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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Donal C on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Donal C on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Donal C on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[A casual review of Accounting For Value in Marx’s Capital]]></title>
            <link>https://donalcostello1.medium.com/a-casual-review-of-accounting-for-value-in-marxs-capital-eeb6b15fa177?source=rss-90f5c4ba2b05------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[problem-transformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marx]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[accounting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[accounting-for-value]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marxism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Donal C]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jan 2024 02:17:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-08T03:39:49.647Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>First off, I just want to say that this is basically a collection of my own notes and thoughts from reading the book — if I misinterpreted anything, that’s on me and not on the author (Robert Bryer) of course. A lot of it is copy-paste too, but do not take the following to be anything other than my understanding of the book’s main ideas. I also haven’t included any of the really technical discussions about the ‘Transformation Problem’ here, or some of the other topics like his discussions of productive and unproductive labour. Anyway I hope you get something out of it and are motivated to go and read this excellent book, as well as the author’s other title — “Accounting for History in Marx’s Capital”.</p><p>The amazing thing about this book is that it approaches the topic of labour value and money prices with an actual empirical presentation of how they interact in the real world, as opposed to assertions about what Marx wanted to write or should have written. It details how the ‘transformation problem’ is not some academic question of whether prices of production can be ‘mapped’ back to labour values (and even if they were — this would still be just one of many competing theories of what money represents). Rather, it shows how accountants actually deal with this exact problem, and it explains why, within enterprises, they have no choice but to deal with labour time as social abstract labour, count it methodically as adding social value to products during production, and in doing so, transform abstract labour value into money costs. I can see your eyebrows raising already — <em>“accountants do what now?”</em>, but wait, Prof Bryer of the <em>Warwick Business School </em>knows a thing or two about accounting, and his presentation blew me away.</p><p>To me, this book is a triumph, because it is rooted in observable practice, not theory. The book argues convincingly that Marx understood the general accounting and production process from his conversations with Engels, and sought to describe this empirical observation. Unlike Ricardian or other explanations for money prices, it wasn’t a hypothetical model and he didn’t invent it. That being the case, the evidence that money is the phenomenal form of social labour is simply that, unlike in purely theoretical economics, it is an inescapable and self-evident practice in management and financial accounting.</p><p>The story starts with “total social capital” — the capital market (stock market, investment funds, banks etc). Total social capital is basically a giant control system to direct the management of producers in capitalism. The control system is operationalised through financial accounting. The primary traditional function of financial accounting is measuring the monetary flows of output, a “profit and loss account,” and the stock of capital at a moment in time, a “balance sheet,” to enable the owners, the shareholders, to calculate the rate of profit, and to hold management accountable for its “stewardship” of capital”. The real function of capitalist management therefore, although they do not think of it like this themselves, is to be stewards of some portion of the ‘total social capital’ in the society. Total social capital controls all sectors and individual firms by controlling both investment and the financial accounting principles and practices which they must use to obtain investment, and thus the arena within which competition between firms happens.</p><p>One common way financial analysts today estimate management’s performance is by comparing an enterprise’s financial statements with historical, industrial sector averages, and other benchmarks (e.g., paired comparisons). Shareholders punish or reward management according to whether they believe they can distinguish management’s contribution to the enterprise’s Return on Investment (ROI). Investors and creditors use accounts to hold their agents, management, accountable for “capital” and “profit,” and thus to give them ‘results control’ of the enterprise’s ‘valorisation process’ — the labour process that produces the return on capital.</p><p>Within “total social capital”, capitalists together hold the “market portfolio,” a value-weighted share of all companies, who demand the general rate of profit, adjusted for risk and other “compensating” factors. In mature capitalism, the general rate of profit, instead of simply emerging through competition, becomes consciously calculated in advance to reflect expected differences in rates of profit from the average by building in “grounds of compensation”. These calculations produce what today capitalists and accountants know as the “required return,” the demanded rate of profit, which is a key element of Marx’s accounting explanation. This is the actual reason that prices fluctuate around prices of production rather than values, because commodities are “exchanged as the products of capitals”, complete with a portfolio-based required rate of return.</p><p>This fact defines the socially necessary cost price of production. “Value is the relation of production costs to utility. The first application of value is the decision as to whether a thing ought to be produced at all; i.e., as to whether utility counterbalances production costs” (Engels 1975, 426). Engels knew from his business experience that when capitalists applied “value” to the decision whether to produce or not, they calculated expected profit, and would not produce without it.</p><p>These “required return” requirements pose a real problem for the boards of directors of companies, which is that they are controlled by total social capital. They solve this problem by imposing accounting control in turn onto their own firm. Managers do this with the help of management accountants. The aim of this internal firm control system is that: “these agents must produce a “profit” (not simply not lose money), and they must produce “sufficient” profit to “keep up” with competitors, that is, at least the (risk adjusted) average of rate of profit, the ‘ratio of profit to the capital employed’ — what the accountants call the return on capital employed (ROCE) or return on investment (ROI).</p><p>But how do they know the level of labour productivity within their firm that will generate — at the social level — this appropriate risk-adjusted average rate of return? Management accountants do this by distinguishing between the actual cost of concrete labour and materials etc. at their firm, and their abstract costs, which they call “standard” or “target” costs. They treat any expenditure over the “standard” as a loss, rather than treating expenditure above their own concrete costs as a loss.</p><p>(This kind of valuation is also, for similar reasons, used to value the business itself as an entity, according to accountants’ “going concern” theory of valuation, which meant the value the market would put on a firm’s assets if it changed hands as a continuing business. Because the purchaser of a going concern could buy equivalents to its assets on the market at their current replacement prices, the purchaser would pay no more than this for them. The value at the social level is all that matters.)</p><p>Accountants don’t know the “abstract costs” of their firm’s concrete labour process exactly of course, but they build up this ‘standard cost’ from a detailed study of the necessary technical and labour inputs, design and “value engineering” studies, observation based on trial runs, and work study. Also they know that for firms to survive, their historical average labour productivity must have equalled the required rate of profit until now, so this is a good guide. ‘Target costing’ takes standard costing to its logical conclusion, that the commodity markets and capital market determine what “socially necessary labour” is because its “cardinal rule,” “do not launch products that cannot be manufactured at their target cost,” applies equally to an existing product, which “is scrapped” if this ceases to be the case.</p><p>In Volumes 1 and 2 of Capital, Marx did not “propose any particular method for the measurement of labour time” (Foley 2000, 17), defining it simply as the time “required to produce an article under normal conditions of production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time” (Marx 1996, 49). However, in Volume 3 Marx developed the idea in Grundrisse that under competition total social capital imposed an overriding, specifically capitalist definition of “socially necessary” to mean what accountants call “standard cost” or “target cost,” the cost necessary to give the capitalist the “required return”. As capitalism develops, Marx argued in Volume 3, its calculations become more sophisticated. Rather than the general rate of profit simply emerging through competition for capital, capitalists calculate the rate of profit they require in advance, building in “compensating factors”:</p><p>“Experience shows . . . that if one branch of industry, e.g. cotton, yields extraordinarily high profits at one time, it may bring in very low profits at another, or even run at a loss, so that in a particular cycle of years the average is more or less the same as in other branches” (Marx 1981, 311). “Capital soon learns to reckon with this experience” (Marx 1981, 311), individual capitalists quickly adjust their required rates of profit to reflect the factors that experience shows influences their average returns, particularly for risk: Accounting and finance textbooks agree, “the required rate of return . . . which is the minimum acceptable rate of return on an investment . . . is the return that the organisation could expect to receive elsewhere for an investment of comparable risk”</p><p>Competition for capital, experience, and calculations, generalize this rate of profit and generate market prices consistent with it across all capitals. In this process, capitalists offer commodities for sale at prices of production they calculate will give them the general rate of profit or better, and where they cannot get these prices they will endeavour to engineer costs down, but will continue to produce only if they can earn the general rate of profit. In other words, labour counts as socially necessary only if it meets a “social want” but this must also be consistent with total social capital’s demand for the general rate of profit.</p><p>The individual capitalist must therefore produce at the (social) cost price, which is the market price that delivers at least the average rate of profit on behalf of total social capital. In general, the higher the required return and the longer the turnover period, the lower the required target cost. Target cost is [Marx’s] “cost price” (c + v) — it’s the maximum cost, and anything below that cost yields a profit which is demanded as ‘social break-even’ by total social capital. Paying dividends to investors or repayments to banks imposes a breakeven cost which is institutional and not technical in nature.</p><p>Capitalists do not leave the process of doing this to chance. They make sure to control the production of commodities with a value equal to its market price to realize the required rate of profit, an aim that accountants define as their primary function. It is because capitalists aim to produce a commodity with a value that will realize the anticipated surplus and on average succeed in this, that according to Marx, “The value of a commodity is expressed in its price before it enters into circulation, and it is therefore a precondition of circulation, and not a result”.</p><p>Marx’s fundamental claim was that “profit is produced before outputs go to market”. Management accounting proves this to be true. A widely held position among some Marxists has been that commodities acquire their (‘actual’) values at the moment they are exchanged and through the act of exchange. Prior to this the value is latent / hidden / potential value only — not real value. This is incorrect. Accountants know through their principles and practices that the production of value is prior to the sale of the commodity, and that some, all, or more than its produced value is then, as both Marx and accountants say, “realized,” converted into money. Accountants inchoately agree that objectively measurable value as “abstract labour” exists, and is observable in capitalist accounting, in recording the social cost of production, and in holding workers accountable for this ‘target cost’. This is regarded as completely distinct from accountability for sales.</p><p>Marx added that, following the expansion of the market, “useful articles are produced for the purpose of being exchanged . . . their character as values has therefore to be taken into account, beforehand, during production”. Neither capitalists nor anyone else consciously “see in these articles the material receptacles of homogenous human labour” (Marx 1996, 84). “Value . . . does not stalk about with a label describing what it is”. But as we can see, it must be, and is, determined by management accountants or managers at each firm because they are accountable to a required rate of profit.</p><p>What actually happens to the value once products go on the market, and some are not sold? Marx and accountants agree with the requirement that capitalists write down commodities (inventories) that “cannot be sold” to the “lower of cost or market”, which may be zero. This practice only makes sense if a prior value existed that management controlled and had quantified before the fall in market price. If the market price of finished commodities falls below their social cost price for whatever reason, the capitalist will make no surplus value, consumption was not productive and capital is lost (and this is how they account for it).</p><p>For example, if commodities “get spoiled, and lose, together with their use-value, the property of being bearers of exchange value, . . . [b]oth the capital contained in them and the surplus-value added to it are lost”.<strong> </strong>Moreover, the key principles and practices of capitalist accounting — its use of replacement cost accounting (RCA), target costing, its methods of accounting for fixed capital, its use of absorption costing to measure the cost of production — also make sense only if labour actually creates value at the social level already while in production, some of which may then be subsequently lost.</p><p>That management accountants consciously do all of this has a profound implication for what is called the ‘transformation problem’. Management accountants must, and do, work out labour productivity levels (at their firm) that are required to generate the required rate of return (at the social level). They express this by observing labour time within their firm and consciously applying a MELT (monetary equivalent of (socially abstract) labour time) to it, for every stage in the production process. The cost price that they calculate is therefore a social cost price, not a private one, and it only exists because of an estimate of socially necessary labour time, which they are made aware of through the required rate of return imposed on them at the social level by total social capital.</p><p>The profound implication is that management accountants solve the “transformation problem” every day. Target costing became an established social practice in developed capitalism because total social capital, the capital market, became the dominant social power, the “form in which capital becomes conscious of itself as a social power,” “with the capitalist as its functionary,” “which confronts society as a thing”. The social power behind its demand for the general rate of profit explains why “The cost price is a given precondition, independent of his, the capitalist’s, production”.</p><p>Rather than a central calculator, in Marx’s accounting solution the capital market <strong>sets </strong>the individual capitalist’s maximum cost through the required rate of profit, which <strong>implies </strong>a maximum standard or target cost, given the market price of the commodities.<strong> </strong>Target cost is the maximum cost of production because capitalists seek an excess rate of profit by cost cutting. Not simply competition enforces the cost price, but active management by the capitalist to hit or beat targets. Financial accounting then enforces this on all firms by controlling the production of value through budgeted profit and loss accounts, and management accounting within the firm through balance sheets based on standard or target costs.</p><p>Like the accountant, Marx thought that the “capitalist is inclined to regard the cost price as the true inner value of the commodity, because it is the price required for bare conservation of his capital” (1998, 42, emphasis added), that is, the price required for capital maintenance. This explains why Marx defined profit as “the excess of the money recovered at the end of the circulation of capital over and above the cost price that is ‘presupposed’ . . .” (Moseley 2000a, 298), and why capitalists account for costs over <em>standard cost </em>as a “period cost” (Drury 2000, 680), not as a value-creating “cost of production.”<strong> </strong>Capitalists, by accounting for standard or target cost, through their measurement and control of production, unwittingly transform the general rate of profit and prices of production into value and surplus value.</p><p>Marx explicitly agrees that firms target profits <em>as if they were surplus value </em>(in terms of a monetary equivalent of labour productivity)<em> </em>because the accounting principle of costs “attach” is the same as his reckoning that all the necessary costs of production — those that produce use values for sale — are the socially necessary labour time “Expressed in gold”. As he said, and capitalist accountants inchoately agree, it is only because all value-creating labour is equal that production costs attach, “that cotton planting, spindle making and spinning, are capable of forming the component parts, differing only quantitatively from each other, of one whole, namely, the value of the yarn”. This is why the ‘MELT’ (the quantification of labour processes as money costs) is both possible and necessary to perform for management accountants.</p><p>This is the idea (also called “absorption costing”) that we should measure the cost of production by summing the costs of production workers, materials and production overheads. Wells (1978, 106), an accounting academic, noted that the “costs attach” principle “bears a striking resemblance to that enunciated earlier by classical economists,” particularly by Marx, in whose idea of socially necessary labour, he thought, we find its “ultimate expression”.</p><p>Capital, taken as a whole, is thus a social relation which is a system of layered accountability that produces surplus value for total social capital, divided up according to private investment stakes. Workers have no choice but to participate, because total social capital has a monopoly on all production. “What brings the seller into a relationship of dependency is solely the fact that the buyer is the owner of the conditions of labour”; “capital . . . [i]s the monopoly . . . buyer of his labour power”. The transition [from feudalism] was in the mode of accountability, from a physically coercive relationship, to “a relationship of sale and purchase, a purely financial relationship,” which “is objective in nature, voluntary in appearance, purely economic”.</p><p>The transformation problem itself pre-dates Marx and was basically the conflict between the fact that you could invest in, and make just as much return from highly capital intensive production as highly labour intensive production. If living labour creates value, how could this be? This transformation problem is solved by accountants when firms purchase goods at the market price, require a minimum socially necessary labour productivity, and produce goods with a required Return On Investment (ROI). This is the simultaneous adding of value with different levels of labour productivity and achieving the general rate of profit by doing so. The profit, let’s recall, exists already at this point, as the monetary expression of social labour in the form of standard costing during production.</p><p>Marx did not translate flows of money in capitalist accounts into flows of labour time and vice versa, but in the accounts he studied he found labour time already translated into money value, into capital, which he explained. His argument, in short, was that <strong>we know capitalists produce profit as a form surplus value because they account for all capital, variable capital and constant capital, using principles and practices consistent with value being the monetary expression of socially necessary labour time</strong>. In Volume 3, he used this approach to analyse “cost price” and its relationship to value, and the effect of turnover on the rate of profit, which led to his discovery of what is now called “target cost,” which is his and every management accountant’s solution to the “transformation problem.”</p><p>Contrary to most presentations of the transformation of values into prices, capitalists do not first produce the total surplus value and then redistribute it as profit. Their production of surplus value is simultaneously its distribution as profit, because the profit is already produced in production. The firms know the labour productivity needed for the required rate of return, and by all being held to that standard, the distribution of profit is complete (notwithstanding that some of it may later be lost, just as a bundle of money can be lost in a fire). The Capitalist production and competition — and the calculations they require — simultaneously determine individual profits and distribute total surplus value:</p><p>The above is true because individual capitalists keep their accounts as though socially necessary labour time is money. A management accountant does not believe the old adage that ‘time is money’ — they believe that a very specific kind of time (socially necessary labour time) is money, and they account for labour productivity within the firm relative to best-practice targets, literally, in units of money. Marx’s concept of “socially necessary” labour time simply explains the “general form of surplus value” found in management accounts and how the production of surplus value is its simultaneous distribution to capitalists (and then to landlords, shareholders and creditors) as profits.</p><p>But there is a wrinkle: For both Marx and financial accountants, the profit mark-up which the capitalists receive appears only <strong>after </strong>maintaining the value of the capital necessary to produce the same quantity of goods and services, to maintain what accountants call “operating capital”. Just as the management accountants martial and account for labour productivity according to SNLT (and not according to a firm’s concrete labour), financial accountants in turn account for a firm’s capital in terms of what it as a whole is worth socially. Doing this requires what accountants call “capital maintenance adjustments” (CMAs), which is a revaluation of capital on the books <em>in light of its social value</em>. This means that an accountant, as in the standard presentation of Marx’s ‘transformation process’ (not the TSSI), calculates the profit that the producers <em>would earn if they repeated the investment under current conditions</em>. However, unlike the standard presentation, accountants would then modify this with a CMA if repeating the investment requires a different sum than what was actually paid. Any portion of the ‘profit’ which is owed to price changes since production began is a ‘return to capital’ for the firm, and not actually profit. This portion is transferred out of profit and to capital, meaning that, notwithstanding the different route to get there, the rate of profit ends up being equivalent to the accountants’ ROI — that profit which the TSSI predicts.</p><p>I will leave it to the experts on the subject to debate that further — there is a lot of detail on constant capital, depreciation and comparisons of all of the interpretations of the transformation problem in the book. I just wanted to give a flavour of the overall argument. I think if one thing comes from this book, it should be that all Marxists — who agree with the TSSI’s conclusions or otherwise — take a close look at this new analysis from the accounting perspective, because this is where you can test if your theories stack up against the real production processes.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eeb6b15fa177" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On the prospects of a referendum on Irish Unity]]></title>
            <link>https://donalcostello1.medium.com/on-the-prospects-of-a-referendum-on-irish-unity-1f96a83b9972?source=rss-90f5c4ba2b05------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[border-poll]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ireland]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[irish-unity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[referendum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Donal C]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jun 2022 11:45:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-06-10T11:48:55.244Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is an article I wrote last year for a small publication in Ireland called Republic Media. It received a highly critical response, so I decided to double down and re-release it.</p><p><strong>I’m sorry to be the bearer of bad news — but there isn’t going to be a border poll.</strong></p><p>I’ve thought about writing this article for quite some time, but something always stopped me; it’s a story that no one wants to hear. Those who have committed themselves to the pursuit of a border poll as a key political objective towards Irish unity do not — understandably — want to believe that it isn’t on the table. Those who believe that no border poll is required to end partition are also uninterested, because for them, a border poll would change nothing and its occurrence is unimportant — Ireland is one country already and partitioning the republic of 1916 was unconstitutional.</p><p>I want to challenge all of these assumptions and argue that — yes, a border poll would matter in terms of <em>realpolitik</em> because it would force the British government to give up on the pretence that they have some kind of mandated role in Ireland, but no — it isn’t going to happen and we should have our eyes open about that. To explain my reasoning, I want to walk you through some key events in English and Scottish politics in the last decade — these may seem unrelated to the question of a border poll, but they are not, as we shall see.</p><p>First, let’s go back to the Edinburgh Agreement on the 15th of October 2012 — this was when the SNP-led Scottish assembly negotiated with the British government for the Scottish independence referendum to happen in 2014. David Cameron was the then British prime minister, and he wanted his legacy to be the settling of the British constitutional position (as he said, “for a generation”[1] in the case of Scotland, and “forever”[2] in the case of British membership of the EU).</p><p>The majority faction within the British establishment at that time (consisting of both the Labour Blairites and the Conservative Thatcherites) regarded this as an important legitimising exercise — the constitutional arrangements which underpinned the UK had to be validated by a series of votes.</p><p>The Scottish independence and Brexit referenda were therefore calculated risks. They did not want to adopt the ‘Spanish model’ of simply refusing all requests for referenda (to Catalonia and the Basque Country) outright, fearing that such a policy would eventually lead to increasing tensions and disfunction. Prior to the Edinburgh agreement, Cameron had very good reason to believe that the decision which Scotland would make was not in any real doubt. Opinion polls before the agreement was signed gave the unionist side a very comfortable, average 18.1% lead[3]. The Conservatives, Labour and the Liberals joined together to campaign for a ‘No’ vote on independence, but only narrowly won — Cameron should have taken this as a warning that affirming the British state’s position through referenda was too risky — but he didn’t.</p><p>Prior to the Brexit referendum, the opinion polling was much closer. Cameron’s determination to secure his legacy cost him the office of British prime minister. Only a few hours after the results of the referendum were announced, he was forced to resign. We know for a fact that Cameron’s government never considered losing to be a possibility, because they refused to make any contingency plans for this outcome.[4] It was entirely for the sake of proving that the UK’s position in the world was affirmed by democratic consent. Again, they felt that they didn’t have to worry about it; political support for Brexit was limited to a minority faction of the Conservative party (along with UKIP, and the Unionists in the six counties). The majority of the Conservatives, along with almost all of Labour, the Liberals, the Greens, the trade union movement, the SNP and an array of NGOs were in favour of remaining within the EU. What happened on June 23rd 2016 was not supposed to happen.</p><p>We should recall that in the years following the result, every attempt was made by the mainstream establishment of the day (then represented by Theresa May) to walk-back the referendum result — to convert it into ‘BRINO’ (Brexit In Name Only) — and, of course, to “give the British voters a chance to change their minds”, in a re-run referendum[5]. The Pro-Brexit faction, although small, were savvy political operators. They turned ‘Brexit’ into the ultimate anti-establishment populist cause, accused the political class of trying to overturn the referendum result (which was, of course, true) and formed the ‘Brexit Party’. They immediately turned English politics on it’s head, first sweeping aside all other parties in the European elections in May 2019, and fully intending to go on to win the General Election later in the year. By June they were polling ahead of both Labour and the Conservatives, the latter of which saved themselves in the only way they could — by adopting Nigel Farage’s entire platform as their own; enter Boris Johnson — the Conservatives then became the Brexit party.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/962/1*oFbtOZbKhZgFG7ROYjmeOQ.png" /><figcaption>2019 European Elections — the triumph of the Brexit party</figcaption></figure><p>We need to be very clear about a few things when we look at all that transpired since Cameron sat down with Alex Salmond to set this process of ‘constitutional validation’ in motion in 2012: This period is now viewed as a catastrophe by the British establishment. They didn’t want Brexit, and they fought it every step of the way. Had the Brexiteers been less politically and electorally effective, there is no doubt that ‘BRINO’ would have been the end result of the 2015 vote. Equally, had the SNP produced a shock win in their 2014 independence referendum, there is no doubt that ‘SIINO’ (Scottish Independence In Name Only) would have been the result — as the SNP could never do what the Brexit Party did — threaten to win-over the base of England’s Conservative and Labour voters, upon which the whole of the Westminster political system rests.</p><p>The upshot of the events of the past eight years is that the border poll strategy for Irish republicans — whatever chance it may have had of eventually coming to fruition before (as the 2014 referendum did in Scotland) — is now dead and buried. The British establishment today is divided between the ultra-nationalist Brexiteers who view Irish or Scottish separatism with complete distain, and the old David Cameron / Theresa May / Tony Blair / Keir Starmer establishment who view the constitutional risk-taking of the past decade to have been the greatest of political blunders. There is no longer a faction of the British establishment which will countenance a border poll in Ireland under any circumstances.</p><p>If you need clear evidence for this — let’s return to Scotland and look at it. The SNP last month released their ‘roadmap to a [second] referendum’ on independence. They have said that if they win the next Scottish elections in May, they will hold the referendum — or rather, they will request permission from the British government to hold one, saying <em>“there could be no moral or democratic justification for denying that request”,</em> and adding that if the UK government did adopt that position, it would be <em>“unsustainable both at home and abroad”. </em>Despite this claim, the SNP are already implying that they won’t get the go-ahead for a second referendum, and are floating the idea of the <em>“advisory referendum”</em> instead (one with no legal standing, which the British government can simply ignore)[7].</p><p>It is worth taking a step back here to acknowledge just how much further away Scottish independence is now, when compared to the pre-Brexit era. The British government won’t give them another referendum, and all sides know that this position isn’t “unsustainable”, just as it isn’t unsustainable for the Spanish to deny an independence referendum to Catalonia in perpetuity.</p><p>In both Ireland and Scotland the penny has perhaps not yet dropped with most people, but the referendum route is already closed. Anyone who still wants to campaign for a border poll here can of course do so if their aim is to ‘call the bluff’ of the British government (force them to officially reject applications for a referendum) — but they should not become despondent when that rejection comes. They should understand now, at this point, that there will not be a legally binding border poll, or second Scottish independence vote.</p><p>Those who said that the ‘referendum route’ was a dead-end to begin with will, I believe, be conclusively and undeniably vindicated, but it is they who will then have the most heavy burden of responsibility of all — to lay out the strategy for independence which comes next.</p><p>1) <a href="https://www.irishexaminer.com/world/arid-30642517.html">https://www.irishexaminer.com/world/arid-30642517.html</a></p><p>2) <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9820277/David-Cameron-I-will-settle-the-Europe-question-with-EU-referendum.html">https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9820277/David-Cameron-I-will-settle-the-Europe-question-with-EU-referendum.html</a></p><p>3)<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_2014_Scottish_independence_referendum">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_2014_Scottish_independence_referendum</a></p><p>4) <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/20/david-cameron-accused-gross-negligence-brexit-contingency-plans">https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/20/david-cameron-accused-gross-negligence-brexit-contingency-plans</a></p><p>5) <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1246a046-f0ae-11e8-9623-d7f9881e729f">https://www.ft.com/content/1246a046-f0ae-11e8-9623-d7f9881e729f</a></p><p>6) <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nicola-sturgeon-news-brexit-indyref2-scotland-independence-referendum-today-a9310791.html">https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nicola-sturgeon-news-brexit-indyref2-scotland-independence-referendum-today-a9310791.html</a></p><p>7) <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jan/24/scotland-independence-referendum-nicola-sturgeon-snp-wins-may-">https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jan/24/scotland-independence-referendum-nicola-sturgeon-snp-wins-may-</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1f96a83b9972" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Entry 3: Notes From Kazan]]></title>
            <link>https://donalcostello1.medium.com/entry-3-notes-from-kazan-af96f93a4e03?source=rss-90f5c4ba2b05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/af96f93a4e03</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Donal C]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 30 Apr 2022 12:31:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-30T12:31:06.012Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For the third instalment of this little diary, I was asked by Antique_landscape (<a href="https://twitter.com/Antiquelandsca1">@Antiquelandsca1</a>) the following question:</p><p><em>After reading your posts, I got a little curious about the Russian people’s view of their own history? Specifically, has the war affected the way they think about the Russian Revolution? Like a cultural awakening, along the lines of “We need to go back to Communism”?</em></p><p>Well I thought the only thing to do was to ask my fellow students at my dormitory and university what they thought about this question. There was recently a party at my friend’s apartment and everyone was invited — the perfect chance. Guitars were strummed, songs were sung, girls did handstands and guys arm-wrestled for some reason. The bottles of whiskey and vodka appeared on the table, one after the other, and I realised that I’m getting too old for this stuff. But all of that was yet to pass.</p><p>Before things got too out of hand, but after enough drink had been consumed to remove any inhibitions, and despite my pretty poor level of Russian, I got them talking about history. “What do young Russians think about the Russian revolution?” — the answers were pretty unanimous — it was a mistake, a tragedy for the country. An unfortunate aberration which Russia was only now getting past and becoming something like a ‘normal’ (capitalist) society. That was the overwhelming response. Only one girl dissented, saying something along the lines of “Lenin wanted everyone to be equal, to make a society of good and kind people”. Everyone nodded in agreement, despite the earlier denunciations of the road that their country had taken at the beginning of the 20th century.</p><p>The subject turned to the current war, without any further prompting by myself. Undoubtedly young people are the biggest anti-war bloc in the country, but even among them, you’ll find a large cohort of nationalists and Putin supporters. I say Putin supporters, because it really is all about this one man. ‘United Russia’, Putin’s party, is not at all an attractive proposition for any Russians, minus Putin — he’s the guy who has the authority to make the whole thing into a movement that people can believe in.</p><p>So it was with my university group, with all the usual discourse about ‘Avoz Nazis’ and Donbass civilians living in their basements for the past 8 years, and on the other side about relations with the rest of the Ukrainian people being destroyed for generations. “The real tragedy” I chimed in “was like Yugoslavia, these people lived as neighbours once. All of this would have seemed quite impossible in the 1970s”.</p><p>But again I was reminded of how far attitudes have shifted since the USSR days — for my friends here, I might as well have been talking about the 1870s. Russia is what matters to Russians, and to many people here, the Soviet Union was just Russia in a different guise. Where I see the ubiquitous statues and portraits of Lenin, red flags, hammers and sickles , ‘Karl Marx Street’ and so on — I understand that all of these relate to the question of who owns society’s stock of productive assets. For most Russians today, they are aesthetically just understood as Soviet style names and symbols, and Soviet symbols have been co-opted as Russian symbols. They no longer have anything much to do with the idea of socialism.</p><p>To answer the originally posed question, I’m sorry to report that from what I can see, there is very little thinking in a progressive political direction from young people here. This is not to say that they are apolitical — they are not. They are far more politically engaged than western young people, but the dominant ideology is something like social traditionalism and economic (right wing) libertarianism. The social traditionalism includes anti-feminism that is pretty remarkable and even shocking at times, and I’ll write a few examples in a future post.</p><p>Older people who lived in the USSR tend to have a far more favourable view of it. The few that I have spoken to in the past always describe it the same way: In Soviet socialism people were more decent, more honest, more innocent in many ways. Everyone was materially poor, but not undignified. People could settle down and have families with some confidence because they knew that their needs would be looked after to a great extent by social programmes such as free universal childcare. People could grow old and not be simply abandoned.</p><p>Having said all that, I just want to offer a few thoughts on what I have observed about a few aspects of society here that stood out to me. I can only speak about Kazan, because I have not lived anywhere else.</p><p>Firstly, some of the Soviet welfare system has been maintained. Public transport costs are nominal and completely free for the elderly. There are a lot of sports and recreation halls for teenagers, with video games, basketball and other activities, which I understand to be publicly funded. Quite a lot of the community seems to be involved in different ways in maintaining and cleaning streets and parks. There are ‘repair shops’ everywhere — for clothes, shoes, electronics, everything you can think of — if it can be fixed, it will be fixed. I have yet to see a homeless person. Everything is incredibly clean. People take very good care of themselves — they dress like they are going on a date when they are just walking to the shop.</p><p>There appears to be little or no petty crime to speak of — for example, from my dormitory window I can see a line of electric scooters, which people can come and take for the day by scanning a QR code. The scooters are not chained to anything. In my hometown of Dublin, they would last approximately 15 minutes there before they all disappeared into the back of someone’s van. This speaks to the fact that people have a different mentality here. They are very poor, but this kind of crime is still not common.</p><p>And I mean — they really are poor, people might make 25,000 rubles per month (about 250 euros), and just going to the supermarket to buy food for one day costs easily 1000 rubles. Many people live at home with their parents and grandparents even into their 30s, because renting an apartment is out of the question despite working full time. This was also the case in the Soviet days, but now there are far fewer community supports, and housing tied to your job is no longer provided by the huge public employers of those times.</p><p>Lastly, on a positive note, I want to say that I am endlessly impressed by Sperbank — the Russian publicly owned (almost monopoly) banking provider here. Their ‘Sperbank’ mobile phone application is really quite brilliant and intuitive. It has no maintenance or transaction fees for normal use, and everyone’s phone is linked to their account. You can send money to any of your contacts just like sending a free text message, and you can pay for the fulfilment of contracts (for university, housing, or any other services) by just scanning a QR code or receiving the digital contract and pressing ‘pay’. Many businesses, and even buskers who play music on the street, just accept money by displaying their phone numbers on a sign. Public banks in other countries should take note, this is how it’s done! There is no need for private banks at all, these financial services should always be free and easy to use.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af96f93a4e03" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Entry 2: Notes from Kazan]]></title>
            <link>https://donalcostello1.medium.com/entry-2-notes-from-kazan-f3df1419af6d?source=rss-90f5c4ba2b05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f3df1419af6d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Donal C]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Mar 2022 10:19:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-23T10:19:26.775Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I went to the ‘Pyatorichka’ store this morning to purchase my usual unimaginative basket of goods — rice, some kind of meat, a few tomatoes, that kind of thing. I have my own little ‘inflation index’, and at its core is my favourite snack — chilli nuts. I figure it’s probably domestically produced except for the spices which are imported. Before February 24th, this snack used to set me back about 70 rubles — then it rose to 80, and now it’s 99.99. A 30% increase in a month.</p><p>My friends tell me that the pattern is pretty clear — domestically produced goods are almost unaffected by inflation, but goods which are partially or entirely reliant on imports have seen large price increases. I’m told that the price of an imported fridge has increased by 100% for example. However, my understanding is also that after the initial big jump in prices, they have now stabilised at this higher level, at least for the moment. Is the inflation just taking a pause for breath, before rising again? We’ll see. The ruble is clearly receiving fresh central bank support, because it has consolidated over the past week.</p><p>Sanctions impact economies painfully and highlight areas where domestic production is absent. One such case here is women’s sanitary products. There are significant shortages, as apparently Russian retailers were reliant on European producers, and it will take some time to make agreements with alternative suppliers (perhaps from China, as appears to be the strategy with so many disrupted imports). In general, for Chinese and other non-western business, this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to simply capture large consumer goods segments of a massive, middle-income country. Until the adjustments happen however, the shortages of these particular goods will persist.</p><p>To conclude my notes for this time, I want to make a quick reference to Russian TV, which western readers might not be too familiar with. ‘Channel 1’ is the main pro-Government TV station, watched mainly by older people (but also my pal from university, which is how I came to watch a few hours of it recently). It’s clear that they’ve learned a lot from Fox and the other American news networks about how to present a war. It reminds me of how those networks presented the US invasion and occupation of Iraq — all flashy maps, breathless reporters, feelgood stories mixed with action-packed victories. None of the gut wrenching realities of young guys with young families being blown to bits in their hundreds every day by the world’s most sophisticated weapons.</p><p>Even the terminology that’s used is straight from the NATO playbook. It’s not a war, it’s a <em>special operation</em>. Doesn’t that sound more palatable? Just like NATO’s aerial campaigns are never a question of dropping massive amounts of explosive ordinance onto cities — no-no, they are <em>no fly zones. </em>A war today can never be a war, it must be a <em>humanitarian intervention,</em> or something of that nature. While the marketing of war as something other than war may serve domestic political goals, it is very dangerous. Someday, perhaps in the not too distant future, a nuclear strike won’t be a nuclear strike at all, it will just be some <em>time-limited unconventional self defence procedure.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*2wtA_CZLD2nJ4RE4Wr8HtA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Spotted while out driving in Kazan — Z stands for западный — meaning western. A reference to the Russian Western military district, whose soldiers painted the letter on their vehicles. It has become a symbol of support for the war, and is a common sight in Russian cities.</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f3df1419af6d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Entry 1: Notes from Kaz]]></title>
            <link>https://donalcostello1.medium.com/entry-1-notes-from-kaz-b013f59a6cbf?source=rss-90f5c4ba2b05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b013f59a6cbf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[university]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kazan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sanctions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Donal C]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Mar 2022 10:00:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-18T10:00:42.942Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Entry 1: Notes from Kazan</h3><p>For the past six months I have been living in Kazan, Russia. I came here as an international student from Ireland, studying a masters degree in engineering cybernetics. After a lot of prompting by a friend and comrade of mine, Jose from Chile, who I’m sure will be reading this, I decided to start writing a few short notes from my life here, and thoughts about what may yet happen.</p><p>It was the morning of the 24th of February, I was woken by my dormitory roommate, he said “Донал, это война” — it’s war. I was shocked but not surprised. Having listened to the now famous speech of Putin, in which he discussed the history of modern Ukraine, and ascribed its existence to Lenin, I was pretty certain of what would happen, but I thought the operation would be limited to the Donbass region. My roommate along with the students in the university were both shocked and surprised, they considered this kind of talk normal and hadn’t anticipated any military action. Very few people in Russia expected a real war, and the media had done nothing to prepare the population for it.</p><p>Since that moment, the world as a whole, with Russia at its centre, has been caught up in a whirlwind of escalation and counter-escalation. The sanctions have been very serious, and for a short time it appeared as through the Russian economy might collapse. That possibility is still non-negligible. Russian society is completely traumatised by the experience of the 1990s, even the students who are friends of mine (and don’t remember those times) speak about it with genuine terror. The possibility of ‘going back to the 90s’ is something worse than the prospect of war. It was a time of absolute chaos, from real hunger to drug abuse and child prostitution. The current Russian state was born out of what many Russians regard as <em>salvation</em> from those times. If you want to know why Putin is genuinely popular here with a large strata of society — that’s why. It’s something that western people never experienced, so they generally don’t get it.</p><p>There will be other posts where I’ll speak more about Russian reactions to the war. But I’ll end my first entry on this note: The western policy of sanctions will be remembered as one of the greatest blunders in modern political history. The initial shock on the 24th of February (the word I heard over and over again — “ужас”, meaning horror and extreme disagreement), has now been replaced with something else.</p><p>A lot of the students I know belong to Russia’s middle class, they are in their early 20s, and they don’t like Putin. If they have any affiliation, it is towards Navalny, and a general feeling of being ‘held back’ by the current Russian state. That same group of students that I know are now mostly in favour of the war, as strange as that may sound. They see the sanctions of the west as being aimed primarily at them. They think that the aim of western policy is to wipe out their meagre savings, and, simply put ‘to send us back to the 90s’. That the Russian state could collapse, and that the west will not save them after the destruction is complete, any more than they saved the people of Libya. The power of this theory is of course that it is fundamentally not wrong.</p><p>Whatever chance there might have been for a popular movement against the war in Russia seems to be gone now — and attitudes are hardening; “либо мы победим, либо этой стране конец” as one friend, a Kazakh student who has made Russia his home, told me, “either we win, or the country is finished”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b013f59a6cbf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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