite structure: modest capital, continuous commodity revenue, and costs — almost guaranteed to be highly volatile and that recur but are passed to the consumer.</p><p>For a capex-heavy project, the interest rate is not one input among many. It <em>is</em> the cost. A wind or electrolysis project financed at 4% over twenty years can cost 50% or more than the same project at near-zero rates, and that cost is locked in at financial close for the asset’s whole life. For a gas-fired plant or an oil field with short payback, a similar interest rate is inconsequential: returns are always guaranteed either by government subsidy or another surge in fuel prices.</p><p>As a stark reminder; after a 4% interest rate was imposed in 2022, not one final investment decision was taken for a large-scale offshore wind project that year.</p><p>So a single, supposedly neutral instrument, applied uniformly across asset classes, systematically advantages the incumbent. This single policy lever — raising the interest rate — is a <strong>carbon subsidy</strong> that nobody has to legislate, nobody has to defend in public, and nobody has to record as a subsidy. It shows up in no fossil support register; it is simply the weather of the financial system.</p><p>The result is a loop that reinforces itself. Climate impacts drive food and energy prices &gt; central banks respond with rates &gt; rates make the decarbonisation that would eventually stabilise those prices more expensive and therefore slower &gt; slower decarbonisation produces more impacts. Each turn of the loop transfers more income to creditors, and each turn makes the exit more expensive than it was the turn before.</p><p>This has been explained to the ECB continuously since at least 2022. Thirty economists and business figures <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2024/03/02/la-bce-pourrait-appliquer-des-taux-d-interet-moins-eleves-au-refinancement-des-prets-bancaires-alloues-a-la-transition-ecologique_6219665_3232.html">set it out in <em>Le Monde</em></a> in March 2024. French President Emmanuel Macron called for <a href="https://greencentralbanking.com/2024/01/05/macron-urged-to-push-for-dual-interest-rates-at-eu-level/">a differentiated rate</a> at COP28 and again in print. David Barmes and Director at the LSE Centre for Economic Transition Expertise<strong> </strong>Simon Dikau warned that continuing would leave central banks credibly accused of <a href="https://greencentralbanking.com/2024/02/14/rethinking-inflation-in-times-of-environmental-instability/">feeding inequality and stalling the transition</a> simultaneously. The Commission’s own economy unit DG ECON funded a paper in 2026 <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2026/779881/ECTI_STU(2026)779881_EN.pdf">specifically regarding the case for differentiated rates</a>, and the lack of progress made by the ECB to date.</p><p>The tools exist and are now pragmatically agreed by consensus: 1️⃣ differentiated refinancing rates, 2️⃣ targeted long-term operations conditioned on decarbonisation lending, 3️⃣ collateral haircuts weighted by carbon exposure, 4️⃣ capital requirements that price fossil lending as the stranding risk it is.</p><p>None of these measures have been implemented in any binding form.</p><h3>The myth of market neutrality vs. what it actually protects</h3><p>The ECB’s defence is that it does not hold jurisdiction over which technologies it chooses to support: its mandate is price stability, and intervening between asset classes would breach market neutrality and exceed the powers conferred by European Treaty.</p><p>This argument is wrong from both perspectives.</p><p>Price stability is the ECB’s primary mandate, with the secondary mandate requiring the ECB to support the European Union’s general economic policies without bias. Climate neutrality is, unambiguously, a general economic policy of the European Union — but somehow, the ECB <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/press_conference/monetary-policy-statement/2026/html/ecb.is260611~372040d313.en.html">continues to treat this secondary mandate as purely decorative</a>.</p><p>More importantly, market neutrality is not a description of what the ECB does, it is a description of what the ECB <em>claims</em> to do when asked to do something else. The corporate sector purchase programme was never neutral: its holdings skewed heavily toward carbon-intensive issuers, because bond issuance skews that way, and buying the market as it exists means financing the economy as it exists. That was documented years ago: when the ECB finally announced it would tilt reinvestments toward better climate performers, the tilting was rendered largely moot by the decision to let the balance sheet run off, e.g. sell off these ‘green’ government-issued loans (bonds), without buying new ones. The ‘greening’ was announced into an instrument that was quietly being switched off.</p><p>A neutral institution facing a systemic risk it has itself quantified at 15% of GDP cannot call inaction neutrality. A collateral framework — a ranking of asset classes including fossil fuels or renewables for example — is a set of choices about what counts as good money. It has always been a set of choices. So by pretending otherwise the ECB have made a choice while disclaiming ownership of that choice.</p><h3>Both directions of the interest rate cycle point the same way</h3><p>The rate cycle since the 2008 Financial Crisis has run in two phases, and it is worth noting that both of them ended with the same result: further upward transfer of capital and rents.</p><p>In the first phase, sustained quantitative easing and near-zero rates inflated the price of financial assets, such as equity, bonds, property. Ownership of those assets in the euro area is heavily concentrated in the top decile of households, so the decade of cheap money was, in distributional terms, a decade of transfer to people who already held capital — while wage growth stayed flat.</p><p>In the second phase, rates rose sharply. Asset-holders were compensated through interest on reserves and higher yields on new issuance, while the cost landed on mortgage-holders, indebted member states, and every capital-intensive project not yet financed. For example, Ørsted and the offshore wind sector lost billions as their profit margins evaporated — while fossil incumbents had no such interest-linked capex hurdles to worry about.</p><p>And behind both phases sits the same guarantee: if the system breaks, the public balance sheet absorbs it. There are still no meaningful capital requirements against fossil lending despite the vast risk of asset stranding which has only been increasing. The 2008 Financial Crisis outcome — where shareholders were immediately bailed out by governments, and the trillions in losses were fully socialised — was never questioned explicitly, it was simply ratified. Every actor in this system is operating without any genuine downside, which is now precisely why they can afford to treat a 15%-of-GDP physical risk as somebody else’s problem.</p><h3>Climate damages become power to fossil incumbents as governments buckle</h3><p>As climate damages compound, states face rising costs as mitigation and adaptation become more urgent, and simultaneously growth is being cut off by the cost of borrowing under high interest rates, and increasingly lack of insurance to underwrite climate impacts. The European Environmental Agency already prices disaster response, crop support, health systems under heat stress, infrastructure repair and adaptation at around €200 billion a year in the EU, and this money is not being spent. At the same time, growth stops — so the tax base stops growing while debt servicing rises with rates.</p><p>The result of this situation has one conventional answer, and neoliberal doctrine will supply it: consolidation. Spending restraint, asset sales, private capital &quot;crowded in&quot; to public functions, service provision such as water, healthcare and supports contracted out. Each round of climate damage becomes an argument for a smaller state, and each reduction in state capacity removes the only actor with the balance sheet and the time horizon to finance a transition that the private sector has already declined to invest in at the unworkable rates prescribed by central banks.</p><p>That is the <strong>consolidation of power</strong>, and it does not require anyone to want the planet to burn. It only requires that when the bill arrives, the response is the one neoliberal doctrine has supplied automatically for fifty years: the public sphere shrinks, and what it used to own is bought at distress prices by the only parties with liquidity — the same parties the rate cycle has been paying throughout.</p><p>Water systems, grids, ports, farmland, housing stock, adaptation infrastructure, which is the one growth market a warming Europe reliably generates, and which by construction charges rent for access to survivability. It’s a giant game of Monopoly, and the elites and their shareholder clientele own the whole board.</p><h3>Why the broader shareholder community do not care</h3><p>Only around 17% of large institutional portfolios are invested in fossil fuels. Those same portfolios are exposed, through the other 83%, to agriculture, insurance, property, logistics, manufacturing — everything that climate breakdown destroys. Common logic would suggest that these investors should therefore be the most aggressive climate advocates in existence, because they own the externality. They own the whole economy.</p><p>They are not. Why not?</p><p>Four reasons exist to limit shareholder action on climate and none of them are irrational once you look at the incentives properly, as I detail below.</p><p><strong>Fees accrue on assets under management, not on returns</strong>. A passive manager’s revenue tracks the nominal size of the fund. Asset price inflation driven by monetary policy grows that revenue whether or not the underlying economy is healthy.</p><p><strong>Index construction is backward-looking</strong>. A passive vehicle holds what the index holds. Nobody at the top of these firms has to make an active decision to finance a stranded asset; the decision is made by a rule written years earlier, which is exactly the kind of deniability that makes the arrangement durable.</p><p><strong>The downside is truncated</strong>. If systemic losses are felt by public balance sheets, the expected cost to the institution of a systemic event is far lower than the headline. You do not hedge a risk someone else is carrying.</p><p><strong>Institutional exposure is not personal exposure</strong>. This is the decisive one. The people who direct these institutions are not themselves diversified index holders. Their personal position is concentrated in exactly the things that hold value through a contraction: private equity, land, physical infrastructure, hard assets, jurisdictional mobility. A fund can lose 40% of its value and the person managing it can end the decade in a stronger relative position than they started it.</p><p>And <strong>relative position</strong> is the point. In a growing economy, everyone’s incentive is to grow the pie, because absolute returns dominate. In a contracting one, the equation inverts: what matters is your share of what remains and your claim on the things that still work. Collapse is not irrational if your <strong>objective is control</strong> rather than yield.</p><p>So ultimately they do not imagine a technological rescue and they are not, in the main, denying the science. <strong>What they are betting is that a smaller, hotter, poorer Europe is one in which the people holding the debts and the land and the water and the grid are in charge in a way they have not been since before the twentieth century.</strong></p><h3>The alternative is not expensive!</h3><p>The strongest evidence that this is about distribution rather than feasibility is what the alternative costs.</p><p>Stranding the private fossil asset base sufficiently to hold near 2.5°C has been priced by the IEA’s own net zero work at around $2 trillion for listed companies — against annual global oil revenues of roughly $3.7 trillion and annual climate damages heading for $23–38 trillion by 2050. The stranding is cheap, whereas the damages are not survivable long term. Losses fall against shareholder revenue at roughly 65% on the wealthiest decile in the US and around 75% in the EU — it is only the shareholder elite who suffer if their fossil-related assets lose in value.</p><p><strong>A managed transition is affordable at the level of the economy, but it is unaffordable only at the level of a specific group’s income from a specific set of assets.</strong> The refusal to act is not an economic judgement, it is a class position wearing an economic argument, but the argument now makes no sense.</p><h3>What actually works for society, climate — and shareholders</h3><p>The remedies are known and can be stated in a paragraph, which is itself an indictment of the last five years:</p><p>- Differentiated refinancing rates: a green rate and a brown rate, as Macron put it, and as thirty economists put to the ECB in print.<br>- Targeted longer-term operations conditioned on transition lending, using machinery the ECB has already built and used for other purposes.<br>- Capital requirements against fossil exposure that reflect stranding risk.<br>- Withdrawal of the implicit taxpayer backstop for fossil-heavy institutions, so that the downside stops being truncated.<br>- Shareholder-side measures — carbon-linked taxation of distributions, profit caps on subsidised fossil revenue .</p><p>None of this requires new treaties. Most of it fits inside the secondary mandate. What it requires is the ECB&#39;s governing council deciding that a quantified 15% GDP physical risk is a price stability issue, <strong>which it self-evidently is</strong>, and acting on the basis that the composition of what it finances has consequences — which it does, and always has.</p><h3>The new status quo: climate impacts as leverage for wealth consolidation, until the system disintegrates</h3><p>As stated in Part One, what we might soon experience is a <em>contrived collapse</em>, or an unnecessary ongoing societal breakdown, and I will continue to identify who is responsible, and particularly how they think the situation is going to play out.</p><p>The main issues as I have stated follow an upward flow of wealth to the elites and their shareholder clientele. First, the price of capital as set by central banks, then the socialisation of private losses by shareholders, which subsequently reduces the capacity of public finances, which then translates as the conversion of financial claims into ownership of physical assets as the economy contracts. None of the individual steps are secret, as most of them are published by the institutions carrying them out. Ultimately, what this creates is <strong>a machine for converting a climate catastrophe into a consolidation of ownership</strong> — and which functions because everyone inside it is responding rationally to the incentives placed in front of them, and because the people with the authority to change those incentives are the same people the machine pays.</p><p>Neoliberalism is now eating itself, as the climate impacts they have set in place wipe out any growth going forward.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ea7ae46da75" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The cost of climate change in the EU to 2030 and beyond: climate breakdown in real time]]></title>
            <link>https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/the-cost-of-climate-change-in-the-eu-to-2030-climate-breakdown-in-real-time-4476b94d6119?source=rss-412162597383------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4476b94d6119</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy-transition]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 08:19:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-11T15:15:36.338Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*k720lFoEOMu1UkqZWh2q7w.jpeg" /></figure><h3>The cost of climate change in the EU to 2030 and beyond: climate breakdown in real time</h3><h3>Part one of two: piecing together the evidence</h3><p>According to ethical banking group Triodos, climate change is expected to wipe out all GDP growth in the EU in 2026, pointing to a trend that most credible analysts predict will become the new normal until negative growth sets in. While ECB figures might not yet reflect the extent of this year’s losses, the direction of travel to 2030 is reiterated by German insurer Allianz: we are now broadly on trend for the overall 14–19% in climate damages each year by 2050 forecast by most of the banking and insurance industry. This equates to about €2.9–3.2 trillion per year in the EU — and that is if every announced policy target is reached. The NGFS, ECB, Swiss Re, Bundesbank, LSE/Grantham Institute, Oxford Economics, PIK Potsdam, the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries and many others all say the same thing: the forecast cost of climate change will be extreme. If certain individuals are unhappy to talk about wildfires, crop losses, power and transport outages and lost productivity costing potentially €180 billion in 2026, €3.2 trillion per year by 2050 is likely to come as a shock.</p><p>In the context of an EU Commission energy and climate team that is now <a href="https://euobserver.com/224177/eu-ministers-plan-further-climate-policy-rollbacks-during-historic-heatwave/"><strong>retracting from previous commitments</strong></a>, we cannot expect any significant deviation from the course currently set.</p><p>Unfortunately, and as I keep explaining: it is difficult to escape the conclusion that this is actually the desired outcome set by a small group of people as they consolidate wealth and power at the expense of any kind of livable planet as the century progresses. We are facing a <em>contrived collapse</em>, and I will in future continue to explore precisely who this group is and how they perceive their goal of wealth consolidation and power takeover is going to be achieved.</p><p>It was fair, for a long time, to be sceptical about climate cost estimates; and certainly forecasts running to 2050 do not mean much to ordinary people, even if they seem extreme: 2.6-3.2°C equating to 18% GDP reduction by 2050 under Swiss Re’s worst case scenario, Potsdam Institute in Germany resulting in 2.4°C and 17–19% annual GDP loss, or even Central Banks’ NGFS Phase V revisions putting the cost of climate impacts at 14.8% GDP loss in physical risk alone (not including the cost of transition or adaptation) at only 2.1°C (2050). But now, these cost estimates are becoming reality at a vastly accelerated rate, with 2°C possible by the end of the decade rather than the end of the century, as the Paris Agreement guardrails implied.</p><p>We are following the worst case scenario because of a number of factors but sadly, the main reason is shale: only the massive release of methane from hydrofracturing can explain how scientists got it so badly wrong, and also why none of those same scientists can talk about the situation because of the political sensitivity of doing so. Now with the vast sums being poured into hyperscale datacenters which are <a href="https://heatmap.news/podcast/shift-key-s3-e66-data-centers-natural-gas">predominantly powered by shale</a>; and shale drilling — with no notable criticism from the climate science community — spreading to third countries beyond the US and Canada, the course for destruction is confirmed.</p><p>So the question now is how much is climate change going to cost to 2030 and whether these costs are genuinely tracking the worst case scenarios outlined, which broadly cluster around the 20%-GDP-mark for 2050; and the enormous burden this implies. Understanding that the financial and economic outlook is going to keep getting substantially worse, we get to peer inside the minds of some of the architects of our planetary demise, and what they think they are going to be able to do when complete breakdown is staring us in the face (and yes, this is about power and control, not dollar/euro values).</p><h4>The story so far</h4><p>The past 20 years have seen a far more rapid increase in temperatures than preceding decades, which previously followed the slower, iterative rise in CO2. With the advent of hydrofracturing in 2008, methane levels increased sharply and temperatures started to spike in concert, which can be measured against US rig count data up to approximately 2022 after which the data is more blurred as <a href="https://www.accomsure.com/resources/recap-fort-mcmurray-wildfire/">Canadian shale oil and gas started emerging</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HSwLeDXbYEincUxueAWx7Q.png" /><figcaption>Temperature spikes have become more severe following the advent of hydrofracturing around 2008</figcaption></figure><p>With these temperature spikes, climate impacts around the world have become far more severe and the economic cost of climate change has become more pronounced, to the point that climate impacts are becoming the main driver of inflation as economic growth in the EU is lost to climate change in 2026.</p><p>Most people have experienced the effect of climate change in their shopping bills, as OECD figures put food prices about 46% above their December 2019 level — a far more rapid increase than has been experienced in the past. Wages have not kept up with these rising costs (inflation), so when inflation returns to normal, incomes are considerably behind and this translates as higher cost of living. In early 2026, disruption at the Strait of Hormuz led the Commission to cut EU growth to 1.1% and raise its inflation forecast by a full point to 3.1%, meaning that again, climate costs exacerbate an already weak situation.</p><p><em>Looking at GDP growth figures over the years, we can see a trend emerging</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iccX-vk42YI55CM9Dxd-fg.jpeg" /><figcaption>EU GDP % growth (annual). Source: European Commission</figcaption></figure><h4>What is on the horizon</h4><p>But what is predicted not just by those normally considered alarmist such as the climate science community or even specialist consultancies, but by banks and insurance groups — is an order of magnitude change in the cost of climate impacts in the decades to 2050.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/559/1*ukopwTy7YYMIAhdHnJDzcA.png" /><figcaption>Source: Potsdam Institute ‘The economic commitment of climate change’ - Nature, 2024</figcaption></figure><p>Focusing on a recent <a href="https://www.triodos.com/en/articles/2026/hot-summer-economics">Triodos forecast</a> for 2026 and <a href="https://www.allianz.com/en/economic_research/insights/publications/specials_fmo/260528-heat-economics.html">Allianz forecasting</a> up to 2030, real EU GDP growth for the periods analysed will be severely impacted. At a cumulative €550 billion to 2030, expected costs start fitting into the worst case model predictions now becoming central estimates by banks and insurance groups, not just by fringe science and consultancy groups. And the US face similar costs, for example the 2024 hurricane season cost <a href="https://heatmap.news/climate/hurricanes-2024-costs-billions">approximately $500 billion alone</a>. The days when climate scientists were considered extreme and banks and insurers were the sober voice of reason have ended.</p><p>Detractors to this (un)happy narrative may point to studies focusing specifically on what the long term costs of climate change are expected to be, using some other methodology than extrapolating the raw data provided by insurers and banks, as I have done. And realistically, it could also be argued that the figures don’t really sit very precisely; 5–7% cumulative GDP for the EU27 by 2030 is not the roughly 4-5% per year that the graph above implies. Looking at specific studies, we might also wish to determine their ultimate motivations; but these studies are useful nonetheless. It’s also important at this point to distinguish between different ball-park figures; some only reflect insured losses, not the overall cost of the losses and most only cover single event natural disasters, not the extreme heat and drought that can dramatically reduce GDP overall such as to crops, transport, labour productivity etc.</p><p>One notable report is the first <a href="https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/european-climate-risk-assessment">European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA) report</a> produced by the European Environment Agency (EEA) together with many partner organisations published in 2024. The numbers however are very vague: a headline figure of ‘up to’ €1 trillion per year by 2100 just from coastal damage leaves a lot of room for interpretation and many conflicting viewpoints are presented.</p><p>The data central banks are now being asked to use is significantly different. Accepting that they have had to dramatically increase their damage function as costs materialise, the NGFS 14.8% GDP loss stands in sharp contrast to their previous estimates, which sit within the humdrum status quo of IPCC assessment reports and similar; themselves obsolete at the time of publishing considering the 7-year gap between cycles.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K-vydpndkrXvVV-oUFo9yw.png" /><figcaption>Recent EU GDP growth losses. Source: eurostat</figcaption></figure><p>Comparing approaching costs to previous GDP reductions, one-off events like the Coronavirus epidemic were severe, but the bounce-back was expected and arrived (even if we are still paying for it). But climate impacts are going to be every year, without respite. And if we add the cost of adaptation (which is not even occuring now, when economies have money to invest) it is very unlikely that the €200 billion per year in adaptation alone suggested by the EEA will eventuate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VGRyiCNrQZ7wAbdbJEufbg.png" /><figcaption>Physcal cost of climate impacts to 2050 globally. Source: NGFS</figcaption></figure><p>So, the question remains; what are the real costs approaching, and are they an exaggeration? Or are some proponents underplaying these costs, and what could be their motivation for not being honest? And then what about the costs that don’t even make it to the GDP figures, such as increased mortality or wildfires? For example, an estimated 20,400 people died from heat in France, Germany, Spain and Italy during a single week in late June. By 30 July, over 4,349 square kilometres had burned across the EU — more than in any previous full year.</p><p>GDP growth does serve a simple function when considered within broader timescales; and that is to denote whether an economy is expanding or contracting at all. If the studies from such a wide range of economic, banking and insurance perspectives all point to a sharp downward trajectory in GDP growth starting soon after 2030, then it is certainly worth understanding what these costs will translate as.</p><p>If we take the figures at face value, and start to arrive at an average, cost per capita can be derived.</p><p><strong>Using the ECB’s own figures, which are a step down from about 15% globally presented by the NGFS:</strong></p><p><strong>•</strong> <strong>7–8% GDP loss in 2050</strong> → €1.75–2.0tn in that single year</p><p><strong>•</strong> <strong>12% GDP loss (hot house, vs orderly)</strong> → ~€3.0tn in 2050</p><p>At €1.75–3 trillion per year, this equates as €3,900–6,700 per person in the EU, or about €9,000–14,000 per taxpayer in the EU27, per year.</p><p>A lot depends on those years where GDP growth is achieved in Europe, because if the EU economy stagnates then we would be looking at these costs arriving at a point where incomes are essentially the same as now. Because central banks tax borrowing when costs rise, the financial system is calibrated to negate any actual increase in wages over this time period, meaning that the climate costs presented are unlikely to be comparative to the counterfactual. There won’t be a counterfactual.</p><p>The honest framing is not that climate change will cost Europe some percentage of a larger future economy, but that it may cost Europe the larger future economy itself.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4476b94d6119" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fact: shale methane is the cause of recent warming, and the climate science industry are a charade]]></title>
            <link>https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/fact-methane-is-the-cause-of-recent-warming-and-everybody-knows-it-2b1cd0b625df?source=rss-412162597383------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b1cd0b625df</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[energy-transition]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[methane-emissions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[collapse]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fracking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 08 Aug 2026 10:16:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-06T08:54:25.362Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*6UvoiTyH3SjVrchPyinoOg.jpeg" /><figcaption>LNG Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU)</figcaption></figure><p>For the past two decades, the climate conversation about methane’s effect on the climate has circled around a convenient mistruth: that methane’s rapidly increasing concentrations in the Earth’s atmosphere are <a href="https://acp.copernicus.org/articles/26/7765/2026/">mostly of biological origin</a> — cattle, wetlands, rice paddies, landfills. It is a story that has let the gas industry largely off the hook, and it deserves far more scrutiny than it has received. The entire climate science community is largely willing to completely discard any factual evidence.</p><p>Atmospheric methane, as recorded by NOAA&#39;s Global Greenhouse Gas Reference Network, plateaued from 1998 for almost a decade through most of the 2000s before a sharp upward climb in 2008 that has continued since. The timing tracks with unusual precision the takeoff of shale gas production in the United States, and, in the years since, its spread to Canada (as it&#39;s forests burn) and then third countries. Cornell&#39;s Robert Howarth was among the first scientists to <a href="https://www.www.research.howarthlab.org/documents/Howarth2022_EM_Magazine_methane.pdf">make this connection explicit</a>, arguing in a 2019 paper in Biogeosciences that North American shale gas production may have &quot;<em>contributed more than half of the entire global increase in atmospheric methane</em>&quot; over the preceding decade. His argument asserts that shale gas carries the lighter carbon-12 signature rather than conventional gas (isotope carbon-13) — and almost all the post-2008 methane globally has been carbon-12. So it&#39;s either biogenic methane increasing rapidly at exactly the same time as hydrofracturing started, or.. it&#39;s something else?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/1*YbRSb-6p7_dhcWyPSEyrnw.png" /></figure><h4>Official figures</h4><p>If anything, Howarth’s figures understate the case. Fugitive-emissions accounting for shale wells — flowback water venting, pipeline and compressor-station leakage, and intermittent &#39;super-emitter&#39; events that inventories routinely miss — has consistently trailed real-world measurement. Some studies found facility‑level emissions in some basins such as the Marcellus and Fayetteville fields were <a href="https://pubs.acs.org/esthag/article/50/4/2099/780606/Methane-Emissions-from-Conventional-and">were 10–40× higher</a> for specific unconventional sites, with regional totals substantially above EPA‑based expectations. Further basin-scale aerial surveys published since — including work by Stanford’s Robert Jackson and colleagues, and the striking early imagery released by MethaneSAT itself before its loss — have repeatedly identified concentrated plumes over Permian Basin and Marcellus shale infrastructure invisible to ground-based reporting. Treating the pre-2008 plateau as a control period and the post-2008 trajectory as the &#39;new normal’, it becomes difficult to explain the shape of that curve without concluding that shale gas development is now almost the sole contributor.</p><p>This has consequences for how we quantify methane’s contribution to warming. The commonly cited estimate — echoed across mainstream outlets — is that methane (from all sources) accounts for something on the order of <a href="https://science.nasa.gov/earth/explore/earth-indicators/methane/?utm_source=perplexity">a quarter to a fifth</a> of the additional warming observed since industrialization began accelerating; Howarth himself, in various Cornell University papers, has put methane’s overall contribution to warming at roughly 30% of all other forcings combined since the 1800s and at 40% or more over just the past two decades. That figure was essentially built on the understanding that emissions inventories structurally undercount leakage, for the simple reason that no operator is incentivized to measure its own losses rigorously. An even more blunt accounting of the total — one that takes seriously the scale and persistence of shale’s methane intensity because of second-order effects, and factors in the recent Canadian and Argentinian LNG buildout of recent years — might put the <strong><em>shale-attributable</em></strong><em> </em><strong><em>only</em></strong> share of recent warming closer to 40% or more on average; not the fifth or so that is palatable to most of the climate science community. If we correctly attribute <strong><em>nearly all</em></strong> recent methane increase to shale, then that is the cause of all warming since 2008 which is not explained by incremental CO2 increase. We have a shale problem, not a shipping emissions regulation problem.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wkj1C6A3nLfRtPJIc4ozLw.png" /><figcaption>Annual CO2 increase is predictable</figcaption></figure><h4>Shipping emissions or fracked LNG imports</h4><p>This reframing also clarifies a debate that has been badly muddled. When global average temperatures spiked in 2023 and kept climbing through 2024, one popular explanation, aired widely amongst the science community (notably by shale-promoting climate figureheads such as Zeke Hausfather), pointed to the <em>International Maritime Organization’s</em> 2020 sulfur regulations, which slashed pollution from marine shipping fuel — the theory being that the world had inadvertently been shielded from heat by sulfur aerosols from ship exhaust, and cleaning it up simply ramped these temperatures. This might appear to be a plausible story to some, but it requires a staggering suspension of disbelief: a geographically confined, aerosol-driven mechanism, phased in gradually from 2020 somehow caused a global temperature anomaly that emerged with much greater force a full three years after the event. Obviously, the culprit was however simply sitting in plain sight. As Russian pipeline gas to Europe dropped suddenly following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the total destruction of the Nord stream II pipeline — the International Energy Agency records European LNG imports growing more than 60 percent year-on-year in 2022 alone, effectively replacing lost Russian pipeline flows as the continent’s primary gas supply — the European Union scrambled to replace supply with LNG, from the many terminals built explicitly for this purpose. The gas must be extracted, processed, liquefied, shipped, and regasified, bleeding methane at every stage of the chain. Eurostat data show the shift has only deepened since: the United States&#39; share of EU LNG imports climbed from roughly a quarter in early 2021 to well over half by early 2026 or from roughly 21–30 bcm in 2021 to about 81–100 bcm in 2025, depending on the dataset and whether “Europe” or “EU” is used. So, an ever-larger share of Europe’s gas now originates in American shale basins specifically, with all the messiness that comes with a rapid and sustained increase in hydrofracturing activity that occurs when a huge uptick in demand is initiated. This is not a subtle, indirect atmospheric-chemistry effect operating at the margins — as the shipping emissions theory invites us to believe — that caused the temperature rise. It is a direct, mechanical increase in fugitive methane emissions, arriving on a timeline that lines precisely with the 2023–24 warming acceleration.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i1n1WSvEEfpxTYG5MrBlLA.jpeg" /><figcaption>2023–24 witnessed the highest 12-month global temperature record in history</figcaption></figure><h4>RIP MethaneSAT</h4><p>We are, moreover, now flying blind at precisely the moment we need better eyes on the problem. In June 2025, MethaneSAT — the Bezos Earth Fund-backed satellite built by the Environmental Defense Fund specifically to independently track oil-and-gas methane emissions worldwide, at a cost of roughly $88 million and with contributions from the New Zealand government among others — lost contact with mission control and was declared unrecoverable barely fifteen months into an intended five-year mission. EDF&#39;s own engineering team has said publicly it still does not know why. Whether that failure has any connection to the broader deregulatory posture of the current U.S. administration toward fossil fuel oversight is not something I can establish here, and I want to be careful not to overstate it — there is no public evidence tying the satellite&#39;s mechanical failure to policy. But the timing is nonetheless unfortunate in the extreme: we lost one of our best independent tools for verifying fugitive shale emissions at precisely the moment the political appetite for measuring them, in Washington at least, appears to be waning.</p><p><em>Please see notes about the Environmental Defense Fund </em><a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/when-green-credentials-become-a-veto-how-the-environmental-defense-fund-is-blocking-the-hydrogen-d3b31ad2d615"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><h4>Gas turbine mega-boom</h4><p>And the pressure on the system is only intensifying. The artificial intelligence boom has triggered a scramble for new baseload power that is being met, overwhelmingly, by natural gas rather than coal or diesel. Analysts at Global Energy Monitor reported that US gas-fired capacity in development nearly tripled in 2025 alone, reaching almost 252 gigawatts — more than a third of it slated to power data centers directly on-site — with global gas capacity in development up 31 percent over the same period. Texas, already the epicenter of American shale, accounts for nearly a third of that domestic buildout on its own, with roughly 40 gigawatts earmarked specifically for data centers. RBC Capital Markets projects data-center gas demand in the U.S. could reach 6 billion cubic feet a day by 2030 — a nearly 20 percent increase over recent baseline power-sector gas burn. None of this power is coming from reopened coal plants, and diesel generation remains a rounding error by comparison; turbine order books, according to reporting in TechCrunch, are already stretching into the early 2030s. It is gas, overwhelmingly, and increasingly shale gas, standing behind the server racks of the AI economy.</p><h4>Vaca Meurta and global shale rollout</h4><p>Nor is the underlying supply problem confined to North America. Argentina&#39;s Vaca Muerta formation (Vaca Meurta meaning Dead Cow in English translation, somewhat macabre if you consider that most of the ruminant population will not survive 40°C+ without air conditioning) — one of the largest shale reserves on the planet, spanning 8.6 million acres with an estimated 308 trillion cubic feet of recoverable shale gas, of which current development represents perhaps a tenth of total potential — is now being developed at a pace that rivals the early-2010s Permian boom. YPF, the formerly state-run operator, has committed roughly $130 billion in hydrocarbon infrastructure investment through 2031 as it pivots to become a pure unconventional producer, with new pipeline and liquefaction infrastructure being built explicitly to feed LNG-hungry markets in Europe and Asia — the same markets the war in Ukraine has already redirected toward American shale. If shale gas in the United States and Canada was responsible for a disproportionate share of the methane the world added to its atmosphere over the last fifteen years, there is little reason to expect the next fifteen to look meaningfully different — except that the fields multiply exponentially, and with them methane emissions associated. Combined with this, regulatory oversight and reporting has ostensibly been taken offline. Not a good combination.</p><p>With absolutely no acknowledgement of the massive and devasting effect shale methane is having on the entire planet, and an elaborate network of financiers and shale oil and gas promoters ensuring that absolutely no viable information ever reaches the public, we are setting ourselves up from something truly horrific. We are now staring into the abyss, and there is absolutely no one throughout the value chain of IPCC commentators or independent analysts even bothering to join the dots. Climate science is a theatre and a charade, and the results are going to be devasting as the sheer cowardice of the entire industry becomes apparent.</p><p>We are now at 1.6°C-1.7°C of warming and are very likely to reach almost 2°C by 2030 - a full 70 years ahead of the Paris Agreement guardrail. The cynicism and hypocrisy that underlies this fact is overwhelming.</p><p><strong>Someone needs to start telling the truth.</strong></p><p><em>Please see my previous work regarding hydrofracturing and shale </em><a href="https://medium.com/@danielrwilliams/hydrofracturing-the-real-cause-of-recent-global-temperature-spikes-cfe108a1aedc"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b1cd0b625df" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The myth of fossil fuel profitability]]></title>
            <link>https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/the-myth-of-fossil-fuel-profitability-854ab2539b94?source=rss-412162597383------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/854ab2539b94</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 17:12:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-03T08:02:23.994Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*zpb66M_9I7_UWL2oq6cJ-g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Horizontal drilling rigs in the Permian Basin</figcaption></figure><p>Fossil fuel companies are routinely described as reliable, cash-generative and indispensable engines of profit for investors, and for the economy. The more that is invested in fossil fuels, the cheaper everything is and the better the economy will run.</p><p>This narrative however is a complete fiction. Strip away public subsidies, financial engineering and policy support, and much of the sector’s apparent profitability evaporates, even on a purely economic basis.</p><p><strong>At first glance, oil, gas, and coal companies appear immensely profitable</strong>. Within the IOC (International Oil Company) world, major firms routinely report billions in annual earnings, and their dividends remain attractive to investors. But headline profits do not reflect the full economic picture. Fossil fuel production is exposed to volatile global markets with a number of financial risks, being increasingly dependent on sustained high prices to remain viable. When prices fall — as seen during the 2014 oil crash or the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic — many projects quickly become uneconomic. Entire segments such hydrofractured shale oil and gas produced no actual investor returns for an entire 10-year period between 2010 and 2020, surviving mostly on government support and borrowing to pay shareholders; essentially dependent on much higher prices at some later stage. And even then, after this 10 year period, ExxonMobil for example was <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;opi=89978449&amp;url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dow-jones-exxon-mobil-pfizer-raytheon-replaced-salesforce-amgen-honeywell/&amp;ved=2ahUKEwixpdCT-fqVAxWAUqQEHTK_NI0QFnoECE4QAQ&amp;sqi=2&amp;usg=AOvVaw1EIjggVSftVXtNSS2WK2Mq">dropped from the Dow Jones index</a>— where its shares had been traded for 90 years — simply because the company was not making any actual money.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*gHK-bwqiunbBevLrx5tZ0Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Sightline/IEEFA update</figcaption></figure><h3>Direct and indirect financial subsidies</h3><p>A critical factor underpinning the industry is the scale of direct and indirect financial subsidies it receives. Across the EU and globally, fossil fuels benefit from direct subsidies, tax breaks, consumption subsidies and strong monetary policy bias. Following the 2022 oil price spike, global <a href="https://www.iisd.org/articles/iisd-news/fossil-fuel-subsidies-hit-13-trillion-despite-government-pledges-end-them">fossil fuel subsidies reached $1.3 trillion</a>; over a third of the industry’s average total revenue of $3.7 trillion.</p><p><strong>But monetary policy is also leveraged to transfer wealth to fossil shareholders.</strong> <a href="https://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Living-Beyond-Their-Means-Five-Oil-Majors-Cannot-Cover-Dividends_January-2020.pdf">Between 2010 and 2019</a>, the five largest publicly traded oil and gas companies — ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, Total, and Shell — distributed $536 billion to shareholders while their operations produced only $329 billion in profit. They closed that $207 billion gap by selling assets and, crucially, by borrowing $122 billion in new long-term debt. But that did not mean they were profitable.</p><p>When oil prices spike — as they have repeatedly in recent years, from the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to more recently the Israeli war against Iran and other neighbouring countries— fossil fuel profits return. But as a result of this, inflation increases, because the cost of living rises. So central banks raise rates to reduce inflation stemming from higher energy costs. However, this ‘single-lever’ mechanism — increase borrowing costs to depress demand — does not work when the <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/279870/1/1870862295.pdf">inflation is caused by oil price spikes</a>, as it almost always is.</p><p>The practical effect is that oil and gas producers get to keep the windfall from a price spike, which leads to higher inflation — meaning higher borrowing costs, slower growth and tighter credit — all of which is absorbed by households and by every other sector of the economy that isn’t selling the commodity causing the problem in the first place.</p><p>As another example; during the 2022 and 2023 windfall years, when the largest producers took in a combined roughly $6.4 trillion in net income, this coincided with a period in which central banks worldwide were raising rates specifically to fight the inflation that elevated fossil fuel prices had helped generate. Fossil shareholders captured the profits of the shock; the rest of the economy absorbed the costs of the shareholder-centric policy response to it.</p><p><strong>Monetary policy is explicitly designed to protect fossil fuel shareholders and financiers, and not the renewable energy industry which need low interest rates because nearly all renewable investment is upfront capital.</strong></p><p><strong>A much more detailed explanation of how the financial industry are blocking the energy transition can be found </strong><a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/financing-the-collapse-51cb6754a365"><strong>here</strong></a><strong>.</strong></p><p>With a dual interest rate, renewables maintain profitability, and help to reduce inflation because their cost is fixed. Fossil fuels increase inflation regardless.</p><h4>Cash-harvesting when prices are high, not promoting growth or stability</h4><p>Even at the company level, profitability is often less about operational strength and more about financial strategy. Fossil fuel firms prioritize shareholder payouts — dividends and buybacks — over reinvestment in productive capacity or transition technologies. Following the 2022 energy price spike, European and international oil majors directed a substantial share of windfall profits to shareholders rather than expanding supply or accelerating low-carbon investment. This reflects a structural shift: the sector is increasingly managed as a cash-harvesting industry rather than a growth industry.</p><p>This shift is not accidental. Investors are acutely aware of the long-term risks facing fossil fuels — tightening climate policies, carbon pricing, electrification/hydrogen, and competition from renewables. As a result, there is limited appetite for large-scale, long-term capital expenditure in new fossil infrastructure, which could become stranded assets. Instead, companies are incentivized to extract maximum short-term value from existing reserves and return it to shareholders before demand declines. Fossil fuel companies increasingly resemble declining industries optimizing for yield rather than expansion.</p><h4>The endless boom-bust cycle that drives shareholder returns, and keeps subsidies onboard</h4><p>The claim of profitability also tends to ignore systemic inefficiencies. Fossil fuel markets are prone to boom-and-bust cycles that destroy value over time: high prices encourage overinvestment, leading to oversupply and subsequent price crashes. This cyclical instability contrasts with renewable energy technologies, where costs have followed consistent downward trends and operating expenses are low and predictable. Solar and wind projects, once built, generate electricity without fuel costs, making their economics fundamentally more stable — and largely insulated from the debt cycles and central-bank dilemmas that shape fossil fuel returns.</p><h4>Fossil fuels are locked-in, not inherently cheaper or more economically effective</h4><p>From a broader economic perspective, fossil fuels persist not because they are inherently profitable, but because they are embedded in existing infrastructure, institutions, and political systems. Governments continue to support them out of concern for energy security, employment, and industrial competitiveness. Financial markets continue to reward them for short-term returns. Consumers remain dependent on them due to slow infrastructure transitions. Together, these factors create a lock-in that sustains the industry even as its long-term fundamentals weaken.</p><h4>The business case for fossil fuels</h4><p>None of this translates as a thriving economic business case. It translates as an industry whose profitability depends on massive public subsidy and unpriced externalities at all times, and on a monetary policy environment that is consistently biased against alternatives, while the surrounding regulatory system ensures against stranded asset risk - as the financial industry themselves cash in when oil prices spike. The oil and gas sector functions less as a genuinely profitable enterprise than as a mechanism for converting subsidized production, borrowed money, and the costs of monetary policy into shareholder returns.</p><h4><strong>Recognising this reality matters for policymakers and investors alike</strong>.</h4><p>If profitability is contingent on subsidies, biased policy support, and a monetary regime that quietly absorbs the industry’s shocks by burdening taxpayers, then the case for continued support becomes harder to maintain. The question changes from &quot;how do we support a profitable industry&quot; to &quot;how much longer should the public underwrite one that isn’t.&quot; Redirecting capital toward genuinely sustainable and economically resilient energy systems needs to become a legal mandate.</p><h3>Renewable energy profitability</h3><p>All recent reports and studies, including a joint Imperial College London/IEA <a href="https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ef1d6b50-66a6-478c-990e-ee227e2dd89b/Clean_Energy_Investing_-_Global_Comparison_of_Investment_Returns.pdf">study</a> of 900 European power firms from 2001–2023 show that renewables are now (nearly) all more profitable to build and operate than fossil fuels, which continue to require subsidies to provide returns for shareholders. Further studies show that in France and Germany, for the selected 5-year period renewables investments in Germany and France <a href="https://www.worldenergy.org.tr/just-how-good-an-investment-is-renewable-energy-new-study-reveals-all/">yielded returns of 178.2%</a> compared with -20.7% for fossil fuel investments. In the U.K., also over five years, investments in green energy generated returns of 75.4% compared to just 8.8% for fossil fuels.</p><p>What is now required is a deliberate and accelerated effort to fully capitalize on the growing profitability of renewable energy, while recognizing its broader macroeconomic value. Unlike fossil fuels—whose prices are structurally volatile, geopolitically exposed, and inherently inflationary—renewables and green hydrogen offer a pathway to price stability and long-term cost predictability.</p><p><em>For previous writing about IOCs, NOCs and the exit strategy for fossil fuels, please see </em><a href="https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/the-exit-strategy-for-fossil-fuels-cb34e24ce10e"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=854ab2539b94" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Commission are a PR group working for fossil shareholders]]></title>
            <link>https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/the-commission-are-a-pr-group-working-for-fossil-shareholders-c0749436c5c6?source=rss-412162597383------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c0749436c5c6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy-transition]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 09:55:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-21T20:29:33.180Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*epc0edtWKplMkpcloCBmwA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Berlaymont building, Brussels</figcaption></figure><p>Every year, Europeans pour hundreds of billions of euros into the fossil fuel industry — not through incompetence or oversight. Through deliberate, defended, institutionalised, and fully subsidised policy. The European Commission - the body that positions itself as the world’s foremost climate legislator — ensures this system by presiding over a subsidy architecture that would make an oil executive weep with gratitude.</p><p>The numbers are precise and damning. Global fossil fuel subsidies reached a record $1.3 trillion in 2022, according to the <em>International Energy Agency</em> - roughly $3 million every minute. Specifically, the <em>European Environment Agency</em> has documented that EU member states continue to channel direct and indirect support to coal, oil, and gas at a rate of between €60 billion to €140 billion per year according to the EU Commission’s own figures, with 75% of this figure going directly to shareholders. The Commission press releases trumpet net-zero targets and Green Deal milestones, but block any funding to the critical industries that must replace fossil fuels. This is despite widespread criticism from every EU member state, the EU council, the EU Parliament, the legal sector, and banking sector regarding its alternative fuels regulation. Fossil alternatives are simply being blocked. The gap between rhetoric and reality is not a rounding error. It is the policy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/547/1*7QJABL1GsbkH9aecQghV0g.png" /><figcaption>Fossil fuel subsidies by energy vector in EU Member States, 2015 and 2023 Source: European Environment Agency</figcaption></figure><p>What do specific examples of fossil bias look like in practice? It is the preferential tax treatment of aviation kerosene, exempted from energy taxation for decades under rules the Commission has consistently failed to reform. It is an Emissions Trading System that, for years, handed free allowances to heavy industry at volumes that removed any incentive to decarbonise, and now will continue for decades. But most of all it is the careful severence of the only policy lever that tackles the 77% of EU emissions that electrification currently doesn’t: hydrogen. And the reality is, blocking hydrogen has the undeniable effect of cementing decades of fossil lock-in, within a legal framework as callous as the outcome it seeks to ensure. If the Commission and EU states wait until 2050 to start decarbonising heavy industry, when they are then sure that batteries and direct electrification won’t work, the long timelines involved mean that Europe has lost any hope of decarbonising various sectors, and fossil fuel subsidies continue into perpetuity; or at least until the guaranteed climate-induced societal breakdown they are fostering occurs.</p><p>The Commission does not lack the tools to end this. It lacks the will. As I have shown, the massive subsidies provided to fossil fuels (which they are officially mandated to reduce, in direct letters to Commissioners Dan Jorgensen and Wopke Hoekstra) ensure lavish sponsorship of various philanthropic groups who in turn, because no funding disclosure is required, ensure that various policy groups, NGOs and nonprofits make precisely the kind of mistakes and policy missteps that maintain their subsidy revenues on a permanent basis. The results are always predictable: ambition is inserted at the headline level and quietly hollowed out in the implementing detail.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*io16rxStpJ6W03k0LdxkVA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The fossil fuel circular economy. Source: authors work</figcaption></figure><p>The hydrogen debacle illustrates this perfectly. The Commission’s RFNBO Delegated Acts impose temporal and geographic requirements so stringent that green hydrogen is commercially unviable across nearly all European markets. Meanwhile, other technologies like battery and solar panel production face no obstacles whatsoever, benefiting from classification that opens the door to continued public and EU level support through every stage of the project timeline. Green hydrogen developers face regulatory paralysis; any other technology receives guaranteed ongoing support. This is not accidental architecture.</p><p>The Commission’s defenders will cite the Green Deal, Fit for 55, the 2040 climate target. These are real achievements. But ambition at the strategic level does not offset sabotage at the operational level. You cannot claim seriousness about decarbonisation while exempting aviation fuel from fair taxation, immediately supplying hyperscale datacentres with massive subsidies and zero limits to water and permissable fossil energy use; while designing clean hydrogen rules that guarantee commercial failure. By creating a subsidy mechanism so strict the rules are physically impossible for over 95% of operationally ready electrolyser manufacturing facilities to even start production, after a 5-year delay and constant revisions, there is zero certainty that any subsidy if awarded might, for example, be retroactively redacted. It is a regulatory black hole.</p><p>What is required is structural reform: mandatory lobbying disclosure, independent audit of energy-related state aid against climate compatibility, and genuine political will to close fossil tax exemptions that have survived every reform cycle for thirty years. Combined with this, legal proceedings should be put forward against the Commission as they continue to seek to block hydrogen for what looks like the next 7 years, when the next RFNBO revision is due in 2028.</p><p>Until then, the Commission will keep performing climate leadership for a global audience - while performing a rather different service for fossil fuel shareholders.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c0749436c5c6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Goals and Reality: how likely is the EU to meet its climate targets and what is necessary to achieve success]]></title>
            <link>https://danielrwilliams.medium.com/goals-and-reality-how-likely-is-the-eu-to-meet-its-climate-targets-and-what-is-necessary-to-ba678c0a823b?source=rss-412162597383------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ba678c0a823b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 07:12:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-20T18:11:51.703Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*stx1JQLlvvZmElZaG0_QLA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Burlaymont building, Brussels</figcaption></figure><p>The European Union has the most ambitious climate mitigation strategy of any major economy: a legally binding 55% net reduction by 2030, a 90% target for 2040 formally adopted this spring, and climate neutrality by 2050 anchored in the Climate Law. The question worth asking in mid-2026 is not whether the targets are ambitious — they are — but whether the grandiose rhetoric is capable of delivering. The honest answer is: partially, unevenly, and not without a significant course correction in how Brussels regulates the technologies it claims to champion.</p><h3>The 2030 goal</h3><p>If we start with what the numbers actually say, EU net emissions fell 2.5% in 2024 which brought the 27-nation bloc to roughly 37% below 1990 levels while the economy grew by 71% over the same period. The Commission’s November 2025 <em>Climate Action Progress Report</em> duly declared the EU &quot;on track&quot; — with the load-bearing caveat that this holds only if all existing and planned measures are fully implemented. That caveat is doing a great deal of work. The European Environment Agency’s own projections put the bloc at around 54% by 2030: a percentage point short of the target, but realistically very much in the service of accounting discretion considering some extremely significant disparities.</p><p>The pattern is familiar. Most initial installations under the first ETS revision such as power and coal phase-out are comfortably on course for their 62% reduction against 2005; cheap solar panels and wind turbines, and imported LNG shipments. The Effort Sharing sectors not covered by the first ETS (instead regulated by national targets) — including light industry, transport, buildings, agriculture — are not. Commission staff projections show ESR emissions falling roughly 38% against a 40% target under planned policies, producing a further 9% gap under current policies alone, with agriculture currently the worst performer. The ECNO (European Climate Neutrality Observatory) assessment of all 27 final NECPs (National Energy and Climate Plans), published this spring, reached the conclusion these plans have invited since their first drafts: national contributions do not add up to the EU-wide targets; despite significant problems with the framing and transmission of these EU-wide targets which we will discuss below.</p><p>At face value the 2030 verdict is genuinely close. A 54% outcome against a 55% target would be, by any historical standard, a remarkable achievement. The EU will get most of the way there on the strength of the ETS; renewables deployment (solar passed 400GW of installed capacity in 2025), and the structural replacement of coal, in many cases with LNG. It will fall short with most remaining sectors because member states have so far not been offered any clear strategy framework for achieving these emissions reductions; and ultimately because of the ideological battleground that decarbonisation beyond power and coal phase-out have become — particularly with regard to NGOs and generous EU subsidies still afforded to fossil fuels.</p><h3>2040: ambition with an escape hatch</h3><p>The 2040 target that entered into force in April is a different kind of instrument. The headline 90% net reduction survived the trilogues, but two flexibilities were priced in along the way. From 2036, up to five percentage points may be met with international carbon credits — up from the Commission&#39;s proposed three — meaning the domestic floor is 85%. ETS2, the carbon price for buildings and road transport, was pushed back to 2028. And a biennial review clause allows the target itself to be revisited.</p><p><em>Climate Action Tracker</em> called the credits provision a step backwards, and the criticism carries weight: the EU abandoned international offsets in 2021 for the good reason that cheap credits had flooded the first ETS and crashed the price signal. Reintroducing them, even hedged with &quot;high-quality&quot; language, converts up to a twentieth of the target from engineering into accounting — genuinely; a return to core EU strengths. Optimistically, the October 2025 European Council conclusions made competitiveness and social balance conditions of the target, rather than afterthoughts. However, the post-2030 implementation package now under consultation — national targets, the 2026 ETS revision, carbon removal integration — is where that bargain gets cashed out and the entire house of cards either falls apart or transforms into something structurally cohesive.</p><h3>What success actually requires</h3><p>Three things, in descending order of comfort for Brussels.</p><p><strong>Money, at scale</strong>. The Commission’s own figures require annual energy-system investment to more than double, to roughly €565 billion a year this decade (from approximately €250bn per year today). That capital will not be available with the high interest rate environment favoured by the financial industry (a topic I have discussed in detail); coupled with permitting queues meaning that grid build-out simply doesn’t match renewables development planning. The 2025 Grids Package with €1.2 trillion in planned investment to 2040 (€960bn for electricity grids, €240bn for hydrogen infrastructure) is the right instrument in principle. However its continued ideological conceit means that the difficult part (not the electricity) is going to be even further kicked into the long grass: detailed anticipatory planning for electricity, hand-waving for hydrogen infrastructure translates as a self-inflicted wound for much of the current ESR sectors that the 2040 target depends on.</p><p><strong>Regulatory coherence for the abatement technologies.</strong> The 90% target is physically impossible without deep industrial decarbonisation: H₂-DRI steel, low-carbon chemicals, cement, shipping fuels. Yet the RFNBO framework — additionality, hourly temporal correlation, geographic matching — continues to strangle the business case for the green hydrogen those sectors need, a fact the underwhelming European Hydrogen Bank auction results have highlighted with perfect clarity. Continuing to reduce the actual funding available to supply these auctions, if the funding is indeed ever disbursed (most recently €500 million versus a stated €240 billion investment need) showcases how far away the Commission’s energy team are from reality. The planned June 2026 revision of the RFNBO Delegated Acts is the single most important card the Commission holds. If the Q2 2026 process produces cosmetic amendment rather than structural simplification, the 2040 industrial pathway is fiction, whatever the Climate Law says.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l-Nh2TdxeFuvMQTBNM_QZw.png" /><figcaption>Source: ECNO — to say that hydrogen production is one of many decarbonisation options is somewhat overstating the case. There is hydrogen, hydrogen-derivatives, and bioenergy (and post-combustion CCS but that is unlikely)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Enforcement against member states</strong>. The NECP process has now failed twice — late submissions, insufficient contributions, no consequences. A target architecture in which the ETS delivers and everything governed by national discretion underdelivers is not so much a coincidence but a recognition that the framework is not functioning. An ETS2 extending carbon pricing and EU-level instruments into other sectors may be effective, and must be encouraged.</p><h3>Verdict</h3><p>The EU will probably land within touching distance of its 2030 target and claim success; the claim will be true; but really only on paper. And that paper will be covering some fairly serious cracks. The 2040 target is achievable, but only under conditions the EU has so far ensured can never be met: investment at double the current rate, a hydrogen and industrial framework rebuilt around commercial reality rather than regulatory theology, and an end to the polite fiction that 27 NECPs constitute a delivery mechanism. The targets are not the problem. The gap between legislative ambition and administrative follow-through is — and closing it is now the entire job.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ba678c0a823b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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