<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Danny Foord on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Danny Foord on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@dannyfoord03?source=rss-322d8f517ebb------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 07:40:58 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@dannyfoord03/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Rest Attacks, Transitions and Manchester United]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyfoord03/rest-attacks-transitions-and-manchester-united-87d04fc5ff95?source=rss-322d8f517ebb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/87d04fc5ff95</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[manchester-united]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-tactics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Foord]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Sep 2023 12:09:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-11T12:09:18.400Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/1*-ahtUEV0BvF0yIc4YIvCFA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Rest attack, or rest offence, can be defined as the arrangement of a team’s attackers outside of the defensive block when the opposition team is in possession. The attackers in the rest attack will be arranged in a manner that benefits them most in the event of a transition. This may be in a way to recirculate the ball and retain possession, or often a team may look to exploit the oppositions vulnerable structure post transition and begin a counter attack.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/787/1*N6BCoW-IwNKwIuoPQiNmVQ.png" /><figcaption>Image from <a href="https://spielverlagerung.com/2022/06/16/tactical-theory-rest-attack%ef%bf%bc/">Spielverlagerung</a></figcaption></figure><p>The concept of rest attacks and counter attacking was a particularly interesting tactical insight in Manchester United’s recent match against Arsenal. United’s rest attack often consisted of their front three maintaining an advanced and wide position spread across the entirety of the Arsenal back line, with the rest of the team forming their defensive block.</p><p>In transitions, Eriksen or Bruno were often first receivers for United, naturally due to their ball playing ability — usually Eriksen due to his deeper starting position. United would quickly shift into a 4–2–3–1 or 4–3–3 set up upon winning the ball. With the threat of a central ball carrier, the opposition cannot commit to defending the wide channels and therefore if the pass to the wingers is played at the right time, there should be an opportunity to utilise the transition effectively.</p><p>United exploited Arsenal in transition on two main occasions in the game (with one eventually ruled out for offside). On both occasions, the striker, acting as a connector at the time, vacated the central position in different attacking rotations, often in an attempt to pin one of Arsenal’s centre backs or drawing one out of position. This in turn creates open dribbling paths for the wingers/ ball carriers to attack.</p><p>This theory was put into practice for United’s opening goal. Upon Rashford receiving the ball, Martial began drifting to the far side. This results in the Arsenal back line becoming less compact (as Gabriel was forced wider to compensate for Martial’s movement) and allowing the space for Rashford to cut in and finish.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Go0aP4rldgN9R3_jaAiaZg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QcDwG4E18LhhF_3vFxMjew.jpeg" /></figure><p>This variation of run is not only to the benefit of the ball carrier; by horizontally decompacting the back line space is created in dangerous areas in and around the box. Should the winger be unable to or decide against cutting inside themselves, the space generated can be exploited by late attacking runs from the advanced midfielders, or the opposite side winger. This attacking pattern was used more often in United’s pre-season, particularly when Mason Mount was fit.</p><p>A variation of this was used in Garnacho’s disallowed goal, this time with Højlund coming deep, instead of pushing out wide. This once again disrupted the Arsenal backline, forcing Saliba to follow Højlund and creating the space for Garnacho to make the diagonal run into the centre of the pitch.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J8CcRGr8DrmpHB3yeq1JLQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fYBqr6raXh63KZgwyAHT7A.jpeg" /></figure><p>This seemed to be United’s main approach to attacking in this game. They also struggled to create situations similar to this artificially due to Arsenal’s reluctance to press high at certain points in the match. Whilst Arsenal are often vulnerable when caught in transition, there was perhaps an over reliance from United’s behalf on creating chances in this way which certainly hindered their goalscoring capability in this particular match.</p><p>On top of this, Arsenal in this match often built up in a 2–3 or 3–2 structure, with Zinchenko often inverting and Ben white assuming advanced positions at many points within the match. This left Arsenal particularly vulnerable to United’s rest attack and eventual counters. Assuming a more narrow build up structure played into United’s hands as they looked to break using their wide front three rest attack. While Arsenal often managed to prevent these breaks by means of their counter press, this was obviously not a completely preventative measure. However, Arsenal’s in possession approach may prove to be somewhat of an anomaly in relation to what United will face across the rest of the season. Many teams will be less reluctant to commit as many players in their attacks and will often leave more players in their rest defence, which may somewhat nullify United’s threat in these situations.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=87d04fc5ff95" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Diamond In The Rough]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyfoord03/a-diamond-in-the-rough-746488d4488a?source=rss-322d8f517ebb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/746488d4488a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football-tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[arsenal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soccer]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Foord]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Aug 2023 20:36:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-22T20:38:44.489Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vVA51MFItp39p8smF_RKGg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Arsenal tried many different tactical approaches and systems to varying degrees of success across their pre-season matches. In this article I’ll discuss one tactical pattern I found particularly interesting, the inception of a diamond midfield setup; one that continued to emerge in the opening two games of the Premier League season.</p><p>It is important to note, this is only one of many different approaches Arsenal have tried and continue to use in attempt to build a system that best fits their new signings. This piece aims to take an objective look at this new approach and the pros and cons that may arise, with a particular focus on how this system was used in Arsenal’s opening game against Nottingham Forest.</p><p>In Arsenal’s first phase of build-up, Partey would start in the right back position, particularly when Ramsdale was in possession. Upon Ramsdale playing the ball, Partey will invert to sit alongside Rice, with Arsenal creating a more conventional 3–2 build-up shape. As Arsenal approached the second phase of their build-up, they would begin the transition into their diamond<em>.</em> Rice would depart the pivot, leaving Partey as a lone 6; the diamond would be formed by Rice advancing into the lcm position, Odegaard as the rcm and Havertz at the tip. As a variation of the box midfield being utilised by many teams recently, this diamond approach created a similar numerical advantage in the central areas of the pitch as teams don’t often position 4 players centrally out of possession.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*COXBQDhXjuz8KvRXrxajGw.png" /><figcaption>An example of Arsenal’s diamond shape in midfield.</figcaption></figure><p>In this particular game, Forest combated this with a zonal out of possession system. Their central attacker would often sit on Partey, with the ball side winger pressing the man in possession. The remaining forward would drop deep to form a three man midfield who would block the passing lanes to Arsenal’s three midfield outlets. This winger is forced into the midfield as a result of the aforementioned numerical advantage. This, in turn, allowed Arsenal’s defenders more time on the ball, as any player in the defending team who steps up exposes a passing lane to one of Arsenal’s advanced midfielders.</p><p>This, however, was manipulated by Arsenal. Partey would often drop into the back line to form a back four, and as a result the Forest winger would be forced back into an advanced position to mark Arsenal’s wide centre back. This manipulation of Forest’s mid block was often used to progress the ball to Arsenal’s three advanced midfielders.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O0f33dtuKMLjl3FGfxcoaA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*je0HQOJrJhnAvX-LvYi-ZA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U9Vfuu8ZzPGw8j6vWWQw6g.png" /><figcaption>Partey Dropping into the backline to disrupt Forest’s mid block and open up passing lanes to the midfielders.</figcaption></figure><p>This is a pattern of play that has been repeated many times in Arsenal’s recent games, including pre-season. One of the pivots would often step into the back line to attempt to manipulate the out of possession phases deployed by the opposition in Arsenal’s favour. This happened with different personnel over the games; Partey, Rice, Jorginho and Kiwior all assumed this role at times throughout pre-season.</p><p>This pattern is something that Larcon writes about in more detail in his <a href="https://medium.com/@Lxwrites/artetas-arsenal-an-exercise-in-getting-up-the-pitch-9b5ecd596d3d">article on Arsenal’s pre season games.</a></p><p>Another benefit arises from the numerical advantage centrally in the pinning of Forest’s midfield as a result of the diamond. As the non-ball side winger drops into the midfield to block the passing lanes, it creates space out wide for the wingers to utilise. When Arsenal are successful in finding Saka and Martinelli in these situations, it disrupts the shape of Forest’s mid block — reducing their horizontal compactness.</p><p>This new evolution of Arsenal is not without flaws, and is yet to be perfected. It has its fair share of drawbacks both in possession and out of it too. It is clear from watching Arsenal’s opening two games in the Premier League that there has been a distinct lack of fluidity, particularly in the final third, that was once a hallmark of Arteta’s Arsenal last season. One drawback, that was particularly noticeable against Palace, was the lack of Ben White’s overlapping runs. With Partey now operating as the inverted right back, and Ben white being used as one of the centre backs responsible for forming the back three in possession, White has had significantly less freedom to move up the pitch. As a result, Saka is often left isolated on the right flank. Anyone who has watched Saka regularly will know this is still a situation where he can be dangerous, but his threat is definitely stifled somewhat when coming up against strong 1v1 defenders at full back (e.g Mitchell against Palace).</p><p>One interesting pattern that arose in Arsenal’s match against Palace was Eze’s ability to receive the ball in the 10 position during transitions. This occurred when Arsenal utilised their diamond shape (which was not as frequent in this match as it was against Forest). When Arsenal lost possession, Eze was able to exploit the space left during the transition into Arsenal’s defensive shape, as Partey vacated the 6 position to return to right back and Rice had not yet returned from his more advanced lcm position. Whilst this didn’t cause too many problems on the night, it was a situation Palace could well have exposed and taken better use of on another night. It is yet to be seen if this is a deficiency of the system itself or simply a teething problem due to lack of communication as the players adjust to a new tactical approach.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HKfBf5EtrejCXFoJQ3VkhA.png" /><figcaption>Eze receiving the ball in transition and exploiting the space left by Rice and Partey.</figcaption></figure><p>There are a few other potential benefits of this system that have not been discussed. One of these is the use of the improved aerial ability of the team as a result of the signing of Havertz. It is not something that has been massively utilised by Arsenal as of yet to much success, but paired with the signing of David Raya (a goalkeeper who is renowned for his long ball ability), it may be something we see more frequently in the future.</p><p>It’ll be interesting to see how this approach develops as the roster of available players changes throughout the season and whether it is something Arteta will persist with for the upcoming season.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=746488d4488a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The New Additions at Bournemouth]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyfoord03/the-new-additions-at-bournemouth-3ba104ad32e6?source=rss-322d8f517ebb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3ba104ad32e6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transfers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soccer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Foord]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Aug 2023 20:33:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-21T15:05:01.798Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last season, Gary O’Neill led a newly promoted Bournemouth team to a 15th place finish after replacing Scott Parker only four games into the season. After what many would deem a successful first season in charge, O’Neill was relieved of his duties in June and replaced by former Rayo Vallecano manager Andoni Iraola.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hgbBHP9xADjkAnm1a4nNtA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Whilst it is certainly a risk to sack a manager after such success in a short stint, it is no doubt that Iraola is one of the most exciting coaches in football at the moment. During his time at Rayo Vallecano he earnt promotion from the Spanish Segunda Division via the playoffs in his first season in charge. He followed on with 12th place and 11th place La Liga finishes as well as reaching the Copa del Rey semi final in the 2021/22 season.</p><p>His approach to football is pragmatic and at some times chaotic. He utilises a high risk high reward setup with his intense and relentless press, with Rayo boasting some of the best pressing numbers across Europe and his attacks are direct and unforgiving. His style of play draws similarities to that of Marcelo Bielsa, who Iraola played under during his time at Athletic Bilbao.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iHw1lI9D6HpPlsC5b-p30w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Andoni Iraola</figcaption></figure><p>Neel Shelat writes in far greater detail about Andoni Iraola’s Rayo Vallecano team in his article for <a href="https://analyticsfc.co.uk/blog/2022/11/15/hybrid-pressing-and-avoiding-zone-14-andoni-iraolas-rayo-vallecano/">Analytics FC</a>.</p><h4>Out of Possession</h4><p>Out of possession Rayo set up in a 4–4–2 shape. The left winger will advance into the front two, with the attacking midfielder shifting out wide to fill the gap left. When a team is attempting to build out from the back, the two front men will execute a zonal press to attempt to force the buildup out wide. This will then trigger a more man to man oriented press from the rest of the team in an attempt to force a dispossession. This man to man press will lead to one of the midfield two dropping and one joining to occupy the opposition midfield outlet. Having the one midfielder drop creates a stronger rest defence in the event that the opposition team plays through their frontline press.</p><p>Setting up in this 4–4–2 block also allows them some adaptability in their approach. They have the option of sitting deeper and forming a lower block in situations where this is necessary, for example later in games or when holding onto a lead. When Rayo do this the full backs tend to tuck in to create a narrow back line with the wingers also sometimes dropping deeper and defending the wide areas. This 4–4–2 out of possession system is not something that is unfamiliar in the Premier League, with teams such as Arsenal often utilising a similar shape off the ball.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*skkVqrSswPLdJZns1n95Hg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KWbqBuRKMHzOYMtPfer-5w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Examples of a 4–4–2 block from Rayo’s 2–1 victory over Barcelona.</figcaption></figure><p>Iraola’s main selling point is his unique pressing system. Rayo have boasted the third lowest PPDA (passes per defensive action) in the 22/23 La Liga season , as well as the 8th highest build up disruption percentage in Europe in 21/22. Both these metrics put them among some of the best and most effective pressing teams in Europe.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A0YRhjMycxA_iVs3NGpyCA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/699/1*FFJlzYTQnuWjFm438TnhPQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/698/1*qwCdUHszlhIwfMvFMQxfmw.png" /><figcaption>Data from <a href="https://soccerment.com/measuring-pressing-success-buildup-disruption-percentage-bdp/">Soccerment</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theanalyst.com/eu/2022/10/premier-league-stats-2022-23/">Bournemouth had a PPDA of 15.7 last season </a>ranking them 15th in the premier league, meaning they were not a particularly effective pressing team. This is obviously a contrast to Iraola’s Rayo Vallecano side and represents an aspect of the game that Iraola will almost definitely attempt to improve. This may take some time to implement effectively, so some patience may be needed from the fans and the owners to allow Iraola the time needed.</p><h4><strong>In possession</strong></h4><p>Iraola favours a 4–2–3–1 in possession with his Rayo Vallecano team, with an emphasis on focusing their attacks out wide. Rayo’s full backs, Fran Garcia and Ivan Balliu, play an important role in their attack and will often appear as an option high and wide up the pitch, with the winger coming inside as a result. When this occurs, one of the midfielders within the pivot will often drop back to accommodate the advanced full back. The attacking midfielder will often come ball side into the half space and create a passing option inside for the winger and fullback and forming a triangle out wide.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Pq73VVDmaWvbLG2Fxgf_vw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jKtsayj4_clQNZs_XZ0ABQ.png" /></figure><p>The above pictures are examples of Rayo’s full backs occupying advanced positions: we can see the triangles that have been formed out wide, in these cases with the full back, one of the midfield two and the striker or attacking midfielder.</p><p>The emphasis on the use of full backs offensively is also shown by Opta’s player radars for both Fran Garcia and Ivan Balliu with both players having high attacking outputs when compared to other defenders in Europe.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/738/1*sCjUd2lXXLQILDDv68BPpw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/638/1*i9DM5ie_RT2a6gKTEGJjaw.png" /><figcaption>Opta player radars for <a href="https://theanalyst.com/eu/2023/06/opta-player-comparison-tool/?playerId=227166">Fran Garcia</a> and <a href="https://theanalyst.com/eu/2023/06/opta-player-comparison-tool/?playerId=227166">Ivan Balliu</a></figcaption></figure><p>As well as the use of advanced full backs, Rayo often utilised early crosses and long shots to create chances. Their preference to focus their attacks out wide also benefits them in transitions, allowing them to execute a more effective counter press, as the ball is already located out wide, making it easier to force mistakes via the press.</p><p>Iraola is not just an exciting appointment tactically but he also fits the club well culturally. Bournemouth are not a club who can spend frivolously and don’t have the infrastructure one would expect of a club aiming to break into the top half of the Premier League; but this is not something unfamiliar to Iraola. During his time at Rayo Vallecano, Iraola was forced to be frugal when building his squad, upon achieving promotion to La Liga the core of his team remained very similar to that that played in the Segunda division, even towards the end of his second season in the top flight. They had the <a href="https://www.capology.com/es/la-liga/payrolls/">16th highest wage in the division</a> and many signings came in the form of loans or free transfers. A similar position to that of Bournemouth, who last season had only the <a href="https://sqaf.club/premier-league-wage-bills/">17th highest wage bill in the league.</a></p><h3><strong>New Signings</strong></h3><h4><strong>Milos Kerkez</strong></h4><p>In order to translate this style of play into the Premier League, Iraola will be particularly reliant on the attacking qualities of his full backs, something which has already begun to be addressed within the squad. Bournemouth recently acquired former AZ Alkmaar left back Milos Kerkez. A young player who almost perfectly fits the profile of a Iraola full back.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/529/1*F-O5Q4XmTH9M141DCXpWIQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/488/1*0oqVPhy0V9byzj1bHzTK4g.png" /><figcaption>Data from<a href="https://fbref.com/en/players/0ad53bdc/Milos-Kerkez"> FBref</a> and <a href="https://www.sofascore.com/player/milos-kerkez/1097425">Sofascore</a></figcaption></figure><p>Taking a look at some of his statistics shows he excels offensively, he is among some of the top percentiles in Europe for goalscoring, chance creation and ball progression. As well as his heat map showing he is comfortable and used to advancing high up the pitch. One particularly interesting statistic is that Kerkez receives 6.54 progressive passes per 90, putting him in the 91st percentile for this metric; this shows he has experience receiving the ball in attacking positions and in combination with his impressive output, he can turn these receptions into goal scoring opportunities at a high rate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1002/1*T9IgUoDtYorsBKnAYNIh8Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>It is important to note Kerkez is still a very young player at 19 years old and there is obviously a significant step up in quality from the Eredivisie to the Premier League. However, Kerkez certainly offers the right type of profile to excel in an Iraola team and has the potential to be a very impressive acquisition for Bournemouth.</p><h4><strong>Justin Kluivert</strong></h4><p>Justin Kluivert arrived at Bournemouth this summer in a deal worth £9.6 million from Roma, having spent the last season on loan at Valencia. Kluivert stood out in what was a poor Valencia team, scoring 6 goals for the Spanish side, including a goal against Iraola’s Rayo Vallecano.</p><p>Kluivert is a direct winger who excels at goal scoring and progressing the ball via his direct carries and dribbles.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*w7kwb37W9egRQGo8lK1gTg.png" /><figcaption>Opta Player Radar for <a href="https://theanalyst.com/eu/2023/06/opta-player-comparison-tool/?playerId=227166">Justin Kluivert</a></figcaption></figure><p>We can see this from the above player radar, with Kluivert ranking in the 82nd percentile for dribbles attempted and ranking in the 59th and 65th percentile for goals and shots respectively. Whilst these percentiles may seem low in regards to goals, it is important to consider he was playing in a poor Valencia side, who averaged 5.05 shots on target per 90.</p><p>It is interesting to see that Kluivert ranks in the 81st percentile for possession won among forwards, a potentially important aspect of the game for a Iraola winger. With Bourenmouth’s inevitable desire to press teams highly under Iraola, having a winger who is already an effective ball winner will help to instil this playstyle effectively and quickly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Om0fOGqQt3EszVjwH1xiLA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Kluivert’s club history offers an insight into his adaptability as well. He has played for four different clubs in the last few seasons, so has experience adapting to environments and systems, another potentially important quality to help adjust to Iraola’s pragmatic playstyle.</p><p>One potential flaw in Kluivert’s game may be his on the ball ability when it comes to passing. He ranks in the 4th percentile for passes attempted and just the 18th percentile when it comes to passing accuracy according to fbref. This, however, may not be as big of an issue as it seems as Iraola’s approach to games is not heavily reliant on possession and arguably a lot of his qualities as a coach are focused on his out of possession approach to games. It was not uncommon for his Rayo Vallecano side to win games comfortably with low possession statistics.</p><h4>Romain Faivre</h4><p>Bournemouth have also completed the signing of midfielder Romain Faivre from Lyon, however he has since completed a season long loan move back to Ligue 1 to play for Lorient. This article will not go into detail about this signing as a result, but he is another talented player who could prove to be a great addition in the future.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Bournemouth are starting an exciting new chapter in their history. Coming off the back of a successful first season back in the Premier League, they have now begun to set the foundations for a potentially successful future by employing an exciting up and coming coach, as well as making some astute signings of some talented young players.</p><p>If rumours are to believed Bournemouth’s incoming aren’t stopping just yet, with links to Bristol City midfielder Alex Scott being reported.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ba104ad32e6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Relationism and Europe. Is it needed?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyfoord03/relationism-and-europe-is-it-needed-65299102d476?source=rss-322d8f517ebb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/65299102d476</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soccer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Foord]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Jul 2023 15:51:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-21T15:05:26.454Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>Does football need relationism?</strong></h4><p>In the late 2000s, Guardiola led his Barcelona side through a period of European domination and did so whilst employing a brand of football heavily influenced by positional play. This evolution of the positional approach can be seen to mark the beginnings of a rise in these principles. Fast forward to the current day and disciples of the ‘Guardiolan’ school of positional play occupy coaching roles at some of Europe’s top clubs — Mikel Arteta, Xavi, Erik ten Hag and Xabi Alonso to name a few. However, these names alone do not begin to express the influence Pep Guardiola has had on modern day football, with coaches in leagues all around the world being influenced by his success.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VxwiTEkf9yXuAsa0cEi9Nw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Guardiola’s 2009 treble winning team.</figcaption></figure><p>It is normal and often sensible to draw inspiration from those who are massively successful, but one question arises from this situation, is football at danger of being homogenised?</p><h4>Relationism</h4><p>Relationism, known to some as functional play, can be seen as one extreme of the spectrum of footballing philosophies; it theorises a contrasting approach to positional play, or <em>Juego de</em> <em>Posición. </em>While positional play focuses on structures and the occupation of space, relationism embraces movement and chaos to progress down the pitch.</p><p>Jamie Hamilton provides a core group of tactical patterns typically found in relationist play in his article <a href="https://medium.com/@stirlingj1982/what-is-relationism-c98d6233d9c2">‘<em>What is Relationism?’</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>In Hamilton’s article, he highlights Brazilian coach Fernando Diniz to be particularly influential in the modern day development of relationist principles. Diniz’s Fluminense team play in what would appear an unorthodox way to watchers of European football. At first glance there appears to be little structure in the way the players are set up, with attackers often crowding one side of the pitch. However, the structure is within the freedom the players are allowed and the emphasis is placed on the intricate passing moves generated from the congestion to create unpredictability in their attacks. Fluminense have not been without success while playing this way, Diniz has earnt his first major trophy as a coach, winning the 2023 Campenato Carioca and earning a 3rd place league finish last year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sHHqWJQXdtpRnzubYbEyJg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fluminense coach Fernando Diniz</figcaption></figure><p>Diniz’s move away from the orthodox European tactical setups is significant within Brazilian football. In recent years there has been some discourse among Brazilian football fans over the ‘Europeanification’ of their national team. Tite’s Brazil set up at the 2022 World Cup in a positionalist system, a symbolic change which caused uproar among many fans. Brazilian football fans pride themselves on the influence their culture has on their national team. The street style football many young Brazilians play encourages high levels of creativity and freedom, something which has always been apparent when watching Brazilian sides of the past; positional play is not representative of this side of Brazilian football culture for many fans.</p><p>At its heart, relationism aims to make best use of the relationships between players on the pitch, it relies on player interactions to generate chaos and uses the creativity of players to solve problems on the pitch, the players themselves become the problem solvers. This is in stark contrast to the ideals of positional play which uses structural rigidity to ensure chaos is kept to a minimum and ensure the team has maximum control of the match, with a reliance on the coach as a primary problem solver.</p><p>In modern day football, clubs aim to impart their philosophy across the whole club, with youth teams often employing similar tactical setups to the first team in order to make working your way into the first team a more fluid process. This is a particularly interesting point when it comes to positional play. In a positionalist system, players are told where to play, what passes to make, where and when to press. Does this represent a future where players lose their autonomy on the pitch?</p><p>Football’s obsession with positional play has even crept its way into fan bases with fans on social media attempting to fit their players into a 3–2–5 or 3–2–2–3 setups. Positionism is now seen as the default approach for all teams to play, with inverted full backs and 3–2 build up seen as a mandate to be a successful team by some.</p><p>It is important to note it isn’t correct to suggest that positional play is inherently bad for football and other tactical approaches are better. It is an efficient and successful tactical approach after all. However, football is principally an entertainment product and some may argue that the progressive dominance of positional play philosophies threatens the future of the game in this regard. The overtly structural basis upon which positional play is built upon can be seen to limit the freedom of the footballers themselves which could be seen to suppress the most expressive and imaginative players who are typically viewed as the ‘entertainers’ of the sport.</p><h4>Relationism in Europe</h4><p>Relationism merely offers an alternative approach to football which could lead to a greater variation in how we see teams set up and compete in matches. This variation could be argued to be much needed and beneficial for the future of football. Last season offered some insight on this future. Spalletti’s Napoli and Roger Schmidt’s Benfica were two of Europe’s most entertaining teams last season and neither were short of success with both teams winning their respective domestic leagues and reaching the knockout stages of the champions league; both these coaches are influenced by relationist approaches.</p><p>In particular, Henrik Rydström’s Malmo team has recently been playing a brand of football heavily inspired by relationism. Their play often features high levels of tilting, often with up to 6 or 7 attackers gathering within close proximity, as well as a lot of use of what Hamilton referred to as ‘<em>Escadinhas’ </em>— a way of progressing up the pitch by arranging attackers diagonally or in a staircase arrangement.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5rKnMXz-gF8oZKYIXBLq7A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Malmo displaying tilting and escadinhas during a 3–0 win against IK Sirius in the Allsvenskan.</figcaption></figure><p>However, it is yet to be seen if these approaches can truly challenge at an elite level. In recent months news came out that Carlo Ancelotti will take over as head coach at the end of his Real Madrid contract. In the meantime, Fernando Diniz will assume the role of head coach of Brazil, signifying a return to a relationist approach for the national team. This offers an interesting opportunity to experience some of the world’s best players playing within Diniz’s system. Diniz’s appointment will offer great insight into the applicability of relationist football among elite level. Brazil currently boast some of the world’s best and most creative players, it is only natural to assume the likes of Neymar and Vinicius Jr will thrive under the creative freedom of relationist football.</p><p>These contrasting approaches are best viewed as a spectrum. Taking Henrik Rydström’s Malmo team as an example, they are not purely a relationist team and positionalist principles are still an important part of their setup. They tend to build up in a traditional way, with a double pivot of Sergio Pena and Anders Christiansen being utilised in both defence and attack, as well as full backs often keeping the width. This pivot allows them to build up in a more typical 4–2 or 3–2 build up pattern and use a more traditional rest defence, often not found in a more relationist team instead favouring a high counter press.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g69rjasbXatVSlmpQVlUvg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XUAx1BuTg33flJJAS7pYfw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Malmo using a 4–2 build up pattern in the first phase.</figcaption></figure><p>Tactical diversity will only ever benefit the game both as a sport and an entertainment product. The emergence of relationism indicates an exciting future in football but whether it will represent a tactical revolution is yet to be seen, and there is every chance that within the next few years relationism will fail to invade the European leagues.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=65299102d476" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>