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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Derek Melber on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Derek Melber on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@derek_melber?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Derek Melber on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@derek_melber?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 20:33:51 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Securing Passwords: Understanding Complexity Requirements]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/securing-passwords-understanding-complexity-requirements-8199fcfdc95?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8199fcfdc95</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prevent-hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-solutions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[password-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[password-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Derek Melber]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Mar 2021 10:54:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-19T10:55:11.640Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/11/12/securing-passwords-complexity-requirements">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on November 2020</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dl0F36mQqB_LNtA_dKd3ug.jpeg" /></figure><p>In a world pushing for MFA, there are still some — okay, most — that rely on passwords alone to help secure their user account access into Active Directory and other network resources. Establishing a password policy that both works for security and is realistic for users can be a difficult task. The one thing to keep in mind is that security has never been easy. Ensuring your users have a secure environment is paramount, but they also need to be able to work within the confines of what you establish.</p><p>Complexity requirements for passwords, which can be seen in <strong>Figure 1</strong>, are an essential part of ensuring user passwords are secure within Active Directory. In my opinion, it is essential that this setting be enabled for every installation of AD. Whether you are a small shop or a huge worldwide organization, the complexity requirements are key to securing passwords.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*ZcfW228LSFOW6DfjL1ZsDg.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 1.</strong> Complexity requirement setting for Active Directory passwords.</figcaption></figure><p>often get asked what the password complexity setting actual does. Here is a simple list of the different components for the passwords to meet complexity requirements:Not contain the user’s account name or parts of the user’s full name that exceed two consecutive characters</p><p>• Be at least six characters in length<br>• Contain characters from three of the following four categories:</p><ul><li>English uppercase characters (A through Z)</li><li>English lowercase characters (a through z)</li><li>Base 10 digits (0 through 9)</li><li>Non-alphabetic characters (for example, !, $, #, %)</li></ul><p>A few caveats regarding the Active Directory complexity requirements:</p><ol><li>They can’t be altered without modifying the inner workings of the filter (or using a third-party product)</li><li>Fine-grained password policies have the same setting and the same restrictions/limits but can help define different levels of password policies for different people</li><li>If the minimum password length is set to seven or more characters, it will override the six characters defined in this setting</li></ol><p>Finally, I will add that the complexity requirements are not <em>great</em> security. However, without this being set, the chances of your users inputting a password that can be hacked in minutes is slim. I do suggest moving to TFA/MFA authentication for logons, network access, and resource access.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/11/12/securing-passwords-complexity-requirements">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on November 2020</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8199fcfdc95" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/securing-passwords-understanding-complexity-requirements-8199fcfdc95">Securing Passwords: Understanding Complexity Requirements</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs">Alsid Community Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Alsid /= AD Monitoring]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/alsid-ad-monitoring-79f30a6c859f?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/79f30a6c859f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[password-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Derek Melber]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Mar 2021 10:41:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-19T10:42:48.747Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/10/15/alsid-ad-monitoring/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on October 2020.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kSw-njRsFwVlqbTElIX8oQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>I keep hearing, mostly from AD monitoring vendors, that they compete with Alsid. Unfortunately, that is not the case for them. AD monitoring solutions do provide a required service for the enterprise, which is reporting and compliance. What AD monitoring solutions don’t do is give information regarding security of AD. Ok, if you want to say that getting a report on who has logged in today is related to security, then it is a security solution. But, knowing who logged in over the past 24 hours will not give anyone a clue as to the overall security of AD!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9rDMQUpOMoQTTApTgEZW4A.png" /></figure><h4>AD Monitoring Benefits</h4><p>Most AD monitoring solutions read the security logs from the domain controllers, placing the events into a database. Then, as the reports related to categories are requested, the data from the DB is retrieved and organized into a report.</p><p><strong>The categories of reports include:</strong></p><ul><li>Logon/Logoff</li><li>Object changes (user, group, computer, OU, etc.)</li><li>GPO changes (links, controls, settings, etc.)</li><li>Schema changes</li><li>DNS changes</li><li>Other misc. changes within AD</li></ul><p>These categories and the reports inform the reader what has changed over the past 30 days, 60 days, 6 months, 2 years, etc.</p><p>I honestly don’t think that having a report on any object changes, historically, gives anyone an indication of anything related to security! A report is only as good as the second it was run! A new change could have occurred seconds afterwards, which makes the current report worthless.</p><h4>AD Monitoring Omissions</h4><p>When an event is logged to the security log on a DC, that task that is represented by the event has already occurred. So, it is like someone telling you “You just hit a wall with your car”, which that is just an insult, as you really wanted them to tell you before you hit the wall!</p><p><strong>What AD monitoring solutions can’t do includes:</strong></p><ul><li>Inform you of the security issues that are in the environment before the AD monitoring software was installed</li><li>Inform you of when a setting was changed that an attacker could leverage in an attack</li><li>Inform you how to fix a security problem or setting (mostly because of the second bullet, but also because they just report)</li><li>Detect attacks (DCSync, DCShadow, brute force password, etc.)</li><li>Give you threat hunting capabilities in order to track down related aspects of an attack (per user, group, etc.)</li></ul><h4>Where Does Alsid Fit In?</h4><p>Alsid is a true AD security solution. Alsid is proactively gathering information from all corners of AD, putting each setting, configuration, etc. into a DB, then evaluating the attack paths that each setting could be leveraged to obtain lateral movement and/or domain privileges. This is done in real-time, so the attacker would need to move fast if performing an attack, and even faster if going to leverage misconfigurations.</p><p>Alsid is agent-less, requires no privileges, has no install on any DC, and does not rely on the security logs. Alsid does not rely on a static list of settings or changes, it is a dynamic attack pathway evaluation solution, which indicates attack pathways that open up so the admins/security team can fix the security misconfigurations before the attacker sees them.</p><p><strong>Alsid is great at:</strong></p><ul><li>Finding existing misconfigurations and indicating how to fix them</li><li>Detecting new misconfigurations that lead to attack pathways and alerting the security team/admins of the new issue</li><li>Detecting attacks, which are related to misconfigurations, in real-time</li><li>Allowing threat hunting for the breadth and depth of what attackers are doing in AD</li></ul><p>There is no question that an AD monitoring solution will help with reporting and compliance. However, if you want to secure AD, Alsid is the only solution that can do that!</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/10/15/alsid-ad-monitoring/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on October 2020.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=79f30a6c859f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/alsid-ad-monitoring-79f30a6c859f">Alsid /= AD Monitoring</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs">Alsid Community Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Like Bloodhound? Love Alsid.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/like-bloodhound-love-alsid-46db266ebe7b?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46db266ebe7b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-training]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bloodhound-project]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-solutions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Derek Melber]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Mar 2021 10:05:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-04T12:47:32.641Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Originally published at <a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/12/11/bloodhound-love-alsid/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> on December 2020.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nbBWzCxmIusrztLHI6Rf3A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Bloodhound is by far one of the most useful tools to help see where an attacker can leverage the misconfigurations in an Active Directory. It is so powerful that attackers have started using it in their ransomware attacks by dropping Bloodhound on the endpoint they compromise to enumerate and analyze AD.</p><p>There are, however, some significant limitations to Bloodhound, which Alsid overcomes with ease.</p><p><strong>Bloodhound is manually driven = not real-time</strong></p><p>Alsid is constantly monitoring any alteration to AD, then analyzing to determine if a new attack pathway is being created.</p><p><strong>Bloodhound lacks GPO tracking</strong></p><p>Alsid can look extensively at GPOs and their settings. Password policies, FGPP, SMB, NTLM… these are just the start. Alsid also looks inside of the GPO for rogue executables, which are used primarily in ransomware attacks, as well as permissions and management over GPOs.</p><p><strong>Bloodhound requires manual analysis</strong></p><p>Alsid not only gathers information constantly in real time, the information that is gathered is immediately analyzed to determine if a new attack pathway is created due to the modification.</p><p><strong>Bloodhound does not provide context or remediation guidance</strong></p><p>Alsid provides detailed information on each and every security-related issue, down to the object and attribute levels. Information is provided on the evaluated vulnerability, as well as suggested remediations.</p><p>We at Alsid have a close bond with Bloodhound and believe it provides a helpful view into the core AD security issues. Due to Bloodhound’s limitations, however, Alsid is a more complete solution for organizations that need to protect against ransomware, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time.</p><p>To see the true power and breadth of Alsid, watch the following video walkthrough:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FEBhb6MSYM04%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DEBhb6MSYM04&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FEBhb6MSYM04%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/579a756b71dc40c293233a77c2bbc492/href">https://medium.com/media/579a756b71dc40c293233a77c2bbc492/href</a></iframe><p>Originally published at <a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/12/11/bloodhound-love-alsid/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> on December 2020.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46db266ebe7b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/like-bloodhound-love-alsid-46db266ebe7b">Like Bloodhound? Love Alsid.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs">Alsid Community Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Privileged inside persistent attack]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/privileged-inside-persistent-attack-46efed2791f7?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46efed2791f7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Derek Melber]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2021 16:51:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-01T16:51:20.506Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/08/13/privileged-inside-persistent-attack/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on August 2020.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7dh8_n03-6uWjIcNirIabA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The landscape of Active Directory is changing. In the past, an untrustworthy admin could simply be fired. Now that privileged inside users have become more sophisticated, however, we must dig deeper into how these users might attack us persistently. We will introduce three different attacks which a privileged inside user can perform to grant persistent privileges in areas that are nearly impossible to monitor.</p><h4>DCSync Attack</h4><p>The DCSync attack is performed by a privileged inside user. This means Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Domain Administrators, or Domain Controller computer accounts. The concept is that a privileged inside user can “request” the user password hashes from a real domain controller. Again, the privileged inside user does not have to be a human, only someone using the account to perform the request to obtain the password hashes. With the hashes, and other key user properties, the attacker can perform offline password hash attacks and analysis on the users to compromise their credentials. The attack is persistent because the user hashes can be obtained at any time by running a simple command, ensuring that any updated passwords and their hashes are obtained.</p><p>There are some solutions that can detect this persistent attack, but Active Directory cannot do so natively.</p><p>For more info… <a href="https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729">https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729</a></p><h4>DCShadow Attack</h4><p>The DCShadow attack is also performed by a privileged inside user. This attack is different in that the goal is to update the existing Active Directory objects by modifying an existing object or creating a new object. This attack has a foundation in which a “fake” domain controller is created and injected into the Active Directory replication stream. Once the new domain controller is injected into the replication stream, any object can be updated without any trace of the update. This is possible because the actual event would be logged on the domain controller that performed the change, which in this case is the fake DC unknown to the environment. Common changes would be altering the membership of a privileged group, updating the SIDHistory for a user, or even deleting objects. With the change not being caught in a log or a SIEM, the change is persistent and unknown.</p><p>There are some solutions that can detect this persistent attack, but Active Directory cannot do so natively.</p><p>For more info…. <a href="https://blog.alsid.eu/dcshadow-explained-4510f52fc19d">https://blog.alsid.eu/dcshadow-explained-4510f52fc19d</a></p><h4>AdminCount</h4><p>A final privileged inside user attack is related to how Active Directory protects the privileged accounts in AD. Active Directory is constantly updating the permissions for privileged users and groups to ensure that these objects can perform their activities, even if the permissions are altered which would remove their privileges. There are two moving parts within the system that work together to make this happen. The first is the concept of “which objects are privileged objects”? This is tracked by an object attribute named AdminAcount. The AdminCount for all built-in privileged groups and users is 1. Looking at the Domain Admins group, you can see the AdminCount is 1. When a user or group is added to this group, the new members AdminCount is changed to 1 (in most cases). The other aspect is related to the AdminSDHolder. This is an ACL template, which is located in Active Directory. This list is used to update all the objects that have their AdminCount set to 1 (or those having membership in a privileged group). The AdminSDHolder list is pushed to all privileged objects every 60 minutes to ensure privileged accounts maintain their privileges. If someone with the ability to alter the AdminSDHolder list inserts a bogus entry, the bogus entry is pushed to all objects with AdminCount equaling 1, thus giving the bogus account control over that object. Second, if the AdminCount for non-privileged accounts is configured to be 1, then accounts that should not be privileged are automatically privileged.</p><p>There are some solutions that can detect this persistent attack, but Active Directory allows it natively by default.</p><p>For more info… <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/technet-magazine/ee361593(v=msdn.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/technet-magazine/ee361593(v=msdn.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN</a></p><h4>Consistent Monitoring and Alerting</h4><p>As you can see, these attacks are technical and very difficult to “see”. Therefore, every Active Directory installation needs to have some mechanism that can expose these attacks. Since the attacks are quick and persistent, the solution needs to be able to see the attack immediately and alert the security team <strong>ASAP</strong>.</p><p>Alsid is a solution that provides this level of monitoring and alerting, without any agent or administrative privileges required.</p><p>For more info… <a href="http://alsid.com/">www.alsid.com</a></p><h4>Action to Take</h4><p>You need to know if you have become the victim of these internal persistent attacks. Digging into them and tracking down the configurations can be time consuming and complex. While possible, your time is valuable. Since most SIEM and agent-based solutions look for the “attack activity”, they will not see the persistence of the attack. Alsid not only monitors and alerts on dangerous activity, but it also investigates existing settings to report where issues are found. A POC will expose all your existing Active Directory attack paths and exposures.</p><p>Email me for more info: <a href="/service/mailto:derek.melber@alsid.com">Derek Melber</a></p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/08/13/privileged-inside-persistent-attack/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on August 2020.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46efed2791f7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/privileged-inside-persistent-attack-46efed2791f7">Privileged inside persistent attack</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs">Alsid Community Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Active Directory Security: What you don’t know CAN hurt you!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/active-directory-security-what-you-dont-know-can-hurt-you-4a13143e08ae?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4a13143e08ae</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-solutions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Derek Melber]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Feb 2021 17:27:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-04T12:49:37.826Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yf0a2_BfDbv-4JEBNP41yQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>There are far too many breaches that are leveraging Active Directory. There are many reasons for this, but a few bubble up to the top:</p><ul><li>AD admins are far too busy to secure what they need to secure</li><li>Internal processes and procedures do not consider AD security</li><li>AD admins have not been taught the finer points of AD security</li><li>AD was installed in early 2000 (and then upgraded), with no attention to security along the way</li></ul><p>There are so many aspects of AD that are required, but without the attention they need, can be easily misconfigured and therefore attacked. These processes, objects, attributes, configurations, etc. are not linear with regard to security, which is also an issue. An attribute could be set to a value and the attribute is not a security risk due to a group the user has membership in. However, the same attribute set to the same value could expose the user to a near immediate attack if the user is not in that group.</p><p>We have many blogs on this site, so if one of these terms are not familiar to you, please reference the blog or another article on the Web to research it!</p><ul><li>adminSDHolder</li><li>SDProp</li><li>admincountServicePrincipalName</li><li>Primary Group ID</li><li>SIDHistory</li><li>DCSync</li><li>DCShadow</li><li>Passwords in SYSVOL</li><li>Recon with standard user privileges</li><li>Kerberoasting</li><li>Silver Ticket</li><li>Golden Ticket</li><li>Lateral movement</li><li>Privilege Escalation</li><li>Attack Pathway</li><li>Group Policy Preference Password</li></ul><p>For more information on this topic and strategies for strengthening your own security operations and visit <a href="http://alsid.com/">alsid.com</a>.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/12/17/active-directory-security-what-you-dont-know-can-hurt-you/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on January 2020.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4a13143e08ae" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/active-directory-security-what-you-dont-know-can-hurt-you-4a13143e08ae">Active Directory Security: What you don’t know CAN hurt you!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs">Alsid Community Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Can’t I Just Use BloodHound to Secure Active Directory?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/why-cant-i-just-use-bloodhound-to-secure-active-directory-87496c0d55e4?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/87496c0d55e4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory-support]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bloodhound-project]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-solutions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Derek Melber]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Feb 2021 17:10:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-04T12:47:56.853Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2021/01/12/can-not-use-bloodhound-to-secure-active-directory/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on January 2020.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bGVHRIgWa-nZQafFpABupA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Those who use BloodHound for AD often ask this simple question. BloodHound is undoubtedly a powerful, insightful, and needed solution for any AD environment. It is becoming one of the most popular pen testing solutions, as it is not based on settings alone, rather attack pathways. BloodHound is near and dear to Alsid, and for good reason. Our co-founder, Emmanuel Gras, was one of the minds behind it.(<a href="https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html">https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html</a>)</p><p>BloodHound is based on a mathematical concept called graph theory. (You can geek out on the topic here: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graph_theory">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graph_theory</a>)</p><p>The overall idea is that every two nodes have a relationship between them, either directly or through other nodes (objects, attributes, ACLs, etc.). Uncovering the paths/relationships between two nodes can expose easy access, which is complex to see and understand with the naked eye or even with deep analysis. Graph theory can expose these relationships easily.</p><p>BloodHound can be used to show all relationships, therefore exposing the attack pathways to the Domain Admins and the domain itself. So, why can’t BloodHound be used to secure AD?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*y0t5jrm0poZIRHig.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 1.</strong> Typical BloodHound graph showing insecure Kerberos settings on computers</figcaption></figure><ul><li>BloodHound is not an automatic tool, it must be “started and then imported into the tool”</li><li>BloodHound does not automatically show you the attack pathways</li><li>To see an attack pathway, you must first develop the graph for what you are looking at (Delegations, Domain Admin members, etc.), then analyze the results (Figure 1 illustrates a typical graph just showing Unconstrained Kerberos Delegations for Computers)</li><li>BloodHound does not send information to a SOC tool, such as a SIEM or SOAR</li><li>There is no guidance within BloodHound to help you analyze the attack pathways or know how to fix a setting to remove the attack pathway</li></ul><p>However, take the concept of what BloodHound does “overall” and add all the features to it. The result… Alsid for AD!</p><p>For more information on this topic and strategies for strengthening your own security operations, visit <a href="http://alsid.com/">alsid.com</a> or reach out to <a href="/service/mailto:sales@alsid.com">sales@alsid.com</a>.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2021/01/12/can-not-use-bloodhound-to-secure-active-directory/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on January 2020.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=87496c0d55e4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/why-cant-i-just-use-bloodhound-to-secure-active-directory-87496c0d55e4">Why Can’t I Just Use BloodHound to Secure Active Directory?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs">Alsid Community Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Protecting Privileged Accounts: Service Account Logon Limitations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/protecting-privileged-accounts-service-account-logon-limitations-ef7314235a14?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ef7314235a14</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[it-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[password-protection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Derek Melber]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Dec 2020 22:39:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-04T12:48:08.772Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/07/14/protecting-privileged-accounts-service-account-logon-limitations/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on July 2020.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5ri8W3LSfnLHSFVd-ghUbw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Service accounts are a required component of every organization. They are often not as secured as they need to be, however, which makes them the perfect candidate for an attack. Taking the extra time to secure these accounts can mean all the difference when attackers target your Active Directory.</p><p>Since service accounts are dedicated to one or only a handful of services they support, they should be limited to only the servers where the service is running. For example, if the service account is supporting a dedicated SQL database that houses the HR content, the service account can be limited to only the server where the SQL DB is running.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DGZG6CWxDMQp1cAhV-tWtg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1. Limit which servers the service account can log on to.</figcaption></figure><p>To accomplish this, the service account within AD will be configured to only have the ability to log on to this server, which you can see in <strong>Figure 1</strong>.</p><p>This alone will help control which computers this account can log on to, but it will also prove beneficial if the account is being attacked. As long as you have a solution looking for password attacks, this is ideal. There should not be any attempts for this account to log on to any computer other than SQL4. If there is, the account is under attack!</p><p>Every service account should have a limited list of computers they can log on to. This will reduce the attack surface, allowing you to better monitor for failed logons and give you insights into when these accounts are under a password attack.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/07/14/protecting-privileged-accounts-service-account-logon-limitations/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on July 2020.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef7314235a14" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/protecting-privileged-accounts-service-account-logon-limitations-ef7314235a14">Protecting Privileged Accounts: Service Account Logon Limitations</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs">Alsid Community Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Securing Passwords: What Should the Account Lockout Policy Setting Be?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/securing-passwords-what-should-the-account-lockout-policy-setting-be-aaee22e029e8?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aaee22e029e8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[it-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-solutions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[password-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Derek Melber]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Dec 2020 04:57:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-04T12:48:03.409Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/11/02/securing-passwords-account-lockout-policy/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on August 2020.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G_Cmo0ZZLnjGyHuM-kzG0g.jpeg" /></figure><p>There is a great debate as to how many incorrect password attempts a user should get before the user account is locked out. It is my opinion that the debate was started due to non-IT and non-security people making decisions without truly understanding “the attackers perspective”. Let’s look at three sides of this debate so you can arrive at your own decision.</p><p><strong>First</strong>, let’s examine the debate from the compliance standpoint. Nearly all compliance regulations will include a clause that clearly states that the number of failed logon attempts should be between 3 and 5. First, the level of in-depth security analysis that goes into this range is very shallow. The biggest issue with this range is that every user will know what the value is. How? Well, nearly every user has “one of those Mondays” where they will not remember their password and fail to log on enough times to have their account locked out. Now that the user knows that the number of failed logons is approximately 4, they can have some fun with other user accounts. It is easy to input 4 bad passwords for any other user in the enterprise to lock them out. With enough time, and even a very simple batch file, the entire domain of users can be locked out within minutes.</p><p>(Note: Password spray attacks have risen over the past years. This is where the attacker will try the same password(s) against all users in AD, by using fewer logon attempts that will not trigger a lockout, but will then automatically cycle more passwords after the failed logon counter is reset.)</p><p><strong>Second</strong>, what about those who say that the account lockout policy should be unlimited? This is a clear case where there is no security concern or analysis. Any hack(er) could develop a script that will try every possible password, either from a dictionary list or one that is dynamically created. Without the lockout policy, the attacker has an unlimited number of attempts, which is no security at all.</p><p><strong>Finally</strong>, let’s look at a third option. This option is to set an account lockout policy to be large enough so users will never input enough incorrect passwords to have their account locked out. Let’s imagine this value could be between 50 and 100. On one side, the user will not hit the number and will not be made aware of the number of failed logon attempts before the account is locked out. (Yes, I know a simple command will generate the value, but again that is a different story!) On the other side, having 50 to 100 attempts at a password that is long, strong, and complex is a drop in the bucket for how many it should require to “guess” the password. If you feel that 100 attempts to guess your password is too many, you need to change your password! Setting the other aspects of the Password Policy (Password complexity, Min/Max length, Lockout policy, etc.) is key here.</p><p>As you can see, the key is to not let everyone discover the value while keeping the number of attempts low enough that a batch file attempting to guess the password will be cut off before the password is discovered.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/11/02/securing-passwords-account-lockout-policy/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on August 2020.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aaee22e029e8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/securing-passwords-what-should-the-account-lockout-policy-setting-be-aaee22e029e8">Securing Passwords: What Should the Account Lockout Policy Setting Be?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs">Alsid Community Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Privileged vs non-privileged inside attacker]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/privileged-vs-non-privileged-inside-attacker-10b322595027?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/10b322595027</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privileged-attack-vectors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privileged-access-mgmt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-solutions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Derek Melber]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2020 05:29:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-09T16:04:34.481Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/08/05/privileged-vs-non-privileged-inside-attacker/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on August 2020.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zPaH0mdVs6TJH-D4wtyx4g.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>What are privileges?</strong></p><p>For the purpose of this blog, I am defining privileges that are related to Active Directory and the objects stored within the database. Examples of privileged users include those with membership to the Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Group Policy Creator Owners, Account Operators, etc. groups. They also include users that have delegated permissions over Active Directory, such as the ability to reset passwords and modify group membership.</p><p>I don’t want to negate the other privileges within a Microsoft Windows environment, such as user rights, GPO delegations, and service permissions. But those aren’t the focus here.</p><p><strong>An internal non-privileged user</strong></p><p>An internal non-privileged user is typically an end user. This user will not have any capabilities to modify Active Directory. We could dive into the concept of whether the user has administrative privileges over their desktop, but for the purpose of this blog, let’s assume the user is a local administrator.</p><p>In this scenario, the user has quite a bit of power to install and run applications from their computer. Not all Active Directory interrogation tools require a local administrator, but in many cases they do. This user has the ability to do recon on the entire Active Directory domain and beyond. Since the user has an Active Directory user account, the user has read access to the entire AD database. Of course, the user can’t dump out all of the passwords for domain users. (That is not the level of read access provided.) However, they can obtain user, group, computer, GPO, and trust details. Here are a few examples of what a user can see:</p><ul><li>All members of the Domain Admins group</li><li>The last time a user changed their password</li><li>Settings in a GPO</li></ul><p>If tools like Bloodhound are utilized, not only can this user see the objects within the database, but they can get a full mapping of the attack paths for each user to obtain privileges to Active Directory.</p><p><strong>An internal privileged user</strong></p><p>Of course, an internal privileged user can do all that a non-privileged user can — and more. It can be a bit confusing why an internal privileged user is a concern. I mean, isn’t this just an Active Directory admin? Not at all!</p><p>The issue with an internal privileged user is that they can do anything they want… which means creating backdoors, changing settings without being tracked, obtaining security information without any event log generated, and more. Also, the internal privileged user might not be an employee of the company. This could be a service account, an outside attacker that has compromised an internal account, etc.</p><p>When we start introducing attacks like DCSync and DCShadow (available in Mimikatz), the entire game changes as these attacks bypass many of the auditing, tracking, and event logging solutions on which we rely. It takes a much deeper solution to “see” that these attacks are taking place.</p><p><strong>Taking action</strong></p><p>As we can’t go deep into the attacks that both non-privileged and privileged users can perform, I want to leave you with an action you can take to help secure both of these internal users. For non-privileged users, make sure you take away their local administrative privileges on their computer. For privileged users, make sure that all privileged groups (built-in, service, application, and custom) have the correct members. This includes any nested groups too! It is also important to ensure that all Active Directory delegations are correct. Again, this includes not only the direct ACL, but any nested groups that are in the groups listed on the ACL (referred to as EFFECTIVE permissions).</p><p>If you want to know more, you can download our guide, <a href="https://contact.alsid.com/en/download/guide/the-insider-threat-the-enemy-within">“The Insider Threat: The Enemy Within”</a>.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/08/05/privileged-vs-non-privileged-inside-attacker/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on August 2020.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=10b322595027" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/privileged-vs-non-privileged-inside-attacker-10b322595027">Privileged vs non-privileged inside attacker</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs">Alsid Community Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Securing Privileged Access: Verifying AD Delegations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/securing-privileged-access-verifying-ad-delegations-687f45983fa5?source=rss-51ebc03b5c1b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/687f45983fa5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory-help]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[active-directory-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[password-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-solutions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Derek Melber]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2020 17:30:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-11T17:29:07.271Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/09/03/securing-privileged-access-verifying-ad-delegations/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on September 2020.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GhDjDjMXb8qsPb5fsffKhA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Active Directory delegation is by far one of the most important security aspects of your environment. Over the years, I have seen more misconfigured delegations than correctly configured delegations. Honestly, most of the delegations that were misconfigured were “extreme,” and the organizations did not even realize they needed to check.</p><p>What do I mean by AD delegations? Every object in AD has an access control list (ACL), and the delegation wizard can be run to modify this ACL, as you can see in <strong>Figure 1</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bjXK4BlCv8wErd4a.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 1</strong>. Delegation Wizard in Active Directory Users and Computers</figcaption></figure><p>There are plenty of options that can be selected using the Wizard, but the two most popular include:</p><ul><li>Resetting passwords</li><li>Modifying group membership</li></ul><p>With all users having the ability to “Read” all of AD, you can clearly see how easy it would be for an internal attacker to look up which users and groups they need to attack, then easily discover which user passwords they can alter and which groups they would need to alter to easily access resources as an admin. If the attacker wanted, they could gain domain dominance and remove it from the true domain admins in seconds.</p><p>Therefore, it is essential to verify who has been granted delegations and correct any misconfigurations. Unfortunately, Microsoft does not give you much assistance with this, but there is a built-in command that can. If you use the dsacls command, you can get the current ACL for each OU (you can also get the ACLs for users, groups, computers, etc.) to ensure that only the correct users can modify AD at an admin level. For example, if you wanted to look at the DLM OU, you would run the dsacls command like this:</p><pre>Dsacls ou=DLM,dc=win2019,dc=priv</pre><p>NOTE: my domain is named win2019.priv</p><p>The output resembles <strong>Figure 2</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*i3-o2a4dIIHLAGy8.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 2</strong>. Output of the current ACL of the DLM OU using dsacls.</figcaption></figure><p>Some tips:</p><ol><li>You can leverage a list of all OUs in LDAP syntax by using DSQUERY</li><li>Ignore all of the default entries for an OU</li><li>Be sure to look at nested groups</li><li>The delegation wizard can only add entries, it can’t remove them</li></ol><p>Now that you know how to get into your delegations, you can clean them up and secure the access into AD.</p><p><strong>Additionally:</strong></p><p>You can add a user from win10 — execute this command: “ rundll32 dsquery.dll,OpenQueryWindow “</p><p>To run a graphical tool that provides all the information about group membership without any command 😉</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*v_SHFGPMuR8-uj6T014rhA.png" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.alsid.com/2020/09/03/securing-privileged-access-verifying-ad-delegations/">https://www.alsid.com/blog/</a> <em>on September 2020.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=687f45983fa5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs/securing-privileged-access-verifying-ad-delegations-687f45983fa5">Securing Privileged Access: Verifying AD Delegations</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alsid-it-blogs">Alsid Community Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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