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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by David Chen on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by David Chen on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@dchen333?source=rss-61dd6a2d2e3a------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by David Chen on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dchen333?source=rss-61dd6a2d2e3a------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Everything Your Doctor Touches Turns To Gold (For Someone)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-poleax/everything-your-doctor-touches-turns-to-gold-for-someone-db711de6cdf?source=rss-61dd6a2d2e3a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pharmaceutical]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[obama]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Aug 2017 12:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-24T17:25:02.097Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How healthcare providers rake in profits and drive up already exorbitant costs</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/796/1*RyIQiZuak2bsw3AuYvW8fw.png" /><figcaption>Photo by epSos.de (<a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/legalcode">CC BY 2.0</a>)</figcaption></figure><p><em>This is Part Four of David Chen’s ongoing series </em>How Drug Pricing Works<em>.</em></p><p><a href="https://thepoleax.com/hiking-downhill-555fdeda98a5">Hiking Downhill</a></p><p>In 2009, Dr. Atul Gawande wrote <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-conundrum"><em>The Cost Conundrum</em></a><em>,</em> a clinical examination of how distorted incentives were dramatically increasing costs, along with profits to hospitals and physicians. The journey he takes through McAllen, Texas, is a case study in how oddities in our healthcare system have evolved into a nightmarish system of over-billing and unnecessary care, even as actual health outcomes in America stagnate. Applied broadly, it’s part of the reason why the US <a href="http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/press-releases/2015/oct/us-spends-more-on-health-care-than-other-nations">famously spends more on healthcare, with worse results, than other countries</a>.</p><p>I’ve previously covered how <a href="https://thepoleax.com/how-drug-pricing-works-a919b398a4c9">big pharma</a> and <a href="https://thepoleax.com/the-middlemen-of-prescription-drugs-2c386eb1df80">various middlemen</a> manipulate drug prices, as well as how high drug prices can incentivize bad behavior. But on the provider side, the scene isn’t always much better. Maximizing the volume of procedures, scans, and tests — necessary or not — allows care providers to drive up revenue. In these cases, a reimbursement system of <a href="http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/08/17/breaking-the-fee-for-service-addiction-lets-move-to-a-comprehensive-primary-care-payment-model/">fees for services</a>, combined with the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/magazine/those-indecipherable-medical-bills-theyre-one-reason-health-care-costs-so-much.html">evolution of an entire industry of medical billing and coding</a> to maximize returns on reimbursements, create the means for stark wealth generation.</p><p>The story is different for drugs. In normal scenarios, physicians serve as independent agents when prescribing drugs for patients to pick up at a pharmacy. There, the patient pays a co-pay and the doctor is mostly left out of the transaction. Doctors typically do not have high <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.0040283">awareness</a> <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/bcpt.12678/full">of drug costs</a> and prescribe with a focus on clinical attributes, although at times this can result in physicians prescribing expensive branded products, like <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-arent-doctors-prescribing-the-cheaper-epipen-alternative/">EpiPens instead of cheaper g</a>enerics. Sometimes, doctors can get involved by <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3235606/">providing information about patient assistance programs</a> to help with affordability, but in most cases, there’s a disconnect between drug-prescribing and provider revenue.</p><p>With an important exception: medical benefit reimbursement, either from private insurance or from Medicare Part B reimbursement. Not all drugs are obtained at the pharmacy; some, particularly those that require physician administration like many injectables or infusions, will be covered under these medical benefits, <a href="https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/prescription-drugs-outpatient.html">documented here</a>. Physicians purchase these drugs directly and are compensated by insurers or Medicare directly: Medicare will reimburse based on a drug’s <a href="https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/primer-medicare-part-b-drug-payment-system/">Average Sales Price</a> (ASP) plus a margin of six percent, while private insurers will typically reimburse at <a href="http://www.drugchannels.net/2013/04/the-latest-data-on-specialty-pharmacy.html">ASP plus 12 percent</a> or some similar amount or with a similar method. This process is known as <a href="http://www.drugchannels.net/2016/03/why-cmss-crazy-plan-to-remake-medicare.html">buy and bill</a>.</p><p>There are a variety of technicalities to ASP — in simplified terms, <a href="https://www.auanet.org/Documents/practices-resources/reimbursement/CommonUrologyDrugPayment.pdf">it’s the gross revenues of a drug divided by total volume</a> — but what’s important here is that the higher the ASP, the bigger that margin of six to 12 percent. Just as we’ve seen before, the higher the price of a drug, the bigger the reimbursement. (Six percent of $200 is more than six percent of $100).</p><p>Buy-and-bill is particularly common with oncology, where the reimbursement process has been a significant driver of dollars: on the order of <a href="http://www.drugchannels.net/2016/03/why-cmss-crazy-plan-to-remake-medicare.html">70 percent of the revenues of a typical oncology practice</a> and <a href="http://www.drugchannels.net/2016/03/why-cmss-crazy-plan-to-remake-medicare.html">40 percent of Medicare Part B costs in 2014</a> (<a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/09/469792479/medicare-looks-to-cut-drug-costs-by-changing-how-it-pays-doctors">$7.8 billion</a>). It’s easy to see how such a system can be influential.</p><p><a href="https://thepoleax.com/comp-med-101-6b7dd0c080c3">Comparative Medicine 101</a></p><p>In 2016, the Obama administration and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) made a controversial effort to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/11/a-controversial-rule-could-change-how-doctors-profit-from-using-the-most-expensive-drugs/?utm_term=.f654f4bf4983">reform these payment policies</a>, attempting to shift reimbursement to a more fixed fee approach: instead of ASP plus six percent payment, it would be a flat fee plus a 2.5 percent markup, reducing the incentive to use costlier drugs. CMS would also have eliminated or reduced the copays that patients currently face in cost-sharing for more expensive drugs.</p><p>Strong pushback emerged from physician groups, the drug industry, and patient organizations. They claimed the new regulation was biased against newer and more effective (and more costly) drugs, and that it would hurt the ability of smaller oncology practices to provide these drugs, since they lack the volume to negotiate lower prices with manufacturers. The American Society of Clinical Oncology, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association, the Cancer Support Community, and more than 100 other groups sent a <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/09/469792479/medicare-looks-to-cut-drug-costs-by-changing-how-it-pays-doctors">letter opposing the changes</a>. In the end, CMS acquiesced and <a href="https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/medicare/62130">halted the initiative due to concerns</a>.</p><p>While the 2016 payment changes were scrapped, other payment reforms are still occurring, and there have been other initiatives to try to alter the current models of payment and healthcare delivery, from an <a href="https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/oncology-care/">oncology care model</a> to the <a href="http://www.fiercepharma.com/sales-and-marketing/express-scripts-rolls-out-value-based-pricing-for-cancer-meds">payment of drug manufacturers based on clinical outcomes</a> to a variety of <a href="https://www.vox.com/cards/obamacare/does-obamacare-change-the-card-hospitals-and-doctors-provide">Obamacare initiatives</a>. Change is needed: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/02/15/u-s-health-care-spending-projected-to-soar-to-5-5-trillion-by-2025/?utm_term=.707d44ec6b76">as our current spending trends show</a>, the status quo is unsustainable.</p><p>Still, episodes like the CMS payment changes show why healthcare reform can be so fundamentally hard: it means potential trade-offs between value and efficacy, and it can mean taking away money. Perhaps that’s why the most talked-up changes for healthcare revolve around buzzwords like “value” and “bending the cost curve.” It implies a win-win for everyone, no sacrifices needed. But change is hard, and inertia makes it harder; as Gawande noted in more <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/health-cares-cost-conundrum-squared">recent</a> <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/overkill-atul-gawande">pieces</a>, and as the latest data shows, things have not yet significantly shifted since 2009 when Gawande covered those curious discrepancies. That includes medical benefit reimbursement, another case where high prices mean more profit for someone other than the patient.</p><p><a href="https://thepoleax.com/hanlons-razor-on-capitol-hill-e2cad48559fd">Hanlon’s Razor On Capitol Hill</a></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/dchen333"><em>David Chen</em></a><em> is based in Boston.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db711de6cdf" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-poleax/everything-your-doctor-touches-turns-to-gold-for-someone-db711de6cdf">Everything Your Doctor Touches Turns To Gold (For Someone)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-poleax">The Poleax</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Asian-Americans And Affirmative Action]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-poleax/asian-americans-and-affirmative-action-7903c0fedcab?source=rss-61dd6a2d2e3a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7903c0fedcab</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[asian-american]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[affirmative-action]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[higher-education]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Aug 2017 19:20:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-11T19:57:09.108Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>The affirmative action debates are incomplete</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6MIU6wN4M9ng0UASv-ZNcQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Faolin42">John Phelan</a> (<a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode">CC BY 3.0</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>There’s been a renewed sense of controversy surrounding affirmative action in recent years. Between the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/politics/supreme-court-affirmative-action-university-of-texas.html">Fisher</a> case and a <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2017-02-03/are-asians-the-new-face-of-affirmative-action">variety of lawsuits</a> and <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/14/princeton">investigations</a> pointed against schools like Harvard and Princeton, the debate around affirmative action has again become a prominent battle in a retrenched culture war. Most recently, it’s been reported that the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/us/politics/trump-affirmative-action-universities.html">Trump administration is looking to have the Department of Justice investigate the issue</a>.</p><p>In particular, this is an issue that divides Asian-Americans. While the <a href="http://naasurvey.com/where-do-asian-americans-stand-on-affirmative-action/">majority support affirmative action policies</a>, ethnicity is a sizable predictor of opinion, with, for example, <a href="http://www.apiavote.org/sites/apiavote/files/Inclusion-2016-AAVS-final.pdf">Chinese being mostly against and Filipinos and Vietnamese being mostly for</a>. Some recent Chinese immigrants have shown <a href="http://supchina.com/2017/06/14/split-heart-chinese-america/">robust opposition</a>. But like most issues, there’s a great deal of incomplete information, confirmation bias, and other forms of muddled thinking. The result is that affirmative action seems to get an outsized proportion of coverage for an impact that is likely less than the hyperbole implies.</p><p>One example, <a href="http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-adv-asian-race-tutoring-20150222-story.html">frequently</a> <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21669595-asian-americans-are-united-states-most-successful-minority-they-are-complaining-ever">cited</a>, is the SAT-score racial gap found by a <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/~tje/files/webAdmission%20Preferences%20Espenshade%20Chung%20Walling%20Dec%202004.pdf">Princeton study</a>. Looking at the methodology, however, it seems the study didn’t control for income. Which is remarkable, because the SAT is insanely <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/03/05/these-four-charts-show-how-the-sat-favors-the-rich-educated-families/">correlated with income</a>, and thus undercuts the findings.</p><p>Another analysis comes from looking at MIT versus Harvard. Both are world-renowned, are located in Cambridge, and use a similar <a href="https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/application-process/what-we-look">holistic admissions</a><a href="http://mitadmissions.org/apply/process/selection"> process</a>. In contrast to the numerous lawsuits Harvard has faced, I haven’t heard of any discussions about potentially unfair admissions practices with MIT. Even Ron Unz, one of the men behind a variety of anti-affirmative action initiatives, claims MIT is more <a href="http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-myth-of-american-meritocracy/">meritocratic</a> than the Ivies.</p><blockquote>Trying to distill merit among so many students is a task of near impossibility; most students at one top school would fit in fine at another and, at some point, the qualifications become a wash. Perhaps as a result, the current admissions process has a priority on creating a diverse learning environment, instead of what people seem to think of as a discrete measure of merit.</blockquote><p>Why is this the case? Presumably because MIT’s Asian-American enrollment has been between <a href="http://mitadmissions.org/apply/process/profile">30 and 35</a> percent of the total number for the past few years, whereas Harvard has been at around 15 to 20 percent, with the latest class reaching <a href="https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/admissions-statistics">22</a> percent. And yet, MIT and Harvard still have fairly similar numbers of minority students who supposedly benefit from affirmative action, and both schools practice holistic admissions. What drives this difference?</p><p>There are three key differences between MIT and Harvard as it relates to admissions:</p><ol><li>There is <a href="http://mitadmissions.org/blogs/entry/just-to-be-clear-we-dont-do-legacy">no legacy preference at MIT</a>, which by its nature, would favor white applicants.</li><li>MIT is a Division-III athletic school, while Harvard is Division I. Despite making up 15 to 25 percent of the student body at the Ivy Leagues (all DI schools), Asian-Americans make up only around <a href="http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/diversity-research">seven percent of the athletes</a>. If you go to DI schools in general, that goes down to about two percent. And athletic recruiting is much more impactful at Harvard than MIT.</li><li>But this is perhaps the most significant driver in terms of raw numbers: Harvard is <a href="https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/admissions-statistics">roughly 50 percent STEM</a> and MIT is over <a href="http://web.mit.edu/registrar/stats/degrees/index.html">97 percent STEM</a>. When you consider how over-represented Asians are in <a href="https://trends.collegeboard.org/education-pays/figures-tables/students-stem-fields-gender-and-race-ethnicity">STEM programs</a>, this ends up having a major effect on undergraduate admissions. Demand for a STEM-focused education and career is high in general, and when programs like <a href="https://www.cs.washington.edu/prospective_students/undergrad/admissions">University of Washington’s Computer Science &amp; Engineering</a> are notorious for being highly competitive, that combined with the STEM-skewing for Asian-Americans can make the competition seem inflated. This is really important when you’re talking about the seats at MIT being double those at Harvard. STEM majors also tend to do better on <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-the-average-sat-score-for-every-college-major-2014-10">standardized tests like the SAT or GRE</a>; it’s in the nature of the tests and US curriculum.</li></ol><p>All of this means that when studies aren’t controlling for many of these factors, you’re going to get misleading results.</p><p>These schools each claim they’re building a class. For a school like Harvard — especially when compared to MIT — that means balancing out the academic interests and backgrounds, which in turn means there are only so many STEM-focused students they can take. It also means the clubs and organizations and sports teams have to be somewhat representative of different parts of the US. (E.g., it’s likely easier to get into Harvard from Alabama than New England. ) Then there’s the international factor along with <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/03/13/want-an-edge-in-college-admissions-see-the-schools-where-women-and-men-have-an-advantage/?utm_term=.e7ef21147253">gender. (Note the Caltech gap.)</a> A diverse student body is measured in other ways too, including socioeconomic considerations.</p><p>You can get an alternative idea of it if you look at an orchestra, which only needs so many violinists. At almost every elite school, the violin sections are usually <a href="http://www.harvardradcliffeorchestra.org/members-1/">50 percent</a> to over <a href="http://yso.yalecollege.yale.edu/about-us/musicians">66 percent</a> Asian. If your strength as an applicant is around STEM <em>and</em> the violin, well, that’s going to be a competitive applicant pool that has a lot of Asian-Americans. Notably, if you look at Brown’s symphony orchestra, STEM majors are <a href="http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Music/sites/orchestra/musicians">70 percent of the group</a>. This isn’t an accident: I think it’s safe to say many Asian-Americans can identify with <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/jeremy-lins-younger-brother-joe-chases-his-basketball-dreams">this sentiment</a>, from Jeremy Lin’s dad:</p><blockquote>Gie-Ming, having successfully passed his passion for basketball on to his three sons, is a proud father. “The efforts were not in vain,” he told me. In Taiwan, he said, academics were emphasized at the expense of sports, and he saw the same attitude among many of the Chinese families he knew in California. <em>[Emphasis mine.] </em><strong>Co-workers would wonder why Gie-Ming was investing so much time in his sons’ pursuit of basketball when it seemed that, for Asian-American kids, it would never lead anywhere.</strong></blockquote><p>Caltech, which reportedly does not consider race and is often regarded as one of the most meritocratic schools in terms of admissions, is <a href="https://www.registrar.caltech.edu/academics/enrollment">42 percent </a>Asian-American. Note that this can be further skewed by California being <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demography_of_California">roughly 15 percent Asian</a>, compared to <a href="http://statisticalatlas.com/region/Northeast/Race-and-Ethnicity">about six percent</a> for the Northeast and the US in general. All things considered, this is not as significant a gap compared to MIT as one would initially think — and perhaps this is why MIT has avoided lawsuits, unlike Harvard.</p><p>The rhetoric around the topic is filled with confirmation bias and omissions. It’s hard to grasp that approximately 17,000 kids are going to score in the 99th percentile of the SAT and 16,000 will score in that percentile for the ACT. There are over 30,000 valedictorians in the nation and just as many salutatorians. That is a lot of academically qualified students just at the very top, especially when you consider that only 2,000 might gain admission to a single elite school.</p><p>Trying to distill merit among so many students is a task of near impossibility; most students at one top school would fit in fine at another and, at some point, the qualifications become a wash. Perhaps as a result, the current admissions process has a priority on creating a diverse learning environment, instead of what people seem to think of as a discrete measure of merit.</p><p>After all, people’s perception of merit is not so steadfast; <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/13/white-definitions-merit-and-admissions-change-when-they-think-about-asian-americans">one study</a> shows how whites favor policies that place a high priority on test scores and GPA, until they learn Asian Americans do better under such circumstances.</p><p>Princeton was<a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/09/24/ocr-clears-princeton-anti-asian-discrimination-admissions"> cleared of anti-Asian bias</a> in 2015 by the Department of Education Office of Civil Rights. A relevant passage:</p><blockquote>The university reported to OCR that the university “frequently accepted to the Class of 2010 applicants from Asian backgrounds with grades and test scores lower than rejected non-Asian applicants.” The university gave OCR specific examples of Asian-American applicants for the Class of 2010 whose grades and SAT scores were not near the top of the range usually seen by the university’s admissions officers, but who nonetheless were offered admission. These included an Asian-American applicant who had “only” a 3.45 GPA in high school, but who was a nationally recognized athlete; and two other Asian-American applicants with relatively low GPAs and SAT scores who were notable for other distinctions such as community service, overcoming impoverished backgrounds and working in a family business.</blockquote><blockquote>Added the OCR report: “As the university told OCR, regarding the Class of 2010, the university ‘denied admission to literally hundreds of non-Asian applicants for the Class of 2010 who were valedictorians, and over three thousand non-Asian applicants with a 4.0 GPA. These non-Asian applicants were not admitted despite the fact that many Asian students who did not have these academic credentials were admitted.</blockquote><p>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grutter_v._Bollinger">core argument behind the Supreme Court’s defenses</a> of affirmative action fall under two lines:</p><ol><li>Diversity is valuable in the context of education.</li><li>Affirmative action is a <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/134588/anthony-kennedy-came-around-affirmative-action">factor of a factor</a>.</li></ol><p>Caught up in all the confirmation bias, anecdotes, and incomplete information is that in the end, admissions is incredibly competitive. The stories of hyper-competitive applicants who get into one school and not another are everywhere, but many others are often missing, including the above. With so many factors being considered and so many students who are qualified, it’s hard to pin anything down, but the MIT and Harvard example shows that something as simple as academic interest is likely to be a much more powerful factor.</p><p>So on that note, here’s an illustrious <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/24/opinion/yang-harvard-lawsuit/index.html">excerpt</a> from Jeff Yang, an Asian-American writer, and his admissions story:</p><blockquote>What saved my application was the optional interview I’d done on campus, in which I’d ended up talking about everything that wasn’t in my application: My aspirations to be a writer. The horror movie that I’d scripted and shot in secret at our high school. The subtle differences between anxiety, suspense and fear. The fact that I actually really, really suck at piano.</blockquote><blockquote>The interviewer made the case that I had intangibles that made me a potential asset to the student body, and pressed for me to be considered seriously, despite my middling distinction. Someone decided to take his advice. I hope they didn’t end up regretting it.</blockquote><p><em>[Editor’s note: Asian-Americans here is used inclusive of people with roots in the whole continent. However, Asian-American is often popularly used only to refer to East and Southeast Asian populations, which further complicates the issue.]</em></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/dchen333"><em>David Chen</em></a><em> is based in Boston.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7903c0fedcab" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-poleax/asian-americans-and-affirmative-action-7903c0fedcab">Asian-Americans And Affirmative Action</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-poleax">The Poleax</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hiking Downhill]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-poleax/hiking-downhill-555fdeda98a5?source=rss-61dd6a2d2e3a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/555fdeda98a5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[medicine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pharmaceutical]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drugs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jul 2017 14:45:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-18T14:54:03.815Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Part Three of How Drug Pricing Works: The plight of wholesalers in the pharmaceutical economy</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KVWnq7jd2MG-9pJflPdkkQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Interior of Katz drug store. Kansas City, MO, from t</em>he <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Interior_of_Katz_drug_store._Kansas_City,_Mo_-_NARA_-_283620.jpg">National Archives and Records Administration</a>.</figcaption></figure><ul><li><a href="https://thepoleax.com/the-middlemen-of-prescription-drugs-2c386eb1df80">The Middlemen Of Prescription Drugs</a></li><li><a href="https://thepoleax.com/how-drug-pricing-works-a919b398a4c9">How Drug Pricing Works</a></li></ul><p>Last year, companies McKesson, Cardinal, and AmerisourceBergen (ABC) all saw steep drops in their stock prices as they reduced their earnings forecasts; on one occasion in late October, they lost nearly 20 percent of their value practically overnight. Similar drops happened for these stocks in mid-April, though they’ve since recovered. Here’s what happened . . .</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mnZrAJ-HSW1v46w8RWOrOg.png" /><figcaption>Image from <a href="https://www.google.com/finance?chdnp=1&amp;chdd=1&amp;chds=1&amp;chdv=1&amp;chvs=maximized&amp;chdeh=0&amp;chfdeh=0&amp;chdet=1499917860441&amp;chddm=252279&amp;chls=IntervalBasedLine&amp;cmpto=NYSE:CAH;NYSE:ABC&amp;cmptdms=0;0&amp;q=NYSE:MCK&amp;ntsp=0&amp;ei=bOxmWYigLMXomAG5u6awDQ">Google Finance</a></figcaption></figure><p>McKesson, Cardinal, and ABC (stock prices in the above image) are the three largest drug wholesalers in the US, controlling around 85 percent of the wholesale market. They are also three of the largest companies in the US <a href="http://fortune.com/fortune500/list/">(numbers 5, 11, and 15 in the Fortune 500, respectively</a>), with roughly a combined $500 billion in revenue in 2016.</p><p>Their job is to distribute drugs from manufacturers to retail pharmacies, who then dispense drugs to patients. Wholesalers are common in any industry, providing value by specializing in distribution and maximizing efficiency.</p><p>But why did the future look so bleak for these particular wholesalers? The answer lies in yet another example of how current players in our healthcare system benefit by driving up drug prices.</p><p>Check out the graphic <a href="http://www.healthcarevaluehub.org/files/8314/5943/9552/Opaque_Route_to_Drug_Pricing.pdf">linked here</a> on Healthcare Value Hub. It shows the complexity of the drug supply chain in the US. My previous pieces in this series looked at the top portion of the flow chart: the manufacturer, the Pharmacy Benefits Manager (PBM), the health plan, and the patient. While that covers much of process of <em>paying</em> for the drug, the bottom portion of the figure shows the flow of the actual <em>product</em>.</p><p>Wholesalers buy the product and sell it to pharmacies, who then dispense it to patients. Notice that wholesalers also get discounts and fees and bonuses from manufacturers along the way. As with the PBMs, the essential question is how these payments come to be structured and justified.</p><p>McKesson’s CEO, John Hammergren, <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/mckesson-warns-about-wholesalers-drug-price-scrutiny-shares-fall-2016-10">offered some insight</a> on “branded inflation,” i.e. price increases for drugs:</p><blockquote>What we have seen this year to-date, [are] fewer products with price increases, and those price increases are at lower rates than both prior year results and our expectations for the current fiscal year. Given our second-quarter performance specific to branded price inflation, we now expect full-year branded pharmaceutical pricing trends to be meaningfully below those experienced in Fiscal 2016.</blockquote><p>He’s referring to a slowdown in drug price increases announced earlier this year. Drug-makers promised to <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-drug-prices-drugmakers-20170227-story.html">limit their price increases to single digits</a>, compared to double digit increases in past years. As a result, fewer drugs are seeing price increases, and the magnitude of those increases are lower.</p><p>So what sort of impact does that make? Hammergren (emphasis mine):</p><blockquote>Today, all of our contracts with branded pharmaceutical manufacturers are individually negotiated, but generally, are constructed around charging for the service we provide. <strong>In almost all cases, the charge is derived as a percent of revenue managed and delivered by McKesson for that specific manufacturer.</strong> These charges vary not only by manufacturer, but also by the service requirement at the product level.</blockquote><blockquote>Clearly, revenue-based fees are all affected at some level by inflation. However, in some cases the benefit from inflation is greater, given the specifics and the characteristics of individual contracts . . . <strong>So the takeaway here is that branded inflation still plays a meaningful role, and in some cases, it can be an important part of our overall compensation with specific manufacturers, and we can be impacted by their decisions, relative to price increases.</strong></blockquote><p>What Hammergren is describing here is similar to what we previously saw <a href="https://thepoleax.com/the-middlemen-of-prescription-drugs-2c386eb1df80">with PBMs</a>. For each drug, the wholesaler negotiates a chargeback (i.e. a discount or rebate) with a given manufacturer. This way, the more the wholesaler distributes, the bigger its cut. However, the structure of this chargeback is critical; it could be a raw dollar amount, resulting in revenue depending only on volume shipped, or it could be percentage-based and mean that more costly drugs result in more revenue.</p><p>Although the specifics of the chargebacks are confidential, Hammergren hints at the nature of their structure: some of McKesson’s contracts are tied to the list prices of drugs, which means that higher list prices get McKesson more money.</p><p><strong>McKesson’s forecasts must have assumed ongoing increases in list prices, and did not account for the backlash against rising drug costs. </strong>Think about the public reaction to Martin Shkreli or the makers of the EpiPen, as well as the <a href="http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/333477-trump-taking-aim-at-drug-pricing">rhetoric Trump brought into the conversation</a>. As more gradual price increases were announced, McKesson’s forecasts went down.</p><p><a href="http://www.drugchannels.net/2016/10/what-mckessons-profit-warning-means-for.html">Hammergren had one more thing to say about the matter</a> (emphases, again, mine):</p><blockquote>I think we have every right to go back to those manufacturers and say, listen, we need to open the dialogue again because by your unilateral decision, <strong>you have significantly impacted our profitability on your particular product lines and we don’t think that’s fair and we want to recover that lost margin.</strong> So I think that that certainly is something we plan to pursue.</blockquote><p>It’s clear that McKesson was counting (at least in part) on the rapid price increases of the past few years to drive its own profits, and they’ve suffered as the party winds down. That dependency was enough to drive massive drops in the stock prices of each major wholesaler this year.</p><p>Perhaps this kind of disruption will result in new negotiations and changes in the contracts so that list prices aren’t the basis of compensation.</p><p>On the other hand, maybe not. Stocks are generally back up and, as investors have noted, Trump’s rhetoric on drug pricing has been severely reigned in. Instead of trying to prevent what he described as “getting away with murder,” he’s been working with the industry to <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/16/trump-drug-prices-industry-239659">create legislation</a>. Such legislation mostly focuses on FDA approvals and creating competition, which is all well and good, but is not nearly as drastic as suggestions of Medicare-pooled negotiation, drug importation, and other ideas Trump <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/house/323067-cummings-trump-commits-to-strong-push-for-medicare-drug-price-negotiation">had previously</a> “<a href="https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/02/trump-health-care-plan/">supported</a>.” <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-21/biotech-stocks-rise-as-trump-drug-price-risk-seems-to-lessen">The result has been a much happier drug industry</a>, and with that, happier wholesalers; notice how the NASDAQ biotech index spikes up alongside the wholesalers in mid-June below, as news emerged that Trump’s drug pricing proposals lacked teeth.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NWlmTmoBkaT7_9w7JXXPlw.png" /><figcaption>From Google Finance</figcaption></figure><p>The question then is how this type of system emerged, where increasing drug prices create so much value for so many with seemingly limited downsides. That’s for part four . . .</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/dchen333"><em>David Chen</em></a><em> is based in Boston.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=555fdeda98a5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-poleax/hiking-downhill-555fdeda98a5">Hiking Downhill</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-poleax">The Poleax</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Middlemen Of Prescription Drugs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-poleax/the-middlemen-of-prescription-drugs-2c386eb1df80?source=rss-61dd6a2d2e3a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2c386eb1df80</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pharmaceutical]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medicine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 May 2017 12:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-16T17:56:04.040Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Part Two: PBMs play both sides</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/827/1*wN9Nz9Zs_k1IyRTFFmtDug.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://publikationsserver.tu-braunschweig.de/receive/dbbs_mods_00032797"><em>Illustration</em></a><em> from Was soll ich werden?</em> by Lothar Meggendorfer (<a href="https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/deed.en">PDM 1.0</a>)</figcaption></figure><p><em>This is Part Two of </em>How Drug Pricing Works<em>, a series of rundowns on the business and economics of the healthcare and the pharmaceutical industries once you get past the political rhetoric — insofar as things can exist outside of rhetoric and politics.</em></p><p><a href="https://thepoleax.com/how-drug-pricing-works-a919b398a4c9">How Drug Pricing Works</a></p><p>As I wrote in the first installment, markets — privately and publicly driven — influence how companies negotiate drug prices and that affects consumer prices. Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) are one of the key negotiators for drugs in the US. They interact with a variety of bodies in the healthcare industry, but as far drug pricing goes, what’s relevant here is how PBMs connect health plans with drug manufacturers.</p><p>Originally, PBMs simply processed drug claims, but as more health plans outsourced claim-processing to them, PBMs got into the business of <a href="http://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1131&amp;context=vulr">negotiating drug prices with manufacturers for their health plan clients</a>. By representing pools of health plans, they could leverage greater negotiating power when deciding which drugs to cover favorably. This proved effective and PBMs grew. Multiple mergers in the past 10 years have resulted in the dominance of three major PBMs — Express Scripts, CVS Caremark, and Optum — , which <a href="http://prospect.org/article/hidden-monopolies-raise-drug-prices">control 75–80 percent of the market</a> now.</p><p>You can see the ability of PBMs to leverage covered lives into discounts by a quick look at the numbers. Check out slide 7 in <a href="http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NjU2NjYyfENoaWxkSUQ9MzYyNTc0fFR5cGU9MQ==&amp;t=1">a recent presentation</a> at the JP Morgan Heathcare Conference. You see that Express Scripts (ESI) has major negotiating power, with Humalog’s post-discount net price staying flat despite the pre-discount revenue increasing more than three-fold. Or take for example their <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-express-scripts-abbvie-hepatitisc-idUSKBN0K007620141222">negotiation of the Hep C cure Viekira Pak</a>; ESI got the price down to the levels found in countries like Germany or France. QuintilesIMS, a data analytics firm, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-04/in-scorpion-room-auditor-gets-scant-look-at-drug-contracts">estimates</a> that these discounts average to around 44 percent in the US.</p><p>This might lead you to believe that PBMs are simply a check on the otherwise unregulated pricing of drug manufacturers. But <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEbwZfkeIt8">that’s not entirely accurate</a>. And it’s a role that’s only recently started to get attention.</p><p>Some background. Taking the Humalog example: diabetes is a category that has seen some of the most significant list-price increases, with leading diabetes drugs Humulin, Levemir, and Lantus <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-06/diabetes-drugs-compete-with-prices-that-rise-in-lockstep">seeing price increases</a> of 325, 169, and 168 percent respectively in the past five years. These price increases are catching attention, with the manufacturers now <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/health/drugmakers-lawsuit-insulin-drugs.html?_r=0">getting sued for collusion</a>.</p><p>The eye-popping numbers are unambiguous; without regulations, free pricing allows for whatever price increases that may be desired — and clearly there has been space for it. High list prices like this make it nearly impossible for patients to afford a drug like this without health insurance or <a href="http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-pharma-s-sham-patient-assistance-programs-20150925-column.html">help from charities or patient assistance programs</a>. Even for patients that do have insurance, expensive categories like diabetes may require percent-based cost-sharing, which <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2016/04/26/rebates-offset-drug-prices-why-not-let-patients-benefit/#6b7012fe1347">expose patients to these high prices</a>. <a href="http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2629497?resultClick=1">Increasing numbers of plans with high deductibles are further exposing patients to the full prices of these drugs</a>. These pricing actions from pharma are as clear as day, and scrutiny is well warranted.</p><p>While manufacturers have driven up prices, organizations like ESI have kept net price increases relatively steady, as the aforementioned slide shows. This is what you want a negotiating body to do, and it’s a role that, in other countries, government organizations do.</p><p>But are these private organizations in the US properly conducting their roles, particularly since they negotiate as fractured Medicare segments? (Medicare as a whole is banned from leveraging its entire patient population in price negotiations, instead relying on organizations like PBMs).</p><p>A key issue is that PBMs are a black box. Negotiations and contracts are kept under lock and key, with even <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-04/in-scorpion-room-auditor-gets-scant-look-at-drug-contracts">audits managed with utmost secrecy</a>. A serious concern is the question of how much of these rebates are passed back to health plans and how price increases may benefit a PBM’s bottom line.</p><p>ESI’s stock plunged around a month ago when health insurance company Anthem, which represents 16 percent of ESI’s business, announced it would <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-24/express-scripts-says-anthem-won-t-renew-contract-after-2019">no longer use ESI’s services</a> after the current contract expires in 2019. Why? Last year, Anthem sued ESI, claiming the PBM was overcharging for services by $3 billion a year, which includes passing on ESI’s negotiated rebates. Anthem is looking for ESI to turn over pricing information as part of the case, while <a href="https://www.law360.com/articles/909717/express-scripts-concealing-basic-pricing-info-anthem-says">ESI claims such information is a trade secret</a>. Without this sort of information, it’s unknown how much PBMs are keeping to themselves — and Anthem believes the discounts aren’t enough.</p><p>Related to this lack of information is the nature of contracts with manufacturers. PBMs retain some portion of the discount. ESI and CVS claim <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-04/in-scorpion-room-auditor-gets-scant-look-at-drug-contracts">they pass along about 90 percent of rebates</a>, but the lack of transparency means insurance providers — and the insured — may have to take it on faith. It’s possible PBMs retain a percentage of a negotiated rebate, which results in higher list prices actually being beneficial to the bottom line. Negotiating a 40 percent discount on a $200 drug is going to net ESI a higher cut than getting the same percentage on a $100 drug. A<a href="http://prospect.org/article/hidden-monopolies-raise-drug-prices">nd a higher price gives a manufacturer more room to provide rebates in general.</a> In the case of Humalog, what that means is that while Humalog’s pre-discount revenue was increasing, ESI’s revenue was likely going up despite Humalog’s post-discount revenue staying flat.</p><p>As <a href="http://prospect.org/article/hidden-monopolies-raise-drug-prices">pointed out by David Dayen</a> in his exposé on PBMs, a real life example of this could be the case of AstraZenca (AZ) and its product Nexium, which stayed as a preferred drug at Medco (a subsidiary of ESI), despite being 100 times more expensive than an over-the-counter generic. <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/astrazeneca-pay-79-million-resolve-kickback-allegations">According to the Department of Justice</a>, AZ gave Medco price breaks on its other drugs in exchange for Nexium’s preferred position, where it stood as the “sole and exclusive” heartburn medication on certain Medco formularies. AZ eventually paid $7.9 million after settling, a relatively small figure given Nexiums’ $3.6 billion in revenues in 2014, <a href="http://www.policymed.com/2015/02/astrazeneca-pays-79-million-to-resolve-kickback-allegations-related-to-pbm-formulary-placement.html">even considering</a> how difficult the case probably would have been.</p><p><a href="https://thepoleax.com/color-me-skeptical-bba884066c8">Color Me Skeptical</a></p><p>Now the Nexium example isn’t totally analogous; it involved additional discounts on other products. However, it does show how the rebating game can influence formulary decisions and that the focus can be on the PBM’s bottom line. A new lawsuit may shed some more light on this. The suit alleges that PBMs extorted rebates from glucose test strip manufacturers by <a href="https://www.bna.com/cvs-abbott-others-n73014451494/">essentially implying</a> the PBMs wanted higher list prices.</p><p>PBMs themselves may represent a market failure. The size necessary to generate the best rebates and efficiently process claims allows them to conduct <a href="http://prospect.org/article/hidden-monopolies-raise-drug-prices">other exploitative practices</a>, including a variety of dealings with retail pharmacies (as covered in the Dayen piece). Whether so many PBMs should have been allowed to consolidate into the current big three is up for debate, although Anthem’s ability to cut off ESI may help indicate it isn’t quite a monopoly scenario. ESI is also a special case, in that it’s a standalone PBM, whereas the other major players (i.e. CVS and Optum) are parts of bigger organizations: CVS with its retail pharmacy and Optum with its national insurance company. Broader portfolio considerations for these PBM’s may mean they have different objectives, but the PBM economics are remain same.</p><p>This is also not to absolve other parties of their guilt; there’s more than enough to go around. Mylan’s CEO Heather Bresch attempted to deflect blame over the latest EpiPen price outrage during her congressional hearing by pinning the blame on the the current system, <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/25/investing/epipen-cost-ceo-lowers-price-mylan/">claiming it incentivizes higher prices</a>. Various executives and industry groups have also joined in and <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/19/in-the-debate-over-rising-drug-prices-both-drugmakers-and-pbms-claim-innocence.html">a blame game has emerged</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/health/drug-lobbyists-battle-cry-over-prices-blame-the-others.html">as various sides attempt to maintain their relative innocence against each other</a> as public outrage grows over apparent exploitation and the entire spectrum of American politics seems to agree that the healthcare system is in some way broken and needs fixing. And while PBMs and pharma may be pointing fingers now, it’s likely that both have been benefiting nicely.</p><p>Still, PBMs are but one example of distorted incentives and eyebrow-raising results.</p><p><em>There’s plenty more to cover on the part of manufacturers, providers, and other parties. At the same time, there are some serious and challenging issued to be discussed on how systems should work that aren’t as simple as prices being high. We’ll get back to it in Part Three.</em></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/dchen333"><em>David Chen</em></a><em> is based in Boston.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2c386eb1df80" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-poleax/the-middlemen-of-prescription-drugs-2c386eb1df80">The Middlemen Of Prescription Drugs</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-poleax">The Poleax</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Drug Pricing Works]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-poleax/how-drug-pricing-works-a919b398a4c9?source=rss-61dd6a2d2e3a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a919b398a4c9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[drugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pharmaceutical]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[David Chen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2017 03:38:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-10T20:31:03.277Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Part One: Market Burden</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ihsXz0tSqMCe90nLUAa_ag.jpeg" /><figcaption>Stamp designed by <a href="https://arago.si.edu/category_2034467.html">Ken Davis</a>. Image from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing.</figcaption></figure><p><em>This is Part One of a short series of explainers on how drug pricing actually works once you get past the political rhetoric — insofar as things can exist outside of rhetoric and politics.</em></p><p><a href="https://thepoleax.com/the-middlemen-of-prescription-drugs-2c386eb1df80"><em>Part Two</em></a></p><p><a href="https://thepoleax.com/hiking-downhill-555fdeda98a5"><em>Part Three</em></a></p><p>Perhaps only someone capable of earning the moniker “Pharma Bro” could have brought drug pricing into the realm of pop culture. Martin Shkreli gained national notoriety for raising prices on Daraprim, a treatment for toxoplasmosis and some AIDs-related diseases, by 5600 percent — or up from $13.50 to $750 per pill — in 2015. The pharmaceutical industry has been in the hot seat ever since.</p><p>Senate hearings from Republicans and Democrats, market-dropping tweets from Clinton and Trump, and enormous publicity over every move have forced the industry to be on the defensive as fingers are starting to point.</p><p>But how did we get here? Shkreli didn’t exist in a vacuum. So let’s start with how prices are set. (Later, I’ll focus on issues that have exacerbated the price-setting process, as well as ways to stymie this problem.)</p><p><a href="https://thepoleax.com/a-death-row-99980e4c949e">A Death Row</a></p><p>One of the biggest pieces of misinformation around drug pricing is the idea that high costs make up for high research and development (i.e. R&amp;D) costs. While the idea seems to make intuitive sense, the high cost of developing drugs, including covering failed developments, can’t actually influence how much people will pay. What the high cost of drug development <em>does</em> do is influence investment decisions and where to put R&amp;D dollars. But claims that high drug prices are needed to recoup R&amp;D are disconnected from the market considerations that really determine pricing.</p><p>Instead, it’s more an interaction between supply and demand that determines the prices of drugs; in other words, what a market will bear.</p><p>In most developed countries, the market is composed of payers, who range from the private insurers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) in the US to government organizations in various countries around the world. While physicians decide what drugs to prescribe and patients usually face some cost-sharing in the form of copays, the primary market is whoever pays for most of the cost of therapy. In the US, it’s those insurers and PBMs.</p><p>So how do companies determine what the market will bear? In short, conversations and research. <em>The Wall Street Journal</em> <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-art-of-setting-a-drug-price-1449628081">covers how some of this is done in the US</a>. Companies directly or indirectly (e.g. via consultants) discuss with payers how they perceive a certain disease category and how they would manage a new drug, depending on its price. Would they pay for a drug at all? Require it to be used after another drug? Demand a lower price? Depending on the country, different organizations have different elements of control. Many EU countries are very willing to play hardball and say no if the price isn’t right.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e6ASfm03P4mboQEvcLbozA.jpeg" /><figcaption>A pharmacist dispensing syropus acetosus in his shop. School of Giovannino de Grassi, Lombary, late 14th century. <a href="https://wellcomeimages.org/indexplus/image/L0005335.html">Image from the Wellcome Library</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>The drug’s therapeutic value relative to other treatments and its cost are the major considerations here, and you can consider this as part of the supply/demand element. If a company’s drug is not very good, demand will be low and it’s not going to be able to command a very high price. Likewise, if there are similarly effective drugs treating the same disease, companies will have to compete on price. Physicians and patients complicate this area further, but getting in the door with payers is typically one of the most important steps.</p><p>Another element? The size of the organizations negotiating. For countries with governments negotiating, like many in the EU, it is an entire country using its purchasing power to negotiate. In the US, there are some large organizations capable of negotiating, such as PBMs, but overall fragmentation, requirements, and market complexity reduce the ability to bring drug prices down. That said, the PBM Express Scripts (ESI) was able to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-express-scripts-abbvie-hepatitisc-idUSKBN0K007620141222">reduce the price of a Hepatitis C cure</a> from roughly $83,000 to a price comparable to what Germany and France pay ($66,000 and $51,000 respectively).</p><p>This last distinction with Express Scripts is important. In the US, drug companies are free to set a list price to whatever they want, but then negotiate a net price that payers will actually pay. In the case of ESI and Abbvie, that difference was around $20,000.</p><p>In Part Two, we’ll see how this distinction has helped to drive prices — along with other forces that have led to significant price increases and the overall higher costs of drugs in the US. We’ll also examine some of the influences that change the dynamics and exacerbate the US market in a way that does not happen as much elsewhere.</p><p>You can find Part 2 <a href="https://thepoleax.com/the-middlemen-of-prescription-drugs-2c386eb1df80">here</a>.</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/dchen333"><em>David Chen</em></a><em> is based in Boston.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a919b398a4c9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-poleax/how-drug-pricing-works-a919b398a4c9">How Drug Pricing Works</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-poleax">The Poleax</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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