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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Dick O&#39;Brien on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Dick O&amp;#39;Brien on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Short History of Router Attacks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threat-intel/router-attacks-iot-mirai-vpnfilter-hajime-4f2692d72563?source=rss-e2641e8d02fc------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history-of]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dick O'Brien]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 May 2018 12:56:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-30T14:20:59.577Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Threat Intel’s ‘History of…’ series will look at the origins and evolution of notable developments in cyber security.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UdvPaoq5a7rx3jMOVOrqDQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Yesterday we saw another new strain of IoT malware <a href="https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/vpnfilter-iot-malware">emerge in the form of VPNFilter</a>, a particularly nasty piece of work that’s capable of spying on traffic being routed through a device; is quite hard to remove; and (if that’s not enough) is capable of bricking the device if the attacker so chooses.</p><p>VPNFilter affects a range of devices, but most of them are routers. If you’re thinking that routers have become a particular focus for attacks in the past couple of years, you wouldn’t be wrong. Routers have gone from being a somewhat niche area to one of the main battlegrounds in cyber space. What is it about the humble router that’s suddenly attracted such interest?</p><h4>New frontiers, old-fashioned targets</h4><p>When the Internet of Things started to take off, we began to hear predictions of about attacks targeting IoT devices. There was a lot of talk about security cameras being hacked, connected cars being crashed, and smart homes being burgled. Yet when IoT attacks finally started to happen, it was the oldest (and probably least exciting) connected device that became the main focus for attacks: the router.</p><p>“Hang on,” some of you may be saying, “routers aren’t really IoT devices.” Yes, there’s certainly a compelling argument to say they aren’t. Routers have been around long before anyone started talking about IoT and aren’t the kind of device that people usually associate with IoT. But, at the same time, routers share a lot of similarities with other IoT devices. They’re small, low-powered, connected devices that frequently share a lot of the security weaknesses that make IoT devices so vulnerable to attack, such as infrequent software updates, improper configuration and the use of default or hard-coded credentials.</p><p>So why routers? When IoT attacks really began to take off, attackers realized that one of the best uses for compromised IoT devices was building botnets and using those botnets to perform distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. What routers lacked in processing power they made up for in other respects: there’s lots of them and they’re easy to compromise.</p><h4><strong>Mirai: Simple but effective</strong></h4><p><a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/mirai-what-you-need-know-about-botnet-behind-recent-major-ddos-attacks">The first botnet to really go after routers</a> in a big way was Mirai (<a href="https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2016-112905-2551-99">Linux.Mirai</a>), which first drew attention to itself in September 2016 when it mounted a massive DDoS attack against security writer Brian Krebs. The genie really got out of the bottle a few days later when its source code was leaked, meaning anyone who wanted to could create their own Mirai botnet.</p><p>Mirai is a very simple piece of malware and its success is largely down to poor security on the devices it targets. It operates by continuously scanning the internet for IoT devices that are protected by factory default or hardcoded user names and passwords. When it finds any, it attempts to infect them and add them to the botnet.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y9BFkcAnt5m4AnYzUmmwfw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Very quickly, Mirai proved that a botnet of low-powered devices could still cause major disruption. It mounted an attack on French hosting company OVH that peaked at 1Tbps. However, it was the attack on DNS provider Dyn that really got the world’s attention, since it knocked some major websites offline, including Spotify, Twitter, and PayPal.</p><p>Such was Mirai’s impact that Symantec <a href="https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-22-2017-en.pdf">witnessed a twofold increase in attempted attacks against IoT devices over the course of 2016</a>. During times of peak activity, the average IoT device was attacked once every two minutes.</p><p>By the beginning of 2017, everyone knew all about Mirai, but that awareness didn’t change much because there wasn’t a significant improvement in device security. There was still a big enough pool of vulnerable routers for Mirai and its copycats to prey on. While they didn’t hit the headlines as much in 2017, IoT attacks continued to rocket, <a href="https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-23-2018-en.pdf">growing by a whopping 600 percent during the year</a>. Router attacks were like a cold the internet couldn’t shake, so it wasn’t too surprising that some people decided to take the law into their own hands.</p><h4><strong>Vigilantes</strong></h4><p>While Mirai was carpet bombing its way across the internet, a new rival emerged from very unexpected quarters. <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/hajime-worm-battles-mirai-control-internet-things">Hajime first emerged in October 2016</a> and by early 2017 it was popping up as often as Mirai. On the face of it, it looked to be very similar to Mirai. It was a worm designed to spread via unsecured Linux devices with open Telnet ports using default passwords. It even used the exact same list of default username and password combinations as Mirai used.</p><p>However, a closer look revealed that the two were very different programs. Hajime was much more advanced than Mirai. It was stealthier, taking multiple steps to hide its presence on an infected device. It had a peer-to-peer structure, rather than a hardcoded command-and-control (C&amp;C) address, meaning it was more resistant to takedown attempts. However, the key difference was that it didn’t have any malicious payload. Mirai’s primary purpose was to build a botnet to carry out DDoS attacks. Hajime did the opposite: it tried to improve the security of the infected device by blocking access to ports 23, 7547, 5555, and 5358, all of which host services known to be exploitable on many IoT devices and frequently targeted by Mirai.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U5SHEx9eJDHfojIPs60u7A.jpeg" /></figure><p>So was Hajime non-malicious? It’s authors certainly wanted to us to believe so. Aside from beefing up the security of infected devices, it also fetched a note from its controller and displayed it on the terminal every 10 minutes stating that it was the work of “a white hat, securing some systems”.</p><p>It’s hard to be unconditionally supportive of vigilante efforts like this. While seemingly well intentioned, Hajime did put a back door in affected devices, which its creator still had access too after their work was done. If their intentions changed or if Hajime fell into the wrong hands, it could still be used for malicious purposes.</p><p>While Hajime sounds like one of those singular occurrences, it isn’t the first time something like this has happened. Way back in 2014, <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/there-internet-things-vigilante-out-there">another threat called Wifatch</a> began spreading, primarily across Linux-based routers. When we decided to take a closer look at what Wifatch was up to in 2015, we very quickly found something unusual about it. Like Hajime, it didn’t appear to have a malicious payload. Instead it systematically attempted to harden the device against further attacks. Not only that, it attempted to warn the device’s owner, leaving messages on the device advising them to change their passwords and update their firmware. Wifatch also went one step further by attempting to remove other malware infections from the device.</p><p>If white hat worms such as Hajime and Wifatch were more sophisticated than Mirai and improved devices’ security, why didn’t they triumph and clean up the IoT landscape for good? The most important reason lies in the fact that there is only so much worms like this can do and, usually, any changes they make won’t survive a device reboot.</p><p>For example, with Hajime once the device is rebooted it goes back to its unsecured state, including default passwords and Telnet open. In order to make any changes permanent, the firmware would need to be updated and only the device owner could do that. Similarly, with Wifatch a reboot would remove it and undo any changes it made. A reboot would leave any vulnerable devices wide open again to infection by malicious threats such as Mirai.</p><p>This frustrating status quo, with so many poorly secured routers facilitating the spread of threats like Mirai, was one of the reasons why we created <a href="https://us.norton.com/core">Norton Core</a>, a fully secured router that is impermeable to these attacks, which also protects connected devices sitting behind it on your home network.</p><h4><strong>A new breed of threat</strong></h4><p>But it is the <a href="https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/vpnfilter-iot-malware">emergence of VPNFilter yesterday</a> that is a real source of concern. It targets a range of routers and NAS devices, but unlike most malware that targets these devices, it doesn’t appear to be designed to create a DDoS botnet. Instead, VPNFilter is capable of snooping on traffic being routed through infected devices.</p><p>However, there are two things that make it stand out from other IoT threats. First of all, the malware is persistent. Unlike most other IoT threats, VPNFilter doesn’t disappear from a device when you reboot it. In order to completely remove it, you’ll need to perform a hard reset of the device. This will restore it to its original factory settings (but will also remove any configuration details or credentials stored on it, meaning you’ll need to back these up before you perform a hard reset).</p><p>The second worrying aspect is that VPNFilter has a feature that allows the attacker to effectively “brick” the device if they so choose. If a “kill” command is issued by the attacker, VPNFilter will overwrite a key section of the firmware and then reboot, rendering the device unusable.</p><p>What’s this feature for? There are a few possibilities. One is that VPNFilter’s creators could use it to destroy evidence of any infection, covering their tracks behind them. An alternative is that it could be used to facilitate widescale disruption. By simultaneously issuing the kill command to thousands of infected routers, the attackers could knock a lot of organizations offline and cause chaos in affected countries.</p><p>With the information security community sounding the alarm about VPNFilter and the <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-actions-disrupt-advanced-persistent-threat-28-botnet-infected">FBI already beginning to seize domains belonging to the group</a>, there is hope that its effectiveness may be blunted.</p><p>However, as with any new development in malware, other attackers will be taking a close look at VPNFilter and wondering if there is anything they can learn from this new threat.</p><p><em>Check out the Security Response </em><a href="https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence"><em>blog</em></a><em> and follow Threat Intel on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/threatintel"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> to keep up-to-date with the latest happenings in the world of threat intelligence and cyber security.</em></p><p><em>Like this story? Recommend it by hitting the heart button so others on Medium see it, and follow Threat Intel on Medium for more great content.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4f2692d72563" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel/router-attacks-iot-mirai-vpnfilter-hajime-4f2692d72563">A Short History of Router Attacks</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel">Threat Intel</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Short History of Law Enforcement and Cyber Crime]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threat-intel/cyber-crime-takedowns-66915be7307e?source=rss-e2641e8d02fc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/66915be7307e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[history-of]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dick O'Brien]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 May 2018 14:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-03T14:01:01.029Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>Threat Intel’s ‘History of…’ series will look at the origins and evolution of notable developments in cybersecurity</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NIkGJFZB4EkmOe3HN6FODQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The advent of cyber crime created a lot of headaches for police forces. Over a very short space of time, an entirely new form of criminality emerged. There were no fingerprints, no witnesses, and often the victim and the perpetrator were continents apart.</p><p>It’s debatable who exactly the first hacker to be jailed was. But certainly one contender for the moniker is Captain Crunch, or John Draper to his friends and family. Draper, now 75, served in the U.S. Air Force before working as an engineer in Silicon Valley in the early 1970s. However, in his spare time, he was involved in phone phreaking. What’s phreaking? Essentially it’s the telecoms equivalent of hacking, using in-depth knowledge of how the telephone system works to get free phone calls. At the time, phone phreakers were underground celebrities and it was that celebrity that led the police to his door.</p><p>In 1971, he did an interview with <em>Esquire </em>magazine in which he made a thinly veiled admission to phone phreaking. Not surprisingly, this drew the attention of the authorities and he was promptly arrested, convicted of toll fraud and given five years’ probation. Coming to the attention of the authorities didn’t deter Draper and he was jailed twice more for phone fraud, in 1976 and 1978.</p><p>Draper’s activities were a precursor of what was to come as authorities adapted to deal with the nascent field of cyber crime. In the early years, hacking often wasn’t about financial gain. Instead it was usually about demonstrating your skills, gaining recognition from fellow hackers and, sometimes, thumbing your nose at authority. That desire to be noticed was often what allowed the police to identify hackers.</p><h4>Hacking sprees</h4><p>One of the first to get caught was Kevin Mitnick, who began breaking into computer networks as a teenager in the late ’70s and by the late 1980s had embarked on a prolific hacking career. Law enforcement finally caught up with him in 1988 when he was convicted of breaking into computer maker Digital’s network and stealing their software. Mitnick was jailed for a year and was then meant to do three years of supervised release but, near the end of the term, he was caught hacking Pacific Bell and a warrant was issued for his arrest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ukxdiU81HuDxprI0UeRwpg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Facing a return to jail, Mitnick opted to go on the run. Mitnick didn’t lie low and instead went on a hacking spree. Over the next three years he hacked into and stole information from dozens of organizations. The FBI launched what it termed an “electronic manhunt”. Ironically, one of the steps Mitnick took to cover his tracks would eventually lead to his downfall.</p><p>Mitnick figured that using a cellular phone to go online would be harder to trace than a landline, which in many ways was true, but he managed to raise some flags while doing so. One of the mistakes he made was pilfering some cellphone software from a developer called Tsutomu Shimomura. Shimomura took the theft personally and <a href="https://www.wired.com/1996/02/catching/">threw himself into helping the authorities track Mitnick down</a>. Working with a technician from cellular operator Sprint, he helped track Mitnick down to an apartment building in Raleigh, North Carolina. From there, the FBI was able to do its work, deploying the Triggerfish cellular direction finder in order to pinpoint Mitnick’s exact location and arrest him on February 15, 1995.</p><p>Mitnick spent four-and-a -half years in jail before his case was heard, including eight months in solitary after officials expressed fears that he could even mount attacks using just a pay phone. When his case was heard in 1999 he pleaded guilty to four counts of wire fraud, two of computer fraud and one of intercepting a wire communication and was sentenced to five years in prison. Taking into account the time he’d served already, he was released in 2000.</p><h4>Cyber crime gets serious</h4><p>While Mitnick was elusive for several years, he was at least in the US, which made it easy for the FBI to bring him to justice once he’d been located. However, within a very short space of time, two new complications for law enforcement when it came to cyber crime became very apparent. The first was that the old school hacker was rapidly eclipsed by a new breed of cyber criminal who was in it for the money. These people had no interest in publicly demonstrating their prowess and, aside from some who were a little too careless in flaunting their ill-gotten gains, maintained a very low profile.</p><p>The other complication lay in the fact that international borders mattered very little to cyber criminals and it was often as easy for them to attack a target on the other side of the world as it was to hit one on the other side of the street. The globalization of cyber crime meant that law enforcement had to not only identify who the perpetrators were but also find a way of bringing them to justice, either by seeking extradition or providing information to the authorities in the attacker’s home country to ensure a successful prosecution there.</p><p>In 1994, while the FBI was still hunting Mitnick, a number of corporate bank customers discovered that their accounts had been raided to the tune of $400,000. <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/a-byte-out-of-history-10-million-hack">An FBI investigation established</a> that the attackers had compromised the bank’s cash management systems. The attackers were siphoning off money into overseas bank accounts and had already stolen up to $10 million.</p><p>The bank in question managed to get the overseas accounts frozen before any more money could be withdrawn, while the FBI turned its attention to the sole account used by the attackers that was located in the US. It’s owners were a Russian couple who had previously lived in the US. When the wife flew to the US to withdraw more money, the FBI arrested her and persuaded her and her husband to cooperate.</p><p>From them, the FBI learned the mastermind behind the operation was a Russian man called Vladimir Levin. Working with Russian authorities, the FBI gathered evidence and built its case against Levin. In March 1995, Levin was arrested while he was visiting London, allowing the U.S. to request his extradition. He was eventually convicted in 1998 and sentenced to three years in jail.</p><h4>International takedowns</h4><p>Levin’s arrest illustrated another issue in pursuing international cyber criminals — you can only extradite someone from a country you have an extradition treaty with. Once a suspect is identified, authorities will often wait until they travel to a country they can extradite from and request their arrest. Since Levin’s London arrest, a steady stream of suspects have ended up in custody after they got on a plane thinking they were going on holidays.</p><p>One of the most prominent examples of this was Aleksandr Panin, aka “Gribodemon”, the brains behind the SpyEye financial Trojan. Panin was the main developer and, starting in 2009, he sold it to other cyber criminals online who used it to target more than one million banking customers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sewWl8kQOi6NjTcKWDiKJQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Based in the Russian city of Tver, Panin may have thought he was beyond the reach of US authorities. However, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2014/03/05/hackers-prowl-dark-web/5982023/">things began to unravel for him</a> when, in 2011, the FBI seized a SpyEye command and control (C&amp;C) server in Atlanta Georgia, which was being operated by one of his associates, Algeria-based Hamza Bendelladj. Later that year, unbeknownst to him, Panin sold undercover agents a copy of SpyEye online. While they still didn’t have a name, the FBI was closing in on Panin and secured an indictment against their as-yet-unnamed suspect. A short while later, the FBI found evidence that tied Panin with his online alias Gribodemon, but the indictment remained sealed in order to avoid tipping off Panin that US authorities were on to him.</p><p>The opportunity for law enforcement came just over a year later. First Bendelladj was arrested in Bangkok airport in January 2013, while he was in transit between Malaysia and Algeria. He was later extradited to the U.S. Six months later, Panin made the mistake of flying through the U.S. and was arrested in Atlanta airport. In 2016, the pair <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/two-major-international-hackers-who-developed-spyeye-malware-get-over-24-years-combined">were sentenced to a combined 24 years, six months in prison</a>.</p><p>Over time, law enforcement agencies have adapted and improved their response to cyber crime. Whereas once international operations were unusual, today they’re the norm and it’s not unusual to see police forces from several different countries involved in a single operation. International law enforcement organizations such as Interpol and Europol often play a central role. The goal is no longer just arrests (although arrests remain the main objective). Infrastructure, in the form of servers and domains is often seized, meaning that even if some or all of the suspects behind a particular operation remain at large, the group’s operations are disrupted.</p><h4>Putting the squeeze on</h4><p>Takedowns not involving arrests are sometimes criticized as being ineffective or tokenistic, but this is often far from the case. <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/international-takedown-wounds-gameover-zeus-cybercrime-network">The takedown of the Gameover Zeus</a> is a classic case in point. Just under four years ago, the FBI, the UK’s National Crime Agency, a number of other police forces, along with cyber security companies including Symantec teamed up to tackle the financial Trojan which, at the time, was one of the most prolific and dangerous financial online threats.</p><p>Gameover Zeus doubled up as a botnet and at its height had hundreds of thousands of computers in its sway. It was difficult to disrupt because it didn’t have any centralized C&amp;C infrastructure and instead used a peer-to-peer network and domain generation algorithm (DGA) for (C&amp;C) purposes. Its most recent refinement was the addition of a low level driver, to prevent the malware from being easily uninstalled. Prior to the 2014 operation, Gameover Zeus had already weathered two takedown attempts.</p><p>This time around, key nodes on the peer network were disabled by law enforcement, along with the domains generated by the DGA. One of Symantec’s contributions to the operation was <a href="http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052915-1402-99">to release a new tool that bypassed countermeasures and removed the malware</a>, along with the additional Gameover Zeus components.</p><p>It wasn’t third time lucky for Gameover Zeus and, this time, the takedown seemed to do serious damage to the group’s operations, with activity surrounding the malware dropping off considerably in the aftermath of the raids and never recovering.</p><p>Of course, often when one major cyber crime group is broken up, others emerge to take its place. However, there are some signs that the balance may be shifting. The pace of law enforcement takedowns in recent years has picked up, with several major banking Trojan and ransomware gangs being hit. To some extent, we believe that this is one of the factors behind the <a href="https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/istr-23-cyber-security-threat-landscape">sudden and dramatic take off of malicious coin mining in late 2017.</a> Because the loss to the victim is indirect and less obvious, cyber criminals may feel that there’s less risk of law enforcement action around coinminers. Whether this turns out to be a long term trend remains to be seen.</p><p><em>Check out the Security Response </em><a href="https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence"><em>blog</em></a><em> and follow Threat Intel on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/threatintel"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> to keep up-to-date with the latest happenings in the world of threat intelligence and cybersecurity.</em></p><p><em>Like this story? Recommend it by hitting the heart button so others on Medium see it, and follow Threat Intel on Medium for more great content.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=66915be7307e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel/cyber-crime-takedowns-66915be7307e">A Short History of Law Enforcement and Cyber Crime</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel">Threat Intel</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The A to Z of Cyber Security]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threat-intel/the-a-to-z-of-cyber-security-93150c4f336c?source=rss-e2641e8d02fc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/93150c4f336c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dick O'Brien]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jan 2018 14:01:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-17T16:23:21.937Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><em>From BEC scams to DDoS attacks, and quantum cryptography to zero-days, here’s our brief guide to the world of cyber security.</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*usf8sjDdfyeWuOUcwojxgQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>A is for Authentication</h3><p>Authentication is one of the fundamentals of cyber security and a core requirement for any kind of transaction or for access to private data. The standard form of authentication is what’s known as “single factor”, i.e. a username and password. However, the rise of online fraud has severely tested its limits. Usernames are easily guessed (usually a person’s name or email address) and, all too often, so are passwords (since many people pick weak, easy-to-guess passwords such as “abc123”, “123456” and… ummmm… “password”). Even a strong password has its limitations, since it can be stolen, either through a data breach or phishing (see below). As a result, we’ve seen a move towards more robust forms of authentication, including two factor authentication (2FA) where the user has to input an additional, private piece of information (such as a pin code) and biometric authentication, where a fingerprint or facial recognition (such as in the new iPhone X) is employed.</p><h3>B is for Business Email Compromise</h3><p>As a form of fraud, Business Email Compromise (BEC) scams are among the most lucrative for cyber criminals. According to the FBI, roughly US$5 billion was lost to BEC scams between October 2013 and December 2016. <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/business-email-compromise-campaigns-continue-targeting-c-level-employees-despite-warnings">Also known as “whaling” or “CEO fraud”,</a> BEC scams don’t require too much technical sophistication and instead rely on social engineering. How do they work? Scammers will usually send an email purporting to come from the CEO, asking the recipient to initiate an urgent wire transfer. The emails are usually sent to a senior member of the finance department, often the CFO. If the recipient falls for the email, they could be duped into sending huge sums to accounts controlled by the scammers. Losses of hundreds of thousands of dollars have frequently been seen and, in some cases, millions have been stolen.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*GhnmcQVariUCe1J7m16RWQ.gif" /></figure><h3>C is for Cryptocurrencies</h3><p>The arrival of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin has had a major impact on cybersecurity. Cryptocurrencies have quickly become the default currency on the cyber underground, since they’re easily traded and offer a greater degree of anonymity than traditional financial systems. Their arrival played a central role in the growth of ransomware, providing a payment mechanism that was easily automated and hard to trace. A surge in the value of many cryptocurrencies over the past year has prompted a growing number of cyber criminals to get involved in it by distributing crypto-mining malware and effectively outsourcing their mining to unsuspecting victims.</p><h3>D is for Denial of Service (DoS)</h3><p>One of the biggest causes of online disruption is denial of service attacks, where websites or the networks of entire organizations are knocked offline, usually by flooding them with traffic. The most common form of attack these days is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, where attackers use botnets of thousands of infected devices to generate the sheer volume of traffic needed to knock even the most well-resourced organizations offline. DDoS attacks are carried out for a variety of reasons. In some cases, it’s simple malice, but in others the attackers are seeking to extract money from the targeted organization in exchange for calling off the attacks. Other motives may revolve around “hacktivism”, where an organization is attacked for political reasons.</p><h3>E is for Exploit Kit</h3><p>Exploit kits are one of the methods cyber criminals use to infect people with malware. What are they? Essentially they allow attackers to use a website to infect unsuspecting visitors. They work by exploiting vulnerabilities in software in order to install malware. Usually, exploit kit operators will compromise third-party web servers and inject malicious code into the web pages hosted on them. This code directs browsers to the servers hosting the exploit kit itself. The exploit kit will analyze the visiting computer in order to identify the most appropriate exploit for the victim’s computer. This exploit will then be used to attempt to deliver malware to their computer.</p><h3>F is for Fileless Threats</h3><p>The success of any cyber attack largely depends on the likelihood of discovery, and it goes without saying that attackers put considerable time and effort into minimizing that risk. The more evidence you leave on a computer, the greater that risk, and one of the main kinds of evidence we see are files installed on a computer. <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/attackers-are-increasingly-living-land">One tactic we’ve seen growing in popularity in recent years is fileless threats</a>; malware that never writes itself to the hard disk but instead remains resident in memory, which could evade the attention of security software that only scans the hard disk. They aren’t undetectable though. Our way of combating this threat is memory exploit mitigation (MEM) techniques in our products, which can proactively block remote code execution exploits (RCE), along with our heuristic based memory scanning, which can detect memory-only threats.</p><h3>G is for Grayware</h3><p>The divide between legitimate software and malware is often blurred. Grayware occupies the murky middle ground. Grayware is applications that may not have any recognizable malware concealed within them but can nevertheless be in some way harmful or annoying to the user. It could track their web browsing habits, serve up unwanted ads or dial up premium rate numbers. In many cases, grayware authors often maintain a veneer of legitimacy by outlining the application’s capabilities in the small print of the software license agreement.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*An5qMf0pLxrTlP8TSbQ7Kg.gif" /></figure><h3>H is for Hacking</h3><p>We’ve all heard of websites or companies being hacked. But what does “hacking” actually mean? In its original incarnation, hacking simply meant finding new ways of doing things with computers and software. That could be good (improving the performance of something) or bad (finding a way onto a computer you shouldn’t have access to). Nowadays hacking tends to be employed as a catch-all phrase for all sorts of malicious activity from data breaches, to web page defacement, to bank fraud. Often it doesn’t even involve any programming skill on the part of the attacker. It’s even used as an excuse for embarrassing behavior. Post something you regret saying on social media? “Sorry folks, my account was hacked”.</p><h3>I is for IoT</h3><p>There was once a time when it was just computers that were connected to the internet. Then it was cellphones. Now, it’s pretty much…. everything. Household appliances, security systems, home heating and lighting, and even cars are all becoming Internet-enabled. That makes the Internet of Things (IoT) one of the new frontiers for cyber security. We’ve long heard predictions about ransomware on home appliances and hijacking of cars, but threats against IoT have now gone from theory to reality. At the moment, attacks are less elaborate than some of the predicted scenarios. By and large, attackers have taken advantage of poor security on IoT devices to add them to botnets (<a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/mirai-what-you-need-know-about-botnet-behind-recent-major-ddos-attacks">the most notable of which has been Mirai</a>), which have been mainly used to perform DDoS attacks.</p><h3>J is for JavaScript</h3><p>What’s this doing on the list you ask? JavaScript is a widely used scripting language and is, in itself, no way malicious. However, in recent times, JavaScript has been by far the most popular file format for malicious email attachments. If you’re lured into opening it, the script will run and download malware to your computer. In some cases, these JavaScript downloaders are easy to spot, since they’ll bear the .JS extension, but attackers will often attempt to obfuscate the file type by adding additional extensions (e.g. invoice.docx.js) or by hiding them in a zipped archive.</p><h3>K is for Keylogger</h3><p>Malware comes in lots of varieties. One of the oldest is the keylogger, which does what it says on the tin, recording every keystroke on an infected computer. It remains one of the most effective ways of stealing information, including user names, passwords, and private communications such as emails and instant messages. Keyloggers are often included as features in financial or spying Trojans and can be doubly effective information stealing tools when combined with screen grabbers, which take snapshots of what’s on the user’s screen.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/1*suhkDfefOjRWcSdagpZuZw.gif" /><figcaption>Living off the land? Not quite what we mean.</figcaption></figure><h3>L is for Living off the Land</h3><p>Living off the Land describes a cyber attack strategy that eschews traditional tools such as malware and zero-day vulnerabilities in favor of alternatives, such as using operating system features, legitimate tools, and cloud services, to compromise networks. Why would attackers do this? <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/attackers-are-increasingly-living-land">Living off the Land can make attacks more difficult to detect</a>, since it’s harder to spot malicious use of legitimate tools compared to the presence of malware. It’s something we’ve seen more of in recent years as attackers are forced to work harder to stay under the radar.</p><h3>M is for Man-in-the-Middle</h3><p>A man-in-the-middle attack (MITM for short) is a tactic used to intercept and/or alter supposedly private or secure communications. Generally speaking, the attacker will need to either exploit a vulnerability or use some kind of malware to perform a successful MITM attack. For example, the reason why the <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/freak-vulnerability-can-leave-encrypted-communications-open-attack">FREAK vulnerability</a>, which was discovered in 2015, was so serious was that it facilitated MITM attacks against secure connections. Financial Trojans frequently use a variant of MITM called man-in-the-browser (MITB) to intercept secure banking sessions and alter pages in order to dupe victims into disclosing their banking credentials.</p><h3>N is for Necurs</h3><p>The single biggest distribution channel for malware, scams, and other kinds of online threats is spam email. The major cyber crime groups generally outsource their distribution to specialist outfits who control vast botnets of thousands of infected computers that power their spamming operations. A small handful of spam botnets dominate malware distribution and, for the past few years, the Necurs botnet has been the daddy of them all. Nothing illustrates this more than the fact that when Necurs briefly went offline for a few months last year, <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/necurs-mass-mailing-botnet-returns-new-wave-spam-campaigns">the email malware rate plummeted</a>. In December 2016, the last month of Necurs operations before the pause, one in 98 emails blocked by Symantec contained malware. In January 2017, that rate dropped to one in 772.</p><h3>O is for One-Time Password</h3><p>As the number of accounts we have that require authentication grows, the challenge of keeping them secure becomes greater. In some cases, a simple username and password combination is deemed insufficient and extra layers of security are applied, such as two-factor authentication (2FA). One approach to 2FA is the one-time password (OTP), which is only valid for a single login. This reduces the risk around a stolen password being reused. How do they work? OTPs are usually generated on a small device contained in a keyring fob or by a smartphone app.</p><h3>P is for Point-of-Sale malware</h3><p>Remember there was a huge number of payment card breaches at major retailers a couple of years ago? Most of them were caused by point-of-sale (POS) malware. POS terminals can be infected with malware like any other connected device. When a card is swiped, its details are briefly stored in the terminal’s memory while being transmitted to the payment processor. This provides a brief window for malware on the terminal to copy the card data, which it then transmits back to the attackers. The technique is known as “memory scraping”. The rash of breaches forced retailers and payment providers into upping their security. The introduction of EMV, chip-and-pin type cards to replace traditional magnetic stripe cards has helped to reduce the threat posed by memory scraping POS malware.</p><h3>Q is for Quantum Cryptography</h3><p>Cryptography is core to cyber security. As computing power continually increases, the strength of encryption needs to increase in parallel. If it doesn’t, then sooner or later, someone is going to build a computer fast enough to perform a brute force attack (i.e. attempting all possible encryption key combinations). 256-bit encryption, which is the strongest standard in common use, is still an unimaginably long time away from being cracked in this fashion. However, the advent of quantum computing does pose a threat to traditional cryptography since it is theoretically possible for it to break public key cryptography at some point. If that comes to pass, the answer could lie in quantum cryptography, where quantum computing is used to create new and more secure forms of cryptography, a quantum solution to a quantum problem, so to speak.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*6MG91qQlUumuDwuibHQfBw.gif" /></figure><h3>R is for Ransomware</h3><p>Ransomware has arguably been the number one cyber security concern over the last few years. A number of factors coalesced to make it a potent threat. First of all, cyber criminals mastered the art of employing strong encryption on infected computers. Secondly, the advent of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin meant criminals had an accessible and relatively anonymous payment mechanism. Thirdly, mass-mailing spam botnets such as the aforementioned Necurs meant they could spread their malware far and wide, maximizing the number of potential victims.</p><h3>S is for Spear Phishing</h3><p>Phishing emails are designed to look like they come from somebody else and are usually designed to trick the recipient into disclosing information. For example, it could be an email pretending to come from a bank asking customers to change their password and providing a link to a bogus website designed to harvest credentials. Spear phishing emails are a variation on that theme, the difference being that they are targeted at specific individuals. Like regular phishing emails, they could be designed to trick the recipient into disclosing credentials. Or they could be used to lure people into installing malware by asking them to open a malicious attachment or follow a malicious link. The tactic is often used in BEC scams (see above) and targeted attacks (see below)</p><h3>T is for Targeted Attack</h3><p>Most of the activity we see involving malware is indiscriminate. Cyber criminals usually don’t really care who their victim is as long there is a possibility of profiting from them. Targeted attacks are very different. They’re usually the work of organized, state sponsored groups and their main motivation is espionage. By and large, that means intelligence gathering, but targeted attacks can include disruption, subversion and sabotage. Although quite small in number when compared to ordinary cyber crime, targeted attacks nevertheless pose a significant threat. Usually the attackers are more skillful and better resourced than run-of-the mill cyber criminals and are often targeting highly sensitive information.</p><h3>U is for Update</h3><p>Sick and tired of getting constant reminders to update your software to the latest version (which inevitably arrive when you’re busiest)? Avoid clicking “no” or “later” where possible. Software updates play an important role in keeping you secure. Vendors will regularly roll out patches for newly discovered vulnerabilities (see below) in the latest version. If you don’t apply the update, attackers could exploit unpatched vulnerabilities and infect your computer.</p><h3>V is for Vulnerability</h3><p>No piece of software is perfect and, even after years of testing, new bugs are often found. Vulnerabilities are a type of bug that permit someone to use the software in a way that wasn’t intended. There are numerous types of vulnerabilities. Some can allow an attacker to crash the software. Others may permit denial of service conditions or allow someone to gain privileges they shouldn’t have. The most serious kinds of vulnerabilities are what’s known as remote code execution vulnerabilities, which allow attackers to run arbitrary code on the vulnerable computer and can be triggered remotely, such as from another computer on the network or over the internet.</p><h3>W is for WannaCry</h3><p>WannaCry was undoubtedly <a href="https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/wannacry-ransomware-attack">the cyber security news story of 2017</a>. These days it’s quite rare for a single piece of malware to cause overnight panic. WannaCry was similar to most families of ransomware we’ve seen in recent except for one critical difference — it incorporated a Windows exploit known as “EternalBlue” that enabled it to self-propagate, infecting other computers on a network and spreading across the internet. The vulnerability exploited by EternalBlue had been patched by Microsoft two months earlier, but there were enough unpatched computers online for WannaCry to cause chaos. Hundreds of thousands of computers were hit.</p><h3>X is for XSS</h3><p>Cross Site Scripting (XSS) is one of the most commonly used methods to attack visitors to a website. XSS works by exploiting vulnerabilities in web applications that permit attackers to insert their own code on to other people’s websites. This could permit attackers to steal other users’ credentials or cookies, allowing them to access their accounts and/or impersonate them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*9aOTgCH9KRvOAn78uuI7vA.jpeg" /><figcaption>No, not that Yara!</figcaption></figure><h3>Y is for YARA</h3><p>As the number of new malware threats multiplies every year, protecting against them presents a constant challenge, requiring innovative new tools and techniques. One tool that is growing in popularity is YARA. An open source initiative, YARA is a tool firms can use to identify and flag malware. While many traditional signature-based detection technologies rely on matching file hashes, YARA additionally works by creating rules that instead flag files based on matching code strings.</p><h3>Z is for Zero Days</h3><p>Vulnerability exploits are a key tool for attackers attempting to compromise a computer or web server. Zero-day vulnerabilities are the holy grail for attackers; they are previously unknown vulnerabilities that have yet to be patched by the software vendor. There’s a thriving market for new zero days and attackers are willing to pay big money for critical vulnerabilities in commonly used software. Many software vendors are attempting to fight back by paying “bug bounties” to researchers who find vulnerabilities in their products.</p><p><em>Check out the Security Response </em><a href="https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence"><em>blog</em></a><em> and follow Threat Intel on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/threatintel"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> to keep up-to-date with the latest happenings in the world of threat intelligence and cybersecurity.</em></p><p><em>Like this story? Recommend it by hitting the heart button so others on Medium see it, and follow Threat Intel on Medium for more great content.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=93150c4f336c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel/the-a-to-z-of-cyber-security-93150c4f336c">The A to Z of Cyber Security</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel">Threat Intel</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A short history of the exploit kit]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threat-intel/exploit-kits-cybersecurity-3ca6aa283b52?source=rss-e2641e8d02fc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3ca6aa283b52</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history-of]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dick O'Brien]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Sep 2017 13:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-21T13:01:01.564Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Threat Intel’s ‘History of…’ series will look at the origins and evolution of notable developments in cyber security.</em></p><p>There are many ways that malware and other unwelcome pests can get on to your computer but, in the past few years, the two biggest means-of-entry favored by cyber criminals have been email and exploit kits.</p><p>Email-borne threats are widely understood and most people now know that something nasty could be lurking in an email attachment. Exploit kits are probably not as widely understood.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oLheRQxgh1ClGCgxTrReEQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Exploit kit operators create their own websites or attempt to hijack third-party websites to deliver their malware</figcaption></figure><h3>So, what’s an exploit kit?</h3><p>Exploit kits work by exploiting vulnerabilities in software in order to install malware. Exploit kit operators use self-created or hijacked third-party websites to deliver their wares, injecting malicious code into their pages. This code directs browsers to the servers hosting the exploit kit itself .</p><p>What happens then? The landing page will usually host code that “fingerprints” the visitor, attempting to identify what operating system, web browser and other software they are using, such as browser plugins. Based on that information, it will redirect the visitor to another page, hosting the most appropriate exploit for the victim’s computer. This exploit will then be used to attempt to deliver malware to their computer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U5e9A9OifDpT-LS6lDOtaQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Exploit kit operators often compromise legitimate websites and redirect visitors to their servers</figcaption></figure><p>Generally speaking, an exploit kit will incorporate a range of different exploits, most of which will target vulnerabilities in commonly used operating systems, web browsers, or browser plugins, such as Adobe Flash. The most successful exploit kits will regularly shuffle their deck of exploits, swapping out exploits of older vulnerabilities in favor of newer ones. Exploit kit operators will inevitably favor recently patched vulnerabilities, relying on the fact that a good proportion of potential victims may not have kept their software up-to-date (don’t say you weren’t warned!). On some occasions, exploit kits will even run exploits of zero-day vulnerabilities, that is, previously unknown vulnerabilities that have yet to be patched by the software vendor.</p><p>Exploit kits first appeared just over 10 years ago, with groups such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Webattacker">Webattacker</a> and <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/mpack-packed-full-badness">MPack</a> creating the template that was later perfected by a swarm of successors. At the time, web-based exploits were not a new thing. What was original was the way exploit kit creators packaged them together and sold them as a service to other cyber criminals, in some cases even offering technical support to customers.</p><p>The emergence of the exploit kit is a good example of how the cyber crime underground has evolved into specialist operations. Many attackers now don’t try to spread their wares themselves and instead pay a specialist to do it for them.</p><h3>Rotating cast of shadowy characters</h3><p>The exploit kit marketplace is best described as volatile, and features a constantly shifting cast of characters. Exploit kits with a dominant market share can disappear overnight, while new players can emerge to quickly fill the gap.</p><p>What’s the reason for this volatility? An effective exploit kit is a hot property on the cyber crime underground. Since you own one of the most potent malware distribution channels around, you’re effectively a gatekeeper for cyber criminals and can sell your services to the highest bidder. This has made some exploit kit operators incredibly wealthy, but has also put a big target on their backs for law enforcement agencies. A successful takedown would not only remove a cyber crime big fish, but would also disrupt anyone relying on the exploit kit for distribution.</p><p>A classic case in point is Paunch (or Dmitry Fedotov, as he was known to his family and friends). Paunch was the mastermind behind the Blackhole exploit kit, which first appeared in 2010. By the time he was arrested in 2013, he had more than 1,000 customers and was estimated to be earning around $50,000 per month from his activities, enough for him to drive a Porsche Cayenne.</p><p><a href="https://www.group-ib.com/index.php/7-novosti/790-group-ib-assists-to-suppress-the-activities-of-a-blackhole-exploit-kit-author-paunch-is-arrestedq">According to an investigation by Russian security firm Group-IB</a>, which assisted Russian police in arresting him, Paunch was earning so much from his business that he was able to reinvest some of the profits by buying new zero-day vulnerabilities from a broker, who in turn was offering up to $200,000 for anyone wishing to sell them. By 2012, Paunch had branched out and launched a second product: the Cool exploit kit, which was marketed as a “premium” product and cost more, but came with more effective vulnerabilities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dX9K40RBYeTXEQ2mgJxuWA.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>“Paunch” was earning up to $50,000 per month from the Blackhole exploit kit. Image via Group-IB</em></figcaption></figure><p>Three years after his arrest, <a href="http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/04/blackhole-exploit-kit-author-gets-8-years/">Paunch was sentenced to seven years in a Russian penal colony</a>. The Russian Interior Ministry estimated that he and his associates earned more than $2.3 million from their activities. How much their customers made is unknown, but likely multiples of this figure.</p><p>One of the most recent examples of an exploit kit suddenly going offline was Angler, <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/locky-dridex-and-angler-among-cybercrime-groups-experience-fall-activity">which disappeared in June 2016</a>. For a time, it was one of the most widely used exploit kits by malware groups, such as ransomware families TeslaCrypt and CryptXXX, and financial Trojan Snifula. What happened to Angler remains a mystery but it might be related to the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36434104">arrest of 50 people in Russia accused of involvement in the Lurk banking fraud group</a>. Immediately afterwards, Angler and several cyber crime operations, including Dridex and Locky, went offline. While Dridex and Locky reappeared, Angler has not been seen since.</p><p>The most recent major operator to go dark was Neutrino, which was for a short while one of the most widely used exploit kits, <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/former-major-player-neutrino-exploit-kit-has-gone-dark/">before it disappeared completely in April 2017</a>.</p><h3>Brief ebb or permanent decline?</h3><p>The number of exploit kits going offline over the past year or two has had a material impact on overall trends. During 2016, Symantec saw a 60 percent decrease in exploit kit detections and we did wonder if they were beginning to go out of fashion, with many attackers seeming to favor email as their main distribution channel.</p><p>On the evidence of recent months, we’re not so sure. Overall web attack activity (which includes exploit kits) began to rise again from May onward, and a number of exploit kits have been highly active, most notably the RIG exploit kit. It’s fair to say that the exploit kit can’t be written off just yet.</p><p><em>Check out the Security Response </em><a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/sr"><em>blog</em></a><em> and follow Threat Intel on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/threatintel"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> to keep up-to-date with the latest happenings in the world of threat intelligence and cybersecurity.</em></p><p><em>Like this story? Recommend it by hitting the heart button so others on Medium see it, and follow Threat Intel on Medium for more great content.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ca6aa283b52" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel/exploit-kits-cybersecurity-3ca6aa283b52">A short history of the exploit kit</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel">Threat Intel</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A short history of cyber espionage]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threat-intel/cyber-espionage-spying-409416c794ec?source=rss-e2641e8d02fc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/409416c794ec</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[history-of]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dick O'Brien]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Jul 2017 13:03:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-31T11:13:08.951Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Threat Intel’s ‘History of…’ series will look at the origins and evolution of notable developments in cybersecurity.</em></p><p>Throughout history, nation states have been trying to undermine each other through clandestine activity, whether its spying, sabotage, or subversion. The rapid growth of the internet during the 1990s opened up a new frontier in the arena of international espionage, and it wasn’t long before we began to read ominous warnings about cyber warfare. Could a country’s enemies shut down its power grid, take out its telephone system, or even hijack its nuclear missiles?</p><p>Given the covert nature of the beast, we don’t know exactly when or how cyber espionage began. But if we had to guess, there’s a good chance that early operations didn’t resemble the plot of a James Bond movie and were actually quite mundane. Signals intelligence — intercepting and decrypting enemy communications — has long been a bread and butter operation for intelligence agencies and its quite likely that early efforts involved the expansion of this into cyber space.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jSscLSl4eQhaN-ChyVKs4g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Signals intelligence, intercepting and decrypting enemy communications, has long been a bread and butter operation for intelligence agencies</figcaption></figure><h3>First cases</h3><p>The first documented case of cyber espionage pre-dated the web itself. In 1986, Clifford Stoll, who at the time was managing computers at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California, noticed some strange activity in computing time records. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cuckoo%27s_Egg">This eventually led him to a hacker who appeared to be systematically targeting computers at military bases around the U.S</a>. looking for military secrets. He eventually created a trap for the attacker, luring him in with a cache of fake information. The hacker fell for the bait and was identified as Markus Hess, a West German who had been selling stolen information to the KGB.</p><p>Earlier still, the CIA is alleged to have caused the explosion of a Siberian gas pipeline in 1982 by duping Soviet agents into stealing booby-trapped industrial control software, which caused the pipeline to malfunction. The incident was long the subject of rumor but appeared to be confirmed in 2004 when Thomas Reed, a former member of Ronald Reagan’s National Security Council, wrote about it in his book. However, Reed’s account has been disputed by some experts, including <a href="http://jeffreycarr.blogspot.ie/2012/06/myth-of-cia-and-trans-siberian-pipeline.html">well-known cyber security researcher Jeffrey Carr</a>.</p><p>The case that really brought cyber espionage to public attention was Moonlight Maze, the name given to attacks against US government targets, which became public in 1999 with the publication of a story in <em>Newsweek</em>. An FBI investigation found that the group responsible had compromised the US Navy, Air Force, Department of Energy, and NASA, among other targets, and stolen so many documents that, if stacked, they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html">“would be taller than the Washington Monument”</a>.</p><p>While Moonlight Maze was one of the first operations to be uncovered, it certainly wasn’t the only underway at this time. While the activities of the Equation Group, a highly advanced, well-resourced cyber espionage group, <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/equation-advanced-cyberespionage-group-has-all-tricks-book-and-more">only became public in 2015</a>, available evidence suggests that it was operating as early as 2001.</p><p>Although not immediately apparent at the time, at least to the public, the level of activity began to really increase in subsequent years, with many of the major cyber espionage groups first showing signs of life between 2005 and 2010.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Mwt3fhd0qPXWkjRphE-5Cg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Activity really began to ramp up between 2005 and 2010</figcaption></figure><p>It took a few years to join the dots, but by the end of the decade cyber espionage was back in the spotlight, this time with <a href="https://googleblog.blogspot.ie/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html">Google disclosing that it and at least 20 other large companie</a>s had been targeted by a group called Aurora (<a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/security-vendors-take-action-against-hidden-lynx-malware">known to Symantec as Hidden Lynx</a>). By our estimation, Hidden Lynx had approximately 50 to 100 operatives at its disposal and was capable of carrying out hundreds of simultaneous attacks against diverse targets, indicating how cyber espionage operations had scaled up over the years.</p><h3>Sabotage!</h3><p>Perhaps one of the most dramatic developments in the world of cyber espionage occurred with the <a href="https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf">discovery of Stuxnet</a>. It was probably the first real-world example of the kind of ambitious and highly destructive cyber attack that had always been seen as theoretically possible but had hitherto only been the subject of doom laden warnings.</p><p>The story of Stuxnet is worthy of an entire post itself (and if you haven’t seen <a href="http://www.zerodaysfilm.com/">Alex Gibney’s documentary</a> on it featuring my colleagues Liam O’Murchu and Eric Chien you should check it out) but to summarize briefly: Stuxnet was a mysterious piece of malware that appeared in 2010 and initially garnered attention because of its use of a zero-day vulnerability to spread via removable drives. However, it was only after extensive investigation by Eric and Liam that its true purpose became apparent.</p><p>Stuxnet was designed to target industrial control systems, in particular, to hijack Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). PLCs are used to run and monitor industrial systems. However, Stuxnet was designed to attack a particular type of PLC, namely those being used in the Iranian uranium enrichment program which, at the time, was the subject of a diplomatic standoff.</p><p>Stuxnet changed the output frequency of the PLCs for short periods of time and covered up the modification to avoid alerting the system’s operators. The modification caused the system to malfunction, essentially sabotaging the equipment being used.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hIDKrBjTa6Wr9wyjbBkzNg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Stuxnet was designed to sabotage industrial control systems</figcaption></figure><p>Even now, seven years later, the complexity and ambition of the Stuxnet attack stands out. The attackers needed to gather extensive intelligence even before the attacks began in order to know exactly what equipment the target was using. Secondly, they had significant obstacles to overcome to deploy the malware, since the targeted computers weren’t connected the internet (hence the ability to spread via removable drives).</p><p>For a while, it appeared that, with Stuxnet, we’d seen the future of cyber espionage and we were facing into an era where states would swap confrontation on the battlefield for taking down their enemy’s infrastructure in cyber space. Sure enough, another destructive attack followed not too long after Stuxnet, when Shamoon, a destructive disk-wiping worm, <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks">was used in a wave of attacks against the Saudi Arabian energy sector</a>.</p><p>Yet as time went on, it became apparent that operations like Stuxnet and Shamoon would be the exception and not the new norm. In retrospect, it isn’t that surprising. Sabotage, by its very nature, attracts a lot of attention, both to the attackers and the tools used. By contrast, traditional intelligence gathering allows attackers to maintain a much lower profile, reducing the risk of discovery.</p><h3>Stealthy threats</h3><p>That desire to maintain a low profile has been only partly successful. Over the past decade, security firms such as Symantec and its peers have progressively uncovered a wide array of groups that appear to be state-sponsored cyber espionage operations. It’s no longer just the realm of the major global powers. Many regional powers now have their own cyber espionage operations and there is evidence to suggest that even smaller states are moving into this arena, often through the purchase of off-the-shelf spying software.</p><p>To list every single cyber espionage group uncovered in recent years would be a book in itself, but there have been some very interesting discoveries. One of the most advanced threats we came across was Regin, <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/regin-top-tier-espionage-tool-enables-stealthy-surveillance">which we discovered in 2014</a>. An incredibly complex and stealthy piece of malware, it could be customized with a range of payloads depending on the target and was used in spying operations against governments, infrastructure operators, businesses, researchers, and private citizens.</p><p>However, Regin didn’t lack competition. For example, Dragonfly, <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-companies-under-sabotage-threat">another group we did extensive research on during 2014</a>, was found to be targeting a range of strategically important targets in the US and European energy sectors, such as grid operators, major electricity generation firms, petroleum pipeline operators, and energy industry industrial equipment providers. The malware used by the group not only contained spying features but was also capable of sabotage, an option that the attackers appear not to have opted for yet.</p><p>Cyber espionage is also no longer the preserve of state sponsored groups. For example, during 2015, <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/butterfly-profiting-high-level-corporate-attacks">we discovered a group known as Butterfly,</a> which had compromised a string of major companies over the past three years in order to steal information and intellectual property. However, the group had none of the hallmarks of state-sponsored attackers and instead seemed to be motivated by financial gain.</p><h3>Leaky ships</h3><p>Progressive uncovering of major cyber espionage groups’ activities has gone some way towards blunting their effectiveness. Not only are security firms better at protecting their customers, but end users themselves are more aware of the threat. More and more organizations are beginning to realize that it isn’t just governments that can come under attack; even relatively small organizations can be targeted. In some cases, it’s because they’re viewed as the weak link in a supply chain: compromising them could make it easier for attackers to move up the chain to their real targets. In other cases, the attackers could be interested in stealing their intellectual property or acquiring intelligence on their customers.</p><p>Alongside this, a series of high-profile leaks have also put the spotlight on cyber espionage, such as the revelations of former NSA contractor Edward Snowdon and, more recently, <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/longhorn-tools-used-cyberespionage-group-linked-vault-7">the Vault 7 leak</a> and the release of files connected with <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/equation-has-secretive-cyberespionage-group-been-breached">the Equation cyber espionage group</a>.</p><p>This glare of publicity may herald the end of the golden age of cyber espionage. A growing number of software and web companies are encrypting their end users’ data by default, so much so that encryption has become a bone of contention between governments and the technology sector. Some governments have argued that law enforcement agencies need a way of accessing encrypted messages in order to protect national security, while technology firms have pointed out that building back doors into their products will benefit the bad guys as much as the good guys. That’s not to say that cyber espionage is by any means on the wane, rather that nation state actors may have to work harder to compromise their targets in future.</p><p>Cyber espionage came out of the shadows again in the last 12 months, not least in the US presidential election, when a series of intrusions against the Democratic Party led to the leak of internal emails. A <a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf">joint investigation by the US Intelligence Community</a> concluded that two groups linked to Russia’s intelligence services were responsible for the campaign.</p><p>One of those groups, Swallowtail (aka APT28 and Fancy Bear) was also linked to a cyber attack against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), which saw data relating to American Olympic athletes, British cyclists, and a number of other athletes stolen. Maintaining a low profile wasn’t a priority in this case and the group even created its own website (using the Fancy Bear nickname) to publish the stolen data.</p><p>Given how disruptive the attack on the US Democratic party was, it was hardly surprising that the same tactics were used in a bid to upset the French presidential election. On the eve of the decisive second round poll, the campaign of the eventual victor Emmanuel Macron was hit with a leak that saw thousands of documents and emails released online.</p><p>However, the leak appeared to have little effect on the eventual result (Macron won by a healthy margin). It’s effectiveness was blunted partly because it came so late in the campaign and also because such an attack was widely expected. What’s more, the <a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/05/macron-campaign-team-used-honeypot-accounts-to-fake-out-fancy-bear/">Macron campaign said it took precautions by seeding its online presence with fake accounts</a> containing false information, intended to slow the attackers down by forcing them to wade through stolen information in order to verify what was genuine.</p><p>What was going on? Why were groups that had spent years staying out of the public eye now suddenly acting in quite an overt fashion? The answer in part lies in a change of motive. Subversion rather than intelligence gathering was the goal of these attacks, and evidence that a foreign power may have been behind these attacks feeds into the doubt and confusion caused by them.</p><h3>Permanent shift?</h3><p>Whether the events of the last 12 months signal a long term shift to a more active form of cyber espionage remains to be seen. While recent attacks illustrate the disruptive potential of more overt cyber espionage operations, they arguably also demonstrate their limitations. As seen with the case of the French election, once the element of surprise is removed and politicians and the voting public become more aware of the threat, the potential impact may be lessened.</p><p><em>Check out the Security Response </em><a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/sr"><em>blog</em></a><em> and follow Threat Intel on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/threatintel"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> to keep up-to-date with the latest happenings in the world of threat intelligence and cybersecurity.</em></p><p><em>Like this story? Recommend it by hitting the heart button so others on Medium see it, and follow Threat Intel on Medium for more great content.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=409416c794ec" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel/cyber-espionage-spying-409416c794ec">A short history of cyber espionage</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel">Threat Intel</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How software updates help keep you safe]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threat-intel/software-updates-petya-wannacry-b99c932fdfef?source=rss-e2641e8d02fc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b99c932fdfef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dick O'Brien]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Jun 2017 11:01:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-31T11:46:16.488Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Welcome to Threat Intel’s #WednesdayWisdom column, which aims to help improve your cybersecurity knowledge and keep you informed on important developments.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*V0LTT2Rm3kv2vg3kC0QGow.jpeg" /></figure><p>For most of us, updating software is a chore. You can bet that update reminders and restart requests will always arrive at the worst possible time, usually when you’re trying to get something important done.</p><p>It can mean that people will often put updates on the long finger, repeatedly dismissing reminders or clicking “Remind me Later”. There are even some who never update their software, unaware that updates will often contain patches for newly discovered vulnerabilities. Software vulnerabilities are one of the key tools for attackers attempting to compromise individuals and organizations. The more outdated the software a computer is running, the juicier a target it is for attackers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/450/1*_mRRepQnbow5UB1mPsnqMg.jpeg" /></figure><p>The recent <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/petya-ransomware-outbreak-here-s-what-you-need-know">Petya</a> and <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/what-you-need-know-about-wannacry-ransomware">WannaCry ransomware outbreaks</a> are classic cases in point. What made them dangerous was their ability to spread quickly. They both incorporated an exploit of a recently patched Windows vulnerability that effectively turned them into worms, allowing them to jump to other vulnerable computers, both across a network and across the internet. Approximately 300,000 computers were infected with WannaCry within the space of a few days. What every infected computer had in common was that it hadn’t been updated.</p><p><a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx">Microsoft issued at security update on March 14, 2017,</a> that patched the vulnerability. The version of WannaCry that incorporated an exploit of the vulnerability appeared almost two months later on May 12. Had more of these computers been updated sooner, WannaCry wouldn’t have been nearly as effective. However, as the Petya outbreak, which began on June 27, has shown, in some cases even a high-profile incident like WannaCry isn’t enough to inspire individuals to update their systems.</p><p>While Petya and WannaCry are high-profile recent examples, they are just two threats among many that target individuals and organizations that, for one reason or another, haven’t updated their software.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1PXumwiLQOh9colz9D4kUw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>What’s a vulnerability and why should I care about them?</h3><p>In a nutshell, a vulnerability is a flaw in a piece of software that allows an attacker to use it to do something it wasn’t intended to do. That could be anything from creating a denial-of-service condition or making the computer unresponsive, to granting the attacker administrative privileges.</p><blockquote>“A vulnerability is a flaw in a piece of software that allows an attacker to use it to do something it wasn’t intended to do”</blockquote><p>Some vulnerabilities require local access, i.e. the attacker needs access to the computer to exploit it. Far more dangerous are remote access vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to trigger an exploit across a network or the internet.</p><p>Generally speaking, remote code execution vulnerabilities are the ones that are most feared, since they permit a remote attacker to run code on a vulnerable computer. In most cases, “running code” means installing malware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*5-Ij09YW4WoQKO9mpFDmUA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Exploit kits, a prime danger</h3><p>One of the most common ways vulnerabilities are exploited is through exploit kits. An exploit kit is a tool that is installed on a malicious website and scans visiting computers for unpatched vulnerabilities. If it finds one, the exploit kit will then attempt to use it to install malware on the visitor’s computer.</p><p>Most exploit kits will incorporate a range of exploits in order to maximize the chances of infection. Exploit kits will usually scan visiting computers to learn what software they are running and use this information to identify the exploit most likely to work and then use it to deliver malware.</p><blockquote>“An exploit kit is a tool that is installed on a malicious website and scans visiting computers for unpatched vulnerabilities”</blockquote><p>Exploit kit authors usually continually update the list of exploits their kits will use. Older exploits will be phased out and replaced with ones exploiting more recently discovered vulnerabilities. The cyber criminals behind exploit kits generally don’t get involved in creating malware themselves. Instead they rent their services out to various malware authors who are looking for a distribution channel.</p><p>While exploit kits are some of the prime users of vulnerabilities, they aren’t the only ones. Some malware will have an exploit incorporated into it — usually permitting it to install or spread itself — WannaCry being a classic example.</p><p>Exploits are also a valuable tool for groups conducting targeted attacks and are frequently used to gain access to networks and escalate privileges to gain administrator access, which allows attackers to move from computer to computer across a network. The exploit used by Petya and WannaCry, known as Eternal Blue, was originally used by the Equation cyber espionage group and fell into attackers’ hands after it was leaked.</p><h3>Staying safe</h3><p>There are occasions when updating can be delayed for reasons other than laziness. For example, many organizations will often delay updating software until their IT department has had a chance to test the update. Why? In an environment where operations rely on multiple, complex software packages, sometimes fixing one thing can break another, and IT needs to check that any update doesn’t cause unexpected problems.</p><blockquote>“The most effective kind of security is multi-layered, and regularly updated software represents one strong line of defense”</blockquote><p>That doesn’t mean that an organization will be wide open to attack while waiting to apply updates. Security software (such as Symantec’s!) can detect and block attempts to exploit vulnerabilities. For example, the Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) in Symantec products will flag and block activity relating to a wide range of exploit kits, in addition to blocking attempts to exploit numerous individual vulnerabilities. In addition to this, our Memory Exploit Mitigation feature can preemptively block exploit techniques regardless of whether they are known or unknown, foiling attackers’ attempts to take advantage of zero-day (previously unknown) vulnerabilities. Free tools, such as Microsoft’s <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=54264">Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)</a>, can also help harden software until it can be patched.</p><p>However, securing yourself against exploits doesn’t mean you can ignore patches. The most effective kind of security is multi-layered, and regularly updated software represents one strong line of defense.</p><h3>What software is most at risk?</h3><p>The perfect piece of software has yet to be written, and most packages require regular updates to fix newly discovered vulnerabilities. However, some software is more frequently targeted by malicious actors in search of vulnerabilities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*-rkMbHgKlqdxs8K-wWwxTQ.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Operating systems</h4><p>Every device has an operating system, so if you want a vulnerability that affects large numbers of people, an operating system bug is a good bet.</p><p>Windows is still by far the most widely used desktop operating system, so it’s not surprising that Windows vulnerabilities are popular among attackers. By attempting to exploit a Windows vulnerability, an attacker can hope to get the “best bang for their buck” and hit the largest number of potential victims.</p><p>However, Windows isn’t the only OS to be affected. Vulnerabilities are frequently found in Mac OS, the two main mobile operating systems — iOS and Android — and various flavors of Linux. Linux vulnerabilities can facilitate quite targeted exploits and may be used by attackers who are attempting to infect specific kinds of computers, such as web servers or Internet of Things (IoT) devices.</p><h4>Browsers and browser plugins</h4><p>Again, their sheer ubiquity, combined with the fact that users will naturally have a browser open if visiting a malicious website, means that browsers are another prime area of interest for attackers. In recent years, browser plugin vulnerabilities have been just as popular, partly because many plugins are cross-platform, meaning that an exploit will affect users of any browser using the plugin.</p><h3>Avoid complacency</h3><p>While widely used packages are the most frequently targeted by attackers, you shouldn’t ignore the other software you run. Even relatively niche packages can sometimes be targeted with exploits, particularly by attackers attempting to tailor an attack to certain types of targets. In short, a small bit of inconvenience when it comes to updating can help spare you a lot of trouble in the long run.</p><p><em>Check out the Security Response </em><a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/sr"><em>blog</em></a><em> and follow Threat Intel on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/threatintel"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> to keep up-to-date with the latest happenings in the world of threat intelligence and cybersecurity.</em></p><p><em>Like this story? Recommend it by hitting the heart button so others on Medium see it, and follow Threat Intel on Medium for more great content.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b99c932fdfef" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel/software-updates-petya-wannacry-b99c932fdfef">How software updates help keep you safe</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel">Threat Intel</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[7 of the worst malware fails ever]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threat-intel/malware-fails-cybersecurity-d37fa1fc525?source=rss-e2641e8d02fc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d37fa1fc525</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[history-of]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dick O'Brien]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Jun 2017 12:59:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-31T11:14:22.702Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Symantec blocks nearly 1 million new malware variants every day. Few stand out from the crowd, but very occasionally we come across examples that are memorable for reasons that may not have been intended. Whether it’s accidentally revealing the author’s identity, leaving the decryption key on an encrypted computer, or just plain ineptitude, here are some of the funnier malware goofs we’ve encountered.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*h5DB6rgOAaNMB-3CGsG0QQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>How a malware author looks when they realize they’ve made a mistake. Probably. (Stock image)</figcaption></figure><h3>Blaster master meets disaster</h3><p>If the first thing a piece of malware does is create a file called “penis32.exe” you can safely bet that the author is a teenager. That turned out to be the case with the author of Blaster.B (<a href="https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-081315-0500-99">W32.Blaster.B.Worm</a>) a variant of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blaster_(computer_worm)">the Blaster Worm</a>. Shortly after the original worm was released, 18-year-old Jeffrey Lee Parson released a modified version of the worm designed to infect compromised computers with a backdoor Trojan.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/648/1*ZLod1JrCASb-KdVQ8qzL0w.jpeg" /></figure><p>Within days, the FBI had tracked Parson down. The investigation <a href="http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/cyberlaw/usparson82803cmp.pdf">was aided considerably by Parson’s ineptitude</a>. A website that the malware contacted was registered using Parson’s real name and address. If that wasn’t enough, the IP address he used was traceable to his father’s broadband account. He was quickly apprehended and, in 2005, was <a href="https://www.justice.gov/archive/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2005/parsonSent.htm">sentenced to 18 months in prison, three years of supervised release and 100 hours of community service</a>. The authors of the original worm were never brought to justice.</p><h3>Scary name, not-so-scary payload</h3><p>Less-skilled malware writers will often try to compensate for their poor technical skills by giving their creations menacing names. Nazis, Satan and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) are often favored sources of inspiration. <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/development-version-of-the-hitler-ransomware-discovered/">That was the case with Hitler ransomware</a> (<a href="https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2016-081613-4541-99">Ransom.Hit</a>). Using a picture of Adolf Hitler in its ransom message, it informed victims that they had been infected by the “Hitler Ransonware” [sic] and their files had been encrypted. However, the malware didn’t encrypt any files, presumably because this was beyond the capabilities of its authors. Instead it simply removed the extensions from files in a range of folders. After an hour, the malware crashed the infected computer and deleted all files from the User Profile folder after restarting.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*fn8UTd9AT_DMSRdwm7hQDA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Hitler ransomware authors demanded €25 in pre-pay cellphone credit as a ransom, but anyone (if there was anyone) who paid the ransom wouldn’t have received a decryption key since there were no encrypted files to decrypt. While the malware does delete the victim’s files, they may be recoverable. <a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel/wannacry-ransomware-decryption-821c7e3f0a2b">As with some of the files targeted by the recent WannaCry ransomware</a>, the fact that they are deleted rather than wiped means they are potentially recoverable using an undelete or disk recovery tool.</p><p>A reference in its code to it being a test led to some speculation that it was an unfinished version of the malware. If it was, the finished version has yet to see the light of day, which is hardly surprising for people who couldn’t even spell “ransomware” correctly.</p><h3>One small oversight</h3><p>A far more professional piece of ransomware was CryptoDefense (<a href="https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032622-1552-99">Ransom.Cryptodefense</a>), which appeared in 2014 and was one of the first of the new breed of crypto-ransomware families that have mushroomed in the past number of years.</p><p>CryptoDefense included all of the usual elements that make crypto-ransomware devastatingly effective. It employed strong encryption, which can make the victim’s files inaccessible without a decryption key, and Bitcoin payments, which provide a relatively anonymous means of ransom payment. Analysis by Symantec found that its authors made $34,000 during the first month of distribution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*rGRdFyBFkFlJlrdm3qsfZQ.gif" /></figure><p>So far, so good. But the authors made one mistake. <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cryptodefense-cryptolocker-imitator-makes-over-34000-one-month">The encryption method they used left a copy of the decryption key on the victim’s computer</a>. Anyone who knew about this would be easily able to decrypt their files themselves, the ransomware equivalent of leaving the keys in the ignition. Back to the drawing board…</p><h3>Too clever by half</h3><p>During 2012, the Remote Control Virus (<a href="http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-101004-0445-99">Backdoor.Rabasheeta</a>) caused quite a stir in Japan. A number of people were arrested after death threats posted online were traced back to their computers. However, further investigation revealed that those arrested were innocent. Their computers had been infected by the Remote Control Virus, which hijacked them and used them to issue the threats.</p><p>A few months later, someone sent an email to a lawyer claiming to be the malware’s author and offering proof in the form of a “How To” manual for the attacks. What followed <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/man-arrested-relation-remote-control-virus">was a lengthy cat and mouse game involving the malware author and the police</a>.</p><p>A month later, the lawyer and a number of journalists received an email from the same person, claiming that they had made a mistake that would allow the authorities to track them down. The email contained an attached image with faked Exif data, designed to fool the police about the attacker’s location.</p><p>By the end of 2012 the police were no nearer to catching the Remote Control Virus author and offered a reward of three million yen ($27,000) for information that would lead to an arrest. In January 2013, the attacker sent more emails to the media, this time containing a series of puzzles. Solving the puzzles would provide the location of a cat. Bizarrely, the puzzles did indeed lead to a cat on the island of Enoshima. In the cat’s collar, the police found an SD card containing the malware’s source code.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/580/1*21M27GnQLTQ3GdfTVsJ3tw.jpeg" /></figure><p>However, the malware author had slipped up. He didn’t realize there was CCTV in operation when he approached the cat. The footage allowed police to identify Yusuke Katayama, a 30-year-old Tokyo IT worker, who was subsequently <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31129817">jailed for eight years</a>.</p><h3>Not so stealthy</h3><p>A number of companies develop spyware that is sold to governments and intelligence agencies. Most keep a low profile and their tools contain few traces of who created them or who is using them. When a remote access Trojan (<a href="https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-071512-0653-99">Android.Mobilespy</a>) was first discovered it contained few clues as to its origin, other than some evidence that it had been developed by Italian speakers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/464/1*SwnDHkwb58-E4Qwil7TtvQ.gif" /></figure><p>Sometime later, <a href="https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/government-spyware-maker-doxes-itself-by-linking-to-its-site-in-malware-code">two independent analyses of the malware revealed an operational security faux pas</a>: the Italian company that created the malware had accidentally left a URL in the code that redirected to the company’s own website.</p><h3>One very costly typo</h3><p>The cyber attack that led to the <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/swift-attackers-malware-linked-more-financial-attacks">theft of $81 million from the Bangladesh central bank</a> was one of the biggest bank heists in history, so it may seem odd to list it among malware goofs. However, the attackers could have potentially stolen a lot more if their spelling had been better.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*nTEjAhpF5ZH1qVOGDq3UHQ.gif" /></figure><p>The attackers used a range of malware to compromise computers at the bank and initiate $951 million in fraudulent transactions. Four transactions, totaling $81 million, were completed, but <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-bangladesh-typo-insight-idUSKCN0WC0TC">the next one, for $20 million, raised a red flag</a>. The attackers were attempting to route the money to a fictitious NGO in Sri Lanka called the “Shalika Fandation” [sic], but had misspelled the word “foundation”. This typo, along with the unusually large number of payment requests to private entities, raised suspicions and led to the Bangladesh Bank blocking the remaining transactions.</p><h3>I’ll get you next time!</h3><p>On occasion, when a security firm stymies the work of malware authors, they’ll retaliate by incorporating taunts and insults into their code, knowing they’ll be found the next time the company’s researchers pick apart their work, e.g. “Symantec does group masturbation” or “Symantec team is a big hen-coop chicken smart” (your guess is as good as mine).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/1*BlXGjzf7S4brvQqTfK0wZg.gif" /></figure><p>One of our favorites was <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/heres-one-speaks-itself">this defiant note</a>:</p><blockquote>Dear Symantec: For years I have longed for just one thing, to make malware with just the right sting, you detected my creation and got my domains killed, but I will not stop, I can rebuild. P.S. F@?k you a**^$les, especially Stephen Doherty who is the biggest f@??#t I know of.</blockquote><p>That malware authored by that individual has since disappeared without trace.</p><p><em>If you want to read more about malware mistakes, take a look at </em><a href="https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/me.code.write.good.pdf"><em>this white paper</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>Check out the Security Response </em><a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/sr"><em>blog</em></a><em> and follow Threat Intel on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/threatintel"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> to keep up-to-date with the latest happenings in the world of threat intelligence and cybersecurity.</em></p><p><em>Like this story? Recommend it by hitting the heart button so others on Medium see it, and follow Threat Intel on Medium for more great content.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d37fa1fc525" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel/malware-fails-cybersecurity-d37fa1fc525">7 of the worst malware fails ever</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel">Threat Intel</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A short history of the financial Trojan]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threat-intel/financial-trojans-evolution-banking-f95dd0900559?source=rss-e2641e8d02fc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f95dd0900559</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history-of]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dick O'Brien]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 Apr 2017 12:57:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-31T11:15:38.811Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Threat Intel’s ‘History of…’ series will look at the origins and evolution of notable developments in cybersecurity.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5rNTdKRMMuGhj3p9Xk9Zpg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Once banking moved online, it was inevitable cybercriminals would follow</figcaption></figure><p>Once banks began putting their services online in the late 1990s, it was only going to be a matter of time before cybercriminals began trying to steal from them. However, with banks employing robust security, gangs quickly realized that attacking the banks themselves would be tough. Stealing customers’ credentials was a more feasible avenue of attack, and so the first financial Trojans were born.</p><p>Every financial Trojan since then has followed the basic template of hiding on the victim’s computer and either attempting to steal their credentials when they log in to online banking services or hijacking online banking sessions to carry out unauthorized transactions.</p><h3>Technical advances</h3><p>Early variants relied on tactics such as logging keystrokes or redirecting victims to fake banking websites. Over time, the tactics used have become a lot more sophisticated. One of the biggest advances was the advent of man-in-the-browser (MITB) attacks, where the Trojan manipulates the victim’s web browser and changes what is displayed on a website.</p><p><a href="http://securityresponse.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/zeus_king_of_bots.pdf">One of the first Trojans to pioneer this technique was Zeus</a>, which appeared in 2007. Zeus could be configured to attack virtually any online banking session by injecting additional HTML known as “web injects” into the web pages open on the browser, allowing the Trojan to alter or replace content and/or display additional fields. This allowed the attackers to steal credentials when they were input on the web page or to create requests for additional credentials not requested by the bank, such as PIN codes.</p><p>Zeus proved to be a serious money spinner and its creators were able to sell it on underground marketplaces for thousands of dollars. Buyers could then configure it with web injects they either wrote themselves or bought from other malware developers to target customers of specific banks.</p><p>Not surprisingly, Zeus soon spawned copycats. In 2009, another Trojan known as SpyEye appeared, which was capable of doing much of what Zeus could do, but undercut it by selling for US$700. The template for the modern financial Trojan had been created and, for a brief period of time, the cybercriminals behind these two threats dominated the marketplace.</p><h3>Shifting sands</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*JE7nAFL6T-hpvV9GBZ7M9w.jpeg" /><figcaption>The source code for the Zeus Trojan was leaked in 2011</figcaption></figure><p>One thing that has characterized financial Trojans is that the sector has been in a near constant state of flux, with leaks and law enforcement actions regularly altering its dynamic. In 2011, the source code for Zeus was leaked. Overnight, a once tightly-controlled piece of malware was now freely available to anyone. The leak led to the creation of a host of clones based on the Zeus source code, such as Citadel and Gameover Zeus. Shortly afterwards, a similar thing happened to SpyEye, when its builder protector was cracked and source code released.</p><p>Source code leaks are not unusual on the cyberunderground. In some cases, malware authors themselves are believed to be behind the leaks. If this occurs, it usually appears to be prompted by fear of a law enforcement investigation. By releasing the source code, authors can “muddy the waters” by putting their tools into the hands of multiple groups.</p><p>Despite the public perception that financial Trojan gangs can remain anonymous, police forces have had some success in recent years in dismantling operations and arresting key players. In 2014, <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/international-takedown-wounds-gameover-zeus-cybercrime-network">the Gameover Zeus gang</a> was hit by a coordinated swoop, involving the FBI, the UK’s National Crime Agency, and several other police forces, which saw a large amount of its infrastructure seized. Although no arrests were made, activity surrounding the malware dropped off considerably in the aftermath of the raids.</p><p><a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/all-glitters-no-longer-gold-shylock-trojan-gang-hit-takedown">Another Trojan to suffer a similar fate was Shylock</a>. The gang behind Shylock was estimated to have stolen millions of dollars over a three-year period, but a law enforcement takedown in 2014 led by the UK National Crime Agency saw much of the gang’s infrastructure seized. Shylock activity tailed off following the operation, suggesting it was dealt a serious blow.</p><h3>Filling the void</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*dtQcFVSr-OPt5NkWvU8LIw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Law enforcement takedowns have had a big impact on the financial Trojan landscape</figcaption></figure><p>All of this upheaval created a vacuum that new threats emerged to fill. <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dyre-emerges-main-financial-trojan-threat">One of the most prominent of this new generation was Dyre</a>, a Trojan that first emerged in mid-2014 and, for much of 2015, was the main financial menace circulating online.</p><p>Honing the business model created by Zeus, Dyre was the next generation of financial threat, configured to defraud the customers of more than 1,000 banks and other companies worldwide. Email was the preferred method of infection, and Dyre was spread via spam emails masquerading as business documents, voicemails, or fax messages.</p><p>Once installed, the Dyre Trojan could perform MITB attacks on all the main Windows web browsers (Internet Explorer, Chrome, and Firefox). It employed two different types of MITB attacks. If the victim visited one of the web pages listed in its configuration files, they would be redirected to a malicious server hosting a fake version of the page, which would be used to harvest their credentials.</p><p>If the victim visited a banking page not listed in the configuration, Dyre was capable of creating a web inject on-the-fly through the neat trick of sending a compressed version of the web page back to the gang’s servers, which would then repackage it with malicious code added to it and send it back to the victim’s browser, allowing Dyre to steal inputted credentials.</p><p>However, Dyre’s dominance lasted barely eighteen months. The Trojan <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dyre-operations-bank-fraud-group-grind-halt-following-takedown">suddenly disappeared from circulation in November 2015</a> following a Russian law enforcement operation against the gang. Unfortunately, an even more virulent Trojan emerged to take its place: Dridex.</p><h3>Scaling up</h3><p>A variant of an older Trojan known as Cridex, Dridex is technically quite similar to many of its predecessors. What has made it especially dangerous is that <a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dridex-financial-trojan-aggressively-spread-millions-spam-emails-each-day">the gang controlling it has brought distribution to a new scale</a>. The Dridex group has the resources to contract major spamming botnets to run massive spam campaigns distributing the malware. When Symantec took a close look at Dridex last year, we found that we were blocking an average of more than 250,000 Dridex emails a day, meaning it was likely millions were being sent daily. Although Dridex was configured to attack fewer banks than Dyre, the sheer volume of emails being sent made it a significant threat.</p><p>While Dridex continues to dominate the financial threats landscape, it is operating in an increasingly crowded marketplace. Mass mailing botnets, which presumably sell their services to the highest bidder, have in the past year been increasingly working for ransomware groups. While Dridex hasn’t disappeared, other threats such as the ransomware known as Locky have accounted for an increasing proportion of malicious emails.</p><p><a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/odinaff-new-trojan-used-high-level-financial-attacks">A new generation of attackers, such as Carbanak and Odinaff</a>, have also moved up the cybercrime value chain and begun attacking banks themselves rather than their customers, and the prospect of big money heists is likely to lead other groups to try their luck.</p><p>For the ordinary banking customers, though, financial Trojans continue to pose a serious threat. Most modern financial Trojans are capable of quietly inserting themselves into online banking sessions and stealing the victim’s credentials, potentially allowing attackers to drain their accounts at a later date.</p><h3>Don’t become a victim</h3><p>If you don’t want to be one of the unlucky ones, a few simple precautions will greatly reduce the risk:</p><p>· Always keep your security software up to date to protect yourself against any new variants of malware.</p><p>· Keep your operating system and other software updated. Software updates will frequently include patches for newly-discovered security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers.</p><p>· Exercise caution when conducting online banking sessions, in particular if the behavior or appearance of your bank’s website changes.</p><p>· Delete any suspicious-looking emails you receive, especially if they contain links or attachments.</p><p>· Be extremely wary of any Microsoft Office email attachment that advises you to enable macros to view its content. Unless you are absolutely sure that this is a genuine email from a trusted source, do not enable macros and instead immediately delete the email.</p><p>· If you suspect an infection, immediately change your online banking account passwords using an uninfected system and contact your bank to alert them to look for any potentially fraudulent transactions.</p><p><em>Check out the Security Response </em><a href="https://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/sr"><em>blog</em></a><em> and follow Threat Intel on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/threatintel"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> to keep up-to-date with the latest happenings in the world of threat intelligence and cybersecurity.</em></p><p><em>Like this story? Recommend it by hitting the heart button so others on Medium see it, and follow Threat Intel on Medium for more great content.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f95dd0900559" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel/financial-trojans-evolution-banking-f95dd0900559">A short history of the financial Trojan</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threat-intel">Threat Intel</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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