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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Deal ex Machina on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[General Tableau of the progress of cryptoeconomic systems a.k.a. Blockchains]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dealexmachina/general-tableau-of-the-progress-of-cryptoeconomic-systems-a-k-a-blockchains-ad83e6e03327?source=rss-33197dc240a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cryptoeconomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Deal ex Machina]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Feb 2026 06:22:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-13T06:25:44.210Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Note to readers : this is an old text I wrote back in 2017. There are parts that remain obviously true, others that developed, and some that were not quite there. The retrospective reading is somehow interesting, hence the publication.</em></p><p>Bitcoin as a system is much more than a slow, suboptimal shared ledger. It is a decentralized system at global scale syncing its state every 10mn. A prowess and a marvel of our time!</p><p>Since its inception, back in 2009, other systems have emerged, open or closed, permissioned or not, centralised or decentralised, more or less censorship resistant. Key computer science and game theory concepts are being applied to these systems which, coupled with decentralized and institutional economics, will bring about new structures that will compete, and sometimes win, against the current centralised systems, firms, organizations, institutions.</p><p>It is only the beginning and I found it useful to review the various high level factors which, combined, will unfold into a truly global scaled out network of decentralized crypto economic systems.</p><p>These are the incentives for you to read this through and to provide feeback to improve this document:</p><ol><li>You have valuable information at hand, even if you are not a cryptographer or some math genius,</li><li>You get links to start understanding or exploring each aspect,</li><li>The more you read (work), the more you’ll get the systemic view, beyond the usual emphatic and boring headlines about “blockchain is disruption”.</li><li>You give me your valuable and friendly feedback and I update this text, to make it better. I also get a chance from you to improve this tableau over time.</li></ol><p>Let’s go.</p><h4><strong>Cryptography’s progress</strong></h4><blockquote>Quantum resistance, homomorphic encryption, zero knowledge proofs</blockquote><p>Most systems rely on math algorithms, such as the discrete logarithm problem, that may be broken by quantum computing (see <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shor%27s_algorithm">Schor algorithm</a>). Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), as used today, <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0301141">will be upgraded</a> with new quantum resistant algorithms.</p><p>The second aspect that is currently showing promises in applied cryptography is the use of (weak) homomorphic encryption to enable more privacy, such as the use of <a href="https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/the-power-of-schnorr-the-signature-algorithm-to-increase-bitcoin-s-scale-and-privacy-1460642496/">Schnorr signatures</a> in <a href="https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/wizardry/mimblewimble.pdf">Mimblewimble</a>, and now part of a <a href="https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/bip-schnorr.mediawiki">BIP</a>. <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/637.pdf">Full homomorphic encryption is progressing significantly</a> and will offer opportunities to improve privacy of transactions and contracts and fungibility of coins.</p><p>One of the key progress in cryptography is related to <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/646.pdf">Computational Integrity</a> research. In the short term, open blockchains will support zero knowledge proof (zkp) protocols e.g. . These protocols provide cryptographic proofs to third parties without revealing private information. This is a mind boggling concept (i.e. you need strong math skills to understand it), and there are significant implementation hurdles, but this is a key aspect to progress in the upcoming years.</p><h4>Consensus</h4><blockquote>Welcome my son, welcome to the machine</blockquote><p>One of the key component of decentralisation is the decentralised consensus technology. It has to resist multiple types of attacks and let the “network” decide of the “truth” : a valid state (change) of the global machine. It must converge to a <a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/05/09/on-settlement-finality/">finality</a> within a given timeframe, i.e not “hesitate” too long between two or multiple “digital realities”. No one should be able to enforce “truth”, hence the necessity of a crowd, a very decentralised level where any single party would have a hard time beating or cheating the multitude (e.g. the rest of us).</p><p>Currently, Bitcoin consensus works with Proof of Work. It has proven its security and is facing two main criticisms : One, it’s consuming a vast amount of electricity to run the mining farms and two, miners <em>might</em> form a cartel, capturing the governance (the evolution of bitcoin) from other players (users, devs), to maximize their present and future profit. In Bitcoin, miners have power (pun intended) because they made the capital expenditure and they protect their investment (mining farms). For example, they would want to see a correlation between their reward (in bitcoin creation or in transaction fees), and the number and value of transactions. They would deter more miners coming in and the way to do this is to increase the hash power, leading to mining pools/cartels to capture the rent (this has a positive effect of increasing the security of Bitcoin). At the same time, users would want miners to process more transactions faster at a minimal (marginally zero) cost.</p><p>As a result, alternative consensus methods are explored and deployed at smaller or private scale. To date, the question on whether alternative consensus protocols may resist in open “trustless” networks has no definitive answer. Proof of Stake (PoS), which seems to be the most likely candidate, is widely criticized. This is why the forthcoming deployment of <a href="https://medium.com/@Vlad_Zamfir/the-history-of-casper-part-1-59233819c9a9">Casper</a>, the new Proof of Stake protocol for Ethereum is so critical. <a href="https://www.tezos.com/">Tez0s</a> will also deploy on federated PoS as the preferred consensus mechanism and enable governance mechanisms to manage the evolution of interests from stakeholders.</p><blockquote>Avalanche and the Team Rocket</blockquote><p>Consensus protocols are actually at the heart of cryptoeconomic systems, they operate mechanisms where all participants are incentivized to act and collaborate for what “the governance” has agreed is the “common good” and where non collaborative behavior is punished (<a href="https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/minimal-slashing-conditions-20f0b500fc6c">see slashing in Casper</a>). This is why the <a href="https://twitter.com/NickSzabo4/status/871462865206509568">whole discussion about governance</a> is necessary, as this problem relates to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragedy_of_the_commons">tragedy of the commons</a>.</p><p>The key innovation in these cryptoeconomic systems is the use of game theory math and knowledge combined with cryptology to design games/systems that maintain an (decentralised) equilibrium and resist attacks, from the inside or the outside of the system. This is a topic on which much progress is expected, as more research is performed in this field. Currently, there are not many simulation tools available to model and simulate such games. Some <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/2s359t/cryptoeconomic_simulation_seeking_advice/">forum discussions</a> suggest that extensions of multiple autonomous agents systems could do the job.</p><h4>Scalability</h4><p>Bitcoin wars have raged on this very topic, Ethereum has been overloaded in June 2017 by a few ICOs and some cryptokitties. As usage is growing, including for petty transactions, blocks are filled and many transactions may remain unconfirmed for a long time. Some users actually flooded the network to make the point. This issue is leading Bitcoin to a “near fork experience” after segregated witness (SegWit 2x) proposal “locked in” and Bitcoin Cash (BCH) was forked.</p><p>A variety of technics, such as <a href="https://blockstream.com/sidechains.pdf">pegged sidechains</a>, <a href="http://www.jeffcoleman.ca/state-channels/">state channels</a> or <a href="https://diyhpl.us/wiki/transcripts/scalingbitcoin/sharding-the-blockchain/">sharding</a> are likely to bring scalability. This comes with a price to pay : it may fragment the resistance : a given sidechain can be compromised, and settle on the main chain. <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Sharding-FAQ">Sharding is creating limits</a> for smart contract execution (across shards), and needs some mechanism to maintain coherence.</p><p>“Metachains” or parachains (whatever it’s going to get called) may federate multiple blockchains providing transactions settlement, netting and “world” confirmation of blockchain to blockchain (or <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directed_acyclic_graph">DAG</a>, or anything) transactions. In this regard, the <a href="https://github.com/w3f/polkadot-white-paper/raw/master/PolkaDotPaper.pdf">Polkadot project</a>, headed by Dr Gavin Wood (Web3 foundation), or <a href="https://cosmos.network/whitepaper">Cosmos</a>, from Tendermint, are paving the way of blockchains of blockchains. A quite good explainer from Stephan Tual is available <a href="https://blog.stephantual.com/web-three-revisited-part-two-introduction-to-polkadot-what-it-is-what-it-aint-657782051d34">here</a>. Other proposals such as <a href="https://aion.network/">aion </a>from Nuco are emerging.</p><p>At the time of writing, <a href="http://plasma.io/plasma.pdf">plasma.io</a> just came out, supported by Josef Poon and Vitalik Buterin. Plasma is the transposition of a <a href="https://lightning.network/">lightning network</a> applied to smart contracts, enabling a high throughput validation of smart contract states without requiring continuous validation on the main Ethereum blockchain. This will lower the “gas price” (cost of execution), and let more sophisticated contracts be deployed on this sidechain.</p><p><a href="http://raiden.network/">Raiden</a> is also a payment channel for Ethereum, with high potential throughput and fast confirmation, derived from the lightning network protocol. It is primarily targetted at applications in IoT, M2M, as well as micropayments.</p><h4>Identity</h4><blockquote>Self sovereign identity is a human right, <em>right?</em></blockquote><p>One of the favorite books of the “crypto” community is <em>The sovereign individual </em>from James Dale Davidson and Lord William Rees-Mogg. This is in direct connection with <em>The road to serfdom</em> from Friedrich A. Hayek and the strong historical current of liberalism, where liberty prevails over equality. The whole discussion on self sovereign identity takes place in a context where individuals challenge and distrust public and private institutions.</p><p>The notion of <em>self sovereign</em> identity is well described by <a href="http://www.lifewithalacrity.com/2016/04/the-path-to-self-soverereign-identity.html">Christopher Allen</a> and <a href="https://github.com/jandrieu/rebooting-the-web-of-trust-fall2016/raw/master/topics-and-advance-readings/a-technology-free-definition-of-self-sovereign-identity.pdf">Joe Andrieu</a>. For the sake of simplification, it means that individuals are managing their identities and the related attributes attached to them. It means they can decide what identity attributes they share with whom, and how long.</p><p>Decentralised cryptoeconomic systems need to deal with <strong>identity, and not just authentication, </strong>if they are to be connected to the “fiat” world : the world of institutions. These institutions enforcing property laws, access to courts of justice, and liabilities of parties involved in exchanges of goods and services, are based on proof of identities. These institutions may have flaws, limited efficiency, may sometimes be corrupted, but it will be difficult to scale crypto economic systems at a global level without establishing direct links with them. The difficulty is to avoid projecting current institutional arrangements onto the new decentralized systems, it would likely end up delivering only marginal benefits and lean to centralization. That’s one of the phenomenon that may limit the value of “private blockchains” by (centralised) firms or by cartels of actors.</p><p>Reciprocally, institutions will (have to) adapt to the new paradigm of decentralised and self sovereign identity. Centralized identity systems are defeating the very purpose of decentralized systems, which is to avoid a take over and manipulation of information by any central entity. One step further is to affirm that Identity is a human right (should a state or any organisation have an arbitrary control over one individual’s identity?). Another bullish step would be to affirm that any <em>legal entity</em> should exist and be referenced at global level and be the verifiable outcome of a governed organisation of individuals through an open constitution. And now, these entities can be created and governed on decentralized systems, where rules of engagement, responsibilities, decisions and rewards of managers, directors, and shareholders would be auditable.</p><p>It is possible thereof to derive a public and open decentralised registry (Entity Naming System) of legal entities at global level from the current <a href="https://www.gleif.org/en/about-lei/introducing-the-legal-entity-identifier-lei">LEI system</a>. This would help reduce the transaction costs {onboarding costs; counterparty risks; AML/KYC red tape} for businesses. Have a look at how Monax describes such <a href="http://monax LEI">a system</a>.</p><p>A contrario, the negation of identity in transactions is defeating the notions of property, responsibility and liability. Some decentralised systems will still operate on their own and they may remain “just experiments”, forming a layer opened to anyone with a connection, and censor resistant. The two worlds will coexist and cooperate.</p><p><strong>Bottomline:</strong> Expect global decentralised identity systems to emerge, and current centralised authentication systems (Certificate Central Authorities, Public PKIs, DNS, Directories), to be challenged. This trend is only being accelerated by regulations on privacy such as GDPR, and by policies enacted to fight terrorism and money laundering. This will provide compelling reasons for corporations to pay attention, and initiate a transition. Identities and attributes will help improve the governance of delegations, entitlements, signing and access control in firms and between firms. As a result, corporations may take a few levels of bureaucracy out of their current organization and shrink internal audits and controls.</p><p><em>Note : I think I am only scratching the surface of a huge aspect. More to come in subsequent versions.</em></p><h4>Oracles</h4><blockquote>Who’s Zed? Zed’s dead, baby. Zed’s dead. — Pulp fiction</blockquote><p>Oracles are true life “trusted” facts that need to be attested, verified prior to be used as triggers for events in the systems. Cryptoeconomic systems and their action rules or “smart contracts” operate from signed transactions. There is a strong necessity to connect the real world i.e. represent <em>trusted facts</em> into these systems, that may otherwise be corrupted.</p><p>As long as actions in the cryptoeconomic sphere cannot be taken from verified facts, or worse, can be taken from unverified facts, these systems will be exposed to “fake news” attacks, causing flash failures, which may become “the truth” once validated through consensus, requiring hard or soft forking etc.</p><p>Therefore, Oracles, which are signed contracts certifying the occurence of physical “real life” events, are critical to the wide adoption of blockchain and smart contract technologies. Once again, this is connected to identity and liability. And this is the single most important application needed to connect <em>trusted objects</em> to cryptoeconomic systems.</p><p>Who is going to verify facts in a decentralised manner? Will we need to reinvent third parties in order to reach a level of certitude about the reality of a fact? What would be the incentive mechanism to have fact verifiers tell the truth and put a measurable level of diligence in their verification?</p><p>One of the technology used for capturing real world data are hardware secure enclaves, such as what is used by Ledger, Intel (SGX) for Sawtooth Lake, or smart phone trustzones. Those secure enclaves should be audited to avoid <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/03/using_intels_sg.html">this</a>.</p><h4><strong>Privacy &amp; Fungibility</strong></h4><p>Privacy is required by many protocols of exchange, and used to protect properties. It is also one of the key attributes in order to enable a true fungibility of tokens (i.e. it is not possible to identify former owners and previous usage of tokens). There will be no mainstream take off without privacy, fungibility and censorship protection.</p><p>The current state of crypto-economic systems offers various levels of privacy, but most of public ones expose transactions and script or contract code (and it is necessary to trust the system). This is one reason why private blockchains or distributed ledgers have been created, to expose code/scripts and transactions only to those entitled (back to the identity discussion). These settings defeat both the decentralization and the censorship-resistant nature of these systems. They become a shared registry, bringing marginally more cooperation than in centralized existing systems. They are vulnerable to collusion attacks by subsets of authorized validating authorities.</p><p>Very significant progress in the specialized field of Computational Integrity has been achieved in the last 27 years, that led to the development of “zero knowledge proofs”. This provides a way for a “prover” to compute a proof, that can be verified by a verifier, without disclosing more information than what is in the proof. For example, the verifier can check that the prover has (stored) enough money to pay for a good, without knowing how much is owned by the owner and where he got his coins from. This is opening a new area of fast paced innovations which will be implemented in cryptoeconomic systems.</p><p>The first implementation of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-interactive_zero-knowledge_proof">zk-SNARK</a> (zero knowledge — succinct non interactive argument of knowledge) occured in ZCash, launched on Oct 28th, 2016.</p><p>Ethereum has annouced support for zk-SNARK in the Metropolis/Byzantium, just released. Tez0s have included zk-STARK in their roadmap, with no available implementation available to date. zk-SNARK offers a level of protection with one caveat : the certainty that the central private key has been destroyed, alongside all elements that would enable its reconstruction (see <a href="https://z.cash/blog/the-design-of-the-ceremony.html">The Ceremony, which is providing evidence in the case of ZCash</a>). The existence of this trusted setup introduces a doubt which, applied to self interested agents who would control the trusted setup ceremony, is currently a showstopper. This is why the development of zk-STARK (T stands of Transparent), <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HJ9K_o-RRSY">as described by Dr Eli Ben-Sasson</a> is a significant progress to come, as it provides a way to avoid a non transparent trusted setup ceremony.</p><p>This progress will cause a lot of debates since it can provide a way to obfuscate transactions on a public cryptoeconomic system. How do you allow surveillance, regulation, investigations in these systems? Or do you?</p><h4><strong>Smart Contracts</strong></h4><blockquote>Code is Law? Not yet, still wet.</blockquote><p>The notion of smart contracts has been described by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nick_Szabo">Nick Szabo</a>, back in 1996. It has led enthusiasts to inflated expectations as, implemented in a cryptographic ledger, it could be used to execute terms of contracts, bringing down the transaction cost of executing the contract. It met the famous quote from <a href="http://harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law-html">Lawrence Lessig : “code is law”</a>. Real life proved this preposterous. Lawyers explain why. Smart contracts are scripts that run in a cryptographic environment, providing proofs of execution on terms that have been signed by parties. They are nowhere near a legal contract, lacking currently many attributes. Also, so far, there is no system of dispute management nor accountability enforcement, or legally sound framework to attach (property of) assets to a given coin, that may be enforced by jurisdictions. Nevertheless, this situation is evolving quickly and this is one of the most fundamental aspect of progress that will disseminate the technology in many areas of law, regulations and institutions.</p><p>The emergence of smart contracts, simple scripts with Bitcoin, or more sophisticated code with Ethereum, Symbiont, Rootstock (on BTC) have made the blockchain and distributed ledger technology more generative. However, any failure or exploit in the execution of this scripts is causing more than a mere “blue screen of death”, it can be exploited right away to drill and derive millions of coins. No need to reexplain the mishaps of TheDao or the <em>repeated </em>multisig wallet bug in Parity that occured recently.</p><p>As a result, serious progress is going to happen in the next couple of years to harden the infrastructure code and the audit of scripts, very much like what is done with software in mission critical applications (aerospace, public transport etc.). To this end, new languages — such as <a href="https://www.tezos.com/static/papers/language.pdf">Michelson for Tez0s</a> and tools are emerging, and formal verification of code (see the <a href="https://medium.com/@pirapira/ten-ethereum-related-pending-projects-you-could-take-c828a2dce88e">work of Yoishi Hirai</a>), will become the norm. It will be key to use more strongly typed languages, such as Rust versus C++, as in Parity. Yet, many currently deployed code in C++ (wallets), or untested solidity smart contracts deployed quickly through ICOs may cause serious damages (back to the liability discussion).</p><p>// insert Contract DSLs here : Clause, OpenLaw, CommonAccord, Cocoa …</p><p><a href="http://iang.org/papers/intersection_ricardian_smart.html">http://iang.org/papers/intersection_ricardian_smart.html</a></p><h4><strong>Game theory, incentives, crypto economics and the amazing world of tokens</strong></h4><p>While many private blockchain efforts have focused on the ledger itself, and on the utility of a shared, <em>somewhat decentralized</em>, append-only database, an essential paradigm has emerged on public blockchains : tokens.</p><p>Unfortunately, this has been known by the general public as a way to “invest” on a decentralised application or platform, through the now (in)famous Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). This paradigm has been used to fund valid startups, but many of these ICOs are scams or promises from delusioned people that would deliver on what they have claimed on YouTube or through a whitepaper supposedly validated by “advisors”. This ICO mania, reaching <a href="https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/ico-mania-strikes-promising-to-transform-capital-infrastructures/">1,2bn$ in the first half of 2017 only</a> (update : 4Bn$ as of Dec 2017), is an excess, that will <em>— maybe —</em> deflate violently in 2018.</p><p>But tokens have a more profound interest, and might be a huge opportunity to reshape key economic and institutional processes such as property rights, allowance of usage, voting, or sophisticated algorithmic exchange of value “systems to systems”. This is a domain to be explored beyond the heated debates around ICOs.</p><p>Tokens are a new nature of programmable private currency, that are used to transfer utility within a community of “players with a skin in the game”, while creating a way to transfer value from inside or outside of the system. Ultimately, tokens are managed through rules and are used to create equilibria that will provide the long term development of the system. They are a technical vehicle of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transferable_utility">transferable utility</a>, which is so important to define equilibria in game theory through the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey%E2%80%93Clarke%E2%80%93Groves_mechanism">Vickrey-Clarke-Grove mechanism</a>, an essential setting to have truthfulness has a dominant strategy and a socially optimized outcome.</p><h4>Governing the Commons, principles for collective action</h4><blockquote>Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit — in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination towards which all men run, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believe in the freedom of the common. — Garrett Hardin, 1968</blockquote><p>Beyond the mere exchange of coins, decentralised crypto-economic systems show a rare property : Decentralization. In 1968, Garrett Hardin published a very famous article in Science : <a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243.full">The Tragedy of the Commons</a>. It showed that if you want to regulate the use of a Common Resource (a scarce resource in open access shared by a community, of which you want to avoid its extinction), you must choose between public or private control, e.g. having a central authority to regulate the access and use of the Common Resource through coercion and rules.</p><p>It became accepted as a dominant institutional arrangement that a community would need to centralize the governance associated with the usage of common and scarce resources. At the same time, in politicial economy, many examples of governance and institutional failures demonstrated that centralized governance was inherently subject to attacks, flaws and led to capture attempts by coalitions, at the expense of the community. Delegated centralization led to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principal%E2%80%93agent_problem">Principal Agent</a> failures and therefore, institutions were created to control and regulate these agents. In open markets, regulators had to create coordination bodies, to regulate and control each other, and detect attempts from colluded parties to “capture” regulators. This has led to an inflation of regulation, a burden for society. Each failure in the institutional setting is generating its social cost and, as the society and economies have expanded at global scale, it is today a systemic and global issue.</p><p>In 1990, <a href="http://wtf.tw/ref/ostrom_1990.pdf">Elinor Ostrom’s work on “Governing the commons”</a> became a seminal piece in microeconomics, since it demonstrated that decentralised and secular human communities have managed to design institutional settings that could function and find equilibrium <em>without centralisatio</em>n, and that these institutional arrangements were presenting a common set of principles.</p><p>Here is a very summarised description of these principles:</p><ol><li>Clear boundary &amp; membership<br>Members must be known and have a stake in the community. The community needs to manage the free rider problem. Membership is linked to access to the resource.</li><li>Congruent rules<br>A set of rules is designed to manage specifically the resource.</li><li>Collective choice arenas<br>A set of collective settings to elaborate and decide collective choices need to be defined, at various levels (governance, collective action, operational).</li><li>Monitoring<br>A monitoring system demonstrating that participants follow the rules must be defined, to assure each participant that the rest of the community respects the common rules.</li><li>Graduated sanctions<br>Sanctions need to be applied proportionnally in order to maintain participation at a cost linked to a negative social cost for the community, and for the community to keep the incentives around collaborative strategies.</li><li>Conflict resolution mechanisms<br>A mechanism for dispute management and resolution need to exist when two or more parties are in conflict.</li><li>Recognized right to organize<br>There should be a explicit way for participants to review and update the operationnal rules that apply to all of them.</li><li>Nested units</li></ol><p>Ostrom’s work is part of “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_institutional_economics">New Institutional Economics</a>”a very influential and somewhat heterodox school of economists challenging neoclassics, where you’ll identify 4 Nobel prizes — Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, Douglass North and Elinor Ostrom.</p><h4>The changing nature of the firms</h4><blockquote>The art of association then becomes, as I said above, the mother science; everyone studies it and applies it. — Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America</blockquote><p>There is a strong possibility that the organization of large groups of humans through decentralized cryptoeconomic systems, based initially on incentives and deriving from self interested dominant strategies, might result in the emergence of new organisations, creating a new kind of firms, organisations, unions, or governments that will compete with the established and centralized institutions.</p><p>I am more directly connected to the “Nature of the Firm”, which is represented in various aspects, some of whom may be represented in a “state machine” as a “Nexus of contracts”, putting the ricardian and smart aspects of these contracts right in the system, thereby offering opportunities to optimize firms, trade and markets.</p><blockquote>Note : I wrote this text in june of 2017. Did multiple edits since but did not change the core message. It is very difficult to predict the future but, retrospectively, it seems that things happen, it’s too slow, for sure.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ad83e6e03327" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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