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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Srinivas kodali on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Srinivas kodali on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@digitaldutta?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Srinivas kodali on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@digitaldutta?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 18:36:43 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[How do we build India’s National Open Digital Ecosystem?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hasgeek/how-do-we-build-indias-national-open-digital-ecosystem-f7ffe73bd1e?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f7ffe73bd1e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[platform-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-standards]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[platform-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[govtech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas kodali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2020 01:43:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-19T01:43:13.992Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Ministry of Electronics of Information Technology (MeITY) has released a consultation paper on Strategy for <a href="https://www.mygov.in/group-issue/inviting-suggestions-strategy-national-open-digital-ecosystems-node/">National Open Digital Ecosystem</a>. The aim of the consultation process is to come up with principles for design, governance and to strategize the national open digital ecosystem of next generation citizen delivery platforms. The paper traces the evolution of e-Governance in India and categories them into different versions of GovTech ranging from 1.0 to the current version of 3.0. Examples of GovTech 3.0 are GSTN, UPI and other upcoming stacks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/887/1*7dKovzt2kDiITAkues-c7Q.png" /></figure><p><em>The paper has quite a set of new terms which deserves a separate dictionary with some definitions offered while others need to be inferred. The most important term GovTech 3.0 or NODE is defined as “Open and secure delivery platforms, anchored by transparent governance mechanisms, which enable a community of partners to unlock innovative solutions, to transform societal outcomes”. In plain terms NODE essentially is a tech delivery platform consisting of APIs, data registries, exchanges, stacks to help build citizen delivery products controlled by a Special Purpose Vehicle built using public private partnership.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4XjwChHhm1c7ygJMVvHXSg.png" /><figcaption>Imagining National Open Digital Ecosystem</figcaption></figure><p>To achieve this the paper discusses a set of 15 principles in the domains of platform design, platform governance and building a vibrant community. The principles are being open and interoperable, reusable and shareable, be scalable, ensure security and privacy, adopting an agile, data-driven development method, having accountable institution(s), establishing rules of engagement, creating transparent data governance, ensuring capacity, adopting a financial model, ensure inclusiveness, facilitate participatory design, drive user engagement, be analytical driven with the last one being enable grievance redressal.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DQSClctFKhawK3VuBoFfow.png" /></figure><p>The advantages of building NODE is illustrated citing the example of e-Transport project of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MORTH). The journey of the e-Transport project which was built as one of the 31 Mission Mode Projects of the National e-Governance Plan is quite interesting. The ministry helped digitize issuing of vehicle registrations and driver’s licenses making it easier for citizens to obtain them, creating dashboards with analytics. It now integrates a National Vehicle Register and State Vehicle Registers with data interlinked across databases with access to government institutions like Police, National Crime Records Bureau and private institutions like banks and insurance companies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HaeAbdljaGcPgiLmCFwnbQ.png" /><figcaption>Various components of e-Transport Project</figcaption></figure><blockquote>A set of future possible nodes in the sectors of Skilling, Agriculture, MSME and State Service Delivery are cited as further examples. The architecture for NODE at some level is inspired from <a href="https://negd.gov.in/node/79">India Enterprise Architecture</a> (IndiaEA), which recommends interlinking of all government databases with a new approach termed “Whole of Government (WofG)”. IndiaEA wants to help build One Nation One Government with its approach. This interlinking of all government databases is made possible by bringing in digital standards in e-Governance called <a href="https://negd.gov.in/digital-service-standard">Digital Service Standards</a>.</blockquote><p>The paper touches upon risks of building these platforms including potential for exclusion of citizens, security issues and potential violations of privacy and possible weaponization of data. Over the years it has become clear that technology systems can be manipulated or simply mal-function and can become a major issue. The questions posed in the paper want to address some of these issues. While the paper kept away from discussing any existing examples of known problems of data registries, stacks. To illustrate these potential anticipated problems that are possible with NODE, let’s look at an existing system that is already accepted as a NODE in the paper; e-transport project.</p><p>While the e-transport project is being termed a technology marvel, several components of it have recently come under heavy criticism. The Vahan database until recently has been publicly allowing anyone to check the <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/transport-ministry-to-partially-conceal-names-of-vehicle-owners-on-vahan-database/articleshow/74338287.cms">personal information of any vehicle owner</a>. The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways also <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/india-news-legal-or-not-why-has-the-roads-ministry-sold-our-data/334278">sold this information</a> to private firms without the consent of the vehicle owner assuming implied consent and ownership of information. Not limited to these issues, the e-transport project has centralized governance of transport which is a state subject according to the constitution. The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways had <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/registration-of-all-motor-vehicles-stopped/article27016454.ece">stopped allowing states to register new vehicles online</a> unless they followed centre rules on number plates. A clear case of excessive intrusion by the centre into the state’s affairs.</p><p>It is important how technology is built and used for governance in India. The technology communities in India have an important role to play and ensure they are just and fair. Interestingly in the paper, community only comprises Government, foundations, think tanks, businesses and entrepreneurs. Specifically categorizing them into builders and end-users consisting of consumers of the delivery platform. While the paper extensively cites terms like open-source, open-standards, open-data, open-API the exclusion of open-source communities is unfortunate.</p><p>The definition of most terms also need to be viewed from the lens of consultants who drafted it for the ministry. The word open itself is tricky and unless explicitly explained is prone to be mis-understood or used in wrong contexts.</p><blockquote>The term “open” in NODE refers to principles of openness, including but not limited to transparency, accessibility, inter- operability, open APIs and standards and open source code, where appropriate. However, it must be noted that each NODE will have its own configuration and degree of “openness”, which may introduce certain limitations in order to adhere to specific objectives, context or to mitigate potential risks</blockquote><p>Even though clarification for the term open is explicitly cited, none of the existing national registers, stacks, platforms or existing potential NODEs are open in any way close to the definition. The entire paper and building various NODEs could all be an interesting exercise of open-washing to just sell a consumer product while openness is just ignored.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f7ffe73bd1e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hasgeek/how-do-we-build-indias-national-open-digital-ecosystem-f7ffe73bd1e">How do we build India’s National Open Digital Ecosystem?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hasgeek">Hasgeek</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Technology Apocalypse]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-fifth-elephant-blog/the-technology-apocalypse-3b5090f835ea?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[aadhaar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas kodali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Aug 2018 07:04:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-01T08:23:13.449Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="https://fifthelephant.in/2018">seventh edition of The Fifth Elephant </a>— which concluded last week — featured a talk on poor quality of data collected by the Aadhar project. <a href="https://medium.com/u/a08e769ef709">Anand Venkatanarayanan</a> drew parallels with the “Four horsemen and Apocalypse” fable to explain data security issues with the Aadhar project. As developers, it is hard to get lost in the technology and fail to think about the value and purpose of technology and that we have inherent biases and blindness towards technology. These biases hurt us when we scale any technology across the country.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*3x1JJA6R5Zruxh2F" /><figcaption>Sketch note of Anand’s talk by <a href="https://medium.com/u/b7a81645edd9">Rasagy Sharma</a></figcaption></figure><p>You can catch up on the talk online, below:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FxOc9PMa0yDg%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DxOc9PMa0yDg&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FxOc9PMa0yDg%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/eb700eccdea693925ae6def103ea6260/href">https://medium.com/media/eb700eccdea693925ae6def103ea6260/href</a></iframe><p>As the country is debating important technology initiatives, and is making technology mandatory in day-to-day governance, we are still unable to understand the shortcomings of the technology itself. An interesting trait which Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) Chairman RS Sharma brought into the debate — incidentally, last week — is harm. How can technology harm us? If technology can harm us, how do we classify/define such harms? These are important questions which no one has an answer to. The latest draft of the personal data protection bill presented by Sri Krishna Committee tries to answer some of them.</p><h3>RS Sharma on Twitter</h3><p>@kingslyj My Aadhaar number is 7621 7768 2740 Now I give this challenge to you: Show me one concrete example where you can do any harm to me!</p><p>Harm from technology is something everyone is studying across the world as we enter the age of ubiquitous computing, with sensors tracking every aspect of our life. Racial biases and discrimination through technology have been extensively documented and debated in the West. It is important as a community that we do not cause any harm to others, especially when Big Data and algorithms are being termed “<a href="https://weaponsofmathdestructionbook.com/">Weapons of Math Destruction</a>”.</p><p>As stakeholders of developing these tech solutions, we can’t ignore the rights of people and work for profits. Employees across different tech firms are even voicing out against technologies like surveillance and Artificial Intelligence which may violate human rights. So there is a need to have a conversation about some of these issues in tech more and start looking at tech differently.</p><p>You can read the following books and papers from these organisations who work on digital rights</p><p><strong>Organisations:</strong></p><p>MIT Civic Media Lab — <a href="https://civic.mit.edu/publications/">https://civic.mit.edu/publications/</a><br>Gov lab — <a href="http://www.thegovlab.org/publications.html">http://www.thegovlab.org/publications.html</a><br>Harvard Berkman Klein Center — <a href="http://cyber.harvard.edu/publications">http://cyber.harvard.edu/publications</a><br>Web Foundation — <a href="https://webfoundation.org/research-publications/">https://webfoundation.org/research-publications/</a><br>Data and Society — <a href="https://datasociety.net/research/">https://datasociety.net/research/</a><br>Algorithmic Justice League — <a href="https://www.ajlunited.org/">https://www.ajlunited.org/</a></p><p><strong>Books:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/36610369-the-people-vs-tech">The People Vs Tech</a></li><li><a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/34964830-automating-inequality">Automating Inequality</a></li><li><a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/28186015-weapons-of-math-destruction">Weapons of Math Destruction</a></li><li><a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/28503628-the-attention-merchants">The Attention Merchants</a></li><li><a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/36088.Interface_Culture">Interface Culture</a></li><li><a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/7954936-what-technology-wants">What Technology Wants</a></li><li><a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6683549-you-are-not-a-gadget">You Are Not a Gadget</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3b5090f835ea" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-fifth-elephant-blog/the-technology-apocalypse-3b5090f835ea">The Technology Apocalypse</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-fifth-elephant-blog">The Fifth Elephant Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A billion users, but no bug reporting policy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/karana/a-billion-users-but-no-bug-reporting-policy-20ce35122795?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/20ce35122795</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-identity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aadhaar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas kodali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Dec 2017 03:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-05T03:40:53.463Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*77_Y-7QjSh2wuQNCEhnayA.gif" /></figure><h4>Even after <a href="http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/12/AU574.pdf">210 websites were found publishing Aadhaar numbers</a> and bank account details, UIDAI has not done enough to engage with security researchers who discovered these and other issues</h4><p><a href="https://medium.com/karana/aadhaar-numbers-being-stored-by-others-apart-from-uidai-are-not-secure-82720848fce6">Aadhaar numbers being stored by others apart from UIDAI are not secure</a></p><p>Mainstream and social media have carried several reports about security issues in Aadhaar. Any organisation holding so much sensitive information of individuals (including yours) should ideally host a bug bounty program for independent security researchers, to receive and process bug reports in a secure manner.</p><p>Certain features of Aadhaar — like eKYC — share sensitive personal information, including your photo, to third parties. The Aadhaar Act and regulations were introduced to enforce control around this shared information. But the Aadhaar Act only applies within the jurisdiction of India. A cybercriminal from another country cannot be brought to justice under the Act (unless extradition treaties apply). Besides, cybersecurity issues can’t be controlled by law alone. They need sane architecture and design choices to be made upfront, backed by continuous technological improvements.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YlbbAhVrBMZ2OKRlB3UASA.png" /><figcaption>Section 1, Clause 2 of the Aadhaar Act recognises any offence committed outside India</figcaption></figure><p>Security researchers, journalists, and writers like <a href="https://twitter.com/SkochSameer">Sameer Kochhar</a> have been gagged with criminal complaints for bringing issues to public attention.</p><p><a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/article-says-aadhaar-can-be-hacked-fir-against-writer-4548695/">Article says Aadhaar can be hacked, FIR against writer</a></p><p>Earlier this year, UIDAI CEO Ajay Bhushan Pandey promised a legal and safe bug reporting mechanism for researchers to report issues directly to UIDAI. It has been months since, but with no such policy in place, it is hard for security researchers to report actual issues with Aadhaar.</p><h3>CEO UIDAI on Twitter</h3><p>@iam_anandv @UIDAI UIDAI is working on a policy to enable security experts to report issues in a legal and safe manner.</p><p>Pertinent to note: the Government of India does have cybersecurity reporting procedures via the <a href="http://www.cert-in.org.in/">Computer Emergency Response Team of India (CERT-In)</a> and the <a href="http://nciipc.gov.in/">National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre</a>.</p><p>But UIDAI not having such a process for itself is an issue, as they are custodians of the Aadhaar project and need to be primary responders. Twitter Direct Messages (DMs) and phone calls to a call centre are not secure channels for reporting issues.</p><p>When an organization lacks an official procedure, many researchers define their own ethical framework for reporting security issues. For example, Datameet, a community of data enthusiasts, offers these guidelines:</p><p><a href="http://datameet.org/2017/07/30/ethical-reporting-of-data-and-security-issues/">Ethical Reporting of Data and Security Issues</a></p><p>Citizens complaints often go unresolved by UIDAI, and they can be seen expressing frustration on Twitter. UIDAI does respond on Twitter some of the time, but using Twitter DM for sharing enrolment ID (EID) and UID is not safe. The Twitter company retains access to all private messages, and may be obliged to share with security agencies such as the NSA in its host country, the United States.</p><h3>Srikanth ஸ்‌ரீகாந்த் on Twitter</h3><p>While inboxing, EID is shared with US based @Twitter . The entire social media support of @UIDAI is leaking #Aadhaar UID, EID to US, NSA @ceo_uidai Was this intentional? https://t.co/ngQrqIVAwb</p><p><a href="https://theoutline.com/post/2444/going-rogue-in-silicon-valley">Going rogue in Silicon Valley</a></p><p>An organization that claims a billion active users refusing to engage with security researchers is strange, but not even having a secure bug reporting policy is in the realm of bizarre. The very least that UIDAI must do to recover its credibility is to publish an official policy — assuming it cares about its credibility, that is.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=20ce35122795" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/karana/a-billion-users-but-no-bug-reporting-policy-20ce35122795">A billion users, but no bug reporting policy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/karana">Kaarana</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Aadhaar numbers being stored by others apart from UIDAI are not secure]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/karana/aadhaar-numbers-being-stored-by-others-apart-from-uidai-are-not-secure-82720848fce6?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[aadhaar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas kodali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Feb 2017 01:20:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-21T11:16:35.216Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BpUQbdP-onX_e3br4Jl7Qw.jpeg" /><figcaption>list of students with their Aadhaar numbers, caste, parents info and photographs along with their signatures leaked online</figcaption></figure><p>On February 17 being informed about a website publishing various details of potentially 5–6 lakhs children including their Aadhaar numbers, I informed authorities responsible for the website to bring it down and the website was brought down at the earliest. The website was publishing several attributes including aadhaar number, name of the child, both parent’s name, gender, caste, signature and photo. The core biometrics of the individuals affected are probably secure as this was a third party website storing the mentioned information along with Aadhaar. This was a data leakage with lapse measures around information design and without any access management controls or encryption to store data securely on the website servers.</p><h3>Srinivas Kodali on Twitter</h3><p>Yesterday I was informed about a website which was publishing #Aadhaar numbers of minors. We informed the authorities and brought it down.</p><p>After the website was brought down I have filed an incident report with supporting evidence to National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Center (NCIIPC) along with Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) on 19th February. The website was not cached on any major search engines and neither on archive systems like the wayback machine. But it would be fair to say the metadata of servers and domains are quite public and its allied websites might contain similar data. It is for the authorities to conduct forensic analysis and look into it this leak further.</p><p>Now as curious as everyone wants to know further details about what the organization was and why were they storing this information in the first place, I am not at liberty to disclose any further information until relevant authorities conclude their investigation and release further information. There are lot of questions for which I seek answers as well, how long the website has been running, how much information was accessed during this time-period and whether this information was accessed by non-state actors? These are questions which can only be answered through a forensic analysis of the servers which are only accessible to the website maintainers and relevant authorities.</p><p>In India there is no mandatory disclosure law related to cyber security incidents and the authorities may not even disclose who were the affected parties in this incident. I do not know the list of all individuals affected by this leak as I did not access any major information apart from what is needed for minimal evidence to be submitted to the authorities. The Aadhaar Act of 2016 has provisions to issue new Aadhaar numbers and whether UIDAI will issue them to the affected parties is a serious question.</p><p>This is not the only website out there which is storing various identity data linking Aadhaar as a key in the databases. Private identity verification providers like OnGrid are collecting larger individual attributes by linking it to Aadhar. The bigger question is whether these databases are secure and are being subjected to any security and compliance standards by UIDAI? There are several questions which need answers from UIDAI and its founding architects in regards to the security, robustness and functionality of Aadhaar servers/API’s and verification mechanisms to the larger public. I hope UIDAI answers some of these for us preferably through an open house on security before citizens lose little faith they have left in the authority. I have little incentives to actually report issues to authorities if they don’t respond or acknowledge the reports I sent.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.lostprogrammer.com/blog/aadhaar-numbers-being-stored-by-others-apart-from-uidai-are-not-secure/"><em>www.lostprogrammer.com</em></a><em> on February 22, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=82720848fce6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/karana/aadhaar-numbers-being-stored-by-others-apart-from-uidai-are-not-secure-82720848fce6">Aadhaar numbers being stored by others apart from UIDAI are not secure</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/karana">Kaarana</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Indian Railways Information and Data Security]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@digitaldutta/indian-railways-information-and-data-security-f8d181acbefc?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f8d181acbefc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trains]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas kodali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 03 Dec 2016 08:11:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-06T11:41:03.113Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Indian Railways Information and Data Security</p><p>I have been documenting about Indian Railways and its IT systems over the past two years. In a previous <a href="http://www.lostprogrammer.com/blog/indian-railways-should-secure-data-before-monetising-it/">post</a> I criticized the railways plans of monetizing the data without securing it in the first place, when the Maharashtra Police announced they found out the irctc has been hacked and they were investigating it. The railways denied the claim and moved on as what bureaucrats are best at.</p><p>I have been looking at security of several railway systems documenting things. I reported most of these to the entire railways IT team with no official response from them for at-least 8 months now. I am gonna write about few of these vulnerabilities which have been closed or which do not have any sensitive information. Note: Indian Railways is massive and the organization structure for IT systems alone include CRIS, IRCTC and their own IT teams for each division.</p><h4>Integrated Coaching Management System ICMS</h4><p>The <a href="http://icms.indianrail.gov.in/reports/">ICMS</a> portal of railways is an integrated management system to track coaches and trains for operations. This website has information of every coach manufacturing date, position in the train for each trip updated by each division for operations. A cached cookie which never expired let google index this website and gave access to anyone to use this website. This was a common knowledge among Indian Railways fan forums and the moderators had to <a href="http://forum.irfca.org/threads/icms-and-other-railway-websites.36733/">specifically ban</a> people from discussions and using this website in the forums. This bug has been fixed in a successive server upgrade, but one can essentially hack it back and is definitely possible. Internal websites like these should instead be on a virtual network not accessible to everyone on the internet. The railways can easily do this through RailTel instead of giving free wifi to others.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*fVi-PRcp5daDfbu2.png" /></figure><p>A screenshot of ICMS pages which were accessible for everyone for few months</p><h4>National Train Enquiry System NTES</h4><p>The rail radar or the National Train Enquiry System was designed to help passengers know the real time status of trains. The website was launched first followed by an android application later in 2014. NTES even though quite useful doesn’t has all the information required by a passenger like PNR status at the same website/application. This made startups like ixigo, travelyaari and several others provide all of this information under one application. Until early 2015 NTES android application was communicating to its servers over http with not much security. Somewhere in mid 2015 they started using AES 256 encryption to encrypt the data from servers and the application to restrict people mining this data. But this didn’t stop startups to further exploit this data by breaking the AES encryption. The following video shows how a popular train application ixigo breaks this encryption to mine railways data.</p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0kaUz_F3Eo0&amp;feature=youtu.be">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0kaUz_F3Eo0&amp;feature=youtu.be</a></p><p>All of this data is publicly accessible, but they don’t want to give access. With the rise of startups increasingly hitting railway servers for data, the railways announced monetizing this data by closing the bugs and providing these API’s as service to the same startups at a price in 2016. Most of these API’s were supposed to be made available in the first place under National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy of 2012. The railways chief data officer ignored and did not comply in releasing any of this data. According to the policy they were also supposed to give out plans for charging data under 6 months if data can’t be made open. The whole issue is because railways failed to do its job the right way firms started exploiting their IT systems and now railways wants to capitalize the situation. The bigger question is why is the railways not reporting these firms of exploiting their systems and is instead playing merry go round with them. Breaking encrypted content is an offense under the Information Technology Act. But the selective implementation of rule of law around this is really bad.</p><p>I have emailed the railways about additional vulnerabilities to their chief data officer and everyone in their IT team from their directory. I never received a formal reply. I later called two of them up to confirm whether they received my mails. In all there are few more open bugs which they haven’t fixed in 8 months of me reporting them. It’s been too long i didn’t disclose this. As a researcher on Intelligent Transportation Systems I look into most of these issues and I do require access to railway data for research.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/337/0*KSeIjEwZsUA8y2E5.png" /></figure><p>screenshot of my third mail to railway authorities about security issues with railway IT systems.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.lostprogrammer.com/blog/indian-railways-information-and-data-security/"><em>www.lostprogrammer.com</em></a><em> on December 3, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f8d181acbefc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[BEST to partner with Zophop for real-time updates]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@digitaldutta/best-to-partner-with-zophop-for-real-time-updates-fe390fbf577f?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fe390fbf577f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[open-data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-transit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transportation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas kodali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Oct 2016 14:31:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-06T11:39:17.876Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>BEST to partner with Zophop for real-time updates</p><p>This post first appeared on <a href="http://bestpedia.in/2016/10/best-to-partner-with-zophop-for-real-time-updates/">BESTpedia</a></p><p>BEST has an update for their long lost initiative of informing commuters when a bus will arrive, to attract more commuters to use buses. BEST will now show real-time locations of AC buses using a third party android application called Zophop. It is interesting that BEST is partnering with third party private firms to inform the commuters than maintaining the tech in house which can result in heavy IT expenditure. Even though we have our very own GPS satellites in space, tracking a bus still seems like a challenge.</p><p>Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) is the new hot discussion among many cash deprived transit agencies, every agency wants to use them to improve operations and attract commuters. BMTC has recently launched their own ITS system with a whopping cost of 89 crores to track buses. But none of these systems can help the agency if they are not implemented in the right way. Every agency is experimenting with the setup with no major success stories in sight.</p><p>In the past BEST has sold the rights of advertising to a third party firm Verve Soft Pvt Ltd. which has placed GPS units, TVs in the buses. This firm has launched a website and app called BEST <a href="http://bestpis.in/">Passenger Information System</a> with little or no useful information. This lack of useful information resulted in many third party applications to track locals and bus timings in Mumbai like m-indicator, smartshehar, ridlr, Zophop and citizen led initiatives like ChaloBEST.</p><p>BEST partnering with one such firm is an interesting development, yet is it only sharing the data with zophop or will it also share it with others? Several people have approached BEST for data and have been shunned away in the past. From an anecdote, IIT Bombay was paying a hefty amount to buy GPS data of BEST for their research work on a real-time multimodal trip planner. As a public agency BEST cannot favour one private player and the partnership terms need to be transparent, so that any other private firm like Google Maps can also access this real-time data to show updates for commuters.</p><p>For BEST to share this real-time data with others, it should be noted that the data rights need to be with BEST. From what is known BEST has already sold these rights to Verve Soft Pvt Ltd. and may not have any rights over it as BEST has not spent any money on GPS units and might be receiving money through advertising revenues. Several transit agencies abroad have been sharing their real-time data to commuters by making it open to anyone including researchers and individual developers. Even though BMTC has announced an intention for such an open data policy to share data with third parties, it hasn’t been executed yet. Third party partnerships and open data policies will likely be adopted by many transport agencies in the near future in India. BEST is already experimenting with such practices, but it needs to be more transparent in doing so as a public agency.</p><p>Disclosure: The author was an employee/Director at Zophop briefly in 2014 and helped source transport data while at the firm.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.lostprogrammer.com/blog/best-to-partner-with-zophop-for-real-time-updates/"><em>www.lostprogrammer.com</em></a><em> on October 20, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fe390fbf577f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Comments on National Data Sharing Policy and Open Data License]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@digitaldutta/comments-on-national-data-sharing-policy-and-open-data-license-47dba111a926?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/47dba111a926</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-data]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas kodali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Jul 2016 18:44:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-06T11:38:29.685Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Comments on National Data Sharing Policy and Open Data License</p><p>These were my comments on the implementation of the policy and the new <a href="https://www.mygov.in/group-issue/public-consultation-government-open-data-use-license-india/">draft Government Open Data License</a>. I couldn’t submit this on time, so this is turning into a post middle of the night. Some of the serious issues have already been reported through a submission from <a href="https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/mygov_146945275043355271.pdf">datameet</a>. The comments are in form of a letter from a disappointed citizen, I hope I make my case clear on their shortfalls on the implementation and the issues with the license.</p><p>Dear Officers-In-Charge,</p><p>I understand this is a unique opportunity to give some serious feedback on the current implementation of NDSAP; while suggesting changes to the draft license. I am a true believer in the concept of open data and it’s potential to bring in transparency and accountability in governance. But I am disheartened to see your efforts in pushing open data in the country to be slow.</p><p>NDSAP mandates to publish 5 high quality datasets from each department under 3 months of notification (12e of NDSAP). It took you almost 3 years to get started to publish few high quality datasets (August 2015). In my own field of transportation, all I could see is timetables of around 2800 trains out of the 12000 trains in India. No data about local trains, no real-time data, no API’s and I am just taking the case of Indian railways. The implementation of the license is too slow and helps nobody in it’s current stage. All public government data was mandated to be published under a year by March 2013 according to clause 12 (f) of NDSAP. Now after almost 4 years, you are hosting a consultation whether I am allowed to use the data.</p><p>The draft license in it’s current form is a mixture of policy statements and threats to not use anything else than what you approve (section 6). There are online travel aggregators who are breaking encryption of <a href="http://enquiry.indianrail.gov.in/ntes/">National Train Enquiry System (NTES)</a> to get access to real-time trains data. What option do you leave them when you don’t publish complete datasets, clearly trains schedules are not under negative list since you publish 25% of them. So is it fair to say that they can break the encryption to do so? You are threatening to revoke licenses but people don’t really care to begin with. They can probably pay for accessing this data. But did you update the pricing models as required under section 11 of NDSAP?</p><p>Your colleagues published some sensitive data within a data portal calling it open data, which I responsibly reported to some of your colleagues. Clearly you don’t want the liability for such accidents, but you are not helping at all by threatening me to stay mum about it. How can a citizen be silent when his data is being published without his permission and the officials in charge want to play a game of blames? The draft license in its current form clearly strips data users and citizens of their rights by exempting data providers of any liability and clauses with no warranty for data.</p><p><strong>Demand for changes in the draft license:</strong></p><p><strong>Scope of the license Section 1:</strong> The license states that the scope of it falls under all the data being published under NDSAP and data being published through data.gov.in. This is in contradiction with some of the existing practices of releasing data by pro-active disclosure under the RTI act. While the legal basis of RTI act is already established, draft license contradicts itself with the scope by not following the principles of right to information as granted by the constitution. The scope of the license needs to be clearly established for existing datasets which were made open before NDSAP was notified. NDSAP applies to all datasets being generated using government funds, that applies to several academic institutions with government funding generating data through experiments. Your license doesn’t cater to academic requirements at all. Academic institutions will require a separate license and a portal for this purpose and mandatory disclosures needs to be pushed through.</p><p><strong>Definition of Data Section 2:</strong> The definition of data in NDSAP and the license is vast and doesn’t distinguish between digital and analog datasets clearly. The ambiguity of videos being data or not is contestable as in digital form it is simple encodings of numbers.</p><p><strong>Definition of Access Section 3:</strong> The definition of access is not clear and specially the “non-exclusive purposes” definition needs to clarified. NDSAP mandates that access to different types of datasets require different forms of licensing and registrations. This is ambiguous under the license.</p><p><strong>Warranty Section 4:</strong> The entire sections makes claims of no warranty of data and continuity, suggests that data providers are not liable for the data being published. The RTI Act provides certain provisions where the data requested through RTI must be published and can be used for any intended use case. Clearly data without warranty,continuity violates the provisions in the act. A limited warranty and support for continuity is needed for datasets like judgement orders, legislative proceedings as defined under the RTI act.</p><p><strong>Exemptions Section 6:</strong> There is no scope for exemptions under a license, exemptions are already defined under section 8 of the RTI act for the data providers. By providing exemptions for users instead of a data provider you are threatening the user with consequences, A clear violations of user rights. NDSAP doesn’t define what needs to be done with sensitive datasets and negative lists, placing these exemptions here instead under the policy or guidelines for data providers is a bad way of designing a license. Under this section, it is ok for data providers to publish state secrets but the users need to keep quiet while you destroy the nation. This entire section needs to be removed from the license.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.lostprogrammer.com/blog/comments-on-national-data-sharing-policy-and-license/"><em>www.lostprogrammer.com</em></a><em> on July 25, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=47dba111a926" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Indian Railways Should Secure Data Before Monetising It]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@digitaldutta/indian-railways-should-secure-data-before-monetising-it-eaf9fcdff172?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eaf9fcdff172</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[big-data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-railways]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas kodali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jun 2016 05:40:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-03T05:50:34.544Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>IRCTC may or may not have been hacked; the railways doesn’t need to tell you about it because there are no mandatory disclosure laws in India. Indian Railways (IR) has other portals for ticket reservations, IRCTC is just one of the major public-facing portals. Most of these railway portals are still running on unsecured protocols, they don’t use any sort of security certificates yet and thus fall prey for hackers easily.</p><p>It is no secret that the railways has bugs in their portals, the infamous bug of captcha being text is always laughed about in quora and reddit threads. If you are a railway fan and are familiar with the <a href="http://forum.irfca.org/threads/icms-and-other-railway-websites.36733/#post-296052">Indian Railway Fan Club Association</a>, you would know how the moderators had to block people posting internal data from Integrated Coaching Management System, an internal portal of the railways.</p><p>OTAs (Online Travel Aggregators) exploit several security bugs and hit railway servers constantly, data mining thousands of data records. Some even decrypt encrypted content in violation of the IT Act. They are even monetizing real-time railway data against the <a href="http://enquiry.indianrail.gov.in/ntes/disclaimerDisplay.jsp">limited permissions</a> to use them. You can’t possess any railway property illegally according to the RAILWAYS PROPERTY (Unlawful Possession) Act 1966; it follows that railway data is its property too. Right now data like train status, PNR status, ticket availability would fall under the public data. But OTAs accessing it using exploits in code make the data illegal, irrespective of it being public already. These practices of OTAs could prove potent at a time of disaster.</p><p>When Estonia was attacked it showed the world how impactful cyber-warfare can be. Everything from banking to communications was hit. When Snowden made the revelations about the scale of NSA security snooping, every other government started strengthening its IT infrastructure and started using the same tactics as the NSA. The Chinese are not far behind the Americans and often use their great firewall for both censorship and attacks.</p><p>Railways is critical infrastructure to the nation, any weakness therein can be a serious threat. Realizing that, IR came up with a Basic Security Policy in 2008. But a recent <a href="http://www.cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/audit_report_files/Union_Performance_Railways_Crew_mgmt_Report_47_2015_chap_4.pdf">CAG report</a> from 2015 on IT infrastructure for crew management points out that almost 90–100% employees use the same password, sidelining the system designed for role-based access management. Several contract workers are provided with the same user-name and password defying the whole logic of the policy.</p><p>The way railways is using Information Technology to reach people and help them over social media is astonishing, but at the same time there is no place for someone to report security bugs to the officials. Bug bounty programs are often used by the industry to address it’s security problems using the expertise from hobbyists and professional security experts. In the current budget year, Indian railways is spending 50 crores to fund innovations in the space of data, part of which focus on cyber-security according to Mr. Suresh Prabhu.</p><p>What the railways is forgetting to understand is this: buying a cyber-security solution is not going to solve their problems. It is the culture in CRIS which needs to change. The minister has been emphasizing on the importance of change in the 150-year old organization. If it intends to tackle cyber-security, it needs to improve CRIS personal. Railways can set an example by building an expert IT team to help CRIS and re-innovate itself. The web moves really fast, today’s security is tomorrow’s vulnerability and the railways need to start adapting to it.</p><p>Railways recently started adopting the National Data Sharing &amp; Accessibility Policy (2012) to an extent; the chief data officer for railways has opened up some of the train time tables (around 2800 trains) on <a href="https://data.gov.in/catalog/indian-railways-train-time-table-0">Open Government Data Portal</a>. The policy requires to classify datasets into public, private &amp; restricted data. It is high time railways start improving its data practices, releasing open data, open API’s and closing security loopholes of sensitive information by potentially adopting a bug bounty program. It is necessary for railways to secure it’s data before it tries to monetize it.</p><p>This post first appeared on <a href="http://swarajyamag.com/ideas/indian-railways-should-change-to-secure-data-before-monetising-it">Swarajya</a></p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.lostprogrammer.com/blog/indian-railways-should-secure-data-before-monetising-it/"><em>www.lostprogrammer.com</em></a><em> on June 3, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eaf9fcdff172" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Call Data Records of Bangalore Police Investigations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@digitaldutta/call-data-records-of-bangalore-police-investigations-42b3e78b175e?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/42b3e78b175e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[responsible-disclosure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas kodali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Feb 2016 06:10:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-03-03T15:58:22.883Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bangalore Police released 13,000 call data records (CDR) of potential on-going investigations during a hackathon with focus on solving problems of cities. This is a first person account of events on what happened during the hackathon.</p><p><a href="https://www.hackerearth.com/sprints/urban-hack/">Urban Hack</a>, a Hackathon focused on cities organized through HackerEarth by NASSCOM, WRI Cities India, Xerox India, Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC) and Bangalore Police was held on 3rd Oct 2015. As a enthusiast and a engineer focused on transportation I was participating in the hackathon to see the problem statements and potential datasets which were being released through the hackathon. During the hackathon, there was an Ask Me Anything session with the bangalore police and others. In one of the event posts it was mentioned that they would be releasing data on petty crimes in Bangalore and call data records which they use in their investigations.</p><p>I was familiar with usage of call data records in research from the work of <a href="http://senseable.mit.edu/manycities/">MIT senseable city lab</a> and was wondering what set of parameters the police would be releasing, as getting your hands onto a CDR dataset is really hard due to the privacy/security concerns. While this was going on, I was having a call with a friend Chinmayi SK who runs Random Hacks of Kindness India. I was explaining her what these records meant and even she was surprised that the police are giving access to CDR data. To our surprise, the CDR dataset released had phone numbers of the individuals which the police was monitoring. Normally when telephone companies share this data to third parties for internal analytics, the data is shared with extreme care. They are shared through a Virtual Cloud and the phone numbers are obfuscated with one way hash functions.</p><p>This was a serious blunder by the organizing team, I wasn’t sure how they would mitigate the side effects, as the dataset was shared online on HackerEarth’s webpage for participants of more than 1500. I consulted few friends from the data community, some of them being pro privacy wanted to tweet shame about the blunder. But this would have resulted in more curious people getting access to the dataset. So I tried reaching out to one of the organizers from WRI Cities India, when I couldn’t reach them I hurried to NASSCOM Warehouse in Diamond District, which was the physical venue for the hackathon. I reached the venue in 2 hours post the release of the dataset, tried explaining what they have done to HackerEarth and NASSCOM representatives. They initially were reluctant in accepting the issue, as the police themselves shared the dataset. I warned them there can be consequences in what they have done.</p><p>I left the venue re-iterating the seriousness of the mistake and explaining that my job was only to report the issue. I did a follow up with the WRI Cities India representative to have a look into it, the dataset was removed sometime later with no explanation. Post this, I along with several community members wrote a <a href="http://datameet.org/2016/02/02/to-hack-or-not-to-hack/">letter</a> to the organizers re-iterating the importance of what happened, as the dataset was out with the participants and no body knows when it will re-surface. I would love to analyze the call data records, but the dataset was biased in the first place with only data of persons of interest. May be in future, I can get my hands on to a appropriately licensed data set of call data records.</p><p>There has been very little talk about data ethics and data practices in India. But cases of mis use of data are frequent. When I talk about open data, I can’t ignore all the other data-sets which are open by default and can be harmful in terms of privacy and security. According to Attorney General of India, we don’t have a right to privacy. Its a sad set of affairs. But I would like to host a healthy discussion around this, I would love to hear from you, if you are working on data licenses, responsible data practices and ethics.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.lostprogrammer.com/blog/call-data-records-of-bangalore-police-investigations/"><em>www.lostprogrammer.com</em></a><em> on February 29, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=42b3e78b175e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Historic Maps of India at Library of Congress]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@digitaldutta/historic-maps-of-india-at-library-of-congress-5d2b05339ffd?source=rss-517ee2e6bcd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5d2b05339ffd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[maps]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[railways]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-transportation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Srinivas kodali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Feb 2016 17:30:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-03-03T15:57:31.159Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was in Washington D.C for Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting in January. I spent significant amount of my brief stay in the library of congress map room in the basement of madison building. I found a treasure of several un-catalogued historic maps of Indian cities and transport networks. To your luck, I could scan and photocopy them. You can download high resolution images of all the maps I could scan from this <a href="https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B1RcWLku0ZOWdC0zNFRKYVpWU1U">link</a>.</p><p><em>Caution: do not print/post the maps anywhere, </em><a href="http://www.surveyofindia.gov.in/files/nmp/National%20Map%20Policy.pdf"><em>National Map Policy</em></a><em> has several restrictions on publication of maps. If you want to share, just point people to this link rather. Read the license within shared folder.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*jd11En2gWEu_2v4u.jpg" /></figure><p>*Maps tray in the library</p><p>The maps are mainly of Indian Railways, cities of Bombay, Goa, Madras, Delhi, Calcutta, Hyderabad and Bangalore. Most of the maps where published by Survey of India (SOI) either during the colonial period or by the various departments of Government of India. SOI has been the primary source of maps in India for decades, but there were significant maps also published by public entities like departments of Tourism, Railways, Public Sector undertakings and Associations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*9am64W72CWsmczNW.jpg" /></figure><p>*Map of Postal Delivery Zones of Delhi</p><p>I do intend to geo-reference the maps and wrap them to visualize them, but cannot commit any timeline. I also made photocopies of timetables of Delhi Transport Undertaking, Metropolitan Transport Corporation (MTC, Madras), Indian Railways from 1960’s. I need help, digitizing these tables into machine readable formats to study them further. The data will be further released under creative commons. I also need help understanding the copyrights of few of these maps under Indian law, obviously to put them on wikipedia.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DgfFfY99YE6lhP75.jpg" /></figure><p>*Madras Government Transport Timetables from 1955</p><p>From transit maps to tourist maps, there were a lot of them which I wanted to scan, but <em>tempus flies</em>. While I did copy few maps which where relevant to me and my area of work, there were maps of city planning authorities before independence, army camps in Delhi over-seen by the viceroy, maps of cities by SBI, shell and Automobile Association of Upper India, maps in different Indian languages. I took low resolution photos of few of these maps, which I will share through a later update.</p><p>The library holds 55 million maps of the entire world with different time periods. The map room provides you the space and resources to view and copy the maps as long as you want. You have access to scanners and photocopy machines to take relevant material, to continue work on them post library hours. If you are in D.C, you should certainly make time to go visit the map room to view maps of your interest. Quick Tip: preferably scan them and study them later, if you are not staying in D.C for long.</p><p>Update: For those of you, who are looking for an online resource with extensive collection of maps on India, the <a href="http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/">Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection</a> has several maps of the world including India and also points to potential resources through a Index of map resources.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.lostprogrammer.com/blog/historic-maps-of-india-at-library-of-congress/"><em>www.lostprogrammer.com</em></a><em> on February 28, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5d2b05339ffd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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