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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by David Wilson on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by David Wilson on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by David Wilson on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 06:02:17 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[My Mother’s Escape: A story of abuse, breaking free, and building a family]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/my-mothers-escape-130ffe9b6d0d?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[family]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[abuse]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Wilson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2026 05:08:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-30T12:29:13.531Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>She was the daughter of Chinese Immigrants who treated her like a house slave, but she escaped to build an empowered life.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JKztu2v8zPnrrLEpqXy-Ng.png" /><figcaption>Left to right: My grandmother, Helen Zia Chan; my mother, Edna; my uncle, George; and my grandfather, George King Chan. Circa 1943. ©David Wilson, author’s collection.</figcaption></figure><p>By David Wilson ©2026</p><p>My mother never spoke about leaving home; she would always say, “When I escaped from home…” As a child, I didn’t perceive the subtext of the phrasing. There were other clues that darkness lay in my mother’s past. She would audibly gasp when someone came up behind her unexpectedly. It was not a gasp of momentary surprise. You could see in her face that it was fear.</p><p>As a young child, I learned to stomp my feet loudly when I approached my mother from behind so she would not be surprised. But it didn’t always work. One time, when I was maybe eight or nine, I came skipping into the kitchen quickly while she was at the sink, absorbed with doing the dishes. As I dashed unexpectedly behind her, instead of a gasp, she let out a loud scream that stopped me cold in my tracks.</p><p>She quickly recovered from the fright and saw that I was looking dejectedly at the floor. She pulled me over to the kitchen table and sat me down, and finally told me why she reacted like that. She said it was because when she was a young child, her mother would often come up from behind her and hit her with no warning. Sometimes it was a slap, sometimes it was a fist. Occasionally, it was a broomstick.</p><p>Over the years, she told me more stories of life at home. She said it was her mother who did all the hitting. Her father never struck her, but he also did little to stop the abuse. She seemed to indicate that her father was somewhat cowed and henpecked by her mother.</p><p>She did tell a story about how he intervened one time on her behalf, when her mother had hit her across the back with the broomstick hard enough to break the handle. He stood up and said, “That’s enough!” I’m not sure if this was the only time her father defended her, but the way she told the story made it seem like a rare, if not singular, occasion.</p><h4>Cherished Son, Detested Daughter</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eTzyaW_B-wHCUWI05VdHww.png" /><figcaption>My grandmother, Helen Zia Chan, circa 1935. ©David Wilson, author’s collection.</figcaption></figure><p>My mother, Edna May Wilson, née Chan, was born in 1931 in Marlboro, Massachusetts. Her parents were of Chinese heritage. My grandfather, George King Chan, listed his birthplace as San Francisco in 1904. However, this was the era of the Chinese Exclusion Act, and there is a good chance that he was a “paper son.” Paper sons were men who had immigrated from China, but took advantage of the destruction of birth records in the great San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906 to claim birth in the city, and thus birthright American citizenship. They were called “paper sons” because they would use false documents provided by a Chinese family already living in the United States as evidence of their native birth. Some historians estimate that 90% of Chinese immigrant men who came to America in the early 20th Century used the paper son system.</p><p>My grandmother, Helen Zia Chan, was born in 1916 in China. We don’t know when exactly she immigrated from China or how she met my grandfather. It is possible that she was a “picture bride,” a common method in that era for men of Chinese ancestry in America to find a Chinese woman to marry. Brokers would show Chinese men living in California pictures of eligible women in China, and they would choose their brides based on those photos. The 12-year age gap between them and the fact that he was ostensibly born in America but married a much younger woman from China lend some weight to this theory, but it’s unlikely we will ever know for certain.</p><p>Probably around 1930, my mother’s parents moved from California to the East Coast, settling in Marlborough, Massachusetts, about 20 miles outside of Boston. There, they opened the town’s first and only Chinese-owned laundry. Laundries were one of the few businesses Chinese were allowed to own in that era. The place of business was also their home, with living quarters in the back of the store.</p><p>Edna was born the following year, in 1931. If my grandmother’s recorded birth year of 1916 is accurate, that means she had my mother when she was just 15 or 16, while my grandfather would have been 27. Growing up in the Great Depression, Edna said she was always hungry. But there were two reasons for this: one was poverty, and the other was that her mother would save the best food for her brother, George, who was two years younger. I asked my mother why this was, and she said, “Sons are valued in China, but daughters are not.”</p><p>When meat was scarce, it went to her brother, George, and Edna only got rice. She was frequently so hungry at school that she would steal food from other children during lunch. One time, she recalled, she snatched food right out of another girl’s hand and ran outside with it so she could eat it. Edna said food only became easier to come by when World War 2 came, and the economy began to recover.</p><p>As she got older, Edna was forced to do all of the housework. They expected her to do nothing but clean, cook, or work in the laundry. If there were no chores to do, she was told to sit quietly. The radio was the only entertainment in the home, but she was not allowed to listen to it by herself. However, when both her parents were out on errands, she would secretly turn on the radio. She enjoyed the radio shows very much, but her mother got wise to this and began putting her hand on the radio when she got home. If it felt warm, Edna got a beating.</p><h4>The Escape</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qRuI4_SyswNi8OAFAz3h-g.png" /><figcaption>My uncle George Chan, circa 1957. ©David Wilson, author’s collection.</figcaption></figure><p>When my uncle George came of age, he joined the Navy and served on a cruiser. Edna, despite being nearly three years older than her brother, was not permitted to work an outside job to earn money. She was forced to stay home to take care of her parents and help run the family business, all while still suffering her mother’s cruelty. She said running away was impossible because she had no money of her own.</p><p>One day, while his ship was in a port, her brother George called Edna and told her, “We need to get you out of there.” He devised a plan: His ship was scheduled to dock at the Charlestown Navy Yard near Boston in a few days. He would ask their mother to come into town to meet him for lunch and shopping while he was on shore leave. While her mother was away, Edna was to gather her things and go into downtown Marlborough, where there was an Air Force recruiting station. “Once enlisted,” George said, “she can’t get to you.”</p><p>When the day came, Helen left for Boston to meet her son. As planned, Edna gathered her few belongings and went to the Air Force recruiting office. There was a separate desk for female recruits staffed by several women. She asked to sign up, but before she could be enlisted, Edna had to take an exam. When the women in the office told her that she had failed, Edna broke down in tears.</p><p>The ladies tried to console her, telling her that she could retake the test another day. Edna said that they didn’t understand: “This is the only time I can escape my mother.” She told them about her mother’s cruelty, and if she didn’t get away then, she might never get away. The women huddled together and spoke among themselves. When they returned, one of them said, “Don’t worry about it, honey. You’re in.”</p><h4>Taking Charge of Her Own Life</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*j0kebcIzYT9VEbO_g15WTA.png" /><figcaption>My mother, Edna, in her late 20’s. ©David Wilson, author’s collection.</figcaption></figure><p>Predictably, once Edna’s mother got back home and discovered what had happened, she went to the recruiting office to try to get her daughter back. But as her brother anticipated, the Air Force told Helen that her daughter was an adult and did not need her parents’ permission to join the service. Thus, with her brother’s help and the kindness of strangers, Edna had made her escape.</p><p>My mother’s use of the word “escape” when talking about how she got away from home was very deliberate and unvarying. She didn’t leave home. She <em>escaped</em> from home. There was power in the word. She had freed herself from a bad situation. She made it happen. She took charge of her life.</p><p>In the Air Force, Edna was trained as a teletype operator. The service gave her food, clothes, and money of her own, which meant independence and empowerment. My mother told me many times that the Air Force had saved her life. After leaving the service, she got a job as a teletype operator with the Civil Aeronautics Administration (a predecessor to today’s Federal Aviation Administration) in Fort Worth, Texas. It was at the CAA office on Blue Mound Road in north Fort Worth that she met my father, Glenn Wilson, who was an Air Traffic Controller there.</p><p>The year was 1957. She was 26, and he was 25. They were married the following year in 1958. I’ve come to appreciate the courage my father had as a young white guy from rural Oklahoma choosing to marry a woman of Chinese descent at that time. Anti-asian sentiment was still quite prevalent in the country, and Asians were a practically unknown minority in the rural regions of his home state. When he brought her to meet his family in Duncan, Oklahoma, it must have been like he had brought home an alien from another planet.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YsXzLH4PsTKvuxU0o60O6w.jpeg" /><figcaption>My mother and father on their wedding day, May 15, 1958. ©David Wilson, author’s collection.</figcaption></figure><p>Like my mother, Glenn grew up in tremendous poverty during the Great Depression. His story of surviving the many hardships of Dust Bowl Oklahoma, working on migrant farms in California, and life as a roughneck on oil rigs is at least as interesting as my mother’s tale. Like my mother, he has his own story of escape, and also like her, he credited joining the Air Force with saving his life.</p><p>In 1959, Glenn and Edna had their first son, followed by a daughter in 1961, and a third and final child — me — in 1966. During the early years of her marriage, Edna tried to maintain good relations with her parents. This might seem strange to those who do not have experience with abusive relationships, but it is not unusual.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kjgsTyAo5xRgFsC3VUletg.jpeg" /><figcaption>My mother, father, and newborn me, 1966. ©David Wilson, author’s collection.</figcaption></figure><p>However, shortly after my birth in 1966, Edna had a revelation about her mother. When she called to tell Helen she had a new grandson, her mother seemed uninterested. She later told me, “Here I was telling her I had a new baby boy, and she never asked one question about you. All she did was talk about herself.” When Edna hung up the phone, it occurred to her that she no longer needed her mother. “I was done with her,” she said.</p><p>Edna’s father passed away a few years later, in 1972, at age 68. Her trip to attend her father’s funeral in Massachusetts was apparently the last time that she ever saw her mother. As far as I know, their estrangement after that was complete, with little—if any—subsequent communication between them.</p><p>My grandmother eventually remarried and left Massachusetts to be with her new husband and his family in Ohio. It was there that she passed away at the age of 80 in 1997. These facts I know only because of genealogical research. While Edna surely heard of her mother’s death, she did not tell my siblings or me about it. In fact, we had all assumed that our grandmother had passed away long before that, as Edna never made any mention of her except in the past tense for decades. In any case, it is clear that her mother had not been an important part of her life for a long time.</p><p>Edna struggled in her early years of parenting, which is understandable given her lack of good parental role models. But she became a kind, considerate, and strongly supportive parent. She said many times that she wanted to give her children the kind of upbringing that she would have liked to have had as a child.</p><p>One way this manifested was at Christmastime. This was not something much celebrated in the Chan home. Mom wanted it to be a lavish affair for the whole family. In addition to transforming the house with decorations, she wanted the space under the tree to be filled with gifts, brimming.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*imHMGF0z1XqL70DeYp0hNQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Christmas Day, 1975. My mother’s gift to me of an aeronautical building set. ©David Wilson, author’s collection.</figcaption></figure><p>I give my mother much credit for my own intellectual development. She saw early on that I was a curious, thoughtful child, and she encouraged my thirst for knowledge by frequently taking me to the library and museums. She bought a set of World Book Encyclopedias that I spent many hours with every week. And when she saw I was interested in science, she bought me a telescope, which I used to view planets, stars, galaxies, and the Moon.</p><p>In addition to making a family of her own, Edna gathered a large found family around herself. Beginning in the mid-1970s, she worked as a hostess at a Chinese restaurant in Arlington, Texas, where she became something of a matriarch, or “Auntie,” to many of the young, immigrant Chinese women who worked there. For them, Edna provided a strong, kind maternal presence; something that she never had for herself.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RONg_a2cfUOqlhkmJQhmTQ.png" /><figcaption>My mother, Edna, with my daughter, Sarah, 2001. ©David Wilson, author’s collection.</figcaption></figure><p>For much of my life, I blamed traditional Chinese culture’s contempt for women as being at least partly — if not mostly in my mind — responsible for the abuse that my mother suffered at home. Because of that, I didn’t take much interest in the Chinese side of my heritage for a long time. However, as I have grown older, I have come to appreciate that my mother’s story, the story of her family, and more generally the story of early Chinese immigration to America are also parts of my heritage that deserve to be studied and remembered. Even the painful parts.</p><p>In the summer of 2016, I visited Mom in her nursing home. Edna had had a massive stroke some time before, was bedridden, and rarely spoke in her last years, sometimes going months without saying a word. But that day she was talking. After a couple of hours of sitting at her bedside, I told her I had to go. She said it was OK because she had to get back to work anyway. Past and present were muddled in her mind, and I smiled and asked her where she thought she had to go. She replied, “I have to go help mom in the laundry.” Edna died two weeks later at age 85.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=130ffe9b6d0d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Rebutting Trump’s Case Against Birthright Citizenship]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/rebutting-trumps-case-against-birthright-citizenship-1ab06e6e7850?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ab06e6e7850</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[citizenship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[14th-amendment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Wilson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Nov 2025 22:49:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-05T23:30:58.481Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Agree or not with Trump, an executive order isn’t the right way to change the law</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*yhgwFDLAKAnOzRQcLY0PzQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Trump signing an executive order. Public Domain from White House X channel. <a href="https://x.com/WhiteHouse/status/1881692356006797552">https://x.com/WhiteHouse/status/1881692356006797552</a></figcaption></figure><p>By David Wilson ©2025</p><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/rebutting-trumps-case-against-birthright-citizenship-1ab06e6e7850?sk=a7a576a5682e85fa45ba06dc86799c1b"><em>👉</em><strong>Not a Medium member? Click here to read the article for FREE!</strong>👈</a></blockquote><p>On January 20, 2025, President Trump signed <a href="https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-02007.pdf">Executive Order 14160</a>, “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship.” This fulfilled a campaign promise that on his first day in office, he would issue an order “ending citizenship for children of illegals and outlawing birth tourism.”</p><p>Before Trump’s order, the law was that practically everyone born within the territorial bounds of the United States of America was automatically a citizen. This included children born in the United States whose parents were not citizens. This is what is meant by “birthright citizenship,” also known as <em>jus soli</em>.</p><p>The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, passed in 1868, said very succinctly:</p><blockquote>“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”</blockquote><p>The exception noted was for children whose parents were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. It was understood at the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 that this was a very narrow category of people, including only the children of ambassadors or diplomats, the children of invading soldiers, and the children of “Indians not taxed,” which was the Constitutional euphemism for Indian nations that maintained a quasi-foreign nation status by treaty. The Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation in its 1898 decision in <em>United States v. Wong Kim Ark</em>.</p><p>For most of our history, birthright citizenship has been a very practical system. It removed confusion about who was a citizen and who was not, especially in the years before the 20th century, when records were not kept as meticulously as they are today.</p><p>More importantly, without birthright citizenship, a bifurcated caste system would exist where some Americans would have more rights and privileges than others. Even worse, many who were born here would be at risk of being forced to leave the country, deported to a country they were neither born in nor called home. This is, in fact, what nearly happened to Wong Kim Ark in 1898; more on his important story later in the article.</p><p>However, many, including Trump, believe birthright citizenship has outlived its usefulness and has today led to abuses of the system. He thinks, and many Americans agree with him, that birthright citizenship creates an incentive for illegal immigration, which he says is a drain on American resources and a source of crime.</p><p>Of course, many would argue that immigrants — even undocumented ones — are not a drain on resources and are, in fact, a net positive for an economy, often doing jobs that most Americans refuse to do, such as harvesting crops. They see birthright citizenship for the children of undocumented migrants as a necessity to ensure that children who are born and raised in America are not deported “back” to a country that they have never lived in and may not even speak the language of.</p><p>But even if you think the benefits of birthright citizenship outweigh the harms, Trump’s arguments are legitimate concerns that should be addressed.</p><h4>Trump says the law has been “misinterpreted” for over 150 years</h4><p>Presidents don’t make laws. Under our Constitution, Congress does that. So, how is it that Trump could change the law using an executive order, bypassing Congress?</p><p>To justify his change, Trump made a novel argument: <em>The law has been misinterpreted for over 157 years, since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.</em> According to Trump, “the correct interpretation of the law” is that children of “illegal aliens” are not eligible for citizenship. Trump says that,</p><blockquote>“For years, open-borders proponents have deliberately misinterpreted ‘subject to the jurisdiction’ in the Fourteenth Amendment to mean merely subject to American law, which is the case for anyone physically present in the United States.”</blockquote><p>Trump says the previous policy was “based on a historical myth, and a willful misinterpretation of the law by open borders advocates.” He goes on to say that,</p><blockquote>The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment had nothing to do with the citizenship of immigrants, let alone the citizenship of the children of illegal aliens. Its purpose was to extend citizenship to people newly freed from slavery, whose status was left in question after the infamous case <em>Dred Scott v. Sandford</em>.</blockquote><h4>The Fourteenth Amendment and Immigrants</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/819/1*Lp8oAiXceNU_uTxcHgZmQw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Chinese immigrants arriving in San Francisco. U.S. Library of Congress, Public Domain.</figcaption></figure><p>Undeniably, the Fourteenth Amendment was a necessary follow-up to the Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed slavery, but did not address the question of whether or not former slaves, and members of the Black race generally, were or could become citizens.</p><p>However, Trump is entirely incorrect when he says that the Fourteenth Amendment “had nothing to do with the citizenship of immigrants” and “children of illegal aliens.” Congressional records show that the amendment’s application to immigrants and their children was hotly debated and discussed at length by Congress before the law’s adoption.</p><p>Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania, the most vocal opponent of civil rights in the 39th Congress, protested the amendment by asking, “Will it [the amendment] not have the effect of naturalizing the children of Chinese and Gypsies born in the country?”</p><p>Senator Lyman Trumbull, principal author of the Civil Rights Bill, replied, <strong>“Undoubtedly.”</strong></p><p>Cowan continued his argument, stating that the Chinese were, in his words, “very rapacious in their character,” and that if the amendment were allowed, “California, or Oregon, or Colorado, or Nevada, or any of those states shall be given over to an irruption of Chinese. I, for my part, protest against it.”</p><p>Senator John Conness of California disagreed, stating that,</p><blockquote>The proposition before us [Fourteenth Amendment]… relates simply in that respect to the children begotten of Chinese parents in California, and it is proposed to declare that they shall be citizens… I am in favor of doing so.</blockquote><blockquote>I voted for the proposition to declare that the children of all parentage whatever, born in California, should be regarded and treated as citizens of the United States, entitled to equal civil rights with other citizens of the United States.”</blockquote><p>President Andrew Johnson, in his veto of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 (the precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment), stated that he opposed the bill in part because it would make citizens of the children of parents whose races he considered incompatible with U.S. citizenship.</p><blockquote>“The Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the people called Gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks, people of color, negroes, mulattoes, and persons of African blood. Every individual of those races, born in the United States, is by the bill made a citizen of the United States.”</blockquote><p>Thus, the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment, and even its opponents, acknowledged that immigrants and the status of their children were key considerations of the new law.</p><h4>“Illegal Aliens” and the Fourteenth Amendment</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*kUGPMmm-9vdZGYQCs-o3gA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Detained immigrants on Ellis Island. U.S. Library of Congress, Public Domain.</figcaption></figure><p>Trump contends that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to apply to “children of illegal aliens.” However, Congressional records show that during debates on the Civil Rights Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment, there was no discussion whatsoever of the legal status of aliens or immigrants. This is because in the 1860s, when the amendment was enacted, the concept of illegal immigration had not yet been invented. All immigration was legal.</p><p>The first law restricting immigration — the Chinese Exclusion Act — was passed in 1882, some 14 years after the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted. Prior to that, nearly anyone could enter the country, and if they stayed for 5 years and demonstrated “good moral character” during that period, they could become citizens.</p><p>Indeed, the term “illegal alien” did not really enter the American vocabulary until after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, which first established the immigration quota system. Even then, “illegal alien” was a rarely used phrase that would only become part of the popular lexicon in the mid-1960s, when the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was enacted, and the Bracero guest worker program for Mexican migrant laborers was ended.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*EHE44Gpd3qpItyNyWqiRvg.png" /></figure><p>Thus, it is an anachronism and inaccurate to say the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had any opinion on or other intentions related to migrants or aliens who had come “illegally.”</p><h4>“Subject to the Jurisdiction”</h4><p>The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Opponents of birthright citizenship have latched onto the phrase “<em>subject to the jurisdiction thereof</em>” to indicate the law is not meant to apply to the children of illegal aliens.</p><p>However, having established that there was no such thing as “illegal aliens” at the time the amendment was written, the question remains: What does the enigmatic phrase <em>“subject to the jurisdiction thereof”</em> mean, exactly? Who was meant to be included — and excluded — by this phrase?</p><p>This question was at the center of the 1898 Supreme Court decision in <em>United States v. Wong Kim Ark</em>. Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco around 1868 to parents who had immigrated from China shortly before. In 1889, his parents decided to return to live in China. In 1894, he visited China, but when he returned in 1895, he was blocked from reentering the country by a U.S. Customs agent who claimed Wong was not a citizen.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/542/1*KuOKlW8cT6RlWNcv1m0adA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Wong Kim Ark. Public Domain from U.S. Government records.</figcaption></figure><p>That Wong was born in San Francisco was never in dispute. The customs agent, instead, argued that Wong could not be a citizen because his parents were not citizens and could never be made citizens under the terms of the Chinese Exclusion Act. So, despite having been born in the United States and having lived there his entire life, and having taken only two short trips to China, he was prevented from reentering the country.</p><p>In 1898, by a 6–2 margin, with one abstention, the Supreme Court affirmed Wong’s American citizenship, based on his birth in the country, and so his right to reenter the country. The court had exhaustively investigated all precedents to the case, including the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, as well as previous Supreme Court decisions, case law, and even English common law.</p><p>The majority opinion concluded that,</p><blockquote>The Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes.</blockquote><blockquote>The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States. Every citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States. His allegiance to the United States is direct and immediate, and, although but local and temporary, continuing only so long as he remains within our territory.</blockquote><p>Trump and others who want to end birthright citizenship argue that the decision did not address the question of illegal aliens, mainly because Wong’s parents had come to America legally, before the Chinese Exclusion Act was in force. This, they postulate, gives them the leeway to say that illegal aliens are not included in the Wong Kim Ark decision, and by extension, in the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of birthright citizenship.</p><p>However, this argument ignores the fact that the Supreme Court justices took great care to enumerate <strong>every specific class</strong> of people who were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, to remove all doubt as to whom the law applied. Keeping in mind that by the time of the decision, the Chinese Exclusion Act had introduced the concept of legal and illegal immigration, if the court thought that “children of aliens not in the country legally” were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, it would have included that category in the list that it had so meticulously compiled.</p><p>In addition, Trump’s executive order also bans “birth tourism” for the children of mothers who are in the country legally, but only temporarily, such as on a tourist visa. The wording of the Supreme Court decision also contradicts this, stating that “local and temporary” allegiance is owed by “every citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here.”</p><p>There is little doubt, therefore, that the decision in <em>United States v. Wong Kim Ark</em> upholds birthright citizenship for citizens of aliens, regardless of the legal status of the parents or the length of their stay in the country.</p><h4>Executive Orders are the Wrong Instrument for Change of Great Magnitude</h4><p>Executive orders are only intended to enable the President to instruct officials of the executive branch on how to implement laws passed by Congress. They are not meant to create or change the law on their own. They tend to be ephemeral because future presidents can rescind them without approval or oversight from any other branch of government.</p><p>Therefore, if the Supreme Court rules that Trump’s executive order can stand — and to be clear, I think the odds of that are very low — the next president could still rescind the executive order and reenact the old policy. The citizenship status of some individuals could change every few years, alternating back and forth depending on the politics of each new presidential administration.</p><p>This is why, even if you agree with the change Trump wants, it needs to be enacted by amendment, not an executive order. In the American system, the process by which we enact change is just as important as making the change itself.</p><p>The Constitution and its amendments are meant to be very difficult to change. This is not a bug, it’s a feature. For example, many Trump supporters are strong supporters of the Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms.” Do they think it is in the power of the next Democratic president to declare a “gun violence emergency” and issue an executive order eliminating the right of private citizens to own firearms?</p><p>Such an order could argue that the wording of the Second Amendment has been misinterpreted for over 200 years. It would say that the phrase, “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,” is meant to include only state militias and was never meant to include individuals. Indeed, there is a much stronger constitutional argument for that than for overturning birthright citizenship.</p><p>What other rights and laws have been “misinterpreted” over the last few hundred years since the founding of the American Republic? Stability and the rule of law have been cornerstones of American success and exceptionalism. The founders wanted changes of great magnitude to be shaped with input from many voices and to be adopted by a majority of the people’s representatives, using the Congressional legislative and Constitutional amendment processes.</p><p>The founders made it this way so it would be difficult to take away fundamental rights or change the basic functions of our government at the whim of one man. I am therefore confident that the Supreme Court will reaffirm the <em>United States v. Wong Kim Ark</em> decision and find Trump’s executive order unconstitutional.</p><figure><a href="https://buymeacoffee.com/davidkwilson"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5fCWVCbZveBHdWzwkKWzTQ.png" /></a><figcaption>If you’ve enjoyed this article, please consider clicking above to buy me a coffee! Any donation that you can make is welcome and helps me to continue to develop and share content for people to enjoy.</figcaption></figure><h4>Bibliography</h4><p><strong>Ballotpedia</strong>. “Illegal Alien.” Ballotpedia. Accessed November 30, 2025. <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Illegal_alien#cite_note-8">https://ballotpedia.org/Illegal_alien#cite_note-8</a></p><p><strong>Barnes, William Horatio.</strong> <em>History of the Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States.</em> 1868. Internet Archive. Accessed April 20, 2025. <a href="https://archive.org/details/historyofthirtyn1868barn/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://archive.org/details/historyofthirtyn1868barn/</a></p><p><strong>Douthat, Ross. </strong>“Birthright Citizenship Is a Fundamental Constitutional Value.” <em>Washington Post</em>, July 20, 2018. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/birthright-citizenship-is-a-fundamental-constitutional-value/2018/07/20/49d7f9d2-8c46-11e8-8b20-60521f27434e_story.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/birthright-citizenship-is-a-fundamental-constitutional-value/2018/07/20/49d7f9d2-8c46-11e8-8b20-60521f27434e_story.html</a></p><p><strong>Drezner, Daniel W.</strong> “Michael Anton and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Racist Argument on Birthright Citizenship.” <em>Washington Post</em>, July 23, 2018. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/07/23/michael-antons-bad-no-good-very-racist-argument-on-birthright-citizenship/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/07/23/michael-antons-bad-no-good-very-racist-argument-on-birthright-citizenship/</a></p><p><strong>Fogel, Walter A.</strong> <em>Mexican Illegal Alien Workers in the United States.</em> Berkeley, CA: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1978. ISBN 9780892150915</p><p><strong>Google Books Ngram Viewer</strong>. “illegal alien, illegal immigrant, undocumented immigrant.” Accessed July 10, 2025. <a href="https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=illegal+alien%2C+illegal+immigrant%2C+undocumented+immigrant&amp;year_start=1800&amp;year_end=2022&amp;corpus=en&amp;smoothing=3">https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=illegal+alien%2C+illegal+immigrant%2C+undocumented+immigrant&amp;year_start=1800&amp;year_end=2022&amp;corpus=en&amp;smoothing=3</a></p><p><strong>Ho, James C.</strong> <em>Defining “American”: Birthright Citizenship and the Original Understanding of the 14th Amendment.</em> Gibson, Dunn &amp; Crutcher LLP. Accessed November 30, 2025. <a href="https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/Ho-DefiningAmerican.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/Ho-DefiningAmerican.pdf</a></p><p><strong>Pew Research Center.</strong> “U.S. Public Is Split on Birthright Citizenship for People Whose Parents Immigrated Illegally.” <em>Pew Research Center — Short Reads</em>, June 10, 2025. Accessed November 30, 2025. <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/06/10/us-public-is-split-on-birthright-citizenship-for-people-whose-parents-immigrated-illegally/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/06/10/us-public-is-split-on-birthright-citizenship-for-people-whose-parents-immigrated-illegally/</a></p><p><strong>Scobey-Thal, Jake.</strong> “Illegal Alien: A Short History.” <em>Foreign Policy</em>, August 27, 2014. Accessed November 30, 2025. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/27/illegal-alien-a-short-history/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/27/illegal-alien-a-short-history/</a></p><p><strong>Trump, Donald J.</strong> “Agenda 47 — Day One Executive Order Ending Citizenship for Children of Illegals and Outlawing Birth Tourism.” <em>DonaldJTrump.com</em>, May 30, 2023. Accessed March 25, 2025. <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/agenda47/agenda47-day-one-executive-order-ending-citizenship-for-children-of-illegals-and-outlawing-birth-tourism">https://www.donaldjtrump.com/agenda47/agenda47-day-one-executive-order-ending-citizenship-for-children-of-illegals-and-outlawing-birth-tourism</a></p><p><strong>United States. Congress.</strong> <em>The Congressional Globe: Containing the Debates and Proceedings of the First Session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1st session, parts 1, 2, 3, 4.</em> Washington, D.C.: Blair &amp; Rives (publisher of the original), published 1865–1866. Archive.org. Accessed July 30, 2025. <a href="https://archive.org/details/us_congress_39/congressional-globe-congress-39-session-1-part-1/">https://archive.org/details/us_congress_39/congressional-globe-congress-39-session-1-part-1/</a>, <a href="https://archive.org/details/us_congress_39/congressional-globe-congress-39-session-1-part-2/">https://archive.org/details/us_congress_39/congressional-globe-congress-39-session-1-part-2/</a>, <a href="https://archive.org/details/us_congress_39/congressional-globe-congress-39-session-1-part-3/">https://archive.org/details/us_congress_39/congressional-globe-congress-39-session-1-part-3/</a>, <a href="https://archive.org/details/us_congress_39/congressional-globe-congress-39-session-1-part-4/">https://archive.org/details/us_congress_39/congressional-globe-congress-39-session-1-part-4/</a>.</p><p><strong>United States. Congress.</strong> “The Civil Rights Act of 1866.” <em>Teaching American History.</em> Accessed November 30, 2025. <a href="https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/the-civil-rights-act-of-1866/">https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/the-civil-rights-act-of-1866/</a></p><p><strong>United States. Congress.</strong> “14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” National Archives, U.S. Government. Accessed November 30, 2025. <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/14th-amendment">https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/14th-amendment</a></p><p><strong>United States. Congress.</strong> “Chinese Exclusion Act (1882).” <em>Milestone Documents</em>. National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed April 10, 2025. <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/chinese-exclusion-act?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/chinese-exclusion-act</a></p><p><strong>United States. Supreme Court.</strong> United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), Justia. Accessed February 13, 2025. <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/169/649/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/169/649/</a></p><p><strong>United States. Congress.</strong> “A resolution expressing the regret of the Senate for the passage of discriminatory laws against the Chinese in America, including the Chinese Exclusion Act.” <em>S. Res. 201, 112th Cong.</em> Congress.gov. Accessed February 13, 2025. <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-resolution/201/text">https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-resolution/201/text</a></p><p><strong>The White House.</strong> “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship.” <em>Presidential Actions</em>, January 20, 2025. Accessed April 1, 2025. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-meaning-and-value-of-american-citizenship/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-meaning-and-value-of-american-citizenship/</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ab06e6e7850" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dowding and Park won the Battle of Britain, but lost the Political War]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lessons-from-history/dowding-and-park-won-the-battle-of-britain-but-lost-the-political-war-a476fd22fed4?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a476fd22fed4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[world-war-ii]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[winston-churchill]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[battle-of-britain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[second-world-war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Wilson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 13 Sep 2025 20:26:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-09T05:37:54.270Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>It was their finest hour, but they were fired anyway</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*LD0SFA3evWiXJKZcYW8wdQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Spitfire. Imperial War Museum Non-commercial license. CH 2929.</figcaption></figure><p>By David Wilson ©2025</p><blockquote><strong><em>👉</em></strong><a href="https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/a476fd22fed4?source=friends_link&amp;sk=8bed7369e7433dd4128b7b0a8f45d432"><strong>Not a Medium member? Click here to read the article for FREE!</strong></a><strong>👈</strong></blockquote><h3>Battle of Britain Day</h3><p>September 15, 1940, was a Sunday. That morning, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill left the PM’s country house at Chequers and headed toward London. It was a beautiful day with a few scattered clouds and a gentle, cool breeze.</p><p>It might have been a lovely day for a picnic, except Britain was in the midst of a fight for its very national survival with Germany. In this context, good weather meant Nazi air raids. Knowing this, the Prime Minister decided to stop at the Royal Air Force (RAF) group headquarters at Uxbridge, which was on his way into the city.</p><p>On his arrival, he was met at the door by Air Vice-Marshall Keith Park, who commanded №11 Group, the RAF organization charged with the defense of London and southeastern England. 11 Group had around a dozen squadrons of fighter planes and, because of its location, bore the brunt of the fighting with the German Luftwaffe, which operated out of northern France since the Fall of France in June.</p><p>Churchill acquiesced to Park’s admonition not to smoke, so he kept his ever-present cigar unlit, but still clenched in his teeth, as he was led down into the command bunker, fifty feet below ground. The Uxbridge Operations Room inside the bunker was a marvel of military command organization.</p><p>A massive map table dominated the center of the room, depicting southern England, the Channel, and northern France. On the wall, a giant “tote board” with electric lights indicated the status of every squadron in 11 Group. A series of white lights indicated the squadron’s status, such as if it was standing by to take off or was in the air ready to intercept. A prominent row of red lights would light up when the squadron had engaged the enemy.</p><p>About twenty young men and women were present in the room. The women controllers were known as WAAFs, which stood for the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force. Most wore wired headsets and microphones, allowing them to receive the latest information from Fighter Command Headquarters at Bentley Priory. Churchill took a seat in the “Dress Circle” overlooking the room and spoke with Park about several matters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Azu_WzNnQ9gkGq_EosyY6Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Plotting table at Uxbridge Operations Room. Public Domain courtesy <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Danielstirland">Danielstirland</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Things remained quiet until 11:04 AM when the first German raid was detected. A WAAF put a wooden block counter on the table labeled “H06 30+” and pushed it into position on the map using a long wooden rod. The counter’s label, “H06,” meant “hostile raid number 6,” and “30+” was the estimated size of the raid: more than thirty enemy aircraft. Park took his leave of the Prime Minister, conferred with his staff, and ordered two squadrons to intercept. The lights on the tote board for these squadrons progressed from “at standby” to “left ground.”</p><p>Within minutes, new blocks were added to the table: H04 30+, H10 40+. There were now at least 100 German aircraft headed toward London. Park decided to respond in force. At 11:15 AM, he called out “Northolt, Kenley, Debden.” These were the names of sector stations, each with three fighter squadrons, that Park was ordering to take off. Lights on the tote board flickered to life; over one hundred British fighters were airborne.</p><p>At 11:20, more blocks representing enemy formations were added to the table. Park called out more sector station names: “Hornchurch, North Weald,” sending dozens more British aircraft into the skies. Then, he told his controllers to request reinforcement squadrons from neighboring Groups 10 and 12. A new large enemy formation was detected at 11:42, and Park ordered six more squadrons aloft to intercept. On the radio speaker in the room, they could hear the friendly pilots’ chatter. “Tally ho!,” one cried, “Here they come, chaps!” The lights on the board began to turn red: “Engaged.”</p><p>There were now more than 250 British aircraft in the air. The Uxbridge Operations Room buzzed with activity. As Churchill later described it, “busy plotters pushed their discs to and fro in accordance with the swiftly-changing situation. Air Vice-Marshall Park gave general directions for the disposition of his fighter force, which were translated into detailed orders.”</p><p>Park engaged the enemy in three waves. The first wave of fighters targeted the German bombers as soon as they crossed the coast. If the British fighters failed to reach the enemy bombers, the hope was that they would instead strip them of their fighter protection, making them more vulnerable to the follow-up waves of interceptors.</p><p>Park’s tactics forced the German escort fighters to use up their limited fuel supplies while defending the bombers, which put them at a disadvantage against the next wave of fresh British fighters that arrived midway to London. Whatever penetrated the first two waves would be met by the third wave in a last stand directly in front of the capital.</p><p>Sending up the squadrons in a staggered fashion was standard procedure to avoid having the entire British force caught on the ground refueling and rearming. This was the worst-case scenario, and one that Park had to avoid at all costs.</p><p>Despite the best efforts of the British fighters, the majority of German bombers penetrated the defenses and attacked London. The last wave of British fighters continued their attacks on the German forces even as the bombs fell. Reports came in of explosions on the grounds of Buckingham Palace, but fortunately, no casualties were reported, and the damage to the palace was relatively minor. Reports also came in of many downed German planes as well.</p><p>Overall, the defense was successful, and by 1 PM, all the blocks on the plotting table were moving back toward France and were finally removed from the board. The threat seemingly over, Churchill stood and told the room, “Well done.” However, this was only an intermission.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qmG2-e3FlYB1hD0cpQn2Hw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Plotting table at Uxbridge Operations Room. Public Domain courtesy <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Danielstirland">Danielstirland</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>At 1:45 PM, British radar detected new German formations over France. Again, raid counters were added to the table; this time with larger aircraft numbers, “40+,” “60+,” and even “80+.” What Park and Churchill would soon realize is that these were underestimations. In fact, the Luftwaffe had launched 475 aircraft. As the scale of the attack became evident, Park once again began barking out names of sector stations, ordering hundreds of British fighters into the air.</p><p>The lights on the tote board began turning red one after another, indicating that 11 Group’s fighters had engaged the enemy. At around 2:35 PM, every light on the board was red, this meant that all squadrons of 11 Group were engaged, not to mention three reinforcing squadrons called in from neighboring 10 and 12 Groups. Churchill stood behind Park, his face grave, and asked his subordinate what reserves they had. “There are none,” the Air Vice-Marshall responded.</p><p>Churchill worried that with no reserves, large numbers of planes might get caught on the ground without any cover when they inevitably had to land to refuel and rearm. The Prime Minister later wrote, in his characteristic, succinct prose: “The odds were great; our margins small; the stakes infinite.”</p><p>Fortunately, that did not happen. While the situation may have looked desperate to the PM, Park had matters well in hand. The weather had turned in favor of the British during the afternoon. A blanket of clouds now shrouded nearly all of Fighter Command’s airfields, giving Park the cover he needed to fully commit all of his squadrons at the same time, with little fear that the Germans could catch them on the ground refueling and rearming.</p><p>On the radio, excited British pilots could once again be heard shouting “Tally Ho! Tally Ho!” when they spotted the enemy formations. And while the German radio frequencies were not on speaker at Uxbridge, they were filled with similar cries of “Achtung, Spitfire!” and “Indianer!” <em>(Sidenote: Yes, German pilots in WW2 called out “Indians!” when they spotted enemy fighter planes, probably because of the popularity of American cowboy movies in Europe. Leave it to the Nazis to have been politically incorrect.)</em></p><p>British fighters then engaged in a massive aerial melee with invaders. While many of the bombers got through, it was an effective enough defense that the city suffered only light damage and relatively few casualties.</p><p>Then, within a few minutes, the danger began to subside. The WAAFs began pushing the map blocks representing the German aircraft back east and south towards their bases in France. Lights on the tote board began shifting from red to white, indicating squadrons were disengaging from enemy contact, with statuses of “Ordered to Land” or “Landed and Refueling.” Ten minutes later, the action was over.</p><p>The British claimed that day to have shot down 218 enemy planes for the loss of only 28 of their own. After the war, it was found that the actual total of German losses was less than 60 aircraft, roughly half of which were bombers and the rest fighters. In any case, it was evident to Hitler that the Luftwaffe had failed to gain air superiority over southeastern Britain.</p><p>With the RAF undefeated, Operation Sea Lion, Hitler’s planned invasion of Britain, could not proceed. Two days later, on September 17, Hitler indefinitely postponed — and effectively canceled — the invasion operation which had been scheduled to start September 21.</p><p>The Battle of Britain lasted from roughly July 10 to October 31, 1940. The engagement on September 15 was not the first massive daylight aerial battle during that time, but it was the last. Soon, the Germans would switch to nighttime terror raids that Londoners dubbed “The Blitz.”</p><p>While “The Blitz” caused much death and destruction, it was militarily ineffective. This is why the date September 15 is now commemorated as Battle of Britain Day in the United Kingdom, celebrating the end of Nazi ambitions to conquer Great Britain.</p><h3>The Dowding System</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2JQHdRBI6zsDhVTZvGcsMA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hugh Dowding (left) and Keith Park (right). Imperial War Museums Non-Commercial License. D 1417 CM 3513.</figcaption></figure><p>The Uxbridge Operations Room, which Air Vice-Marshall Keith Park commanded throughout the Battle of Britain, was a key node in a vast and sophisticated air defense network that sprawled over the surface and airspace of the British Isles. Park was instrumental in helping build the network, but the principal architect of the system was his boss, Air Marshall Hugh Dowding.</p><p>This air defense system brought together the then brand-new radar detection technology with a sprawling landline telephone network to gather data on enemy forces, filter it, and disseminate it to regional command centers for informed command decisions.</p><p>Today, we refer to this arrangement as C3, or Command, Communications, and Control. The system was unique and unprecedented. At the time, it had no name, but historians have since labeled it eponymously for its creator: <em>The Dowding System</em>. It was the world’s first integrated air defense system and the mother of all battle management systems that followed.</p><p>Dowding was head of RAF Fighter Command in 1940 during the Battle of Britain, and he had held that position since 1936, when Fighter Command had been created. It was evident in the late 1930s that war with Germany was likely, and Dowding had been tasked with building a defense against German air attack.</p><p>In February 1935, a team of British engineers working for Robert Watson-Watt successfully demonstrated the ability to detect a bomber in flight using radio waves. (Watson-Watt’s team was originally tasked with investigating the feasibility of making a radio-wave-based “death ray.”) Impressed with the demonstration, Dowding declared that this was “a discovery of the highest importance,” and he immediately threw his support behind the new technology.</p><p>Watson-Watt dubbed this invention “RDF” for Radio Direction Finding. However, within a few years, the American name for the technology, radar (derived from “<strong><em>RA</em></strong>dio <strong><em>D</em></strong>etection <strong><em>A</em></strong>nd <strong><em>R</em></strong>anging”), became the preferred term.</p><p>In 1937, the first RAF radar installation was built on the coast. Its range was 80 to 120 miles (averaging 100), depending on atmospheric conditions. By the end of the year, a chain of twenty radar installations had been constructed on the southeastern English coastline, each about 100 miles apart, to provide continuous coverage. The RAF Air Ministry dubbed this network “Chain Home.”</p><p>However, the Chain Home radar towers were fixed facing outward and were placed as close to the coastline as possible to provide the earliest warning of raids. Because of this, Chain Home did not provide coverage of the interior of the British Isles.</p><p>To fill that information gap, Dowding had to rely on the Observer Corps. First deployed in World War 1 to detect Zeppelin airship raids, the Observer Corps had been expanded in the years leading up to World War 2 so that by the time of the Battle of Britain, it consisted of nearly 30,000 civilian volunteers who, stationed in observer posts throughout the country, worked in shifts to provide a continuous sky watch.</p><p>Another weakness of the Chain Home radars was that while they had a reasonably long range, they had difficulty picking up low-flying aircraft. To fill this breach, the British created a second network of radars called “Chain Home Low” that used a rotating dish and operated at higher frequencies. This allowed for good coverage at low altitudes, though at a reduced range of only 30–50 miles.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/662/1*7A4ZEimK2jevz3D5qqtUHQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Chain Home radar towers. Imperial War Museums Non-Commercial License. CH 15337.</figcaption></figure><p>The last input that the system needed was a way to distinguish friendly aircraft from the enemy. The development of IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) systems, which enabled radar operators to identify friendly aircraft directly using a transponder, was just being developed.</p><p>It would be ready to deploy in the closing months of 1940. But, in the interim, a technology called High-Frequency Direction Finding (or “Huff-Duff,” for short) combined with a precursor to a radio transponder known as “pip squeak,” was used to locate friendly aircraft locations using their radio transmissions.</p><p>Dowding’s main contribution to building Britain’s air defense was his realization that all these different inputs — Chain Home, Chain Home Low, Observer Corps, and Huff-Duff — would only be a cacophony of noise if there was no system built to process the information, analyze it, and then disseminate it as actionable intelligence to the various defensive forces including the squadrons of Fighter Command, the Anti-Aircraft Artillery units, and the Barrage Balloon corps.</p><p>To this end, he expanded on the organizational model created by Major General Edward Bailey Ashmore during World War 1 to defend against German Zeppelins and bombers. Ashmore came up with the idea to centralize the information from the Observer Corps using operations rooms, along with a large gridded map table and block counters to indicate enemy raids. While the idea was Ashmore’s originally, what Dowding built was an order of magnitude larger and more sophisticated.</p><p>The various inputs (radar, observer corps, Huff-Duff) would flow via telephone into Fighter Command Headquarters at Bentley Priory on the outskirts of London, where it would be “filtered” in a central “Filter Centre,” also known as the Filter Room.</p><p>Filtering was a process that involved analyzing and simplifying the data to enable commanders to make more informed decisions on how to respond. For example, the Filter Center determined whether raid reports from different sources represented multiple raids or the same raid reported multiple times.</p><p>Only after information was processed and validated in the Filter Centre would it be passed on to the Operations Rooms, where commanders could decide how to respond.</p><p>Dowding was initially skeptical of the need for the information to be filtered. However, Keith Park, who served as Dowding’s chief of staff in the years before the Battle of Britain, was able to convince Dowding of the necessity through a series of practical demonstrations.</p><h3>A Unique British Advantage in 1940</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t7wa6SsePsV5zTeY_9NScg.jpeg" /><figcaption>British defenses in 1940. Public Domain for Non-Commercial use, United Kingdom National Archives.</figcaption></figure><p>Like many disruptive technologies, processes, or ideas, the concept of creating an integrated air defense network seems obvious in hindsight. However, two air battles in the early history of World War 2 demonstrate that such a system was not immediately apparent and that radar technology alone was insufficient.</p><p>First was the Battle of Heligoland Bight, December 18, 1939, where a force of British bombers attacked German ships in the North Sea. The Germans had their own radar system, called “Freya,” which had detected the British bombers very early. However, there was no communication system set up that could pass on their early warning to anyone with command authority to act on it. As a result, interceptors were only dispatched after ground observers spotted the bombers.</p><p>As the historian Robin Holmes said of the incident:</p><blockquote>While the German radar was every bit as efficient as its British counterpart, the problem lay in communications… The British had succeeded in marrying their radar chain to an efficient fighter control organization. No such union existed between the Luftwaffe and its long-range electronic eyes.</blockquote><p>A more famous incident is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. In this battle, technicians manning an American mobile radar unit positioned at Opana Point on Oahu detected a large formation of incoming aircraft. Not knowing it was a Japanese air raid, they telephoned the duty officer to report the unknown contact. The officer assumed that they had detected a group of American B-17 bombers that were due to arrive that same morning. He told the men at Opana Point, “not to worry about it.” As a result, no action was taken, and the Japanese achieved complete surprise in their attack on the American fleet.</p><p>A National Park Service historian later described it:</p><blockquote>The failure to warn the Army command in Hawaii on the morning of December 7, 1941, was not a failure of the technology as much as it was an organizational failure. The use of radar was not fully combined into an integrated air defense system. While the technology of radar functioned, as intended, and detected the incoming planes, there was no way to accurately assess that information and communicate it to those in command.</blockquote><p>No better testament to the effectiveness of the Dowding System was given than by the German pilot and wing commander, Adolf Galland, who said after the war:</p><blockquote>From the very beginning, the British had an extraordinary advantage which we could never overcome throughout the war — radar and fighter control… The British fighter was guided all the way from takeoff to his correct position for an attack on the German formations. We had nothing of the kind.</blockquote><p>After a few years, the Americans and Germans also built their own integrated air defense systems, modeled on the successful British example. And as radar technology improved, providing 360° coverage and the ability to identify friendly aircraft using transponders, much of the Dowding System, with its elaborate networks of observation posts, multiple radar types, and “Huff-Duff”, became obsolete. But in 1940, it provided a unique advantage to the Royal Air Force in its death struggle with the German Luftwaffe.</p><h3>“An Odd Fish…”</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/564/1*HDJeeRwV-R8kdkq9W7y1Ig.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hugh “Stuffy” Dowding. IWM Non-commercial license. ©William Rothenstein. Art.IWM ART LD 8</figcaption></figure><p>Post-war historians have near-universal acclaim for Dowding’s and Park’s performance both in preparing for and fighting the Battle of Britain. However, in 1940, there was no consensus in the RAF Air Ministry regarding the effectiveness or competence of the two men.</p><p>Hugh Dowding was, as historian Stephen Bungay put it, “an odd fish.” At 58, he was the oldest commander in the Royal Air Force at the time of the Battle of Britain. His experience as a fighter pilot and wing commander in World War 1 gave him the hands-on insight into air combat needed to help guide the development of aircraft and technologies like radar. However, he had a reputation for insularity and aloofness, which earned him the nickname “Stuffy.”</p><p>Dowding was “intensely private, formalized most of his contacts with other people, and had no close friends.” Even those who were friendly with him said he was a “difficult man, a self-opinionated man.” It’s sufficient to say that Dowding inspired respect, but not affection, in both his subordinates and peers.</p><p>Dowding was promoted to lead Fighter Command mainly because he was the most senior officer in the Royal Air Force at the time. He was also one of the few senior officers in the RAF who actually believed that fighters could provide a defense against bombers in an era where most thought, “The bomber will always get through.” Originally scheduled to retire in 1939, he was asked to stay on, given the looming war with Germany and the fact that he was the architect of Britain’s new air defenses.</p><p>Insular, opinionated, and technically-focused men like Dowding are generally not a good fit within large, highly bureaucratic structures like the British military. In these settings, the path to success usually involves the ability to develop strong personal relationships, adhere to tradition, and acquiesce to consensus. All things that Dowding was incapable of.</p><p>Yet men like Dowding are also the ones who can affect change and build new structures in organizations that are typically resistant to doing both. However, bringing about this kind of change has a price.</p><h3>Defying the Defiant</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/799/1*P4jTlokmRYCbNYmVJlcryg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Paul Boulton Defiant. Imperial War Museums Non-Commercial License.</figcaption></figure><p>In t he late 1930s, deciding which fighters to build for the war that everyone knew was coming was the overriding question for the RAF. Dowding supported the development of the Hurricane and Spitfire, two fast, single-seat fighters.</p><p>The Spitfire had more speed and maneuverability than the Hurricane, but its famed elliptical wing was challenging to build. The Hurricane was less maneuverable but a more stable gun platform, making it suitable for the bomber-interceptor role. It also had the advantage of being cheaper than the Spitfire and could be built in greater numbers. Together, the two planes made a good “high-low” mix.</p><p>There was another fighter under consideration, the Paul Boulton Defiant, championed by Air Vice-Marshall Sholto Douglas. It was a two-seat “heavy” fighter with a pilot in front and a gunner manning a turret with four machine guns in the back. It had no forward-firing weapons at all.</p><p>The Defiant was considerably slower than either the Hurricane or Spitfire, much less maneuverable, and its lack of forward-facing guns put it at a significant disadvantage in dogfights against other fighters. However, Douglas thought a two-seater was the best choice for intercepting bombers and for operations over enemy territory.</p><p>In 1938, Douglas ordered 450 Defiants, or nine squadrons, to be built. He had the support of Winston Churchill, who also liked the two-seater concept. However, Air Marshall Dowding strongly opposed the Defiant and countermanded the order. He instead prioritized Hurricane and Spitfire production, restricting manufacture of the Defiant to just two squadrons.</p><p>Events proved Dowding correct in his judgment. The performance of the Defiant was atrocious during the Battle of Britain, and its squadrons suffered such appalling losses that the model was withdrawn from frontline service. Historian Stephen Bungay said:</p><blockquote>But for Dowding, Spitfire and Hurricane production could have been curtailed in favour of a machine [the Defiant] which would have lost the Battle of Britain within a few weeks.</blockquote><p>Though Dowding made the correct, possibly war-winning decision, he did not gain an ally in Sholto Douglas.</p><h3>The Big Wing</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*6z65GLBgkY_kdqkCO1dBrQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Imperial War Museums Non-commercial License. CH 012756.</figcaption></figure><p>Unlike Dowding, Air Vice-Marshall Keith Park was a born battle leader who inspired devotion in his followers. However, his popularity and force of personality did not spare him censure from rivals in the RAF.</p><p>As commander of №11 Group, which faced the brunt of the German onslaught, Park usually sent his squadrons up to intercept the enemy either singly or as “wings” of two squadrons. This allowed his fighters to get to the enemy formations quickly.</p><p>Park’s counterpart at №12 Group, Trafford Leigh-Mallory, was critical of this approach. He believed in something he called the “Big Wing,” which called for three to five squadrons to be grouped together before being sent to engage the enemy. Leigh-Mallory believed that this mass of planes, comprising as many as 60 or more, could inflict greater losses on the large enemy formations.</p><p>Park disagreed with the Big Wing tactic, noting that it took too long to assemble such a large formation of planes. With only a few minutes to react to reports of enemy raids, the enemy bombers would more often than not hit their targets before the Big Wing could intercept. Park also believed the Big Wing to be less flexible than his squadron approach, with the Big Wing pilots focusing more on maintaining formation and avoiding collisions than on trying to come to grips with the enemy.</p><p>Leigh-Mallory countered that even if his fighters hit the bombers on the way out instead of the way in, the Big Wing inflicted greater losses on the enemy than did Park’s approach, and thus in the long run was worthwhile. But historians have since proved that the higher kill count claimed by Leigh-Mallory’s Big Wing pilots was an illusion. Fighter pilots inevitably overcount their kills, mainly because if more than one pilot shoots at an enemy aircraft that crashes, each pilot would claim the kill as a separate victory. And it turns out that the more pilots in a formation, the higher the overcount.</p><p>For example, in an engagement with German fighters on September 7, 1940, Leigh-Mallory’s Big Wing claimed 22 kills, but post-war analysis of German losses showed that no more than 3 to 5 planes were actually downed. Historians would later prove that Park’s approach was tactically more effective and actually shot down more enemy aircraft than the Big Wing. The Big Wing was, in fact, a complete failure militarily, though the large formations overhead did have a positive effect on British morale.</p><p>The disagreements between Park and Leigh-Mallory turned into an outright feud, but the Air Ministry took Leigh-Mallory’s side. Unsurprisingly, Sholto Douglas aligned with Leigh-Mallory and took up the cause of the Big Wing as well. They openly called Park’s judgment into question and indicted Dowding as well, since he refused to force Park to adopt the supposedly more effective Big Wing tactic.</p><h3>Night Raids</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/865/1*qWBWxmT0GEPvsdXkuKWCwA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Manchester Night Raid, Dec. 23, 1940. IWM Non-commercial license. H 6318.</figcaption></figure><p>As the Battle of Britain wound down in late October and early November 1940, the Germans increasingly turned to night bombing of cities, “The Blitz,” as an alternative to costly daylight raids. While militarily ineffective, the night raids terrorized the British population, killing tens of thousands over the course of the war.</p><p>Sholto Douglas complained that Dowding was doing too little to combat the threat of German night attacks. Douglas wanted to dedicate both Defiant squadrons and two squadrons of Hurricanes to night defense, something Dowding opposed.</p><p>Dowding argued that the British did not yet have the proper tools for aerial night fighting. Until fighters could be equipped with a transponder and airborne interception radar, night operations were impractical and hazardous. As soon as these tools became available, he would turn more attention to night defenses.</p><p>Dowding’s arguments did not satisfy Douglas and others in the Air Ministry, who wanted more to be done, whether or not airborne radar was ready, and regardless of the risks to the pilots. While Dowding was correct in his technical assessments, he failed to grasp the political implications of taking a position that, on the surface, appeared to be against more night defenses at a time when British cities were getting bombed at night.</p><p>On the night of November 14–15, the city of Coventry was hit by a large German bombing raid. The city burned, and over 500 British civilians were killed, with another 1,000 injured. Dowding’s detractors claimed this was the result of failing to take night defense seriously. Ironically, radar-equipped night fighters were finally being deployed by this time, but it was too late to save Dowding. There was just too much negative sentiment in the RAF senior leadership for him to overcome.</p><p>On November 25, the ministry removed Dowding as head of Fighter Command, to be replaced by his rival, Sholto Douglas. Less than a month later, Keith Park was likewise removed from command of 11 Group, with Leigh-Mallory taking his place. The faction of Douglas and Leigh-Mallory had triumphed over Dowding and Park, the men who led the British to victory in the Battle of Britain and saved the country.</p><h4>Retrospective</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0x2cv6ZT4uRiwJfHKeMUKg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hugh Dowding Memorial Statue. IWM Non-commercial license. © Jeremy Bartlett WMR-60569</figcaption></figure><p>In hindsight, it is perhaps not surprising that the private, aloof, and opinionated “Stuffy” Dowding could not survive the intense politics of war. And while Keith Park was better-liked in the service and less eccentric than Dowding, his refusal to adopt the RAF’s consensus on tactics and his close association with Dowding made him a liability to the RAF leadership.</p><p>After his removal from command, Dowding briefly served as a RAF liaison to America, but a diplomatic post was something the truculent Dowding was destined to fail in. Perhaps that was the idea. He was finally forced to retire in July 1942. As something of a consolation, the following year, he was awarded a peerage and named “Baron Dowding of Bentley Priory.” After the war, he devoted considerable time to promoting spiritualism — including supposedly communicating with the dead — which only served to reinforce his reputation among many as an eccentric crank.</p><p>Keith Park fared better with the remainder of his war career. After being dismissed from command of 11 Group, he spent a year relegated to a training division before being put back in a frontline command. Park subsequently led British air forces in the Middle East, Malta, the invasion of Italy, and finally the Far East.</p><p>Wherever he went, Park met with success, and he was present for the surrender of Japanese forces in Singapore on September 12, 1945. With the war over, the British military began drawing down, and Park was compelled to retire in December 1946. He then returned with his wife to his native New Zealand, which he had been absent from for over 30 years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*si1CktK_Hdk977uPwMO7pg.jpeg" /><figcaption>General Slim (left) Admiral Sir A J Power, (right); and Air Marshal Sir Keith Park, (center) at the Japanese surrender ceremony in Singapore, 1945. IWM Non-commercial license. A 30490</figcaption></figure><p>The reputations of Dowding and Park were rehabilitated in the decades after the war as historians made the public aware of their wartime contributions. In 1988, a memorial statue of Dowding was finally erected in London next to St. Clemens Danes RAF Church. And in 2010, an even more belated memorial to Keith Park was raised about a mile away at Waterloo Park.</p><p>The best testimonial about Park was made in 1947 by Lord Tedder, the head of the RAF at that time: “If any one man won the Battle of Britain, he did. I don’t believe it is recognized how much this one man, with his leadership, his calm judgment and his skill, did to save not only this country, but the world.”</p><p>And as regards Dowding’s legacy, there was no better praise than the epitaph on his tombstone: “Dowding Air Chief Marshal 1882–1970. He led the few in the Battle of Britain.”</p><figure><a href="http://buymeacoffee.com/davidkwilson"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5fCWVCbZveBHdWzwkKWzTQ.png" /></a><figcaption>If you’ve enjoyed this article, please consider clicking above to buy me a coffee! Any donation that you can make is welcome and helps me to continue to develop and share content for people to enjoy.</figcaption></figure><h4>Sources</h4><p><strong>Print</strong></p><p><strong>Bungay, Stephen.</strong> <em>The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain</em>. London: Aurum Press, 2015. Originally published 2000. ISBN 9781781314951.</p><p><strong>Churchill, Winston S. </strong>“The War Memoirs of Winston Churchill: Their Finest Hour, Part IV” <em>LIFE</em>, February 28, 1949, 43–47. New York: Time Inc. Accessed September 5, 2025. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=800EAAAAMBAJ&amp;lpg=PA47&amp;pg=PA43&amp;utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://books.google.com/books?id=800EAAAAMBAJ&amp;lpg=PA47&amp;pg=PA43</a>.</p><p><strong>Holmes, Robin.</strong> <em>The Battle of Heligoland Bight 1939: The Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe’s Baptism of Fire.</em> E-book (Kindle edition). London: Grub Street Publishing, February 12, 2021. Originally published 2010. ISBN 9781906502560.</p><p><strong>Price, Alfred.</strong> <em>Battle of Britain Day, 15 September 1940</em>. E-book (Kindle edition). Greenhill Books, 1999. Originally published 1990. ISBN 9781853673757.</p><p><strong>Online</strong></p><p>“Battle of Britain map.” <em>Education — Significant Events</em>, The National Archives (UK). Accessed September 5, 2025. Includes the fighter defences map, 1940 (Catalogue ref: AIR 41/16). <a href="https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/significant-events/battle-of-britain-map/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/significant-events/battle-of-britain-map/</a></p><p><strong>Butowsky, Harry A</strong>. <em>National Register of Historic Places Registration Form: Opana Radar Site</em>. Prepared March 10, 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service. Accessed September 5, 2025. <a href="https://npgallery.nps.gov/NRHP/GetAsset/NHLS/91001379_text?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://npgallery.nps.gov/NRHP/GetAsset/NHLS/91001379_text</a></p><p>“Chain Home.” <em>Wikipedia</em>, last modified July 2025. Accessed September 5, 2025. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_Home?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_Home</a></p><p>“Dowding system.” <em>Wikipedia</em>, last modified July 2025. Accessed September 5, 2025. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dowding_system?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dowding_system</a></p><p>“Hugh Dowding.” <em>Wikipedia</em>, last modified August 2025. Accessed September 5, 2025. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hugh_Dowding?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hugh_Dowding</a></p><p>“Understanding The Dowding System.” <em>The Association of RAF Fighter Control Officers</em>. Accessed September 5, 2025. <a href="https://www.raffca.uk/art_UnderstandingTheDowdingSystem.php">https://www.raffca.uk/art_UnderstandingTheDowdingSystem.php</a></p><p><strong>Lim, Jean Carmela.</strong> “World War II Victory: How Allied Forces Used Radar to Win Aerial Battles in WW2.” <em>AeroTime</em>, May 22, 2025. Accessed September 5, 2025. <a href="https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/world-war-ii-victory-how-allied-forces-used-radar-to-win-aerial-battles-in-ww2?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/world-war-ii-victory-how-allied-forces-used-radar-to-win-aerial-battles-in-ww2</a></p><p>“RADAR — The Battle Winner?” <em>History of the Battle of Britain</em>, online exhibition, Royal Air Force Museum. Accessed September 5, 2025. <a href="https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/online-exhibitions/history-of-the-battle-of-britain/radar-the-battle-winner/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/online-exhibitions/history-of-the-battle-of-britain/radar-the-battle-winner/</a></p><p>“Was the Big Wing a bad idea?”<strong> </strong><em>IWM Stories</em>, Imperial War Museum. Accessed September 5, 2025. <a href="https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/battle-of-britain-big-wing-was-the-big-wing-a-bad-idea?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/battle-of-britain-big-wing-was-the-big-wing-a-bad-idea</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a476fd22fed4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lessons-from-history/dowding-and-park-won-the-battle-of-britain-but-lost-the-political-war-a476fd22fed4">Dowding and Park won the Battle of Britain, but lost the Political War</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lessons-from-history">Lessons from History</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Rise of Hannibal and the Battle of Trebia, 218 BCE]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lessons-from-history/the-rise-of-hannibal-the-battle-of-trebia-218-bce-6b7d2f69b995?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6b7d2f69b995</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hannibal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rome]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[warfare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Wilson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Jul 2025 13:30:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-04T23:19:00.395Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Hannibal’s first victory over the Romans demonstrated his tactical genius</h4><p>By David Wilson ©2025</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*w0YdSb3H_9prEpWg9p_WYg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Bust of Hannibal Barca. Public Domain. <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hannibal_Barca_bust_from_Capua_photo.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>In 238 BCE, a nine-year-old Hannibal stood next to his father, Hamilcar Barca, in a temple in Carthage. Hamilcar then made a ritual sacrifice to Zeus, pouring a libation on the altar to win the god’s favor for his upcoming military campaign in Spain, then known as Iberia.</p><p>Hamilcar then turned to Hannibal and asked if he wished to go with him on the expedition. With “boyish enthusiasm,” he begged his father to be allowed to go. Hamilcar took his son’s right hand and placed it on the altar, and had Hannibal swear he “would never be friends with Rome.” Hannibal would uphold that oath until death and become the greatest threat the Roman Republic would ever face.</p><p>Hannibal’s father had been a leading general of the Carthaginian armies during the First Punic War (264–241 BCE). That war ended in a victory for the Romans, with Carthage being forced to surrender Sicily, and later, Sardinia and Corsica. To compensate for these losses, Hamilcar decided to invade Spain and make it a Carthaginian province.</p><p>At that time, Spain was a patchwork of fiercely independent tribes and towns. While the tribes never stopped resisting, Hamilcar persisted until he had conquered most of the region, including valuable silver mines in the mountains. The lucrative nature of the conquests directly benefited Hamilcar’s family, known to historians as the “Barcids,” who effectively ran the province as a fiefdom.</p><p>In 228 BCE, Hamilcar drowned while on one of his endless expeditions. The leadership of Carthage’s Spanish province fell to Hannibal’s brother-in-law, Hasdrubal the Fair, who continued the pacification of the Iberian Peninsula. But, in 221 BCE, a slave assassinated Hasdrubal, and the governorship of Carthaginian Spain finally passed to the twenty-six-year-old Hannibal.</p><p>Hannibal was the scion of a family that had been immersed in war for over forty years, and he had participated in or led campaigns in Spain since boyhood. Now, he was ready to take on his life’s ambition: War with Rome.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/557/1*MPtEU-KyPz1RPcNSfRKUmw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hannibal swears never to befriend Rome. <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hannibal_as_a_child,_accompanied_by_a_Roman_soldier.jpg">Wikimedia Commons.</a></figcaption></figure><h3>The Start of the Second Punic War</h3><p>Hannibal’s father had advised his son not to take on the Romans until he had “thoroughly secured” Spain.</p><p>Accordingly, Hannibal spent the first year of his command successfully campaigning against the various tribal holdouts to Carthaginian rule. By the end of 220 BCE, only the fortified and wealthy town of Saguntum, near modern Sagunto, remained independent south of the Ebro River.</p><p>Cognizant of their isolation and vulnerability, Saguntum’s leaders successfully lobbied Rome for a treaty of protection. However, far from deterring Hannibal, the alliance provoked him. He could not allow the Romans to gain a stronghold in what he considered his territory.</p><p>Hannibal immediately mustered an army at his regional capital, today known as Cartagena, and marched to Saguntum in early 219 BCE. The siege lasted eight months, but Rome was slow to respond, and the town fell without any Roman intervention. “A great booty of money, slaves, and property,” fell into Hannibal’s hands with the conquest, which set him up nicely for his next campaign.</p><p>Rome regarded the sack of its ally as a <em>casus belli</em> and sent a delegation to Carthage. A debate ensued between the Roman ambassadors and the Carthaginian Senate. Accusations of treaty violations were exchanged, and lengthy speeches were given.</p><p>In the end, the Roman ultimatum was straightforward: the Carthaginians must either denounce Hannibal’s actions and surrender him to Roman justice or accept responsibility for his actions and go to war. When the Carthaginian Senate refused the demand, the Roman ambassador bade them choose: Peace or war? The senators shouted, “whichever of the two he chose.” Then, he said, “It should be war.”</p><h3>Hannibal Crosses the Alps</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Vr_geIsG_GTPFuhvi3fOjg.gif" /><figcaption>Hannibal’s invasion route. Public Domain. <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hannibal_route_of_invasion.gif">The Department of<br>History, United States Military Academy</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>The Romans assumed that the fighting would mainly take place in Spain and Africa, and were accordingly preparing expeditionary forces to fight in those theaters.</p><p>However, that is not what Hannibal had in mind. He was going to take the fight to Italy and threaten Rome itself. Starting at Cartagena with a force of 90,000 foot soldiers, 12,000 cavalry, and 37 elephants, Hannibal undertook one of the most epic marches in military history.</p><p>The route took him north through the Pyrenees Mountains of northern Spain, then across what is now southern France, crossing the Rhône River, and then finally navigating a treacherous pass through the southern Alps to descend into the Po River valley of northern Italy. That he accomplished this not only with his infantry but also thousands of cavalry and, most astonishingly, dozens of elephants, made the trek all the more remarkable.</p><p>Hannibal’s progress was contested nearly the entire way, as he battled through numerous independent tribes who did not approve of any army using their land as a highway. By the time he descended into northern Italy in late November or December, he had also picked up some allies who shared his hatred of Rome in the form of thousands of Celts.</p><p>The Romans were surprised when they heard rumors that Hannibal had marched out of the Iberian Peninsula, and even more so when they found he was crossing the Alps. The Roman army under Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio, which was preparing to invade Spain, was forced to pivot to the defense of the Italian Peninsula instead.</p><p>Scipio intercepted Hannibal near the Ticinus River (today Ticino), one of the many tributaries to the mighty Po River. A heavy skirmish ensued, with the Romans taking the worst of it. Scipio was severely wounded and found himself surrounded. He was only saved when his 16-year-old son, also named Scipio (future Scipio Africanus), led a small force of legionaries to his rescue.</p><p>The Romans withdrew to lick their wounds and await reinforcements, while Hannibal also paused his advance to recruit from Gallic tribes and solidify his logistics. Scipio established the Roman camp on the east side of the Trebia River, another tributary of the Po, while Hannibal camped on the west side.</p><p>Recognizing the seriousness of the Carthaginian threat to their homeland, the Roman Senate directed Consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus to abandon his plan to attack Africa and instead move to support Scipio in his confrontation with Hannibal. After a 40-day forced march, Sempronius’s troops arrived near the end of December.</p><p>Since Scipio was still recovering from his earlier wounds, Sempronius took overall command. The stage was now set for the first significant battle between Hannibal and the foe he had been preparing to fight his entire life: The Roman Republic.</p><h3>The Opposing Forces</h3><p>At this time in Roman history, an army commanded by a consul consisted of two legions of Roman citizens and two legion-sized units composed of allies from the Italian Peninsula, along with auxiliaries of cavalry and light infantry.</p><p>With two of these consular armies combined at Trebia, this meant that there were roughly eight legions, totaling approximately 40,000 soldiers. Of these, 16,000 were Roman legionaries, 20,000 were allied troops, and around 4,000 were cavalry.</p><p>While Hannibal had supposedly started his march with over 100,000 soldiers, his force had been severely depleted due to detachments made to secure his communications, casualties from battling tribes along the way, and attrition in the mountains from cold, falls, and desertions.</p><p>Thus, by the time he reached Italy, Hannibal commanded a similar number of men to the Romans, approximately 40,000, consisting of 21,000 Iberians and African troops, 11,000 cavalry, and 8,000 Celtic infantry who had joined him on the march.<a href="#3cb7">*</a> Of the 37 elephants that Hannibal had started with from Spain, 30 somehow survived the journey through the mountains to participate in the battle. Although small in number, the war elephants must have been incredibly intimidating to the Romans, who had most likely never seen even one such beast and certainly not dozens outfitted for battle.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*8C4ZnPAv-pDsTy2DRs_2iw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Silver double shekel of Carthage with Hannibal and a War Elephant. <a href="https://www.bmimages.com/preview.asp?image=00933265004">British Museum.</a> Creative Commons.</figcaption></figure><p>While the opposing sides seemed to be roughly equivalent “on parchment,” with about 40,000 soldiers each, there were some significant differences on closer examination. Most obviously, the Carthaginians had more cavalry, 11,000 to just 4,000. Most were Numidians, who excelled at light cavalry tactics, while some were Celts who may have been armored and acted more as shock troops.</p><p>But equally important was the fact that the Roman soldiers had only been under arms a short time, no more than a few months, and were thus very inexperienced. This was because in the era of the Roman Republic, Rome did not have a professional army. Instead, Rome raised armies only when needed in times of war. Likewise, the Roman consuls, who acted as generals, were civilian politicians who often had little military experience themselves.</p><p>The inexperience of the Romans stood in stark contrast to that of Hannibal and his army, many, if not most, of whom were veterans who had spent years campaigning in Spain. It was for this reason that Scipio supposedly advised Sempronius to avoid battle and take advantage of the winter months to drill the Roman soldiers.<a href="#0ef0">**</a></p><p>But Sempronius was eager for battle because he wanted to claim a victory over Hannibal while Scipio was still wounded, so he did not have to share credit with his co-consul. Also, his and Scipio’s terms as consuls were nearly up. If he did not battle soon, new consuls would take over, again denying him the credit for the anticipated victory.</p><h3>The Battle</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ARBZ-J4N3rOnvzJqvBHY-w.png" /></figure><p>The day of battle was the winter solstice, 218 BCE, which would have made the date roughly December 22 or 23 on a modern calendar. A cold rain mixed with snow was falling. At daybreak, Hannibal sought to draw the Romans into a general engagement by sending his Numidian cavalry out to harass the Roman camp.</p><p>Sempronius attempted to fend off these attacks with his cavalry and javelin-armed skirmishers. However, the Numidians were experts in skirmish warfare, charging forward on horseback, throwing or jousting with their spears, sometimes dismounting to fight on foot, and then withdrawing when the Romans counterattacked.</p><p>After several rounds of this hit-and-run, the frustrated Roman Consul took the bait and started his whole army in pursuit of the annoying Numidians, perhaps encouraged by some success he had had dealing with Carthaginian skirmishers the day before. But once the entire Roman force was in motion, a general engagement was inevitable.</p><p>Hannibal had drawn up his army parallel to the Trebia, waiting for the Romans to cross. He placed the Celts in the center of his line, flanked by his best African and Iberian (Spanish) troops. He put his war elephants on either side of his infantry and then positioned the Numidian and Celtic cavalry on the flanks of the battle line. Slingers from Spain’s Balearic islands formed a skirmish line ahead of the main body.</p><p>Importantly, Hannibal placed a contingent of 2,000 Numidian troops, half cavalry and half infantry, in a hidden spot on his right flank, forward of his line, under the command of his younger brother, Mago.</p><p>To get at Hannibal’s army, the Romans crossed the Trebia River, which was swollen with rain and bone-chillingly cold. The Roman infantry waded through the chest-deep river with difficulty. This enervating experience was made worse by the fact that they had skipped breakfast in their rush to get into formation during the earlier skirmishing. Hannibal’s troops, other than the Numidian horsemen, were relatively dry, well-rested, and had eaten their morning meal.</p><p>However, Roman fortitude was on full display as the legionnaires formed for battle despite their fatigue. All four legions of Roman citizens took the center, with the legions of their Italian allies on either side of them. Per standard practice, the Romans placed their cavalry on the flanks, but Hannibal’s horsemen vastly outnumbered them.</p><p>The Roman light troops, who had been engaged since early morning, were stationed in front of the main battle line to skirmish, no matter that they were tired and short on javelins. Likewise, the Carthaginians had Balaeric Slingers in a skirmish line ahead of his army. When the heavy infantry of both sides finally charged forward, the light troops fell back to the rear through gaps in their lines.</p><p>The legions pressed Hannibal’s line hard in the center, achieving significant success and completely pushing through the Celts. The experienced African and Iberian troops held out longer, but also fell back under the pressure of the Roman heavy infantry.</p><p>However, the Roman flanks were a different story. Hannibal’s veteran cavalry fell hard on the Roman equestrians, who were outnumbered and less experienced. In addition, the Carthaginian war elephants, “terrified the [Roman] horses not only by their appearance but by their unaccustomed smell, and created widespread panic.” The Roman flanks gave way quickly, with the Roman cavalry altogether fleeing the battlefield.</p><p>The Greek historian Polybius recorded that this was the moment Mago’s “Numidians issued from their ambuscade and suddenly attacked the enemy’s center from the rear, upon which the whole Roman army was thrown into the utmost confusion and distress. At length, both of [the Roman] wings, hard pressed in front by the elephants and all round their flanks by the light-armed troops, turned and were driven by their pursuers back on the river behind them.”</p><p>The legionnaires who survived the fiasco, about 10,000 in total, re-crossed the Trebia River, fled past their camp, and did not stop until they reached the town of Placentia. The winter storm worsened during the retreat, adding further misery to the exhausted Roman troops. But the heavy rain and snow were actually a blessing for the Romans, as they swelled the river behind the retreating forces, preventing Hannibal from crossing the Trebia and finishing off the remnant.</p><h3>Aftermath</h3><p>No classical source gives exact numbers, but most scholars think the Romans suffered between 15,000 and 30,000 killed, wounded, and captured/missing. Hannibal suffered far fewer casualties, with killed, wounded, and missing, estimated at 5,000 to 6,000.</p><p>Polybius noted that the Celtic infantry stationed in the center of the battle line took the brunt of the losses in their fighting with the heavy infantry of the Roman legions. After the battle, the extreme cold resulted in some of Hannibal’s men dying from exposure, as did all but one of his war elephants.</p><h3>Legacy</h3><p>The Battle of Trebia is not the best-known of Hannibal’s battles, but it was his first great victory over the Romans that made his later successes possible.</p><p>Hannibal’s tactics that day were exemplary. First, he goaded his enemy to attack, tricking the Romans into crossing the cold Trebia while most of his troops stayed dry. He then made use of his elephants to terrify and sow panic in the enemy ranks, and pressed the advantage on the flanks with his superior cavalry.</p><p>And finally, the clever positioning of Mago’s troops to ambush the Roman rear completed the encirclement of the Roman force. History rightly ascribes to Hannibal the reputation of a battlefield genius.</p><p>The Romans suffered two additional battlefield disasters in succession following Trebia; the second took place the following year, 217 BCE, at Lake Trasimene, and the third occurred in 216 BCE at Cannae, where the Romans lost an army of nearly 90,000 men.</p><p>At Cannae, Hannibal perfected the tactics he had employed at Trebia, which was to absorb the enemy’s main effort in the center while striking hard at the flanks to complete an encirclement. This “double envelopment” became the signature tactic for which Hannibal is famous today, and nearly every general since has tried to emulate it on the battlefield when possible.</p><p>Following these catastrophes, Rome adopted a “Fabian” strategy — named after Fabius, the Roman general who devised it — which involved avoiding full-scale battles with Hannibal and instead waging an attritional war against him. This created something of a stalemate in the war because while the Romans could not defeat Hannibal’s army in the field, the Carthaginians lacked the necessary skills and equipment to lay siege to Rome.</p><p>The war dragged on for another fifteen years. Hannibal won a few more victories, but proved incapable of taking Rome itself. Over time, Publius Cornelius Scipio, who had rescued his father in the first Roman skirmish with Hannibal and who had seen battle as a young soldier at Trebia, matured into a general in his own right. Mustering a veteran army and finally taking the war to the doorstep of Carthage in North Africa, it was he who ultimately defeated Hannibal at the Battle of Zama in 202 BCE, earning him the epithet Scipio Africanus.</p><p>Much like Napoleon, though Hannibal lost in the end, he will always be remembered as one of history’s Great Captains and Rome’s greatest enemy.</p><figure><a href="http://coff.ee/davidkwilson"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5fCWVCbZveBHdWzwkKWzTQ.png" /></a><figcaption>If you’ve enjoyed this article, please consider clicking above to buy me a coffee! Any donation that you can make is welcome and helps me to continue to develop and share content for people to enjoy.</figcaption></figure><h4>Notes:</h4><p><a href="#d0a8">*</a>Carthage was unique among major ancient powers in that the armies it employed were typically made up of nearly all allied forces or mercenaries. The only actual Carthaginians at Trebia were likely Hannibal and his officers, many of whom, like Mago, were his relatives. Polybius said there were “Libyans” present at the battle. Libya was the Greek name for Africa, and the troops he mentions were North Africans, probably from the vicinity of Carthage, which was located in what is today Tunisia. Numidians were also from North Africa.</p><p><a href="#c1aa">**</a>The best ancient source for the Battle of Trebia is Polybius, who wrote his <em>Histories</em> a few decades after the battle. Since he was a Greek historian in the service of the Scipio family, it is not surprising that he ascribes to Scipio the wise advice, which Sempronius ignored, to delay seeking a battle until the Roman troops were better trained.</p><h4>Classical Sources:</h4><p>Polybius, <em>The Histories</em>, trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, 2 vols., New York: Macmillan And Co., 1889. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44125/44125-h/44125-h.htm">https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44125/44125-h/44125-h.htm</a></p><p>Titus Livius (Livy), <em>History of Rome</em>, vol. 3. Trans. Rev. Canon Roberts, translator, Ernest Rhys, ed., London: J. M. Dent &amp; Sons, Ltd., 1905. <a href="https://www.yorku.ca/pswarney/Texts/livy-21.htm">https://www.yorku.ca/pswarney/Texts/livy-21.htm</a></p><h4>Secondary Sources</h4><p>Beard, Mary. <em>SPQR</em>. New York: Liveright, 2015.</p><p>Delbrück, Hans. <em>History of the art of war. Vol . 1, Warfare in Antiquity</em>. Translated by Walter J. Renfroe. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.</p><p>Goldsworthy, Adrian. <em>The Fall of Carthage</em>. London: Hachette UK, 2012.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b7d2f69b995" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lessons-from-history/the-rise-of-hannibal-the-battle-of-trebia-218-bce-6b7d2f69b995">The Rise of Hannibal and the Battle of Trebia, 218 BCE</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lessons-from-history">Lessons from History</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Franklin Gambit: Chess Diplomacy and the American Revolution]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lessons-from-history/the-franklin-gambit-b802870bf972?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b802870bf972</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[chess]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[games]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[benjamin-franklin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Wilson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2023 22:24:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-09T05:39:48.092Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By David Wilson ©2023</p><blockquote>👉<a href="https://medium.com/lessons-from-history/the-franklin-gambit-b802870bf972?sk=e3546d483d3463c771ecf6f9c7ea6ece"><strong>Not a Medium member? Click here to read the article for FREE!</strong></a>👈</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ndjq59WF7Tbb2_EXFRjtoQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Lady Howe Checkmating Benjamin Franklin,” by Edward Harrison May. Public Domain due to age.</figcaption></figure><p>“The game of chess,” Benjamin Franklin once wrote, “is not merely an idle amusement… for life is a kind of chess, in which we have often points to gain, and competitors or adversaries to contend with, and in which there is a vast variety of good and ill events, that are, in some degree, the effects of prudence or the want of it.”</p><p>Franklin loved chess so much that he would often play several times a week in game sessions that would last many hours. He even wrote one of the first essays on the game by an American author,<em> </em><a href="https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-29-02-0608"><em>The Morals of Chess</em></a>, from which came the preceding quote.</p><p>Games that involved chance, like cards or backgammon, held little appeal for Franklin, as John Adams noted that he “never play’d at anything but chess or checquers.” What Franklin liked about chess was that the game was resolved solely based on the planning and decisions of each player, who had to consider “the consequences that may attend an action… If I move this piece, what will be the advantages of my new situation? What use can my adversary make of it to annoy me? What other moves can I make to support it, and to defend myself from his attacks?” In this way, he wrote that “the game thereby becomes more the image of human life, and particularly of war.”</p><p>Given the importance that Franklin ascribed to the game, it is perhaps not surprising that chess played a role in the secret diplomacy he conducted in London in 1774 as he attempted to defuse tensions between the British Crown and its American colonies. On December 16, 1773, the Boston Tea Party precipitated an escalating crisis that by 1774 seemed to be leading toward war.</p><p>The Tea Party was a protest over Parliament’s Tea Act, which, in addition to levying a tax on tea, handed a monopoly on tea sales to the British East India Company. More than 340 chests of the company’s tea (weighing over 92,000 pounds) were destroyed, the value of which was estimated to be approximately £10,000, equivalent to roughly $2,000,000 in today’s money.</p><p>Britain’s Parliament overreacted to the Tea Party and, in the spring and summer of 1774, passed a series of punitive laws that collectively punished all the citizens of Massachusetts. These measures were known as the Coercive Acts in Britain but were more commonly referred to as the Intolerable Acts in America.</p><p>Among other things, the acts closed the port of Boston, deposed the elected government, and essentially placed the Massachusetts colony under martial law. The measures were designed to punish Massachusetts but were also clearly meant to intimidate the other American colonies and discourage them from making similar protests.</p><p>But Parliament had misjudged the American reaction. Rather than being cowed to submission, the other colonies rallied to support beleaguered Massachusetts. Forming the first Continental Congress in September 1774, the colonies refused to abide by the Coercive Acts and enacted boycotts of British goods in response.</p><p>In addition, the colonists began to gather gunpowder and other munitions in anticipation of conflict.<strong> </strong>During this volatile time, Benjamin Franklin was in London, having served for many years as a representative for Pennsylvania and several other American colonies. In this capacity, he was generally regarded as the unofficial “ambassador” of America.</p><p>At the beginning of November 1774, Franklin attended a meeting of Britain’s Royal Society where an associate told him, “There was a certain lady who had a desire of playing with me at chess, fancying she could beat me, and had requested him to bring me to her.” Franklin responded that he “had been long out of practice, but would wait upon the Lady when he and she should think fit.”</p><p>The lady, it turned out, was Caroline Howe, the sister of two prominent men in the British government: Lord Richard Howe, a rear-admiral in the Royal Navy, and William Howe, a major general in the army as well as a Member of Parliament. While both of these men would play prominent roles in the upcoming war in America, they also regarded themselves as friends of the American colonists and actually sympathized with their cause.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WY_KYbqdjBVqncku3vsiBA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mrs. Caroline Howe is often erroneously given the British aristocratic title, “Lady;” however, her late husband was never a Lord. Lord Richard Howe was her brother, not her husband.</figcaption></figure><p>Mrs. Howe was a 54-year-old widow, her husband having passed away in 1769. And while history has relegated her to having lived in the shadow of her brothers’ accomplishments, she was almost certainly, as historian Rick Atkinson put it, “the most appealing and… likely the smartest of the [Howe] brood.”</p><p>She was well educated and an avid reader of “Shakespeare, Voltaire and Thucydides, with a passion for mathematics, politics and languages.” Beyond her native English tongue, “Caroline was fluent in French and capable in Italian and Latin; later in life she took up ancient Greek.”</p><p>A game date with Caroline Howe should have been — and was in all likelihood devised to be — irresistible to Franklin, as it would combine three of his several passions: Intelligent conversation, women, and chess. However, perceiving the invitation to be “a little awkward,” Franklin put off meeting with her.</p><p>After a few weeks had passed without any contact from him, the determined Mrs. Howe once again sent her acquaintance at the Royal Society as a proxy to insist on a meet-up. The reluctant Franklin finally acquiesced, agreeing to meet her for what he described as a “chess party” on Friday, December 2, 1774.</p><p>On that date, Franklin went to Mrs. Howe’s townhome at №11 Grafton Street in London, where he “play’d a few games with the lady, whom I found of very sensible conversation and pleasing behaviour.” Apparently, Mrs. Howe did not reveal any ulterior motives in this first encounter with Dr. Franklin, who remarked, “I had not the least apprehension that any political business could have any connection with this new acquaintance.”</p><p>Franklin agreed to meet again for another match in two days, and accordingly, on Sunday, December 4, he arrived at Grafton Street for another chess party. This time, “after playing as long as we lik’d,” they indulged in a longer conversation. Initially, they discussed “a mathematical problem,” which seemed to delight Franklin, who said that “this lady… has a good deal of mathematical knowledge.” Which, he noted at that time, was “a little unusual in ladies.”</p><p>However, the talk soon turned to politics, and Mrs. Howe straightforwardly asked, “And what is to be done with this dispute between Britain and the colonies? I hope we are not to have a Civil War.” Franklin responded that they “should kiss and be friends,” adding that, “quarrelling [<em>sic</em>] can be of service to neither but is ruin to both.”</p><p>Mrs. Howe then said, “I have often said… that I wish’d government would employ you to settle the dispute for ’em. I am sure nobody could do it so well. Don’t you think that the thing is practicable?” Franklin responded that there was no genuine “clashing interest” between the colonies and Britain and if both sides were willing to reconcile, then they “might settle in half an hour.” But Franklin did not believe the British ministers were so inclined, nor did he think they would ever employ him for such a project as “they chuse [<em>sic</em>] rather to abuse me.”</p><p>Caroline Howe’s suggestion that Britain employ Franklin as a mediator to settle the conflict should have aroused his suspicions that her invitations to chess were not merely for their amusement. Yet Franklin said, “I look’d upon this as accidental conversation [and] thought no more of it.” Coincidentally, or perhaps not so coincidentally, later the same day, Franklin met with two prominent Londoners to discuss the subject of brokering a reconciliation between the colonies and the mother country.</p><p>One of the men was David Barclay, a wealthy merchant for whom today’s Barclays Bank is named. The other was Dr. John Fothergill, a friend and benefactor of Franklin. They asked Franklin to draft a written peace proposal that they could present to the British ministers with whom they were well connected. Franklin agreed to do so, though he expressed doubt it could have much effect, given he believed “there did not exist the least disposition in the ministry to an accommodation.”</p><p>Nevertheless, Franklin quickly produced a sixteen-point peace proposal titled, <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Political_and_Civil_History_of_the_Unite/KcD5SjGxtjUC?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;dq=%E2%80%9CHints+for+Conversation+upon+the+Subject+of+Terms+that+might+probably+produce+a+Durable+Union+between+Great+Britain+and+the+Colonies.%E2%80%9D&amp;pg=PA315&amp;printsec=frontcover">“Hints for Conversation upon the Subject of Terms that might probably produce a Durable Union between Great Britain and the Colonies.”</a> Abbreviated in discussion as “Hints,” the document called for a number of redresses, with two principal items being that the colonists to pay for the tea destroyed in the Boston Tea Party the previous year, and in exchange, the British would repeal the Tea Act that precipitated the event.</p><p>The negotiations with Barclay and Fothergill continued for some weeks with input from unnamed figures in the British government. Franklin did not have another meeting with Caroline Howe until Christmas Day, December 25, 1774. No sooner had Franklin walked in her door, she told him “that her brother Lord Howe wish’d to be acquainted with me” and asked if she could send for him. Franklin gave his assent, and within a few minutes, her brother appeared.</p><p>Lord Richard Howe was a rear admiral in the Royal Navy and had an extensive combat record in the Seven Years War. He would later be promoted to Vice Admiral during the War of the American Revolution.</p><p>After a short exchange of pleasantries, Lord Howe came straight to the point and said he was there to discuss the “alarming situation of our affairs with America.” He implored Franklin to work with him on a plan for reconciliation, and Franklin agreed upon the condition that Howe keep everything “perfectly secret.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/977/1*P_KOPCe3RUcdtJZ3PNaHpw.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Lord Howe on the Deck of the ‘Queen Charlotte’, 1 June 1794</em>, by Mather Brown. Public Domain due to age.</figcaption></figure><p>At this point, Caroline Howe offered to withdraw from the room, but Franklin begged her to remain, stating that “I should have no secret in a business of this nature that I could not freely confide to her prudence. Which was truth; for I had never conceiv’d a higher opinion of the discretion and excellent understanding of any woman on so short an acquaintance.”</p><p>Franklin agreed to a new meeting with Lord Howe in three days, and he asked if they should meet at his or Lord Howe’s home. Howe thought that meeting at either location would be the cause of suspicion and speculation by others. Therefore, “it was concluded to be best to meet at his sister’s who readily offered her house for the purpose, and where there was a good pretence [<em>sic</em>] with her family and friends for my being often seen, as it was known we play’d together at chess.”</p><p>While chess was the ostensible reason for Franklin’s third visit to Mrs. Howe’s on December 28, the only game played this time was diplomacy. During this meeting, Lord Howe smiled and pulled from his coat pocket a copy of “Hints,” the peace proposal that Franklin had worked out with Barclay and Fothergill.</p><p>Howe asked if he was familiar with the document, to which Franklin admitted primary authorship. Having previously understood that his negotiations with Barclay and Fothergill were secret and separate from his talks with the Howes, it was obvious that there had been connections between these parties all along.</p><p>Lord Howe expressed some disappointment in the points contained in the “Hints,” stating that he didn’t think there was any likelihood the British ministry would consent to them. He asked that Franklin draw up a new plan that might have a better chance of approval with the government. Franklin agreed to “sketch” a new proposal, but he doubted “it would be thought preferable to that he had in his hand.”</p><p>To ensure Franklin’s authorship would remain secret, it was decided that Franklin would give his manuscript to Caroline Howe, who would make a copy of it in her own hand and return the original to Franklin. The “<a href="https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-21-02-0224">Sketch</a>” he produced this time was shorter than his earlier “Hints,” with only five points of a more general nature, this time making reference to the demands made in the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petition_to_the_King">Petition to the King</a>” by the Continental Congress, which had arrived in London a few weeks earlier.</p><p>Franklin had now written two written peace proposals, “Hints” and “Sketch;” though neither officially bore his name, it was really no secret who the author was. Franklin’s collaborators, Lord Howe, Barclay, and Fothergill, implied that leading men at Whitehall had seen the documents, almost certainly Lord Dartmouth, the Secretary of State for Colonies, and maybe even Lord North, the Prime Minister. But with all the secrecy, Franklin could never be sure. Franklin’s centrality to the process was evident, and Lord Howe alluded to the possibility that he and Franklin might be appointed as joint peace commissioners to America.</p><p>Franklin used Caroline Howe as an intermediary to convey written communications to her brother, and her home likewise continued to be a rendezvous for their clandestine meetings. Whether chess was still being used as a cover for Franklin’s frequent comings and goings is not known. Initially, both Lord Howe and Franklin thought being covert was important, but after a while Franklin seemed to tire of the cloak-and-dagger, later stating that the secrecy “seem’d not of much importance.”</p><p>The deliberations over Franklin’s terms continued into the early days of 1775, but little progress was made. The British fixated on details, such as demanding repayment for the destroyed tea; Franklin, on the other hand, focused on more fundamental issues, such as whether the British Parliament had the right to legislate for the colonies at all.</p><p>The two sides were talking past each other. Franklin had stated early on that he did not believe those men leading the British government “had the least disposition” to come to an accommodation with the colonies. In February 1775, he came to the conclusion he had been right from the start.</p><p>The futility of his diplomatic efforts and the increasing likelihood of war weighed heavily on him. Then, in late February, Franklin learned that his wife of more than 40 years had passed away in Philadelphia almost two months earlier, in mid-December. Franklin had been in Britain for over 10 years; it was time for him to return home to pay his respects and put his finances in order.</p><p>On February 28, 1775, Franklin met with Caroline and Lord Howe at her home on Grafton Street, where he informed them of his wife’s passing and his need to return to America as soon as possible to settle his affairs. About a week later, on March 7, a final meeting took place between Franklin and the Howe siblings.</p><p>He offered to delay his departure only if Lord Howe thought it likely they might be sent to America as peace commissioners, as Howe had once suggested, but it seemed that “all thoughts of that kind were laid aside.” The negotiations were over.</p><p>Franklin departed Britain from Portsmouth on March 21, 1775. When he left, America and Britain were at peace. When Franklin arrived home in May, he found a country at war.</p><p>While his ship was still in transit, the battles of Lexington and Concord occurred on April 19, 1775. A little over a year later, America would declare its independence. While it is true that Franklin’s attempt to avert war had failed, it is also true his “chessboard diplomacy” was one of the few efforts that ever had any real hope to stop the war before it began.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*muzTVk_9YxdjQq8j4y0GRQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Benjamin Franklin playing chess in Paris, (1776–1783). Attributed to Benjamin Franklin Bache. Public Domain due to age.</figcaption></figure><h3>Franklin in France</h3><p>Franklin’s interlude with Caroline Howe was not his only episode of “chessboard diplomacy.”</p><p>When he was appointed a representative to France in 1776, Franklin used chess as a means of getting closer to influential women in French high society. “Franklin’s intimate friendships with French women,” historian Kelsa Pellettiere argues, “played a key political role in early American diplomacy.”</p><p>Franklin’s most productive relationship in France was his friendship with Anne-Louise Brillon de Jouy. Madame Brillon, as she was known, was an intelligent composer who befriended Franklin over games of chess and tea. This friendship afforded Franklin an important means of increasing his social links in France, and this in turn helped him achieve his diplomatic mission to gain French recognition of American independence, as well as military aid.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*moxhEJMX0a268208Gftjzw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Madame Brillon de Jouy (1744–1824). By Jean-Honoré Fragonard. Public Domain due to age.</figcaption></figure><p>“Madam Brillion,” John Adams wrote, “was one of the most beautiful women in France, [and] a great mistress of musick [<em>sic</em>].” Franklin was over seventy years old at the time, while Brillon was in her early to mid-30s. Despite the near four-decade gap in their ages, the relationship was sometimes flirtatious. Franklin is sometimes called America’s ‘Founding Flirt’, and there is no doubt he found the young Brillon attractive.</p><p>Brillon indulged Franklin’s behavior and was playful in return. She called him “Papa” and frequently sat on his lap and kissed his forehead. In one famous incident, she allowed Franklin and a male friend to play chess in her bathroom… <em>while she took a bath</em>.</p><p>One supposes she permitted this so that she could observe the game. The contest was exceptionally lengthy, taking several hours to resolve. Only then did the two men depart, allowing the waterlogged Brillon the opportunity to leave her tub while preserving her modesty.*</p><p>According to Pellettiere, Franklin “tried to push the boundaries of their friendship to a more sexual level,” but Brillon did not allow the flirtations to develop into anything serious. Though Franklin was a widower, Brillon reminded him that she was married. It is likely Brillon understood the importance of their relationship to Franklin’s diplomatic efforts, and she did not want that undone by rumors.</p><p>She wrote to Franklin that they had to conduct themselves with more restraint to counter “certain criticisms had been uttered by persons whom I meet in society concerning the kind of familiarity that reigns between us.” In other words, she told Franklin to keep his moves confined to the chessboard and not the boudoir.</p><p>A final anecdote, written down by Thomas Jefferson, serves to sum up how Franklin saw his efforts on the chessboard mirroring his real-life efforts to help win America’s independence. Jefferson wrote that in a game with the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louise_Marie_Ad%C3%A9la%C3%AFde_de_Bourbon%2C_Duchess_of_Orl%C3%A9ans">Duchess of Bourbon</a>, Franklin managed to put her king in check.</p><p>A protocol of chess, both then and today, is that when a player’s king is checkmated, the losing player resigns rather than allow the king to be taken. However, in this game, Franklin snatched the piece up. The French duchess—a member of the royal family—chided Franklin, “Ah, we do not take kings so!” To which Franklin responded, “We do in America.”</p><figure><a href="https://buymeacoffee.com/davidkwilson"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5fCWVCbZveBHdWzwkKWzTQ.png" /></a><figcaption>If you’ve enjoyed this article, please consider clicking above to buy me a coffee! Any donation that you can make is welcome and helps me to continue to develop and share content for people to enjoy.</figcaption></figure><h4>Notes</h4><p>*In the HBO series <em>John Adams</em>, there is a <a href="https://youtu.be/JouE7mOVdI4?si=bLM1Im-_rKOLL28O">completely fictional scene</a> where Adams bursts in on Franklin playing chess in a bathtub with an older French woman, presumably Madame Brillon. This scene was obviously inspired by the historical incident mentioned here, but in reality, 1) Adams was not there, 2) Franklin was never in a bathtub with Madame Brillon, and 3) Madame Brillon was much younger than the older woman portrayed in the television show. The show made another error when, in a different scene, it implied that Franklin’s wife was still alive in America while he was in France, when, as previously mentioned, she died in 1774.</p><h4>Sources:</h4><p>John Adams, “[April 10. Fryday. 1778.] ,” <em>Founders Online</em>, National Archives, <a href="https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/01-04-02-0001-0042">https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/01-04-02–0001-0042</a>. [Original source: <em>The Adams Papers, Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, vol. 4, Autobiography, Parts Two and Three, 1777–1780</em>, ed. L. H. Butterfield. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961, pp. 43–48.]</p><p>Rick Atkinson, “A Fresh Look at the Family Who Led (and Lost) Britain’s War for America,” <em>The New York Times</em>, July 20, 2021. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/20/books/review/the-howe-dynasty-julie-flavell.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/20/books/review/the-howe-dynasty-julie-flavell.html</a></p><p>Madame Brillon, “Editorial Note on Four Undated Letters from Madame Brillon, [1777?],” <em>Founders Online</em>, National Archives, <a href="https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-25-02-0312">https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-25-02-0312</a> [Original source: <em>The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 25, October 1, 1777, through February 28, 1778, </em>ed. William B. Willcox. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 390.]</p><p>Raymond F. Dolle, “Ben Franklin’s Game of Love and War,” Varsity Tutors. <a href="https://www.varsitytutors.com/earlyamerica/early-america-review/volume-14/ben-franklins-game-love-war">https://www.varsitytutors.com/earlyamerica/early-america-review/volume-14/ben-franklins-game-love-war</a></p><p>Lisa Francavilla, “New Letters Shed Light on the Paris Lives of Thomas Jefferson and Teenaged Martha Jefferson (Randolph),” Monticello.org. Aug. 12, 2015. <a href="https://www.monticello.org/research-education/blog/new-letters-shed-light-on-the-paris-lives-of-thomas-jefferson-and-teenaged-martha-jefferson-randolph/">https://www.monticello.org/research-education/blog/new-letters-shed-light-on-the-paris-lives-of-thomas-jefferson-and-teenaged-martha-jefferson-randolph/</a></p><p>Benjamin Franklin, <em>Autobiography</em>, originally published 1793. Reprint, The Harvard Classics. 1909–1914. Republished Bartleby.com. <a href="https://www.bartleby.com/1/1/5.html">https://www.bartleby.com/1/1/5.html</a></p><p>Benjamin Franklin, “Benjamin Franklin to Lord Howe, July 20, 1776,” in <em>The American Revolution: Writings from the War of Independence</em>, Library of America, 2001, 156–158.</p><p>Benjamin Franklin, “From Benjamin Franklin to William Franklin: Journal of Negotiations in London, 22 March 1775,” <em>Founders Online,</em> National Archives, <a href="https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-21-02-0306.">https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-21-02-0306.</a> [Original source: <em>The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 21, January 1, 1774, through March 22, 1775,</em> ed. William B. Willcox. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978, pp. 540–599.]</p><p>Benjamin Franklin, “From Benjamin Franklin to Madame Brillon: “The Ephemera,” 20 September 1778,” <em>Founders Online</em>, National Archives, <a href="https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-27-%2002-0408">https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-27- 02–0408</a> [Original source: <em>The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 27, July 1 through October 31, 1778, </em>ed. Claude A. Lopez. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988, pp. 430–435.]</p><p>Benjamin Franklin, “The Morals of Chess”, [before 28 June 1779],” <em>Founders Online</em>, National Archives, <a href="https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-29-02-0608">https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-29-02-0608</a> [Original source: <em>The Papers of Benjamin Franklin</em>, <em>vol. 29, March 1 through June 30, 1779,</em> ed. Barbara B. Oberg. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992, pp. 750–757.]</p><p>Richard Garnier, ‘Grafton Street, Mayfair’, The Georgian Group Journal, Vol. xIII, 2003, pp. 201–272. <a href="https://georgiangroup.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GGJ_2003_12_GARNIER.pdf">https://georgiangroup.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GGJ_2003_12_GARNIER.pdf</a></p><p>Ira Gruber, <em>The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution, </em>New York: W. W. Norton &amp; Company, 1975.</p><p>Matthew Smith, “Benjamin Franklin: Diplomat, Libertine, Chess Master,” HistoryNet. April 11, 2022. <a href="https://www.historynet.com/how-playing-chess-made-benjamin-franklin-a-better-diplomat/">https://www.historynet.com/how-playing-chess-made-benjamin-franklin-a-better-diplomat/</a></p><p>Monticello.org, “Chess,” <a href="https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/chess">https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/chess</a></p><p>Kelsa Pellettiere, “Friendship and Sociability: A Reexamination of Benjamin Franklin’s Friendship with Madame Brillon de Jouy.” A<em>ge of Revolutions</em>. Jan. 12, 2021. <a href="https://ageofrevolutions.com/2021/01/12/friendship-and-sociability-a-reexamination-of-benjamin-franklins-friendship-with-madame-brillon-de-jouy/">https://ageofrevolutions.com/2021/01/12/friendship-and-sociability-a-reexamination-of-benjamin-franklins-friendship-with-madame-brillon-de-jouy/</a></p><p>Pétronille Le Roy, “Benjamin Franklin from Pétronille Le Roy, [before 23 June? 1777],” <em>Founders Online</em>, National Archives, <a href="https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-24-02-0155">https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-24-02-0155</a> [Original source: <em>The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 24, May 1 through September 30, 1777,</em> ed. William B. Willcox. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 210–211.]</p><p>Bob Ruppert, “Franklin’s Secret Efforts to Bring about Reconciliation,” <em>Journal of the American Revolution</em>, January 18, 2018. <a href="https://allthingsliberty.com/2018/01/franklins-secret-efforts-bring-reconciliation/">https://allthingsliberty.com/2018/01/franklins-secret-efforts-bring-reconciliation/</a></p><p>Swansea University, “Caroline Howe,” in <em>Elizabeth Montagu Correspondence Online</em>, Swansea University. <a href="https://emco.swansea.ac.uk/emco/person/424/">https://emco.swansea.ac.uk/emco/person/424/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b802870bf972" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lessons-from-history/the-franklin-gambit-b802870bf972">The Franklin Gambit: Chess Diplomacy and the American Revolution</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lessons-from-history">Lessons from History</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Piggly Wiggly Revolutionized Retail Shopping]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/how-piggly-wiggly-revolutionized-retail-shopping-edacd59b41f9?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/edacd59b41f9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shopping]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Wilson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Aug 2023 00:51:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-17T21:42:39.167Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Self-service shopping had to be invented</h4><p>by David Wilson ©2023</p><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/how-piggly-wiggly-revolutionized-retail-shopping-edacd59b41f9?sk=11003f1a21c013de61577a6c91851ac9">Not a Medium member? Click here to read the article for free!</a></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wWK-7g8l9-vd3x0wJSFp9A.jpeg" /><figcaption>The first Piggly Wiggly store, Memphis, Tennessee, 1918. Public Domain.</figcaption></figure><p>For nearly all of human history, shopping at a store or market looked a lot like what you might see in an old Western movie: You entered the store and either told the clerk what you wanted or, if you were the more prepared type, handed the clerk a written shopping list. The clerk would then go about the store and gather the items that you wanted. This included measuring out dry goods, such as sugar or rice, and placing them into bags.</p><p>There were inherent inefficiencies with this arrangement. Smaller stores struggled if there was a surge of customers who had to wait for clerks to become available. Larger stores, especially in urban areas, had to hire small armies of clerks at great expense to serve ever-growing numbers of customers. Yet if the store was slow, you still had to pay the clerks who stood idle.</p><p>That a solution to these problems with traditional stores arose in the early years of the innovative 20th century is not surprising; however, that it came from an unassuming corner of middle America, rather than the established commerce capitals on the East Coast, was perhaps unexpected. Even more so, it had a funny name: “Piggly Wiggly.”</p><blockquote>“The obscure we see eventually. The completely obvious, it seems, takes longer.” –Edward R. Murrow</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/417/1*VWN6F5oc1djG3cdcCnFHag.jpeg" /><figcaption>Clarence Saunders. Courtesy Library of Congress.</figcaption></figure><p>In 1904, Clarence Saunders, then 23 years old, moved to Memphis, Tennessee, with his young wife, Amy, whom he had married the previous year. Saunders was in the wholesale grocery business, and over the next 10 years, he worked his way up to owning his own company. He then began to ponder whether there was a way to make the grocery store more efficient in serving Memphis’s booming population.</p><p><a href="https://www.thepig.net/history/">Legend has it</a> that Saunders was on a train when he looked out the window and saw a farm with several pigs struggling to get through a single low spot under a fence. It was then that he had an epiphany: What if customers served themselves? After all, the goods they wanted were on the shelves. Why couldn’t they get the items they wanted on their own? Then you would only need clerks to stock the shelves and to “check out” what customers had placed in their baskets before charging them at the cash register.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/225/1*UP0wPmShX4VdRpRT6thN9Q.png" /></figure><p>On September 6, 1916, Saunders opened his first <a href="https://www.pigglywiggly.com/history/"><strong>Piggly Wiggly</strong></a> grocery store at 79 Jefferson Street in downtown Memphis. The curious name was intentionally different and attention-getting for marketing purposes. When asked how he came up with it, Saunders would only answer, “So people will ask that very question.”</p><p>Customers entered the store through a turnstile, where they either picked up a basket or were handed one. The floor plan was designed to guide shoppers along a one-way path that zigzagged through every aisle in the store. In the patent application he filed just after the store opened, Saunders said, “The customer will be enabled to serve himself and, in so doing, will be required to review the entire assortment of goods carried in stock.”</p><p>The most in-demand items, such as bread, milk, and meat, were purposely placed at the back of the store so shoppers couldn’t just grab the main thing they wanted without passing by the items in lesser demand, in hopes of spurring impulse buys. Many modern stores were inspired by Saunders’ approach and applied his principles of careful pathing, though perhaps not quite as restrictive or narrow as Piggly Wiggly had made it. However, if you have ever been frustrated snaking through the aisles at Ikea, you probably have Saunders to blame.</p><p>The store’s layout was also clearly designed to reduce the risk of shoplifting. There was only one entrance to the store, which was protected by one-way turnstiles. After being forced to march past the store’s entire inventory, shoppers could only leave by going past the checkout clerks on the other end of the store who manned the cash registers near the exits.</p><p>Saunders implemented several other important innovations with his first store. Price tags were placed on the shelves in front of the items, allowing shoppers to easily see the cost without having to pick up and examine the item. Shoppers were also given a paper cash register receipt so that they could be confident they were being charged the correct amount for their purchases. Like the concept of the self-serving store and the guided shopping path, Saunders applied for and was awarded patents for each of these innovations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PjgfV03uoTXFT_ohmz9NJg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Concept sketch for “self-serving store” included with Saunders’ patent filing. Note the baskets on the left side near the single entrance sign, as well as the single exit on the right near the cash register.</figcaption></figure><p>The day the store opened, customers were greeted with flowers, balloons, and a Dixieland band. Some shoppers were reluctant to take items from the shelves themselves and entreated the stock clerks for assistance, but they were “politely refused.”</p><p>Many predicted the store would fail and that shoplifting would eat away at their profits. But instead, Piggly Wiggly proved a wild success, with impulse purchases more than making up for any shoplifting losses. Saunders then began to sell the concept as a franchise, and just a year after opening, it had become a chain with nine stores.</p><p>The company grew at a wild pace and, by the early 1920s, was the third-largest grocery chain in the country, with nearly 1,300 stores in 29 states. It was also publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, which would prove to be Saunders’ undoing. In 1923, through a complex series of Wall Street trades and deals, a group of New York bankers forced Saunders out of the company he had conceived and founded. Saunders went on to found several new companies and even owned a football team, but he never again achieved the kind of success he had with Piggly Wiggly.</p><p>Piggly Wiggly itself would continue to reach new heights without Saunders. The chain reached its peak in 1932 with 2,660 stores. There was even one last innovation for the chain even without Saunders: The wheeled nesting shopping cart, introduced in 1937. The Great Depression, of course, impacted the company; however, it was competition from other grocery stores that copied the self-service concept which led to Piggly Wiggly&#39;s decline. Once the self-service concept became the standard, there was little to differentiate or distinguish Piggly Wiggly from its competitors. Today, there are only about 500 stores, mostly located in the South.</p><p>But wait, didn’t Piggly Wiggly own the patent for the self-serving store? How did it come that other stores could copy the self-serve concept with abandon?</p><h3>The Patents</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6a6i411x2-XAPTSPhojvuA.jpeg" /><figcaption>A sketch from Saunders’ patent application showing a top-down view of the store’s “<em>continuous passageway from a single entrance to a single exit.” </em>This turned out to be the only element of the patent the court determined was truly original.</figcaption></figure><p>As previously mentioned, Saunders had applied for a patent for a “self-serving store” in October 1916, shortly after he opened his first store in Memphis. The patent was granted a year later by the U.S. Patent Office. He soon supplemented this patent with one that refined the concept slightly and added a patent for price tags that were hung from hooks on the shelves in front of the merchandise. Given that Piggly Wiggly Inc. owned these patents, how were other stores able to copy the concepts?</p><p>In 1930, the Piggly Wiggly Corporation sued a copycat grocery store, Jitney Jungle, for using a similar self-service model. During the trial, the defendant presented evidence that Alpha-Beta, a grocery store in California, introduced and implemented a self-service model in 1915, a full year before Piggly Wiggly opened. This is known as “prior art” in patent law and was in large part why the court ruled against Piggly Wiggly, stating that</p><blockquote>The first two Saunders patents were not pioneer patents, because they did not perform any function that was new, original, or unknown to the prior art; but they were, as they purport to be, for improvements of an already existing self-service function…</blockquote><p>The opinion went on to say that</p><blockquote>The only new feature of the first two patents is the continuous passageway from a single entrance to a single exit. The result accomplished by that feature was to make it certain that customers would be compelled to pass by the whole stock of goods, and thus make it probable that they would buy more goods than they might otherwise buy.</blockquote><p>In sum, the judge determined that Piggly Wiggly’s patents were only enforceable in combination, where all of the elements mentioned in the patents were used together in the same way. Jitney Jungle did not employ the single “continuous passageway,” and self-service, by itself, was not patentable.</p><p>This ruling made Piggly Wiggly’s patents essentially worthless, as the highly restrictive, narrow path through the aisles was probably the least attractive thing about the original Piggly Wiggly concept, and therefore, few, if any, competitors copied that. As a result of this case, there was no longer any barrier to other stores adopting the self-serve model, and it quickly became the standard.</p><h3>The Legacy of Piggly Wiggly</h3><p>While Piggly Wiggly may not have won its court cases defending the patents for a “self-serving store,” there is no denying that the success of the Piggly Wiggly store chain is what popularized the concept. This is not dissimilar to how Apple Inc. did not invent the touch-screen smartphone, but you would be hard-pressed to find anyone who could name <a href="https://technologyfacts.wordpress.com/tag/ibm-simon/">who actually did</a>.</p><p>Apple’s iPhone was so well executed that it immediately defined the product category and made it popular with the masses. This is precisely what Piggly Wiggly did with the retail self-serve grocery store. They earned the right to call themselves “The original self-service,” and most historical authorities, <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/bizarre-story-piggly-wiggly-first-self-service-grocery-store-180964708/">such as the Smithsonian</a>, recognize them as such.</p><p>Piggly Wiggly’s thousands of stores across the country proved the value of self-service as a business model, and nearly all grocery stores implemented the feature by the 1930s. This innovation paved the way for today’s supermarkets, as these oversized behemoths could never have existed without self-service.</p><p>Self-service quickly became essential to nearly all retail shopping, not just for groceries. Whether you are shopping for electronics, books, or clothes, the standard procedure is to add the items to a cart and then check out at the front of the store at a register. This concept was then applied to the digital realm in the mid-1990s, where digital shopping carts and checkout on Web retail stores were made to emulate the real-world experience pioneered by Piggly Wiggly.</p><p>If there is a lesson to the Clarence Saunders and Piggly Wiggly story, it is to not accept the limitations imposed by traditional thinking and established ways of doing things. Saunders was able to revolutionize shopping without relying on new technologies but rather by combining existing ideas in novel ways. Inspiration to innovate may be Saunders and Piggly Wiggly’s greatest legacy.</p><figure><a href="https://buymeacoffee.com/davidkwilson"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5fCWVCbZveBHdWzwkKWzTQ.png" /></a><figcaption>If you’ve enjoyed this article, please consider clicking above to buy me a coffee! Any donation that you can make is welcome and helps me to continue to develop and share content for people to enjoy.</figcaption></figure><h3>References and Bibliography</h3><p>Eschner, Kat. “The Bizarre Story of Piggly Wiggly, the First Self-Service Grocery Store.” <em>Smithsonian Magazine</em>, September 6, 2017. <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/bizarre-story-piggly-wiggly-first-self-service-grocery-store-180964708/">https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/bizarre-story-piggly-wiggly-first-self-service-grocery-store-180964708/</a> Accessed July 28, 2023.</p><p>Freeman, Mike. “Clarence Saunders: The Piggly Wiggly Man.” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 51, no. 3 (1992): 161–69. <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/42627012">http://www.jstor.org/stable/42627012</a>.</p><p>Freeman, Mike. “Who invented the self service grocery store?”<a href="https://michaelwfreem.blogspot.com/2012/02/who-invented-self-service-grocery-store.html">https://michaelwfreem.blogspot.com/2012/02/who-invented-self-service-grocery-store.html</a> Accessed July 25, 2023.</p><p>Hunter, Al. “Piggly Wiggly.” <em>The Weekly View</em>, Eastside Voice Community News Media, Inc. Nov. 23, 2017. <a href="http://weeklyview.net/2017/11/23/piggly-wiggly/">http://weeklyview.net/2017/11/23/piggly-wiggly/</a> Accessed July 30, 2023.</p><p>Lindstrom, Martin. “Shopping Carts Will Track Consumers’ Every Move.” <em>Harvard Business Review,</em>December 09, 2011. <a href="https://hbr.org/2011/12/shopping-carts-will-track-cons">https://hbr.org/2011/12/shopping-carts-will-track-cons</a> Accessed July 30, 2023.</p><p>Piggly Wiggly Inc. “Our History.” <a href="https://www.pigglywiggly.com/history/">https://www.pigglywiggly.com/history/</a></p><p>Piggly Wiggly Inc. “The History of Piggly Wiggly Corporation, The Original Self-Service.” <a href="https://www.thepig.net/history/">https://www.thepig.net/history/</a> Accessed July 23, 2023.</p><p>Casetext.com “Piggly Wiggly Corp. v. Jitney Jungle Corp<em>.</em>” Casetext: Smarter Legal Research. Originally published April 9, 1930. <a href="https://casetext.com/case/piggly-wiggly-corp-v-jitney-jungle-corp">https://casetext.com/case/piggly-wiggly-corp-v-jitney-jungle-corp</a> Accessed July 30, 2023.</p><p>Saunders, Clarence. “Self-serving store” Patent Application. <a href="https://patents.google.com/patent/US1242872A/en">https://patents.google.com/patent/US1242872A/en</a></p><p>Scrapehero.com. “Number of Piggly Wiggly stores in the United States in 2023.” July 04, 2023. <a href="https://www.scrapehero.com/location-reports/Piggly%20Wiggly-USA/">https://www.scrapehero.com/location-reports/Piggly%20Wiggly-USA/</a> Accessed July 23, 2023.</p><p>Schwartz, Ralph. “The Untold Truth Of Piggly Wiggly.” <a href="https://www.mashed.com/426197/the-untold-truth-of-piggly-wiggly/">https://www.mashed.com/426197/the-untold-truth-of-piggly-wiggly/</a> Accessed July 23, 2023.</p><p>Arney, Oliver. “The Story of Piggly Wiggly: The First Supermarket.” January 26, 2021. <a href="https://tnmuseum.org/junior-curators/posts/the-story-of-piggly-wiggly-the-first-supermarket?locale=en">https://tnmuseum.org/junior-curators/posts/the-story-of-piggly-wiggly-the-first-supermarket?locale=en</a>Accessed July 23, 2023.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=edacd59b41f9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Midway and the Last Days of the Battleship]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/the-last-days-of-the-battleship-2e8f77f7ab4e?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2e8f77f7ab4e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[midway]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world-war-ii]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Wilson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Dec 2022 17:19:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-01T22:05:17.753Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Why the Battle of Midway, Not Pearl Harbor, Ended the Reign of the Battleship</h4><p>by David Wilson ©2022</p><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/the-last-days-of-the-battleship-2e8f77f7ab4e?sk=de43a8d450147e2b3527364261c5c110">Not a Medium member? Click here to read the article for free!</a></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M2727CfCxxU7gLOFEC66Ng.jpeg" /><figcaption>Battleship <em>Texas. Author’s collection ©David Wilson</em></figcaption></figure><p>Pinpointing when and where the Americans and Japanese came to the realization that the aircraft carrier had usurped the role of the battleship as the principal weapon of naval warfare is not as easy as it might seem. Many would assume that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, decided the issue; however, this was not the case. Yes, on that date, the Japanese dealt a crippling blow to the American battleship fleet using aircraft launched from carriers. Yet paradoxically, the Japanese belief in the centrality of the battleship in naval warfare continued for some time after that momentous event.</p><p>As evidence of this, as late as May 27, 1942, Captain Hideo Hiraide, head of the Japanese naval press office, said in a speech, “Let it be well known… that battleships have an importance incomparable with cruisers or destroyers. <em>The battleship constitutes the nucleus of naval power</em> [emphasis added].” American historian Gordon Prange noted that Hiraide was “the official mouthpiece of the Japanese Naval General Staff,” thus the speech extolling the central role of battleships, with no mention of aircraft carriers, obviously reflected the thinking of the upper echelons of Imperial Japanese Navy leadership.¹</p><p>The thinking of American naval leaders regarding battleship primacy changed more quickly than that of the Japanese, but it was still a process that took several months to unfold after Pearl Harbor. It would be the Battle of Midway that put the argument to bed for both sides for good.</p><p>At Midway, the Japanese planned to use their battleships to inflict a decisive defeat on the U.S. Navy, with their carriers in support. The Americans lacked battleships, but aircraft from their three fleet carriers destroyed all four of the Japanese fleet carriers present in one of the most decisive naval engagements in history. Lacking air cover, the remaining Japanese fleet had to withdraw, proving that a naval force with carriers but no battleships could defeat a fleet that had battleships but no carriers. There could be no denying the ascendance of carriers over battleships after Midway.</p><p>But precisely when and why did the Americans decide to abandon their reliance on battleships? And why were the Japanese still clinging to an outmoded battleship doctrine well after the time that they had proven the vulnerability of battleships to naval aircraft?</p><h4>“Almost Unsinkable”: The Interwar Belief in the Battleship</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*haXEsdgwJkXFm-JveRDWhA.jpeg" /><figcaption>USS Arizona at Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 1941</figcaption></figure><p>In defense of the Japanese naval leaders, in the interwar period between World Wars 1 and 2, it was a nearly universally held belief that battleships were superior to aircraft carriers. With decades of momentum behind this thinking, it was not a simple thing to change course, even with the evidence of change becoming more evident. And it was not just the Japanese who thought this way; this was the canonical belief of most naval war experts in the world’s two largest navies, the British and American, who believed this as well. Historian Malcom Muir summed it up succinctly: “Many authorities simply did not believe the battleship was really vulnerable to aircraft attack.”²</p><p>True, there were a handful of prophets who preached the gospel of airpower over surface ships. Still, by and large, the navies of the world regarded these men as cranks, and the orthodoxy of battleship supremacy was never seriously under threat during the decades between the world wars. One of the most prominent interwar airpower advocates was U.S. Army officer Billy Mitchell. In 1921, Mitchell attempted to prove his theories about the superiority of airpower over battleships by using land-based bombers to sink the German war prize battleship <em>Ostfriesland</em>. Despite the success of the demonstration, Mitchell failed to change many minds.³</p><p>Just three years after Mitchell sank the <em>Ostfriesland,</em> an American naval expert concluded that an air-dropped bomb “would have little effectiveness against a modern man-of-war — barring a lucky hit down the funnel.” The British, too, remained unconvinced, and in 1934, “the First Sea Lord told the Prime Minister that all Admiralty studies showed the battleship to be ‘impervious’ to air attack.” As late as 1941, shortly before Pearl Harbor, an American authority proclaimed the modern battleship to be “almost unsinkable.”⁴</p><p>In the two decades between the world wars, aircraft and aircraft carriers became dramatically more capable. Yet, “in the three years preceding Pearl Harbor not one sentence in the thirty-six issues [of the <em>U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings</em>] suggested that the carrier would replace the battleship as the main weapon of the fleet.” Shortly before the start of the war, the U.S. Navy issued an assessment that assigned a numerical value on each class of ship to show the relative “merit of efficiency” of each type. On a scale of 1 to 100, Battleships were rated at 100, the best, while carriers were scored only at 56. This math would only begin to change with the onset of World War 2.⁵</p><p>Unsurprisingly, politics also played a large role in the belief in the battleship’s superiority over aircraft and aircraft carriers, despite growing evidence to the contrary. For decades before World War 2, “battleship command was the road to the top in the Navy.” A notable example was Admiral William “Bull” Halsey, who went on to hold important fleet commands in the Pacific during World War II. He was “a member of the ‘gun club,’ whose greatest [prewar] ambition had been to command a battleship.”⁶ If you wanted to become an admiral, you had better command a battleship. And, Muir noted, the system was “self-perpetuating.” Once on top, these battleship admirals “were not usually inclined to turn their back on their specialty.”⁷ As Upton Sinclair put it, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.”⁸</p><h4><strong>Differences in Japanese and American Approaches to Carrier Operations</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WS_AjYSSsLcCuTPzHPZDmw.jpeg" /><figcaption>USS Yorktown</figcaption></figure><p>“The prewar [U.S.] Navy,” historian Trent Hone observed, “had centered on a battle fleet, a battleship-centric formation that, concentrated together with a large fleet train, would move as a unit.” Hone further noted that, “Battle-line aircraft carriers operated with the battle fleet, providing air cover for the battleships and fleet train.” This arrangement meant that American carrier operations were usually constrained to the slower speed and tempo of the battleships. Only occasionally would American aircraft carriers operate independent of the battleline, mostly for scouting purposes.⁹</p><p>Japanese fleet tactics likewise relied on “battleships as the backbone.” Some admirals, like Isoroku Yamamoto, saw the potential of airpower, but “this was distinctly a minority position in the Imperial Navy.” The Japanese faith in the battleship “was reflected in every aspect of the Navy: fleet organization, education, maneuvers, and, of course, the building programs.”¹⁰</p><p>Despite the firm Japanese belief that the battleship was the “nucleus of naval power,” they still invested heavily in naval airpower. As a result, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) inarguably had some of the best naval aircraft and aircraft carriers before the start of World War 2. But it was their radical concentrated carrier doctrine that set them apart from all the other powers, including the U.S. Navy.</p><p>The idea of grouping carriers to form a fast-moving, independent striking force unencumbered by slow battleships was a concept unique to the Japanese. In the early months of 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy formed something they called the 1st Air Fleet, also known as the <em>Kidō Butai</em>, or “mobile force.” Comprised of up to six fleet carriers and escorted by fast battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, the <em>Kidō Butai</em> could move quickly at upwards of 30 knots, a speed that most heavy battleship fleets could not hope to match. The high speed of the ships and the tremendous firepower of the attached air wings gave the 1st Air Fleet nearly unmatched flexibility and effectiveness at tactical, operational, and even strategic levels.</p><p>The formation of the <em>Kidō Butai</em> was undoubtedly one of the most important naval innovations of World War 2. Unshackled from the constraints of operating with the slower main battleline, the Japanese carriers could suddenly appear to launch massive air strikes with hundreds of aircraft on unprepared opponents. This is, in fact, what happened at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, when the <em>Kidō Butai</em> attacked with 353 planes, surprising and overwhelming the American defenders and temporarily neutralizing the American battleship fleet in the Pacific.</p><h4><strong>The Formation of Task Force One</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8D0Fxwkd_PQUZNJtKjOrsA.jpeg" /></figure><p>To appreciate the seismic shift in the U.S. Navy’s thinking away from its battleship-based tradition to a new carrier-centric doctrine, one must first dispense with the myth that all American battleships were sunk at Pearl Harbor. This is important because if one believes the myth, then there is no question as to why the Americans had to change their doctrine: They were forced to by the sinking of the battleships at Pearl Harbor. However, this was not the case.</p><p>At the start of the war, the Americans had 17 active-duty battleships and five fleet carriers, reflecting the battleship-centered doctrine of the Navy. Eight of the battleships were in the Atlantic, one — <em>USS</em> <em>Colorado</em> — was being refit on the West Coast, and the remaining eight were at Pearl Harbor. As <strong>Table 1</strong> below shows, while the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941 was unquestionably devastating, only two battleships were essentially destroyed and could not return to service, two more were so badly damaged that they would take years to return to service, one was moderately damaged and would take nearly a year to be repaired, but three were so lightly damaged that they were back in service in a little more than two months.¹¹</p><p><strong>Table 1. U.S. Battleships at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XX8yW2p6cFrT3y3zgO3mhQ.png" /></figure><p>As seen in <strong>Table 2</strong> below, roughly six weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the three lightly damaged but now repaired battleships were joined by three battleships transferred from the Atlantic, along with the <em>Colorado,</em> which had completed its refit at Puget Sound. This reconstituted Pacific battleship fleet was designated Task Force One in early April 1942.</p><p><strong>Table 2. Battleships of Task Force One, spring 1942</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OvzcG3szXAzErXzigdXJYA.png" /></figure><p>Thus, “like the mythical phoenix, the Pacific battleships rose from the ash of Pearl Harbor ready to avenge the deaths of their brethren.” In addition, the Americans wisely decided to update the anti-aircraft armament of the battleships and add new radar and fire control systems. Therefore, “well before the first of many naval actions, Admiral Nimitz had at his disposal a [battleship] fleet superior in nearly every respect to the one lost at Pearl Harbor.”¹²</p><h4><strong>Nimitz and a New American Naval Doctrine Based on the Aircraft Carrier</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/520/1*d3c43A448tWUqoG_2s3iHA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Admiral Chester Nimitz was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet shortly after the debacle at Pearl Harbor. He reported to Admiral Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations, in Washington, D.C. The first few days and weeks after Pearl Harbor, the situation must have looked very grim. War Plan Orange was America’s prewar blueprint for fighting a war with Japan, but it relied on battleships, and those were temporarily out of commission. Nimitz was therefore forced to employ his aircraft carriers as his primary capital ships for several months, setting Plan Orange aside for the time being.</p><p>Once the American Pacific battleship fleet was reconstituted in the early months of 1942, Nimitz was faced with a choice: Should he return to the prewar doctrine of Plan Orange, where carriers were relegated to a support role for the battleships? Or should he try a new approach and emulate the Japanese success with their concentrated carrier doctrine, building an American version of the <em>Kidō Butai</em>?</p><p>In light of Pearl Harbor, one might assume Nimitz’s choice was easy, but it was more difficult than it might appear. While Pearl Harbor shook the American faith in the battleship, it was not immediately broken. This was because, “The American casualties at Pearl Harbor could be ascribed to the fact that the ships were ‘sitting ducks.’” If only the American battleships had been prepared, underway at sea, and fighting back, some argued, things might have been different. It should be noted that similar arguments had been made a year earlier when the British launched a surprise raid on the Italian battleship fleet moored at the harbor of Taranto. On November 11, 1940, using just 20 out-of-date aircraft, the British severely damaged three battleships. In both cases, the battleship proponents claimed that the ships were at anchor and surprised, which made them vulnerable to aircraft attack.</p><p>However, three days after Pearl Harbor, an event occurred that shook even the most stalwart battleship advocates. On December 10, 1941, a British task force that included the modern battleship <em>Prince of Wales</em> and the WW1-era battlecruiser <em>Repulse</em> was sunk in the South China Sea off the coast of Malaysia. Despite the fact these ships were underway at sea and fighting back, they were both dispatched with relative ease by Japanese land-based aircraft. With the lessons of Taranto, Pearl Harbor, and now the South China Sea, there could be no denying the vulnerability of the battleship to air attack.¹³</p><p>Nimitz also could not ignore the biggest problem with Task Force One: It was too slow. As shown in Table 2, all the battleships of Task Force One were older, WW1-era designs that had a top speed of 21 knots (nautical miles per hour). Nimitz’s carriers, on the other hand, had top speeds in excess of 30 knots. There was no way Nimitz could hope to emulate the success of the Japanese <em>Kidō Butai</em> if he tied his carriers to the old, slow battlewagons of TF1. And while the Americans possessed two new <em>North Carolina</em>-class fast battleships that could make nearly 30 knots, they were not ready for action. They were only scheduled to arrive in the Pacific theater later that summer.</p><p>With the weakness of battleships to air attack now fully exposed, and the fact that the U.S. only had outdated, slow battleships at its disposal, Nimitz made the momentous decision not to go back to the old battleship-centric doctrine. In an assessment titled “Estimate of the Situation,” dated April 22, 1942, Nimitz recommended to his superior, Admiral Ernest King, that the battleships of Task Force One be sent back to the West Coast to base at San Francisco. Among his reasons for this recommendation were fuel constraints at Pearl Harbor; however, it was his operational assessments regarding the utility and proper use of carriers and battleships that are most salient in defining what was emerging as a new, war-winning naval doctrine based on fast carrier task forces.</p><p>First, Nimitz concluded that, with few exceptions, “there appears to be little chance of finding suitable objectives for the employment of their [battleships’] power.” Second, he said that the aircraft carriers and other support ships necessary to protect the battleships, “would take forces which can be utilized as carrier striking groups for which there are certain to be suitable objectives.” Third, and most importantly, <em>“Operating carrier groups and battleships in coordination reduces the freedom of action of the former.”</em>[emphasis added]¹⁴</p><p>The importance of Nimitz’s April 22 assessments cannot be overstated. In one fell swoop, Nimitz broke all the rules of the prewar doctrine of battleship primacy. Admiral King accepted Nimitz’s arguments, and Task Force One was summarily sent back to San Francisco, where it arrived on May 8, 1942. It is essential to note the timing of Nimitz’s decision because it shows his carrier-focused doctrinal changes <em>preceded</em> the first large naval engagements of 1942 at Coral Sea and Midway, and were not made as a result of these battles.</p><p>That Nimitz was able to break with battleship orthodoxy, and did so with the support of his commanding officer in Washington, also speaks to the open-mindedness and flexibility of the American command structure. Unlike Nimitz, his boss, Admiral King, had felt there was still a role for the old battleships, and he repeatedly urged Nimitz to give “continuous study” to their use. He even suggested to Nimitz to consider creating a task force based on the carrier <em>Saratoga</em>, escorted by the battleships of Task Force One.¹⁵</p><p>Nimitz declined King’s suggestion for the reasons already stated: Slow battleships could not escort fast carriers without hobbling the latter. But the fact that Nimitz could refuse King’s recommendation without fear of political repercussions is an especially salient point when, as will be shown later, Yamamoto proved unable to ignore the Japanese equivalent of the American “Gun Club.”</p><p>It should be noted that Nimitz was not blind to the utility of the battleship. However, in 1942, the Americans had only two of the new “fast battleships,” the North Carolina and Washington, which could reach nearly 30 knots. These arrived in the Pacific theater in August, and unlike the old battlewagons of Task Force One, they were put to use immediately in the battles of the South Pacific. However, they were never employed as envisioned pre-war, as the centerpiece of a concentrated “battleline” consisting of many battleships seeking a great decisive engagement with an enemy battleline of similar composition, akin to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Jutland">Battle of Jutland</a>.</p><h4><strong>American Carrier-centric Doctrine Tested at Coral Sea</strong></h4><p>In mid-April 1942, the Americans received intelligence of a major Japanese operation that was in the works against Port Moresby in New Guinea. Nimitz began planning his response, which would eventually lead to the Battle of Coral Sea, May 4–8. This was the first major naval battle in history where the principal combat ships on both sides were aircraft carriers, and the surface combatants never sighted each other. As if to underscore the diminishment of the battleships, the battle concluded on the same day, May 8, that Task Force One had arrived in San Francisco after redeploying out of the battle zone.</p><p>The outcome of the Battle of Coral Sea has often been described as a tactical victory for the Japanese and a strategic victory for the Americans. The Japanese losses included one light carrier sunk and one fleet carrier severely damaged. However, the losses in aircraft for the Japanese were severe enough to put a second fleet carrier out of action temporarily. This meant that Japan would have only four fleet carriers available for the Battle of Midway that would occur just four weeks later.</p><p>American losses at Coral Sea were indisputably worse, with one fleet carrier sunk (<em>Lexington</em>) and another damaged (<em>Yorktown</em>). However, the damaged <em>Yorktown</em> was repaired in time to participate in the Battle of Midway. In addition, the Japanese attack on Port Moresby was turned back due to their lack of air cover once all of their carriers were put out of action. Despite the mixed results, the outcome of the action seemed to affirm Nimitz’s new emphasis on carriers as the Navy’s primary weapon. Surface ships played no important part in the engagement except in support of the carrier operations. In his after-action report on the engagement, Nimitz wrote, “The brunt of our offensive effort is now being carried by our aviation personnel in a courageous and devoted manner.”¹⁶</p><h4><strong>Yamamoto’s Midway Plan</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/595/1*lBbDbrmjiipvFFzGND1BBw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Doolittle Raid on the Japanese homeland in April 1942 convinced Japan’s leaders that the remaining American naval strength in the Pacific needed to be neutralized. To this end, they approved Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s proposal to occupy Midway Island as a means of drawing out the American fleet so it could be defeated in a decisive engagement.</p><p>Yamamoto’s plan essentially called for three main divisions of their fleet to move against Midway: 1) The Midway Invasion Force with the transports carrying the troops for the ground attack on the island; 2) The First Carrier Striking Force (<em>Kidō Butai</em>) with four fleet carriers; 3) the “Main Body” consisting of three large battleships including the mighty <em>Yamato</em>, the largest battleship in the world. Each of these forces was liberally supplied with supporting and screening ships of cruisers, destroyers, and light carriers. A cordon of submarines was also dispatched ahead of the fleet. Simultaneously, the Alaskan Aleutian islands would be attacked, an operation which drew more force away from the primary effort at Midway.¹⁷</p><p>This division of force had the advantage of allowing the Japanese carriers to operate as they usually did, with speed and flexibility to maneuver, not tied as an auxiliary to the comparatively slow battleships of the “Main Body,” or the even slower transports of the Invasion Force. However, there were too many objectives, the different divisions were too far apart to support each other properly, and the plan still relied on an outdated battleship doctrine to defeat the American fleet. Of equal importance, the plan was dependent on a tight schedule of events unfolding exactly as anticipated, with the Americans assumed to be surprised and then responding precisely as predicted.</p><p>First, the Japanese carriers would launch an airstrike on Midway Island, neutralizing the airfield and softening up the defenses for the Midway Invasion Force to occupy the island. This would prompt the supposedly unsuspecting Americans to send the remainder of their fleet — certainly their carriers and hopefully their remaining battleships — to challenge Japanese control of the island. Only then would Yamamoto’s “Main Body” engage with its battleships in a great Jutland-style battle to finish off the Americans, with air cover provided by the <em>Kidō Butai</em>.</p><p>There were two main reasons why events did not unfold as Yamamoto planned: 1) The Americans were not surprised and therefore did not react as he anticipated, and 2) As has already been established, the Americans had no intention of using battleships as a counter to these attacks and would instead rely completely on carrier-centric task forces in the engagement, along with Midway-based land airpower. This fact, along with the completely open nature of the Midway area of operations, meant that it was highly unlikely Japanese battleships of the Main Body would ever come to grips with an American battleline, barring some blunder on the Americans’ part.¹⁸</p><p>Japanese proponents of airpower, like Mitsuo Fuchida, the pilot who led the Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, had a hard time understanding Yamamoto’s plan. He wondered how Yamamoto, the man who had always been an advocate for naval aviation, who had supported the formation of the <em>Kidō Butai,</em> and who had devised one of the greatest strategic coups of World War 2 with his carrier strike on Pearl Harbor, could conceive a plan for the Midway operation that “evidenced an adherence to the outmoded doctrine of the battleship advocates.”¹⁹</p><p>“At Pearl Harbor,” Fuchida wrote, “Japanese carrier air power had smashed the enemy’s battleships, and with them the myth of battleship supremacy… One cannot help wondering what might have been the course of the war had our top naval command been more prompt to revise its outmoded thinking in light of new experience.” It was the <em>Kidō Butai</em>, he argued, “with its six carriers, not the seven battleships at Hashirajima, [that] constituted the main combat strength of the Japanese Fleet.” Fuchida speculated that “perhaps Yamamoto himself was afflicted with the characteristic Japanese tendency to cling to the past. Or perhaps he found traditional concepts so firmly entrenched that he was powerless to effect any radical overnight change.”²⁰</p><p>Ultimately, Yamamoto was a product of the strict tradition learned over his decades serving the Imperial Japanese Navy, whose senior leadership, historian Ronald Spector observes, “were too faithful students of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Thayer_Mahan">[Alfred Thayer] Mahan</a>²¹ to put their faith for ultimate victory in any weapon except the battleship.”²²</p><h4><strong>Midway and the End of the Reign of the Battleship</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ilHhTxvye-pgOP1NnzjUUg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Japanese heavy cruiser <em>Mikuma, J</em>une 6, 1942. <em>National Archives, Washington, D.C.</em></figcaption></figure><p>The Americans had partially broken the Japanese naval codes and gained advanced intelligence of Yamamoto’s plan to attack Midway. This intelligence was critical because it allowed Nimitz to recall his three remaining fleet carriers, <em>Enterprise</em>, <em>Hornet</em>, and the hastily repaired <em>Yorktown,</em> and redeploy them northwest of Midway. Nimitz acted so quickly upon learning of Yamamoto’s plans that his ships were in place before the Japanese had their screens of submarines in position to monitor American ship movements. This meant that the Americans were perfectly positioned to ambush the unaware Japanese.</p><p>The battle unfolded June 3–6, 1942, with the bulk of the action happening on June 4. It was on this date that planes from the carriers <em>Yorktown</em>, <em>Hornet</em>, and <em>Enterprise</em> sank or mortally wounded the four Japanese fleet carriers that were present, Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and <em>Hiryu</em>. In return, the Americans lost <em>Yorktown,</em> but this still left them with two operational fleet carriers in the battle, whereas the Japanese had none. Like the Battle of Coral Sea a month earlier, the major surface combatants never came within gun range of each other. Aircraft and aircraft carriers were the sole instruments of decision.</p><p>As shown in Table 3 below, the Japanese deployed seven battleships to the battle, but only the four battleships of the Carrier Force and Midway Occupation Force saw action, primarily in the role of providing anti-aircraft support during American air attacks. The three large battleships of Yamamoto’s Main Body were initially positioned over 300 miles distant from the Japanese carriers during the bulk of the battle. After hearing of the disaster unfolding on June 4, Yamamoto charged forward to try to engage with the American fleet.</p><p><strong>Table 3. Battle of Midway Order of Battle, June 4, 1942²³</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iEsTetl9AI5747tflE0-Bw.png" /></figure><p>However, after careful consideration, he realized that he had lost air superiority, and without that, there was no way he could accomplish his mission goals. To continue would be to place his valuable, yet vulnerable, battleships at risk, so he ordered a general retreat on June 5.</p><p>Admiral Raymond Spruance, who commanded the American aircraft carrier task forces, noted that at the time of the battle, the Americans had no idea that Yamamoto and the ships of the Main Body were operating northwest of the battle area, only learning of this fact “several months after the battle.” His forces had been pursuing the retreating Japanese, and had he continued, he might have run into the ships of the Main Body and unwittingly given Yamamoto a chance to use the guns of his battleships as intended. However, Spruance wanted to stay out of range of Japanese aircraft based at Wake Island, and something else: “I had a feeling, an intuition perhaps, that we had pushed our luck as far to the westward as was good for us. Accordingly we turned back to the eastward.”²⁴</p><p>It is also important to note that, despite Task Force One operating out of San Francisco, the fleet of seven American battleships could have sortied to support operations at Midway. This is made clear in Nimitz’s after-action report written on June 15, 1942:</p><blockquote>Full consideration was given to employment of Task Force ONE in the defense of Midway. It was not moved out because of the undesirability of diverting to its screen any units which could add to our long range striking power against the enemy carriers. Events proved that every air unit which was employed could have ill been spared from the purpose for which it was used, even though the results were far beyond the expectations of most.²⁵</blockquote><p>In other words, Nimitz knew he could not deploy the old battleships without air cover, and the only way to give them air cover was to use one of his precious three fleet carriers to support them. This would have meant essentially adhering to the original pre-war doctrine of carriers following the battleline at the rear to provide air cover. Not only had Nimitz already rejected this idea, but he knew he could not spare any of his carriers for defensive duty; they were all needed for offense, and events proved him correct.</p><p>Not noted in many histories is the fact that Task Force One did sortie from San Francisco on June 6, 1942 — the last day of the battle — in support of the Midway operations, but only after CVE-1 <em>Long Island</em> joined the fleet<em> </em>on June 5. The <em>Long Island</em> was the first escort carrier in the U.S. Navy built on the hull of a converted cargo ship. These “baby flattops” did not have the speed or capacity to match the large fleet carriers, but were sufficient to provide air cover for the slower old battleships.²⁶</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>To be clear, the battleship was useful for some time as a support to carriers, for shore bombardment, and sometimes in its original intended role as an anti-ship weapon. However, any doubts as to the supremacy of the aircraft carrier vis-à-vis the battleship were erased in the aftermath of the Battle of Midway. The Japanese acknowledged as much when, just a month after the battle, they decided to convert the unfinished super battleship <em>Shinano</em> (third in the <em>Yamato</em>-class) into an aircraft carrier. Even the traditionalists of the Imperial Japanese Navy could no longer deny that, as Fuchida put it, “Naval air power had indeed taken the place of the battleship as the decisive striking force at sea.”²⁷</p><p>In America, the famed publication of the U.S. Naval Institute, <em>Proceedings</em>, finally began to publish articles that acknowledged how naval warfare was changing. One in particular, “The Aircraft Carrier — The Backbone of Aero-Sea Warfare,” ran in December 1942, and it summarized the lessons of Midway succinctly. Among the author’s conclusions were:</p><blockquote>· The aircraft carrier, not the battleship, is the backbone of the fleet.</blockquote><blockquote>· The aircraft carrier is not in the fleet to protect surface ships but as the main offensive striking weapon.</blockquote><blockquote>· The role of the battleship as a weapon with which to win naval battles at sea <em>à la</em> Jutland has practically vanished.</blockquote><blockquote>· Any attempt to say that naval battles will be fought by lines of battleships once the carriers have been sunk is wishful thinking — somebody’s carriers won’t be sunk and he will have complete control of the situation.</blockquote><p>“In summation,” the author wrote, “this war was started with all the world’s navies thinking in terms of Jutland and the battleship as the principal weapon — the aircraft carrier was an untried weapon. It is an untried weapon no longer and the Navy that is going to win this war is the Navy that thinks in terms of Midway and the aircraft carrier.”²⁸</p><p>The author of the article was Lieutenant Commander John Austin Collett, known as ‘Jack’ to his friends. He was the pilot of a TBF-1 Avenger torpedo bomber and was killed at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in October 1942, about a month before his article was published. And though he did not live to see the completion of the war, he had correctly identified the naval weapon that would win it.</p><figure><a href="https://buymeacoffee.com/davidkwilson"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5fCWVCbZveBHdWzwkKWzTQ.png" /></a><figcaption>If you’ve enjoyed this article, please consider clicking above to buy me a coffee! Any donation that you can make is welcome and helps me to continue to develop and share content for people to enjoy.</figcaption></figure><h4>Endnotes</h4><p>¹ Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, <em>Miracle at Midway</em> (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981) p. 89.</p><p>² Malcolm Muir, Jr., “The Capital Ship Program In The United States Navy, 1934–1945,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 1976, pp. 55, 60. <a href="https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=osu1487001556865121&amp;disposition=inline">https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=osu1487001556865121&amp;disposition=inline</a></p><p>Accessed Oct. 3, 2022</p><p>Mitsuo Fuchida, Masatake Okumiya, <em>Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan</em> (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1955), p 12.</p><p>³ John T. Correll, “Billy Mitchell and the Battleships,” Air Force Magazine, July 21, 2021, <a href="https://www.airforcemag.com/article/billy-mitchell-ostfriesland/">https://www.airforcemag.com/article/billy-mitchell-ostfriesland/</a> accessed Jan. 20, 2022.</p><p>⁴ Muir, 55.</p><p>⁵ Muir, 60.</p><p>⁶ Ronald Spector, <em>Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan</em> (New York: Free Press, 1985) 169. Unlike many battleship admirals, Halsey adapted quickly to the new era of the aircraft carrier.</p><p>⁷ Muir, 62.</p><p>⁸ Upton Sinclair, <em>I, candidate for governor: and how I got licked</em> (Pasenda: End Poverty League, Inc., 1935).</p><p>⁹ Trent Hone, “U.S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine and Victory in the Pacific,” <em>Naval War College Review, </em>Vol. 62 [2009], №1, Art. 7, pp 70, 73. <a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1668&amp;context=nwc-review">https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1668&amp;context=nwc-review</a></p><p>¹⁰ Muir, 60, 94.</p><p>¹¹ The USS Utah, BB-31, was an unarmed target ship. While it was a battleship hull and was sunk at Pearl Harbor, it is usually not counted among the battleships sunk on Dec. 7, 1941.</p><p>¹² David C. Fuquea, “Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942,” <em>The Journal of Military History</em>, Vol. 61, №4 (Oct., 1997), pp. 707–734. <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2954083">http://www.jstor.org/stable/2954083</a> Accessed January 18, 2016.</p><p>¹³ Muir, 176</p><p>¹⁴ Command Summary of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, Nimitz “Graybook”, 7 December 1941–31 August 1945, Volume 1 of 8. United States Naval War College, Newport, RI 2013. pp. 378–379.</p><p>¹⁵ Fuquea, 718.</p><p>¹⁶ Chester Nimitz, “Naval Action in Coral Sea Area, 4–8 May, 1942,” June 17, 1942. <a href="https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Coral/CincPac.html">https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Coral/CincPac.html</a> Accessed Dec. 12, 2022.</p><p>¹⁷ The Japanese attacks against the Aleutian islands has traditionally been called a feint or a diversion for the Midway operation. However, historians Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully have disputed this interpretation saying that Japanese records do not refer to Aleutian operations as a feint. Either way, the Japanese attack against the Aleutians indisputably drew resources and focus away from their main effort at Midway. Jonathan Parshall, Anthony Tully, <em>Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway </em>(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005) 44.</p><p>¹⁸ In October 1944, at the Battle off Samar, the battleship Yamato was one of several vessels that engaged and sunk the American light carrier, USS Gambier Bay. But the circumstances were completely unlike those at Midway 1942.</p><p>¹⁹ Fuchida, 77.</p><p>²⁰ Ibid, 46–47, 77.</p><p>²¹ Alfred Thayer Mahan was an American who wrote a series of influential books and treatises on naval warfare and theory in the late nineteenth century, including <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Influence_of_Sea_Power_upon_History"><em>The Influence of Sea Power on History: 1660–1783</em></a>. Mahan’s theories became the basis of naval doctrine in the major naval powers during World War I and the interwar period preceding World War II. However, his writings were done before the advent of the aircraft carrier, which made some of his conclusions obsolete.</p><p>²² Spector, 47.</p><p>²³ The author created this order of battle based on data from the <em>Naval History and Heritage Command Web</em> pages:</p><p>U.S. forces: <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/c/composition-of-us-forces.html">https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/c/composition-of-us-forces.html</a></p><p>Japanese forces: <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/c/composition-of-japanese-forces.html">https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/c/composition-of-japanese-forces.html</a></p><p>Notes on the order or battle:</p><p>1) I understand the controversy in some circles with counting the four <em>Kongō</em>-class ships as battlecruisers or battleships. In my opinion this debate is purely academic. They were classified as fast battleships by both the Imperial Japanese Navy and the U.S. Navy, which is good enough for the purposes of this order of battle.</p><p>2) I understand that Hiryu and Soryu were somewhat smaller carriers than Akagi and Kaga, and thus some argue they were not “fleet” carriers. However, the complement of aircraft they held was only marginally smaller than their counterparts and their speed and capabilities were similar allowing them to operate in conjunction with the other carriers of the <em>Kidō Butai</em>. Thus they are counted as fleet carriers and were considered as such by both sides.</p><p>3) To determine the numbers of “combat aircraft” I left out planes whose primary mission was support or scouting, despite the fact that I realize that some of these craft could carry bombs or torpedoes when called for.</p><p>4) This order of battle was purposely kept simplified which leads to the grouping of some items like combat aircraft and tactical elements.</p><p>²⁴ Raymond Spruance in <em>Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan</em>, vi.</p><p>²⁵ Chester Nimitz, “Battle of Midway,” CINCPAC file A16:01849, June 15, 1942. <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/archives/digital-exhibits-highlights/action-reports/wwii-battle-of-midway/commander-in-chief-pacific-fleet.html">https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/archives/digital-exhibits-highlights/action-reports/wwii-battle-of-midway/commander-in-chief-pacific-fleet.html</a></p><p>²⁶ Naval War in the Pacific, 1941–1945, <a href="http://pacific.valka.cz/forces/tf1.htm#1_42">http://pacific.valka.cz/forces/tf1.htm#1_42</a>; USS Long Island II CVE-1, <a href="https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/dafs/CVE/cve1.html">https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/dafs/CVE/cve1.html</a>; “USS Long Island II (CVE-1)” in Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division) <a href="https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/dafs/CVE/cve1.html">https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/dafs/CVE/cve1.html</a></p><p>²⁷ Fuchida, 241.</p><p>²⁸ John A. Collett, “The Aircraft Carrier — The Backbone of Aero-Sea Warfare,” in <em>U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings</em>, December 1942, Vol. 68, №478, pp. 1742.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2e8f77f7ab4e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Best Job Advice That I Ever Received]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/the-best-job-advice-that-i-ever-received-4656f549f957?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4656f549f957</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[choices]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jobs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[life-lessons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[employment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[job-search]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Wilson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Jul 2022 01:57:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-01T22:04:47.943Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Bd30KtN4TxDKTHqq3E16ww.jpeg" /></figure><h4><strong>The best advice I ever got was in response to the dumbest question that I ever asked</strong></h4><p>By David Wilson ©2022</p><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/the-best-job-advice-that-i-ever-received-4656f549f957?sk=0e3b17368cc0f2234961089a4bb68f5e">Not a Medium member? Click here to read the article for free!</a></blockquote><p>In 2011, I was laboring over a decision of which of two job offers to accept. I called my best friend for advice, and he gave me an answer I did not expect. However, to understand why this question was so important to me and why his answer surprised me, some background is necessary.</p><h4>Let Go</h4><p>In July 2010, I got laid off. I was 45 years old, and it was the only time I had been unemployed in my adult life. I was not mentally prepared for the event. I had had the hubris to think that no company would ever let me go, that I was too valuable. Life must have thought it was time for a lesson in humility.</p><p>I was initially optimistic that I could find work quickly, but as the months went by without any offers, that optimism faded. With a mortgage, two car payments, child care, and so on, things were becoming increasingly difficult. My wife had a job, but it didn’t generate nearly enough to cover our expenses. I had tried to start my own business, which, while bringing in some extra cash, wasn’t enough to sustain us.</p><p>As 2011 started with no good job prospects, I began to feel depressed, but not in a clinical sense. I was still getting up and functioning every day, working my new home business, looking for work. The sole bright spot was that I did have money in reserve, which I finally began to tap to buy myself more time to find a job.</p><h4><strong>The offers</strong></h4><p>In February 2011, after nearly seven months, I finally had a ray of hope. Two rays actually in the form of two job offers that came at almost the same time! The first offer was a full-time position for an agency managing their graphic production and photo-imaging studio. I had applied for a different position there the previous year, but was told that I was overqualified. Now that something had opened up that fit my skill set, they were happy to offer me that.</p><p>I was eminently qualified for the position, it was in an agency environment that was familiar to me, and I was confident that I would do well there. But there were some downsides. I knew a couple of people who worked there who said the place was known for its long hours and poor management, to put it mildly. I think the words “sweatshop” and “incompetence” were used by more than one person to describe the company.</p><p>The second job offer was from a large, well-known international company headquartered in the Dallas area. They were seeking someone to oversee their new graphic design studio. The upside to this position is that it was with a company that had a reputation for being well-managed with a good work-life balance. The downside was that it was a contract position with less pay and the “intention,” but not the promise, that it would be converted to a full-time position after one year.</p><h4><strong>The advice</strong></h4><p>I called my oldest friend for advice. He is a successful attorney and possibly the most intelligent person that I know. We had been friends for decades, and he could be as blunt as he was brilliant. When I asked him which job he thought I should take, he responded: “That is the dumbest question I’ve ever heard.”</p><p>Why is it dumb, I asked. He replied, <strong><em>“Where do you want to work?”</em></strong> The company with a reputation for work-life balance, I replied. “There’s your answer,” he said. “Why would you take a job somewhere you DON’T want to work?”</p><p>Because, I replied, the other position is a contract and not permanent like the full-time offer. “Oh,” he responded, “Was your last job a ‘<em>permanent</em>’ position? Anyone can be fired for any reason at any time, whenever the employer chooses. Go work for the company you WANT to work at. They’ll see how good you are, hire you, and promote you eventually, like every other company you’ve worked for.”</p><p>Was the answer really that simple? <em>Where do I want to work?</em> Up until that time, I had been leaning toward the full-time position despite the poor reputation of the company making the offer. I wanted the theoretical security that a full-time position entailed. But my friend was right, as recent events had proved, “full-time” did not guarantee any permanence.</p><p>I also thought about my last job. I had not been particularly happy there. The hours had been grueling, and it was also pretty poorly run. The new full-time offer sounded like more of the same. Working at a company with a reputation for work-life balance and solid management would be a refreshing change, despite the lower pay and risks associated with contracting.</p><p><em>Where did I want to work?</em> The answer was obvious. Thankfully, things went as my friend predicted. After a year of contracting, I was hired full-time, got promoted, and I’ve been there ever since, over 11 years now. And I’m happy. The company has a good work-life balance and some of the best senior management and leadership that I’ve seen in my career.</p><p>I’m not sure that I would have made the choice that I did without my friend’s input. I’m glad that I made the decision based on what was the best choice for myself, on what <em>I</em> wanted in a good job, rather than letting my insecurities drive me to make a choice that I knew was wrong. Why would I take a job somewhere I didn’t want to work? There is no good reason.</p><figure><a href="https://buymeacoffee.com/davidkwilson"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5fCWVCbZveBHdWzwkKWzTQ.png" /></a><figcaption>If you’ve enjoyed this article, please consider clicking above to buy me a coffee! Any donation that you can make is welcome and helps me to continue to develop and share content for people to enjoy.</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4656f549f957" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Stop Measuring Busyness — Start Measuring Impact]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/rethinking-the-billable-hour-e49290bd7632?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e49290bd7632</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[time-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[creative]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[billable-hours]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Wilson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 May 2022 15:19:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-28T15:56:46.829Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_rG0p_JCO5_8hlyDgzqnqQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>iStock Photo</figcaption></figure><h4>It’s time to redefine productivity for the information age</h4><p>By David Wilson ©2022</p><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/rethinking-the-billable-hour-e49290bd7632?sk=5d71e9e716f9c5545f49258c3e5723cc">Not a Medium member? Click here to read the article for free!</a></blockquote><p>I once worked at a large advertising agency that had a “play” area with a small kitchen as well as a ping pong and foosball table. The idea was you could grab a drink or a snack and game a little with your coworkers to unwind. It was an acknowledgement of numerous <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-power-rest/201705/rest-success">studies</a> — and common sense — that show that <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-power-rest/201705/rest-success">play and rest are conducive to creative thinking</a>.</p><p>The only problem was that almost no one ever used the game tables during regular business hours. If we were working late (which was frequent), then you might see a couple of art directors knocking some balls around while waiting for a pizza to be delivered, but during the day, it was basically never.</p><p>Eventually, the agency got rid of the tables and replaced them with additional cubicles. The tables failed because no one wanted to be seen as having any slack time that could be devoted to such idle pursuits. It was one thing to chit-chat with a coworker at her desk — after all, that could be mistaken for work by a manager passing by — but there was no way to spin playing foosball as anything other than “this person has time to play games.”</p><p>So, despite the agency’s attempt to send a message through the game tables that it was OK to have downtime during your work hours, no one believed it. And for good reason: employees have had years of experience that taught them that employers value busy workers. This is built into the billing structure in most companies. It’s a simple formula: busyness = productivity = profit—end of story.</p><h4>The factory mentality</h4><p>Except that it is not the end of the story, because there is a fundamental flaw in the formula when applied to knowledge work: it is based on a manufacturing model. This is what Seth Godin labeled “the factory mentality” in his book, <a href="https://www.deanyeong.com/book-notes/linchpin">Linchpin</a>. In a factory, machines make the parts or goods you are selling, and people run the machines. The machines are the vital components in an old-school factory, not the workers.</p><p>If you have a machine that can produce 10 widgets an hour, then you need the person to operate that machine for as many minutes as possible out of the workday. Ergo, busyness = productivity = $$$. The quality of the part remains consistent, as does the time it takes to manufacture it. The only variable is how long the person can work that machine effectively. Therefore, if you are a factory owner, you don’t want someone playing foosball when they should be cranking out widgets for your profit. You want to maximize your employees’ <em>utilization</em>.</p><h4>The problem with utilization as a metric</h4><p>The ratio of productive or billable time to total hours worked, expressed as a percentage, is called <a href="https://www.smartsheet.com/content/what-is-utilization-rate-formula">utilization</a>. For example, if you bill 30 hours out of a standard 40-hour work week, then your utilization rate is 75%. While it is acknowledged that employers can’t expect 100% utilization (unless you think that employees should not take any breaks), there is no set standard for what this percentage should be.</p><p>I’d say that most agencies seem to like 80% utilization, but I’ve seen the expected number as high as 85% or 95%. (This is both nuts and funny because at least one study says the <a href="https://www.productive.io/blog/agency-utilization-rate-the-most-important-metric-for-your-business/">average agency utilization rate is 60%</a>, which is far more believable based on my experience.)</p><p>Many business school graduates are obsessed with utilization because their schools still teach the old factory mentality. However, when it comes to most knowledge work, the product is not the same as a manufactured good or commodity part. A logo design, copy deck, or business case is not a quantifiable item with a specific amount of time allocated to its creation.</p><p>More importantly, with knowledge/creative work, each deliverable is not equal. A designer might create a great logo in one hour, while another might take eight hours to create a mediocre one. There is no correlation between the amount of time spent and the quality of a creative product.</p><blockquote>“<strong>Never mistake activity for achievement.” –John Wooden</strong></blockquote><p>In my experience, some of the most efficient and highest-quality employees bill the least time and have the lowest utilization rates. And I’ve found that the opposite is often true: many times, some of the least efficient employees have had the highest utilization rates.</p><p>I once had an employee who would always bill at least 40 full hours each week (usually more). However, the reason for this was that she was very slow. Additionally, her work often had to be redone by someone else. Therefore, her seemingly high productivity was entirely illusory.</p><p>Yet she also received an award from management for having the highest utilization rate in the department. The irony of that award highlights how utilization can be an ineffective metric for productivity for less skilled or less efficient employees.</p><p>Utilization rates similarly fall short as a metric when attempting to measure the value of highly efficient employees. Skilled and experienced workers can usually tackle complex tasks in much less time than their less skilled or less experienced counterparts. Which means if you are billing by the hour, they make you less money!</p><p>The only solution to this problem is to bill for the value of the work rather than simply the time it took to complete it. Suppose the client insists on hours as a metric. In that case, the work can be estimated and billed in “standard work hours,” rather than actual time, thereby disconnecting the work from the vagaries of individual employee efficiency.</p><p>Based on the commentary above, you might think that I am against recording hours worked on projects, but this is not the case. Accurately recording the time spent on projects is crucial because it enables you to use historical data to inform future planning. Plan-versus-actuals reporting is essential for adjusting your estimates, enabling capacity-versus-demand forecasting, and effective resource management.</p><p>What I oppose is management’s misuse of utilization rates to unfairly assess the productivity of individual employees or departments with low utilization. Some years ago, our group became lax in filling out their timesheets. One of our managers attempted to address this by implementing strict policies for recording billable hours.</p><p>Unfortunately, she also stipulated that all workers must have a weekly utilization rate of 80% and all supervisors a utilization rate of 70%. If you did not reach this goal, your direct supervisor was to meet with you to discuss why you were failing to meet this requirement.</p><p>One of the problems with her approach was that a one-week reporting period was too short to account for the feast-or-famine nature of most knowledge and creative work. However, the biggest issue was that the policy created an atmosphere of fear.</p><p>No one wanted to be called in for judgment on their “failure” to record sufficient billable time, so they did the logical thing: if they had to, they either slowed their work or padded their hours to meet their utilization goals. If the company’s objective was to have high utilization rates on the books, mission accomplished. However, we had destroyed any chance of obtaining accurate data for billing or forecasting resource demand.</p><p>The company was sending the wrong message to their employees. Employees were told the value of their work was measured by the time spent doing it, not by its impact on their business. The company was punishing efficiency and ignoring quality.</p><p>There are several positive ways the manager can address a low utilization rate, but the key is to understand that it is not necessarily a problem at all. If the employee is simply very efficient and produces high-quality work, low utilization can actually be a benefit because it provides the employee with the downtime needed to recharge their creative batteries and/or handle non-project-related tasks.</p><p>The most important thing for time recording is accuracy. Having full timesheets each week is useless if they are completed inaccurately out of fear. This fact, along with the understanding that more hours do not necessarily equate to better work, is why managers should stop worrying if their employees are <em>busy</em>. Instead, they should strive to ensure that they are productive, efficient, and deliver<em> their work with quality.</em></p><p>How do you judge productivity then? Managers should have defined tasks, deliverables, and project schedules for each employee. That should make it easy to see if they are meeting productivity goals. Cloud project management software, such as Asana or Workfront, can help employers track tasks and deliverables for each worker.</p><p>A <a href="https://www.qualtrics.com/experience-management/customer/satisfaction-surveys/">client satisfaction survey</a> or quality score on the deliverable might also be helpful, depending on the type of work. Meeting goals, supplying deliverables, and doing both on schedule with high customer satisfaction is the best way to judge the productivity of individuals in the knowledge or creative fields.</p><p>Having accurate time reporting is also essential, as it enables managers to determine how to utilize available capacity effectively and assess whether overall capacity is too low, necessitating the need to hire or outsource. However, we are long past the time when being constantly busy is a key metric for work.</p><figure><a href="https://buymeacoffee.com/davidkwilson"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5fCWVCbZveBHdWzwkKWzTQ.png" /></a><figcaption>If you’ve enjoyed this article, please consider clicking above to buy me a coffee! Any donation that you can make is welcome and helps me to continue to develop and share content for people to enjoy.</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e49290bd7632" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dropbox vs OneDrive: Which is better for Creative Teams?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/dropbox-vs-onedrive-which-is-better-for-creative-teams-38537167ea8?source=rss-6686afdcf61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/38537167ea8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dropbox]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[apple]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[onedrive]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Wilson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 May 2022 17:56:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-01T23:27:18.722Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t4HrrFxn7---8NGc89-B4A.png" /></figure><h4><strong>The flaws in Microsoft’s cloud storage approach</strong></h4><p>By David Wilson ©2022</p><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@davidwilson1776/dropbox-vs-onedrive-which-is-better-for-creative-teams-38537167ea8?sk=629db7b84efadf439737eda94046432c">Not a Medium member? Click here to read the article for free!</a></blockquote><p>In March 2020, the company that I worked for, like many others, was made an unwilling participant in a sudden, unplanned experiment to see if we could effectively work remotely. For large creative teams, like the one I managed, the problem was particularly pronounced due to the sheer volume and size of our digital files. While we had some of the building blocks needed for the challenge, it is also fair to say that we were not prepared and struggled for many months to establish systems and processes that could allow us to work effectively without physical access to our office building.</p><p>Fast forward to today, we can now work efficiently wherever we have a high-speed Internet connection by accessing nearly all of our digital assets and systems in the cloud. I hope that creative companies and internal agencies find this article helpful as they make their own decision on which cloud storage system is right for them. <em>(Skip below to the section </em><strong><em>“List of Issues…”</em></strong><em> if you are only interested in the comparison of the systems and don’t want to know more about our decision-making process.)</em></p><p>We achieved our remote-work success by devising a three-part cloud strategy:</p><ol><li>Project management</li><li>DAM (digital asset management)</li><li>File storage and sharing</li></ol><p>We had been working on deploying Workfront, a cloud-based project management system, for several months and had gone live with it in March, literally on the day we were sent home for the lockdown. Critically, in addition to project management, Workfront also features a best-in-class digital proofing system, ProofHQ, which eliminates the need for physical proofs for routings and approvals.</p><p>We had also known for some time that we needed a cloud-based DAM that would allow us to store our final deliverables, perform DRM (digital rights management), link to our digital assets centrally rather than download, and provide access and version control. However, in a large bureaucracy like our company, it would take some time to research systems, build a business case, staff for the resource needs, implement, and migrate assets.</p><p>The cloud storage system was designed to hold shared team folders, work-in-progress files, and project asset files. However, it also temporarily stored our final deliverables until the DAM system was operational.</p><h4><strong>The Scope of the Problem</strong></h4><p>Creative work is one of the most computing-intensive fields of business. The digital footprint of a large creative department in a major corporation like ours is almost incomprehensibly vast, comprising hundreds of thousands of graphic design files, millions of photos, and hundreds of terabytes of video.</p><p>At the start of the pandemic lockdown, all of these files resided on on-premise file servers. With the entire company trying to use VPN, access to the servers had become problematic. File operations that took minutes in the office might take hours working over VPN.</p><p>To keep working, we resorted to copying thousands of files to laptops, portable hard drives, and flash drives. We also had a small number of Dropbox licenses, but not enough for our entire team. In a matter of weeks, our work became scattered. The orderly file structure that we had thoughtfully crafted for the better part of a decade was disintegrating into chaos before our very eyes. Productivity declined, mistakes were being made, and stress levels were high.</p><h4><strong>Selecting a cloud-storage system</strong></h4><p>Cloud storage would solve our problems by allowing us to bypass VPN and access our files directly. When we set about deciding on which cloud storage system to use, the most important requirement we had was that it could synchronize low-resolution proxies of the files stored in the cloud to our users’ local drives, simulating the familiar server workspace environment that our creative users were accustomed to. The storage system would then download high-res data in place of the proxies as needed by the user. Speed, reliability, and robust search were also key considerations.</p><p>Our first instinct was to select Dropbox as our cloud-storage system, as it met all of our requirements, was familiar to us, and we trusted it. We also already had a small number of licenses that we used for file transfers with outside vendors. We therefore requested an expansion of our Dropbox deployment to ensure we had enough licenses to cover our entire creative team.</p><p>However, we were asked to consider a counter-proposal: What about using <em>OneDrive for Business</em>? It also met the requirement for syncing proxies to users’ local drives, and the company was in the process of rolling out OneDrive for every employee so that it would incur no additional costs. Like most large companies, we are also significant users of Microsoft 365 products, including Outlook and Teams. Having a cloud-storage system that linked seamlessly with those other products made a lot of sense. We agreed, and our IT department began assisting us in rolling out the system to our users.</p><h4><strong>What is in a name? Everything when it comes to <em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong></h4><p>If you are familiar with OneDrive, you might mistakenly assume that OneDrive for Business is simply a higher-priced tier with additional features of the OneDrive product you are already familiar with. That is, after all, what the name implies and how most other companies scale their products for business users. But that is not the case with Microsoft: <em>OneDrive </em>and<em> OneDrive for Business </em>are, for all practical purposes,<strong> two completely different products</strong>.</p><p>OneDrive is Microsoft’s answer to Dropbox, primarily intended for individual users to store their personal Office documents. And while OneDrive has some sharing capabilities, it cannot create collaborative team folders without upgrading to OneDrive for Business, which is a marriage (or, as I have come to call it, an “<a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unholy">unholy union</a>”) of SharePoint Online and OneDrive.</p><p>SharePoint Online is where your team files are actually stored, and it also provides a web interface that is distinctly different from anything OneDrive by itself offers. OneDrive is primarily present so its sync engine can transfer files between your desktop and SharePoint Online.</p><p>This is a very different approach than Dropbox. While you must also upgrade to Dropbox Business to get collaborative team folders, Dropbox Business is clearly the same product as Dropbox. A person who has used Dropbox will easily recognize and be familiar with Dropbox Business because it uses the same Web UI at all levels and is basically just a scaled up version of Dropbox that adds more capabilities and features for business and enterprise users.</p><h4><strong>Trial and Error</strong></h4><p>As our rollout began, I immediately immersed myself in learning everything I could about <strong><em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong>. I created two internal manuals: one for our IT partners to assist with installing and configuring the system correctly on our Macs and PCs, and the other for our end-users, whom I trained in using the system.</p><p>By the end of summer 2020, we had migrated — with considerable effort — enough of our files to SharePoint Online (<strong><em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong>) so that we could start using it as our primary workspace. Problems began to manifest themselves immediately; however, I didn’t let that deter me at the time. As with the deployment of any new system, many issues arise initially and must be resolved. However, within a few months, you usually reach an inflection point where the difficulties start to subside, and the deployment begins to pay off.</p><p>Unfortunately, that was not the case this time. Rather than resolving over time, the problems with <strong><em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong> multiplied and became more serious as we added tens of thousands more files. Tickets were opened with Microsoft, but despite months of working with their technicians, they were unable to resolve or even explain the issues. However, beyond technical glitches and performance issues, we also began to realize that many key features essential to our creative teams were poorly implemented by Microsoft, particularly when compared to our later experience with Dropbox.</p><p>The list below breaks down in detail some (not all) of the most serious issues that we experienced with <strong><em>OneDrive for Business/SharePoint</em></strong>. Additionally, it demonstrates how Dropbox performs better in these areas. It is my personal belief that several of the problems listed below, particularly items 3 and 5, are a direct result of Microsoft&#39;s failure to properly integrate the cloud portion of the software (SharePoint) with the desktop software (OneDrive).</p><h4>List of Issues with OneDrive for Business and why Dropbox performs better</h4><p><strong>1. Speed</strong></p><ul><li><strong><em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong><em> </em>is slow at syncing huge folders with numerous big files; file copies to SharePoint Online websites were equally slow and would sometimes fail.</li><li><strong><em>Dropbox</em></strong> is amazingly fast at copying large numbers of big creative files. We ran several tests syncing nearly 6,000 JPEG files, 27 GB, from the desktop to both Dropbox and OneDrive for Business. Dropbox took about<em> </em>5–9 minutes<strong> </strong>each time, while OneDrive for Business<em> took over an hour</em><strong><em> </em></strong>each time. Multiple users reported that operations that previously took hours in OneDrive for Business could now be completed in less than half an hour using Dropbox.</li></ul><p><strong>2. File corruptions</strong></p><ul><li><strong><em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong> experienced multiple instances where individual files and even entire batches of files became corrupted during transfer. Despite detailed documentation of these incidents, including file paths, dates, and times, tickets opened with Microsoft failed to resolve the issues.</li><li><strong><em>Dropbox</em></strong> has never experienced corruption for us, despite us copying approximately a million files to our instance.</li></ul><p><strong>3. Renaming top-level folders</strong></p><ul><li><strong><em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong><em> </em>uses its SharePoint Online Web UI to create its top-level shared team folders. However, we encountered issues trying to rename these folders, as it would break the file sync with the desktop app (OneDrive). Although not documented, I found that you can resolve this issue by manually renaming the folder in the desktop app to match the new SharePoint name. However, it shouldn’t be up to users to figure this out on their own. Additionally, there were issues with shared links still displaying the old name. Generally, it is not recommended to rename a top-level folder in OneDrive for Business.</li><li><strong><em>Dropbox</em></strong> functions much more like a standard file system. Renaming even top-level team folders is quick, easy, and painless.</li></ul><p><strong>4. Moving large folders with the Web UI</strong></p><ul><li><strong><em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong><em> </em>struggles with moving folders with a large number of big files from one location to another using its SharePoint Online Web interface, and the copies frequently fail. (Moving via desktop sync is more reliable, but it is slow and can slow down your system.)</li><li><strong><em>Dropbox</em></strong> effortlessly moves folders from one location to another using its Web interface. In one recent example, we relocated a folder containing over 500,000 photos. The operation completed in under two hours with no issues and had no impact on desktop performance, as it was performed as a Web operation.</li></ul><p><strong>5. File check-out/in </strong>(prevents users from trying to edit a file at the same time)</p><ul><li><strong><em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong> cannot lock a file on the user’s desktop; it can only be done using the SharePoint Online Web interface. If you try to check a file out on your desktop, it will redirect you to the Web UI to complete the task, and it requires several steps to do so. Additionally, “checked-out” files disappear from other users’ folders, leaving them wondering what happened to them, rather than locking the files so they can’t be edited. It’s essentially too complicated for anyone to use.</li><li><strong><em>Dropbox</em></strong> refers to check-out/in as “Lock for editing.” It can be performed in just one click at the user’s desktop level. When a file is locked, it shows up on other user’s computers with a padlock icon indicating it is closed, if that user double-clicks on the file to try to open it, it tells the user the file is locked, who has it locked, and asks if the user would like to send a notification to the owner requesting that it be unlocked. It is a very elegant solution that is both simple and feature-rich.</li></ul><p><strong>6. File deconfliction</strong> (prevents files from being overwritten if two users accidentally edit at the same time)</p><ul><li><strong><em>OneDrive for Business’s</em></strong> deconfliction mechanism has failed to function correctly on multiple occasions, resulting in users losing hours of effort due to overwritten files.</li><li><strong><em>Dropbox’s</em></strong> deconfliction mechanism has never failed to work correctly for us.</li></ul><p><strong>7. Sync delay and reliability</strong></p><ul><li><strong><em>OneDrive for Busines</em></strong><em>s </em>can experience a significant delay between when files are completed uploading to the cloud and when they become visible to other users. Sometimes, syncing stops without explanation, and OneDrive must be restarted. At other times, synced folders must be manually relinked with SharePoint Online. Sometimes, OneDrive feels it necessary to reindex all of its local files, causing the user’s computer to slow down, sometimes for hours.</li><li><strong><em>Dropbox</em></strong> has almost no delay between when files are completed copying to the cloud and when they appear for other users to view and begin working with them. Sync is always on and is entirely reliable. I have never noticed Dropbox doing a complete reindex on its local files.</li></ul><p><strong>8. Partial word search</strong></p><ul><li><strong><em>OneDrive for Business’s</em></strong><em> </em>SharePoint Online Web interface cannot perform partial word searches. That is, it can’t find words that are part of other words in a file name if spaces do not separate them. For example, if looking for the file “redlipstick.png” (no space between red and lipstick), a search for the word “red” will not find it. One can add an asterisk as a wildcard to a search parameter, but only as a suffix, not as a prefix. Thus, searching for “red*” will find the file. But searching for “*lipstick” will not. (This antiquated and limited search mechanism may have been the most surprising feature of SharePoint Online.)</li><li><strong><em>Dropbox</em></strong> can perform partial word searches.</li></ul><p><strong>9. File Transfers and Requests</strong> (ability to send a one-time copy of a file with delivery confirmation or request files from users without accounts)</p><ul><li><strong><em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong> lacks “transfer” and “request” features that Dropbox has.</li><li><strong><em>Dropbox’s</em></strong> Transfer and Request features are handy for us to send and receive files with users who do not have Dropbox accounts. Sent files also have the option for delivery confirmation, passwords, and expiration dates. The fact that these features can serve any number of users with a single link is vital to our use case. For example, we can set up a file request where hundreds of conference attendees can send us social media photos and videos using a single link that is emailed or texted to them.</li></ul><h3><strong>Transitioning to Dropbox</strong></h3><p>We used <strong><em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong> for about nine months. (Six months exclusively, and another three while transitioning to the new system.) Most of that time was a struggle. We weren’t able to focus on our work because we were too distracted by the dysfunction of the technology that was supposed to facilitate that work. Before switching, we conducted additional due diligence this time and compiled a list of replacement candidates that included <strong><em>Dropbox, WeTransfer,</em></strong> and <strong><em>Box</em></strong>. I also reached out to a consultant with expertise in cloud storage at a top technology research firm.</p><p>The consultant confirmed our conclusions: <strong><em>OneDrive for Business</em></strong> is designed for general office use and is not generally regarded as a solution for creative teams. And while our other candidates were good options, <strong><em>Dropbox’s</em></strong> optimization of high-volume, large-file transfers is hard to beat. These factors, along with our familiarity with Dropbox and existing vendor relationship, made it the best fit for us.</p><p>The migration of our files from OneDrive for Business to Dropbox was completed by the end of summer 2021. By that time, we had also implemented our DAM (we chose Widen, now Acquia DAM), which is now meeting our expectations. Using Dropbox for work-in-progress files and project assets, along with Widen DAM for final deliverables, has proven to be an excellent combination.</p><p>The only complaint that we’ve had is that Dropbox has been slow to update its software to be <a href="https://help.dropbox.com/installs-integrations/desktop/macos-12-monterey-support">compatible with macOS 12.3 Monterey</a>. If you are running macOS 12.3, certain automated features of Dropbox’s Smart Sync don’t work. There are workarounds, but they are inconvenient, and Dropbox should have had a fully compatible version out by now.</p><p>That issue aside, Dropbox functions so well that it fades into the background, which is as it should be. We can finally focus on our work instead of worrying about how to complete it. I’d call that a win.</p><figure><a href="https://buymeacoffee.com/davidkwilson"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5fCWVCbZveBHdWzwkKWzTQ.png" /></a><figcaption>If you’ve enjoyed this article, please consider clicking above to buy me a coffee! Any donation that you can make is welcome and helps me to continue to develop and share content for people to enjoy.</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=38537167ea8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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