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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by DJ Poteet on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by DJ Poteet on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@djpoteet?source=rss-b941f2987afb------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by DJ Poteet on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@djpoteet?source=rss-b941f2987afb------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Prospect Report — Brody Hopkins]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@djpoteet/prospect-report-brody-hopkins-4155ca22fca4?source=rss-b941f2987afb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4155ca22fca4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tampa-bay-rays]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pitching]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[milb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[DJ Poteet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Apr 2025 01:40:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-18T01:40:22.883Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Prospect Report — Brody Hopkins</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*q42IjLBkc1VWGTg9.jpg" /><figcaption>Image from MiLB</figcaption></figure><p>The Tampa Bay Rays know a thing or two about getting the most out of their prospects. Brody Hopkins might just be there next case. He is still relatively new to pitching full time, but the ability and stuff are there. On top of that, he’s in one of the best player development systems in baseball, and I see a path for him to emerge as one of the most improved arms in the minors this season.</p><p>The biggest reason Hopkins will make the jump is because he is now in the Rays’ system after getting traded last year from the Seattle Mariners for Randy Arozarena. Tampa Bay has consistently proven they can identify and develop dynamic arms, and turn them into major-league contributors. Whether it’s turning mid-round picks into back-end relievers or maximizing potential in starters like Shane McClanahan or Taj Bradley, their track record is one of the best in baseball. Hopkins is exactly the kind of player they excel at developing. Pitchers with big stuff, big body, athletic delivery, and room to get better are the Rays’ bread and butter.</p><p>Hopkins is one of, if not the best, athletes in the Rays organization. At 6-foot-4 with long arms and a loose, low three quarters arm slot, he creates tough angles and generates easy velocity. The fastball sits mid-90s with life and is complimented nicely with his slider that is a swing and miss type of pitch that flashes plus with sharp horizontal break. He has been experimenting with a cutter that could help with bridging the velocity gap between his slider and fastball.</p><p>In 2024, he struck out 133 batters in 115 innings. His extremely athletic delivery coupled with his low slot release adds to his deception which is why hitters struggle to square him up even when he makes mistakes over the plate. The command is the main concern right now. Hopkins walked 53 guys last year and hit 19 batters allowing for a total of 72 free passes. I’m less concerned than I would be because of his above average athleticism. He’s still relatively inexperienced compared to his peers on the mound, and the improvements he has made since turning pro suggest there’s room to improve his command. As I mentioned before, he is in one of the best organizations to help him reach his full potential.</p><p>Through 2 starts in 2025, Hopkins is 1–0 with a 1.93 ERA, 10 Ks, and a .188 BAA. Although he has already walked 8 in 9.1 IP, I’m confident the command will come this season. Sharpening his command while maintaining his stuff will propel Hopkins into the 2026 MLB Top 100 list. There just aren’t many pitchers in the minor leagues with his combination of athleticism, fastball/slider pairing, and upside.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4155ca22fca4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Integrated Approaches to Roster Construction in MLB Front Offices]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@djpoteet/integrated-approaches-to-roster-construction-in-mlb-front-offices-7640b3a11e3f?source=rss-b941f2987afb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7640b3a11e3f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scouting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball-analytics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[DJ Poteet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Apr 2025 18:46:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-12T03:50:51.316Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hb7Fbng47sfZYJxyXdqbEQ.png" /><figcaption>Image from The Athletic</figcaption></figure><p>This article examines how successful Major League Baseball organizations integrate analytics, scouting, and financial strategy to optimize roster construction. Through case studies of organizations like the Los Angeles Dodgers, Tampa Bay Rays, and Cleveland Guardians, this article identifies best practices for cross-departmental collaboration in player evaluation, acquisition, and roster management. The research demonstrates that organizations achieving sustained success have developed robust frameworks for balancing quantitative analysis with traditional scouting while maintaining financial flexibility. These findings provide insights for baseball operations departments seeking to enhance their approach to roster construction in an increasingly complex competitive landscape.</p><p>The landscape of Major League Baseball front offices has transformed dramatically over the past two decades. What began with the Oakland Athletics’ “Moneyball” approach has evolved into a blend of cutting-edge analytics, traditional scouting, and strategic financial management. Modern front offices face the challenge of integrating these diverse perspectives into a cohesive strategy for roster construction that maximizes competitive advantage while maintaining long-term sustainability.</p><p>This article examines how successful MLB organizations have developed integrated approaches to roster construction that leverage the strengths of analytics, scouting, and salary management. Through analysis of specific organizational structures, decision-making frameworks, and case studies, the article identifies best practices for cross-departmental collaboration in player evaluation, acquisition, and roster management.</p><h3>The Evolution of Front Office Integration</h3><h4>From Separation to Collaboration</h4><p>Historically, MLB front offices operated in isolation, with limited interaction between departments. This compartmentalization often led to disconnected decision-making processes where player evaluation, development strategy, and financial considerations were treated as separate concerns rather than interconnected elements of roster construction.</p><p>The transition toward integrated approaches began heavily during the 2010s when organizations like the Houston Astros, Chicago Cubs, Tampa Bay Rays, Cleveland Guardians, and Los Angeles Dodgers pioneered new organizational structures designed to facilitate cross-functional collaboration. These organizations recognized that sustainable competitive advantage required merging insights from multiple departments rather than privileging any single perspective.</p><h3>Current Landscape of Front Office Integration</h3><p>Today, all 30 MLB organizations have established analytics departments, but significant variation exists in how effectively these departments collaborate with scouting, player development, and salary management. According to Baseball America’s 2023 Front Office Survey, organizations with the highest win percentages over the past five years reported stronger cross-departmental integration in their decision-making processes, with executives citing “collaborative culture” as a critical factor in organizational success.</p><p>The Los Angeles Dodgers, who have made the playoffs for twelve consecutive seasons (2013–2024) and won two World Series in that span, exemplify this approach. Under President of Baseball Operations Andrew Friedman, the Dodgers have built an organizational structure that systematically integrates perspectives from analytics, scouting, and player development in all roster decisions. Their sustained success, a .607 winning percentage from 2013–2024, the highest in MLB during that span, demonstrates the competitive advantage of effective front office cohesion.</p><h3>Key Components of Integrated Roster Construction</h3><h4>1. Unified Player Evaluation Systems</h4><p>Organizations with integrated approaches to roster construction have developed systems that combine quantitative metrics with qualitative scouting to create comprehensive player evaluations. These unified evaluation frameworks enable more accurate player valuation across different acquisition contexts, from amateur drafts to trade markets and free agency.</p><p>The Tampa Bay Rays exemplify this approach. Despite consistently operating with one of MLB’s lowest payrolls ($101 million in 2024, 25th in MLB according to USA Today), the Rays have achieved a .576 winning percentage from 2019–2024 (5th highest in MLB) through superior player evaluation. Their integrated player evaluation models assign numerical values to traditional scouting reports while incorporating proprietary analytics, creating a unified language that facilitates communication between departments.</p><h4>Case Study: The Rays’ Acquisition of Yandy Díaz</h4><p>In December 2018, the Rays acquired Yandy Díaz from Cleveland in a three-team trade. At the time, Díaz had posted a .312 SLG in 299 MLB plate appearances, but the Rays’ integrated evaluation identified untapped potential. Their analytics department highlighted Díaz’s above average exit velocity (91.7 mph average in 2018, top 7% in MLB according to Baseball Savant) and hard-hit rate (47.5%), while their scouts loved his plate discipline and potential for swing adjustments.</p><p>By integrating these perspectives, the Rays projected significant upside that traditional statistics missed. After acquiring Díaz, they implemented targeted development plans to elevate his launch angle while preserving his high contact rate. This resulted in Díaz developing into an All-Star caliber player, posting a .410 OBP and 22 home runs in 2023.</p><h4>2. Strategic Financial Frameworks</h4><p>Successful organizations have developed sophisticated financial frameworks that extend beyond traditional payroll management to incorporate concepts like:</p><ul><li><strong>Marginal win value analysis</strong>: Calculating the competitive and financial return on investment for each additional win based on team context</li><li><strong>Contract structure optimization</strong>: Designing contract terms that balance risk mitigation with player incentives</li><li><strong>Roster flexibility preservation</strong>: Maintaining elasticity through strategic use of option years, service time management, and 40-man roster allocation</li></ul><p>The Cleveland Guardians exemplify strategic financial management integrated with baseball operations. Despite consistently ranking in the bottom third of MLB payrolls (about $90 million in 2023), Cleveland has maintained a .556 winning percentage over the last decade (2016-present) through disciplined financial strategy aligned with their player evaluation and development systems.</p><p>Cleveland’s approach includes:</p><ol><li>Targeted extensions for pre-arbitration players: Identifying core talents early and securing cost-controlled years with team options (e.g., José Ramírez’s first extension signed in 2017, four years before free agency)</li><li>Strategic trade timing: Moving players approaching expensive arbitration years for prospects who align with competitive windows</li><li>Value-focused free agent acquisitions: Selective market participation focused on specific team needs rather than headline acquisitions</li></ol><p>This financial strategy doesn’t exist in isolation but is integrated with Cleveland’s player evaluation and development processes. Their analytics and scouting departments collaborate to identify players whose market value might not reflect their projected contribution, enabling more efficient resource allocation.</p><h4>3. Development-Centered Acquisition Strategy</h4><p>Organizations with integrated approaches align their acquisition strategy with their player development capabilities. Rather than evaluating players solely on current performance, they assess potential fit with their development infrastructure and organizational philosophy.</p><p>The Los Angeles Dodgers have mastered this integration, acquiring players with specific developmental opportunities that align with their technical capabilities. Their acquisition strategy incorporates input from:</p><ul><li><strong>Analytics</strong>: Identifying underlying performance indicators suggesting untapped potential</li><li><strong>Scouting</strong>: Assessing mechanical or approach adjustments that could unlock performance gains</li><li><strong>Player Development</strong>: Evaluating fit with existing coaching methodologies and technologies</li><li><strong>Financial Management</strong>: Calculating potential surplus value if development succeeds</li></ul><h4><strong>Case Study: The Dodgers’ Acquisition of Max Muncy</strong></h4><p>After being released by Oakland in 2017, Max Muncy signed a minor league contract with the Dodgers. At the time, Muncy had a career .195 batting average in limited MLB action, but the Dodgers’ integrated evaluation identified specific developmental opportunities:</p><ul><li>Identification: Above-average plate discipline (12.3% BB% in Triple-A) and exit velocity metrics despite poor results</li><li>Notes: Mechanical inefficiencies that could be addressed and fixed</li><li>Player development plan: Specific swing adjustments that aligned with the organization’s technical capabilities</li></ul><p>After signing Muncy for the MLB minimum salary, the Dodgers implemented tailored development plans that transformed him into an All-Star caliber player who produced 23.7 WAR from 2018–2024. This represents around $185 million in value, demonstrating the competitive advantage of development-centered acquisition.</p><h3>Implementation Frameworks for Front Office Integration</h3><h4><strong>1. Decision-Making Structures</strong></h4><p>Successful organizations have established formal structures for cross-departmental collaboration in roster decisions. These structures typically include:</p><ul><li>Integrated evaluation meetings: Regular sessions where analytics, scouting, and player development members discuss player evaluations</li><li>Decision models: Frameworks that weight different evaluation components based on context (e.g., acquisition type, current vs future needs)</li><li>Collaborative projections: Ways to combine quantitative data and scouting observations into single player projections</li></ul><p>The Houston Astros pioneered many of these approaches during their rebuild and championship years. Their “Ground Control” database, while controversial due to the unauthorized access scandal, represented one of the first comprehensive attempts to integrate scouting reports, analytical models, and financial projections into a unified information system accessible across departments.</p><h4>2. Unified Information Systems</h4><p>Organizations with mature integration have developed technological systems that facilitate information sharing across departments. These platforms typically include:</p><ul><li>Centralized databases: Systems that organize and link information from various places</li><li>Customized interfaces: Ways for each department to see shared data in formats that make sense to them</li><li>Collaborative annotation features: Features that let staff from different departments add notes and explain what the information means</li></ul><p>According to Baseball America’s technology survey, 27 of 30 MLB organizations now utilize some form of integrated information system, though the sophistication and utilization rates vary significantly.</p><h4>3. Cross-Training and Shared Vocabulary</h4><p>Truly integrated organizations have developed training programs and shared vocabulary that enable staff from different backgrounds to communicate effectively. These initiatives include:</p><ul><li>Analytics training for scouts: Programs teaching traditional scouts to interpret advanced metrics</li><li>Scouting exposure for analysts: Field experience for data specialists to understand contextual factors in player evaluation</li><li>Financial literacy across departments: Education on how roster decisions impact financial flexibility</li></ul><h4>Case Study: The Dodgers’ Integrated Approach to the 2020–2024 Rosters</h4><p>The Los Angeles Dodgers’ roster construction from 2020–2024 exemplifies the competitive advantage of integration. Their 2020 and 2024 World Series championship teams and consistent division championships featured rosters built through diverse acquisition methods, each reflecting cross-departmental collaboration:</p><h4><strong>Draft and Development</strong>:</h4><ul><li>Will Smith (1st round, 2016): Identified through integrated amateur scouting and analytics, developed into an elite catcher worth 18.5 WAR from 2019–2024</li><li>Walker Buehler (1st round, 2015): Drafted following Tommy John surgery, with medical, scouting, and analytics departments collaborating on risk assessment</li></ul><h4><strong>Strategic Free Agent Investments</strong>:</h4><ul><li>Mookie Betts (before 2020 season): acquired via trade, then extended for 12-year, $365 million</li><li>Freddie Freeman (before 2022 season): 6-year, $162 million</li><li>Shohei Ohtani (before 2024 season): 10-year, $700 million with deferred payments to be able to allocate financial resources elsewhere</li><li>Teoscar Hernandez (before 2024 season): 1 year, $23.5 million</li></ul><h4><strong>Value-Focused Acquisitions</strong>:</h4><ul><li>Tyler Anderson: Signed for $8 million in 2022 after identification of development opportunities, produced 4.3 WAR worth approximately $34 million in market value</li><li>Evan Phillips: Claimed off waivers in 2021, transformed into elite reliever through targeted development informed by both analytics and pitching coaches</li><li>Tommy Edman: traded to Dodgers at 2024 trade deadline, valued for his versatility and won the 2024 NLCS MVP</li></ul><h4><strong>Financial Flexibility Preservation</strong>:</h4><ul><li>Maintained ability to acquire midseason reinforcements through strategic contract structuring</li><li>Created payroll space by balancing high-AAV, shorter-term contracts with pre-arbitration talent</li></ul><p>The Dodgers’ success stems not just from financial resources (Opening Day payrolls of $227 million in 2023 and $250 million in 2024) but from superior integration of perspectives in roster construction. Their 111-win 2022 season featured contributions from players acquired through every available channel, each reflecting their integrated evaluation and decision-making process.</p><h3>Measuring the Impact of Integration</h3><p>Quantifying the impact of front office integration presents methodological challenges, but several indicators suggest significant competitive advantage:</p><ol><li><strong>Acquisition Efficiency</strong>: Organizations with strong integration demonstrate superior return on investment in player acquisition. According to Fangraphs’ value calculations, the Rays, Guardians, and Dodgers have consistently produced more WAR per dollar spent than organizations with less integrated approaches.</li><li><strong>Development Effectiveness</strong>: Integrated organizations show higher rates of player development success. The Dodgers converted prospects into productive MLB players at a 37% higher rate than league average from 2018–2023, according to Baseball America’s prospect success metrics.</li><li><strong>Transaction Success Rate</strong>: Organizations with advanced integration show higher success rates in trades and free agent signings. The Rays’ transactions from 2018–2023 produced positive value (measured by surplus WAR) in 72% of cases, compared to the league average of 48%.</li><li><strong>Competitive Sustainability</strong>: Perhaps most importantly, organizations with integrated approaches demonstrate sustained competitive success despite challenges like payroll constraints and free agent departures.</li></ol><h3>Toward a Framework for Modern Roster Construction</h3><p>This research demonstrates that organizations achieving sustained success have developed frameworks for integrating analytics, scouting, and financial strategy in roster construction. These integrated approaches share common characteristics:</p><ol><li>Systematic processes for incorporating multiple perspectives in player evaluation and acquisition</li><li>Technological infrastructure that facilitates information sharing across departments</li><li>Organizational culture that values diverse skill sets</li><li>Development-centered mindset that aligns acquisition with what the organization excels at</li><li>Strategic financial planning that balances short-term competitiveness with long-term sustainability</li></ol><p>For baseball operations departments seeking to enhance their approach to roster construction, this research suggests investing in:</p><ul><li>Formal structures for cross-departmental collaboration</li><li>Unified information systems that connect different data sources</li><li>Cross-training programs that build shared understanding</li><li>Decision frameworks that systematically integrate different ideas</li></ul><p>As the competitive landscape continues to evolve, organizations that most effectively align analytics, scouting, and financial strategy will maintain competitive advantage in roster construction. The most successful front offices will excel at creating cohesiveness throughout all departments.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7640b3a11e3f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Four to Three: The Effects of Changing the Walk Rule in MLB]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@djpoteet/from-four-to-three-the-effect-of-changing-the-walk-rule-in-mlb-42cdef7be932?source=rss-b941f2987afb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/42cdef7be932</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[DJ Poteet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Mar 2025 20:29:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-12T03:56:29.442Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The recent wave of pitcher injuries in Major League Baseball, highlighted by the UCL injury of Yankees ace Gerrit Cole, has reignited concerns over pitcher workloads and arm health. Teams are increasingly investing in high-priced pitchers who, due to Tommy John surgery and other injuries, end up missing significant portions of their contracts. This raises the question: could altering the fundamental structure of the game help alleviate this issue? One radical yet intriguing proposal is reducing the number of balls required for a walk from four to three. Although arm injuries are a popular topic in the baseball community, the three-ball walk rule change is not just due to the epidemic. There would possibly be many effects to a new rule change.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PtUCrJW_dO_HGrcSs5GIwA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image from MLB.com</figcaption></figure><p>Rule changes in baseball have historically been met with skepticism, particularly from “old school” fans and players who value tradition. However, recent modifications, such as the implementation of a pitch clock and switch to larger bases, have demonstrated that change can enhance the game. Initially, many opposed the pitch clock, arguing that it would disrupt the rhythm of play and alter the game’s natural flow. Yet, data from the 2023 season showed that the average game time decreased by nearly 30 minutes, significantly improving the pace of play. Similarly, the increase in base size led to a notable rise in stolen base attempts and success rates, adding an extra layer of offensive excitement. These changes, once criticized, have now become accepted as positive evolutions of the sport by many.</p><p>Given this precedent, a potential shift from four balls to three for a walk should not be dismissed outright. Instead, it should be analyzed in terms of its potential to improve pitcher health, game strategy, and overall fan experience.</p><h3>The Potential Benefits of a Three-Ball Walk</h3><h4>Encouraging Pitchers to Prioritize Command</h4><p>A shift to a three-ball walk would force pitchers to focus on early-count control, as falling behind 2–0 would put them in immediate risk of issuing a free pass. This could lead to pitchers refining their command and reducing the frequency of max-effort, high-velocity pitches that contribute to arm stress and injuries. The modern emphasis on velocity has led to a rise in injuries, and changing the walk rule could incentivize a different approach.</p><h4>Decreasing Pitch Counts and Workload</h4><p>One of the primary causes of arm injuries is the cumulative stress of high pitch counts. By increasing the likelihood of shorter plate appearances, a three-ball walk rule could reduce the overall number of pitches thrown per game. This could, in turn, decrease the strain on pitchers’ arms and prolong careers, ultimately benefiting both players and teams. However, it is important to note that despite pitchers throwing fewer pitches per start than ever before, elbow injuries are occurring at an alarmingly high rate. This suggests that the issue may not solely be pitch count-related but rather tied to the intensity and frequency of max-effort pitches. A rule change encouraging early-count efficiency could help combat this trend.</p><h4>Speeding Up the Game</h4><p>MLB has already implemented rule changes aimed at improving the pace of play, including a pitch clock and restrictions on defensive shifts. A three-ball walk would likely lead to quicker at-bats and shorter games. This could enhance the fan experience, particularly for younger audiences who favor a faster-paced product.</p><h4>Economic Implications for Teams and Players</h4><p>From a financial standpoint, if a rule change led to fewer arm injuries, teams could avoid paying large salaries to players who are sidelined for a year or more. The market for pitchers could also shift which could place increased value on those with elite command rather than just pure velocity. Meanwhile, hitters who exhibit strong plate discipline would likely see a rise in their market value. Additionally, the increased offensive output could lead to higher ticket sales and television ratings, benefiting teams and the league overall. On the other hand, pitchers who rely on high-velocity strikeout approaches might see their market value decline which could shift contract structures in unforeseen ways. Pitching staffs could face an identity crisis due to starters and relievers throwing harder than ever before.</p><h3>The Potential Downsides of a Three-Ball Walk</h3><h4>Disrupting the Balance Between Pitchers and Hitters</h4><p>A three-ball walk would drastically shift the advantage toward hitters. Walk rates would likely increase causing higher on-base percentages and possibly diminishing some of the strategic aspects of pitching. This could result in higher-scoring games which could fundamentally alter the way baseball is played. Due to more runs possibly being scored because of the rule change, the length of the game could end up being around the same as before, diminishing the notion of a possible faster pace of play.</p><h4>Incentivizing More Aggressive Pitching Strategies</h4><p>While some pitchers might respond by improving their command, others could become more aggressive, throwing more strikes early in the count to avoid walks. This could lead to an increase in contact, hard-hit balls and home runs, changing the nature of the game and potentially making it even more reliant on power hitting. However, this could also push pitchers to go deeper into games as they would no longer have to rely on strikeouts and could instead pitch to contact more often like previous times. In an era where starting pitchers are averaging fewer innings than ever, this shift could renew the role of the starter and lessen the demand for excessive bullpen usage, indirectly reducing stress on relievers as well.</p><h4>Impact on the Fan Experience</h4><p>While shorter games could be a plus, a three-ball walk could lead to more frequent pitching changes as managers adjust to the new dynamic. More walks could also slow down the flow of the game, making it less engaging for fans who enjoy the battle between pitcher and hitter. However, if starters were encouraged to go deeper into games, it could bring back the appeal of complete games and dominant pitching performances, an aspect of the game that has been declining in recent years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xC9oUaLOwBO63Hcz" /><figcaption>Image from <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jakobnoahrosen?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Jakob Rosen</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Changing the walk rule from four balls to three is a radical idea that could have significant implications for pitcher health, game strategy, and baseball economics. While it could help reduce injuries by encouraging better command and lowering pitch counts, it might also shift the balance of power too heavily toward hitters and alter the strategic fabric of the game.</p><p>After testing the three-ball walk rule, it could very possibly be determined that it has little to no effect on pitcher injuries. Ultimately, MLB would need extensive data and experimentation before considering such a drastic change. Given the ongoing injury crisis among pitchers and the evolving nature of the sport, ideas like this deserve to be explored as baseball searches for ways to adapt and improve for future generations.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=42cdef7be932" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Clarke Schmidt Needs a Splitter]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@djpoteet/clarke-schmidt-needs-a-splitter-57fb94d56306?source=rss-b941f2987afb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/57fb94d56306</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pitching]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[new-york-yankees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[DJ Poteet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Feb 2025 18:43:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-12T21:06:08.367Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mPV5uRG54idjkZn6BE20LA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo from pinstripealley.com</figcaption></figure><p>Adding a splitter to Clarke Schmidt’s pitching arsenal could significantly improve his effectiveness, particularly against left-handed hitters. According to Baseball Savant, Schmidt’s arsenal in 2024 included a sinker, cutter, sweeper, and curveball. His sinker got hit the hardest with an average exit velocity of 94.3 mph. His performance against left-handed batters has fared worse than against right-handed batters. Left-handers have posted a .283 /.365/.457 line against him over his career, compared to .225/.286 /.361 by right-handed hitters.</p><p>A splitter, known for its late downward movement, can be particularly effective in neutralizing left-handed hitters by inducing ground balls and swings and misses. For instance, Kevin Gausman’s splitter has been a game-changer in his career. In the past two seasons, Gausman’s splitter produced a .185 Batting Average Against, a .239 wOBA, and a 38.4% Whiff Rate.</p><p>Analytics show that supination-biased pitchers should take up the splitter. Spin efficiency is directly related to pronation or supination bias. Schmidt’s spin efficiency on the four-seamer hovered in the high-60s in 2021 and 2022, which could be the reason why he no longer throws that pitch.</p><p>Incorporating a splitter could provide Schmidt with a pitch that maintains a similar arm speed and release point but dropping sharply as it approaches the plate. This addition could lead to a decrease in hard contact, particularly from left-handed hitters. Given the success of pitchers like Gausman with the splitter, it’s reasonable to anticipate that Schmidt could experience similar improvements in his performance metrics by adding this pitch.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=57fb94d56306" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Prospect Report — Quinn Mathews]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@djpoteet/prospect-report-quinn-mathews-26f69eb24b2e?source=rss-b941f2987afb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/26f69eb24b2e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[minor-league-baseball]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[DJ Poteet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Feb 2025 18:35:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-12T21:11:14.702Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Prospect Report — Quinn Mathews</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kYBdkCCY4VyNbVADU3cZWw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image from vivaelbirdos.com</figcaption></figure><p>Quinn Mathews, a left-handed pitcher in the St. Louis Cardinals’ organization, is underrated in FanGraphs’ prospect rankings. Mathews’ overall ranking is 59th according to FanGraphs. In 2024, Matthews was a workhorse starting 26 games and logging 143.1 innings pitched across four levels. After dominating the Florida State League in Low-A, he quickly got promoted to High A where he posted a 2.68 ERA and .756 WHIP. After 7 starts in in High A, he was promoted to AA where he continued to dominate before ending an end of the season promotion to AAA where he would start four games. Across the four levels, Mathews had a 2.76 ERA and striking out 202 batters.</p><p>Mathews’ four-pitch mix, featuring a low-to-mid 90s fastball, curveball, slider, and changeup is that of a Major League prospect. The fastball’s velocity is not elite by today’s standards, but it plays up because of good extension and late life. His changeup is already considered an above average pitch. The development of the slider and curveball will add to his deception and ability to sequence, making him more than just a fastball dominant arm.</p><p>Because he was drafted as a senior, his stock may have lowered in some rankings. Senior draft picks are often undervalued because of their age. Mathews possesses polish and maturity that younger prospects might not yet possess which is often overlooked in rankings. His quick rise through the minors thanks to his advanced pitch ability should be weighed more by FanGraphs.</p><p>Thanks to his deceptive fastball and plus changeup, Mathews could very well make his way to the big-league team in St. Louis sometime in 2025. Due to his draft position and age, a prospect like Mathews is undervalued. Although he is slightly older and did not sign for as much as most of the other prospects ranked above him, Mathews is undervalued and I believe he will prove why in 2025.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=26f69eb24b2e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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