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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Danny Zimny-Schmitt on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Danny Zimny-Schmitt on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@dannyz3143?source=rss-41bedc0f249b------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Danny Zimny-Schmitt on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyz3143?source=rss-41bedc0f249b------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Wisconsin?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyz3143/why-wisconsin-0235ef3f8198?source=rss-41bedc0f249b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0235ef3f8198</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[democrats]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[us-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[republicans]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wisconsin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Zimny-Schmitt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Dec 2024 23:48:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-13T23:48:26.747Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Why Wisconsin Is — And Looks Poised to Remain — The National Bellwether</em></p><p>If you had to pick just one state to gauge the national mood, which would it be? Maybe Pennsylvania, the most hard-fought over swing state in this last election? Or Arizona, with its recent history of vacillating between the two major parties? The best choice would be Wisconsin, the only state whose margin of victory has been within a point in five of the past seven presidential elections. It is also the only state in the union that has sent both a Democrat and a Republican to the US Senate for the past decade and will continue that trend after this election.</p><p>What is it about Wisconsin that makes it such a reliable bellwether of national voting trends? The answer can be found in the state’s demography and geography relative to other states with a near-even political split. While it is a bit redder than nearby “blue wall” states of Michigan and Pennsylvania, it is also a bit bluer than the emerging Sunbelt battleground states, landing it squarely in a political goldilocks zone whereby its electoral results usually reflect the nation as a whole.</p><p>Typically, bellwether states only remain so for brief periods of time. This makes intuitive sense; because the population makeup of a given state changes over time, and the relative power of voting blocs within that state will vary from election to election. Florida and Ohio were bellwethers in the 2000s, but have since moved solidly to the right, while Colorado and Virginia have moved just as rapidly to the left. Wisconsin’s longevity as a bellwether is underscored by its voters continually sending a split delegation to the US Senate even in our age of extreme polarization. And that is what makes it so unique.</p><p>Relative to its Sunbelt counterparts (Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, North Carolina), the demography and population of Wisconsin has been more stable across time. In Georgia and North Carolina, much of the recent swing toward Democrats is attributable to an influx of educated people to suburban Atlanta and the Research Triangle region. Political success in these two states is also highly dependent on the margins of the Black vote, which recent data indicate may be shifting rightward. Arizona and Nevada, once more solidly red and blue, respectively, may be moving toward bellwether status. However, like their Southern counterparts, their politics may increasingly be driven by in-migration of residents from other places, as well as by the large Latino vote in each state, which all indicators suggest is shifting rightward. Nevada is famously home to the lowest percentage of current residents who were born in the state (27 percent), suggesting a lack of social and political cohesiveness in the longer term.</p><p>Relative to its blue wall cousins, winning in Wisconsin hinges less on the effectiveness of turnout operations and more on winning over voters statewide. Unlike Detroit in Michigan or Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, Milwaukee does not command this same disproportionate influence over the state because of its smaller relative population. Wisconsin’s rural areas also consistently vote bluer than rural areas in Michigan and Pennsylvania. While all three states have voted the same way in the past nine presidential elections, Michigan and Pennsylvania have swung by multiple points back and forth (likely due to the turnout issue), while the final tally in Wisconsin has remained within one point in every election except for Obama’s two decisive national victories.</p><p>Some of Wisconsin’s bellwether streak is also likely attributable to its geography. Pennsylvania is divided into the distinct Greater Philadelphia and Northeast PA regions in the east, Greater Pittsburgh and the Great Lakes in the west, while separated by the Appalachians running north-south through the center of the state. Michigan is composed of two peninsulas, and Detroit is both large enough and far enough away from most of the state to create a natural political divide. Wisconsin is more compact, and its two primary cities are well-balanced by a number of smaller cities across the state. Coupled with its smaller population, it is able to sustain a social and political cohesiveness rare for a state of its size and diversity of political opinion.</p><p>To highlight just how much election outcomes can vary in Wisconsin from race to race, consider five recent contests: President Biden’s half-point victory in 2020, Governor Ever’s 3-point victory in 2022 on the same day as Senator Johnson’s one-point victory, and President Trump’s one-point victory in 2024 on the same day as Senator Baldwin’s one-point victory. In these five narrow elections, Democrats prevailed in three contests and Republicans prevailed in two, and on two occasions, a small but decisive number of ticket splitters resulted in both a Democrat and a Republican victory on the same night.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hTKiZG9bYE_LaffeEyIoFg.png" /></figure><p>The map shows that while most counties in the state voted consistently across these five contests, a few are true hyper-local bellwethers within the state. Columbia and Vernon counties, more typically won by Republicans, flipped blue in the 2022 Governor’s election. Door and Sauk counties, more typically won by Democrats, flipped red once each in the 2022 Senate election and 2024 presidential race, respectively. While these margins may not ultimately drive the electoral outcome as much as the more populous Milwaukee collar counties do, the fact that these four counties have flipped back and forth in very tight statewide races also makes Wisconsin unique relative to its Sunbelt and blue wall counterparts.</p><p>All things considered, Wisconsin does come down as just slightly bluer than the nation as a whole. It has been considered an essential part of the blue wall for a reason, and it was President Trump’s narrowest win in any swing state in 2024. It is far easier to imagine a Republican winning the presidency without Wisconsin (George W. Bush did twice) than it is to imagine a Democrat (the last to do so was John F. Kennedy), meaning Wisconsin will likely remain close to a must-win for a national Democratic Party seeking power in the Senate or the White House. What New Yorkers are fond of saying about their state as it relates to business, Wisconsinites might start saying about theirs as it relates to politics: “If you can make it here, you can make it anywhere.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0235ef3f8198" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What’s Happening in the Race for the House?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyz3143/whats-happening-in-the-race-for-the-house-8094b1e7fddb?source=rss-41bedc0f249b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8094b1e7fddb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[republicans]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[election2024]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democrats]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[house-of-representatives]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Zimny-Schmitt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2024 17:25:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-21T17:25:01.909Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Every presidential election year, the race to win control of the House falls out of the news amid the rush to cover the presidential contest. This year, the race for the House is coming down to the wire: Republicans are clinging to a four-seat majority and post-2022 redistricting will likely tilt at least a couple of races in the Democrats’ favor.</p><p>As Chuck Todd recently described, it is very difficult for the president’s party to make progress with their political agenda if their party does not also control the House. A Harris presidency with a Republican-controlled lower chamber or a Trump presidency with a Democratic-controlled one would likely be checked by the House’s effective use of subpoena power.</p><p>Where do things stand today? House races aren’t polled to the same extent presidential and Senate races are (and often are not polled at all), leading to greater ambiguity and gaps between different forecasts. After comparing forecasts and polls between districts, and considering the voting history and demography of districts with close contests, I think the race for control will be tight and neither side will wield a solid majority.</p><p>My forecast yields 196 safe seats for Republicans and 191 for Democrats. These seats include two safe Democratic pickups in newly drawn minority opportunity districts in Alabama and Louisiana, and three safe Republicans pickups in North Carolina. An additional 31 districts are leaning one direction or the other. I forecast 13 of these seats favoring the Republican candidate and 18 favoring the Democrat. All 13 districts leaning Republican are currently Republican-held, while three of the 18 blue-leaning districts are pickups for Democrats. This forecast yields exactly 209 seats for each party.</p><p>Control of the House would then rest upon the remaining 17 seats that are tossups. If each party split these districts down the middle, it would yield a 218–217 balance of power in the House. While this scenario itself may be unlikely, the real possibility of it underscores just how close the final result will likely be. If one party carries a full two-thirds of the toss up districts, the winning party would only have a four-seat governing majority, the same tight margin as the current House.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/787/1*Z7y9KFGJovVo_T34aEGHOA.png" /></figure><p>When will we know which party is likely to win the House? Because five of these 17 districts are in California (and a couple more are in slow vote-counting New York), we almost certainly will not know who is destined to control the House on election night. If multiple races are close enough to require recounts, we may not have a definitive answer for weeks after.</p><p>If you are looking for a few races to keep an eye on for some early hints on election night, I would recommend watching Pennsylvania’s 8th (home of Scranton and a resilient Democratic incumbent in Trump country), Michigan’s 7th (an open seat in central Michigan that includes Lansing), Iowa’s 3rd (a bellwether district that has traded hands twice in the past three cycles), and Arizona’s 1st (a district in suburban Phoenix that will provide hints on the close California races).</p><p>While it may be a long few days or weeks to determine which party controls the House for the next Congress, the results will likely be of similar consequence to the presidential and Senate races happening concurrently. Don’t sleep on the House this year!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8094b1e7fddb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[5 Things to Consider 50 Days Before the Election]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyz3143/5-things-to-consider-50-days-before-the-election-713b878e5516?source=rss-41bedc0f249b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/713b878e5516</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2024-elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kamala-harris]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Zimny-Schmitt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Sep 2024 01:29:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-17T01:29:00.385Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It has been a wild summer of presidential politics — from a debate that ultimately pushed Joe Biden out of the race to an assassination attempt on Donald Trump to Kamala Harris’s ascent to become the Democratic Party’s standard bearer. With both party conventions past, vice presidential choices made, and the first and potentially only debate between Harris and Trump in the rearview mirror, I’ve begun working on a forecast for the upcoming election. Between examining the crosstabs of polls, travels across the country counting yard signs, and conversations with people across the political spectrum, I’ve found myself coming back to five topics I believe are flying under the radar that will play a large role in the election outcome.</p><p><strong>Elite influence</strong></p><p>The number of defections by prominent Republicans who have come out against Trump is notable; from the Never Trump movement dating back to 2015 to the <a href="https://lincolnproject.us/">Lincoln Project</a> dating from 2019, groups of Republicans have coalesced around opposition to his candidacy and thereby permitted conservative Trump skeptics not to support the party’s standard bearer. Most recently, Trump’s own vice president Mike Pence <a href="https://apnews.com/article/pence-trump-endorsement-c05ffad1e20381fed3cfc87b7071ba4c">announced</a> he would not be supporting him, and Dick and Liz Cheney <a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/09/06/dick-cheney-kamala-harris-liz-cheney">declared</a> they will be voting for Kamala Harris. With so many prominent voices speaking out against him, it’s fair to question how Trump expects to win if he lacks support from significant parts of his own party.</p><p>But this is to overlook a fundamental truth about Trump’s style of populism. His rhetoric and policies are not best understood as a resurgence of the right-wing but rather a usurpation of the party from the working class below. Trump’s early and most fervent support has come not from traditional bastions but from places where civic and religious communities are in collapse. These places are described by Tim Carney’s thesis in <a href="https://www.aei.org/research-products/book/alienated-america-why-some-places-thrive-while-others-collapse/"><em>Alienated America</em></a>, which details that places plagued by “death of despair” are where Trump draws his strength. It is this group who have moved toward his column that need to be balanced against elites who have moved in the opposite direction.</p><p>The question to consider here is how many elite endorsements and large campaign donations are needed to counteract the populist fervor defecting toward Trump from voters who lack the loud microphones that the political classes have. We’d do well to remember that despite the Lincoln Project’s best efforts, Trump received 11 million more votes in the 2020 election than he did in 2016.</p><p><strong>Younger voters</strong></p><p>Young voters have long been more likely to vote for Democrats than their older counterparts, but this observation isn’t a useful guide unless the margins by which these groups vote is considered. Earlier in the summer, <a href="https://news.northeastern.edu/2024/05/22/biden-young-voters-support/">research</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/05/upshot/biden-trump-black-hispanic-voters.html?campaign_id=277&amp;emc=edit_nc_20230906&amp;instance_id=102023&amp;nl=the-tilt&amp;regi_id=88521190&amp;segment_id=143857&amp;te=1&amp;user_id=e4c147287116ce62e0707994f15de18c">polling</a> alike indicated that Joe Biden and the Democratic Party were struggling to win the support of younger age cohorts, with the most pronounced drops in support among younger voters of color. More recent surveys indicate that Harris’s ascent to the top of the ticket has led to a <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4864606-kamala-harris-joe-biden-young-voters/">recovery</a> of much of this support, but whether such a large swing is just breath of fresh air after the loathing at the prospect electoral rematch or truly amounts to a genuine endorsement of Harris remains to be seen in upcoming polls.</p><p>Progressive Generation Z activist David Hogg (founder of March for Our Lives) <a href="https://x.com/davidhogg111/status/1832095573249532179">posted</a> on X earlier this month that should Harris lose in November, it will be due to a growing number of young men who no longer consider themselves Democrats. Even small numbers of young voters staying home or voting for Trump will likely be enough to influence the outcome, and the roughly two-thirds margin Democrats have <a href="https://catalist.us/whathappened2022/">counted on</a> to win recent elections.</p><p><strong>The growing gender gap</strong></p><p>The quote from Hogg also introduces a third topic, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/01/opinion/biden-younger-voters-gender.html">growing</a> gender gap between parties, perhaps especially among the youngest voters. Young women are <a href="https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/young-womens-political-engagement-elections-and-beyond">outpacing</a> young men in voter turnout and civic engagement, which may bode well for Harris. However, while men have been increasingly <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/books/of-boys-and-men/">struggling</a> with many aspects of modern life, dropping out of the workforce, dropping out of or not even starting college, and disproportionately dying by suicide or drug overdoses, they have also been increasingly <a href="https://catalist.us/whathappened2022/">voting</a> for Republicans.</p><p>While men and women each make up roughly half of the electorate, it will again be in the margins where they make a difference. In purple Wisconsin, an in-depth <a href="https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/analysis/2022/11/21/2022-midterm-elections-answered-6-questions-about-wisconsin-politics/69647148007/?utm_source=jsonline-OnWisconsinPolitics&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=baseline&amp;utm_term=list_article_thumb&amp;utm_content=PMJS-1258MJ-E-NLETTER27">analysis</a> of the 2022 election (which saw the Democratic incumbent win the governor’s race while a Republican retained his Senate seat) suggested that the Democrats’ lead amongst women has failed to grow as quickly as the Republican’s edge amongst men. Trump has made more <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/07/01/nx-s1-5005013/the-idea-of-manhood-looms-large-in-the-current-gop">overt</a> appeals to many disaffected men, and how their numbers stack up in November next to women who are expected to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/15/upshot/election-young-women-liberal.html">break heavily</a> for Harris will play a large part in the outcome.</p><p><strong>How Harris defines herself</strong></p><p>Harris’s late arrival on the scene as presidential nominee is both an opportunity and a liability. By skipping the primary, she hasn’t had to define herself and the specific policies she champions that she otherwise would have by this point in the cycle. Given the fractious nature of the Democratic coalition, not having to dive into policy minutiae that could alienate some factions may be a blessing in disguise. But the flip side is that voters may feel they do not know her and what she stands for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/08/podcasts/the-daily/kamala-harris-democrats.html">well enough</a> to make an informed decision.</p><p>While her debate <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/takeaway-harris-trump-presidential-debate-2024-09-11/">performance</a> was strong, leading Trump down many rabbit holes and landing many strong points about his less popular policies, she did relatively little to define herself to voters who may have been considering her for the first time. On questions about the Biden administration’s handling of inflation and the economy, clarifying her stances on immigration and fracking, she left many voters questioning her true stances on these high-profile issues.</p><p>Harris lacks the successful track record in retail politicking of candidates who came before her, without notching a victory in a single state’s Democratic presidential primary contest. She is also without a major legislative accomplishment to point to from her time in the Senate or in her role as Vice President. Whether these details will matter in the minds of voters is hard to gauge; enough people may prefer a generic Democrat to Trump to put her over the top regardless. Discounting the unconventionality of her path, one that didn’t involve the hard work of winning the hearts and minds through a competitive primary process, could amount to overlooking a crucial ingredient of a general election victory.</p><p><strong>Change versus the status quo</strong></p><p>Since Biden’s decided to step aside, Harris has had to walk a fine line. Should she stand by his administration’s policies, or should she create daylight between herself and Biden (particularly his less popular policies) at the risk of harming the legacy of an administration she has been a part of? This question made multiple appearances at the debate, as Trump challenged her to differentiate her policies from Biden’s on the economy and immigration, all while reminding viewers of the past three and a half years they have been in power. Harris largely came away feeling like the candidate backing the status quo, while Trump positioned himself as the candidate of change. The inevitable follow-up harkens back to the first question of the debate directed toward but left largely unanswered by Harris — whether the public feels better off than they did four years ago.</p><p>On the surface, the status quo looks positive. The stock market is near all time highs, the administration’s spending policies have spread investments to red and blue districts alike, and no American troops are in active combat zones around the world. But a deeper dive reveals cracks, with housing and groceries increasingly unaffordable, median wages that struggle to keep pace with inflation, and brutal conflict in both Ukraine and Palestine. Trump’s debate reference to the prices of bacon and eggs that were more affordable on his watch may resonate more with voters than Harris’s wonkier plans to reign in rents and food prices.</p><p>While many narratives about the election detail the growing political divide by educational attainment, the risk to democracy that Trump does (or doesn’t) pose, and the racial and gender dynamics of the race, I believe these five topics will also define the outcome of the election. While daily headlines and topline poll numbers can be important, we’d do well to consider these underlying trendlines for hints about who our 47th president will be.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=713b878e5516" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Things I Learned Traveling to Every County in America]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyz3143/things-i-learned-traveling-to-every-county-in-america-49f3c87c43a6?source=rss-41bedc0f249b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/49f3c87c43a6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Zimny-Schmitt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Nov 2023 14:52:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-17T19:08:05.127Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/633/1*_SeKhYs3KZghD9lAF2CSrQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>This article has now been published in The Hart and The Cur. You can read it here: <a href="https://www.thehartandthecur.com/3143-pieces-of-america">https://www.thehartandthecur.com/3143-pieces-of-america</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=49f3c87c43a6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Making Sense of Voting Shifts by Demographic Group]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyz3143/making-sense-of-voting-shifts-by-demographic-group-d71e0ea22680?source=rss-41bedc0f249b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d71e0ea22680</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[election2024]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democratic-party]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Zimny-Schmitt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Oct 2023 01:41:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-10T01:41:13.582Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A few months ago, the Democratic polling and analytics firm Catalist <a href="https://catalist.us/whathappened2022/">released</a> their post-2022 midterm election voter data. Their national crosstabs, complete with data from the last three presidential elections (2012–2020) and last five congressional elections (2012–2022), allow for the analysis of voter trends by demographic groups across time. More recent polls taking an early look at next year’s election were also released, suggesting that the trends visible in the crosstabs are likely to continue into the 2024 election. When viewed together, a more comprehensive picture emerges of how different demographic groups are gradually, yet substantially, changing their allegiances.</p><p>Race has always been a critical factor in voting behavior. The electorate has been roughly 75 percent white for each of the elections analyzed here, but minority voters have often provided the support needed to get either the Democrat or Republican across the line in close races. In presidential cycles between 2012 and 2020, the share of white voters supporting the Democratic candidate moved upward from 42 to 44 percent, and the share of Asian voters supporting the Democrat inched from 65 to 66 percent. Meanwhile, Democrats lost ground in presidential contests among Black voters (falling from 97 to 91 percent) and Latino voters (70 to 62 percent). In congressional elections between 2012 and 2022, the Democrat’s share of white voters held steady at 42 percent, while it decreased among Black (92 to 88 percent), Latino (66 to 62 percent), and Asian voters (61 to 59 percent). While these shifts may look small at first glance, they do become significant in close contests.</p><p>With Democrats losing ground with nonwhite voters in almost every election over the past decade, there is reason to believe this trend will continue in 2024. More <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/05/upshot/biden-trump-black-hispanic-voters.html?campaign_id=277&amp;emc=edit_nc_20230906&amp;instance_id=102023&amp;nl=the-tilt&amp;regi_id=88521190&amp;segment_id=143857&amp;te=1&amp;user_id=e4c147287116ce62e0707994f15de18c">recent polling</a> suggests as much; in a compilation of Times/Siena polls from 2022 and 2023, Biden leads Trump by a margin of just 53 percent to 28 percent among registered nonwhite voters. While the election is still more than a year out, this early weakness for the likely Democratic presidential candidate is surprising; even veteran New York Times political analyst Nate Cohn concedes that Biden’s weakness among nonwhite voters is serious.</p><p>At a time when racially charged fights animate the political arena, from Black Lives Matter to border control to affirmative action, an outside observer might wonder why the trends among nonwhite voters are not moving in the opposite direction. While issues like abortion access, threats to democracy, and immigration reform comprise much of the rhetoric of Democratic leaders today, these issues are less likely to rally support from Black and Latino voters, who tend to be more conservative than white Democratic voters. These moderate or conservative nonwhite voters do not have party-line views on many of the issues championed by the Democratic party, but they may nonetheless support them because they feel their interests are still better represented by Democrats than Republicans. However, the Republicans may be able to peel off some of these voters by appealing to their more socially conservative views.</p><p>To better understand which voters are switching their partisan allegiances, we have to look beyond race alone to education for some clues. For college educated voters, in presidential cycles between 2012 and 2020, the share supporting the Democratic candidate jumped from 53 to 59 percent, and from 52 to 55 percent in 2012–2022 congressional elections. For non-college voters, Democratic support slipped from 52 to 48 percent in presidential elections and from 51 to 45 percent in congressional elections across the same time periods. Notably, these percentage shifts tend to be greater than the shifts observed by race.</p><p>Combining race and education yields even larger magnitude shifts than either does alone. While only 46 percent of white college graduates supported the Democratic presidential candidate in 2012, 55 percent did so in 2020. Similar numbers were observed among this group in congressional elections. White non-college voters moved away from Democrats over this time period, with support falling from 40 to 37 percent in presidential elections and from 41 to 34 percent in congressional races. College-educated Latinos decreased their support for Democratic presidential candidates between 2012 and 2020 (65 to 62 percent), while offering slightly more support to congressional candidates (61 to 62 percent) over the same time period. While Black voters offered more support to Democratic candidates during these cycles than whites or Latinos, both college and non-college Blacks decreased their support for Democratic presidential and congressional candidates between 2012 and 2020.</p><p>The more recent New York Times/Siena polls have found a significant education gap among nonwhite voters, with Biden losing the most ground among nonwhite voters making less than $100,000 per year and those without a college degree. For many of these nonwhite voters, Trump’s style of populism may be peeling away a small but noticeable number of nonwhite working-class voters who feel that Biden’s economic policies and widespread inflation have eroded the economic reasons they historically have supported Democrats.</p><p>A final demographic variable we need to consider is age. In the 2012–2020 presidential cycles and the 2012–2022 congressional cycles, white voters in the 18–29 and 30–44 age brackets increased their support for the Democratic presidential candidate by 5 to 7 points and increased their support for Democratic congressional candidates by 11 points. Older whites in the 45–64 and 65+ age brackets offered less support to Democratic presidential and congressional candidates over this time period by between 1 and 5 points. Thus, among white voters, an important generational divide in support for Democratic candidates across this time period is increasingly evident.</p><p>Nonwhite voters did not exhibit the same pattern of shifting support by age bracket. Blacks in all age groups moved away from supporting Democratic candidates in presidential contests by 4 to 7 points and Democratic candidates in congressional candidates by 2 to 7 points. Latinos in all age brackets moved away from the Democrats by 2 and 11 points in presidential races, with the most pronounced shift away (11 percent) among voters in the 18–29 age bracket. Younger Latinos moved slightly toward Democrats in congressional races, and older Latinos moved slightly away from them. Asian voters across all age groups saw virtually no change in support for Democrats in presidential elections, and in congressional elections, younger Asian voters moved toward Democrats and older Asian voters moved away.</p><p>An important trend emerges when combining data on race and age: The new support for Democrats in both presidential and congressional contests coming from younger white voters, who are only sometimes joined in their growing support by their young nonwhite peers. While Democrats are gradually losing the support of older whites and minorities, the surge in support among younger whites has kept the party above water electorally. However, the more socially liberal policies the Democratic Party is championing to win the support of this group may be costing the party support among the multiracial working class, who are more socially conservative.</p><p>Squaring the age and race data with more recent polling hints that these trends are likely to continue. Recent polling showcases Biden’s notable weakness and slipping support among younger nonwhite voters relative to their older counterparts. To borrow from Nate Cohn, this generational divide is the most evident among Black voters, whose voters over 45 support Biden by an 83 to 8 point margin, while voters under 45 back him by only 59 to 14 points. Any number of reasons can be speculated upon as to why this gap is so large, but the receding memories of the Democrat-driven civil rights movement and lower church attendance (which helped tied the Black community to the Democratic party for decades) by the younger generations, are solid guesses.</p><p>While the erosion of Black support from a sky-high to a merely high level of support for the Democratic party is concerning, what is perhaps more concerning is what the 2022 election postmortem focusing on the Latino vote by <a href="https://medium.com/2022%20Post-Mortem%20Prerelease%20Final%20June%2014%20(weareequis.us)">Equis Labs</a> found. Fully 5 percent of nonwhite Biden voters now support Trump, including 8 percent of the Latino voters who voted for Biden in 2020. Given the narrow margins that Biden carried crucial swing states with large Latino population like Nevada and Arizona, this may spell trouble for his 2024 electoral prospects.</p><p>The longer-term voting data trends from Catalist and more recent polling data can be taken together for an early look at next year’s election. Polling data tend to demonstrate that these long-term trends are still moving in the same direction, perhaps even at an accelerated rate. Thus, when considering the 2024 election, we need to consider the likely consequences of having a Democratic electorate that is likely to be whiter, younger, and better educated than in election cycles past.</p><p>Sunbelt states with lower levels of educational attainment and higher nonwhite populations like Georgia, Arizona, and especially Nevada may be tougher for Biden and down-ballot Democrats to win. Florida and Texas appear poised to continue drifting away from Democrats. On the other hand, the more educated and whiter states in the Northeast and Upper Midwest may offer the Democratic party some stronger electoral prospects than might otherwise be expected.</p><p>Early hints of these trends were seen in the 2022 results, which saw strong Republican performance in the Sunbelt and the Nevada gubernatorial contest, where a Republican challenger ousted a Democratic incumbent. Stronger Democratic performances were observed in races from roughly Maine to Minnesota, including the party’s nearly 5-point victory in the race for the open Pennsylvania Senate seat. Any number of circumstances may change before next November, but from where both the short-term polling and the long-term trends stand now, the electoral coalitions of both parties seem likely to continue to evolve in the same direction they have for the past decade.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d71e0ea22680" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Varying Voter Turnout Drove the 2022 Election Results]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyz3143/how-varying-voter-turnout-drove-the-2022-election-results-fa8fc9654a47?source=rss-41bedc0f249b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fa8fc9654a47</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[voter-turnout]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2022-elections]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Zimny-Schmitt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Feb 2023 06:35:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-17T06:35:34.541Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Forecasting and interpreting the results of the 2022 midterm elections were perplexing tasks for election observers and pundits alike. In a historically difficult cycle for the party in control of the presidency, Democrats made gains in the Senate but lost the House. Many of the pickups Republicans were counting on failed to materialize, their hoped-for red wave turning into more of a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/09/us/politics/republican-election-results.html">red ripple</a>.</p><p>But the full story is more complicated — why did Republicans perform so well in Florida and New York, while underperforming in Pennsylvania and the Upper Midwest? On election night, geographic differences in voting patterns and in voter turnout were on full display, with important implications for both parties.</p><p>Voter turnout in the 2022 midterms was high, and while it didn’t exceed the modern high water mark set for midterm elections in 2018, it does introduce the question of whether higher voter turnout is the <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/turnout-was-high-again-is-this-the-new-normal/">new normal</a>. While turnout averaged 47 percent in 2022 relative to 50 percent in 2018, turnout <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meetthepressblog/turnout-was-2022-midterms-not-key-states-rcna58325">was up</a> in a few states (led by New Hampshire, Arizona, and Pennsylvania), especially those with marquee Senate and Governor races.</p><p>Thus, an important part of the turnout question is <a href="https://thefulcrum.us/voter-turnout-by-state-2022">where</a> voters turned out and where they did not. Turnout exceeded 60 percent in a few states, while remaining below 40 percent in others. As Figure 1 below demonstrates, the highest turnout was observed in northern New England, the Upper Midwest, the Pacific Northwest, and in a few other states, notably Colorado and Pennsylvania. Turnout was relatively low across much of the South (Georgia and North Carolina being notable exceptions) and in some large states like California and New York.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uq_8VpvAv5t7oLS3-1a5fg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Voter turnout in 2022 by state, as calculated by average turnout in each state’s contested House races.</figcaption></figure><p>A reasonable question that stems from this figure is whether turnout was higher where voters felt their participation would affect the outcome of competitive Senate and/or Governor races. There is some support for this hypothesis, particularly in explaining why northern New England, the Upper Midwest, and Pennsylvania turned out and why Georgia and North Carolina led the South in voter turnout. But it does leave unanswered why turnout in Nevada and New York was quite low.</p><p>To take this analysis a step further, I examined voter turnout at the congressional district level. Whereas the range of turnout was less than 30 percentage points at the state level, at the district level it ranged from a high 66 percent in Wisconsin’s 5th to a low of 16 percent in New York’s 15th. In Figure 2, it becomes evident that turnout not only varied significantly between states but also within states. Northern New England, the Upper Midwest, the Pacific Northwest, and Colorado still show up as bastions of high turnout, but the figure spotlights how the highest turnout in those states were led by rural districts, while their more urban districts turned out in numbers closer to the national average.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HChzA2K4_BtnuJkEEpTOWQ.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Voter turnout in 2022 by congressional district.</figcaption></figure><p>With data points available from all congressional districts (excluding the 17 uncontested races), voter turnout was plotted against the margin of victory in each district to examine whether turnout was higher in places where the House race was closer. The scatterplot in Figure 3 showcases the existence of a weak relationship between higher voter turnout and closer races, with the R-squared suggesting that approximately 12 percent of the variability in turnout by district can be described by how close the outcome of the House race was.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*zyA5eSwS-5XnfE96fsiWHw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Voter turnout versus margin of victory in 2022 by congressional district.</figcaption></figure><p>To think about this in other terms, consider that for the 72 House districts decided by less than 10 percentage points, the average voter turnout was 46.2 percent, a few points above the 42.9 percent turnout in the median district. There does appear to be a relationship, however weak, between voter turnout and how close a race was, lending credence to the idea that voters turned out in greater numbers where they felt their participation might affect the outcome.</p><p>In summary, did higher turnout benefit Democrats or Republicans more? A look at the state and district maps suggests Democrats, who generally outperformed expectations in places like northern New England, the upper Midwest, the Pacific Northwest, Colorado, and Pennsylvania, led the way in terms of turnout. Competitive House races in these states generally remained in Democratic hands, denying Republicans the large number of House district pickups many were expecting. Democrats also uniformly won tight races for Senate and governorships in these states, the sole exception being Wisconsin’s Republican incumbent senator holding onto his seat in Wisconsin by a single percentage point.</p><p>None of that is to say Republicans didn’t show significant strength in other places. Republicans won the national House <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/13/upshot/2022-republicans-midterms-analysis.html">popular vote</a> by about three points, and despite not translating that into winning a corresponding number of House seats, they did run up their margins of victory in many races, particularly in the South. They also showed considerable strength in more rural and exurban districts in higher turnout states. While Democrats won the statewide races in Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, and Oregon, turnout was higher in more Republican-leaning districts away from these states’ major cities than they were in more urban and Democratic-leaning districts in these states. A tentative interpretation of these results is that both the urban-rural and Democrat-Republican divides in these states is only continuing to grow.</p><p>The 2022 election was a difficult one to both forecast and digest. Perhaps the night’s mixed results are most embodied by places like Nevada (which reelected a Democratic senator but ousted a Democratic governor) and Wisconsin (which reelected a Democratic governor but retained a Republican senator). Voter turnout was highly variable both between states and within them, but higher turnout places did tend to favor Democrats. It also appears that turnout was marginally higher in places where voters felt their participation in the electoral process was more likely to make a difference in the outcome.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fa8fc9654a47" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Five Overlooked Maps that Explain the Future of the Democratic Party]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dannyz3143/five-overlooked-maps-that-explain-the-future-of-the-democratic-party-e4632df9578?source=rss-41bedc0f249b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e4632df9578</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[democratic-party-primary]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democrats]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democratic-party]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Zimny-Schmitt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Oct 2022 18:33:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-07T18:33:38.832Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the run up to the 2022 midterm elections, the Democratic party finds itself in an intriguing position. The legislative accomplishments of the first two years of the Biden administration, made possible by narrow Democratic control of both the House and Senate, are impressive in their own right. They have led many to remark that Biden’s approach toward compromise with the Republican party has borne fruit, and proven that even in today’s environment of political fractiousness, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/28/biden-is-showing-that-governing-middle-is-possible/">governing from the center</a> is still possible. But Biden’s low approval ratings and the tendency of the president’s party to lose congressional seats in the midterm elections could mean that this unusually productive 117th Congress will be replaced by a far less productive 118th if Republicans win control of either chamber in November.</p><p>While the Republican party finds itself locked in an identity crisis that grows more rigid by the day, with Trump loyalists whose political convictions are increasingly defined by conspiracy theories on one side and traditional Republicans who would like to see the party return to its roots as one of limited government and business interests on the other, the Democratic party finds itself in a rare place of opportunity to redefine itself and win new voters to its cause. That is, only if they can overcome their historical tendency that is perhaps best summarized by the quote, “Democrats never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.”</p><p>But how should they seize this opportunity? There is no shortage of columnists spouting opinions about how they can most effectively move forward: should they target their efforts at engaging <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/17/1056280738/house-democrats-have-a-new-strategy-to-engage-voters-of-color-in-the-midterm-ele">voters of color</a>, or should they focus on what have often been called as <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-07-24/midterm-elections-parents">kitchen table issues</a>, like the economy, education, and concerns of working parents? Concerns about the cost of health care, prescription drugs, availability of affordable housing, and support for union organizing efforts are generally seen as politically popular. This is arguably because they are grounded in improving people’s material circumstances, while lashing out at the ‘global elite,’ sentiments tapped by Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders alike.</p><p>While polls and columnists’ analyses of what is politically popular at a given moment have their place in the conversation, the latter half of the 2010s have taught us that polls are often wrong, and sometimes wildly so. In this article, I will focus on elections that actually happened (in the form of Democratic primaries) to highlight the present disconnects within the Democratic party. Each primary contest comprises a small piece of the fight for the soul of and future direction of the party, and this article aims to highlight some of the key messages Democratic voters are giving party leaders.</p><p><strong><em>The 2016 Wisconsin Democratic Primary</em></strong></p><p>Few states have risen to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/12/us/politics/wisconsin-politics.html">prominence</a> in the national political conversation faster than Wisconsin has since the 2016 general election. Once considered a safe state for Democrats, part of the so-called ‘Blue Wall’ that dramatically crumbled when tested by Donald Trump, the truth is that Wisconsin has always been something of a national bellwether. Indeed, it is the only state that has been decided by less than single point in four of the last six presidential elections. Accordingly, a closer look at how it voted in the 2016 Democratic primary between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders is a worthwhile exercise that received scant attention at the time. Clinton’s and Bernie’s messages were of very different flavors, Clinton’s focusing on generally continuing the economic and social policies advanced by the Obama administration (who won Wisconsin twice by comfortable margins), while Sanders called for a break from the neoliberal economic policies that he saw as hurting the middle class. One of those messages played much better in Wisconsin than the other.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/808/1*ScNeERtQc7dApnR_PD6kYA.png" /><figcaption>Map 1: 2016 Wisconsin Democratic Presidential Primary</figcaption></figure><p>In this first map of five, the message from voters couldn’t be clearer: Clinton carried just one of Wisconsin’s 72 counties, and even in populous Milwaukee County, she won by less than four points. Articles at the <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2016/04/bernie-sanders-wisconsin-primary-2016-hillary-clinton-221542">time</a> acknowledged Sander’s significant victory statewide by more than thirteen points, but conceded that such a strong showing in the crucial but moderately sized state would do little to change the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/sanders-gets-momentum-gains-little-wisconsin-win-n551476">delegate math</a> between him and Clinton in the face of larger primaries on the calendar like New York’s.</p><p>Thus, a critical warning of the rebellion against the corporate wing of the Democratic party visibly represented by Clinton was lost in the shuffle. It’s hard to imagine strategists in the Clinton camp poring over this primary map and concluding that she was electorally secure enough in the state to not pay Wisconsin a single visit in the 2016 election cycle, but with hindsight, it appears that is indeed what happened. Later <a href="https://www.npr.org/2017/08/24/545812242/1-in-10-sanders-primary-voters-ended-up-supporting-trump-survey-finds">analyses</a> found that significant numbers of Sanders’ primary voters switched their allegiance to Trump in the general election across the ‘Blue Wall’ states of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, in great enough numbers to flip each those states from Clinton’s column to Trump’s (in Wisconsin, they estimated there were 51,000 of these Sanders-Trump voters, and Trump carried the state by only 23,000 votes).</p><p>The lesson here is clear: many voters, perhaps especially so in swingier states like Wisconsin, are not loyal to either major political party, and their votes are up for grabs by the candidate of either party has a message that resonates with them. It’s important that parties listen to the will of the voters and which messages are resonating them (with special attention paid to those in swing states) when significant rifts between wings of the party arise. A 2020 article describing seven <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/wisconsin-political-geography/">political states</a> of Wisconsin can be instructive to Democrats moving forward. While Clinton’s appeal was largely limited to just one of those seven regions (Milwaukee County), Sanders showed strength in all of the others. These facts were ignored by the party at the time, but should not be overlooked again.</p><p><strong><em>The 2020 Iowa Caucasus</em></strong></p><p>The 2020 Iowa caucuses were the first opportunity post-2016 when the Democratic party once again offered voters different flavors of the party on which to cast their allegiance. Unfortunately, much of the message on caucus night got lost in the shuffle when <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/02/04/802681380/what-the-iowa-meltdown-means-and-where-we-go-from-here">problems</a> with the party’s vote counting technology made results unavailable for <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/live-blog/iowa-caucus-2020-election-live/">days</a>, leading both Bernie Sanders and Pete Buttigieg to declare victory. While the technology issues were real and two candidates declaring victory stole the show for days afterward, including <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/02/05/opinion/kill-tradition-nh-iowa-should-not-go-first/">suggestions</a> that the debacle should strip Iowa of its unique right to hold the first-in-the-nation caucus, the preferences of Democratic caucus-goers received short shrift.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GhdSwjGfT8Bf7ggyuLLNnA.png" /><figcaption>Map 2: 2020 Iowa Democratic Caucuses</figcaption></figure><p>Consider the five leading candidates heading into caucus night according to the trusted Des Moines Register <a href="https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/iowa-poll/caucus/2020/01/10/iowa-poll-2020-bernie-sanders-lead-iowa-caucus-president-election/4426492002/">poll</a>: Bernie Sanders, Pete Buttigieg, Elizabeth Warren, Joe Biden, and Amy Klobuchar. Sanders, despite his near tie in the state with Clinton in 2016 and widespread support in counties across the state, struggled to repeat his feat in 2020. This time, Sanders carried just 20 of Iowa’s 99 counties, and the counties he did win were disproportionately urban (indeed, Sanders carried seven of the ten most populated counties in the state). What he didn’t carry were as many rural counties as he had in 2016. These counties largely flipped to Buttigieg.</p><p>While Buttigieg was eventually declared the winner of the Iowa caucuses by a hair of a delegate, his widespread geographic support dwarfed any other candidates.’ In the crowded caucus field, Buttigieg carried more than half (57) of Iowa’s counties outright, and tied in six of the eight officially tied counties. Sander’s and Buttigieg’s widespread geographic victories appears to have come largely at the expense of Warren, who polled close to them but who managed to scrape by winning just a single county on caucus night. Bringing up the rear on caucus night were Biden and Klobuchar, who won just eight and five counties respectively.</p><p>What can the party learn from the technological disaster but politically instructive night in early February? The message on the salience of political centrism is mixed, since Buttigieg performed well while Biden and Klobuchar did not. Sander’s and Warren’s progressivism was embraced more urban and educated Iowans, but struggled in smaller towns and rural areas around the state. Warren’s dramatically <a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/3/3/21162527/what-happened-to-elizabeth-warren">collapse</a> received some attention but perhaps not enough. More than any other candidate, she was hobbled by her inability to connect with non-college and non-white voters, winning only the county home to Iowa City and the University of Iowa, long viewed as a political outlier in the state (it was the only county in the state popular former Republican governor Terry Branstad failed to carry in any of his statewide runs for office). The emergent lesson here was also clear: a populist approach to progressivism embodied by Sanders is far more poignant to voters than the technocratic alternative offered by Warren, and the centrist approach found a stronger standard bearer in Buttigieg than in long-term senators like Biden and Klobuchar.</p><p><strong><em>The 2020 Massachusetts Democratic Primary</em></strong></p><p>Massachusetts, perhaps more than any other single state, is a bastion of progressive politics. The victor of the Democratic primary contest for the state’s House and Senate seats is almost guaranteed to be sent to Washington in the general election. In 2020, Representative Joe Kennedy III challenged the incumbent Ed Markey for his seat in the Senate, and ultimately <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/01/joe-kennedy-end-of-a-dynasty-407474">failed</a> to do so. But some important details of the race were overlooked.</p><p>In the 2020 cycle, younger progressives did <a href="https://theconversation.com/joe-kennedy-iii-challenges-ed-markey-in-2020s-weirdest-primary-race-144902">challenge</a> and defeat a number of Democratic incumbents. Marie Newman in Illinois, Cori Bush in Missouri, and Jamaal Bowman in New York each unseated long serving representatives in urban districts in Chicago, St. Louis, and New York City. There were however a couple of key differences with the Massachusetts contest: Each of these races were on the House rather than Senate side, and Kennedy III was not running significantly to the left of Markey. While there was some disagreement over which candidate held the more progressive mantle early in the race, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ed-markey-defeats-joe-kennedy-massachusetts-senate-primary/">endorsement</a> of Markey ultimately solidified their differing ideological positions in the race. Kennedy III then appeared to largely be running on his family’s name and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53980982">legacy</a> as a prominent political family in the state, with at least one member serving in federal elected office continuously from 1947 to 201l. His argument largely came down to the idea that he as a 39-year-old could <a href="https://theintercept.com/2020/09/01/ed-markey-senate-win-joe-kennedy/">leverage</a> the Senate seat more effectively than the 74-year-old Markey.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jheLNR7G1UZq6asUHzu4Og.png" /><figcaption>Map 3: 2020 Massachusetts Democratic Senatorial Primary</figcaption></figure><p>Early polling before the election forecast a close race, but saw Markey pulling ahead by summer. One of the largest demographic divides in support for each candidate in late summer <a href="https://www.uml.edu/docs/2020-Mass-Dem-Pri-Topline_tcm18-329558.pdf">polling</a> was on the basis of education. For those without a four-year degree, voters reported favoring Kennedy III by 15 points and voters with four-year degrees reported favoring Markey by 37 points. Geographically, Markey <a href="https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/09/01/markey-kennedy-senate-primary-results">cleaned up</a> in progressive towns and the Boston metro area, especially in places won by Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren six months earlier in the Democratic presidential primary. Kennedy III found his strength in what have been designated Massachusetts’ <a href="https://massinc.org/our-work/policy-center/gateway-cities/about-the-gateway-cities/#:~:text=The%20Legislature%20defines%2026%20Gateway,%2C%20Springfield%2C%20Taunton%2C%20Westfield%2C">gateway cities</a> by the state legislature. These 26 cities are largely midsize urban centers with histories of industry and manufacturing that have fallen on harder economic times. Kennedy III won in 21 of the 26, including Springfield, Worcester, Fall River, and Lowell.</p><p>The margin in the race was 11 points, a decisive win for Markey to be sure, but worth putting in context. Massachusetts is the most educated state in the country, with 45 percent of adults over 25 years of age holding a four-year degree, compared to 33 percent nationally. If the polls of the race based on voter preference by educational attainment are to be believed (and the town-by-town results suggest they can be), Markey would have faced a much tougher challenge in any other state than he did in Massachusetts. Kennedy III’s message evidently resonated more with less educated voters, which exist in far greater numbers everywhere else in the country.</p><p><strong><em>The 2021 New York City Mayoral Democratic Primary</em></strong></p><p>Like Massachusetts, New York City is also seen as progressive relative to the country. The current roster of progressive firebrands it has sent to Congress includes AOC, Jamaal Bowman, and Senator Kirsten Gillibrand. What makes it somewhat different from Massachusetts is its greater racial diversity, higher numbers of immigrants, and educational attainment statistics that are less of an anomaly nationally. These factors proved important in Eric Adams’ <a href="https://www.thecity.nyc/2021/7/6/22566026/eric-adams-declares-victory-over-garcia-in-nyc-mayoral-primary">victory</a> in the Democratic primary for mayor.</p><p>A <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/new-york-city-mayor-candidates-2021-1165068/">crowded field</a> of Democratic candidates emerged to fill the seat of outgoing mayor Bill de Blasio included nationally recognized names like Andrew Yang, who was leading in early polling. As the electoral contest approached, however, other names emerged and began consolidating their own support. Kathryn Garcia and Maya Wiley emerged as two progressives in the race, as did the less progressive and more pragmatic former NYPD officer and captain Eric Adams. The primary race featured rank choice voting, whereby a voter’s second and third choice preferences would be taken into account if their higher choices were eliminated in an earlier round. In the first round of voting, Adams won more than twice as many of the city’s Election Districts as did Garcia, his closest competitor. In the eighth and final round, Adams would ultimately nudge out Garcia by only a point, since a disproportionate of Wiley and Yang voters had <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2021-nyc-mayoral-analysis/?leadSource=uverify%20wall">ranked</a> her above Adams.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/941/1*pAGiLl4eEtjY1tFGxwmwjg.png" /><figcaption>Map 4: 2021 New York City Democratic Mayoral Primary (source: NYC Election Atlas <a href="https://www.nycelectionatlas.com/maps.html#!NYCResults2021primaryfirstround">https://www.nycelectionatlas.com/maps.html#!NYCResults2021primaryfirstround</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Some fascinating demographic analysis has been done on each of the major candidates’ coalitions in the wake of the election. Eric Adams found his greatest <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2021-nyc-mayoral-analysis/?leadSource=uverify%20wall">strength</a> with Black and Latino voters, Wiley did with white and Latino voters, Yang found his with white and Asian voters, and Garcia’s coalition was largely white alone. A distinct socioeconomic gap also emerged between the candidates, with Garcia winning all eight of the city’s wealthiest assembly districts, while Adams won in all ten of the city’s poorest assembly districts. FiveThirtyEight devised a useful framework, the five <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-5-political-boroughs-of-new-york-city/">political boroughs</a> of New York City, to contextualize the race. Once precinct level results were released, it found that Adams had won three of these five, winning in the True-Blue Bronx, the Black Bloc, and Crossroads. Garcia won in Elite Circles, and Yang carried the Lands of Contradiction. Adams’ success in the outer boroughs contrasted with Garcia’s and Wiley’s bases of support in Manhattan and along the East River in Queens &amp; Brooklyn, respectively.</p><p>While the final tally was quite close, Adams <a href="https://nypost.com/2021/07/07/kathryn-garcia-concedes-nyc-mayoral-primary-to-eric-adams/">prevailing</a> against two progressive challengers showed that Democrats focused more on pragmatic issues do win in even the most progressive places. Adams’ relative strength with Black and Latino <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/07/10/new-york-mayor-primary-adams-pragmatic/">voters</a> demonstrated the ongoing importance of diverse outer-borough political alliances. While Wiley’s New Deal New York <a href="https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/new-york-elections-government/ny-maya-wiley-jobs-plan-mayoral-race-20210111-3b3oxako3bcprargl7bhrnpwdq-story.html">proposal</a> found traction amongst more affluent New Yorkers, Adams focused on issues closer to home for working class New Yorkers worried about crime. His exact politics were hard to <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-eric-adams-won-the-new-york-city-mayoral-primary/">pinpoint</a>, but running on an anti-elite platform, decrying the “fancy candidates” who were favored in Manhattan convinced voters he was someone in touch with their concerns.</p><p><strong><em>The 2022 Democratic Primary in Texas’s 28th District</em></strong></p><p>In a light blue House district in South Texas, an embattled conservative Democrat faced a tough primary challenge from a young progressive this past summer. Jessica Cisneros, a 29-year old immigration lawyer came within a point of unseating longtime Representative Henry Cuellar in a runoff two years after she first <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/democrat-rep-henry-cuellar-declared-winner-in-texas-recount">challenged</a> him. Cuellar has found himself increasingly out of line with the national Democratic party, holding conservative views on abortion, immigration and gun control. While he believes that his <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/05/25/1101016123/cuellar-cisneros-texas-28th-congressional-district-democratic-runoff-results">positions</a> are aligned with those of his largely Latino district stretching from Laredo in the Rio Grande Valley to east suburban San Antonio, Cisneros has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/21/us/politics/cuellar-defeats-cisneros-texas-primary-runoff.html">championed</a> Medicare for All, the Green New Deal, and pro-labor legislation.</p><p>Some external factors also made this a race to watch. Less than two months before the primary in March, the FBI <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2022/02/01/henry-cuellar-fbi-raid-election/">raided</a> his Laredo home in connection to a criminal investigation. While he hasn’t been charged with a crime, Cisneros used it as an opportunity to paint him as a corrupt politician. Throughout the primary contest, Cuellar retained the support of heavy hitters in the House, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and majority whip Jim Clyburn.</p><p>South Texas has also featured prominently in recent soul searching by the Democratic Party, following Trump’s substantial electoral <a href="https://thetexan.news/2020-election-signals-political-realignment-in-texas-border-counties/">gains</a> in the region in 2020 compared to 2016. Indeed, counties in the Rio Grande Valley like Starr, Zapata, Maverick shifted toward Trump by more than twenty points in just four years. Even though Starr and Maverick were still won by Clinton and Biden, Zapata flipped to Trump, highlighting how quickly many Latinos are switching their political loyalties. This trend is <a href="https://time.com/5946848/donald-trump-hispanic-latino-voters-texas/">concerning</a> many Democrats in Texas and beyond, and in a region where many middle class jobs come in the form of law enforcement officers and border patrol agents, progressive party rhetoric feels increasingly <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/11/17/trump-latinos-south-texas-tejanos-437027">out of touch</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/597/1*UyQKUb5y8sopab5S9n1pbQ.png" /><figcaption>Map 5: 2022 Texas 28th House District Democratic Primary (note: The 28th district only contains portions of Bexar and Guadalupe counties)</figcaption></figure><p>In the race for the 28th district, which is centered on Laredo but does not encompass the whole Rio Grande Valley, the March primary went to a runoff in June, which Cuellar won by a couple hundred votes out of more than 45,000 cast. What’s more telling than the margin of his victory is where his votes came from. Cuellar bested Cisneros in every county in the valley by landslide margins. In Webb County (home to Laredo) for example, he won by 38 points. Cisneros found her strength in the district in portions of Bexar and Guadalupe counties abutting San Antonio, where she beat Cuellar handily. The regional bifurcation of support for these candidates is a curious phenomenon. Like trends we’ve seen elsewhere, there appears to be a divide between progressive more educated voters and less progressive less educated voters.</p><p><strong><em>What Do These Maps Tell Us?</em></strong></p><p>As the Democratic party engages in its own soul searching between its progressive and moderate wings, many <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/07/31/moderate-progressives-democratic-primaries">analyses</a> of the divide seem focused on discerning whether progressive or moderate candidates fare better in elections. When considering the question this broadly, you can find evidence in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/may/24/us-progressive-democrats-primaries-wins-congress">favor</a> of candidates espousing progressive views, as well as evidence in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/07/13/moderates-progressives-congress-swing-districts-majority-democrats/">favor</a> of more moderation. These articles tend to overlook two important aspects: the importance of the state or district in question, and the ability of a given candidate to connect with working class voters.</p><p>Let’s consider the joint importance of state or district and strength of candidate as it relates to these five maps. In Wisconsin in 2016 and Massachusetts in 2020, the more progressive candidate won, while in Iowa in 2020, New York City in 2021, and Texas’s 28th in 2022, the more moderate candidate won. Sanders’ victory in Wisconsin can be attributed to his better ability to connect with working class voters relative to Clinton’s, while Markey’s victory in Massachusetts appeared to have more to do with his political views being a better fit for his state. While the moderates’ victories in each of the other three cases were narrow, they all won by assembling a coalition that was more geographically and socioeconomically (and racially in the case of New York City) diverse than their progressive challengers.</p><p>Chuck Schumer <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/146345/democrats-risky-pursuit-suburban-republicans">famously</a> remarked in the summer of 2016 responding to Clinton’s campaign strategy, “For every blue-collar Democrat we lose in western Pennsylvania, we will pick up two moderate Republicans in the suburbs in Philadelphia, and you can repeat that in Ohio and Illinois and Wisconsin.” Ridiculed after Trump’s victory, the Democrats are still <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/04/briefing/democrats-election-working-class-voters.html">struggling</a> to win the support of their traditional working class base. While there is no magic formula that will win them back, putting forth candidates who play well in places where they live is a good place to start.</p><p>How can the Democrats find these winning candidates? In some ways, it’s deceptively simple: Promote the candidate that wins the primary votes of non-college voters. After all, these voters comprise the majority of the population in every state and nearly every district. With so much data from primaries over the past few cycles to pore over, finding common attributes amongst candidates who connected with these voters (whether the candidates themselves are more progressive or more moderate) would be a worthwhile exercise. With the Republican party teetering in a precarious position due to its own internal divisions, Democrats currently have a once in a generation opportunity to forge a majority governing coalition that is broad and inclusive enough to sustain itself. Will their own divisions along educational lines foreclose this chance, or will they prove adept enough at listening to seize this remarkable opportunity?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e4632df9578" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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