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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Danny Leese on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Danny Leese on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Art of the Grab-And-Go Bucket]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/the-art-of-the-grab-and-go-bucket-114e2a515765?source=rss-84181903a831------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/114e2a515765</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[efficiency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebron-james]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Leese]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Aug 2020 18:40:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-04T20:22:14.496Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A grab-and-go bucket refers to when a player grabs a defensive rebound and proceeds to assist a teammate or score an unassisted bucket in transition. Derrick Rose and Russell Westbrook were known as the best grab-and-go Bucket Getters for years in the NBA due to their sheer speed and athleticism, but Giannis Antetokounmpo has surpassed them as the premier grab-and-go player.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FEbQp1ychWUQ%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DEbQp1ychWUQ&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FEbQp1ychWUQ%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d12f7164e6c34b786d6fc85680f08b22/href">https://medium.com/media/d12f7164e6c34b786d6fc85680f08b22/href</a></iframe><p>The general idea of a grab-and go-bucket is that if a teams’ point guard can get a defensive rebound instead of the center, then the team can get into their offensive action quicker, or in the best-case scenario look to score in transition. Generally, teams score better in transition rather than in a half-court setting. The theory sounds quite intuitive, but it made a lot more sense to me once I looked through the numbers.</p><h4>What is the average possession length based on which position retrieved the defensive rebound?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*o0pbFq6anMxJKTJ9D4e8FA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The smaller the position that received the rebound (point guard = smallest, center = largest), the faster a shot is taken.</p><p>I found the same results when I filtered for only possessions when the team took their shot in transition (grab-and-go scenario).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WbC0x9hpXKaKaqbkzO-SCw.jpeg" /></figure><p>These findings made a lot of sense considering the smaller positions are generally the best ball handlers and passers, which allows them to move the ball up the floor quickly in transition. On the other hand, big men have an instinct to find the nearest guard to pass to once they retrieve a defensive rebound, stalling the offense.</p><h4>Which positional rebound led to the best offense?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RDAPw7tZQNaKvE_qxK-b-g.jpeg" /></figure><p>The TS% (True Shooting Percentage) of the PG, SG, SF, and PF in grab-and-go scenarios were all similar and about 1% better than the C’s. So from an efficiency standpoint, there is a clear benefit of any position other than the center grabbing the defensive rebound.</p><p>I expected the PG’s efficiency to be best, but in today’s game, we see elite play-making and athleticism coming from all wing positions.</p><p>It turns out that the best grab-and-go player for each team was usually the team’s best player. The faster and more often a team could get the ball to their best player, the better offense they would have.</p><h4>Which position performed a grab-and-go most frequently?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q-QZ5uXKpO1A36fjKMZkiQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Point guards executed the grab-and-go most frequently, and as the position size increased, the grab-and-go frequency decreased.</p><p>Point guards created shots in transition 61% of the time after they grabbed a defensive rebound compared to centers who only created shots in transition 46% of the time after they grabbed a defensive rebound. Such a meaningful difference gives considerable incentive for teams to try to have their guards defensive rebound.</p><p>The basketball analytics community, including myself, would trash Westbrook for going out of his way to steal rebounds from his teammates… who cares! This was actually extremely beneficial for OKC because their best player would have the ball in his hands earlier, and more often on each possession. Why waste time having the center rebound then pass to the guard, by that time the opposing team could have already set up their defense.</p><h4>How have the NBA’s top players fared at grab-and-go plays?</h4><p>Here is a list of <strong>notable </strong>grab and go Bucket Getters that I will focus my analysis on, and their estimated team TS%.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/348/1*YA6mvSuwoj6ZRNihpnlmXQ.png" /></figure><p>De’Aaron Fox sits atop an impressive list creating efficient offense for his team. Fox has an incredible ability to push the pace, collapse the defense and then find his teammates for open looks in transition.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F444012076%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F444012076&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F933920325_640.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8efa98c50bb89c920b32bd6cc82a2cf1/href">https://medium.com/media/8efa98c50bb89c920b32bd6cc82a2cf1/href</a></iframe><p>He also has excelled scoring in transition ranking in the 69th percentile per NBA.com.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F444015166%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F444015166&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F933925572_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1280" height="720" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0c60a06bbdd33dd04098fb892941e2f2/href">https://medium.com/media/0c60a06bbdd33dd04098fb892941e2f2/href</a></iframe><p>Additionally, at the top of the list are James Harden and Lebron James whose grab-and-go TS was about 10% better than their positional average. Not surprising to see them ranked highly considering they are two of the best offensive players in the NBA with unbelievable passing skills.</p><p>Looking at the Transition Rate of the same group of players (percentage of defensive rebounds turned in grab-and-go’s), D’Aaron Fox leads leads the group.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/583/1*BrqleurwFtTYaRKFNW0ZEQ.png" /></figure><p>Fox rebounded far less than the rest of the players on this list, but he was looking to push when he did rebound.</p><p>Antetokounmpo’s Transition Rate was 68%, which ranked second on this list, and his grab-and-go efficiency was about league average (previous chart). These numbers were similar to the Milwaukee Bucks overall, who ranked second in transition frequency but near the bottom in transition efficiency. This doesn’t mean that Antetokounmpo should put on the breaks when he gets a defensive rebound. The Bucks 58% TS overall was third in the NBA, so Antetokounmpo generating a 59.2% TS on grab-and-go’s is still great offense for the Bucks.</p><p>Jokic, Gobert, and Adebayo created the least transition possession after a defensive rebound, aligning with the grab-and-go findings that centers push after a defensive rebound far less than other positions.</p><h4>Who scores the fastest out of the notable group on grab-and-go buckets?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/458/1*R3HAgyGlVxrTuoDkS5RJPg.png" /></figure><p>At 35 years old, James’ passing vision and speed was still among the best in the league. He also topped the list of fastest grab-and-go players for all NBA players with over 100 grab-and-go possession as seen below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/484/1*nrKbxgrjkLMoZY2-AP4lUA.png" /></figure><p>Think about how fast that is, when James grabbed a defensive rebound and looked to push, he and his team scored on average in 4.5 seconds.</p><p>Two other players that stood out throughout the analysis were Westbrook and Simmons. Both players were able to execute their grab-and-go possessions quickly, and both pushed in transition after defensive rebounds above league average. However, both players were at the bottom of the list in terms of TS%. And unlike Antetokounmpo, their TS%’s were well below their team’s average, so it doesn’t appear to be a smart shot for their team.</p><p>Harden ranked number one in the NBA in grab-and-go TS% for players with over 100 grab-and-go possessions, so Westbrook’s poor performance can’t be blamed on his teammates.</p><p>Simmons has been poor finishing his own grab-and-go’s shooting 49.5% TS, and overall his grab-and-go efficiency of 51% TS, is still well below the league average and the 76ers team average. Even when looking at transition points per possession per NBA.com, Simmons ranked in the 21st percentile.</p><p>These metrics should be concerning for Russell Westbrook and Ben Simmons. I hate to say it, but they’re probably both overrated in transition/grab-and-go.</p><h4>So who is the best grab-and-go Bucket Getter?</h4><p>I will give De’Aaron Fox an honourable mention, but he just hasn’t had enough grab-and-go possession to win the highly coveted award.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XamrWZfYBy2yxk0HWanBlA.jpeg" /></figure><p>In my eyes, Lebron James and Giannis Antetokounmpo take the cake for the best grab-and-go players in the league. James is absurdly efficient on grab-and-go plays, and to be so effective at 35 years young is incredible.</p><p>Although not as efficient, Antetokounmpo sheer grab-and-go volume is incredible. Most grab-and-go plays come from centers just because centers dominate defensive rebounds. Still, Antetokounmpo ranks first with 301 grab-and-go possessions, nearly 100 more than second-place Hassan Whiteside who has 209 grab-and-go possessions.</p><p>I’ll end with one more grab-and-go dunk from the GOAT himself, King James throwing down a monster one-handed dunk in game four of the 2014 Eastern Conference Finals.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FSLo7e5FzLAY%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DSLo7e5FzLAY&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FSLo7e5FzLAY%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/767bd9deb674b5f6fa51fd0e125d99d3/href">https://medium.com/media/767bd9deb674b5f6fa51fd0e125d99d3/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=114e2a515765" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/the-art-of-the-grab-and-go-bucket-114e2a515765">The Art of the Grab-And-Go Bucket</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist">The Sports Scientist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[NBA Breakout Seasons By The Numbers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/nba-breakout-seasons-by-the-numbers-2b7e46ca7e37?source=rss-84181903a831------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b7e46ca7e37</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[all-star]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[giannis-antetokounmpo]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Leese]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2020 13:18:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-09T13:14:56.274Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There have been some wildly surprising breakout NBA seasons over the past 20 years. Players like Giannis Antetokounmpo and Victor Oladipo exploded onto the scene mid-way through their NBA careers and unexpectedly emerged as NBA All-Stars. There are so many questions related to NBA players having a breakout season: What even is a breakout season? Who had the best breakout season? What causes a player to have a breakout season? Can you predict who is going to have a breakout season? Well, if you are wondering the answer to some of these questions… keep reading.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1005/1*B0aKeQ4Vpfe_iDWzeTLLhg.jpeg" /></figure><h4>How to Measure a Breakout Season?</h4><p>A breakout season is when a player unexpectedly raises their game to a new level. The measurement I used to determine a players’ on court improvement is their increased <a href="https://www.basketball-reference.com/about/per.html">Player Efficiency Rating (PER)</a> year over year. This is a standard all-encompassing statistic created by John Hollinger.</p><p>There are several control parameters necessary to accurately assess a breakout season. To control for an NBA player’s obvious natural progression, the player had to be over 21 years old and be in the third year of his career or later. This accounted for players like Trae Young and Luka Doncic who improved their PER by 7 and 8 in their second season. Although they dramatically improved their game, their improvement was much less interesting than players like Bam Adebayo and Brandon Ingram’s breakout season. Ingram increased his PER by a lesser amount, but his growth was far more surprising, and is the type of player I am going to be investigating.</p><p>To control for fringe NBA players whose statistics are based on a small sample, the breakout season and the season prior had to have at least 1000 minutes. And the last important control I used was measuring the player’s PER change from their previous PER career high. This accounted for weird circumstances such as when Dwayne Wade improved his PER by nine from 2008 to 2009. Before 2008, Wade’s PER reached 28.9, so when his PER reached 30.4 in 2009, it shouldn’t be considered a breakout season. His improvement should be attributed to his injury-ridden down year in 2008.</p><h4>Who are the NBA’s Best Breakout Players Over the Past 20 Years?</h4><p>Here are the top 30 best breakout NBA seasons.</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/74fb2287c9ed0daafd16551cb0df12f5/href">https://medium.com/media/74fb2287c9ed0daafd16551cb0df12f5/href</a></iframe><p>Each players breakout season is worth its own story, but I am going to just touch on a few that are not as well known as the prominent examples.</p><p>According to my measurement, Boris Diaw had the greatest breakout season. This was especially surprising because I had never heard him mentioned when talking about breakout seasons. That may be because I was under 10 years old during the 2005–06 NBA season, but more likely because his breakout season is incredibly underrated. It happened in Diaw’s third NBA season when he was 23 years old, and he increased his PER from 10 to 17.3. Here is his box score per game statistics from his breakout season and the year prior.</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a80d1118dc300b7db4765ed86b329332/href">https://medium.com/media/a80d1118dc300b7db4765ed86b329332/href</a></iframe><p>Absolutely outstanding improvements by all accounts which earned Diaw the Most Improved Player Award in 2006.</p><p>Another intriguing breakout season was Tracy McGrady’s 2002–03 NBA season, where he improved his PER from 25.1 to 30.3. McGrady was in his sixth NBA season and 23 years old. The reason the breakout season was so incredible was that McGrady already became a superstar two years prior when he was traded to the Orlando Magic, experienced a 4.9 increase in PER, and won the Most Improved Player Award. McGrady went from All-Star to Supernova during his 2003 breakout season. He placed fourth in the MVP race, made the All-NBA First Team, and according to my projections in a previous <a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/best-nba-seasons-ever-4d2a32ca3d27">article</a>, it was the 17th best NBA season ever.</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a0c0a0c2fe1bcdd4b9744162ce34cb5e/href">https://medium.com/media/a0c0a0c2fe1bcdd4b9744162ce34cb5e/href</a></iframe><h4>What Causes a Player to Have a Breakout Season?</h4><p>An old saying in sports is, “He needs a change of scenery.” After doing some research, this saying has a considerable amount of merit when it comes to breakout seasons. For players whose PER increased by four or higher, 44% were on a new team the season of, or the season before their breakout season. For players who saw a PER increase of five or higher, 52% were on a new team the season of, or the season before their breakout season. Boris Diaw, Montrezl Harrell, Victor Oladipo, Trey Lyles and Brandon Ingram are some examples of players traded the off-season before their breakout. Even Chris Paul’s breakout season happened after the New Orleans Hornets returned home following their two seasons in Oklahoma City due to Hurricane Katrina. There appears to be a significant correlation between changing teams and having a breakout season. I don’t think that switching teams causes a breakout season, but it can very possibly help trigger one.</p><p>A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the new team is a “good team,” and winning can really help fix any problem. Players who increased their PER by four or higher in their breakout season had an average team win percentage of 54%. For players who raised their PER by five or greater had an average team win percentage of 58%. For the same groups of players, their average increase in team win percentage from the year prior to their breakout season was 5% and 10%, respectively. The obvious flaw with this argument is that if a team had a player who experienced a massive increase in performance unexpectedly, of course the team experienced an improved win percentage. However, playing on a winning team can be another contributing factor to a breakout season.</p><h4>Can You Predict who is Going to be a Breakout Player?</h4><p>Although extremely hard to predict, breakout seasons are not entirely random. For players who experienced a PER increase of 4 or higher, their average age was 24, 52% were drafted as lottery picks, and 25% of them were centers which was the most out of any position. There is an element of the player being highly touted and developing later than expected when it comes to breakout seasons.</p><p>The teams that experienced the most breakout players over the past 20 years were the Toronto Raptors and Indiana Pacers. Indiana seemed slightly surprising, but when I looked into it, they experienced breakout years from notable players including, Victor Oladipo, Danny Granger, Domantas and Paul George. The teams tied for the second most breakout players were Milwaukee, Golden State, Boston, and Phoenix. All of these teams are well run organizations (except for Phoenix), so on top of changing teams, likely the organization plays a part in having a breakout season.</p><p>Another hypothesis I had was that during the season before a player’s breakout, the player could be trending upwards in the later months. It turns out this is likely not the case; for the most part, breakout seasons are unexpected. For all players who experienced a PER increase of five or higher, on average, experienced virtually no change in performance from before the All-Star break vs. after, in the season before their breakout. I then looked at players who experienced a PER increase of five or greater who did NOT switch teams before their breakout season. Theoretically, if the player’s situation stayed the same, they should have shown some signs of improvement in the prior season. For example, Antetokounmpo saw significant improvement before vs. after the All-Star break the season before his breakout.</p><p>(Per 36 minute statistics)</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/14a117037e908cf661976588fcc836d7/href">https://medium.com/media/14a117037e908cf661976588fcc836d7/href</a></iframe><p>However, again on the whole, the player’s statistics increased a trivial amount. The only non-trivial statistical increase was their usage percentage, which increased by an average of 1.1% before vs after the All-Star break.</p><h4>So Which NBA Player is Going to Have the Next Breakout Season?</h4><p>Robert Williams of the Boston Celtics deserves an honourable mention. He is entering his third year at age 23, and the Celtics are thin at the center position which could give Williams an opportunity to shine in his third season.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b9_TUU2kIzbsmE64UxBizQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>If I had to pick only one player to have a breakout season next year, I like Harry Giles chances. Giles will be entering his third season next year at 23 years old. He was drafted 20th overall by the Sacramento Kings in the 2017 NBA draft, and the Kings declined his 2020–21 season option, so he will likely be joining a new team next season. Giles played most of his minutes at center, and the Kings have been a sub .500 team over his two seasons. If all the stars align for Giles, he could be in store for a significant improvement next season.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b7e46ca7e37" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/nba-breakout-seasons-by-the-numbers-2b7e46ca7e37">NBA Breakout Seasons By The Numbers</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist">The Sports Scientist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Andre Drummond is a Below Average Starting Center in the NBA]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/andre-drummond-is-a-below-average-starting-center-in-the-nba-694be66eca6c?source=rss-84181903a831------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/694be66eca6c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[detroit-pistons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Leese]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2020 12:55:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-19T13:57:17.759Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At the NBA trade deadline, several NBA fans wondered why not one championship contender would take a chance on Andre Drummond averaging 17.8 points, 15.8 rebounds, 1.9 steals, and 1.6 blocks per game while shooting 53% FG this season. He ended up being dealt on February 6th, to the last place Cleveland Cavaliers for the least favourable of Cleveland and Golden State’s 2023 second-round draft pick. No playoff team was willing to part with a late second-round pick for the 26 year old two-time all-star, confirming Drummond’s thin market.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZU-VqyaQF34WdR0ptoU8uw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In Drummond’s current form, he is a detriment to his organization. Although that seems hard to believe, I am going to try to convince you of that in this article.</p><p>Just to be fair, here is a career highlight reel of Drummond before I completely skew your view of a $100 million man (feel free not to watch this video).</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FUwc4nB6hxkk%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DUwc4nB6hxkk&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FUwc4nB6hxkk%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/6223277c056a1e0c4134e03e10f45aaf/href">https://medium.com/media/6223277c056a1e0c4134e03e10f45aaf/href</a></iframe><p>The number one statistic the stood out to me was Drummond’s 18.2 Turnover Percentage (TOV%). TOV% is the estimated number of turnovers committed per 100 plays. This was the 7th highest TOV% in the entire NBA. You would expect a high assist rate for a player turning over the ball at such an extreme rate, but not the case for Drummond, who had a 13.6 Assist Percentage (AST%). The six players who had a higher TOV% than Drummond had an average AST% of 30.9.</p><p>There were three notable centers that had a comparable TOV% and AST% to Drummond, with one significant difference. Dwight Howard, DeAndre Jordan, and Rudy Gobert’s True Shooting Percentage was an average of 69%… Drummond’s was 55%. This made Drummond wildly less efficient than these players, and I’d argue that for Drummond to be a successful player on a playoff team, he would have an offensive role similar to these three big men.</p><p>Now let’s get into some of the specifics about Drummonds game.</p><h4><em>Isolation</em></h4><p>6.3% of Drummond’s possessions came in isolation, which was likely about 6.3% too many. He scored 0.79 Points Per Possession (PPP) ranking in the 36th percentile. Just for reference, the Detroit Pistons score 1.06 PPP on average. Here Drummond slowly crossed over to his left before he forced a drive against Celtics guard Brad Wanamaker with 14 seconds left on the shot clock.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F428884969%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F428884969&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F908591764_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1280" height="720" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/db7c68b3ce5a38b0d030803b48f2901c/href">https://medium.com/media/db7c68b3ce5a38b0d030803b48f2901c/href</a></iframe><p>He also tended to over dribble. For players over 6’10, the only players with a higher average “dribbles per touch” were Ben Simmons and Giannis Antetokounmpo. That means Nikola Jokic, Anthony Davis, Joel Embiid, and Karl-Anthony Tows all dribbled less than Drummond. Considering these players are some of the most skilled centers ever, in all likelihood, it was a bad idea for Drummond to be dribbling that much.</p><p>Here are four clips of Drummond over dribbling in ridiculous fashion.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F429125227%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F429125227&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F909005537_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1280" height="720" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1b6c684e0d86696cf577c87438ad3cf9/href">https://medium.com/media/1b6c684e0d86696cf577c87438ad3cf9/href</a></iframe><h4>Transition</h4><p>Drummond ranked in the 28th percentile in transition and had a 23.5 TOV%. This was the sixth highest TOV% for all players with over one transition possession per game. The players ahead of Drummond were pass-first players, including Draymond Green and Lonzo Ball, so there was no reason for Drummond to be coughing it up so much. Drummond tended to force long distance passes like this. And when I say force, they might actually be open, but he is just not a very strong passer.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F428885909%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F428885909&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F908593417_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1280" height="720" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f9964dc1158e0fba742ab0172528d1b9/href">https://medium.com/media/f9964dc1158e0fba742ab0172528d1b9/href</a></iframe><p>You would be shocked how many times this happened. He also tended to attempt to push end to end which looked like this on several occasions.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F428886018%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F428886018&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F908593573_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1280" height="720" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e01a0cd2e7445a1a561a158c2477bc86/href">https://medium.com/media/e01a0cd2e7445a1a561a158c2477bc86/href</a></iframe><h4>3-Point Shooting</h4><p>Drummond appeared to have developed a strange 3-pointer tic over the past two seasons. Drummond took 38 3-pointers last season and was on pace to shoot over 40 this season. He is a career 14.6% 3-point shooter and has shot below this mark the past two years. Call me crazy, but pulling over 40 3-pointers at 14% was absolute anarchy. That is less than six 3-pointers per 40 attempts.</p><h4>Post Up &amp; Screen and Roll</h4><p>Drummond took 3.1 post up possessions per game, which was about 16% of his possessions. He scored 0.91 PPP, which ranked in the 48th percentile and well below his team average of 1.06 PPP. For all players who had more post up possessions per game ranked on average in the 56th percentile.</p><p>Drummond also had a 17.1 TOV% compared to the same group of players who averaged a 14.3 TOV%. Although Drummond was not terrible on post ups, it was not a particularly good shot for the Pistons.</p><p>Drummond as the roll man was a similar story to him in the post. He ranked in the 30th percentile scoring 0.96 PPP, well below his team average.</p><p>Drummond’s touch around the basket seemed average at best. He shot 63% FG from shots in the restricted area, which ranked 55th out of 76 starting centers this season.</p><p>He also only dunked 13.6% of his shots. Far less than Howard, Jordan, and Gobert, who dunked around 45% of their shots. Even more versatile players like Dwight Powell, Bam Adebayo, and John Collins all had dunk percentages above 20%.</p><p>Here Drummond easily spun around Cody Zeller but attempted to lay it in instead of what appeared to be a clear dunk opportunity.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F429124062%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F429124062&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F909003376_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1280" height="720" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/66413c4166744f59196fd91182a4ad9b/href">https://medium.com/media/66413c4166744f59196fd91182a4ad9b/href</a></iframe><h4>Defensive Impact</h4><p>Looking at all-encompassing defensive metrics, Drummond appeared to be quite average. His Defensive Real Plus-Minus (DRPM) of -0.01 ranked 36th for centers this year. Last year he had a DRPM of 1.79 which ranked 26th for centers. He had a Defensive Raptor Rating of 1.8, which ranked 22nd among centers this season (last year unavailable). Drummond’s opponent FG% difference was +1.0 and ranked 30th for starting centers who played over 20 games. Last year it was -2.1, which ranked 21st for starting centers who played over 20 games. For the same group of players, Drummond’s Defensive Field Goal Percentage at the rim ranked 20th and 22nd over the past two seasons, respectively. All his defensive metrics over the past two years fall into the 20–30 range. Hard to argue that Drummond was an elite defender. The standard box score statistics like steals and blocks (where Drummond excels) fail to paint a complete picture of what is really happening.</p><h4>Rebounding</h4><p>Drummond’s best skill set is his rebounding ability. I won’t get into many advanced metrics, but whichever way you slice it, he can rebound. He has ranked in the top three of offensive and defensive rebound percentage for the past six years, and contains all the necessary attributes to beat anyone on the glass.</p><p>Here Drummond gained position over Marc Gasol and retrieved the offensive rebound.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F429133465%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F429133465&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F909020182_640.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/70597b4c3b30b362f76ca71bea94dea7/href">https://medium.com/media/70597b4c3b30b362f76ca71bea94dea7/href</a></iframe><p>Here he used his strength to out rebound three Chicago Bulls.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F428886714%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F428886714&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F908594845_1280.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1280" height="720" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/cc48ac61143f3700e188c7189dadc83b/href">https://medium.com/media/cc48ac61143f3700e188c7189dadc83b/href</a></iframe><p>Here he used active hands to out rebound four Minnesota Timberwolves.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F429133093%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F429133093&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F909019356_640.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f1df45aec7998456efd0bce38bf908be/href">https://medium.com/media/f1df45aec7998456efd0bce38bf908be/href</a></iframe><p>Drummond has proven to be a world class rebounder, but that is really all he has proven to be in the NBA. Besides his rebounding, he is likely a below average starting center on both ends of the floor. With his current salary at $27 million, he is grossly overpaid. To be a productive NBA player, I think his offensive role should be reduced entirely to offensive rebounding and setting screens. By being an excellent rebounder, solid defender and a low usage efficient offensive player, Drummond can transform into a contributing piece on a playoff team. Until then, his teams will continue to suffer.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=694be66eca6c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/andre-drummond-is-a-below-average-starting-center-in-the-nba-694be66eca6c">Andre Drummond is a Below Average Starting Center in the NBA</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist">The Sports Scientist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Quantifying NBA Player Chemistry]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/quantifying-nba-player-chemistry-d6c4fa8f016e?source=rss-84181903a831------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d6c4fa8f016e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[orlando-magic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[team-chemistry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[k-means]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Leese]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2020 20:04:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-09T17:48:00.359Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Championship level NBA teams have been built in a multitude of ways. There have been Big 3’s like the Miami Heat, “Small Ball” lineups like the Golden State Warriors, and well-rounded teams like the San Antonio Spurs. Do some players have better chemistry than others? Personally, I thought that chemistry was not as valuable as people said, and for the most part, the optimal strategy was trying to get the best overall players on your team. As per usual, I dove into the numbers to see what I could find.</p><p>My approach was to group all similar players in the NBA. For example, I would have a group of 3-point shooters, a group of defensive big men, and a group of pass-first guards, etc. I then looked at all 5-player lineup combinations over the past 20 years to see which groups made up each lineup. By determining the performance level of a 5-group combination in a lineup, I could quantify the chemistry of that group mixture. And finally, I fit today’s NBA rosters into the best lineup combinations to see if teams were playing the optimal player personnel.</p><p>To group players, I used a machine learning technique called K-Means Clustering. In simple terms, once I decided on the number of groups/clusters, the algorithm classified each player into a group based on similar statistics. I chose to classify NBA players from 2000 to 2020 into 20 groups. A player was classified into a group based on a single season. For example, Lebron James would have 17 data points; one for each season. Here are the statistics I chose to use in the analysis.</p><p>Per 100 Possession Box Score Statistics (100 possessions is about 48 minutes or a full game):</p><p>3PA, 3P%, 2PA, 2P%, FTA, FT%, PF</p><p>Advanced Statistics:</p><p>FTr, ORB%, DRB%, AST%, STL%, BLK%, TOV%</p><p>Once I completed this process, I created group descriptions and displayed the mean statistics for each player type, as seen below. Five of the groups were full of outliers, so we are left with 15 clusters. I only included the basic box score statistics per 100 possessions in this chart to get an easier understanding of the type of player within each group.</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/288a343cc066318122050ad056cd84af/href">https://medium.com/media/288a343cc066318122050ad056cd84af/href</a></iframe><p>I then collected all 5-player lineups since 2000 and each lineup per 100 possession statistics. There were about 50,000 lineups that played over 10 minutes since 2000 and the primary metric I used to judge the performance of a lineup was Net Rating. Net Rating is the estimated point difference per 100 possessions for a given lineup vs all opponents.</p><p>Now, this part may get confusing, but stay with me. Next, I corresponded each players’ group to the lineups they played on. So along with each lineup combination since 2000, there were also the corresponding five groups of players. For example, if a lineup were denoted by 20, 20, 15, 15, 15, it would mean this lineup had two Star Guards/Wings, and three Efficient Shooters.</p><p>I then used a weighted average to combine all lineup combinations that had the same five player types. An important consideration I made was how many total minutes were enough to accept the sample size of a lineup combination. Using trial and error and looking at the total minutes of NBA teams starting lineups, I removed all lineup combinations with under a total of 500 minutes played. I viewed any lineup with less than 500-minutes, as coaches acknowledging that the lineup was not an optimal grouping. Here are the resulting top 15 lineups.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/456/1*2UcZ4Bo1bcuPgPGJG8pKFw.png" /></figure><p>An initial finding of the analysis was that there were 112 different lineup combinations with a Net Rating higher than five. There is a considerable amount of possible player type combinations that can yield success in the NBA, meaning there are several ways to assemble a great roster. A Net Rating of five is also substantial, as this season only six teams had a Net Rating greater than five.</p><p>The lineup that displayed the best chemistry consisted of a Star Guard/Wing, a Well-Rounded Forward, a Defensive First Center, a Starting Caliber Point Guard, and an Efficient Shooter. The majority of this lineups’ minutes belong to the 2008–09 Cleveland Cavaliers including:</p><p>Lebron James | Zydrunas Ilgauskas | Ben Wallace | Mo Williams | Delonte West.</p><p>Despite there being a common NBA narrative that LeBron played with “bad” teammates in Cleveland, they did build a team of player types with tremendous synergy.</p><p>This logic may be reverse causation because the lineup might just have been successful because of Lebron James. But there are other examples of weak teams that found success with this lineup. The 2016–17 Knicks who finished 31–51 found a lot of success in the few minutes they played this lineup.</p><p>Derrick Rose | Kristaps Porzingis | Joakim Noah | Brandon Jennings | Justin Holliday</p><p>This lineup had a Net Rating of 47.7 in 26 minutes of action. Of course, this production is not sustainable, but it’s interesting to see the lineup be successful for a weak team.</p><p>Another measure to consider is which player type had the most lineup versatility. The graph below displays how many times a player appeared in one of the top 100 lineups.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/734/1*n5Lqf8eaSnoymdOfU1XiOw.jpeg" /></figure><p>A Group 15 player (Efficient Shooter) appeared 82 times among the top 100 lineups, which was significantly more than any other group. This made sense, considering it is generally easy to play with this type of player. Many of the players in this group, like Jae Crowder, Klay Thomson, and Kyle Korver, act as floor spacers and don’t demand the ball on offense. This makes them a natural fit in any offensive scheme or with any player grouping.</p><p>I then fitted each teams’ roster to the best possible lineup. Overall most teams’ starting lineup similarly matched their best chemistry lineup. For example, based on the Houston Rockets’ current roster, the best lineup they can field is two, Star Guards/Wings, and three Efficient Shooters (20, 20, 15, 15, 15). This lineup combination ranked 23rd in terms of overall Net Rating and played in 172 games for 792 minutes. Houston can play 35 lineups with this five-player grouping including their likely best lineup:</p><p>James Harden | Russell Westbrook | Robert Covington | PJ Tucker | Eric Gordon</p><p>One team that stood out was the Orlando Magic, whose projected lineups were noticeably different than their starting lineup. There were 545 lineups that Orlando could field with a positive net rating, but none of them included Nikola Vucevic, Jonathan Isaac, and Aaron Gordon. These three players were classified in group 19 as Well-Rounded Starting Forwards.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*s8sAOinPHOdeGvFbQxZa7Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here are all the lineup combinations Orlando can field along with an example five players. Highlighted are the lineups that had two of Vucevic, Isaac, and Gordon.</p><p>(Net Rating is cumulative for all lineups with that cluster grouping)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q2iPGzruYXO2gEgEOwWLaA.png" /></figure><p>As seen from the player examples and clusters, in the lineups with two of the three noted forwards, the other players are guards and wing shooters. Additionally, three of the highlighted lineups have a negative net rating. It likely isn’t optimal for Orlando to build their team around these three forwards whose player types haven’t had successful chemistry on the floor together in the past. Vucevic, Isaac, and Gordan are core pieces of the Orlando Magic and had a three-player Net Rating of -0.1 this season. Without elite guard play and three-point shooting, the Magic will continue to struggle with these three players in their lineup.</p><p>Do some players have better chemistry than others? I would argue, yes. With a substantial sample size, there is a clear difference in performance based on the type of players within each lineup.</p><p>Is chemistry important for a championship level team? Although there were 112 different lineup combinations with a Net Rating greater than 5, only 25 different lineup combinations had a Net Rating higher than 10. For a team to reach a championship caliber, I think chemistry plays a definite role.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d6c4fa8f016e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/quantifying-nba-player-chemistry-d6c4fa8f016e">Quantifying NBA Player Chemistry</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist">The Sports Scientist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Visualizing the Mid Season Resurgence of Russell Westbrook]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/sports-analytics/visualizing-the-mid-season-resurgence-of-russell-westbrook-5cddd6b84745?source=rss-84181903a831------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5cddd6b84745</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russell-westbrook]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[visualization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[james-harden]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Leese]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2020 20:51:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-22T20:59:45.154Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There has been a lot made of the early season struggles with Russell Westbrook and the Houston Rockets. The Rockets traded Chris Paul, and multiple drafts picks for Russell Westbrook on July 11th, 2019, in hopes of upgrading their superstar duo. They were attempting to better align their championship window with James Harden’s prime. Westbrook was three years younger than Paul, and the same age as Harden, so there was a logical argument to make the trade. However, Westbrook was one of the most polarizing players in the NBA. He had just come off his third straight season averaging a triple double, and had a major decline in his efficiency. He most notably was shooting 29% on three-pointers, and 66% on foul shots. Paul fit with Houston’s strategy of raining 3-pointers far more than Westbrook did, so there was going to be a steep learning curve.</p><p>Up until the start of the new year, Westbrook was playing at an all-time inefficient pace and far worse than Chris Paul. Westbrook was shooting 4.9 3-pointers per game at 23%, and he was also shooting 21.2 Field Goals per game at 45.4% EFG. To put his 3-point percentage into perspective, it would be the worst percentage in the past 20 years for all players shooting over three 3-pointers per game.</p><p>But it appears that once the season hit January 1st, Westbrook made a cautious effort to change his game and his shot selection. He improved his Effective Field Goal to 54.2% from January to March, which is nearly 10% better than the months prior to January. The graph below displays Westbrook’s average shot distance per game, with a rolling average line through it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ffGmhcrwkL67Yf935sYe0g.png" /></figure><p>There appears to be an inflection point on January 1st, where the average shot distance per game significantly changed. He decided he was going to take fewer threes and try to get into the Restricted Area. In a five-game stretch from January 18th — 26th, Westbrook only attempted two 3-pointers; this was the lowest amount he had ever taken over a five-game stretch since the 2010–11 season.</p><p>As seen in the graph below, in the new year, he is taking fewer threes and mid-range shots and is taking more shots in the paint and the Restricted Area.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uRrBdozHVWIEWu07nElgHA.png" /></figure><p>From the start of this NBA season to January 1st, 19% of Westbrook’s shots were above the break 3-pointers. Since then, less than 7% of his shots were above the break 3-pointers.</p><p>Shots in the paint (excluding Restricted Area) increased from 11% to 16%.</p><p>He virtually stopped taking corner 3-pointers altogether, combining for a total of 2% of his shots.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/530/1*nZV3MSsKjAp0GZmdH2KElw.png" /></figure><p>And finally, his shots in the Restricted Area increased from 41% to 53%. He was shooting 12.6 Field Goal attempts per game in 2020 from the restricted area, which ranked second in the league. Westbrook is only 6’3” and was creating shot attempts in the Restricted Area at an extremely high rate. The rest of the top ranked players are forwards 6’6” and taller.</p><p>Comparing games up until January 1st, vs after January 1st, this is Westbrook’s overall shot charts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IuDIhvdc2z4Xmar62lUIJw.png" /></figure><p>On top of taking fewer threes and more shots in the paint and Restricted Area, the paint shots (yellow) appear to be quite a bit closer to the basket. His Field Goal percentage in the paint has decreased by 2%, however, I expect it to increase considering his paint shot selection has improved.</p><p>Looking at his shot distribution by distance, compared to the league, it is a similar story. This graph shows the percentage of Westbrook’s shots at each distance (i.e. what percentage of his shots were taken from two feet vs five feet, etc.).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mKA8VnTQL5Ap-G4Y3ntCNw.png" /></figure><p>As seen from the red line, Westbrook, since January, is taking nearly double the number of shots at the 1–2 feet range than the NBA average (green line). Conversely, on shots over 24 feet, he is taking a fraction of the threes that the rest of the NBA is taking.</p><p>On top of Westbrook changing his shot selection, his efficiency has also improved quite substantially. Each point is an NBA player’s Field Goal percentage at that given shot type.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ohC_KrL5Xkq0cHOLUVXssA.png" /></figure><p>His Field Goal percentage in the Restricted Area has increased from 58% FG to 64% FG. Quite impressive considering he is taking 12% more shots in the Restricted Area. He has also managed to increase his mid-range Field Goal percentage from 37% to 48%. Shooting 48% from the mid-range is in the top quartile of the NBA. This increase could be attributed to having more space to shoot because defenders are so focused on him attacking the basket.</p><p>Although it is clear Westbrook has improved his game, it has not necessarily translated to the Houston Rockets being a better team. The Rockets Net Rating from the start of the NBA season to January 1st was 4.9; comparatively, their Net Rating from January 1st until March 11th was 1.8.</p><p>Can their poor Net Rating strictly be attributed to worse defense?</p><p>No, their offense over the same span was also down. The Rockets’ Offensive Rating for games in 2019 was 114.0, and for games in 2020, it was 112.6.</p><p>Did their win percentage improve?</p><p>No, their win percentage was 68% on January 1st, and it now sits at 63%.</p><p>What does Clint Capela have to do with this? (Traded on February 5)</p><p>While Capela was on the floor, the Rockets offensive rating decreased by over 4 points, so we should have seen an increase in their offense once he stopped playing.</p><p>A potential reason for the Rockets’ worsened performance could be because Westbrook is taking the ball out of James Harden’s hands. Harden’s Usage has fallen from 37.0 to 34.3, while Westbrook’s has risen from 31.4 to 35.0. Although other factors contribute to winning, it should concern the Rockets that while Russell Westbrook had his best stretch of basketball in years, their team’s play and net rating has declined.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zl2srhloyiirU_jPw9gbYQ.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5cddd6b84745" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/sports-analytics/visualizing-the-mid-season-resurgence-of-russell-westbrook-5cddd6b84745">Visualizing the Mid Season Resurgence of Russell Westbrook</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/sports-analytics">Sports Analytics</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Can NBA Star Players “turn it on” In The Playoffs?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/can-nba-star-players-turn-it-on-in-the-playoffs-490b0c4d0fcc?source=rss-84181903a831------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/490b0c4d0fcc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kyle-lowry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba-playoffs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Leese]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 16 May 2020 14:53:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-16T19:11:50.776Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As a huge supporter of Kyle Lowry, I get particularly sensitive when I hear critics bash on Lowry’s playoff performances. I was at game one during the 2019 NBA playoffs when Lowry went 0 for 7, missed his only two free throws, and ended with zero points. I almost found myself giving into the narrative, but thankfully, Lowry went on to have an amazing playoff run capped off by a 26-point, 10 assist, 7 rebound, and 3 steal game to beat the Golden State Warriors in the NBA Finals.</p><p>After game six of the finals Fred VanVleet said, “He gets more slander than anybody I’ve ever seen in the league, and so to have him be able to hold that trophy up tonight… that’s what means the most for us.”</p><p>Fred implied that the slander was misinformed and this performance vindicated Lowry’s apparent playoff woes. I decided to analyze the data and see if Lowry’s 2019 playoff performance did in fact rectify the debatable narrative surrounding him. But more specifically, I wanted to see how star players performance changes moving from regular season to playoff action.</p><p>A common train of thought from the NBA media is that star players can “turn it on” in the playoffs, or “bring their game to a different level.” It turns out that this is likely the exception rather than the rule.</p><p>Here is a graph of players average change in regular season vs. playoff Player Efficiency Rating (PER), for players who played over 40 playoff games since 2000 and averaged over 30 minutes in the playoffs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A3T2wx7MPyJM2ZQMPThATA.png" /></figure><p>As seen from the graph, it is extremely difficult for top players on a playoff team to actually improve their performance in the playoffs. Every player except for seven, experience a drop in PER once they reached the playoffs.</p><p>My calculation is based off of the change in PER for each year separately, and then averaged. This provided an accurate representation of whether a player could improve from their regular season to the post season, rather than a career comparison of regular season PER and playoff PER.</p><p>All things considered, a decrease in players PER should have been expected. The main reason for this being that the competition is far stronger in the playoffs. Firstly, players are playing against the best opposing teams and players in the league. Secondly, a playoff series gives more time to scout opponents, thus improving defense as a whole.</p><p>To further prove this I also looked at a statistic called Efficiency (EFF). This is a very simple all encompassing statistic which is essentially a summation of counting statistics.</p><p>NBA’s efficiency rating: (PTS + REB + AST + STL + BLK − ((FGA − FGM) + (FTA − FTM) + TO))</p><p>Considering that players in the above group averaged 33 and 35 regular season and playoff minutes respectively, we should see an improvement in the playoffs to all their counting statistics and their EFF. As seen from the graph below, that is not the case for most star players in the NBA today.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/953/1*yLTyoGY2bhlK6T-dun7iPw.png" /></figure><p>There are two things that really stand out when looking at this figure. One is that even though 18 out of 20 players on this list saw an increase in minutes in the playoffs, only six increased their EFF. And second, players 2pt and 3pt field goal percentages are significantly lower. Giannis Antetokounmpo is shooting more than 5% worse from two, Damian Lillard, and Lou Williams are shooting more than 5% worse from three, and Steph Curry, Kevin Durant and James Harden are all shooting over 3% worse from three. It is surprising to see some of the leagues all-time efficient players (besides Lou Williams), become more human in the playoffs.</p><p>For Draymond Green and Lebron James there is feasible explanation as to why their EFF was able to improve. These two players are notorious for “dogging it” in the regular season before deciding to play harder in the playoffs. Since there is quite a wide spread agreement by NBA media on this issue, I accepted it as a plausible explanation.</p><p>Kawhi Leonard on the other hand is an anomaly. It seems he is one of the only star players to actually raise the level of his game in April. Kawhi has been able to improve his 2pt and 3pt shooting efficiency in the playoffs. It is incredibly impressive to think Kawhi was able to do this shooting more 2-pointers, 3-pointers, and free throws per game in the playoff than in the regular season, before the start of the 2020 season.</p><p>In the 2019 playoffs, only 51% of Kawhi’s three pointers were assisted while shooting 38% fg. In the regular season, 66% of his threes were assisted while shooting 37%. Kawhi managed to improve his three point percentage taking more threes overall, but even crazier, taking more pull up threes.</p><p>Since it is now clear that it is a difficult task for players to raise their game in the playoffs, it is time to check how my man Kyle Lowry fared in the playoffs compared to his peers, to determine if he has misstepped in the playoffs.</p><p>Below is the same group of 20 players career on-off statistics during the playoffs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/329/1*-mUncL1HDPvz_b_ROYgOMQ.png" /></figure><p>On-off is a teams net rating while you are on the floor vs. off of the floor. For example, Lowry’s career playoffs on-off is 12.7. That meant that the Raptors net rating was 12.7 points better when he was on the floor. To the contrary, Demar DeRozan’s career playoff on-off is -12, meaning the Raptors had a 12 points worse net rating when he was on the court.</p><p>In my view, this graph is what actually paints the correct picture of the Kyle Lowry playoff experience. Although Lowry’s statistics suffered in the playoffs, the Raptors were always a better team when he was on the court. He ranks fourth in this elite pool of players. Lowry is doing so many things to contribute to winning that are not effectively captured in most statistics. This list effectively captures how important a players is to their own team. There is an argument to be made that Lowry is more important to the Raptors than the players below him have been to their respective teams in their career. Kyle Lowry has always been an unbelievable playoff performer, and his championship run in the 2019 playoffs only helps confirm this case.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=490b0c4d0fcc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/can-nba-star-players-turn-it-on-in-the-playoffs-490b0c4d0fcc">Can NBA Star Players “turn it on” In The Playoffs?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist">The Sports Scientist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Are NBA Draft Class Analysts Really Experts… My Testing Proves Otherwise]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/are-nba-draft-class-analysts-really-experts-my-testing-proves-otherwise-42913471d467?source=rss-84181903a831------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/42913471d467</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba-draft]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sentiment-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba-analytics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Leese]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2020 13:50:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-08T14:41:20.552Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In recent weeks there has been a lot of discussion regarding the upcoming NBA draft class. Most media members covering the NBA have considered the 2020 NBA draft class to be weak.</p><p>Are draft analysts able to accurately predict if an entire draft class is strong or weak? The short answer is probably not, but I dived into the numbers to answer this question which proved to be a very challenging task.</p><p>The methodology I used was to collect data regarding the sentiment around each draft class prior to the actual draft taking place. The sentiment of a draft class is referring to whether the media predicts that the draft class is strong or weak. I then compared the sentiment of each class to their actual performance over time.</p><p>I began by looking at targeted Google searches within the year prior to each draft in order to find the sentiment of each class. I used several variations of words like “2015 NBA draft.” Although there were several articles on the topic, most of them were mock drafts with only one line in the whole article alluding to the draft class being strong or weak. This resulted in noisy text data that would be hard to clean. My next approach was to look at Twitter posts in the months prior to each draft. Although there was more direct discussion of the draft class sentiment, there were not enough credible Tweets (i.e. verified accounts or minimum likes) on the draft class in the early 2010’s.</p><p>The next approach I attempted was to look at the language in the analysis section of players on NBAdraft.net.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EAVHoSpnoQqQitViVRMP0g.jpeg" /></figure><p>By looking at the language used for every player in a draft class and comparing it to other years, I could determine which class had better sentiment than others.</p><p>This process is called opinion or sentiment analysis. I used text mining tools to understand the emotional context of text. To do this I analyzed the sentiment of individual words using the <a href="http://saifmohammad.com/WebPages/NRC-Emotion-Lexicon.htm">NRC Word-Emotion Association Lexicon</a> (NRC). The NRC is a list of words associated with an emotion (i.e. fear/trust) or, with a positive or negative sentiment. After summing all the positive and negative sentiments in the text, I could assign a sentiment score to each draft class, or in other words, evaluate which mock draft the authors preferred.</p><p>I chose to use <a href="https://www.nbadraft.net/">nbadraft.net</a> because they used the same format for each year and are widely considered an excellent source for NBA draft information. Of course, using more draft analysis websites would have been ideal but for language consistencies sake, it made the most sense to only use one website.</p><p>I looked at every players analysis from the 2010–2020 NBA draft simply because that is how long <a href="https://www.nbadraft.net/">nbadraft.net</a> has been creating draft analysis. This left me with nearly 500,000 words to investigate. Here is a word jumble of the top 300 most commonly used words.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/1*639rdzOePO-viYZz2fFgvw.png" /></figure><p>For those interested, here is the R Script which collected all 660 names from the last 11 NBA drafts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E1Xji5e-fKjxBX3ff_lJCw.png" /></figure><p>Naturally there were some problems assessing NBA analysis using NRC. Several words that are generally considered negative words, are considered positive when thinking about an NBA prospect. Below is a list of the 25 most common positive and negative words used in the mock draft analysis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2xIclIrtsb3ZXR0pbPJsKw.png" /></figure><p>In real life, being called “explosive” and “aggressive” is insulting, but when it comes to being in the NBA, these are the traits players aspire to have. This is a slight drawback of the analysis, but overall it hardly affected the process because most of the negative words were accurately represented.</p><p>The scoring system works in terms of a sentiment score. The score is calculated by the amount of positive words minus the amount of negative words. The chart below on the left displays the aggregate details of each pick sorted by the total sentiment. For example, total sentiment of first overall draft picks scored the highest sentiment. As well, you can see from the chart below on the right, there is clear right skew distribution between draft position and sentiment. As expected, the higher draft positions generally scored a higher sentiment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/256/1*i2fgbvg2rrIXIsRfRe8COQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/1*9ghTGHLTH4n-zMjNScwHYg.png" /></figure><p>I also considered that when a reporter writes about a draft class as being strong or weak, they are referring to the top picks. You rarely hear a draft analyst writing about a draft being weak because of the players in the second round. Therefore, I adjusted the data to only look at the sentiment of the first ten picks. This proved quite successful because as you can see below, the sentiment of the first ten picks is much more differentiated than compared to the next 20.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/1*0lbQ3j_J2lTwlhXzmNb5SA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/1*mHs2YG_mgmm4krx991O_DQ.png" /></figure><p>Using the aggregated sentiment of the first ten picks in each draft class, here is the resulting draft class sentiment ranking.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/1*8cwZACqlq7eXmORdVb3_tw.png" /></figure><p>The 2018 draft class ranked as the most highly touted of the list which featured, Markelle Fultz, Lonzo Ball and Jayson Tatum who were high profile prospects entering the draft. This year’s 2020 class was the second least touted class which seems to align with the sentiment of the media.</p><p>After determining the sentiment of each class, it was time to assess the performance of each draft class. There are several ways to determine the on-court performance of a draft class. I chose to use average minutes per game of the top ten players as the variable to determine performance success. To check the accuracy of minutes per game as a performance indicator, below is the top ten minutes played per game over the past five seasons.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aIcfnmrlVQxjPzcAdfXhbg.png" /></figure><p>Although it is not a perfect indicator, it works well for evaluating performance, and is the best variable to analyze the past ten drafts. For one, minutes can capture the potential of the younger players. Of course, there will be outliers but if a player is playing high minutes in his second or third year, there is reason to believe he is going to improve even if his career statistics aren’t up to par yet. For example, Trae Young and Jaren Jackson from the 2018 draft have an equivalent Win Shares/48 minutes to about league average. These two players are projected to have well above average careers which is portrayed in their minutes averaging 33 and 27 minutes respectively. On the other hand, rookies with high minutes who do not exhibit potential, will have their minutes fall off in year two and three. For example, Kevin Knox from the 2018 draft class saw his minutes fall from 29 to 18 minutes per game in his second year. In addition, if a veteran player has averaged high minutes throughout his career, he has likely had a successful career and his statistics will depict a similar story.</p><p>If I were to use standard performance measurements (i.e. PER, Win Shares), it would heavily favour the older players. For example, using Win Shares/48 minutes, the 2011 draft class would rank first. The three highest Win Shares/48 minutes in the top ten picks of this draft are Kyrie Irving, Jonas Valancuinas, and Enes Kanter. It would be hard to argue that this draft is the best performing draft class in the last ten years.</p><p>Finally, the moment you have been waiting for — these are the results of the draft class sentiment vs. the draft class performance from 2010 -2019.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/1*nO0HjQ6bTthFC98ZepB0uA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/1*fjv6Ft5unJLhRLSUjC5EBA.png" /></figure><p>As you can see, the sentiment does not follow a similar pattern to the performance. There was only a 0.27 correlation between sentiment and performance. This led me to believe the opinions regarding a draft class are not a strong indication of performance. Even looking at the sentiment of the entire first round of each class, there were similar results — only a correlation of 0.03, meaning there is no relationship between sentiment and performance.</p><p>Looking forward:</p><p>Analyzing the performance of an entire draft class proved to be very difficult, especially if the players are still playing. In another five years this type of analysis will only be easier; there will be a larger data set to use, the draft classes performance will be clearer, and the predictive power of the draft sentiment will be more accurate.</p><p>So, does this mean the sentiment surrounding a draft class is useless? I can confidently say it is likely not a strong predictor of how a draft class will perform. And if teams are persuaded to trade into or out of a draft because of the negative sentiment surrounding it, this is a likely bad strategy, but that’s a topic for another time.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=42913471d467" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/are-nba-draft-class-analysts-really-experts-my-testing-proves-otherwise-42913471d467">Are NBA Draft Class Analysts Really Experts… My Testing Proves Otherwise</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist">The Sports Scientist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Best NBA Seasons Ever]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/best-nba-seasons-ever-4d2a32ca3d27?source=rss-84181903a831------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4d2a32ca3d27</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebron-james]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[michael-jordan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[the-last-dance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Danny Leese]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2020 17:56:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-04T16:06:19.887Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Best Individual NBA Season Ever</h3><p>As a 23 year old basketball fan I never had the chance to watch Michael Jordan live. His new documentary series, “The Last Dance” got me thinking how Jordan’s best seasons stack up next to the other all time great seasons.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8cubgOgY96Z-fH1LLgdGnQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>To determine the best NBA season ever, I looked at regular season statistics from 1980–2020. I only looked back to 1980 because the three-point line was introduced in 1979, and prior to this, the game was vastly different. The minimum minutes played requirement was set at 400 minutes. This would mean a player averaged only about five minutes per game for an entire season, or a star player playing 35 minutes a night only played in 11 games. The purpose of this was to exclude players that played extremely few games in a year, but I was interested if there was a player whose numbers were so exceptional in his 400 minutes that it could be considered an all time season.</p><p>Instead of using individual statistics I used all encompassing statistics because the goal of these measures is to rank the best player in each season. For example, this season Giannis Antetokounmpo ranks #1 in Player Efficiency Rating (PER), Box Plus Minus (BPM) and Win Shares Per 48 Minutes (WS/48) and ranks #2 in Value Over Replacement Player (VORP). When the season paused on March 11, Giannis was virtually on top of every MVP ranking as well as being a heavy favourite according to Vegas betting odds. Additionally, in the 1980 season, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar ranked #1 or #2 in all four statistics and beat out Julius Irving for MVP 147 to 31 points. This gave me confidence that using PER, BMP, WS/48 and VORP would provide an accurate representation of who the best season ever belongs too.</p><p>In order to combine all the statistics into an accurate final ranking I used a Z-Score technique. A Z-Score accounts for the magnitude difference between players’ statistics. This is a much better system than a ranking system, because ranking assumes a linear distribution. In other words, a standard ranking system assumes the difference from the 1st to 2nd ranked player is the same as the 100th to 101st ranked player, which is obviously flawed logic.</p><p>After converting each player’s PER, BMP, WS/48 and VORP into a Z-Score, I summed them to provide a final “score” for each player every season. As expected, Lebron James and Michael Jordan were featured the most in the top 20 seasons ever.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/941/1*b9Ok-lzxjaHJyOdPAgf7_A.png" /></figure><p>Jordan accounted for seven and Lebron accounted for four of the 20 seasons. The number one season ever was Michael Jordan in 1988. Jordan was 24 years old at the time and achieved his highest PER of any season at 31.7, reached a 0.3 WS/48 which he only did three times, and accomplished his highest BPM and VORP. It was also in this year that Jordan took home one of his five MVP honours and his only defensive player of the year honour. Looking at basic statistics, this season was by all accounts amazing, but does not appear to stand out compared to his other amazing seasons. He took only 0.6 threes per game shooting 13%, had one of his worst rebounding seasons, and averaged 3.1 turnovers (his 4th worst). However, he did score 35 points a game, had an effective field goal percentage of 54%, averaged 5.9 assists and 3.2 steals which were all amongst the best of his career.</p><p>So why is this season the best ever? PER, BMP, WS/48, and VORP all account for how the rest of the players in the NBA performed that given season. Michael Jordan’s 88’ season “score” according to my ranking was 20.9 points. To give context, the 100th best ranked season “score” was 12.6. Larry Bird and Magic Johnson placed second and third in MVP voting in the 1987–1988 season. Larry Bird’s 88’ season ranked 48th all time and “scored” 14.4 points. Magic Johnson’s 88’ season ranked 274th all time and “scored” 9.5 points.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/675/1*V8bQjfC-3wuos9VEIe1klw.png" /></figure><p>Jordan’s season was so much better than his counter parts making his 1987–1988 the greatest single regular season performance of all time.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4d2a32ca3d27" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist/best-nba-seasons-ever-4d2a32ca3d27">Best NBA Seasons Ever</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sports-scientist">The Sports Scientist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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