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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Daniel Sylvester on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Daniel Sylvester on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@danielsylvester2003?source=rss-037d5140f995------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Daniel Sylvester on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@danielsylvester2003?source=rss-037d5140f995------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[⚔️ For Those Who Keep Going When It Breaks You — CPTS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@danielsylvester2003/%EF%B8%8F-for-those-who-keep-going-when-it-breaks-you-cpts-5587225004b6?source=rss-037d5140f995------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5587225004b6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hackthebox]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackthebox-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Sylvester]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Jan 2026 10:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-27T10:34:33.005Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>⚔️ <strong>For Those Who Keep Going When It Breaks You — CPTS</strong></h3><h3>🚀 Introduction — What Is CPTS and Why It Matters</h3><p>The <strong>Certified Penetration Testing Specialist (CPTS)</strong> is not a certification you can simply book and attempt on a whim. It’s designed to be earned — not rushed, not guessed, and definitely not memorized.</p><p>Offered by <strong>Hack The Box</strong>, CPTS requires candidates to complete a <strong>comprehensive learning path</strong> before they’re even allowed to attempt the exam. That alone sets it apart. You don’t jump straight into the exam — you <em>grow into it</em>. The path forces you to build strong fundamentals, practice real-world scenarios, and develop the mindset required for actual penetration testing work.</p><p>What makes CPTS truly valuable is its focus on <strong>how you think</strong>, not just what tools you run. The exam tests deep enumeration, logical attack chaining, and the ability to adapt when things don’t go as planned. It’s not about speed — it’s about understanding.</p><p>I cleared the CPTS exam on my <strong>first attempt</strong>, but it didn’t happen by luck. It was the result of months of structured learning, consistent lab practice, and respecting the process that Hack The Box designed. Completing the path wasn’t optional — it was the key.</p><p>This article isn’t just about passing an exam. It’s about the journey behind it — the struggles, the breakthroughs, the mistakes, and the lessons that shaped my approach to penetration testing. If you’re considering CPTS or already on the path, this story will give you a realistic picture of what lies ahead — and why it’s worth it.</p><h3>🧭 Where It All Started: CBBH → CPTS</h3><p>My Hack The Box journey didn’t start with CPTS.</p><p>I first entered the platform by completing <strong>CBBH</strong> (now renamed and updated as <strong>CWES</strong>).</p><p>That path helped me:</p><ul><li>Build strong web security fundamentals</li><li>Understand real-world vulnerabilities</li><li>Develop a habit of structured learning</li></ul><p>As CPTS started gaining more attention in the community, curiosity kicked in.</p><p>The depth, realism, and challenge around CPTS made me ask myself:</p><blockquote><em>“Am I ready for this?”</em></blockquote><blockquote>That curiosity eventually pushed me to start the CPTS path — and once I began, there was no turning back.</blockquote><h3>🛠️ Entering the CPTS Path</h3><p>Entering the CPTS path felt like stepping into unfamiliar territory.</p><p>At the beginning, I thought it was something I could plan, schedule, and move through systematically. That assumption faded quickly. Very early on, it became clear that CPTS wasn’t designed to be rushed or treated like a checklist.</p><p>Each module slowed me down.</p><p>Not because it was unclear — but because it demanded attention.</p><p>New concepts. Deeper technical layers. Constant pauses to revisit, rethink, and research beyond the material provided.</p><p>What I initially expected to finish in a few months naturally stretched into <strong>6–7 months</strong>. Not due to a lack of effort, but because the learning curve was real. Adapting to new topics, revisiting earlier concepts, and spending time understanding them properly became part of my daily routine.</p><p>There were days when progress felt invisible.</p><p>Days when frustration kicked in.</p><p>Days when nothing seemed to make sense.</p><p>But consistency mattered.</p><p>Through repeated revision and hands-on practice, the pieces slowly started to connect. Over time, my focus shifted from simply executing techniques to understanding the logic behind them — <em>why</em> an attack works, <em>how</em> misconfigurations lead to compromise, and <em>what</em> to look for next.</p><p>That mindset shift is what truly defined my CPTS journey.</p><p>And consistency is the only reason I made it through.</p><h3>📚 How I Prepared for the CPTS Exam</h3><p>As the exam got closer, my focus shifted.</p><p>This was no longer about learning new concepts — it was about <strong>strengthening what I already knew</strong>.</p><p>Revision became non-negotiable. I went back to the CPTS modules and started revisiting labs again and again. Not to “finish” them, but to understand <em>every decision</em> behind each step. Repeating labs slowly turned concepts into muscle memory and helped my approach feel more natural and structured under pressure.</p><p>To push my hands-on practice further, I took a <strong>one-month VIP subscription</strong> and used it with intent. During this time, I worked through the <strong>CPTS playlist by IppSec</strong> and solved several labs recommended under the CPTS preparation list on HTB. Watching IppSec wasn’t about copying commands — it was about understanding his mindset. How he enumerates patiently, how he pivots when things don’t work, and how small details come together to form a complete attack path.</p><p>Alongside all of this, <strong>note-taking became a weapon</strong>.</p><p>I maintained clean, structured notes in <strong>Notion</strong>, organizing concepts, commands, attack flows, and common pitfalls in a way that made revision fast and effective. Instead of scattered information, I had a single place to revisit patterns and logic — something that proved invaluable as the exam pressure increased.</p><p>That combination of focused revision, repeated lab practice, learning from IppSec, and disciplined note-taking gave me the clarity and confidence I needed going into the exam.</p><h3>🧪 CPTS Exam Review — More Than Just an Exam</h3><p>Going into the CPTS exam, I expected it to be technically challenging.</p><p>What I didn’t expect was how deeply it would test my <strong>patience, confidence, and mental endurance</strong>.</p><p>This wasn’t just about exploiting vulnerabilities.</p><p>It was about surviving the process.</p><h3>🚨 Day 1 — A Reality Check</h3><p>Day one hit hard.</p><p>Reaching <strong>Flag 1</strong> alone felt exhausting. From reconnaissance to gaining initial access, every step demanded careful thinking and chaining multiple vulnerabilities together. Nothing was straightforward. By the end of the day, I had managed to reach <strong>15 points</strong>, but the message was clear — this exam wasn’t going to be easy.</p><p>Still, I told myself: <em>just survive day one.</em></p><h3>⚡ Day 2 — Momentum, Persistence, and False Comfort</h3><p>Day two finally brought some momentum.</p><p>I made solid progress and reached around <strong>40 points</strong>. Gaining a foothold and establishing <strong>persistence</strong> turned out to be the real key. Since the exam spans multiple days, persistence saved me from redoing work and wasting precious time.</p><p>By the end of day two, I had <strong>7 flags</strong> in hand.</p><p>At that moment, I genuinely believed I would finish the exam with ease.</p><p>That belief didn’t last long.</p><h3>🧱 Days 3–5 — Flag 8 and the Confidence Killer</h3><p>Then came <strong>Flag 8</strong>.</p><p>For two straight days, I couldn’t crack it. No matter what I tried, nothing worked. Each failed attempt slowly drained my confidence, and for the first time, I felt like I was actually failing.</p><p>This was the lowest point of the exam.</p><p>Instead of rushing or panicking, I slowed everything down. I relied heavily on <strong>proper note-taking</strong>, retraced every step, and tested each possibility methodically. Trial and error — guided by logic — finally opened a door.</p><p>And with that, my confidence returned.</p><h3>🔥 Day 6 — Confidence Restored</h3><p>By <strong>Day 6</strong>, I had <strong>9 flags</strong>.</p><p>I reminded myself of one important fact:</p><p>Out of <strong>14 flags</strong>, I only needed <strong>12 to pass</strong>.</p><p>The finish line was closer than it had ever been.</p><h3>🎯 Day 7 — Almost There</h3><p>By day seven, I reached <strong>13 flags</strong>.</p><p>At this stage, I made a deliberate decision — I didn’t even look at <strong>Flag 14</strong>. I didn’t want curiosity or ego to ruin my progress. Instead, I shifted my focus to the <strong>reporting phase</strong>, knowing how critical clean and accurate documentation is.</p><p>But Flag 14…</p><p>It lingered in my mind.</p><h3>😵‍💫 Day 9 — The Temptation and the Final Push</h3><p>By halfway through <strong>Day 9</strong>, my report was complete. I was ready to submit.</p><p>Yet Flag 14 disturbed my inner peace.</p><p>Instead of submitting, I made a risky decision — I went back hunting for it. For hours, I questioned myself, feeling exhausted, stuck, and honestly frustrated for not just ending the exam.</p><p>Then, finally…</p><p>I captured <strong>Flag 14</strong>.</p><p>I updated the report, made the final changes, and submitted everything.</p><p>After spending <strong>9–10 hours a day</strong>, cracking my head against walls, feeling stuck, doubting myself — it was finally over.</p><h3>📝 Reporting Phase — Where SysReptor Saved Me</h3><p>One thing that often doesn’t get enough attention in the CPTS journey is the <strong>reporting phase</strong> — and honestly, this part can be just as demanding as the technical work.</p><p>For me, <strong>SysReptor was an absolute gem</strong>.</p><p>Trying to create a full penetration testing report manually during the exam would have felt overwhelming, if not impossible. With the amount of time already spent enumerating, exploiting, and troubleshooting, manually formatting and structuring a report would have drained both time and energy.</p><p>SysReptor changed that completely.</p><p>It helped me organize findings clearly, structure the report professionally, and focus on <strong>content rather than formatting</strong>. Instead of worrying about layouts and consistency, I could concentrate on explaining attack paths, impact, and remediation properly.</p><p>Most importantly, it <strong>saved me a huge amount of time</strong> — time that I could either use to double-check my findings or take much-needed breaks during the exam.</p><p>If you’re planning to attempt CPTS, I highly recommend <strong>getting comfortable with SysReptor before the exam</strong>. Learn how it works, understand its structure, and integrate it into your workflow early. When the pressure is on, having a reporting tool you already trust makes a massive difference.</p><p>In an exam where time and clarity matter, SysReptor made reporting feel manageable — and that alone was a huge relief.</p><h3>🏁 Closing Thoughts</h3><p>This journey changed how I approach learning and problem-solving.</p><p>CPTS didn’t just strengthen my penetration testing fundamentals —</p><p>it taught me <strong>discipline, patience, and confidence</strong> in my abilities.</p><p>If you’re currently on this path or thinking about starting it:</p><blockquote><em>Trust the process. Keep going. You’ll get there.</em></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5587225004b6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ When Trust Backfires:⚔️ How Kerberos Delegation Can Be Weaponized]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@danielsylvester2003/when-trust-backfires-%EF%B8%8F-how-kerberos-delegation-can-be-weaponized-dc2fa66c032e?source=rss-037d5140f995------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dc2fa66c032e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kerberos-authentication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kerberos-delegation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kerberos]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Sylvester]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2025 14:08:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-29T14:08:34.037Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>🧭 What is Kerberos?</h3><p><strong>Kerberos</strong> is the <strong>default authentication protocol</strong> used in <strong>Windows environments</strong> powered by <strong>Active Directory</strong>.</p><p>Its main goal is simple:</p><blockquote><em>Let users sign in once and access multiple services securely — without typing their password over and over again.</em></blockquote><h3>🧰 Key Building Blocks of Kerberos</h3><ul><li><strong>Client:</strong> The user’s device (e.g., Alice’s PC)</li><li><strong>KDC (Key Distribution Center):</strong> Brain of Kerberos, lives on the Domain Controller.</li><li><strong>AS (Authentication Service):</strong> Issues the initial TGT.</li><li><strong>TGS (Ticket Granting Service):</strong> Issues service-specific tickets.</li><li><strong>TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket):</strong> Reusable pass that proves a user’s identity.</li><li><strong>Service Ticket:</strong> Lets users access specific services like file shares, databases, etc.</li></ul><h3>🔁 Step-by-Step Kerberos Authentication</h3><p>Let’s break Kerberos down into 6 simple steps that happen behind the scenes:</p><h3>✅ Step 1: AS-REQ — Authentication Request</h3><p>🧠 <strong>Goal</strong>: Get a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT)</p><ul><li>Alice logs into her domain-joined Windows machine.</li><li>Her machine sends an <strong>AS-REQ</strong> to the Domain Controller (KDC):</li><li>Her username</li><li>A timestamp encrypted with her password-derived key</li><li>Realm and encryption details</li></ul><p>📢 <em>“Here’s who I am and proof that I know my password.”</em></p><h3>✅ Step 2: AS-REP — Authentication Reply</h3><p>🧠 <strong>Goal</strong>: Receive a TGT and session key</p><ul><li>The KDC verifies Alice’s identity and replies:</li><li>A <strong>TGT</strong> (Ticket Granting Ticket) — encrypted with the KDC’s key</li><li>A <strong>session key</strong> — encrypted using Alice’s key</li></ul><p>📢 <em>“Here’s your TGT and a session key to talk securely.”</em></p><h3>✅ Step 3: TGS-REQ — Requesting Service Access</h3><p>🧠 <strong>Goal</strong>: Access a specific service (e.g., file server)</p><ul><li>Alice wants to access a service like \\\\fileshare.corp.local.</li><li>Her machine sends the TGT and a new <strong>authenticator</strong> to the <strong>TGS</strong> part of the KDC.</li><li>It also includes the <strong>SPN</strong> of the service she wants.</li></ul><p>📢 <em>“Here’s my TGT. I’d like access to this service.”</em></p><h3>✅ Step 4: TGS-REP — Receiving a Service Ticket</h3><p>🧠 <strong>Goal</strong>: Get a service ticket to access the requested resource</p><ul><li>The KDC replies with:</li><li>A <strong>Service Ticket</strong> (encrypted with the service’s key)</li><li>A new <strong>session key</strong> (encrypted for Alice)</li></ul><p>📢 <em>“Here’s your access ticket for that service.”</em></p><h3>✅ Step 5: AP-REQ — Accessing the Service</h3><p>🧠 <strong>Goal</strong>: Use the service ticket to prove identity</p><ul><li>Alice’s system sends the <strong>service ticket</strong> and an <strong>authenticator</strong> to the target service.</li></ul><p>📢 <em>“Here’s my ticket and proof I’m really using it right now.”</em></p><h3>✅ Step 6: Authorization with PAC</h3><p>🧠 <strong>Goal</strong>: Service verifies permissions</p><ul><li>The service decrypts the ticket and reads Alice’s <strong>PAC</strong> (Privilege Attribute Certificate).</li><li>It checks:</li><li>Who she is</li><li>What groups she’s in</li><li>Whether she’s allowed access</li></ul><p>📢 <em>“Access granted. You have the required permissions.”</em></p><h3>🔐 How Kerberos Achieves Password-less Access After Login</h3><p>The secret lies in a clever use of <strong>tickets</strong>. Here’s how it flows, step by step:</p><ol><li><strong>Login (Initial Authentication)</strong></li></ol><p>When you log in, your username and password are used <strong>once</strong> to request a special ticket called the <strong>TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket)</strong> from the <strong>Authentication Service (AS)</strong> — part of the <strong>KDC (Key Distribution Center)</strong>.</p><p>✅ Your password isn’t stored or reused — it’s used just to prove who you are.</p><p><strong>2. TGT Stored Securely</strong></p><p>This <strong>TGT</strong> is stored securely on your system and can be reused to request other tickets — it’s like your personal pass that proves your identity.</p><p><strong>3. Accessing a Service (e.g., File Server)</strong></p><p>When you try to access a service (like a file share or a web app), your system doesn’t ask you for your password again. Instead, it sends the <strong>TGT</strong> to the <strong>Ticket Granting Service (TGS)</strong> — also part of the KDC — and says:</p><blockquote><em>“Hey, I need a ticket to access this service. Here’s my TGT as proof I’m allowed.”</em></blockquote><p><strong>4. Service Ticket Issued</strong></p><p>If the TGT is valid, the TGS issues a <strong>Service Ticket</strong>, which your computer then sends to the target service (e.g., a file server).</p><p><strong>5. You’re In! 🎉</strong></p><p>The service reads the ticket, verifies it, and grants you access — no password prompt needed.</p><h3>🧩 Kerberos Delegation Types</h3><h3>🎯 What is Unconstrained Delegation?</h3><p><strong>Unconstrained Delegation</strong> is a way to allow a <strong>service (like a web server)</strong> to <strong>impersonate a user</strong> and <strong>access resources on their behalf</strong> — e.g., a backend file server or database.</p><p>💡 In simple terms:</p><blockquote><em>“A user logs into a front-end server. The server uses that user’s identity to request data from another server — without asking for the user’s credentials again.”</em></blockquote><h3>📘 Realistic Example — Unconstrained Delegation in Action</h3><p>Let’s walk through how <strong>unconstrained delegation</strong> can become a serious risk in a real-world environment:</p><h3>🔹 Scenario Setup</h3><ul><li><strong>DC01</strong> is the <strong>Domain Controller</strong> for a corporate network.</li><li><strong>WEB01</strong> is a <strong>web application server</strong> joined to the domain and is configured with <strong>unconstrained delegation</strong>.</li><li><strong>Alice</strong>, a domain user (or admin), accesses the internal web application hosted on WEB01 via her browser.</li><li><strong>Attacker</strong> has compromised the WEB01 server through some vulnerability in the web app (RCE, weak creds, etc.).</li></ul><h3>🔸 What Happens Behind the Scenes</h3><ol><li>When <strong>Alice logs in to the web app</strong>, her system authenticates to WEB01 using <strong>Kerberos</strong>.</li><li>The <strong>Domain Controller (DC01)</strong> gives WEB01 a <strong>service ticket</strong> that includes <strong>Alice’s TGT</strong> inside it — because <strong>unconstrained delegation is enabled</strong>.</li><li>This TGT is now <strong>cached in memory</strong> on WEB01 — so the web server can impersonate Alice to access any service in the domain on her behalf.</li></ol><h3>🔴 Where the Problem Begins</h3><ol><li><strong>Attacker</strong>, having already gained access to WEB01, now extracts Alice’s <strong>TGT</strong> from memory.</li><li>Since this TGT is still <strong>valid</strong>, the attacker uses it to request <strong>TGS tickets</strong> to access other services — like:</li></ol><ul><li>\\\\FileServer\\C$ (SMB share),</li><li>LDAP://DC0</li><li>MSSQL01 (SQL Server),</li><li>even <strong>another domain controller</strong>.</li></ul><p>3. The <strong>DC sees the TGT</strong> and assumes:</p><p><em>“</em>WEB01 is just doing its job — acting on behalf of Alice. That’s fine, I trust WEB01.<em>”</em></p><p>4. The attacker now has <strong>full lateral movement</strong> power — all <strong>in the name of Alice</strong>, without needing her password or even touching her workstation.</p><h3>🧩 The Core Logic</h3><p>Kerberos doesn’t want to make the server (WEB01) keep asking Alice for her password every time it needs to access another service (e.g., a file share). Instead, it allows the <strong>web server to reuse Alice’s TGT</strong>, which enables it to <strong>request new TGS tickets on behalf of Alice</strong> — just like Alice herself could.</p><h3>🧠 What is Constrained Delegation?</h3><blockquote><em>🎯 “I trust this web server to impersonate users, but only to specific services (like file server).”</em></blockquote><p>✅ Admin <strong>predefines which services</strong> a system can delegate to (e.g., CIFS/fileserver.dev.local).</p><p>🧱 This <strong>restricts abuse</strong> by a compromised server — it can’t request <em>any</em> service like in unconstrained.</p><h3>🧠 What are S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy?</h3><p><strong>S4U2Self </strong>— Allows a service (e.g. web server) to get a <strong>service ticket to itself</strong> on behalf of any user.</p><p>S4U2Proxy — Allows a service to get a <strong>TGS to another service</strong> (e.g., file server), on behalf of a user, <strong>using the S4U2Self ticket</strong>.</p><h3>📘 Realistic Example — Constrained Delegation in Action</h3><h3>🔐 The Setup (Configured by Admin)</h3><ul><li>The Domain Admin has configured <strong>Constrained Delegation</strong> on the WEB01 machine account.</li><li>Specifically, WEB01$ is <strong>trusted to impersonate users, but only to the CIFS service on </strong><strong>FILE01</strong> (i.e., it can act as users, but <strong>only when accessing FILE01</strong>).</li></ul><p>This setup limits the attack surface — the web server can’t talk to just any service as another user.</p><h3>📜 The Flow — What Happens When Alice Uses the Web Server?</h3><ol><li><strong>Alice logs into a web application</strong> running on WEB01.</li><li>WEB01, acting as a trusted service, wants to access files from FILE01 <strong>on Alice’s behalf</strong>.</li><li>It performs:</li></ol><ul><li>✅ <strong>S4U2Self</strong>: Gets a service ticket for itself <strong>as Alice</strong> (proving that she’s a legit user).</li><li>✅ <strong>S4U2Proxy</strong>: Uses that ticket to ask the <strong>DC</strong> for a <strong>TGS to CIFS/FILE01</strong> — still pretending to be Alice.</li></ul><p>4. The DC checks:</p><blockquote><em>“Is WEB01 allowed to delegate Alice to FILE01?”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>✅ Yes. So the DC gives the TGS to </em><em>WEB01.</em></blockquote><p>5 . Now WEB01 can access FILE01 as if it were Alice — but only that service.</p><h3>😈 What If an Attacker Compromises WEB01?</h3><ul><li>The attacker <strong>can now request service tickets as any user</strong> (say, Administrator) — but:</li><li>❌ They don’t get the <strong>TGT</strong> of the user.</li><li>❌ They can’t get tickets to any random service.</li><li>✅ They <strong>can only request TGS to services </strong><strong>WEB01 is allowed to delegate to</strong> (like FILE01).</li></ul><h3>🧠 What is RBCD?</h3><blockquote><em>🔐 Resource-Based Constrained Delegation lets resource owners (e.g., FILE01) define which security principals (like WEB01$) are allowed to impersonate users to their service.</em></blockquote><p>Unlike traditional constrained delegation — which is configured by domain admins and set <strong>on the delegating account (e.g., WEB01)</strong> — <strong>RBCD is configured on the <em>target</em> service (e.g., FILE01)</strong></p><h3>🔧 How Does RBCD Work?</h3><p>It uses the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute on the <strong>target computer account</strong>.</p><p>Let’s say:</p><ul><li>🖥️ WEB01$ wants to impersonate Alice to access CIFS/FILE01.</li><li>📌 Admin sets on <strong>FILE01$</strong>:</li></ul><p>msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity = WEB01$</p><p>This means:</p><p>🗂️ “FILE01 trusts WEB01 to act on behalf of others — but <strong>only to services it hosts</strong>.”</p><h3>🔁 RBCD Flow (Step-by-Step)</h3><ol><li><strong>Attacker has control of WEB01</strong>.</li><li>WEB01 requests:</li></ol><ul><li>🧾 S4U2Self: A service ticket to itself as Alice.</li><li>📬 S4U2Proxy: A <strong>TGS to CIFS/FILE01</strong>, pretending to be Alice.</li></ul><p>3. DC checks <strong>FILE01’s msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity</strong>:</p><ul><li>❓”Does FILE01 trust WEB01 to impersonate?”</li><li>✅ Yes → grants ticket.</li></ul><h3>📌 🧾 Summary — Kerberos Delegation Demystified</h3><h3>🔓 Unconstrained Delegation</h3><ul><li><strong>Configured On</strong>: Delegating Server</li><li><strong>Can Impersonate</strong>: Any service in the domain</li><li><strong>Abuse Risk if Compromised</strong>: 🔴 <em>Very High</em></li><li><strong>Why?</strong>: TGTs are cached in memory — attacker can impersonate anyone.</li></ul><h3>🔒 Constrained Delegation</h3><ul><li><strong>Configured On</strong>: Delegating Server</li><li><strong>Can Impersonate</strong>: Only specified services</li><li><strong>Abuse Risk if Compromised</strong>: 🟠 <em>Moderate</em></li><li><strong>Why?</strong>: Attacker can only move to specific allowed services — limited scope.</li></ul><h3>🛡️ Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)</h3><ul><li><strong>Configured On</strong>: The <em>target</em> resource (e.g., file server)</li><li><strong>Can Impersonate</strong>: Only to that specific resource</li><li><strong>Abuse Risk if Compromised</strong>: 🟢 <em>Lower</em></li><li><strong>Why?</strong>: The target must explicitly trust the source — tighter control.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dc2fa66c032e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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