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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ayobami on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ayobami on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@dondekojo?source=rss-7d2eb75211e0------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Ayobami on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dondekojo?source=rss-7d2eb75211e0------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Murder in Ibadan (II)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dondekojo/murder-in-ibadan-ii-da79ce721478?source=rss-7d2eb75211e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/da79ce721478</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[murder-mystery]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[murder]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ayobami]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 May 2018 14:10:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-03T14:10:28.769Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/809/1*ySDC0eAiHzc09ZnyzwvrrQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The murder victim was a cowherd named Salu, he arrived in Ibadan as a runaway slave from Abeokuta, although he was originally from Ilorin. Salu was referred to as a <em>Gambari, </em>a term used(sometimes derogatorily in subsequent years) for members of any tribe beyond the Niger river. Salu was particularly Hausa, a tribe who had been in Ibadan since the 1840s and were among its earliest non-Oyo settlers. The Hausas were first accommodated by Bashorun Oluyole, a warrior chief who owned large kola-nut plantations . The Hausas established themselves as middlemen in a trading exchange of cattle and kola nut between the northern savanna and southern forest zones.</p><p>The ending of the military expeditions by the colonial masters led to economic loss for the Ibadan Soldiers and warrior chiefs, this caused some resentment for the relatively successful Hausa settlers. The fact that they dominated the Governor’s constabulary that surrounded the eastern part of Ibadan, the army that helped the British forces to occupy the city also provoked the local opposition to their presence in Ibadan. Their monopoly of the kola nut trade and the alleged criminal activities were other factors.</p><p>There was a rise in the prevalence of robbery in Ibadan during the 1890s. Since the soldiers could no longer embark on raiding missions in other towns and the livelihood of war could no longer be depended upon, some warrior chiefs turned to brigandage in the city as an economically rewarding venture. They co-operated with the Hausa troops, who assisted by sheltering the thieves in their barracks. The Colonial resident intervened in July 1897 and demanded that the <em>Gambaris</em> deposit their weapons before he started issuing permits to <em>Gambaris</em> that could convince him that they were in Ibadan for honest trade.</p><p>The town chiefs held a council meeting with Resident Fuller in 1898 to discuss this issue of internal security, they decried the increase in armed robbery and blamed the<em> Gambaris</em> as the worst offenders, they complained that the earlier expulsion did not work as they (<em>Gambaris</em>) were back in town. Resident Fuller suggested that they should set up a sort of police for each district of the town and he also permitted self defence.</p><p>This approval for self defence led to a rumour in Ibadan that any Gambari caught stealing should be killed. Barely one month later, Osi Balogun Kongi was accused of sponsoring the thieving gangs. Kongi was a distinguished and successful warrior, he was appointed Areago Balogun as far back as 1879. The Colonial resident accused the Baale of trying to hush the case up, Balogun Akintola (who had been arrested and imprisoned by Captain Bower earlier) insisted that Kongi must go to jail to share his own experience in detention, he did not support Baale Fajimi’s attempts to exonerate Kongi.</p><p>The Chiefs met to Judge Kongi the next week and he was found guilty of ‘harbouring Gambaris’, in contravention of the rule of the Council &amp; the order of the Baale &amp; was fined £50. The Chiefs were pleased that a man of noble birth like Kongi was not publicly disgraced or sent to prison. The Prosecutors could not prove that Kongi joined the Gambaris he harboured in the robbery himself.</p><p>Having previously proved his battle merit, Kongi brought the practice of bringing war spoils right into Ibadan city, embodying his political status through thuggery and display of the large numbers of followers supporting him. His oriki refer to the raids he made, which were carried out on horseback and with a retinue of drummers singing his praise. The other chiefs most likely shared in the material rewards of his city raids; this would explain their reluctance to see him ‘publicly disgraced’.</p><p>Basorun Fajinmi died in April 1902 and his title as Baale became vacant, this was the first time since the 1897 defeat of Ilorin that the Baale post had become available in Ibadan and without military expeditions to confirm promotion, finding a successor became problematic. The absence of external war had already caused one military title, that of the Sarumi, to become redundant. Balogun Kongi claimed that even though he had not led the Ibadan Army into battle, he was eligible to be promoted from Balogun. Kongi’s claim to the throne met a united opposition from the Chiefs who were waiting for “The white men to leave” so that war will ensue.</p><p>Otun Balogun Apanpa was the most vocal in opposition to Kongi as he believed that he had a shot at the title too, Apanpa pointed out that no Balogun had ever become the Baale . Although the four Baale installed during the nineteenth century had been Balogun chiefs, they had not reached the highest rank of their line. They were able to become Baales because their senior Baloguns had been killed in Battle. Meanwhile, Ogunmola and Latoosa had set a precedent for Apanpa’s case. Before assuming the posts of Basorun and Are-onakakanfo respectively they had both been Otun Balogun.</p><p>Both Apanpa and Kongi were unsuccessful in their bids to become Baale, promoting Apanpa over Kongi could have resulted in a civil war that could have destroyed Ibadan altogether while the colonial resident and Ibadan Chiefs believed that Installing Kongi might enable him to extend his enterprise of robbery and extortion without check.</p><p>The Chiefs(influenced by the colonial resident) decided to elect Otun Baale Mosaderin Instead. Mosaderin was described by Resident Elgee as ‘an invalid owing to the ill effects produced by over ten gunshot wounds which he had received in the wars of his youth. In consequence of this he was never able to take a conspicuous part in public affairs’. The Chiefs and Colonial resident decided to elect him because of his old age and frailty. This way they made sure that the Baale would not be too powerful.</p><p>Despite Kongi’s loss, he remained the most powerful chief in Ibadan, the other chiefs started resenting him and accused him of insubordination several times. Consequently the chiefs decided to depose Kongi, They charged him with four offences: that he was harbouring robbers; that he had been insubordinate to both Basorun Fajinmi and Baale Mosaderin; that he had poisoned Basorun Fajinmi; that he ‘was wicked, merciless and proud. The Chiefs decided to expel Kongi, The British acting Governor accepted Kongi’s expulsion to Fesu Iwo, The birth place of his gradfather Ogunmola. He never returned alive.</p><p>After Kongi’s expulsion, Otun Balogun Apanpa was promoted to Balogun, The role of Osi Balogun was given as a first title to Akintayo, the head of ile Awanibaku. Ile Awanibaku was a household which had previously paid allegiance to ile Ogunmola and served as banner men in Ogunmola’s conquests, the compound formerly headed by Kongi. Osi Balogun was an exceptionally high title for a first installation, but Akintayo was rewarded for his role in Kongi’s political downfall.</p><p>To be continued….</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=da79ce721478" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Murder In Ibadan (1)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dondekojo/murder-in-ibadan-1-863866e6d1e?source=rss-7d2eb75211e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/863866e6d1e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ibadan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[murder]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ayobami]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Dec 2016 18:51:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-28T18:51:16.236Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>“ The Council considered that a heavy fine was a greater punishment than death and would act as greater deterrent in future. If people think that they will only be killed if convicted of murder they will not think much of it.”-Balogun Apanpa 1902.</blockquote><p>On the 8th of November 1902, 10 Ibadan traditional chiefs headed by Baale Mosaderin passed a judgement on three men found guilty of murder, the three men confessed to the crime and decided to plead guilty. The council resolved that two of the men should be fined £50 each and the third culprit imprisoned.</p><p>Dr Arthur Pickels, The British resident in Ibadan was dissatisfied with the judgement as he thought it was too lenient and he told the chiefs to reconsider. The council reconvened and decided to raise the fines from £50 each to £75. Pickels questioned their decision again prompting Balogun Apanpa to address him as the spokesman that “a heavy fine was a greater punishment than death”</p><p>To understand Balogun Apanpa’s claim, let us review the political culture and history of Ibadan that sets the scene for the Murder and the Council’s judgement. This story is based on true events.</p><p>The city of Ibadan was formed in 1829 by a composite band of marauders after the fall of the Oyo empire. The city was intended to be a war camp for warriors coming from Oyo, Ife and Ijebu. Refugees flooded the area and therefore the organisation of the Ibadan polity came to be centred upon the success of the ‘marauders’ in settling groups of people in large military households. It was formed as a military state and remained that way until the end of the 19th century.</p><p>Due to the military expeditions, the prominent trade in Ibadan was slave trading and some farming, forays were undertaken to neighbouring towns to acquire slaves for domestic purposes and the slaves were made to work on the farms. This arrangement allowed the city to feed itself despite being at war with most of the surrounding towns.</p><p>The large success on the battlefield encouraged the development of a military style of government, battlefield experience meant that a warrior could amass a body of followers which enabled them to generate <em>ola</em>(Social Honour) This attribute had to be displayed before any Ibadan citizen(or any refugee from anywhere)could claim a chieftaincy title.</p><p>By the mid 18th century the male chieftaincy lines were those of the Balogun, Seriki, and Baale, while the female line was headed by the Iyalode. <strong>No titles were hereditary or royal</strong>. Junior male posts were taken by ologun (‘brave warriors’) who then competed for promotion to a higher position on their line or to another line altogether.</p><p>The Iyalode was a successful female trader who also involved herself in Ibadan war campaigns. She supplied her fellow chiefs with credit to purchase firearms and ammunition and contributed her own corps of armed slaves to military expeditions. If the Iyalode lost her prominent economic status, another, more wealthy woman could usurp her title( Efunsetan took over from Subuola by this means during the late 1860s)</p><p>The Balogun led the senior military men on war campaigns, accompanied by the Sarumi and his subordinates, who were less experienced soldiers. Another junior military office was that of the Sarumi, the chief of the cavalry. The Baale was a war veteran who had distinguished himself in battle and once installed, he did not usually leave the town.</p><p>The regional instability in Yorubaland after the fall of the Oyo empire set the perfect base for this bellicose society and influenced the growth and political rise of the military state. Ibadan chiefs(Warlords) pursued their own imperial policy in defiance of the Alaafin of Oyo from the 1860s, so that by the mid-1870s they had jurisdiction over towns almost 200 miles east of their base. Ibadan had successfully replaced Oyo as the new power base in Yorubaland and it’s neighbours were growing tired.</p><p>Ibadan chiefs sometimes went to war and imperialist campaigns to further their political careers back home and even retreated from some wars that lacked political gains, an example is their reluctance to launch a campaign against Ilesha in 1867; Not from any love of Ilesa or fear of its almost impregnable forts, but rather that titles should be rearranged so that they might have promotions after the war.</p><p>State formation actually occurred on the battlefield, where competing warrior chiefs and their followers transformed their rival military households into the ‘Ibadan army’. Collective warfare was a practical way to win greater spoils; it was more effective than numerous raiding bands. One example is a conquest against the Ekitis in 1874, The Ibadans made an easy conquest of the whole district. Men, women and children were captured without the slightest attempt at resistance. They had so much captives and so much the booty, that the campaign appeared more like a stroll in the park</p><p>There were also longer-term benefits-The Ibadan chiefs usually station administrators in the conquered towns the inhabitants of were forced to pay tribute to Ibadan chiefs quarterly. After successful military expeditions, they return home to share the booty within various households and sold prisoners of wars as slaves to farmers, they satisfied the economic and political need of the city this way.</p><p>In 1877, The Ekitis got tired of the Imperialism, the administrators were unruly, they were accused of bullying young men and raping their women. The Ekitis rebelled, killed the administrators and declared war against Ibadan in what would be known as the Kiriji war, fought by the “ Ekiti Parapo” army.</p><p>Being a smaller town they sought allies and as expected, most towns bought into the revolution. Egba and Ijebu joined in favour of the Ekitis and Ijeshas, and attacked Ibadan from the south, while the combined forces of Ekiti and Ijesha who allied with the Fulanis attacked Ibadan in the north. Ife also joined the war on the side of the Ekitis and Ijeshas. Ibadan alone was fighting five fronts. It was a large civil war in Yoruba land and lasted for sixteen years.</p><p>In August 1893 the Ibadan chiefs were coerced into signing a treaty to end regional warfare and incorporated their polity into the British Empire. By December, Captain Bower had stationed himself on the eastern outskirts of the city, together with a Hausa force of the Governor’s constabulary. The defeat of Ilorin and Ijebu by forces loyal to the Royal Niger company made it easier to get both warring sides to agree on the treaty.</p><p>The city’s chiefs would never again go into battle, and without war spoils they had to find alternative means to meet their expenses and maintain their large followings. With no opportunity to prove themselves in warfare, the strategy for attaining promotion in the chieftaincy ranks was unclear. To be at home with nothing to do was rather irksome for those whose trade was war.</p><p>To be continued…</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=863866e6d1e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Assets Sale/Deregulation : The Curious Case Of NITEL and The Telecommunications sector.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dondekojo/assets-sale-deregulation-the-curious-case-of-nitel-and-the-telecommunications-sector-57e6d244f9c9?source=rss-7d2eb75211e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/57e6d244f9c9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privatization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ayobami]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Sep 2016 14:29:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-28T15:03:12.616Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/124/1*Fdf-n2z8iPCGob8FOW-Bqg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Assets Sale/Deregulation : The Curious Case Of NITEL and The Telecommunications sector.</p><p>Privatization is back in the news in Nigeria again, in reality it never left us. Successive Nigerian governments had commissioned numerous studies to search for solutions to the problem of public enterprises in Nigeria. It started as far back as 1969( The Adebo Commission), it continued in 1973(the Udoji Commission), in 1981 (Onosode Commission), and in 1984( the AL-Hakim Commission).</p><p>The studies came into a similar conclusion; that the Public companies were corrupt, inefficient and a burden on the treasury, they all proposed privatization, deregulation and liberalization as some measures to deal with them. This resulted in the promulgation of the Privatization and Commercialization decree №25 in 1988.</p><p>It is no longer news that Nigeria is in a recession and we have rightfully (in theory) chosen the Keynesian approach to spend our way(on Infrastructure??)out of it. According to the <a href="http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/-why-we-want-to-sell-assets-udoma/163859.html">Budget Minister</a>, we are selling some assets to raise the cash needed to fund capital projects and not necessarily to reduce corruption, recurrent expenditure or deregulate in areas where the role of the state hinders economic activity, like the Petroleum sector.</p><p>The most successful push for deregulation in Nigeria happened in the telecommunications sector, Decree 75 of 1992 had liberalized the sector and opened it up to new entry and competition. The Nigeria Telecommunications company(NITEL) was commercialized and the National Communications Commission(NCC) was established to regulate the industry. Despite the decree NITEL retained a monopoly and was able to install 450k telephone lines across the country by 1999. In 2001, NCC auctioned three digital mobile licenses to new operators MTEL(NITEL’s Mobile arm), MTN, and Econet(Now Airtel).</p><p>With the new economic actors and a deregulated sector, fierce competition made the use of mobile telephony in Nigeria explode. Just 6 years down the line in 2007, the number of mobile telephone lines jumped to 38 million from NITEL’s 450k, by 2010 the number of mobile users had increased to 85 million and according to <a href="http://ncc.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=125&amp;Itemid=73">NCC</a> , the Number of connected telephone lines in Nigeria rose to 216 Million in 2016 with 149M active users. The deregulation and transformation was a huge success.</p><p>The success was intensified by the Telecoms Act of 2003 which strengthened NCC and encouraged new entry, including a Nigerian owned operator, Glo . The NCC estimates about $37.5bn in new investments in the industry within 2003–2007 alone creating over 100,000 direct jobs and more than 5 million indirect jobs in the economy. in 2014 alone, <a href="http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/GSMA_Nigeria-Report_WEB.pdf">the mobile ecosystem contributed $8.3 billion in value add to the Nigerian economy</a> which includes about $2.3bn in direct taxes or sector specific regulatory fees. It generates about 164,000 direct jobs annually.</p><p>The Success of the deregulation and liberization of the sector could not be transmitted to the Privatization of NITEL and it’s Mobile arm, MTEL which was a massive failure. There were four unsuccessful attempts to privatize NITEL. The <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Investors-International-gets-stake-in-Nitel-20011113">first one</a> was in 2001, it was auctioned and the winning bidder was Investors International London Limited, a joint Nigerian venture. This trade failed because they failed to pay the balance of 90% of the bid price of $1.3bn, the transaction was eventually <a href="http://www.totaltele.com/view.aspx?ID=402209">terminated</a> the next year.</p><p>The Government decided to put NITEL under a management contract for the next three years to restructure it and make it more attractive for prospective buyers. Pentascope, a Dutch Nigerian consortium won the contract with the promise to make it competitive and viable within 3 years. They could not meet their target in the first year and the Government <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Nitel-cuts-ties-with-Dutch-firm-20050202">called the deal off</a> within two years despite paying huge sums in Management fees that led to public outcry and a parliamentary probe.</p><p>After the failure of the management deal, the Government attempted to sell NITEL again in 2005. This time the top bidder was Orascom, an Egyptian Telecoms company. This attempt also failed because the top bid was $256.5M which was much lower than the government’s valuation, the government decided to avoid the public outcry of selling one of it’s crown jewels at a give away price. By this time it’s operations had deteriorated and all 8000 of it’s workers were a significant burden on the Treasury.</p><p>Another attempt was made the next year in 2006, the Govt negotiated a “Willing buyer-Willing seller” approach, they sold NITEL to Transcorp, a new Nigerian conglomerate put together by government officials and a group of wealthy Nigerians. Transcorp bought 51% of NITEL’s shares for $500m and the Federal Govt. retained the remaining 49%.</p><p>Transcorp failed to turn NITEL around after two years, there was public outcry when Transcorp failed to pay salary of staff members for more than 12 months and consequently the National council on Privatization revoked NITEL’s sale to Transcorp in an emergency meeting on June 1, 2009. The NCP cited it’s failure to adhere to the terms of the Share Sales Purchase agreement and the salary issue.</p><p>The Next attempt to Privatize NITEL was in the same year 2009, it was auctioned again and New Generation Communications Limited won the bid with Omen International limited as the reserve bidder. They both failed to pay their respective sums of $2.5bn and $985M and the deal was terminated in 2011.</p><p><a href="http://www.pcworld.com/article/2913072/nigerian-govt-hands-over-nitel-mtel-assets-to-natcom.html">NITEL was finally(???) sold in 2015</a> by the National Council on Privatization headed by the VP Nnamadi Sambo to NATCOM. The VP said NATCOM paid the full bid price of $252M and fulfilled all other conditions in the bid process. The company was sold through “guided liquidation”. The main proviso in the guided liquidation process is for the bidder to operate the assets to provide telecommunication services in the country.</p><p>There’s still so much pessimism about NITEL’s future despite the recent sale with obsolete infrastructure and a saturated industry with 11 Mobile service Providers.</p><p>NITEL’s story shows that assets sale isn’t an instant process as it takes years to complete. Unguarded statements about how much we need cash won’t help our Valuation and negotiation too and in cases like the Petroleum industry, we have to pass the PIB and deregulate the downstream sector before talking about “attracting investors” to buy refineries. I hope we can learn a lot from NITEL and the Telecommunications sector</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=57e6d244f9c9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sharia Law In Lagos.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dondekojo/sharia-law-in-lagos-635060ebc7fa?source=rss-7d2eb75211e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/635060ebc7fa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[islam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[secularism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[muslim]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lagos]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ayobami]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Aug 2016 17:53:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-08T17:53:18.745Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday, Someone requested for the office of the Sharia Council in Lagos on my twitter timeline and I was surprised with the reaction of a lot of people including Lagos Muslims asking if there is any Sharia presence in Lagos.</p><p>In 2002, Muslim activists in Lagos State took it upon themselves to set up a private arbitration tribunal — the Independent Sharia Panel(“ISP”) of Lagos State — to which Muslims are invited to submit their disputes for adjudication under Islamic law. This was not the beginning or the end of the struggle to introduce Sharia Law in Lagos.</p><p>Their argument was that over a number of years, Islamic law has effectively been eliminated as a choice of law option in what they consider as the regular courts. The divorces, inheritance cases, and other civil matters even of Muslims who would choose to go under Islamic law if they could, are handled according to Yoruba customary law or “English” law which they also argued that is based on Christian Principles.</p><p>It is a well known historical fact that Yorubaland was almost an islamic caliphate and Sharia might have been practiced to the letter in some of the conquered/ converted towns in Pre- Colonial times. This is seen in the presence of Arabic legal loan-words or infiltration of Shariah terms of expressions in the Yoruba language. There are expressions like “O da seria fun-un” meaning, he meted out to him the punishment he deserved according to Shariah, and “O to suna” meaning, ‘it is in line with the Sunnah of The Muslim Prophet’.</p><p>The Muslim activists in Lagos decided to take matters into their own hands by forming the independent panels after the Government rejected several petitions and campaigns for separate Sharia courts. They were inspired by a modern event, a Nigerian Victory for Sharia advocators all over the world. The declaration of the implementation of Sharia in Zamfara State, done with fanfare and huge celebration at Gusau (October 27,1999).</p><p>Muslims from all over Nigeria attended this epoch making occasion, All the leading ulama from all over the country were also in attendance. Speeches were delivered by the scholars and Islamic Leaders, ushering in a new era in the application of the Sharia in Nigeria(Not Zamfara Alone). Notably, One of the leaders that spoke in Gusau was The Leader of Muslims in Yoruba Land Alhaji Abdulazeez Arisekola Alao [who] said he was the happiest man on earth having been alive to witness the historic occasion.. .[He] thanked the Governor and the members of the State House of Assembly who, according to him unanimously passed the bill on Shariah into law, thereby making it possible “for Allah’s law to be operative in Zamfara State instead of man-made law forced on ‘us’ by our colonial masters.”</p><p>The Gusau launching filled Muslims in all parts of Nigeria — the southwest included — with new zeal to push Sharia implementation ahead in their own states. Inspired by this, a youth organization called NACOMYO( National Council of Muslim Youth Organizations )from all states of the Yoruba southwest, together with other groups, held a meeting at the University of Ibadan Central Mosque in February 2000 to strategize how they could advance the cause of Sharia in their own states.</p><p>On their return Home from the Ibadan meeting, the Lagos chapter of NACOMYO convened a meeting at the Lagos Central Mosque, They Invited several Muslim organizations and communities active in Lagos State, including Ansar-ud-Din, Nawair-ud-Deen, Anwar-ul-Islam,Nasrul-Lahi-l-Fatih Society of Nigeria (NASFAT), Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN), The Muslim Congress (TMC), and the Muslim Lawyers Association of Nigeria (MULAN). They met consistently for a year straight to look for means to introduce Shariah Law in Lagos.</p><p>They resolved that their first step would be to exploit the religious mood in Lagos then by persuading the newly elected Governor (a Muslim) and House of Assembly of Lagos State(majority Muslim) to enact a Sharia Courts Bill. They drafted this bill and approached Muslim members of the House of Assembly to introduce the bill on the floor of the house and they also lobbied the Governor.</p><p>According to the bill, It would establish Sharia courts of first instance, at least one in each LGA (20 in Lagos ) but as many as some unspecified official might deem were needed. All appeals from the lower Sharia courts would go to a new Lagos State Sharia Court of Appeal, which the draft bill would also establish. The territorial jurisdiction of each lower Sharia court would be defined in the warrant establishing it.</p><p>Another feature of the bill, drawn from the same source, is its creation of a third institution, an official state Council of Ulama, which would have a role in the appointment and discipline of judges of the Sharia Courts, in the drafting of their rules of procedure, and even in advising the judges on questions of Islamic law when requested to do so. The Council of Ulama would also have power “to codify all the relevant Islamic personal laws and where applicable their corresponding rewards for easy reference</p><p>One of their major argument was that (more than) Half of the entire population in Lagos are Muslims and Yoruba Muslims must go either under Yoruba custom in the Customary Courts or English law in the Magistrate’s and High Courts. The activists claim that the pagans and Christians of Lagos have their own courts (Yoruba custom derived from the Yoruba traditional religion, and English law derived from “Christian” values). To them the Muslims in Lagos were having a bad deal.</p><p>It is interesting to note that it is the same Muslims in Lagos that they were ‘fighting for’ that ultimately killed their proposal, They could not find one Muslim lawmaker willing to introduce this bill. According to one of the activists, Abdur-Raheem Ahmad Sayi</p><blockquote>We couldn’t find any of the legislators that is bold enough to accept the Bill and present it for the House whether or not it will be accepted or rejected. Initially, we were disappointed in some of them . . . . We felt that by virtue of the Islamic high profile they bear, we think they should be able to do some assistance in that regard but later we came to realize that politicians are always politicians and whatever they see could be detrimental to their political ambition. They all want to leave that place for a higher place, they all have aspirations, political aspirations they have. So, all of them gave one reason or the other to dodge it.</blockquote><p>Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu was the Biggest Politician in the state, As a Muslim himself he was not sympathetic to the idea, He did <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/200209110149.html">confirm</a> that He was under immense pressure to introduce Sharia Law in the state but he ensured Christian leaders that he rebuffed all attempts. As the ‘Asiwaju’ it could also be one of the reasons they could not find a lawmaker sympathetic to their cause. Their Bill was dead on arrival.</p><p>They moved on to their next plan which was the establishment of a private tribunal, The Independent Sharia Panel (ISP) that Lagos Muslims themselves would maintain and to which Muslims who wished to do so could bring their civil matters for adjudication under Islamic law. The hoped that the ISP would gradually attract increasing numbers of young Muslim litigants and financial support from the Muslim community, which could demonstrate a growing desire among Lagos Muslims for serious Islamic adjudication of the sort the ISP would provide.</p><p>They Created two ISPs. One on the Mainland and the other on the Island, They also decided to affiliate with the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria (SCSN) which was formed by Northern Muslims in response to the great outcry that rose up after Zamfara State announced in late 1999 that it was going to implement Sharia and then did so, cutting off the first thief’s hand in March 2000. The Group that famously opposed and actually brought vaccination against polio in Kaduna, Kano, and Zamfara States to a halt in 2003 and for some years thereafter, alleging it was a Western plot to reduce the Muslim birth rate. This resulted in new outbreaks of the virus in the north when it had almost been eradicated. They formed a Lagos Chapter of the body.</p><p>Their last resort was to make their agitation political, They called on Lagos Muslims not to vote for any gubernatorial or House of Assembly aspirant in that year’s elections who was not willing to support the establishment of civil Sharia courts for Muslims. Tinubu defied their call and won again in 2003. Their Bill died a natural death until they decided to support another Muslim candidate in Babatunde Raji Fashola in 2007.</p><p>In 2009, They tried their new candidate and Muslim Governor. In July the Lagos SCSN again approached the House of Assembly with a draft bill for the establishment of Sharia courts and a written petition from Lagos Muslims supporting it this time.</p><p>In September 2009, the Lagos chapter of SCSN, already operating its ISP at two locations in the city, made plans to launch a third division. They received permission from the Police to hold the launching on a certain date. The venue was reserved and invitations went out. But when they got to the venue on the appointed day, they found it blocked by the police and the launching was not allowed to take place. The ISPs are still Operational and I am going to discuss their operations, and some problems encountered in a different post.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=635060ebc7fa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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