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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Denuclearise.com on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Denuclearise.com on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Marija Carter: Words of Mass Destruction — The Israeli Gaza Nuclear Threat Fallout]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@denuclearise.com/marija-carter-words-of-mass-destruction-the-israeli-gaza-nuclear-threat-fallout-e2f8354659da?source=rss-32c80a054d93------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[israel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[armed-conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[israel-palestine-conflict]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Denuclearise.com]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Nov 2023 02:06:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-06T02:06:59.307Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Marija Carter: Words of Mass Destruction — The Israeli Gaza Nuclear Threat Fallout</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P2DdyE4F2Ipv5ws2TrqcCw.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>‘There are no non-combatants in Gaza.’</em></p><p><em>‘Providing humanitarian aid to the Strip would constitute a failure.’</em></p><p><em>‘The monsters in Gaza should find a solution by themselves […] They can go into the deserts.’</em></p><p><em>‘The Gaza Strip has no right to exist.’</em></p><p><em>‘Anyone waving a Palestinian flag shouldn’t continue living on the face of the earth.’</em></p><p>Netanyahu took 5 hours before taking disciplinary action against his Heritage Minister Eliyahu, suspending him from cabinet meetings ‘until further notice.’</p><p>The PM statement barely disavowed Eliyahu’s subtextus:</p><p><em>‘Minister Amihai Eliyahu’s statements are not based in reality. Israel and the IDF are operating in accordance with the highest standards of international law to avoid harming innocents. We will continue to do so until our victory.’</em></p><p>One runs out of sophisticated ways to say that something is bullshit. One runs out of ways to say something is deliberately evil. One runs out of ways to say that something is fascist without using that word, because one runs out of patience for this deliberately evil bullshit.</p><p>In the 29 days since the Hamas attack on 7 October, 9500 people have been killed in the Gaza Strip alone. 3900 children. 35 journalists — targeted for daring to show the world the hell-scape that the antediluvian lands have become under 18,000 tons of IDF explosives. 72 of UNRWA humanitarian staff, many serving the most vulnerable in the clearly marked UN and Red Cross hospitals and schools, struck in heinous breaches of international law. Unequivocally categorised as war crimes.</p><p>Article I of the 1864 First Geneva Convention declares that ‘<em>[a]n individual carrying out medical duties, no matter whether he belongs to the armed forces or not, is considered inviolable by the enemy.’ </em>In 1968, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2444, reaffirming the protection afforded to all non-combatants. UN GA Resolution 2675 of 1970 emphasised the obligation to take all feasible measures to protect civilians trapped in conflict zones. Further, Resolution 3318 condemns any reprisals against the civilian population. Article 18 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention unambiguously mandates the protection and respect for all medical facilities. Article 19 thereof extends such protection to all medical and humanitarian personnel. Complementing the Geneva framework, the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II further reinforce the safeguarding of civilians in the context of armed conflict, underscoring the imperative to shield civilian populations from harm, and mandating all warring parties to employ all possible precautions. In 1999, the UN Security Council Resolution 1265 expanded upon the organisation’s commitment to civilian protection in international armed conflict. A year later, Resolution 1296 specifically emphasised the imperative of ensuring humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas. The 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court designates the deliberate targeting of civilian objects as a war crime in its Article 8(2)(a)(iv). Article 8(2)(b)(ix) explicitly posits that, inter alia, ‘medical units, transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions’ are not only excluded from designation as legitimate military objectives under <em>jus in bello</em> but to be shielded by the belligerents. The 2009 UN SC Resolution 1894 condemns the targeting of humanitarian personnel and facilities.</p><p>It is an odd thing to say for a lawyer in the field of use of force under international law to say, but none of this matters. You know this is fucked up — as a human.</p><p>The MoD of Jordan condemned the ‘<em>blatant and unacceptable violation of international law and humanitarian law,’</em> and urged ‘<em>immediate action against it.</em>’ Qatar’s Foreign Ministry considered it ‘<em>a serious incitement to a war crime,</em>’ while the Saudi counterpart considered ‘<em>the failure to immediately dismiss the minister from the government and merely suspending his membership reflects the utmost disregard for all human, ethical, religious, and legal standards by the Israeli government.</em>’</p><p>Evidently, you do not even need humanity to be sickened by Israel’s modus operandi. Even the Saudi government can do it.</p><p>But the world has reacted. The expeditious denunciations from the Arab world were promptly followed by the widespread rejection of the proposed iter: the US and EU leaders, generally well willing to let Israel have its long-awaited genocide, were not prepared to risk their universally unstable domestic situations.</p><p>Sunak, seeing hundreds of thousands participate in pro-Palestine marches from his window every Saturday since the start of the war, facing an utterly existential threat to his party in the next general election.</p><p>Macron, fresh out of violent street crashes following the increase of the age of retirement, and, in a Kafkaesque and almost comical fit of unfortunate timing, the Islamophobia-driven ban on abayas in schools — effectively mandating that Muslim children dress more revealingly to access education.</p><p>Biden, juxtaposed as always and fair-weather as ever, just oversaw a historic ousting of the Speaker of the House by the most far-right supporters of his predecessor and likely successor.</p><p>Not that any of them care about chain reactions within the IDF’s Teller-Ulam model nuclear weapons, detonating TNT equivalent 520 times greater than the bomb that doomed Hiroshima to be the symbol of hell on earth forever. Not that they would ever spare a thought for the triggering of a meltdown in the Middle East, in the foreign and untameable lands their lineage exploited for centuries. But they care about their home fronts. About their trust funds.</p><p>And they will now do everything in their power to support Netanyahu’s claim that this rogue, insignificant, and anyway, now dismissed minister does not speak for Israel. He only did for about 5 hours, after all. Only until the international condemnation reached a critical mass.</p><p>Grasp the gravity as this is of the utmost urgency: on 5 November 2023, Israel broke a 7-decade-long tradition of strategic ambiguity concerning its nuclear programme.</p><p>Since the 1950s, international observers accepted that Tel Aviv had a nuclear weapon stockpile. 70 years, 8 significant wars, 15 Prime Ministers, 20 defence ministers, 28 governments, no one broke ranks and stated, on record, that Israel is a nuclear proprietor. Until 5 November 2023.</p><p>One of many, the untranslatable Arabic term يقبرني [<em>ya’aburne</em>] refers to one’s wish to die before one’s beloved do. Another similar concept, فناء [<em>fanas</em>] acknowledges the inherently transient nature of existence and the inevitability of crossing over, and, at its core in the context of Islam, the shadow of death is often met with a degree of tranquillity, for it carries the promise of جنّة [<em>Jannah</em>].</p><p>May our Muslim brothers and sisters in Gaza and around the world find solace in whatever the fuck can provide it. As for the rest of us, wishing to see justice during our lifetime, the court halls of Hague will keep standing long past the last cancer hospital in Palestine. Long after its last high school was levelled by the very same Mk80-type bombs that the US deployed against Vietnamese civilians in 1975 — the same year Microsoft was founded, Britain voted to join the EU, and the SNL aired its first show.</p><p>Those who refuse to learn from history intend to repeat it. As we bear 24/7 live witness to the Israeli genocide in Gaza, its increasingly desperate and isolated government, firmly rejected by over 80% of its own people, tests how far can it step to execute its final solution to the Palestinian question.</p><p>To be clear: I am not implying that under its current leadership, Israel is a fascist state. I am saying that explicitly.</p><p>Written by Marija Carter LLM MSc 5/11/2023 for Denuclearise.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e2f8354659da" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Omar Tarqhammen: Notes on Libya’s Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/omar-tarqhammen-notes-on-libyas-renunciation-of-nuclear-weapons-f854ea3fec34?source=rss-32c80a054d93------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[north-africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[libya]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[npt]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Denuclearise.com]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2023 13:27:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-12T13:27:25.491Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In December 2003, Libya announced its decision to renounce its nuclear weapons program and pursue the dismantlement of its existing nuclear capabilities.</p><p>To which extent was this resolution voluntary is strongly debated. On one hand, it is undeniable that the construction of Libya’s nuclear programme was an incredibly expensive exercise in the context of a nation with high rates of poverty. Furthermore, the development put the country at higher risk of being targetted by its adversaries, as well as a subject of criticism by its neighbours and allies. Such criticism is rightful: nuclear weapons are inherently immoral.</p><p>On the other hand, Libya mostly abandoned its program for the same reason it began developing it in the first place: the immense pressure from the USA and the UK, both of which are proud nuclear proprietors.</p><p>The agreement to abandon its nuclear developement program was eventually deemed more reasonable even by the at times utterly chaotic regime. It came after negotiations with the USA, the UK, and international organizations, including the IAEA. Libya’s decision to give up the program was, after all, a part of a broader diplomatic effort to improve its international standing and normalize relations with the Western world.</p><p>The process of dismantling Libya’s nuclear program involved cooperation with international authorities, inspections by the IAEA, and the transfer of sensitive nuclear equipment and materials out of Libya. At every stage, the USA and the UK played a key role in providing technical assistance and facilitating the removal of Libya’s nuclear infrastructure.</p><p>In return for the decision to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions, Libya received assurances from the international community, including the lifting of certain economic sanctions and the normalization of diplomatic relations. This marked a significant shift in the nation’s foreign policy and led to its reintegration into the international community.</p><p>Today, the opinion of the Libyan people on the decision remains divided. Som believe that possessing nuclear weapons would enhance their country’s national security and prevent the collapse of the regime. While this position is of course especially prevalent among the supporters of the Qaddafi regime, it would be incorrect to believe that any opposition to the decision to denuclearise comes from his adherents. Many Libyans that opposed Qaddafi nonetheless submit either the general pro-nuclear argument that having a nuclear deterrent would deter adversaries and provide a sense of security against external threats, or, more crucially, that they view the decision as a concession to boastful nuclear weapon states responsible for the nation’s misery.</p><p>The discovery of oil reserves in the 1950s brought significant wealth to Libya. The oil industry fueled economic growth and modernization efforts, transforming the country’s infrastructure, education, and healthcare systems. In 1969, after Qaddafi led a military coup that overthrew King Idris, he established a revolutionary government, known as the Libyan Arab Republic. Under Qaddafi’s rule, Libya implemented socialist policies, nationalized industries, and pursued a policy of Arab nationalism. His government was always known for its anti-Western stance, supporting various liberation movements and not afraid of engaging in confrontations with Western powers. This played well with a populace tired of the pillage by the west, and ready to fully realise the promises of its 1947 independence from Italy. The realities, of course, were often much more complex.</p><p>At the same time, despite Libya’s oil wealth, mismanagement and corruption hindered the country’s economic development. In 1990s, international sanctions were imposed, severely impacting Libya’s economy, as well as deepening its diplomatic isolation.</p><p>Then, in 2003, in the eyes of many, the west forced Libya of its deterrent against armed violence by the very west itself, all the while they were proudly and openly expanding their own nuclear arsenals.</p><p>While this perspective of neocolonial “putting in line” of disadvantaged countries by armed-to-the-teeth post-colonial states has high merit on its own, it does not take away from the fact that a nuclear program would cost the nation wholy unjustifiable sums, destabilise the region and tarnish Libya’s reputation along its allies.</p><p>In 2011, amidst the Arab Spring protests sweeping across the region, Libya experienced a popular uprising against Qaddafi’s regime. The protests escalated into a full-scale civil war, with rebel forces receiving support from international coalitions. NATO intervention played a crucial role in assisting the rebels, leading to Qaddafi’s overthrow and subsequent widely reported gruesome death.</p><p>Many of his adherents remain in pain over his downfall and the shattering of the promises of his regime. The country still experiences high degree of tension between fractions of its population.</p><p>Nonetheless, Libya opted to become a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This serves as a very positive indication that Libyans have, above all, decided that they do not wish to participate in an insane nuclear arms race. This had been further reaffirmed by Libya’s signature on the fantastic Treaty of Pelindaba project, which designated the entire African continent a nuclear weapon free zone.</p><p>Libya might not have made an entirely voluntary decision when it gave up its nuclear weapons aspirations in 2003. It however showed that it believes in genuine, grown and stable peace more than in the promises of quick fixes by participation in the geopolitics of the west.</p><p>Composed by Omar Tarqhammen for Denuclearise.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f854ea3fec34" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/omar-tarqhammen-notes-on-libyas-renunciation-of-nuclear-weapons-f854ea3fec34">Omar Tarqhammen: Notes on Libya’s Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com">Denuclearise.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Aaron Harding: Minks and Russian Nukes: Putin decides he is willing to let Russia bleed out, and…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/aaron-harding-minks-and-russian-nukes-putin-decides-he-is-willing-to-let-russia-bleed-out-and-cef77ca3210b?source=rss-32c80a054d93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cef77ca3210b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kremlin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia-ukraine-war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Denuclearise.com]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2023 13:25:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-12T13:25:53.805Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Aaron Harding: Minks and Russian Nukes: Putin decides he is willing to let Russia bleed out, and the possibility of a nuclear war creeps in</h3><p>As international security expert Patrick Porter observed, Putin had decided to see his invasion of Ukraine through to the bitter end. While NATO continues to pump immense financial, technological and political support towards Kyiv, its citizens remain largely unaffected by the war, and the involvement’s cost enjoys a considerable degree of popular support.</p><p>Putin’s investment in the ‘special military operation’ in terms of the sheer cost of human life, resources and international condemnation, makes securing substantial territorial gain the only way to protect his own position. Having seen the collapse of the Soviet project first-hand during the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and having witnessed the often-gruesome ends of dictators during his lengthy political career, Putin is visibly distressed by the possibility of his close circle of enablers turning against him, should Russia fail to wrestle the ‘due’ gains from Ukraine.</p><p>As Porter notes, the West is dealing with an ‘imbalance of resolve.’ Russia under Putin remains well willing to bleed for the cause, and in the context of personal fear, Putin might take this largely uncritical support of the populace and the cultist devotion of his military to conclude that the employment of nuclear weapons is his best option at this stage. He needs results, and he needs them fast.</p><p>It remains unlikely that Putin would opt for a nuclear attack akin to the US strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Instead, he is guaranteed to have been at least considering the use of the so-called ‘tactical nuclear weapons.’ Tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) are limited-range nuclear weapons intended for use against specific targets of military nature, in theatre. While all the members of the UN Security Council and several States not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) hold TNWs, they have never been used in any combat situation. The theoretical limitation of their use to that against concrete military targets does not negate the enormous risk of conflict escalation they use would inevitably cause.</p><p>The insanity of this step does not render it impossible. Putin’s strategy in Ukraine had brought on nothing but suffering for his country, yet he remains committed to its objectives. His announcement of his plan to station nuclear weapons in Belarus had not been met with any particular response by NATO. However, it is the same NATO that, for years, ignored the threat of the invasion of Ukraine in the first place. In his 28th March speech, Putin emphasised that Russia will remain in full control over any nuclear weapons stationed in Belarus — in full parallel with the US control over its TNWs on the territories of its European NATO allies. For Russia, this would represent its first nuclear deployment outside of the state borders since the early 1990s.</p><p>Belarus, as well as Kazakhstan and Ukraine itself, inherited large nuclear arsenals following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and all chose to denuclearise following 1991. While the European populace remains reassured that any weapons under Minsk would not pose danger to them, the latest Nobel Peace Prize laureate Dmitry Muratov warns that the tremendous danger of this move is in its subtext: Putin has moved on to prepare to condition the Russian populace that nuclear war is not inconceivable.</p><p>Composed by Aaron Harding for Denuclearise.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cef77ca3210b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/aaron-harding-minks-and-russian-nukes-putin-decides-he-is-willing-to-let-russia-bleed-out-and-cef77ca3210b">Aaron Harding: Minks and Russian Nukes: Putin decides he is willing to let Russia bleed out, and…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com">Denuclearise.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Omar Tarqhammen: The White House seeks to renew the Iran Deal]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/omar-tarqhammen-the-white-house-seeks-to-renew-the-iran-deal-e7edd094a989?source=rss-32c80a054d93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e7edd094a989</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[usa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-nuclear-deal]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Denuclearise.com]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2023 13:24:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-12T13:24:44.779Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The U.S. has presented the representatives of the EU and Israel with a new potential framework for an agreement with Iran. Months in the making, the new document seeks to freeze Tehran’s uranium enrichment programme, in exchange for loosening the international sanctions currently imposed on the regime.</p><p>The old ‘Iran nuclear deal,’ the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), collapsed in 2018 following Trump’s promised U.S. withdrawal from its commitments. This disastrous decision destabilised the region’s fragile non-nuclear policy and reinstated devastating banking and oil sanctions, further damaging the prospects of any successive nuclear deal.</p><p>The JCPOA’s desired effect in this regard was that Iran would unwind its nuclear programme to a state where the development of a nuclear warhead would take in excess of a year, allowing the P5+1 the opportunity to respond. This represented a critical development in a situation where Iran’s nuclear programme threatened to revive the crisis in the Middle East, potentially triggering a domino effect of the nuclear arms race. Saudi Arabia at the time explicitly stated its willingness and preparedness to obtain nuclear weapons, should Iran ever do so. The situation briefly stabilised in 1970, following the entry to force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, in which Iran became a signatory.</p><p>However, following the overthrow of the government in 1979, U.S. intelligence again noted Iran pursued a uranium enrichment programme. In 2013, with the election of the reformist Hassan Rouhani, the P5+1 sought to establish a dialogue with Iran. Years-long negotiations sought to establish a system of incentives on both sides.</p><p>The agreement got off to a smooth start, as the IAEA certified in the spring of 2016 that Iran has met all its preliminary pledges. The JCPOA was in all regards a feat of diplomacy. Binding Iran and several world powers alongside the U.S., the agreement sought for Iran to dismantle the majority of its nuclear programme in a verifiable manner, in exchange for the abolition of the extensive sanction framework imposed on the regime. This amounted to billions of dollars worth of sanction relief each year so the international community could inspect the continued disassembly of the nuclear programme. The flow of investment was expected to bring about general prosperity to the people of Iran, as well as reduce the prospects of conflict between Iran and its ideologically opposed regional rivals, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia.</p><p>Following the American presidential exchange, Biden offered to reinstate the deal, meeting, however, with a predictable distrust by Iran. Further, on the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, Washington remains dissatisfied with Tehran’s vague attitude towards the conflict, in several instances even siding with Moscow. In a situation where the U.S. seeks to rally universal and unwavering support for Ukraine, Raisolsadati’s friendliness towards Putin jeopardised the development of new genuine diplomatic relations with NATO.</p><p>In 2020, the U.S. sought to reimpose full-power sanctions on Iran under the JCPOA 2015. Under the JCPOA, any signatory who suspects that Iran is violating the deal can approach the UN Security Council for a vote on the continuation of the sanction relief. These so-called ‘snapback mechanisms’ remain in effect for ten years following the agreement’s entry to force in 2016, following which they will be permanently removed, should general compliance be ascertained. The P5 partners rejected the U.S. move, citing currently that the U.S. cannot unilaterally implement the snapback mechanisms as it left the JCPOA in 2018.</p><p>The fate of the JCPOA itself remains uncertain, as the tensions between Washington and Tehran remain high. The new, more conservative Iranian government under Ebrahim Raisi remains in stark disagreement about the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organisation and opts to align its loyalty with Russia rather than the U.S. International security experts continue to warn of the dangers of further delay in the negotiations, as Iran is expected to be in possession of enough enriched uranium to construct a nuclear bomb if it chooses to reinstate its programme.</p><p>The U.S. revealed that it had entered negotiations with Iran in January, and informed its European allies (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) and Israel in February 2023. It however remains unclear to which extent is the Iranian regime currently willing to negotiate its terms. The latest reports indicate that Iran has been familiarised with the proposal and rejects its current form. Nonetheless, given the revival of the Iranian uranium enrichment programme in the last two years, and the general instability of the country following the mass protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in the hands of the Iranian ‘morality police,’ anything short of an outright rejection of the very idea of a new nuclear deal remains a positive sign.</p><p>Composed by Omar Tarqhammen for Denuclearise.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e7edd094a989" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/omar-tarqhammen-the-white-house-seeks-to-renew-the-iran-deal-e7edd094a989">Omar Tarqhammen: The White House seeks to renew the Iran Deal</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com">Denuclearise.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Aaron Harding: Did Ukraine Make a Mistake in Giving Up Its Nuclear Weapons]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/aaron-harding-did-ukraine-make-a-mistake-in-giving-up-its-nuclear-weapons-4d0cc36bc668?source=rss-32c80a054d93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4d0cc36bc668</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia-ukraine-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Denuclearise.com]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2023 13:22:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-12T13:22:26.829Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, a litany of variously credible threats of the use of nuclear weapons was uttered behind closed doors as well as screamed from the rooftops. While the actual employment of nuclear weapons remains unlikely, the impact of these threats to regional stability as well as the strain it puts on international governance and liaison are extremely clear. There is no certainty that Putin’s desperate command will not utterly malfunction and set the world on a path of absolute destruction.</p><p>This is especially the case given that a notable number of Russian nuclear weapons have reportedly been placed on high alert, prepared for near immediate deployment should the command arrive. Such tense environment risks tragic mistakes caused by miscommunication, overly active staff, or even a mere accident.</p><p>By their very nature, nuclear weapons can never be completely safe. This, indeed, was well understood by Ukraine itself: when it gave up the nuclear weapons that it “inherited” from the collapsing Soviet Union.</p><p>In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved and was replaced by 15 independent countries: together with the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were formed. Ukraine’s incorporation into the Soviet Union forms an important part of Russia’s currently endorsed historical narrative: it has a rich cultural and intellectual heritage and represents a crucial political and administrative centre.</p><p>Critically, Ukraine holds an incredible strategic value as well. Ukraine was one of the most industrialized and agriculturally productive regions in the USSR: like other Soviet republics, it underwent a process of agricultural collectivisation which negatively impacted productivity, however, its diverse economy nonetheless yielded profit. Its industrial output supplied the Union with essential resources and helped subsidise some of its inherently agriculturally barren regions.</p><p>Almost more importantly for such a paranoid Moscow regime, Ukraine’s position on the Black Sea is integral to USSR’s regional security ambitions, and throughout the existence of the Soviet Union, the country operated with a high degree of Moscow’s military presence. It housed several crucial military bases, training facilities, and defence-related industries. Additionally, Ukraine’s territory was contributing significantly to the production of coal, iron, steel, machinery and chemicals used for the broader Soviet economy as well as its army and its military-related infrastructure.</p><p>In connection with such a position, Ukraine also formed an important component of the Soviet Union’s nuclear program. It hosted a significant portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, including missile silos, research facilities, and production sites. Moscow relied on Ukraine’s resources and expertise for the development and maintenance of its nuclear weapons program. Following the USSR’s dissolution, the new nation of Ukraine inherited a substantial nuclear arsenal, a large part of its specifications classified. The full scope soon became apparent.</p><p>Overnight, the newly formed nation of Ukraine found itself to be the third-largest nuclear power in the world.</p><p>Ukraine’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons is a significant event in the country’s history. Marking a clear separation from the “nuclear and proud” Moscow regime, Kyiv rejected the legitimacy of weapons of mass destruction. Ukraine became a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1994, joining the vast majority of the world with the aim to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and encouraging disarmament.</p><p>In the same year, Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. The memorandum provided Ukraine with assurances of its sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine’s commitment to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Subsequent negotiations took place between Ukraine, Russia, and other countries regarding the fate of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal. These negotiations involved discussions on issues such as compensation, security guarantees, and the safe removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine.</p><p>In 1996, Ukraine completed the process of transferring its nuclear weapons to Russia. This included the removal of all strategic nuclear warheads, which were transported to Russia for dismantlement. By 1996, Ukraine was declared a non-nuclear-weapon state. The denuclearization of Ukraine was supported by the international community, including the United States, Russia, and other countries. Financial and technical assistance was provided to Ukraine to support the dismantlement process and address security concerns.</p><p>The decision to give up nuclear weapons was significant for Ukraine, as it demonstrated its commitment to non-proliferation and international security. However, it also raised concerns about the country’s security, especially given the subsequent conflict with Russia over Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The Budapest Memorandum and the events surrounding Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament continue to be topics of discussion and debate in international relations.</p><p>With all the fear gripping Ukraine now, it is crucial to remember why it gave up the nuclear weapons that fell into its lap following the 1991 dissolution. Nuclear weapons are inherently immoral, and any talk of their use or development exponentially escalates the crisis at hand.</p><p>Ukraine did not make a mistake by giving away its nuclear weapons: on the contrary, Ukraine showed early on that its people wish to be better than Moscow’s regime expects of its subjects.</p><p>Composed by Aaron Harding for Denuclearise.com on 13 June 2023</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4d0cc36bc668" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/aaron-harding-did-ukraine-make-a-mistake-in-giving-up-its-nuclear-weapons-4d0cc36bc668">Aaron Harding: Did Ukraine Make a Mistake in Giving Up Its Nuclear Weapons</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com">Denuclearise.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Marija Carter: ‘Even though it would have been the act of a fucked-up psychopath’ — Wagner Group’s…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/marija-carter-even-though-it-would-have-been-the-act-of-a-fucked-up-psychopath-wagner-group-s-a90c015864c3?source=rss-32c80a054d93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a90c015864c3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wagner-group]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia-ukraine-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prigozhin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Denuclearise.com]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2023 13:21:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-12T13:21:23.316Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Marija Carter: ‘Even though it would have been the act of a fucked-up psychopath’ — Wagner Group’s Prigozhin keeps teasing Putin towards nuclear escalation</h3><p>‘Putin’s Chef’ is increasingly publicly critical of the ‘opportunities missed’ by the death cult that is the Russian invasion of Ukraine.</p><p>In his latest interview, he observed that while deploying nuclear weapons on a territory that Russia considers to be inhabited by our own estranged kin would now be ‘counterproductive,’ Putin should have ‘pressed the button… earlier… even though it would have been the act of a fucked-up psychopath.’</p><p>It has been 10 days since the drone bombing in Moscow. One of the attack drones had lingered around the neighbourhood where my Russian family lives. These intrusions demonstrate the fragility of the very centre of the Federation’s geopolitical power. Russian dissenter Alexei Navalny had narrowly survived an assassination attempt, heroically returned to Russia anyway, and had been thrown in jail for potentially decades. So how, in such a context and at such a time, is Prigozhin ‘permitted’ to air his explicit grievances about the Russian senior political and army command’s incompetence, and openly call for Sergei Shoigu, the defence minister, to be put on trial and shot, together with his staff? How can the notorious mad-dog former catering entrepreneur be seen as such an asset or such a threat?</p><p>Prigozhin is known for his close association with the famously reserved and increasingly paranoid Putin. The ‘trusted confidant’ reputation allowed him to expand his business empire, most notably the Glavset. This troll farm had been involved in spreading enormously large-reach disinformation material in online influence campaigns both domestically and internationally, including the 2016 US presidential election. In addition to the resulting indictment by the US Department of Justice, both the US and the EU imposed sanctions directly on Prigozhin and his companies.</p><p>However, successfully interfering with the US election ecosystem is not Prigozhin’s magnum opus. That title goes to the Wagner Group, a private military company. Founded by Dmitry Utkin, an ex-Special Operation Forces officer, the PMC operates as a paramilitary force available to several clients and primarily to the Russian government. Feared for its brutality and largely criminal and alt-right composition, its activities are shrouded in secrecy. Wagner was deployed in conflicts in Libya in support of General Khalifa Haftar, in CAR and Sudan for guarding gold mines, in Mali against Islamic militant groups, and from 2015 in Syria on the side of al-Assad. The Group was involved in the capture of Palmyra and al-Shaer including the execution of al-Ismail, in regaining control of Damascus and in the Battle of Khasham. Prigozhin had been personally funding the group’s operation in various of these conflict zones, including the PMC’s newest engagement: Ukraine.</p><p>Wagner has deployed their fighters to support pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine, including especially the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. The group’s fighters have been present in multiple crucial battles and have suffered notable casualties. Their mercenaries have been accused of severe human rights violations, including the targeting of civilians, extra-judicial killings and operating with the breaking of the morale of the nation designated as an objective, all of which are war crimes under the Geneva Conventions.</p><p>The Russian government has never officially acknowledged its connection to the Wagner Group; in theory, PMCs are outlawed in Russia. However, the closeness of the ties could not be more obvious. Russian military personnel had been proudly showcasing their fights alongside Wagner, and there are undeniable reports that the Group receives support, funding, and logistical assistance from Russian government entities.</p><p>All the while the PMC’s chief publicly blames Shoigu and Gerasimov for the deaths and injuries of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers, claiming that he ‘will make sure they will bear responsibility for it.’ It is impossible to ascertain what prompted Prigozhin’s change of — the rotting void where a heart might normally be.</p><p>As Samantha de Bendern observes, ‘the question remains whether Prigozhin is controlled by the Kremlin, or is a loose cannon posing a serious threat to the regime. Since in Russia nothing is ever as it seems, this either/or question is probably far too simple.’</p><p>As extreme as Putin’s modus operandi is, the fact of the matter remains that in the Russian political landscape, he might well be seen as a centrist, given the utter vileness and delusion of the most pro-war fringes of his circle.</p><p>It is an extensive tradition in grand-power politics to let your affiliates do your heavy lifting on potentially controversial issues. A classic continental example can be found in the Brexit campaign. While Johnson’s team was aware that stirring up xenophobia is integral to the success of their cause, the risks of associating such messaging with the established Conservative Party were too immense to be run with confidence from the early stages. Therefore, the Johnson &amp; Cummings contingent welcomed Farage’s unhinged willingness to engage this spectre of their own demographic. While that predictably translated into a fair share of his criticism being targeted at them, they correctly calculated that Farage will convert the far-right market for their cause, while they themselves can keep their hands clean of any potential consequences of such a campaign, such as the murder of Jo Cox and the 2016 rise in violent hate crime across Britain.</p><p>Similarly, Putin uses extremists to position himself as a rational leader. The centre relocates as more and more deranged characters join the narrative, and can render his (by all accounts egregious) stances appear sensible in comparison with his strategically endorsed fanatics.</p><p>This slant is one of the possible explanations for Putin’s inaction in the face of Prigozhin’s charges. He could be priming the Russian populace for another chapter of the invasion, and therefore sense the need to radicalise them further — by risking some of his political capital by Prigozhin, he can move what constitutes a ‘moderate viewpoint.’ Additionally, Putin can be using the presence he is affording to Prigozhin to scare his political counterparts, signalling to them that their positions (and indeed, lives) are never truly safe in his regime.</p><p>Prigozhin comments about the desirability of the use of Russia’s nuclear weapons in Ukraine would suggest such an interpretation of his general undertaking. Putin is well aware that adding the nuclear dimension to a conflict his army is observably failing to conclude to Russia’s satisfaction would be nothing short of suicide.</p><p>The West suffered several humiliating demonstrations of its fallibility and often misplaced belief in its might and mandate. However, its approach to the invasion of Ukraine had been much more pragmatic than the Russian one and proved infinitely superior. The sanctions framework started with a bang but afforded plenty of room for further and further tightening of the noose around the Russian economy. It is designed to never give the Russian command the impression that nothing worse can possibly be yet to come.</p><p>Likewise, no single entity on Earth needed this war more than NATO. The organisation resurrected itself to legitimacy, brushed aside any Western questions as to its constitutionality and the litany of war crime evidence from its extraterritorial adventures, and managed to assist Ukraine to hold off the ruthless invasion of its paramount geopolitical rival. The accession of Finland on 4 April 2023 doubled the size of the Russia/NATO border.</p><p>Conversely, no single entity on Earth needed this war less than Russia. To survive, Putin needs to come back with a scalp the size of Donbas. And insinuating that someone in his publicly available close circle advocates for him to use nuclear weapons is one of the only cards he is still holding.</p><p>Russia maintains a mutual agreement with China regarding its ‘no first use’ nuclear policy, and it would render its economy utterly unviable to sabotage its relationship with Beijing in any way. By default, any nuclear fantasies must therefore come from the pens of those sufficiently removed from Moscow. The primary objective of the Kremlin’s nuclear policy is to deter its adversaries from direct attacks on Russia. Nuclear weapons are seen as a critical component of its overall defence strategy indeed, and Russia invests heavily in its nuclear triad’s modernisation with projects such as the RS-28 Sermat ICBM programme, the Burevestnik cruise missiles and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles. However, a nuclear attack in Ukraine remains unlikely. Putin’s escalation control had been surprisingly stable in contrast with his incoherent decision to invade in the first place.</p><p>That, however, brings upon another possible explanation for Prigozhin’s impunity in his calls for the execution of senior Moscow command. Russia already needs someone to blame for the disastrous project, and Putin appears increasingly out of touch with reality. Much like Stalin, dying alone on the floor of his bedroom the whole night as his doctors cringe by the door, too afraid to intervene in fear of his wrath, Putin’s generals have seen his opposition die for much less than what they did to Russia’s view of itself.</p><p>There is a viable chance that Putin’s regime is no longer anywhere calculating enough to pull off any high-end geopolitics manoeuvring. It could well be that there is no grand plan to decipher. Maybe indeed, the cigar is just a cigar — and the lunatic Chef is nothing but the first of many fanatics that are forming a line to erect something even viler in the place of Putin’s mega project, be it with him or over his dead body.</p><p>Russia has exhausted itself: it is estimated that their meat grinder of a ‘special military operation’ took the lives of over 200 000 soldiers. While the majority of the world continues to trade with Moscow for one reason or another, it is actively supported only by Belarus and Iran. Nobody is coming to miraculously save Russia, not even the magic of the split of an atom. A loose canon will eventually point your way too, and Putin is increasingly failing to demonstrate that he has his insane Wagner dog on a firmly gripped leash.</p><p>Moscow is going to lose this war — the only question is just how terribly. All there is left to do is to mitigate. Whether Prigozhin’s role is to appease the far-right spectre of the Russian population, to make Putin’s stance seem more rational, to scare his potentially wavering political circle into submission and NATO into greater compliance, or whether he is a time bomb, one thing is certain: he is a symptom of a regime that is already dead, and merely does not know it yet.</p><p>Composed by Marija Carter for Denuclearise.com on 9th of June 2023</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a90c015864c3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/marija-carter-even-though-it-would-have-been-the-act-of-a-fucked-up-psychopath-wagner-group-s-a90c015864c3">Marija Carter: ‘Even though it would have been the act of a fucked-up psychopath’ — Wagner Group’s…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com">Denuclearise.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Jenny Armini: I am 32 today.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/jenny-armini-i-am-32-today-64036d97cd65?source=rss-32c80a054d93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/64036d97cd65</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[south-africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[france]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Denuclearise.com]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2023 13:20:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-12T13:20:07.306Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Jenny Armini: I am 32 today. South Africa gave up nuclear weapons the year I was born. I am still waiting for France to follow.</h3><p>Growing up in France as a child of a proud South African mother, emigrating to flee prosecution under apartheid, I have experienced my fair share of racism. The most common theme of xenophobia in colonial states centres on the idea of the “inferiority” of the nations they pillaged. The mantra of the right is, to put it in the crude form it deserves: “We the righteous might have committed unspeakable violence in those areas, but these pesky people are probably better off for it now. We might have brought suffering, but we also brought some delayed prosperity. Maybe not for your grandmother, whose village and crops we burned, but for you. You surely would not ever figure out how to build libraries, roads and skyscrapers without us, because progress only comes from the white man by some divine mandate. So be grateful, and try to be French. Or we will make it very clear, what we really think about you.”</p><p>Today, France sits in 290 nuclear weapons: the most barbaric inventions known to mankind. It proudly boasts its dedication to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, more commonly known as the MAD Theory. The nation’s leadership, Macron especially vocal, considers this a point of pride, and not as the monumental, chilling shame that it is.</p><p>South Africa, on the other hand, once possessed nuclear weapons. And then, in a triumphant global first, it fully voluntarily denuclearised.</p><p>South Africa’s journey towards giving up nuclear weapons is a fascinating chapter in the history of nuclear disarmament. In the 1970s, in a time of great tensions, South Africa secretly developed a nuclear weapons program. The apartheid-era government saw nuclear weapons as a means to bolster its security should anyone ever be bothered to intervene and to maintain its political influence as Africa’s only ever nuclear nation.</p><p>As rumours of South Africa’s nuclear program began to surface in the 1980s, it faced increasing international pressure and condemnation. The global community, particularly Western nations, expressed concerns about the potentially destabilizing effects of a nuclear-armed South Africa. While sitting on thousands of nuclear weapons themselves.</p><p>Then, in the late 1980s, South Africa underwent significant political transformations. The shameful apartheid system was dismantled, and negotiations for a democratic transition began.</p><p>The new leadership under President F. W. de Klerk embarked on a path of reform and engagement with the international community. In 1991, de Klerk announced that South Africa had indeed developed a number of nuclear weapons.</p><p>He added that our nation was about to dismantle its entire nuclear arsenal.</p><p>This announcement marked the first time a country voluntarily decided to give up its nuclear weapons program.</p><p>South Africa then cooperated with international verification efforts to prove the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international bodies were involved in verifying the destruction of South Africa’s nuclear weapons and related infrastructure. The nation then signed the NPT in 1991, reaffirming our commitment to nuclear disarmament. The country’s decision to abandon nuclear weapons and join the treaty was widely praised by South Africa’s citizens, as well as by the international community, South Africa’s voluntary disarmament serves as a shining example and inspiration for subsequent non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. It demonstrated that countries with nuclear weapons ambitions could reverse course and contribute to global disarmament objectives.</p><p>In my early twenties, I had finally visited South Africa, and I fell in love right away, and in my late twenties, I had decided to leave France, and “return” here. South Africa’s decision to give up nuclear weapons remains a significant milestone in nuclear non-proliferation efforts, highlighting the potential for diplomacy and political will to achieve disarmament goals.</p><p>Now, we are waiting for France to, for once, have the humility to follow a good example. Join the right side of history — give up the 290 nukes.</p><p>Composed by Jenny Armini for Denuclearise.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=64036d97cd65" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/jenny-armini-i-am-32-today-64036d97cd65">Jenny Armini: I am 32 today.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com">Denuclearise.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Omar Tarqhammen: Notes on the Israeli Nuclear Program]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/omar-tarqhammen-notes-on-the-israeli-nuclear-program-153126508b3c?source=rss-32c80a054d93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/153126508b3c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[israel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[israel-palestine-conflict]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Denuclearise.com]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2023 13:19:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-06T12:46:36.037Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Israel’s nuclear program has been a topic of speculation and secrecy for many years. In line with its general policy in relation to all matters of national defence, Israel never officially acknowledged or denied possessing nuclear weapons.</p><p>Virtually all available publicly available information is based on assessments by intelligence agencies, expert analyses, and unofficial sources. It is widely believed that Israel has developed a notable nuclear arsenal. Indeed, these heavily substantiated rumours were directly cited by Iranian authorities, as the reason for its decision to seek to obtain nuclear capabilities for their nation. In one of the most geopolitically unstable regions on Earth, any talk of nuclear programmes leads to enormous consequences and the escalation of tensions. That is then especially the case given that most current estimates state that Israel is in possession of at least 80, and potentially as many as 100 deployable nuclear weapons.</p><p>So how did Israel’s journey towards becoming the Middle East’s only fully nuclear-armed state begin?</p><p>In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Israel took the first concrete steps towards obtaining nuclear capabilities, driven by concerns about its regional security. Israeli leaders, including its Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, perceived nuclear weapons as a deterrent against potential adversaries in the volatile Middle East. This standard argument for nuclear weapons has been employed all over the world and has always been highly contentious. Here, it could hardly be demonstrated itself dubious in a more obvious way, as the first rumours of Israel’s progress towards becoming a nuclear-armed state immediately send shockwaves across its neighbouring adversaries, most often seeing the actions and sometimes even the existence of the state of Israel as a neo-colonial exercise.</p><p>The painful theme of colonialism in the region became even more pressing when it transpired that Israel received significant assistance from France in the development of its nuclear program. A secret agreement known as the “Peres-France Agreement” was established between Israel and France in 1957, involving scientific and technological cooperation, including the construction of a nuclear reactor. In the eyes of its neighbours, many victims of France’s colonial exploits and in the context of the Suez standoff, brought the tensions even higher, as the Dimona Nuclear Research Center was being finalised in the Negev Desert.</p><p>Israel has maintained a policy of nuclear ambiguity, commonly referred to as the “Israeli nuclear opacity” or “the Samson Option.” This policy involves neither confirming nor denying the existence of its nuclear weapons program. Israel has consistently pursued a stance of strategic ambiguity, which is aimed at preserving deterrence while avoiding regional arms races or international pressure to disarm.</p><p>Israel is one of the only four nations worldwide that rejected becoming a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the multilateral agreement aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.</p><p>The West remains not only silent on Israel’s disregard for the universally endorsed NPT but often continues to go out of its way to support Israel’s nuclear program. This creates an atmosphere of utter distrust between the West and the vast majority of Middle Eastern nations. Even as the West clearly picked its alliances, its wish to keep its status in the region is severely jeopardised by this favouritism. This is especially the case as the USA seeks to re-establish dialogue to lead towards the “New Iran Nuclear Deal.” The US, unfortunately, seems set to remain committed to getting its wishes through the application of illegitimate extreme pressure on the regime, as opposed to building any genuine cooperation.</p><p>Composed by Omar Tarqhammen for Denuclearise.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=153126508b3c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/omar-tarqhammen-notes-on-the-israeli-nuclear-program-153126508b3c">Omar Tarqhammen: Notes on the Israeli Nuclear Program</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com">Denuclearise.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Aaron Harding: Poland’s NATO nuclear sharing aspirations threaten to escalate into the renaissance…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/aaron-harding-polands-nato-nuclear-sharing-aspirations-threaten-to-escalate-into-the-renaissance-6d5ef6429b64?source=rss-32c80a054d93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6d5ef6429b64</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[poland]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Denuclearise.com]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2023 13:18:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-12T13:18:00.198Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Aaron Harding: Poland’s NATO nuclear sharing aspirations threaten to escalate into the renaissance of nuclear weapons</h3><p>President Andrzej Duda first revealed his interest in Polish participation in NATO’s nuclear weapon-sharing club last year, his vague idea is however now gathering steam.</p><p>Two-thirds of Poles currently approve of the motion of nuclear sharing, albeit the support plummets when confronted with the potential stationing of nuclear weapons near human settlements and guaranteed proximity to critical civilian infrastructure.</p><p>NATO’s current nuclear policy is codified in the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Review, with the supporting role of the consultation of the Nuclear Planning Group. Nuclear deterrence has always been at the core of NATO, despite its insistence that it is committed to nuclear non-proliferation and that it remains a nuclear alliance only insofar so far as nuclear weapons exist — an oxymoron deservedly commonly mocked.</p><p>Nuclear sharing forms an integral part of NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy. It seeks to provide Member States without nuclear weapons with an active role in nuclear weapon policy — in NATO’s own words, it seeks to ensure ‘the broadest possible participation by Allies concerned in the agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements to demonstrate the Alliance unity and resolve.’</p><p>Poland’s wish to participate in the program is not entirely surprising: the country shares a 329-mile border with Ukraine and processed over 8 million Ukrainian refugees since the start of the Russian invasion last February. Its less impacted comparable neighbour, the Czech Republic, shares a potential commitment to NATO nuclear sharing, however over three-quarters of the populace do not support nuclear stationing in the country.</p><p>States officially participating in the programme (Germany, Italy, Turkey, Belgium and the Netherlands) also sought no further expansion of their assigned nuclear capabilities.</p><p>In contrast, Duda noted to Gazeta Polska that he contacted the American command: ‘The problem is that we [Poland] do not have nuclear weapons, and nothing indicates that we could obtain them in the near future.’ His symbolic remark about the ‘open topic’ of nuclear sharing now gains more concrete proportions, as NATO seeks to impose a swifter end to the war in a moment of obvious fragility for the Russian authoritative regime.</p><p>It is ever so important that NATO officially possesses 4,178 nuclear warheads, each one capable of unimaginable destruction and inevitable escalation of the conflict into truly unimaginable proportions. If NATO insists on remaining a nuclear alliance, its deterrence power can be achieved just as effectively with a minor percentage of its arsenal. In each case, the weapons shall remain stationed in nuclear weapon States, sparing countries that did not consent to nuclear weapons in their arsenals of their leader’s short-term geopolitical claims.</p><p>Composed by Aaron Harding for Denuclearise.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6d5ef6429b64" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/aaron-harding-polands-nato-nuclear-sharing-aspirations-threaten-to-escalate-into-the-renaissance-6d5ef6429b64">Aaron Harding: Poland’s NATO nuclear sharing aspirations threaten to escalate into the renaissance…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com">Denuclearise.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mostafa Rasheed: Fresh Fear as North Korea Declares Intend to Expand Nuclear Arsenals]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@denuclearise.com/mostafa-rasheed-fresh-fear-as-north-korea-declares-intend-to-expand-nuclear-arsenals-e27c354855eb?source=rss-32c80a054d93------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e27c354855eb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[north-korea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[korea]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Denuclearise.com]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2023 13:16:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-12T13:16:49.423Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the 22nd of February 2023, Kim Tong-Hyung and Huyng Jim-Kim reported for the Associated Press on the latest North Korean missile launches, and on the extent to which these demonstrations constitute a genuine threat. In light of this tension, the following article will assess the current state of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, and the level of dangers that denuclearisation experts agree it poses.</p><p>First, let’s address the state of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, as best as can be done given the country’s notorious isolation and secrecy. North Korea, officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), has been a subject of international concern due to its nuclear weapons program ever since its inception.</p><p>North Korea began its nuclear program in the 1950s, and its nuclear ambitions were further accelerated in the 1990s. Despite signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003 and subsequently pursued its nuclear weapons program.</p><p>North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006, followed by additional tests in 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017. These tests confirmed North Korea’s ability to detonate nuclear devices, and each test indicated an advancement in its nuclear capabilities.</p><p>North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has progressed over the years, although the exact size and capability of its nuclear arsenal remain uncertain. It is believed that North Korea has developed both plutonium-based and highly enriched uranium (HEU)-based nuclear weapons. Estimates regarding the number of nuclear weapons in North Korea’s possession vary, with assessments ranging from around 30 to 60 nuclear warheads.</p><p>In addition to its nuclear weapons program, North Korea has invested heavily in the development of ballistic missiles. They have conducted numerous missile tests, including tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the continental United States. These advancements in missile technology, coupled with nuclear weapons, have raised concerns about North Korea’s ability to deliver nuclear warheads.</p><p>Predictably, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been met with strong international condemnation and several rounds of sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. Multiple diplomatic efforts, including negotiations and dialogue, have been undertaken to address the issue and persuade North Korea to denuclearize. However, progress has been limited, and tensions in the region remain high.</p><p>In recent years, North Korea has expressed its willingness to engage in diplomatic efforts and held summits with the leaders of South Korea, China, and the United States. These diplomatic engagements, including the historic 2018 Singapore Summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump, aimed to ease tensions and seek denuclearization.</p><p>However, subsequent negotiations have faced challenges, and the complete denuclearization of North Korea has yet to be achieved.</p><p>It is important to note that the situation regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is dynamic. Ongoing monitoring and diplomatic efforts by the international community continue to address this complex issue.</p><p>The question of whether North Korea would use nuclear weapons is a matter of speculation and uncertainty. The intentions and motivations of North Korea’s leadership are complex and not easily discernible. However, there are several factors to consider. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is often seen as a means of deterrence. By possessing nuclear weapons, the country clearly aims to deter potential attacks from its adversaries, primarily the United States and its allies. The regime believes that having a nuclear deterrent enhances its security and increases the cost of any potential military action against it.</p><p>Given that sense of threat, the primary objective of the North Korean regime is the survival of the Kim dynasty and the preservation of the regime’s grip on power. North Korea clearly views nuclear weapons as an insurance policy against external threats. The possession of nuclear weapons provides the dictatorship with a sense of security and bolsters the regime’s legitimacy domestically.</p><p>North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has also been used as a bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations. By developing nuclear weapons and engaging in brinkmanship tactics, the state has sought to extract concessions and gain economic and political benefits from the international community. However, such use of the nuclear weapons chip by any state carries significant risks and consequences. North Korea is aware that any nuclear aggression would likely trigger a severe response from the international community, potentially leading to the regime’s downfall and widespread destruction in the Korean Peninsula. The high stakes involved make it unlikely for North Korea to employ nuclear weapons unless it perceives an existential threat to its regime.</p><p>Accurately predicting North Korea’s behaviour is challenging, and the country’s intentions and decision-making processes are closely guarded. The international community, including regional actors and the UN, continues to engage in diplomatic efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and promote regional stability.</p><p>Composed by Mostafa Rasheed for Denuclearise.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e27c354855eb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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