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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Dave Nussbaum on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Dave Nussbaum on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Dave Nussbaum on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davenuss79?source=rss-3625536155fa------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[The replicability issue and stereotype threat research]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davenuss79/the-replicability-issue-and-stereotype-threat-research-a988d6f8b080?source=rss-3625536155fa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[stereotypes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[replication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dave Nussbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Feb 2018 22:34:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-01T22:34:44.050Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Disclosure: Late last year I posted </em><a href="https://medium.com/@davenuss79/claude-steeles-comment-on-a-quote-in-radiolab-s-recent-program-on-stereotype-threat-e67a55aaae94"><em>a response on behalf of Claude Steele</em></a><em>, my PhD advisor, to a Radiolab broadcast about Stereotype Threat. This is a follow up to that post, again on Claude Steele’s behalf, as well as on behalf of Steve Spencer, one of Steele’s early collaborators on Stereotype Threat research, and my post-doctoral advisor.</em></p><p>A recent Radiolab broadcast revisited the topic of stereotype threat (ST) in light of recent concerns about the replicability of findings in psychology and the sciences more generally. The purpose of this post is to address the replication issue in relation to stereotype threat research.</p><p><strong>1)</strong> <strong>Replicating ST’s effect on women and math</strong></p><p>We start by noting that, for some time, we have been gathering resources needed for a large-scale “adversarial” replication of the early experiments testing ST’s effect on women’s math performance. This registered replication addresses the replicability of experiments by Spencer et al. done over 20 years ago. To our knowledge, there has been no attempt to replicate them that has conformed to the conditions stereotype theory specifies as necessary to produce the effect.</p><p><strong>2)</strong> <strong>The Situational Nature of ST</strong></p><p>ST is a situational predicament: being in a situation in which you are strongly invested, where you know you could be negatively stereotyped based on one or more of your social identities — age, religion, gender, race, etc. It’s not a person characteristic like, say neuroticism, that goes with the person from situation to situation. It might make sense to say “how big an effect does being neurotic have in people’s lives?” in the sense of how big an effect does it have across situations in a person’s life. But ST is not a person characteristic.<em> It is a situational predicament or pressure that doesn’t exist when the elements of the predicament are not present, but that can have big, even life-shaping effects when those elements are present, especially when they are persistently present in a domain of life that is important to the person.</em></p><p>Thus, more meaningful questions are: is this <em>predicament</em> strong and important for women in elite STEM coursework, or for girls in 6th grade math, or for girls in Poland where gender math stereotypes are weak, or for whites interacting with blacks when the topic is race, or for whites interacting with blacks when the topic is sports, or for blacks at elite colleges, or for blacks at state colleges, and so on. In all of these examples, the question about ST is whether the predicament that it is, is a significant pressure for the group being referenced in the situation. There is no doubt that you can produce and replicate ST effects — on meaningful dependent measures like intellectual performance, inter-group trust, social comfort in intergroup interaction, physiological and brain activity measures — by creating situations in which this pressure is strong. You can do this with the ease of a classroom demonstration. Thus, the question of whether ST effects “exist” <em>per se</em>, or the question of whether ST effects are “replicable” <em>per se</em>, is hardly contestable. For the “existence” and “replicability” question to be more meaningful, you have to ask for whom and where is ST a meaningful pressure; for women in advanced college STEM classes? for Muslims boarding an airplane? for white players competing against a predominantly black basketball team? Addressing these questions can be informative; implicitly testing the “existence” and “replicability” questions and telling us how big a role ST plays in situations of particular concern.</p><p><strong>3)</strong> <strong>The Size of ST Effects</strong></p><p>The question “How big are ST effects?” has occupied many recent discussions. Here <em>theory</em> is everything; experimental effects of ST should be strong in situations where this predicament (specified by ST theory) is strong, and weak in situations where this predicament (specified by ST theory) is weak. ST theory predicts that ST effects will be strong when: a) the person is identified with a domain of performance or functioning in which he or she can be negatively stereotyped (based on stereotypes about one or more of his or her social identities); b) the performance or functioning is frustrating enough to make the negative stereotype possibly applicable to the person as an account of that frustration; and c) features of the situation and culture suggest some possibility of being stereotyped or, at least, do not quell that possibility. When these specifications are met in an experimental situation, the ST predicament is strong and its effects on behavior (e.g., performance) and physiological functioning should be significant. When these specifications are not met — one or more of these features is absent or weak — the ST predicament is weak, and its effects should be weak or absent.</p><p>A meta-analysis (looking at over 350 studies) is on the horizon that will assess this theoretical prediction across the ST literature more precisely than has been done to date.</p><p>But for now, in assessing whether or not a study “tests” a given ST effect, it is essential to know whether the study included an experimental condition that meets the theory-specified conditions for producing ST, and a control condition that doesn’t. For example, a study we’ve seen cited as a “failure to test” ST is Stricker &amp; Ward (2004). This study contrasted conditions in which test-takers completed demographic information (race in one study, gender in another study) either before or after taking high stakes standardized tests in real-life settings. Providing this information before the test was presumed to be the ST condition (priming the relevance of the identity stereotype); providing it after the test was presumed to be the no-ST condition (since that way, they might take the test without the identity stereotype being primed). They found a modest effect. But here’s the problem: ST theory would predict little or no ST effect here because both conditions — the reputed ST condition and the reputed no-ST condition — have the features the theory says would produce the effect: test-takers invested in doing well on the test; a high stakes test that would produce enough frustration to itself evoke the stereotype as a possible account of their experience; and an American context in which minority and women test-takers would know that their weak performance could be seen as stereotype-confirming. Put simply, both the ST and the no-ST condition would be expected to cause ST, so that not getting a difference between these condition, or only a weak one, is not a “failure to replicate” a ST effect, it is, essentially, a failure to test ST. The theory of the ST predicament has to be kept in mind when assessing the replicability of ST effects. These effects should replicate under conditions predicted to produce the effect, but otherwise not.</p><p><strong>4)</strong> <strong>The information value of a single replication failure</strong></p><p>When an effect found in study A doesn’t replicate in study B, it raises the possibility that the original effect happened by chance, or was due to poor research practices. When there are few such demonstrations, a failed replication is generally more indicting than when there are many prior demonstrations of the effect. The logic here is Bayesian: new information (a replication failure) adjust our prior beliefs about an effect more when that prior belief is based on little information than when it is based on lots of information. Moreover, in a large literature, one must expect some replication failures on the basis of chance alone. Still, following a Bayesian process, this study’s failing to replicate the earlier studies, would affect our expectations about the strength of this effect going forward.</p><p>For example, there are so many demonstrations of dissonance-reducing attitude change, over such a vast array of circumstances and procedures, that the failure to replicate a particular dissonance experiment in a particular circumstance wouldn’t strongly imply that dissonance reduction is not a real phenomenon. What this outcome would mean is hard to say. Perhaps it reflects a boundary condition of the original effect? Perhaps it happened by chance? (In a large literature, one must expect some replication failures on the basis of chance alone.) Perhaps it reflects that the methodologies used in the original research have essentially timed out, that is, not having the same meanings in this new era, they no longer produce the effect. Perhaps it reflects an experimenter’s inattention to context or critical detail? Against a large literature of successful replications and conceptual replications, particular replication failures have enough alternative explanations as to make them difficult to interpret — perhaps too many to convincingly indict the earlier effects, even as, following Bayesian logic, it should adjust one’s expectations downward. A caution light, not a stop light. Yet when there are few prior replications or conceptual replications, a failed replication is more suggestive.</p><p>One could say that even large literatures can be so corrupted by questionable research practices like p-hacking, that the size of a literature is no protection against its being uninterpretable. Clearly these practices can produce false results, and anything is possible. But such accounts often assume the dominance over research of particular investigator motives; namely, those aroused by intense pressures to publish. These are undeniable. But they aren’t the only investigator motives. There are also genuine scientific motives such as to expand human understanding and to develop useful, real-world interventions for important problems — all of which pressure for careful research practices that produce truly interpretable results. Seeing a large literature such as that of cognitive dissonance — and if we dare add, ST — as corrupted beyond interpretability simply because the motive for corruption exists (to publish) and the means exists (e.g., p-hacking) is to disregard the impact of other investigator motives and to embrace, in our view, an unlikely possibility.</p><p><strong>5) Exact vs Conceptual Replications as Tests of an Effects Replicability</strong></p><p>In social psychology the meaning of our research materials, protocols and operations are tied to the culture, context and era in which the research was done. The same materials and procedures that evoke a process at one time, in one setting, may not evoke it at another time in a different setting — their meaning may have “timed out,” a new context may change their meaning, etc. To evoke the process in a second situation, may require different materials and operations, <em>ones that have been shown, largely through pretesting, to create the conditions theorized to produce the effect in that second situation.</em> That is, one may have to “conceptually replicate” the first experiment. If, proceeding this way, one finds the effect, then the phenomenon or process under study has been shown to generalize to a different situation and, in that sense, to be replicable.</p><p>Doing an “exact replication” in that second situation without showing first that the materials and procedures produce the conditions theorized to evoke the process under study, is ill advised. If it fails to replicate the original effect, one doesn’t know whether the failure is due to the phenomenon being unreal, or due to materials and procedures that, in that second situation, simply didn’t evoke the processes critical to getting the effect.</p><p>For example, the same experimental materials and procedures that evoke cognitive dissonance and self-justifying dissonance reduction in New York may not do so in Tokyo. To test whether or not cognitive dissonance can be aroused in the Japanese of Tokyo, one will have to use materials and procedures shown, among the Japanese of Tokyo, to produce the conditions — an important self-contradiction — theorized to produce cognitive dissonance. This will likely involve different materials and operations than those used in New York. One will have to <em>conceptually</em> replicate the experiment done in New York. Proceeding this way, if one finds dissonance reduction among the Japanese of Tokyo, then the original New York study has been conceptually replicated — its finding of dissonance reduction in response to an important self-contradiction shown to be replicable and to generalize to the Japanese of Tokyo. If this conceptual replication fails, it suggests that culture and the way it organizes self-functioning may be different in Tokyo than in New York. Perhaps the process of dissonance reduction itself is somehow culturally moderated. Interesting questions arise. <em>But the point is that the conceptual replication leads to an interpretable result, not the exact replication of the New York study.</em></p><p><strong>6)</strong> <strong>ST transitions out of the laboratory into the field.</strong></p><p>Especially relevant to questions about the strength and reliability of ST effects is the fact that <em>ST research has transitioned out of the laboratory into the real world where the question is how big is this effect in important areas of real life? </em>The intervention research addresses this question by asking how big an improvement in the real life academic performance of ability-stereotyped groups can one get by doing something that reduces the ST pressure they are under? And the answer very often is “a lot, for a long time, with very feasible efforts.” Over 37 such interventions (many RCT designs with large sample sizes) have now been done, and often replicated by independent investigators. Cumulatively now, this work has opened up a new framework for addressing some of the nation’s most tenacious educational challenges.</p><p>More research needs to be done in such field settings, and larger more comprehensive samples should be part of this effort. That said, the studies that have been done strongly encourage the view that even modest efforts to reduce ST can have meaningful effects on people’s real-world outcomes in school and society more generally — and this, after all, is where the tire of social psychological research and theorizing hits the road of affecting real life outcomes. This is not to suggest that ST reduction is the sole answer to this class of challenges. But a truly impressive body of research on this approach now suggest that it can be an important part of the solution.</p><p><strong>7)</strong> <strong>A corrective era</strong></p><p>The current focus on the replicability of research findings in social psychology constitutes an important corrective era in the field. Good developments have followed: a focus on eliminating questionable research practices, an effort to use larger sample sizes, systems for pre-registering experiments, a concern about multiple dependent measures, greater stress on sharing data and so on. We’ve had corrective era’s before. One of us remembers, for example, the depth of concern about experimenter bias in the late 60’s, about small-n demonstrational field studies in the 70’s, or even the struggle to establish experimentation as the methodology of preference again in the 60’s — the origins of SESP, the Society of <strong>Experimental</strong> Social Psychology. A science maturing. We endorse the current era. Our purpose has been to discuss its significance for interpreting ST research, and to offer a broader scientific context for these concerns, one that is assuring as well as corrective.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a988d6f8b080" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Claude Steele’s Comment on a Quote in Radiolab’s recent program on Stereotype Threat]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davenuss79/claude-steeles-comment-on-a-quote-in-radiolab-s-recent-program-on-stereotype-threat-e67a55aaae94?source=rss-3625536155fa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stereotypes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[replication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stereotype-threat]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dave Nussbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Nov 2017 22:43:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-28T02:51:26.291Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last Thursday, November 23rd, Radiolab aired an <a href="http://www.radiolab.org/story/stereothreat/">episode on Stereotype Threat</a> that featured a quote from Claude Steele in which, as it was presented, he appears to state that his belief in the phenomenon is immune to evidence. Steele, who was my PhD advisor, wrote the following in order to clarify and respond.</p><p>In 2009 NPR’s Radiolab did a <a href="http://www.radiolab.org/story/stereothreat/">program on stereotype threat</a>. This fall they revisited the topic in the context of the replication issue in social psychology. That episode was just released. No complaints, but I wanted to address an impression I might have left from something I said on the program — and to raise a point or two about the replication issue. I was asked if the replication<br>issue changed my impression of the stereotype threat literature. I said “no, I don’t think anything could make me go… this whole thing is not true.” The context of this quote was a discussion about whether a single, or a few failures to replicate some particular stereotype threat (ST) effect would change my view of this literature — a literature of hundreds and hundreds of studies. In<br>that context, I will own this quote — and explain myself shortly.</p><h3>What I don’t like about this quote</h3><p>First, I want to acknowledge the bad impression this quote might give: that I have some kind of non-empirically based faith in the phenomenon that makes me impervious to evidence against the effect. I don’t. I wrote a book conveying how much the evolution of this idea and research was against a robust skepticism, inside and outside of our lab. Also learning where the effect happens and where it doesn’t happen, and where it is strong and where it is weak has helped us develop a strong understanding or theory of the phenomenon, a theory that has made it easier to develop interventions to counter its ill effects in, for example, real-life schooling. And, of course, if a smoking gun or guns was identified that explained these hundreds of studies in terms of some concert of artifacts, bias or poor research practices, I would be sad, but all ears. My faith is in science, evidence and reason. So, for the record, I want to disavow any meaning of the above quote as suggesting I wouldn’t be open to evidence against ST. I would be, and always have been. In the end, it’s about evidence. And that goes all around. For example, evidence, and reason built on evidence, should be weighted more than generic, untested suspicions and doubts. To be taken seriously, suspicions and doubts should be made precise and tested.</p><h3>How would I assess the replicability/reliability of the ST phenomenon?</h3><p>Through operations that have fidelity not necessarily to the exact operations of some earlier experiment (the meaning and impact of operationalizations can change from setting to setting and from time to time in ways that are hard to know about — making “exact” replications a little like trying to step in the same river twice) but to the theoretically prescribed requirements for producing the psychology in question. <strong>This is where theory comes in</strong>. It spells out those requirements. If those requirements are demonstrably met in an experiment, and the experiment fails to produce the predicted effect, then we have an interpretable challenge to the theory (allowing for the fact that some small proportion of such experiments will fail strictly due to chance — reflecting the probabilistic nature of our research.) And this is how theory can help with the “replication crisis.” Our ideas can be better specified.</p><p>This is a strength of the stereotype threat literature. It has a specified theory: in performance areas from academics to sports, negative stereotypes are hypothesized to affect groups whose relevant abilities are negatively stereotyped, but to do so primarily for those in the group who identify enough with the relevant domain to be threatened by being negatively stereotyped in it, <em>and</em> when the performance involved is difficult and frustrating enough to make the threatening stereotype applicable as an account of their experience. And this pressure should vary with the strength of cues in the setting suggesting a likelihood of being judged or treated stereotypically. When these conditions are met, one’s conviction about the ST phenomenon has to be held accountable to the experiment’s results, regardless of whether it is an exact or a conceptual replication. That is, if a fair number of ST experiments that met these conditions did not find ST effects, I would surmise that ST wasn’t a significant pressure in the domains these experiments generalize to. It is the now hundreds of conceptual replications of ST effects when these conditions are met, across such varied conditions and domains of behavior, on which I rest my confidence in its replicability.</p><h3>What I was trying to say in Radiolab</h3><p>First, remember its context: would one or several replication failures change my impression of the ST literature. It might change my impression of the experimental protocol being replicated — that its social meaning has changed with time, that ST is no longer a pressure felt by the group in question in the situation in question, or maybe that the finding in the first experiment using that protocol was due to chance, bias or bad research practices. This I could buy. But in the face of hundreds of conceptual replications of the effect across different groups, different stereotypes, behavioral and physiological measures, by hundreds of investigators some of whom are skeptics of the effect, in different places all over the world, I don’t think it’s rational to doubt the existence of the effect on the basis of one or even several replication failures of a particular experiment<a href="#_msocom_1">[Office1]</a> .</p><p>Said another way, based on the evidence from mine and others’ labs and my experience doing this research, I have the prior belief that ST effects are robust and reliable. I have this belief even though I know there are undoubtedly unpublished studies missing from the literature. Given this prior belief, and my read of the large body of evidence on which it’s based, I don’t feel it’s quite right that one, or even several replication failures should overturn that belief. I am in no way saying that my prior belief would not be updated by replication failures. It would be — to be sure. I am just saying that in light of the large body of ST evidence it would take more than a few such studies to do that.</p><p>That’s, in part, what I meant. If the literature was small, or perhaps dominated by a narrow set of methodologies, then it would seem more plausible that replication failures of central studies would bring the effect into question, that is, raise the possibility that the original effect was due to chance or artifact. But when the conceptual replications number in the hundreds and include dozens of real-world interventions, the idea that a failed replication makes the “whole thing” artefactual isn’t highly plausible to me.</p><p>Second, what I also meant is that failures to replicate particular experiments wouldn’t, by themselves, tell me the phenomenon is not true in real life — at least not in this case. Again, I could readily accept such failures as showing that ST isn’t important for the group and situation in question, or that the earlier effects found with that procedure were due to chance or artifact. But as to the truth of the phenomenon…such evidence wouldn’t push me that far. I’ve experienced ST in so many situations, so frequently and throughout so much of my life that doubting the existence of the phenomenon in the face of several failed replications of a given experiment wouldn’t likely dissuade me of the <em>existence</em> of the phenomenon. And while I firmly share the methodological concerns of this replication-focused era — about small n’s, p-hacking, etc. — these concerns don’t rise to the level of negating my personal experience of this phenomenon. We don’t all walk in the same shoes. That’s why a diversity of scientists is important. In my shoes, I’ve just experienced too much of this phenomenon to doubt its <em>existence</em> — which is how far some of the people who doubt this effect seem to take these concerns. I had this in mind too when I answered the question above. How important is the effect? Where and when does it affect a group’s outcomes? etc. These are important research questions — as we have long-described. But the existence of stereotype threat…I’m 99.9% confident of that and somebody failing to get a replication effect wouldn’t likely change that.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e67a55aaae94" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Psychology 2016: A Year in Review]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davenuss79/psychology-2016-a-year-in-review-bb79b9019f8f?source=rss-3625536155fa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[behavioral-science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dave Nussbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Dec 2016 02:07:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-31T16:33:19.210Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/385/1*UaUIBBss0QYCraZIFK6Jpg.jpeg" /><figcaption>From Sunita Sah’s, “The Paradox of Disclosure” July 8th, 2016</figcaption></figure><p>In 2016 I’ve had the good fortune to work with a talented and endlessly interesting group of psychologists to help them share their research with the public. As the year winds down I thought I’d revisit some of my favorite articles of the past year.</p><p>I’m posting these, one a day, on Facebook from now until December 31st, so that’s 15 articles — I’ll throw in a few extras here, updating as I go along. If you’ve got research you’d like help sharing in 2017 don’t be shy about getting in touch.</p><ol><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102758309252943">December 17th</a>. I thought I’d start with a piece from all the way back in February by Jillian Jordan, Paul Bloom, Moshe Hoffman, and Dave Rand called “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/opinion/sunday/whats-the-point-of-moral-outrage.html">What’s the Point of Moral Outrage?</a>” They argue that moral outrage acts as a “costly signal” that shows other people that you are trustworthy. Look for a new article from Jillian and company on why we hate hypocrisy that’s based on the same framework early next year. And don’t forget to check out Paul Bloom’s new book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Against-Empathy-Case-Rational-Compassion/dp/0062339338">Against Empathy</a>, if you haven’t already.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102759371015163?pnref=story">December 18th</a>. Here’s another story from February by Kristina Olson and Katie McLaughlin in the Los Angeles Times, “<a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0228-mclaughlin-olson-raising-healthy-transgender-kids-20160226-story.html">How to Raise Happy, Healthy Transgender Kids</a>.” They make the point that despite what you usually hear transgender kids are not doomed to a childhood of trauma and mental health problems. They focus on cases in which parents accepted their kids’ gender identity, something that is starting to happen with increasing regularity.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102761844807663">December 19th</a>. In the third installment of the look back at 2016 I’m going to bend the rules a little and include multiple articles that tried to make sense of the US election — good thing we sorted that out! Way back in the primaries Todd Rogers and Adan Acevedo wrote about how the Clinton and Cruz campaigns were (mis)using behavioral science to get out the vote in “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/opinion/campaign-stops/in-iowa-voting-science-at-work.html">In Iowa, Voting Science at Work</a>.” After the primaries ended, Yarrow Dunham and Dave Rand <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/31/opinion/sunday/will-sanders-supporters-come-around.html">predicted that Sanders’ supporters would come back into the Clinton fold</a>, building in part on some classic social psychology research. They now have supporting data, so contact them to learn more. In October, Carey Morewedge <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/opinion/sunday/why-you-should-bet-against-your-candidate.html">explained why it is rational to vote against your candidate of choice</a>, so that even if you lose at least you don’t walk away empty handed, but that people are nevertheless reluctant to do so. I probably should have followed his advice. Melissa Ferguson wrote about <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-it-too-late-for-trump-and-clinton-to-become-more-likable-57329">whether it was too late for Clinton and Trump to change voters’ impressions of them</a>. Erez Yoeli, Moshe Hoffman, and Dave Rand explained <a href="http://qz.com/825267/behavioral-scientists-identified-five-things-americans-can-do-to-get-out-the-vote-in-2016/">how to get your friends to vote</a>. And Michelle Gelfand wrote about <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-culture-threat-fear-and-the-tightening-of-the-american-mind-57866">Trump culture</a>.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102763719306153">December 20th</a>. Having just finished Michael Lewis’ Undoing Project, “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/opinion/sunday/how-to-stop-overprescribing-antibiotics.html">How to Stop Overprescribing Antibiotics</a>” strikes me as a perfect example of the legacy of Kahneman and Tversky in helping us to use a better understanding of the way the mind works to make the world work better in important ways. It’s probably not a coincidence that Craig Fox, the lead author, was a student of theirs.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102767046842743">December 21st</a>. Next we veer toward philosophy but narrowly avoid a collision. In “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/opinion/sunday/whose-life-should-your-car-save.html">Whose Life Should Your Car Save?</a>” Azim Shariff, Iyad Rahwan, and JF Bonnefon discuss how, in the coming age of self-driving cars, we should program them to respond in potentially fatal situations. People will agree that, as a policy, cars should not give much greater value to the life of the driver than to those of innocent pedestrians — but if it’s their car they change their minds. In short, people think cars should behave ethically but they refuse to buy the ones that do, leaving car makers with a dilemma.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102768521542433">December 22nd</a>. The prolific Katherine Kinzler deserves her own entry, having written three Gray Matter articles this year, one for NYT’s Well, and most recently an article for Quartz. In March she wrote “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/opinion/sunday/the-superior-social-skills-of-bilinguals.html">The Superior Social Skills of Bilinguals</a>” about how kids raised in environments where people speak different languages learn early on how to consider others’ perspectives in figuring out who speaks what language to whom. In August she described her research on the surprising social aspects of kids’ food selection and how much they learn from watching people eat in “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/opinion/sunday/babies-watching-people-eat.html">Babies Watching People Eat</a>” and in October she explained “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/opinion/sunday/how-kids-learn-prejudice.html">How Kids Learn Prejudice</a>” with a tour of research including findings by Yarrow Dunham, Kristin Shutts, Kristina Olson, Melissa Ferguson, Jeremy Cone and others. Katie also teamed up with Justine Vanden Heuvel, Cornell’s resident oenologist, to consider cultural differences in how kids are introduced to wine in “<a href="http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/do-children-in-france-have-a-healthier-relationship-with-alcohol/">Do Children in France Have a Healthier Relationship With Alcohol?</a>” Finally, following the election, she wrote “<a href="http://qz.com/839961/a-cornell-psychologist-explains-how-to-raise-kids-well-in-the-age-of-trump/">A Cornell psychologist explains how to raise kids well in the age of Trump</a>” in which she again brings together a wide range of findings to explain how to prepare kids to be good citizens. I don’t have a plaque to give out, but maybe if you write a lot of great articles next year you could be the winner of the first annual Katie Kinzler award for helping the public better understand the world using psychological research. Don’t get your hopes up, though, chances are Katie will win it.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102770424044803">December 23rd</a>. Disclosing a conflict of interest — like when doctors reveal that they have received gifts from the pharmaceutical industry — is supposed to reduce bias. In “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/opinion/sunday/the-paradox-of-disclosure.html">The Paradox of Disclosure</a>” <a href="https://www.facebook.com/sunitasahuk">Sunita Sah</a> explains why it often has the opposite effect. Patients feel more pressure to follow advice following disclosure because rejecting their doctor’s advice implies the advice was tainted. Doctors, for their part, give more biased advice after disclosing, because now the patient has all the information and can adjust their decision accordingly. There are some ways to improve the problem that Sunita explores, but this is a great example of a solution that seems great on the surface but when you unpack the psychology of how it plays out in practice may not lead to its intended consequences. Sunita also co-authored an <a href="https://theconversation.com/one-step-toward-making-criminal-justice-less-biased-65022">article </a>in The Conversation on the benefits of blinding prosecutors to the race of suspects when making pre-trial decisions like whether or not to prosecute.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102772644010973">December 24th</a>. Given that tonight is Christmas Eve it seems appropriate to highlight this recent <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/this-holiday-season-spend-on-doing-rather-than-having/">article in Scientific American Mind</a> by Amit Kumar, Jesse Walker, and Tom Gilovich that explains why people tend to be more grateful for experiences than for things. Also, here’s an <a href="https://theconversation.com/gift-giving-taboos-that-arent-as-bad-as-you-think-52293">article</a> on gift giving taboos you can consider breaking by Mary Steffel and Nora Williams that was originally published last December but was so good they just published it again.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102775245088393">December 25th</a>. In “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/opinion/sunday/what-should-you-choose-time-or-money.html">What Should You Choose: Time or Money?</a>” Hal Hershfield and Cassie Mogilner weigh a trade off everyone has to balance at one time or another. Here’s the answer their research led them to: “In our pursuit of happiness, we are constantly faced with decisions both big and small that force us to pit time against money. Of course, sometimes it’s not a choice at all: We must earn that extra pay to make ends meet. But when it is a choice, the likelihood of choosing more time over more money — despite the widespread tendency to do the opposite — is a good sign you’ll enjoy the happiness you seek.”</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102778488668233">December 26th</a>. In “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/opinion/sunday/the-problem-with-slow-motion.html">The Problem with Slow Motion</a>” Eugene Caruso, Zach Burns, and Ben Converse explain how the psychological effect of watching an action in slow motion can have very real consequences. When we see behavior unfold slowly we presume it’s more intentional — we think the actor had more time to make a conscious choice — than if when we watch it at regular speed. That can lead to a longer suspension in the NFL or it can mean the difference between a charge of first and second degree murder. And just knowing you have this bias doesn’t allow you to undo its effects.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102779906117653">December 27th</a>. Following the election, Jess Tracy wrote about <a href="http://qz.com/842183/why-did-people-vote-for-donald-trump/">dominance vs. prestige as paths to power</a>, building on the research in her new book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Take-Pride-Deadliest-Secret-Success-ebook/dp/B01912QB0A">Take Pride: Why the Deadliest Sin Holds the Secret to Human Success</a>, in which she explores the positive and negative sides of pride. She makes the case that while hubristic pride can be problematic, authentic pride can be a positive and important motivator of behavior. Speaking of power, Michael Kraus also wrote an article for Quartz about the research he and his colleagues have done that shows that <a href="http://qz.com/809580/psychology-shows-that-the-more-power-we-give-to-people-like-donald-trump-the-worse-they-get/">power reveals people’s personalities</a>, while a lack of power leads people to adjust their personalities to meet the demands of the situation they’re in. This also seems like a great opportunity to thank <a href="http://qz.com/author/stoddqz/">Sarah Todd at Quartz</a> who did a great job editing a number of psychology articles this year, including the two above and more coming tomorrow.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102781910530793">December 28th</a>. Earlier this year Slovic launched <a href="http://arithmeticofcompassion.org/">ArithmeticofCompassion.org</a>, a website dedicated to help people understand the cognitive obstacles that prevent us from responding to the needs of others even, and sometimes particularly, in the face of great tragedy. In <a href="http://qz.com/772819/aylan-kurdis-tragic-death-a-year-ago-didnt-stop-us-from-staying-numb-to-the-syrian-refugee-crisis/">this Quartz article</a>, he and Nicole Dahmen explain that although empathy can trigger a brief outpouring of support, ultimately it is not sufficient to overcome our biases. Also in Quartz, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/aradhna.krishna.3">Aradhna Krishna</a> makes an important point about <a href="http://qz.com/860814/the-best-way-to-stop-normalizing-bigotry-is-to-talk-more-about-the-people-who-act-as-allies/">the unforeseen side effects of widely publicized hate crimes</a> in recent months. Research on social norms tells us that when we perceive behavior to be common it makes it seem acceptable, so when the New York Times publishes <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/column/this-week-in-hate">This Week in Hate</a>, it does the important task of exposing these crimes, but may unintentionally be making them appear more normal (for more on the psychological underpinnings of this process be on the lookout for an article in Gray Matter early next year by <a href="https://www.facebook.com/adambear91">Adam Bear</a> and Josh Knobe). One solution Krishna proposes is to also publicize cases of people standing up to hate crimes just as vocally.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102784243804893">December 29th</a>. A lot of psychologists, myself included, have made the case that although people are really good at believing what they want to believe, that’s a hard to trick to pull off once you catch yourself doing it. Emily Rosenzweig disagrees and makes an excellent case that <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/we-re-all-biased-but-that-doesn-t-keep-us-from-making-valid-decisions/">people have no problem accepting conclusions they know they generated in a biased way</a>. It’s a really interesting read and has me mostly convinced — the rest is probably bias, not that I care. Also in Scientific American, if you missed it earlier today, Ben Converse and Marie Hennecke have an article just in time for New Year’s that explains <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/why-we-think-we-can-keep-those-new-years-resolutions/">why we have such high hopes for next year and such low ones for today</a>. Special thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/MLemonick">Michael Lemonick</a>, Opinion Editor at Scientific American, who has edited several of the articles on this list, with more to come next year.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102785897915043">December 30th</a>. I’m a co-author on this one, but all the credit goes to <a href="https://twitter.com/seamusapower">Seamus Power</a> who has done a pretty amazing job unpacking the Irish response to fiscal austerity from a cultural and social psychological perspective using both qualitative and quantitative methods. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2016/mar/15/economics-as-a-morality-play-austerity-protest-in-ireland">this article for The Guardian</a>, Seamus explains why the Irish people did not join their Spanish and Greek neighbors in protesting austerity measures following the economic collapse of 2007. His interviews led him to the conclusion that there was a collective sense of responsibility that dampened the motivation to protest that resonated with the cultural belief that “you reap what you sow.” Several years later, however, as the economy began to rebound, surprisingly protests in Ireland started to pick up steam. The economy was doing well, but despite having suffered austerity the benefits were not shared evenly. At the heart of Seamus’ analysis is the idea that it is the subjective experience of the economy, not just objective economic conditions, that predicts how people will behave.</li><li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/davenussbaum79/posts/10102787242585313?pnref=story">December 31st</a>. It’s New Year’s Eve so why not go out with a bang? Some of my favorite op-eds to work with are the ones that connect research to real world problems. Here are a few that do just that — and if you’re interested in more, you’re welcome to check out my work with the <a href="http://behavioralpolicy.org/blog">Behavioral Science &amp; Policy Association</a>. Sapna Cheryan wrote <a href="http://qz.com/823162/a-new-study-shows-how-star-trek-jokes-and-geek-culture-make-women-feel-unwelcome-in-computer-science/">two</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/masculine-culture-responsible-for-keeping-women-out-of-computer-science-engineering-67217">articles </a>on how we can encourage more girls and women to pursue their interests in computer science, making the case that we should, “take the pressure off women to change themselves to fit within masculine cultures. Instead, the pressure should be on society to make computer science a field in which all students feel equally welcome.” Daniel Yudkin and Jay Van Bavel wrote about the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/opinion/sunday/the-roots-of-implicit-bias.html">roots of implicit bias</a>, explaining their research that finds that implicit bias is based on a reflex to favor the ingroup over the outgroup. The good news is that this bias can be overcome with some time to think through our initial reflex (the bad news is that this second step is optional). Ashley Whillans described her new research that showing that <a href="https://theconversation.com/want-to-do-something-good-for-your-health-try-being-generous-51084">spending money on others can be good for your health</a>. For the first time, she and her colleagues document a causal link between generosity and reduced blood pressure among patients previously diagnosed with high blood pressure. Matteo Galizzi and George Loewenstein wrote about <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-obesity-fight-uks-heavy-handed-soda-tax-beats-us-watered-down-warning-60130">policies aimed to reduce obesity</a>, comparing the effectiveness of more heavy handed policies like sugar taxes to lighter touch approaches like mandatory labels and ultimately arguing for a comprehensive approach. Sarah Guminski wrote about Jana Gallus’ research about <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/what-makes-wikipedia-s-volunteer-editors-volunteer/">what drives people to volunteer for Wikipedia</a> as well as about <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/pay-for-success-how-impact-investing-can-make-government-services-better/">the promise of Social Impact Bonds</a> that aim to finance socially beneficial undertakings and pay out when the programs achieve certain defined goals.</li></ol><p>You can say a lot of things about 2016, but not that it wasn’t interesting. Thanks to all the writers and researchers that made it interesting for me, and hopefully for the many people with whom they shared their work. Here’s to an even better 2017 — hopefully I’ll have to start the year-end review even sooner this time around. Happy New Year!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bb79b9019f8f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Behavioral Science & Policy This Week (10.23.15)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davenuss79/behavioral-science-policy-this-week-10-23-15-873bce1b5f55?source=rss-3625536155fa------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[behavioral-economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[behavioral-science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dave Nussbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2015 15:30:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-24T18:11:23.142Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8-K1n5a6Vub5sDO6YdKztg.jpeg" /></figure><p>O n the #<a href="http://behavioralpolicy.org/blog">policyshop</a> blog this week, Rick Larrick wrote about <a href="https://behavioralpolicy.org/providing-better-information-not-more-information/">the importance of providing better information</a> to help consumers make good decisions, not just more of it. We’re also very excited to welcome the World Bank’s Global Insights Initiative who held their launch today.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/344/1*0POCMoKxbO8nHbUuHONndA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The World Bank marked the launch of their behavioral science initiative, the Global Insights Initiative (GINI) today in Washington, D.C. with an event featuring several leading World Bank officials, Duke University’s Dan Ariely, head of the White House SBST, Maya Shankar, her Canadian counterpart, Elizabeth Hardy, Saugato Datta of ideas42, and head of the new GINI team, Varun Gauri.</p><p>Dan Ariely kicked things off with some fascinating research examples relating to honesty and corruption, motivation, and getting people to save. For example, in a laboratory setting, ordinarily moral people induced to give a bribe to an experimenter were subsequently much less honest, and were even willing to steal from the experimenters — the implication is that it can sometimes take very little to shift the prevailing norms and lead otherwise moral people to behave immorally.</p><p>Ariely also talked about an experiment conducted at Intel in which workers who were given cash bonuses were more immediately more productive, but actually saw their productivity decline below their usual level on subsequent days when they received no bonus. Social bonuses, such as vouchers for free pizza, or complimentary text messages from the boss had similar positive effects as cash bonuses, but without the boomerang.</p><p>I’ve posted some of the tweets from the event below, and I will add a link to the replay of the event as soon as it becomes available.</p><p><em>Update: here’s a </em><a href="http://live.worldbank.org/global-insights-initiative"><em>link to the video</em></a><em> of the event</em></p><h3>Jamie Kimmel on Twitter</h3><p>&quot;Development policy is due for a redesign based on a more realistic understanding of how people think and behave.&quot; http://live.worldbank.org/global-insights-initiative ...</p><h3>Jon Hersh on Twitter</h3><p>&quot;As you realize how wrong you are, you develop an appetite for experimentation&quot; Love this. #WBLive @danariely</p><h3>Dave Nussbaum on Twitter</h3><p>WBLive @varungauri explains how people can get stuck in their mental models and how to help them change them, see: http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/story-2015-world-development-report-mind-society-and-behavior ...</p><h3>World Bank Research on Twitter</h3><p>Elizabeth Hardy: organ donors in some Canadian jurisdictions increased by 143% after behavior interventions http://wrld.bg/TIXlX #WBLive</p><h3>IPA on Twitter</h3><p>@danariely wonders why people get angry at &quot;paternalistic&quot; nudges but not at heavy-handed regulation on driving, for example #WBlive</p><h3>Dave Nussbaum on Twitter</h3><p>WBLive SBST&#39;s Maya Shankar on her team&#39;s work, see the full report here: https://sbst.gov/assets/files/2015-annual-report.pdf ... @whitehouseostp</p><h3>alissa fishbane on Twitter</h3><p>&quot;Successful development programs rely on people to behave and choose in certain ways.&quot; @sd268 @ideas42 at #WBLive GINI Launch.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/375/1*tVM3qCEwOmVqlZ9FdQbjhA.jpeg" /><figcaption>photo credit <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/52901568@N08/">Lucas Marcomini</a></figcaption></figure><h4>Ben Castleman on the upsides and downsides of text message interventions in education</h4><blockquote>“Leveraging text messaging to advance public policy goals has been particularly prolific in the education sector of late, with campaigns targeting <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w20659">parents of preschool-aged children with pre-literacy strategies</a> all the way up to <a href="http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-edu-helping-students-pay-for-college-one-text-message-at-a-time-20150927-story.html">a California-wide effort</a> to provide college-bound students with financial aid counseling. All of these campaigns cost only a few dollars per student they serve — a drop in the bucket compared to more traditional, resource-intensive strategies to improve educational outcomes. Many have been rigorously evaluated through randomized controlled trials, and have substantially improved students’ achievement or educational attainment. Low-cost, high-impact, and easily scalable — what more could educators or policy makers want?”</blockquote><p><a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brown-center-chalkboard/posts/2015/10/19-smartphone-nudges-education-castleman">Read the whole article</a></p><h3>in other news…</h3><h3>Behavioural Insights on Twitter</h3><p>New blog post: Our CEO David Halpern encourages the next generation to marvel and pursue the wonder of statistics. http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/news/world-statistics-day/ ...</p><h3>J-PAL on Twitter</h3><p>Randomized evaluations &amp; the power of evidence: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8rD844McrA ... via @TEDx @TEDxPennAve https://twitter.com/TEDxPennAve/status/654718109941547009 ...</p><h3>Dilip Soman on Twitter</h3><p>Nudge: The Animation https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jsy1E3ckxlM ... (EH), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MfW8fbsejC0 ... (FR), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AC5UoZfomU8 ... (ESP) @BE101x @rotmanschool</p><h3>Misbehaving Blog on Twitter</h3><p>Presidential donation pages and BE: have candidates gotten better over the years? http://bit.ly/1QATEQq @SamMcNerney @robertjneal</p><h3>The Psych Report on Twitter</h3><p>A Lawyer, an Economist, a Marketer, &amp; a Behavioral Scientist Go into a Bar...http://thepsychreport.com/books/last-mile-lawyer-economist-a-marketer-behavioral-scientist-go-into-a-bar ... by @dilipsoman, @rotmanschool @R_Thaler</p><h3>Aisling Ní Chonaire on Twitter</h3><p>Telling people that missing their appointment costs the NHS £160 reduces missed apts by 25% @mhallsworth @B_I_Tweets http://eepurl.com/bDstLn</p><h3>ideas42 on Twitter</h3><p>As part of our interview series with academic experts, @BrendanNyhan shared some behavioral insights with us: http://bit.ly/1PGt3TN</p><h3>Bilal Siddiqi on Twitter</h3><p>Fun watch: @EzraKlein plays Shark Tank at the World Bank. Featuring an overly long intro by yours truly. https://cdnapisec.kaltura.com/index.php/extwidget/preview/partner_id/619672/uiconf_id/26723411/entry_id/1_8jfg6fl7/embed/dynamic ...</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=873bce1b5f55" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Automatically Green]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davenuss79/automatically-green-9a173bae510e?source=rss-3625536155fa------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9a173bae510e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dave Nussbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 21:21:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2013-05-16T02:23:21.192Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*7hzBUAPoSIxBELtn.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo credit: Me</figcaption></figure><h4>Cass Sunstein on Green Defaults</h4><p>Yesterday I had the chance to see Cass Sunstein, Obama’s former “regulation czar,” give a talk at the University of Chicago Law School about, among many other things, how people can be encouraged to make environmentally responsible choices.</p><p>There are a lot of people who don’t care much, one way or the other, about the environment. That’s a shame, but it’s a problem for another day. Today I want to focus on the growing number of people who do care about the environment, but often fail to act that way.</p><p>Sometimes, the problem is that the environmentally responsible choice is hard or costly — failing to make that choice is understandable. But other times the problem is that making the wrong choice is too easy.</p><p>Look at the photograph above — I took it right after Sunstein’s talk yesterday right outside the law school. There’s a beautifully manicured lawn, with a path cutting through it, leaving the grass trampled under the feet of hundreds of short-cut-takers.</p><p>This preservation of this lawn isn’t the biggest deal in the world, but consider it symbolically. Instead of taking the extra six seconds or so to walk along the sidewalk, people take the shortcut across the lawn. I know I did on my way in. No individual is really doing much damage, but collectively they’ve destroyed part of the lawn. If you asked them, many of them might tell you that they never intended to destroy the lawn; they were just taking a shortcut and didn’t really think about it.</p><p>They’d be right — we make a lot of choices pretty automatically. You see the shortcut, made obvious by the already-pretty-trampled grass, and you take it without a further thought. After all, everyone else is doing it, and it’s already pretty trampled, so what difference would one more trampling make, anyway? The same goes for littering, or tossing something recyclable in the trash, or drinking out of a one-time-use bottle instead of a reusable one, or a million other little things that we all do, that we don’t think much of. If it were just as easy to do the environmentally responsible thing we would, and we’d be happy doing it. But often it’s not, so we commit the harmless sin, and those sins add up.</p><p>Sunstein’s approach is to try to flip this situation around. Ideally, to make the automatic choice the green one, leaving people free to take the short cut, but only if they really want to. Imagine a simple sign that says, please stay off the grass. It’s not a law and nobody would enforce it — you could still cut across the grass if you really wanted to. But it would just make it a tiny bit easier to make the green choice automatically: The sign says please keep off; I guess I’ll take the extra six seconds and walk around.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9a173bae510e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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