<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Rahul VN on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Rahul VN on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul?source=rss-215e598d7b72------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 09:04:43 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Curious case of Box Midfield across Europe]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul/the-curious-case-of-box-midfield-across-europe-32d7a9ba5c1a?source=rss-215e598d7b72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/32d7a9ba5c1a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tactical-analysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul VN]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Jul 2023 13:28:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-10T13:28:44.111Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What’s inside the box??</p><p>Across Last season, one of the most discussed ‘meta’ in football circles was about the merits-demerits of box midfield. Many people have already written lot of articles/gave out their thoughts on it, some went a step ahead &amp; could predict to move on to an evolutionary ‘diamond’ midfield. While this article will go through the basics of it, I will concentrate more on certain sides outside of PL including National teams &amp; what were the factors that brought this change/usage upon them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g4IohQclde9AxwN67gOSsg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 1: The Belgian side under Tedesco in possession using the ‘fabled’ 3–2–2–3 box</figcaption></figure><p><strong>THE WHAT’S WHAT OF BOX MIDFIELD: VARIATIONS OF SHAPE ACROSS EUROPE (OUTSIDE PL &amp; INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL FOOTBALL)</strong></p><p>A) The backline setup: It Matters</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*bMAgL3JbJZvTafcm6S96dg.gif" /><figcaption>Vid 1: A Video showing effective manipulation of 4–4–2 Base OOP using a 3–2–2–3</figcaption></figure><p>The 1st thing that you might have read about the Box midfield would be the 3–2–2–3 shape. It’s a shape with a Back 3 &amp; if your team’s got a highly reliable GK with feet, you can start your sequnces with a 4–2 using GK as an auxiliary CB or make use of it when you want to draw press (like in the video above where CB’s spread out to draw press &amp; in this way manipulate the cover shadow occupant teammates to step out).<strong> It captures the very essence of Box midfield which is “overload &amp; have the chance to win the midfield battle”</strong>.</p><p>Now coming to the why of Backline setup matters, it’s 1st important to note that teams dont always look forward to to a 3–2–2–3 setup, especially if teams at a certain point of season dont have the right profiles or capable GK’s to be able to start Phase 1 in an artificial 4–2 Buildup. These teams would rather try out a 4–2–2–2 approach, which was bery common in sides that didnt have Proper Ball Playing GK’s.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4VZFr7ahC-_tSSdrf6fW9A.png" /><figcaption>Pic 2: Juventus under Max Allegri towards the 2nd Half of season were proponents of using both 4–2–2–2 &amp; a variation of 3–2–2–3 in Europa League KO’s</figcaption></figure><p>Particular examples like Juventus in the 2nd leg against Sporting CP made use of a 4–2–2–2 with Di Maria &amp; Rabiot as the upper layer of the Box as the 10’s while Locatelli-Miretti would provide the Base. In this case the frontline 2 of Chiesa &amp; Dusan required one of them to provide width when needed &amp; one of the 10’s to drop wide (when compared to a 3–2–2–3 where maintanence of width isnt a issue). For the 4–2–2–2 to work, it largely requires frontline 2 to be capable width providers &amp; one of the 10’s be capable of central presence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0OtTOi3BUaPYgPg73D8X5A.png" /><figcaption>Pic 3: Tedesco’s Belgium in a 4–2–2–2 against Germany on March 29 2023</figcaption></figure><p>This article started off with Me showing Tedesco’s Belgium so let’s talk about them. They have been proponents of using both 4–2–2–2 &amp; the 3–2–2–3 with varying results. Again the player profiles in the lineup was such that they couldnt maintain uniform numbers in terms of who kept width given Lukaku’s presence &amp; generally led to them having a overload on right with Lukebakio drifitng wide &amp; when in defensive or offensive transitions in &amp; out of Box required Carrasco (Number 11) to move in &amp; out constantly. Result of it was a narrow 3–2 win where they conceded twice. Fast forward 3 months Later, we see the shape in Pic 1, the 3–2–2–3 shift from Tedesco.</p><p>In case you are wondering where I am going with all this, let’s recall why the Box midfield matters: It helps you overload the middle, increase chances of winning the midfield battle. But to do that whether you have a capable ball playing GK factors in which shape (the 3–2–2–3 or 4–2–2–2) you chose. But with the disadvantages 4–2–2–2 brings if you dont have specialized/hardworking OOP forward pair, it’s no use going with it. But even without a Great Ball playing GK’s it’s far <strong>‘Safer/Uniform’</strong> to use a 3–2–2–3 which is what pushed in Tedesco’s case to shift to it eventually.</p><p><strong>B) WHY THE BOX: WHAT LED TO TEAMS CHOOSE ONE OF THE BOX FORMATIONS</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Kt-sApuB2zWUKIdF-ZakFg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 4: Jorge’s Jesus’s variation of 3–2–2–3 using Guler as the right halfspace occupant</figcaption></figure><p>We talked about the What of Box Midfield, showcased a few examples of some teams that used it, &amp; with Tedesco’s case setup the base for why of it in last section. Is it all about Overloading the Midfield &amp; weighing the pros/cons of uniform OOP &amp; lack of ball playing GK’s??</p><p>Not exactly, but let’s start by saying it in one sentence: Dearth of Fullbacks</p><p>Across various articles you might have read on various teams, all of them would have made it a point of note that lack of Fullback profiles to cover ground game in game out are a dying breed. So teams naturally looked to a back 3 as a solution &amp; be able to shift to OOP shapes filling the backline with duel winning monsters (Oh Hello Pep!!).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M8YqlPrcC0dFXBRML2SW-w.png" /><figcaption>Pic 5: Max Allegri’s Juventus using the 3–4–3 (3–2–2–3) against Sevilla in Europa League Semis</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TOVdRJg5z3r0bkYw9_XMxw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 6: Max Allegri’s Juventus using the 3–4–3 (3–2–2–3) in a league game against Fiorentina</figcaption></figure><p>Well let’s talk about Juventus. Being a Juventus fan myself, it was pretty evident our fullback options Sandro &amp; Cuadrado were past it to cover gorund &amp; be the dynamic Fullbacks/Widemen they were in the Past. Coupled with Max Allegri’s own shortcoming with initial shapes he played around with that led to falling out of the UCL early &amp; lose ground in scudetto race, post world cup saw Allegri come up with his own variation of the Box shape, using Alex sandro as the LCB in the Back 3 &amp; using Cuadrado in a more offense oriented Winger role in the front 3.</p><p>But because this doesnt involve one of the bacline members stepping inside or inverting to from the Box, it needed either Chiesa (left wideman in the shape) or Cuadrado to drop as the Fullback or wingback to defend. This became a point of contention amongst Juve fans as it hindered Chiesa severly &amp; Allegri’s (though not all his fault) insitence to make it work with the profile of players the squad had just couldnt make it work.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M-EOSaZtmpSoBzZIlq2KxQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 7: Xabi Alonso’s Leverkusen using the 3–4–3/3–2–2–3 against Union Berlin</figcaption></figure><p>Taking a trip to Germany, we see Xabi alonso adopting the Box because it became evident under Gerard Seoane that Dutch pairing of Bakker/Frimpong couldnt offer defensive security in a back 4 &amp; neither could Hincapie with all his ball playing prowess play as the Main Leftback in a back 4. So in comes Alonso who recognized that the neccessary profiles were in place to play that shape, uses the Box shape that sees Hincapie excel in the wide LCB position, allows Frimpong-Diaby pair to terrorize the right flank. It’s interesting to note that unlike in Juventus example, here in Leverkusen the profiles fell in place perfectly to play the 3–2–2–3.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vq_FLpTF6A8AVSgQE_3Qcw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 8: Porto’s 4–2–2–2 against Inter Milan in UCL RO-16 Tie</figcaption></figure><p>I did talk about some demerits of 4–2–2–2 but perhaps what gives hope on using this shape in future couldnt be better explained than Sergio Conceição’s usage of it in the Roudn of 16 tie against Inter even with a presence of a Top ball playing GK like Diogo Costa in his ranks. The best beenfit of using a 4–2–2–2 with a Ball playing GK is it would be it’s ability to generate wide/halfspace overloads against those teams that defend in a 5 back (like Inter in this case), &amp; when you have the security of a Ball playing GK, you can still construct 4–2 Buildups with 3 defenders &amp; the GK to draw press &amp; have one of the Fullbacks push high on any flank &amp; cause damage.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KaHDIF3_yUxKvG4S2ApIpw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 9: Simeone’s Atletico using the 3–4–3/3–2–2–3 against Cadiz in a League Game</figcaption></figure><p>Perhaps Simeone’s example of using the Box Midfield post world cup to go on a Unbeaten streak is another case of Manager’s ability to recognize that player profiles falling in right place to implement the Box midfield with a 3 back. Again for Cholo, his squad had the right ingredients ready enough to cook &amp; serve the dish with Griezmann naturally slotting into the right interior/halfspace role &amp; Hermoso, Molina all soaking in the essence immediately.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G60NzWNh8JjfblS7M5oPUA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 10: Andoni Iraola’s Rayo using a Lopsided 4–2–2–2 against Betis</figcaption></figure><p>Taking a walk across in the same Madrid neibhourhood of Vallecas, we see current Bournemouth coach Andoni Iraola’s Rayo playing a version of 4–2–2–2 that sees Isi tucking in as the interior, &amp; instead of strikers/forwards occupy between CB’s, saw Isi Palazon usually narrowing the opposition backline on their right for their Right back to make overlapping runs but for most part even if it came with the danger of leaving the Right flank much more vulnerable, some brilliant OOP setup from Iraola (which warrants an article of itself) minimize the risk as much though never completely eliminate it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lFXHVN_6PD-dOSJv4prg4Q.png" /><figcaption>Pic 11: Ronald Koeman’s Netherlands using the 3–2–2–3 in Nations League fixture vs Croatia</figcaption></figure><p>And to end it off, finally we take a look at Ronald Koeman continuing on Van Gaal’s work, &amp; that was also down to the factor that Netherlands lacked the dynamic/well rounded Fullbacks that they would instead use this shape in line to achieve the midfield overloads to win the midfield battle &amp; also phase Virgil van Djik, the captain to a CCB role instead where he’s more focused on duels in final few yards of defensive yards than increase his scope of coverage &amp; risk errors.</p><p><strong>CONCLUSION: CONNECTING THE DOTS &amp; EVOLVING BEYOND THE BOX</strong></p><p>Now that I have gone through a range of examples, across various leagues in Europe &amp; National Teams, if you made it till here you would have got the basic idea that teams that adopted it started off with the base idea of how best to overload midfield areas, then weighed the pros &amp; cons of using the 2 different backline shapes &amp; availability of the right profiles.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UHgeDNzSEoBXHsYPpn5zsw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 12: Gasperini’s Atalanta using an iteration of 3–2–2–3 against Juventus</figcaption></figure><p>How it succeeded or failed &amp; then succeeded or remained a largely failed idea always came down to 3 factors:</p><ol><li>Composition of the squad (in national teams case largely not flexible unlike clubs). A main factor in why even if Allegri for Juventus &amp; many other coaches planned it but just couldnt get the consistent output required.</li><li>A manager’s ability to recognize the Potential of playing it with the squad available ( Take Alonso or Simeone’s case) or recognize &amp; fix the dynamics (In Tedesco’s case going from 4–2–2–2 to 3–2–2–3)</li><li>A Manager’s ability to go beyond it’s main intent of just winning the Midfield Battle alone (albeit the most important Battle on pitch). Best examples were Conceição &amp; Iraola’s usage that looked beyond just winning the battle in the middle but started looking at benefits it could offer out wide.</li></ol><p>But for all of it’s merits, the Box midfield has it’s own demerits &amp; though discussing that is beyond the scope of article , it’s imperative to understand that evolving beyond it &amp; how players can be trained to do so eventually (or if not change certain parts of squad) is the challenge that lies ahead &amp; coaches just wouldnt want to copy it unless they have perfected it’s 1st form.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=32d7a9ba5c1a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Can Inzaghi’s Biscione Overcome Pep’s Cityzens]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul/can-inzaghis-biscione-overcome-pep-s-cityzens-823971e140f3?source=rss-215e598d7b72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/823971e140f3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[haaland]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[simone-inzaghi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pep-guardiola]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uefa-champions-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul VN]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Jun 2023 15:07:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-09T15:07:27.281Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*xy9MEsL0mDliQuSp3qXP8w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 1: Guardiola &amp; Inzaghi holding the Premier League &amp; Supercoppa Trophies respectively.</figcaption></figure><p>Every European Final is a special occasion, and as Man City &amp; Inter take on one other this Sunday, it will be a finale to a season that had the World cup taking place in the middle of it. In Pep’s perspective, he’s no stranger to this occasion, having won the competiton twice &amp; as recently as 2 years ago be part of the final where he unfotunately came short against Chelsea. In Inzaghi’s perspective, it’s his 1st rodeo to the UCL final but definitely not his 1st rodeo to a cup final having won 7 out of his 8 Cup Finals he’s participated across his Lazio &amp; Inter stints so far.</p><p>But Beyond the general know how of Both coaches &amp; their teams so far, this article aims to look at the Tactical &amp; Statistical details of both the European finalists &amp; highlight various key points on Both teams, tracing the Journey of both teams &amp; how they evolved.</p><p><strong>HOW DO THE METRICS LINE UP ON A SURFACE LEVEL WRT BOTH TEAMS??</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F_E347uHhdBycCoBTYDhbA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 2: Field Tilt vs Expected Threat difference of European Teams Across T5 Leagues on a Per90 Basis</figcaption></figure><p>Calling Man city by far the best team in Europe easily does justice when you consider their amount of Field tilt ( Team’s share of possession in final 3rd on an average) &amp; the Expected Threat Difference (Diff. in Threat generated &amp; Threat conceded) they have maintained this season. Topping the chart amongst 98 Clubs from T5 Leagues &amp; amongst Europe’s elite by a big margin is no easy feat. Inter on the other hand Rank top 5 in expected threat difference while also maintaining a healthy Field Tilt % that makes them keep company alongside Top European sides, a testament to the Work Inzaghi’s done.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nR7zf8xm8LO5cTvrwsnB5w.png" /><figcaption>Pic 3: Defensive Line of Actions &amp; xG Diifference on a Per90 Basis across T5 Leagues</figcaption></figure><p>Defensive Line of actions specifies the average distance from theirown goal where a team makes most of it’s defensive actions, indicating how high a team mantains it’s line &amp; willingness to Press. It should’nt come as a surpirse that City tops the chart in the highest average difference from it’s Goal making defensive actions to counter press &amp; also maintain a great Expected Goals difference showing their ability to allow less while pressing high while Inter too rank 5th &amp; 4th in both Metrics to show that unlike thought of as underdogs, Inter statistically are amongst the best.</p><p><strong>HOW DID BOTH COACHES EVOLVE AS SEASON WENT??</strong></p><p><strong>A) Guardiola’s Season Turning Tactical changes:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/708/1*TSt0gbGTX4ZZp-31N8dwYg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 4: City’s 1st Phase Buildup in the 2–1 defeat to United in January</figcaption></figure><p>It’s fair to say that post World cup when City met their rivals United in Old trafford, they were still way off the points behind Arsenal &amp; the general consesus of using Fullbacks inverting in 1st phase with likes of cancelo was not clicking anymore with Guardiola falling to a defeat at Old trafford that game.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kPpP17wSKSitEODF74H6Fg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pvAa9p3g-0wKjLqMy9jN3w.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DoWBz3oMFIKYC-No-iEINQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*03J3G8lDpg0VwgC0u3e3wA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 5: City’s 1st Phase in the Leizpig game 1.5 Months after the United Defeat &amp; usage of Haaland</figcaption></figure><p>Fast forward 1.5 months later, City Faced Leizpig in their home after a 1–1 away draw, City ruthlessly puts 7 past Leizpig without a reply &amp; all of a sudden putting John stones as a 6 alongside Rodri in Buildup seemed to have made City almost Invulnerable on &amp; off ball/ The 3–2–2–3/3–2–5 seemd more fluid with Stones ability to receive amidst pressure &amp; able to partner Rodri proving effective. With Kevin De Bruyne &amp; Gundogan playing as advanced 8’s &amp; Grealish-Silva/Mahrez providing width, City could secure possession in middle, could drop Haaland as an outlet to create wide overloads with Gundogan/KDB Drifting &amp; still maintain a strong rest defence mechanism to ensure they wouldnt be vulnerable on transitions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2RSwzQa4FUZUDsxyCKkk5g.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*koqLZem9ZRiEfwSlAQY6Lw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bl24Q68IEqzcJE77bGAozg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zMWpWfCdCjWP5VNGsdcIVQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 6: City’s Pressing structure in the 1st leg against Real Madrid</figcaption></figure><p>City’s 4–4–2 Out of possession structure has seen them almost invulnerable defensiively, with seemingly 4 duel winning defenders used in the last line from a Pool of top class CB’s to pick from which include Stones, Akanji, Ruben Dias, Nathan Ake, Kyle Walker &amp; Laporte which gives Guardiola to pursue more man to man ( like in 2nd pic above) against even Top class techno tactical teams like Real Madrid. Despite sharing spoils in the 1st Leg, it was seemingly inevitable that City were gonna upsurp Real &amp; the result came in 2nd leg with a 4–0 devastation on Real Madrid.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Pi000WyNJrA6r88x5BB1mg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xYxPS0j9NHoqC84vN-poQQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 7: City’s 3–2 Buildup against Real &amp; 3–2–2–3/3–2–5 in action in 2nd Leg</figcaption></figure><p>In the 2nd Leg where Real wanted to largely man mark Gundogan &amp; KDB, Stones &amp; Rodri managed to be effective in their duties in 1st phase, with Stones manipulating cover shadow of Real players effectively &amp; City able to sustain their Domination on Real with Walker keeping Vinicius Junior in Bay as Silva provided a Brace that sealed City’s path to Final.</p><p><strong>B) Inzaghi’s Strengthening with a Robust Buildup Approach</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*ljjaPfqgHdJuX4_w-QBwQA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*iEYaHhes7IRiQDoyUBxSAA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IoQq4I8_WncrBcQOqSfadw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4oxh6OywPBCuXfBGPPez9A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 8: Inter’s 1st phase with Onana’s usage as a Extra CB</figcaption></figure><p>Describing Onae na’s ability on ball as GK with anything other than probably one of or if not the best in the world shouldnt surprise anyone. The Idea behind Inter’s Buildup involves the fact that using Onana as a CB in 1st phase can attract pressure that can open spaces in more advanced areas while also frees Di marco or Dumfries to stay higher. In Pic 4 for example, Inter’s goal against Roma involves Di marco playing as a 3rd forward &amp; when they could succesfully build out, they have the advantage to make blind runs or generate numerically favorable situations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*Vvmf8yVcQIyY0N1yYsN71g.gif" /><figcaption>Vid 1: A Video showcasing Inter bypassing Milan’s Press with Onana</figcaption></figure><p>In the above video for example, Onana’s role is clearly seen when a dropping striker like Dzeko is able to receive between lines after they create space in that area by drawing press closer to Goal which wouldnt have been possible without Onana.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8j597Bs2nJ47sn3kDifeUQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CzOfFUnBV752tUIPFd4LKA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 9: Inter’s Midblock of 5–3–2 out of possession</figcaption></figure><p>Unlike City’s more agressive Man to man solution to press in a 4–4–2, Inter are less conservative in terms of pursuing opponents off ball though Inter but still adaptable based on the game state. Typically they love closing down Opponents using an Iteration of 5–3–2 that employs a trigger to press when ball moves wide.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jKq1FNUr7Dg56Tpsc2XzAg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_kNcNLPVxId2XFNceyU3rA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 10: Inter Milan pushing one of their CB’s Acerbi/Bastoni to facilitate a 3–2 Buildup to keep Both Wingbacks high against Fiorentina in Coppa Italia Final</figcaption></figure><p>Another Interesting point to note of Late that Inzaghi has also used Guardiola’s Version of pushing a CB like Stones to create a Buildup by using Bastoni/Acerbi. This was seen most recently in their game against Fiorentina where they won after going 1–0 making an incredible comeback.</p><p><strong>THE MAIN INDIVIDUALS- PLAYERS TO WATCH</strong></p><p><strong>A) Gundogan and Barella- The Enigmatic Engines of Both sides</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oCicDiWKXnvhR2I-Lkwxvg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 11: Barella’s Actions &amp; Performance Pizza Plot for 22/23 Season</figcaption></figure><p>Analyzing Barella, from 1st glance at his numbers or footage you know that he’s crucial to how Inter operate, often occupying spaces vacated by Dumfries &amp; also provided a significant threat in the Right Halfspace regions, operates as the Engine of the Inter Team. Inter arent the same side without him &amp; whether in Build up phase or Final phases of Play, Barella is crucial to Inter’s entire style of play that relies on Wingplay from Widebacks that need support.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YlHR19ck5foUNbeW3wRmgA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 12: Gundogan’s Actions &amp; Performance Pizza Plot for 22/23 Season</figcaption></figure><p>There are Vital cogs in City’s team &amp; then there is Ilkay Gundogan. Akin to Barella, Man City isnt Man City without Gundogan &amp; it’s easy to see why. Gundogan offers an all round game helping in 1st Phase to Buildup attacks to providing a supplementary Goal threat in Final Phase, Gundogan does it all. His immaculate ability to carry the ball &amp; ability to support in wide areas like Barella matches him head to head against the Italian.</p><p><strong>B) John Stones &amp; Alessandro Bastoni- The Archetype Modern Centrebacks</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5Rq6grHy2dJMW2g6gLi0dA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 13: Stones Actions &amp; Performance Pizza Plot for 22/23 Season</figcaption></figure><p>John Stones has been the subject of discussion across all football platforms this season after his seamless transition as a Centreback (CB) that could act as a 6 in 1st phase to facilitate Buildup. When out of Possession, Stones could drop into middle or into the right &amp; be a menace to attackers that he faces. All these attributes define Stones as what you want from a Modern CB. Guardiola’s City became the machine they are once Stones mastered the Timing &amp; understanding of Space as a 6 &amp; awareness out of possession, which probably makes him the most important defender in the team.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_bUI9_47gnVpnhGrEsv44w.png" /><figcaption>Pic 14: Bastoni’s Actions &amp; Performance Pizza Plot for 22/23 Season</figcaption></figure><p>Stones rightfully has been the most discussed topic in footballing circles, but let me tell you that 24 Years Old Bastoni isnt far away at all &amp; in fact a more mobile player than the Englishman that transitioned to play the support 6 role like Stones as mentioned in Pic 10. Unlike Stones, Bastoni’s more oriented towards making Final balls that has seen him get 6 assists across all competitions &amp; noticing his &amp; stones actions &amp; numbers side by side, you’d be wondering how Bastoni’s not got his due as much as Stones has done, making him invaluable to Inter.</p><p><strong>C) Rodri &amp; Marcelo Brozovic: The Orchestrators</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*py1WLMZ4kDTlrQdLXLhCHg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 15: Rodri’s Actions &amp; Performance Pizza Plot for 22/23 Season</figcaption></figure><p>Rodri’s reputation as one of the best Holding/Defensive/Deep Lying Playmaking Midifielder ever since his move to City in 2019 is testament to his evolution in that role that Guardiola has always seeked season after season with Rodri becoming a player that could relieve pressure in 1st phase &amp; could be a source of threat offensively from outside the Box while able to seamlessly orchestrate every sequence of Play for City. His absence in the 2021 UCL Final was one that’s talked about even today &amp; since then Rodri is a non negotiable player for both club &amp; country for his skillset &amp; a Focal point of City’s system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XBSX1fqUHbYXv3Sfz41B1A.png" /><figcaption>Pic 16: Brozovic’s Actions &amp; Performance Pizza Plot for 22/23 Season</figcaption></figure><p>Brozovic’s perhaps not talked as much as his more illustrious fellow countrymen like Luka Modric or Ivan Rakitic but Brozovic is as pivotal as he comes &amp; as talented as any of the top deep lying midfielders in the last decade. He’s been a familiar mainstay at Inter for a long time &amp; across many coaches from Spalletti to Conte to now Inzaghi been an important focal point in their systems. In many ways, like his counterpart Rodri ahead of the Final, Brozovic isnt limited to being a 1st phase orchestrator but offers offensive threat like Rodri from outside the box &amp; pick Final passes to assist teammates.</p><p><strong>D) Erling Haaland &amp; Lautaro Martinez- The Triggermen at Top</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Cn3FSZcBnjbHR3MpuvuUww.png" /><figcaption>Pic 17: Lautaro’s Actions &amp; Performance Pizza Plot for 22/23 Season</figcaption></figure><p>It’s been quite an year for Lautaro winning a multitude of Trophies including the 2022 World Cup with Argentina. Being a League winner with Inter already, the UCL is the only missing trophy from his cabinet. Lautaro is the complete package as a striker, with ability to drop &amp; receive to progress play while also being a highly reliable attacking generating a 0.58 npxG on a Per90 as seen in Pic 17 &amp; scoring 28 Goals this season. His ability to form Partnerships with Edin Dzeko/Romelu Lukaku has seen him be a facilitator too for his teammates getting double digits in assists this season across all competitions with 10. His action flow map in Pic 17 shows that of a striker that could lay off, carry the ball or arrive in Box to finish Final balls &amp; for Inzaghi his most important source of Goal threat ahead of the UCL Final.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VEkcCYufZnjYFlPt363Saw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 18: Haaland’s Actions &amp; Performance Pizza Plot for 22/23 Season</figcaption></figure><p>Erling Haaland is the Machine Man Goalscorer &amp; when you see the Goalscoring Numbers it shouldnt be a doubt. Producing a record breaking 58 Goals &amp; 10 assists this season, Haaland’s been on a different stratosphere compared since his summer move to City. His game as a Striker has evolved under Guardiola &amp; it’s fair to say Haaland offers as much of the Complete package on field with seemingly becoming a brilliant hold up player that can drop to lay off &amp; also being able to provide progressive outlet to carry the ball higher up the Pitch &amp; with his best years ahead of him it’s a limitless potential of what he can do &amp; become. In Haaland, Guardiola found a striker that he could reshape City’s system keeping his main principles in forefront while also being that Goalscoring juggernaut that City missed since Aguero’s departure.</p><p><strong>HOW THE GAME MAY PAN OUT TACTICALLY: TACTICAL PREDICTIONS</strong></p><p><strong>A) Lukaku’s Hold Up &amp; Combination a Huge Trump card</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*CSsW3K6LAU15otzROFTGTw.gif" /><figcaption>Vid 2: A possible way for Inter in possession against Man City</figcaption></figure><p>Given City’s 4–4–2 press that was discussed in Pic 6, assuming city approach the game in the same way, Inter can mostly gain advantage by using their typical 4–1 Split CB/GK buildup with Onana to draw Haaland to press and KDB to covershadow access to Brozovic while Gundogan &amp; Rodri cover Hakan &amp; Barella. This way they can synchronize Lukaku to drop &amp; receive to either lay it off for Lautaro who has space to run into vacated by one of the CB’s following or play wall pass to Lautaro to score himself, a method that was used by Inter against Atalanta as in the Clip Below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*VBTdW3iLMS8YJdLue0Ik0A.gif" /><figcaption>Vid 3: Lukaku Holds up &amp; plays 1–2 with Lautaro who releases himself into the space that was vacated by the CB</figcaption></figure><p>Perhaps the above video is a simple evidence of Lukaku’s Hold up play that is immensely crucial to Inzaghi’s chances to win the Final whether be it from start or as a trump card from bench.</p><p><strong>B) City’s Usage of Rodri to change pressing strucure</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*oedUhLc3IpiV7w1BSNNm3g.gif" /><figcaption>Vid 4: City’s Possibility to Vary Press Structure</figcaption></figure><p>One Way City can By pass the method of Inter as explained in Vid 2, is by dropping Rodri on Lukaku/Dzeko, have Bernardo silva &amp; Gundogan man mark Barella &amp; Hakan, then press with Haaland &amp; De bruyne in same way &amp; based on where the ball is played (to the left or right flank), Grealish/Silva can interchange the role of coming inside to mark one of the 8’s as the other winger can cut access to ball side Wingback (Dumfries in the video).</p><p>The advantage of this method is City end up with a 3–2–4–1 shape that can handle Lukaku dropping to Hold up without having a CB come out &amp; leave space behind, &amp; also if Lautaro too drops inside, the backline can readjust to a 3 &amp; even in case of a switch to far side wingback not be in trouble immediately.</p><p><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*2zIRxVUH-EhXXZeqoEWO2A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 19: Guardiola after collecting the Silver medal in the 2021 UCL Final via Getty</figcaption></figure><p>Being at Helm for 7 years in City &amp; not tasting European success for close to 12 years has made Guardiola’s quest for the 3rd UCL trophy an obsession to cement his legacy from already one of the finest minds of the game &amp; make a case for himself as the finest over other coaches past &amp; present, while for Inzaghi, it will be coming on top of all the criticism he’s faced over his career at Lazio &amp; Inter where he was labeled as only a manager that could scale at best to Domestic Cup competitions so putting on the European crown will have him etched in minds of all as a winner of the biggest club competition in the world.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=823971e140f3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Does PSxG/xGOT (Post shot Expected Goals) needs to take as much Precedence as xG (Expected Goals) ??]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul/does-psxg-xgot-post-shot-expected-goals-needs-to-take-as-much-precedence-as-xg-expected-goals-99bb585710b7?source=rss-215e598d7b72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/99bb585710b7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[chelsea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[expected-goals]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul VN]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Apr 2023 10:31:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-22T10:31:32.094Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Does PSxG/xGOT (Post shot Expected Goals) needs to take as much Precedence as xG (Expected Goals) ??</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2DKNTi32R5G4jIP93zPpOg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 1: A simple shot map indicating xG wrt marker size of various shots in game between Brzail &amp; Switzerland in FIFA World Cup 2018</figcaption></figure><p>By now in footballing circles, ranging from the higher echelons of professional football to passionate fans of different clubs, people have been familiar or know the existence of Expected metrics, starting from the simple xG (Expected Goals). But for the sake of even the simple reader this article may find, xG is defined as the statistical likelihood of a shot ending up as a goal from any one point of pitch, ascertained by machine learning models trained on loads of shots take across the world in football.</p><p>While xG has been so useful in predicting trends across a larger sample, mere xG/npxG numbers over/under performance arent enough to give a clear picture of certain situations. Say for Example Potter’s Chelsea or Inzaghi’s Inter have underperformed highly on their xG yet that point isnt alone conclusive without looking at shot quality of these teams.</p><p>Here’s where post shot models comes in which calculate PSxG/xGOT, and according to Opta it’s defined as follows: “It measures the likelihood of an <strong>on-target</strong> shot resulting in a goal, based on the combination of the underlying chance quality (xG) and the end location of the shot within the goalmouth”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xCQj6HRi2riWydFVJ1ruEg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 2: Expected Goals vs Goals scored in Serie A 22/23</figcaption></figure><p>Let’s start diving into the specifics: The viz above shows teams in Italy wrt xG generated &amp; the goals scored. As we talked about Inter Milan earlier, they rank the highest in xG accumulated with 55 but have scored only 48 goals showcasing a big difference of 7 in underperformance. But this alone doesnt conclude anything on their goalscoring woes because higher xG alone wont quantify good chances created. To get a deeper idea, we next take a look at how well teams are getting shots on Target:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bGid5S3dNYnLvaB6Dyh-fA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 3: Shots Taken Per90 vs Shots on Target% for Teams in Italy</figcaption></figure><p>Now things get Interesting. The team that accumulated the highest xG in the League, Inter ranks 13th in getting shots on Target, meaning that many of their shots that they take are either blocked or go wayward. Lazio meanwhile get the most shots on Target amongst teams in Italy, but once again the question begs that how do we qualitatively assess these shots?? Meaning how do we know which team/teams test opposing Keepers better than others?? This is where usage of Post shot models make more sense.</p><p>Post shot models can help describe how well teams are able to enhance from the position they take shots from, in other words how well teams better test opponent Keepers, whereas sole xG values can tell about positions a team can get into, when both are taken on a per shot basis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2mvYuawKh06gmzwttTutRw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 4: Post Shot Expected Goals vs Goals Scored</figcaption></figure><p>When we look at Post Shot xG accumulated, Inter rank as 48.1, very close to the Goals they have scored. Consequently Napoli who lead in PSxG, have outperformed it when you look at their Goals scored at 66. Here again we have to understand that in a game a team can take X number of shots &amp; accumulate xG but if all X of them are not on Target they accumulate 0 PSxG. Consequently a team on a bad day may accumulate large PSxG but a Great Keeper performance may keep them from scoring. Hence PSxG is also the same metric that is used to measure shot stopping abilities of Keepers. A good example of use of PSxG alongside xG is given below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/781/1*4Fcl9r5Aih81A2K7ZDG6NQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 5: Shot data of Juventus vs Sporting 2023</figcaption></figure><p>In the recently concluded Europa League Quarter Final Tie, Juventus won 1–0 thanks to a Closing stages goal from Federico Gatti. The game ended with an xG scoreline of 0.9–1.7 for Juventus-Sporting respectively. But on PSxG scoreline it ended as 1.01–2.26, with Mattia Perin’s 2 saves in close range clearly proving the difference in scoreline. Now what this means is Sporting enhanced shot Probability of scoring from the locations they took but were met by excellent saves which means their players arent at Fault for them not scoring any Goals that night. Juventus though managed to enhance their shot to the highest value possibel of 0.97 with the way Gatti took his shot, a shot that’s 97% probability of going in, got their goal.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/739/1*byc6nFDdeqb65uDPbE433g.png" /><figcaption>Pic 6: Shot Data of Inter vs Monza</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*D4hvDQ8pF8KUpy7eB_hsEw.gif" /><figcaption>Vid 1: Lautaro’s missed chance against Monza with 0.45xG &amp; 0.20 PSxG</figcaption></figure><p>Another Example is the Inter vs Monza game, where the xG scoreline finished 2.1–0.7 respectively for both, but when you look at PSxG they accumulated on the shots on target they took, you can see in Pic 6 &amp; Vid 1, Lautaro martinez reduce the Probability of Goal with his shot taken from a location that has 0.45xG but after the shot it’s probability reduced to 0.2, 20% chance. Similarly Joaquin Correa’s 0.13xG shot had reduced chance of scoring by almost Half with a shot which was only probable to go 7% (0.07 PSxG).</p><p>With xG Numbers alone we can say Inter had a finishing Problem, but with PSxG added to it, we are able to pinpoint specifics &amp; perhaps where does larger blame lie.</p><p>As discussed before PSxG is also beneficial to find games where a Keeper may have let down wrt a result while also talking about the finishing struggles we may have highlighted before.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sv_Y91YuRqgxjb2KWRtsuA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 7: Premier League Teams Expected Goals vs Goals Scored</figcaption></figure><p>We did talk about Inzaghi’s Inter &amp; their struggles &amp; were able to conclude to a better degree about their problems on getting shots on target &amp; eventually PSxG numbers to see how well Inter forwards make most of their chances. Now Let’s talk on Graham Potter’s chelsea (during his time as coach for most of the season) . Chelsea this season have had serious Goalscoring problems &amp; from Pic 7 it’s fair to say that Chelsea rank 10th in xG geenrated with 39.5, but what’s more intrguing will be they have underperformed on their xG with only 30 Goals scored.</p><p>Unlike Inter’s case this is different because degree of underperformance is larger &amp; volume of xG generated low. If we once again look back to how we dived into Inter’s woes taking Shots on Target % as a tool, we see that</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l2Ua3gILT7vN0l2u5sCaPw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 8: Shots Per90 vs Shots on Target % in EPL 2022/23</figcaption></figure><p>Chelsea rank low in Shots taken Per90 which obviously will translate a lot into lower xG accumulation, but at same time when SOT% is lower, iminent result is also that their Goals have dried up &amp; consequent underperformance. But a look at PSxG in Pic 9 Below will reflect</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FtIQuCyCZzog1swO3wIr_w.png" /><figcaption>Pic 9: PSxG vs Goals Scored EPL 2022/23</figcaption></figure><p>the fact once again that it’s closer to Goals scored than xG Chelsea generated. But once again we do have to remember the fact taking Arsenal’s case or Napoli’s in earlier Serie A study who both have a larger gap between PSxG &amp; their Goals scored that Teams may have found route to Goal better than some teams, a simpler example can be illustrated below in Pic 10 when Chelsea played Aston Villa:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/748/1*Zw80r_9kNAItnMzvthcAiQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 10: Chelsea vs Aston Villa Shot Data</figcaption></figure><p>For example in the Pic above we can see the shot data for the game after which Potter was relieved of his duties when he his Chelsea lost to Aston Villa. John Mcginn took a shot from distance at a position valued with 0.02 xG, Post shot models show he enhanced the probability of it to 31% &amp; it went into Goal. Could the Chelsea Keeper have done better to save it?? Maybe, here it’s difficult to water it down to Mcginn’s enhancement technique or Kepa must have done better or not. I will leave the Goal Video below for you to decide:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*YGYIZxOUZwlEAGtjZKjGEg.gif" /><figcaption>Vid 2: Mcginn’s Goal vs Chelsea</figcaption></figure><p>But maybe one look at Joao Felix’s shot from closer distance, a shot that had 0.05xG, difficult position to score was enhanced to 0.39 PSxG value but was saved by Martinez probably asks questions of whether Chelsea met a Keeper that performed very well &amp; also whether the Chelsea’s route to goal depended largely on players enhancing shots from very low goalscoring probability positions:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*GhH4ZMKoTGr_wZPMuK9X5w.gif" /><figcaption>Vid 3: Joao Felix’s Shot vs Villa with an xG of 0.05 &amp; PSxG of 0.39</figcaption></figure><p>Perhaps the situations like above are where we get the idea of drawing precedence for usage of xG &amp; PSxG combined. On a visual level it’s a great save, on a statistical level only with xG it’s a low probability position, but with PSxG value, we can combine all 3 &amp; say Chelsea took difficult routes to Goal &amp; were met with Great keeper meaning it’s now down to player, keeper or coach but all chipping in contributions.</p><p><strong>CONCLUSIONS</strong></p><p>If you made it till here without getting confused as much, the idea around this article is simple: Simple xG Numbers over a season or a game shows one dimension of understanding Goalscoring problems if any team has. Addition of Post shot metrics opens the other dimesnions where accountability can be more concisely put on or spread amongst the factors. We saw 2 great cases in European football with Inter &amp; Chelsea about their underperformance wrt xG &amp; Goals scored.</p><p>Simple case can be seen with 2 examples in Vid 1 &amp; Vid 3 of Lautaro Martinez’s &amp; Joao Felix’s chances where route taken to Goal was better by Inter but Lautaro’s shot technique decreased probability of scoring from an already high probable position. It was opposite in case of Felix, who enhanced probability from a low probability (xG) position. Hence Coaches should take more precedence in how they design a team’s ability to accumulate xG, PSxG take larger precedence on Players (with some on coach’s own methods to improve players) to finish chances.</p><p>With that we can conclude with greater degree that Maybe Potter factors in more than his players in Chelsea’s scoring woes whereas in Inter’s case, perhaps Inzaghi factor isnt the greater problem. Of course end of the day, there’s no one single factor to explain any woe in football, it’s always a consequence of Multiple Facors!!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=99bb585710b7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[“2 Steps Forward, 3 Steps Back”- What went wrong with Sevilla in Last 2 years]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul/2-steps-forward-3-steps-back-what-went-wrong-with-sevilla-in-last-2-years-2d3f3ca989d0?source=rss-215e598d7b72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2d3f3ca989d0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sevilla]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul VN]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 25 Mar 2023 17:13:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-25T17:13:10.591Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ya9tGUPF8ghaFLofF0bo3A.jpeg" /><figcaption>It was about 3 years ago in 2020 Julen Lopetegui’s were Europa Kings for 6th time. 3 years Later they are far from Qualifying for it</figcaption></figure><p>Sevilla’s Journey since 2005 is reminiscent of the title of this article. They managed to win the 2006 UEFA Cup (Europa League) with Juande Ramos &amp; host of other trophies including a CDR, UEFA Super Cup, Spanish Supercup all these in the 2 years between 2005 &amp; 2007. Then went on a drought of trophies &amp; underperforming with 5 coaching changes in 6 years before Unai Emery stepping in to delivering a hattrick of Europa Leagues in 2014,2015 &amp; 2016 before going in another managerial merry go round only this time they change 6 coaches in 3 years spanning 2016–2019 including a 1st stint with current coach Sampaoli before Julen Lopetegui steps in, win another Europa League in 2020 &amp; his eventual downspiral of results costing the job.</p><p>Through this article we aim to look at the factors that had Lopetegui finishing 4th a season Prior in 2021/22 season &amp; then Sevilla dropping to relegation places &amp; their eventual fight that still undergoes under Sampaoli since October.</p><p><strong>A SURFACE LEVEL LOOK AT THE LAST 2 SEASONS WRT ADVANCED METRICS</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rKizDpOdVai0u_M1yiiwyA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 1: Sevilla’s xGA game to game basis in Last 2 seasons</figcaption></figure><p>The foremost thing to look at when starting with this study is to look on a surface level how Expected Metrics for Sevilla have panned out in last 2 seasons. In a season where Sevilla conceded the least goals in La Liga in 21/22, their xGA average turned out in line with that, a 0.978 or less than a goal per game expected. Come a few months after 21/22 when 22/23 season started, Sevilla’s xGA average shot up more than twice to 2.07 Per game &amp; with an increasing trend, Lopetegui was relieved from his duties &amp; Sampaoli stepped in, who alibeit managing to reduce it to 1.41 showing reasonable improvement, it’s still close to 1.5 Goals Per game Expected.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GMTVw9ExtQtbN03yNTjj-g.png" /><figcaption>Pic 2: Sevilla’s npxG game to game basis in Last 2 seasons</figcaption></figure><p>While the defensive metrics turned upside down from 21/22 to 22/23, it’s worthwhile noting that Sevilla’s offensive Expected metrics didnt improve either, in a season where they conceded the least in 21/22, they also geenrated lesser expected goals excluding penalties with just over 1 goal a game (1.05) &amp; finished 6th in Goals scored in the league with 53 despite a top 4 Finish. By 22/23, this didnt improve much just a meagre increase of 0.09 in both Lopetegui &amp; Sampaoli’s case, but with a high xGA against Lopetegui it was never going to be sustainable. With Sampaoli, a decrease in xGA (which is albeit still higher than npxG avg a lot) helped somewhat stabilize the ship.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VXWTIBKCVwHQJ-lvmBYtnw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 3: Sevilla’s Progression Coefficient game by game Last 2 seasons</figcaption></figure><p>A look at Progression Coefficient may give some ideas as to how Proactive teams can be wrt progressing the ball relative to the touches they take ie per 100 touches how many progressive actions a team attempts/makes. Again Sevilla’s Progression Coefficient didnt marginally improve from a low 21/22 average, but in Sampaoli’s Tenure it has reached a better value meaning Sampaoli has improved the proactiveness of this Sevilla side.</p><p>With these 3 pictures alone, is it safe to say Lopetegui had to be sacked &amp; Sampaoli has revived Sevilla?? Not exactly because on a surface level this gives a initial insight into the tenure of both coaches but assesing the factors that led to these conditions can give an idea whether those factors were controllable by Lopetegui or Sampaoli.</p><p><strong>A LOOK AT MARKET SESSIONS IN LAST 2 SEASONS</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dPxe_Pog02VVvrzBkB-_kQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 4: Sevilla’s Transfer Session before 21/22 Season</figcaption></figure><p>In 21/22, a season where Sevilla finished in 4th while also conceding the least goals in the League, they managed to release older veterans like Vasquez, Escudero, Vaclik, Sergi Gomez (their respective ages were 33,32,32, &amp; 30) &amp; signed players like Montiel (Eventual WC winner with Argentina at age 25), Delaney ( seasoned campaigner with Dortmund), Rafa Mir ( scored 13 La Liga goals with Huesca a season prior on loan from Wolves at age 25) to a total spend of 41.5 Million while recuperating 25 Million from an eventual sale of Bryan Gil.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AvBaRrRvaGM7cF9zizGGQg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 5: Sevilla’s Transfer Session before 22/23 Season</figcaption></figure><p>In 22/23 season, Sevilla had considerably more departures than arrivals &amp; some of these players crucial to Sevilla’s overall performances, namely Jules Kounde &amp; Diego Carlos, the CB partnership that kept an average of 0.9xGA per game &amp; lowest goals conceded in La Liga replaced by Marcao &amp; Nianzou whom we will later assess with the former pair wrt performances &amp; other factors. Players like Januzaj, Kasper Dolberg, Isco all left in January who arrived as high profile arrivals erstwhile Ocampos who left in summer to Ajax was back. With the whole team dynamics changing within matter of months, it could be said that it didnt help provide a stable environment albeit change of coaches from Lopetegui to Sampaoli also were influential in some of the departures &amp; arrivals mentioned.</p><p><strong>HOW DID THE NEW SIGNINGS &amp; PLAYERS WHO RETURNED FROM LOANS PERFORM COMPARED TO THE ONES THEY REPLACED</strong></p><ol><li><strong>THE KASPER DOLBERG &amp; ADNAN JANUZAJ CONUNDRUM</strong></li></ol><p>With the exit of Luuk De jong to PSV &amp; then Munir to Getafe, Sevilla signed Kasper Dolberg on Loan from Nice &amp; Januzaj as a Free agent. Dolberg was supposed to be a good option to provide competition for Youseff En Neysri who came off a low scoring season in 21/22. Alas Dolberg just appeared 4 times for Sevilla starting only 2 games despite no injuries with Lopetegui not relying much on him.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OG9Mvlu0VEYd33bKbN0Vyg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 6 (a) : Dolberg with Nice in 21/22 played 1492 Minutes scoring 6 &amp; assisting 2</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IEtKRPCULlKth1ebFr9ceQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 6 (b): In contrast, Dolberg only played a mere 197 Minutes with Sevilla despite no injury concerns</figcaption></figure><p>To completely conclude Dolberg’s failure as a mistake on Lopetegui can be too early in this article to say but there could be a case made that Sevilla’s Hierarchy didnt do give a well thought to whether Dolberg could have fit the team dynamics of Sevilla that Lopetegui envisioned</p><p>Now Coming on to Adnan Januzaj. Januzaj arrived as a free signing for the outgoing free transfer of Munir himself. With Munir only playing 474 minutes for Sevilla in 21/22 season, in hindsight it was apparent that Munir would depart &amp; a replacement would arrive. That replacement was Januzaj, who played 1625 Minutes with Sociedad &amp; himself arriving as a free agent.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/931/1*Ti2DKxVLiYZjz5QK664MPw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 7: Comparing Januzaj &amp; Munir’s Seasons in 21/22</figcaption></figure><p>While Januzaj’s metrics on a Per90 Basis looked like an improvement in many departments or atleast a like to like replacement at the least considering Munir’s less playing time &amp; departure. But Januzaj managed a paltry 47 Minutes in the League before eventual Lopetegui departure &amp; arrival of Sampaoli didnt change much as he was considered surplus to requirements soon after when he left on a loan to Basaksehir in January.</p><p>Once again like in case of Dolberg, whether Januzaj was a right fit or not for Sevilla’s big picture can be questioned when an outgoing coach like Lopetegui &amp; Sampaoli deemed him surplus to what they had. While these both moves itself raises eyebrows on Sevilla’s transfer mismanagement, there’s another player that raises it further.</p><p><strong>2. HE CAME, HE SAW &amp; HE LEFT— THE SEVILLA-ISCO FIASCO</strong></p><p>On a club level, Isco’s achievements could be matched by very few considering the spectacular list of honors he won. But it was also true that Isco saw minutes at Real reduce year by year, reaching just 331 minutes in the League &amp; making only 3 starts. The fact that he had recurring back injury problems theoretically didnt justify a move but with <a href="https://www.goal.com/en-in/news/isco-agrees-sevilla-contract-termination-four-months-into-deal-until-2024/blt20c701576771d3d3">Lopetegui Keen on Isco</a>, a contract offer was made &amp; while Isco did see a steady stream of minutes as a starter under the erstwhile Sevilla coach playing 800 mins in the 1st half of season before WC break.</p><p>But rumors of a frosty relationship with Monchi meant Isco’s only admirer in the club was Lopetegui &amp; that raised doubts as to how long the club &amp; player could maintain a sustainable relationship.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qY4P_sKoJVPM6Krn7wAh6A.png" /><figcaption>Pic 8 (a): Isco’s season with Real Madrid in 2021/22 Season</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rHlGlZgtfknXQwJzM_ONog.png" /><figcaption>Pic 8 (b): Isco’s season with Sevilla in 2022/23</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/931/1*xIuD1gwmNU2tbpALgzwZJw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 8 (c): A comparison of Isco’s Performances with Real &amp; Sevilla on a Per90 Basis</figcaption></figure><p>When you look at Pic 8 (c), you cant help but wonder that why Isco, despite his performance levels on a statistical level were better than what he produced at Real he was shown the door out once Sampaoli came in &amp; whether it was a case of Sampaoli weighing if Isco was fit for his system or Isco’s drop off under Sampaoli wrt his level, it was a transfer that left a bitter taste when Isco terminated his contract in January &amp; once again raised questions to Sevilla’s upper management on how a 3rd summer signing after Dolberg-Januzaj were now out of the club after all 3 were deemed to be signings to revive the club.</p><p><strong>THE LOPETEGUI-SAMPAOLI EQUATION</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DqhSQw7OAwP6DMEg4nm2Eg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 9: The 2 Seville coaches when they met each other as opposite Dugouts</figcaption></figure><p>Around 2018, both Lopetegui &amp; Sampaoli were preparing for the World cup campaigns for their respective countries. It wasnt days before the actual campaign that Lopetegui left his post as the Spanish National Team coach while Sampaoli would eventually himself leave Argentina after the tournament turned a nightmare for him. In the 4 years that followed, Lopetegui’s Madrid stint didnt go exactly how he’d planned, Sampaoli took various jobs before eventually landing the Sevilla Job from Lopetegui.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZX0sUNqr5x4tGPEQUkFnRA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 10: Sevilla Team report Under Lopetegui 21/22</figcaption></figure><p>Under Lopetegui in their 21/22 Campaign Sevilla were a team that depended a lot on wide play to generate chances for the team. This was evidenced by 2 of the top 3 Key pass (passes leading to shots) were the Fullbacks Acuna &amp; Navas when we look at Pic 10 showing the Top Key passes by players in Bottom right. Sevilla Also played a 4 back formation that had width maintained often by the Fullbacks ( again a look at Pic 10 at top left) &amp; wingers like Ocampos-Gomez played more inside in halfspaces alongside Rafa Mir.</p><p>As we look at their Key Pass composition, they maintained a big balance in generating them with Longer passes &amp; Shorter ones (in fact Sevilla ranked Number 1 in 21/22 La Liga in terms of Long passes attemtpted (3745) &amp; were clear of the likes of Real Madrid (2902), Barcelona (2912) &amp; Atletico Madrid (3060) by a long shot). In terms of short Passes they ranked 3rd Behind the Real-Barca Duo meaning Sevilla played a Balanced play style under Lopetegui that got them in a title race with Real which only eventually collapsed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7jaDN-RkktxI0nzCMNVkbw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 11: Sevilla Team Report Under Lopetegui &amp; Sampaoli 22/23</figcaption></figure><p>With all the departures &amp; their impact discussed earlier, it became increasingly unstable from a defensive standpoint for Lopetegui to continue in the hotseat. The conclusions made from Pic 1 have a string support from the team report above where Sevilla’s possession turnover zones increased in the central defensive space in their own half (Pic 11 top right). But once Sampaoli came, his brand of football meant a whole change in dynamics, system &amp; more newer signings arriving which meant Sevilla going from a 4 back system to a 3 back, a move that saw several players leave &amp; others arrive.</p><p>Also Sampaoli’s style preferred a more short game, evidently making just 23 Long Key passes so far (Pic 11 bottom left) with 26 games gone, just 40% of the amount they made in 21/22 under Loptegui. Evidently, their shorter Key Passes has already raked to 187, 76% of the total they played in 21/22 &amp; they still have 12 games to go to easily go beyond last year’s number.</p><p>With too many things changing too soon, you cant but think the impact it had on the team.</p><p><strong>CONCLUSIONS: WHAT LIES AHEAD &amp; WHAT CAN SEVILLA DO TO AVOID MESS LIKE THIS AGAIN</strong></p><p>By the time I finish aed drafting this section, news rang all over social media that Sampaoli had been releived of his duties &amp; now Jose Luis Mendilibar, previously of Eibar who had a long stay there coming in as Sevilla’s new head coach with just 1.5 Months of season to go.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_TKNGg9M1w3A1_-82LcWHA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 12: Mendilibar’s already been signed on as the coach until end of season</figcaption></figure><p>With players such as Bryan Gil, Joan Jordan, Mendilibar finds some of his ex players of Eibra that can help him transition faster but ultimately his job will all be evaluated on whether he can be the man to save Sevilla from relegation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VZ1zzZTjAI56kzXzcH2hZA.png" /><figcaption>Eibar’s Team report in 17/18 La Liga Season under Mendilibar</figcaption></figure><p>One interesting thing can be that Mendilibar’s style of play in theory has lots of similarities with what Lopetegui implemented (a back 4 system with a balanced style of play in terms of chance creation with Long &amp; short pass game). Another thing could be wrt Joan Jordan, who was one of the leaders in key passes in Eibar’s best finish in La Liga in 17/18 season and was also one of the key pass leaders under Lopetegui in 21/22 but in 22/23 season he’s not been amogst the top contributors in this aspect.</p><p>Will Sevilla survive &amp; rebuild back to a more stable era of challenging for glory?? Or will they survive the ultimate blow of relegating to second division?? Let’s wait &amp; watch for the next 2 months!!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2d3f3ca989d0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[BERLIN’S FINEST: A Story of Union Berlin’s 22/23 Season & how it came to fore]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul/berlins-finest-a-story-of-union-berlin-s-22-23-season-how-it-came-to-fore-a03afd63bcaf?source=rss-215e598d7b72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a03afd63bcaf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[union-berlin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bundesliga]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul VN]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2023 15:09:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-15T15:09:58.359Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It was not long ago in 2019 that Union Berlin became the 1st club from early East berlin to compete in Buneesliga. 3 seasons later, they have already pushed to 2nd Behind the Long standing powehouse of German football Bayern Munich within a point at the time of writing this article. They even played European football for 1st time in 20 years last season qualifiying for UEFA conference league in dying Minutes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nbf8pj4TyWXh_LDaHQKb6Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 1: A Mural of Urs Fischer in Union Belrin’s stadium, the man who has spearheaded all the success</figcaption></figure><p>In this Article we look at How do Union berlin play their football, How well are their performances related to the underlying metrics in grand scheme things &amp; some of the Notable players that have come &amp; gone in this cycle of their success.</p><p><strong>PART 1: THE PROTAGONIST IN THE TECHNICAL AREA- INTO THE MIND OF URS FISCHER</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DdIIbN5xfpYdSBHxq8CDWQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 2: Union’s defensive shape against Hoffenheim</figcaption></figure><p>Diving into Union’s style/way of football, throughout the 22/23 season Fischer has deployed a 3 back system with comes with it’s own package of ways they want to press, possess &amp; progress the ball. In one of their recent games against Hoffenheim where they emerged 3–1 victors, their defensive shape would usually start in a 3–4–1–2 to usually try to force Hiffenheim to build wide &amp; would drop to a 5 back whenever the ball reached their own half with the wingbacks having to work up &amp; down their flank to be able to fall back or push forward as needed in any typical 3 back system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rj78apWbhe_AE82SAY1Bfw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 3: Union Berlin in Possession</figcaption></figure><p>In Possession, Union’s system relies a lot on combintions between one of their 8’s, the wingback &amp; one of the strikers drifitng wide. Given Union’s both strikers in this case Sheraldo Becker &amp; Jordan Siebatcheu have incredible technique &amp; strength to play combinations, Union’s transitions after they win the ball are generally very effective. The 1st half description can be seen in Pic 3 above, to showcase it in a better way, a video below encapsulates it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*5VKv_b7VbcHWSBMhdRhbxA.gif" /><figcaption>Pic 4: A small Video to show Union’s Buildup</figcaption></figure><p>In the above example, you can see one of the CB droppping moving wide to receive the ball &amp; then pass it inside to the Lone 6 who then makes a long ball towards Becker who drifts to receive the ball &amp; then try to combine with the 8 who can square off if the pass was successful. The idea to Union’s game remains to have quick breaks opposed to more longer patient Buildups in general, an important trait of Urs Fischer’s Union.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lfVBZtA0zcYCqwtf44YbYg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 5: Leverkusen shape against Union</figcaption></figure><p>Analyzing Union’s defeats this season give a bit more context to their weaknesses. One particular trend can be their heaviest defeats have come against teams that have used iterations of 3 back, a shape they themselves use. In Pic 5, Leverkusen’s shape of back 3 that used wingers or number 10’s forming a box shape in midfield with the double pivot helped them dominate Union in midfield.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5AzY9-sabLWgpVjqu--mdQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 6: Freiberg in Possession against Union</figcaption></figure><p>Chances of coincidence reduce when we look back at another game of Union where they had difficulties against teams playing a 3 back, this time Freiburg was the team that inflicted a 4–1 defeat in November. While a Red card didnt help their cause, they went donw 2–0 by then already. Both this &amp; Leverkusen heavy defeats came at a space of one week.</p><p>In grand scheme of things, the point isnt to prove that Union’s not great against teams that play 3 back shape, because they have suffered defeats or draws against teams that can play any other system or have superior quality. But it’s exploring the fact that Mirroring their approach against themselves can be an effective tool sometimes with right quality.</p><p>But Overall, Urs Fischer’s continuation with his system &amp; philosophy has no doubt brought &amp; continues to bring sustainable results, which is what makes him the Protagonist in the Technical area.</p><p><strong>PART 2: WHAT DOES PLAYER &amp; TEAM DATA TELL ABOUT UNION??</strong></p><p>Data can be a great comprehensive source to tell a lot of things about teams as whole or down to a single individual. A team can have players that may not top charts all along but in a combined sense, they maybe really good wrt various metrics.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gW8tcFI3TZbOu2fxRzts-w.png" /><figcaption>Pic 7: Bundesliga PPA vs Expected Assists</figcaption></figure><p>The 1st Viz we are set to look at is the Players data to compare in Bundesliga how they fare wrt completed passes into 18 yard box vs the Expected assists (xA) accumulated per90. In simple way, we can say it’s about managing the quality vs quantity of passes played into 18 yard box. Both Sheraldo Becker &amp; Niko Gibelmann (marked red) rank fairly good in the graph but arent neccesarily in the highest percentile.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YmgByO1QXqj9iKxBNWbZDA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 8: Bundesliga Non Penalty Expected Goals (npxG) vs Expected Assists (xA)</figcaption></figure><p>When we look at players wrt their npxG generation &amp; as well as their Expected assists, Union’s best players can be Midfielder Janik Haberer who ranks highest in npxG generation ( he’s consequently the 2nd highest scorer behind Sheraldo becker, who in this same Viz ranks highest in xA &amp; 2nd highest in npxG). From this maybe we can say that Union’s metrics are distributed amongst their players in a certain way than 1 or 2 players (Niko Giebelmann &amp; Sherlaldo becker combinedly bring an impressive 0.37 xA, compare that to what one top player like Thomas muller or Kingley Coman in Pic 8 alone bring).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0cUL3CoNKmGRMml-cgQzPQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 9: Bundesliga Teams compared with Expected Goals (xG) &amp; Expected Goals Against (xGA)</figcaption></figure><p>The answers to some of questions we may have got before can probably now be explained with Pic 9. Amongst the Top 10 teams in Bundesliga in standings, Union Berlin sport the least Expected Goals generated with 22.7, this also points to why Union had players not on top of both charts in Pic 7 &amp; 8. Consequently Union’s strongpoint is their defence, the least alongside Bayern with a difference of just 0.04 between them. Consequently this proves a big fact that Union’s season has been down to their great defensive record with some good distribution of On ball metrics between their players that helped them to stay on top. In one sentence, Data proves that Union doesnt have great individuals but collectively, they are statistically robust.</p><p><strong>PART 3: THE PATTERNS FROM EVENT DATA OF UNION’S GAMES</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xxV5wxYbrJEpywTf5d-w-Q.png" /><figcaption>Pic 10: Pass Networks of Union Berlin’s Last 6 games at time of writing this article</figcaption></figure><p>One of the best ways to link the Cuurent Part &amp; Part 1 of this article where Fischer’s tactial plans were laid in detail can be analyzing Pic 10. We can clearly see Becker in general be the focal point wrt be more active off ball than on it by the pass strengths to him in any game. Also in most games Union had Khedira in central point in midfield through which the game flowed as well as choosing to Build more from left flank in many of these games as we can see stronger networks in those areas. In the Recent win against Leizpig, this trend reversed with more buildups on from right showing Union’s flexibility to adapt to what opposition offers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z-GpQHz3Y7ADzFXmfAQlDA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 11: Union’s Passing Sequences vs Leizpig</figcaption></figure><p>When we look at the passing sequences in the Pic 11 above against Leizpig, we can prove one of the earlier conclusions from Part 1 about how Union are direct in their build up &amp; have Keeper play out long balls to find strikers or have simpler pass mechanisms to build through wide areas. The 8’s Haberer (Number 20) &amp; Laidouni (Number 20) are seen combining with Wingbacks Gisselmann (Number 23) &amp; Juranovic (Number 18). Also another important trait can be Centreback Robin Knoche (Number 31) was given freedom to drift to left or even advance up the flank to maybe provide Numerical superiority when in possession.</p><p><strong>THE BEAUTY OF DIVIDED DISTRIBUTION &amp; THE IMPORTANT PLAYERS OF UNION’S CAMPAIGN THIS SEASON</strong></p><p>Previously in Part 2, when we analyzed metrics of Union players, we talked about how Union’s best strength is the distribution of Goal/Assist Contributions amongst many players instead of a more focused 2–3 players that rank high in any other team.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/483/1*nAU_ZOI-gLXEmx0d3I-lww.png" /><figcaption>Pic 12: Union’s Goals + Assists Contributors via Sofascore</figcaption></figure><p>In Pic 12 this is clearly illustrated when we see 9 players have combindely contributed to 48 Goals, unlike what more traditional contenders like Bayern this season have 2–3 players comtribute to majority of Goal contributions in the team.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*k2UVekXPlIeY5rybL5uDzg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 13: Viz showcasing Sheraldo Becker’s 22/23 season with Union Berlin</figcaption></figure><p>Sheraldo Becker has been having probably his best season in his career leading wrt goal contributions for his club. But Becker’s game isnt all about that, it’s more on his hardworking role he’s played for Union off the ball as well when we see in Pic 13 the number of defensive actions he’s made all around the Pitch &amp; from his passes the fact that he’s liked to drift &amp; provide support playing ball into box. With a versatile shot taking range, he’s been able to match his season tally of only 7 goals in League in whole of last season by January this season. Adding his ability to play teammates through has also seen him rake assists as well.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cV3OrbhlvAg_YlF0J8sdRQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 14: Viz showcasing Janik Haberer’s 22/23 season with Union Berlin</figcaption></figure><p>Another Union player that deserves to be talked highly about is Janik Haberer. Haberer operating as a left sided 8, offers all the skillsets for the team ranging from his contributions to his teammates for goals as well as great work in the defensive area. His ability to double up on wide areas both in offensive &amp; defensive sense is one of the key driving forces for this Union Berlin side.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6MvsSCnCoc2qhcQTHFVXiQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 15: Viz showcasing Robin Knoche’s 22/23 season with Union Berlin</figcaption></figure><p>This Part wouldnt end if we go on without talking about the role of Robin Knoche. A free agent signing from wolfsburg, Knoche has become immensely important for this squad &amp; his ball playing ability is very important in how Union construct anything in possession. He also provides a great towering presence in the back, making him one of the highly important cog to go all the way for Union.</p><p><strong>PART 4: CONCLUSION</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bp3W-L5DL_boOnacke4uww.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 16: Union Berlin players celebrate after Comeback against Lezipig (source:DW)</figcaption></figure><p>Union is a classic example of The whole being greater than the sum of it’s parts. Throughout this article one of the most important concepts we saw about Union was how on a whole a team grown to challenge for the title even if it’s parts, the players need’nt be the ideal achievers in high volume like any team that could have competed with Bayern ( Taking an example of Klopp’s great Dortmund years where parts constituted some great players, unlike Union whose players make a tough team to beat but arent blessed with the finest of the game). Whether or not Union can clinch the title their story is unlike many, a team that didnt have the best of historical significance on it’s side but rose to challenge every norm in modern football to attempt the difficult, if not close to impossible of dethroning the Bavarian Kings that reigned the German football for many years.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a03afd63bcaf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Serbian’s Tuskers: A look at Ivan Vukomanović’s Rebuild of Kerala Blasters]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul/the-serbians-tuskers-a-look-at-ivan-vukomanovi%C4%87-s-rebuild-of-kerala-blasters-94ef0d8d81d?source=rss-215e598d7b72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/94ef0d8d81d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-super-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kerala-blasters]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul VN]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jan 2023 07:06:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-12T07:06:39.442Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZNxpEVmgzxwwkn0oZBqjlA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 1: Vukmanovic with Kerala Blasters</figcaption></figure><blockquote>“I’d rather win 5–3 than 1–0, That’s the Football I like”</blockquote><p>These were the words of Vukamanovic after the 4–2 Loss against ATK Mohun Bagan in the 1st game of 21/22 ISL Season. It was a pretty much No-Nonsense comment from him, clear in what brand he wanted to set with Kerala Blasters. Blasters had never renewed the Contract of any of their coaches since their start of existence in 2014, but after the 21/22 season, Vukmanovic became the 1st coach to renew his contract with Blasters.</p><p>This article wants to look at the Journey of Vukmanovic’s journey with Blasters in 21/22 season &amp; a small intro to their current trend of their 22/23 season discussing aspects of his Team using Event Data from <strong>Statsbomb </strong>&amp; Metrical Data provided for League Tables by <a href="https://footballxg.com/xg-league-tables/">xG tables</a>.</p><p><strong>PART 1- THE 21/22 HERO ISL SEASON: JOURNEY OF VUKAMANOVIC TO FINAL</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/649/1*wBoqZoRJ1fi0xaW896lHGA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 2: Kerala Blasters Signings after appointment of Vukomanović</figcaption></figure><p>After Vukomanović’s appointment on 17 June as head coach, 9 new players for various positions were signed by Blasters including some players in season. All the 9 players played important roles in the journey of Kerala to Final. Looking at the Pass Networks of each game of Blasters next, we can see in-depth how various players came to foray.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZTfjX0UHQVXaNqih3lCbhw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 3: Pass Networks for All games of Kerala Blasters</figcaption></figure><p>Looking at Pic 3, Kerala’s 1st game loss of 4–2 against ATK was followed by a 10 game unbeaten streak until a 1–0 loss against Bengaluru. In his 1st game, Vukomanović’s shape went from a spread out 4 back system to a more narrow 4 back system where both fullbacks like Harmanjoth singh &amp; Carneiro involved in large volume of passes when building from back than their CB’s in games against Bengaluru &amp; Northeast United while in subsequent games against East Bengal, Mumbai &amp; Chennayin saw Kerala execute setups to overload using one of the Pivots &amp; Centrebacks generally showing how Vukomanović was Flexible according to opposition.</p><p>Comparatively looking at games after the 1–0 Bengaluru loss, the remaining games saw Kerala fall to 2 losses in remaining 8 games compared to the 1st 2 in 12 games that saw them take a 10 game unbeaten streak as mentioned. In those 8 games, Kerala’s Fullbacks roles subsequently involved only one of them pushing up &amp; be involved lesser in passes volume (seen in games like the 3–1 Victory against Mumbai &amp; 1–0 win against East Bengal) &amp; in games they drew or lost, their CB’s often played very less passes indicating that teams pressed Kerala’s CB’s often that gave them results (Best example seen in 4–4 draw against Goa &amp; 1–1 against Jamshedpur)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O5w_l4PDCQuiEN3l7264jA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 4: A Look at ISL teams based on Expected Threat of Passes &amp; Carries</figcaption></figure><p>Expected Threat (xT) is a useful way to quantify how teams can generate any threat on goal. In simpler words, the word Expected threat explains itself as the threat that next few actions of a team from a particular position from where the ball is moved can lead to a goal and this threat is assigned a number. The difference between the zone where a player started to where the player moved the ball using any action being a pass or a ball carry is taken as the xT generated with that move.</p><p>Kerala Blasters Under Vukomanovic ranked themselves as the 2nd best team in generating threat from passes only behind eventual champions they faced Hyderabad FC by a fractional margin. In particular their xT from carries is only 5th highest meaning Kerala under Vukomanovic are significantly dependent on passing football to generate threat than carrying the ball.</p><p><strong>THE GOALSCORERS OF 21/22 UNDER VUKOMANOVIC</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/966/1*10TXmkCAqePwXgL65fYzLQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 5: Top Goalscorers for Blasters in 21/22 Season</figcaption></figure><p>Blasters goalscoring was almost equivalently distributed between 4 players namely Jorge Pereyra, Alvaro Vasquez, Adrian Luna &amp; Sahal Abdul. It is notable of the fact looking at Pic 2 that 3 of the Players in this list were new signings made after Vukomanovic’s appointment. It will be more interesting to look at their roles in next picture.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y7TBth57ZE6BmjDZ7UqnZg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 6: Jorge Pereyra &amp; Alvaro Vasquez in ISL 21/22 Respectively</figcaption></figure><p>The 2 forwards Vasquez &amp; Pereyra operated in exclusively different ways yet provided close to Equal presence in &amp; around box. In particular Pereyra’s role saw him involved high in both Halfspaces &amp; left wingspace looking at 3rd viz in 1st row in Pic 6. His shots concentration too was high inside box but his degree of positioning freedom was certainly high. Compare that to Vasquez, only common thing would be the fact about his positioning freedom having similar to Pereyra but his shots concentration was particularly too high around edge of box &amp; outside too often (exclusively his goal from halfway line against Northeast). Also Vasquez occupied both wings equally compared to Pereyra more on left.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hOUxxMmoHp9vLTCsp0d_Kw.png" /></figure><p>Talking about Adrian Luna &amp; Abdul Samad, their roles were again opposite to one other but more complimentary to one or both the forwards we previously saw. In a way while Pereyra &amp; Vasquez were responsible for Central &amp; Halfspace occupation more, Luna &amp; Samad were responsible for Wing &amp; Halfspaces, which meant these 4 players combined were responsible to make things happen keeping the 5 Fundamental spaces of Football occupied. Again Luna’s shot taking were somewhat similar to Vasquez with high concentration outside the box, Samad’s shots &amp; his goals concentrated inside 28 yard box like Pereyra.</p><p>Simply Put, 4 players with 2 pairs representing some aspects of one other was a driving force to Vukomanovic’s attacking play &amp; approach.</p><p><strong>VUKOMANOVIC’S KERALA OFF BALL CHARACTERISTICS IN 21/22</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4MDIV-0UZbz5LwTFyugfaw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 8: Kerala Blasters Positional Pressure Maps for All games 21/22</figcaption></figure><p>Pressure events are probably the most important off ball metric that can tell a lot about how teams may pressure other teams or which areas they were exploited in particular noting how a team looks to defend itself.</p><p>Looking at Pic 8, the central defensive zone often was the most pressurized area in most of the games in their own half meaning in general most teams looked to attack Kerala Centrally. In particular games that Kerala drew or Lost or conceded a goal, their pressure events were concentrated at one flank largely showing Kerala’s defending out wide may be a somewhat noticeable weakness which was exploited by certain teams.</p><p><strong>THE FINAL OF ISL 21/22: HOW IT WENT FOR A GAME WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN FOR VUKAMOVIC</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xIpJOGinFEfV5fKMjoF3FQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 9: Hyderabad FC vs Kerala Blasters Avg. Locations &amp; Key Passes ISL Final 21/22</figcaption></figure><p>The Final of ISL 21/22 played out in a dramatic fashion for Vukomanovic &amp; his men. Like typical to Kerala’s plans whole season, Vukomanovic fashioned playing a highline with Fullbacks Sandeep singh &amp; Harmanjot singh pushed wide high while Adrian Luna &amp; Rahul Kannoly who replaced Samad occupied the important Halfspace areas with Jorge Diaz given a free supporting role to Alvaro Vasquez. We can see Hyderabad countered this with a more man oriented approach with Souvik Chakraborty &amp; chianese’s average positions close to Jeakson singh &amp; Khawlhring. This meant Joao Victor got more space to pull strings &amp; had Mohammed Yasir push high on right to receive balls. Due to Sandeep pushing high, Yasir got comfortable space up in right Halfspaces.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f0OAeYIq4lHJustbQF5zwQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 10: ISL final 21/22 Shot Freeze Frames</figcaption></figure><p>Shot Freeze Frames add another layer of depth to look at how defenses were setup at the instance of all shots &amp; set pieces across a game. Throughout the game, Hyderabad FC found most opportunities outside &amp; around the box more including Regular play or set pieces. Compare that to Kerala who got more opportunities inside Hyderabad’s box &amp; had 2 of their highest xG (Expected Goals) shots saved by the Keeper Kattimani who played a great game. In the end it can be annotated that Kerala had much more missed opportunities to Hyderabad, a game that could have been for Vukomanovic.</p><p><strong>PART 2- QUICK LOOK AT HOW 22/23 SEASON GONE SO FAR</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*inF7bj0CdKm0i71fb_NCxw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 11: Kerala Blasters signings for 22/23 season.</figcaption></figure><p>It was never going to be easy to cope for any team to lose both of their top scorers like Alvaro Vasquez &amp; Jorge Pereyra Diaz after an unforgettable year yet Kerala once again went on a 8 match Unbeaten streak between 5th November 2022 to 3rd January 2023 winning 7 &amp; losing one game before the recent4–0 loss against Mumbai City FC.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c3J9EOgzjA6JexcM6M6IKA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 12: ISL 22/23 Expected Goals (xG) vs Expected Goals against (xGA)</figcaption></figure><p>Vukomanovic’s men continue keeping the least Expected metrics in terms of goals conceded, event after a 4–0 loss that culminated against Mumbai. Their Goalscoring can get better which may see them close on another playoffs. It remains to be seen how far can they maintain their form this season.</p><p><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HcGJxYP3WZBdW-5q1bdbSA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 13: Vukomanovic signing his extension</figcaption></figure><p>It’s never an easy job for any coach in ISL. The Average Tenure of ISL coaches since it’s inception has been 285 days, which is less than a year. In that way, for Vukomanovic to stay beyond that period &amp; become the 1st coach to sign a extension with Kerala speaks faith in him from their management after he showed results in his 1st season. Building a team in his image whether they lose any of their players at any point can build a stable ecosystem for Kerala to thrive &amp; chase the ever elusive ISL title in upcoming seasons. Vukomanovic staying to oversee it would be a personal achievement for himself.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=94ef0d8d81d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[‘Third Title’s a Charm’: Preview to the 2022 World Cup Final]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul/third-titles-a-charm-preview-to-the-2022-world-cup-final-52c9491e6e77?source=rss-215e598d7b72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/52c9491e6e77</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fifa-world-cup-2022-qatar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul VN]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2022 12:04:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-16T12:04:36.696Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As France &amp; Argentina face each other in the upcoming Final, take a look at the journey &amp; tactical matchups both teams can offer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r2uc_k_CALCx8qSFcEwoTw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The 2 sides last met each other in a enaging 4–3 win for France where Mbappe was breakout player in the Tournament.</figcaption></figure><p>Both France &amp; Argentina sit with their 2 World cups win each. While Argentina try to look back as far as 1978 or 1986 for inspiration, France can look back as early as 2018 with many protagonists of the victory 4 years ago are still the Protagonists now. This article takes a look at some of the tactical &amp; statistical of both teams &amp; highlight what each team may look at.</p><p><strong>ARGENTINA- TACTICAL NOTES</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UcvNaT9lp9iMzFwyR2dmGQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 1: Argentina in Possession vs Poland</figcaption></figure><p>Throughout their campaign, Argentina’s most documented trait is that of adapting game by game either in or out of Possession. In their must win group game against Poland, Argentina’s usage of a 3–1–6 where in order to navigate past Poland’s narrow 4–4–2 block served them in great way as it allowed Messi freedom to pick the leftback or have winger like Di maria move inside or make runs. This also gave Argentina a way to implement combinations between their midfielders while their strikers would work in pulling CB’s apart.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L-pZcH7iwCxnQyY0KfiAVQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 2: Argentina out of Possession vs Croatia</figcaption></figure><p>Against Croatia, Argentina were more adaptive playing a narrow shape out of possession that would bait Croatia to play a game more out of their sorts &amp; this again proved effective when Argentina got all their 3 goals out on counters that dealt blows.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wzY0giRxdUiKkExmD3jyzw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 3: Argentina in Possession against Croatia</figcaption></figure><p>Comparing Pic 1 &amp; Pic 3 for in possession shapes of Argentina, we can see that overlaods played a major part for Argentina, whether it was on right like in Poland game or on left against Croatia. The important aspect is their wingback/Fullbacks height on pitch varied wrt how teams would maintain their line (against Poland in a midblock, Argentina’s widebacks are pushed far more ahead, but against Croatia that varied their depths, widebacks would be more cautious to avoid counters)</p><p><strong>FRANCE-TACTICAL NOTES</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m73_8ONYXhjtg_uU_pG8zg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 4: France out of Possession against England</figcaption></figure><p>France’s approach to game largely relies on building on a structural block that becomes fluid when they win possession with likes of Griezmann, Dembele &amp; Mbappe combine to pull strings with Giroud as a main focal point. France’s defensive shape largely focused on a traditional 4–4–2 that didnt employ major pressing triggers but generally generate mini battles on pitvh to allow them to win the ball.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ju3cT2fEJSvs5CLPgAfkzw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 5: France in Possession against England</figcaption></figure><p>In possession, France’s counters flows through griezmann, mainly focused on either having opposition midfielders follow him at which time dembele often drops in to drag Fullback with him before playing combinations with one other either between both or take support of 3rd man like Kounde.</p><p>This allows :</p><ol><li>Either someone like Rabiot/Tchoumeni to make late runs to score goals (Like tchouameni did against England &amp; Rabiot previously against Australia) if midfielders follow Griezmann or</li><li>It puts Griezmann &amp; Dembele often in numerical situations against fullbacks to put balls into box for a target man like Giroud or low crosses for incoming Mbappe (This has led to Giroud &amp; Mbappe top Goalscoring charts for France this tournament)</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eQwR7aiCGlnZelrtgXPR0g.png" /><figcaption>Pic 6: France in Possession vs Poland</figcaption></figure><p>Pic 3 can be a good representation of positional roations of france, in this case Griezmann can be seen centrally while Giroud has drifted wide, at this point any midfielder that follows Griezmann or doesnt prioritize marking other midfielders than him means Rabiot in this can make diagonal runs played in by Mbappe.</p><p><strong>THE NUMBERS GAME FOR BOTH SIDES</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TiHcIfmdtjEv5E2xgBbUNQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 7: Key Passes vs Expected Assisted Goals (xAG) for WC 2022 on Per 90 Basis (Criteria: At least 170 mins played)</figcaption></figure><p>Both Lionel Messi &amp; Griezmann have been key men in facilitaing their teams forward. Griezmann more than anyone has topped the charts for Expected Assisted Goals (xAG) &amp; Key passes (passes leading to shots) played on a Per 90 basis. Lionel Messi too tops charts for amongst the players in Key Passes played. Like we saw in tactical notes for Both teams, the roles of Messi &amp; Griezmann are proved statistically as well when we look at Pic 7.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z3PDNPhqGgP5L1tT_JJ6hA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 8: Expected Assists vs Non Penalty Expected Goals (npxG) for WC 2022 on a Per 90 Basis</figcaption></figure><p>When we take a look at Non penalty expected goals vs Expected Assists (xA) on a Per 90 basis it gives us a great understanding on how regularly players get into good goalscoring positions while also giving hand in facilitating for teams either with their movement like Giroud /Alvarez or their technique like Mbappe/Messi. While Giroud &amp; Julian Alvarez have proved impeccable in getting into positions, Mbappe generates metrics that makes him a great Double threat player.</p><p>Like Discussed previously Griezmann &amp; Messi remain credible facilitators but Messi has better npxG on a Per90 basis. It’s expected Alvarez &amp; Giroud will play similar roles while Griezmann &amp; Messi should be doing what they do best. Where difference can come is how Argentina’s other players like Di maria or Papu Gomez provide output like Kylian Mbappe can.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y9WRNzKZv0kBXsO6MsmsiQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 9: Types of Passes Completed by teams in WC 2022 on a Per90 Basis</figcaption></figure><p>Looking at Pic 9, Argentina’s number of short passes are only 2nd to Spain on a Per90 Basis while also play one of the Least number of Long passes in the tournament. Comparatively, France maintain more of a balance in Pass style, often opting for either Long or Short given having a target man like Giroud encourages more longer Passes. In terms of this. it’s expected France will play long passes onto Argentina while argentina will play more crisp game.</p><p><strong>CONCLUSIONS: GAME OF FINE MARGINS</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q5aNaetK7JQdtXLM5Yf_6w.png" /><figcaption>The 2 Masterminds: Lionel Scaloni &amp; Didier Deschamps</figcaption></figure><p>With a game with many individuals &amp; 2 coaches who have experience in winning tournaments in recent years, there will be many matchups like described in tactical notes or look at passing styles or statistical notes to contain on player by player basis. As a Fan, an entertaining final beckons!!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=52c9491e6e77" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Tale of 3 Past (& Present) Acquaintances: Brazil, Serbia & Switzerland]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul/the-tale-of-3-past-present-acquaintances-brazil-serbia-switzerland-add89e25a0d0?source=rss-215e598d7b72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/add89e25a0d0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[world-cup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul VN]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 19 Nov 2022 14:57:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-19T14:57:33.547Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O1m7t31sgJqDJWyR0q8M4g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 1: The Gorup E then in 2018 &amp; Group G in now 2022 contain Brazil, Serbia &amp; Switzerland</figcaption></figure><p>It’s Elapsed more than 4 years since the FIFA world cup in 2018 that took place in Russia. Back then The group E was made up of 4 nations, Brazil, Serbia, Switzerland &amp; Costa Rica. Fast Forward 4 years later, The Group G of 2022 World cup in Qatar sees Brazil, Serbia &amp; Switzerland meet again &amp; since then a lot has changed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zpQk73UeToiRTDR4yka0bw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 2: Leading to WC 2022, The Serbian Team is many people’s 1st choice when asked to name a Dark horse of the tournament.</figcaption></figure><p>In This article, we are going to look back to 2018, &amp; see what the teams of 3 nations were made up of then &amp; how the games between each other went &amp; discuss about some of the key players that remain 4 years after in their respective sides. The data used for this article is the <strong>Stastbomb Event Data released for World cup 2018</strong></p><p><strong>2018 WORLD CUP GROUP E: BRAZIL VS SWITZERLAND (1–1) 17 JUNE 2018</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G_yZV9L4WzoEiSBdF04_JA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 3: Average Positions of Players &amp; Key passes in the game of Brazil vs Switzerland</figcaption></figure><p>Typical to today, Brazil employed a trademark 4–3–3 that can be seen in Pic 1 where they favored a heavily left oriented team pushing Fullback Marcelo (who’s now retired for Brazil) to support Neymar while Danilo played more deep in defensive Full back role to usually support willian who would also drift more inside to help the team.</p><p>Switzerland played a more 4–4–1–1/4–5–1 which saw them them play 2 Number 10’s Shaqiri &amp; Zuber inside that presurized the Brazil CB’s &amp; service Seferovic. With Lichtsteiner &amp; Ricardo rodriguez the 2 fullbacks occupying high position, it often meant pivot like casemiro was left more free as we can see in Pic 1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-fD7cPWPzF5PE4a5ZV8TRQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 4: Shot Freeze Frames courtesy of Statsbomb in the game of Brazil vs Switzerland</figcaption></figure><p>Shot Freeze frames provide great detail on how teams would want to break down each other looking at Open play freeze frames or set piece tactics when looking at set piece frames. We can mainly see Brazil’s fundamental tactic to use left side overlaods where Fullback on that side marcelo is pushed high (also seen in Pic 1) &amp; try isolating the right flank to service final balls to that area or sometimes take shots from there onto goal where there’s lesser degree for Goalkeeper to save.</p><p>For example in Pic 4 we can see coutinho’s goal largely resulted from taking shot from a very crowded area using his technique that can confuse keepers to keep track &amp; it resulted in a goal which had a very low xG of just 0.016. Compare that to Switzerland for example whose set piece tactics in corners involved large central crowding of Goalkeeper box which got them their goal with an xG of 0.18 (seen in Pic 4)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OJh6V6rhLNWTp63Q8VbyOQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 5: Shot Map for Both Teams</figcaption></figure><p>Looking at the shot map gives similar observations as to made on Pic 4. Coutinho’s goal that gave Brazil the lead had immensely less xG, but Brazil just couldnt put away many better chances that we can see closer to Goal mouth. Switzerland just took 1/3rd of the shots Brazil took &amp; could produce only 2 good chances but were clinical to convert despite being 1–0 down.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Yraup8SZkG0c9e9_sEDCpg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 6: Pressure Events Map for Brazil &amp; Switzerland</figcaption></figure><p>As we talked about left orientation of Brazil team when discussing about Pic 3, we can see proof of it in the Pressure map of Switzerland where a large number of pressure events are on their Right flank closer &amp; Right halfspace areas, where average positions in Pic 3 showed Neymar, Coutinho &amp; Marcelo operate in that area.</p><p>Also from Pic 3, we talked about Switzerland’s 4–5–1 largely operating with 2 Number 10’s inside &amp; Both fullbacks pressing high, which meant Brazil’s main pressure events would often surround their defensive center &amp; halfspaces which is easily visibly proved by Pic 6 showing Brazil’s pressure events.</p><p><strong>2018 WORLD CUP GROUP E: SERBIA VS SWITZERLAND (1–2) 22 JUNE 2018</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PlSAD-3uRdqz4LIQ5Gkx5A.png" /><figcaption>Pic 7: Average Positions of Players &amp; Key passes in the game of Serbia vs Switzerland</figcaption></figure><p>Serbia’s main plan was to have midfield defensive solidity where they used 2 Pivots Matic &amp; Milivojevic behind Sergej Milinkovic savic, who was given a number 10 role to help in creativity or release wingers Tadic or Kostic to put final balls for Mitrovic. Among the fullbacks, Kolarov played more offensive while Ivanovic stayed inside or deep.</p><p>Compared to Game against Brazil, Switzerland couldnt afford same space for their forwards or midfielders to combine. The Serbian midfield tightly marked around the Swiss counterparts which meant players like Zuber who could play much farther like in Pic 3 against Brazil can be seen in Pic 7 dropping deep to help in Buildup.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ojdhPYOE8dajsGULb-kmcg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 8: Shot Freeze Frames courtesy of Statsbomb in the game of Serbia vs Switzerland</figcaption></figure><p>The shot freeze frames tells another side of story of the game wherein Serbia’s shots came predominantly from many dead ball situations than regular play. Their only goal in game came from a throw in which was well converted from a good goalscoring position by Mitrovic &amp; this both facts combinedly may suggest Serbian players were great at exploiting Dead ball situations more.</p><p>Comparatively, Switzerland were left to take a lot of shots from outside the box, consequence of what we discussed in Pic 7 where it was more difficult for man marked players getting difficult to get between lines. We can see in Pic 8 that many shots taken by Granit xhaka &amp; Xherdan Shaqiri from outside the box including the goal that Xhaka scored which had an xG of just 0.02.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sazQ29I_mal8I1gwDsv7fA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 9: Pic 5: Shot Map for Both Teams</figcaption></figure><p>Simpler shot map might make things more clear as now we can see some of the inferences made in Pic 8 in better clarity. Serbia’s shot threat that came mainly from set pieces would have most of the shots inside the Box compared to Switzerland whom you can see in Pic 9 taking several shots from outside the Box.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LwUo9IfgHMAYWDlbEzweoQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 10: Pressure Events Map for Serbia &amp; Switzerland</figcaption></figure><p>Like we discussed in Pic 7 about how Serbia’s shape meant Switzerland had wingers/10 like Zuber dropping deep into left halfspace regions to help progress the ball, meaning Serbian players had to apply lot of pressures in those areas that were crucial for ball progression for Switzerland players and also the central defensive spaces where strikers like seferovic could find space.</p><p>Swizterland players applying pressures largely in their own defensive central space was primarily due to Sergej Milinkovic savic’s operation as a number 10 in those areas who would more often than not release passes to Filip Kostic or Dusan Tadic on either flanks.</p><p><strong>2018 WORLD CUP GROUP E: SERBIA VS BRAZIL (0–2) 27 JUNE 2018</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GuoM6lM1XARflls8YmaLPg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 11: Average Positions of Players &amp; Key passes in the game of Serbia vs Brazil</figcaption></figure><p>After the loss against Switzerland for Serbia &amp; a Draw for Brazil against same, it was a crucial game for both teams, one where Brazil reigned victorius. Brazil’s plans werent changed much as their idea was to have technicians like Coutinho &amp; Neymar play close to each other &amp; have Gabriel Jesus or willian often dropping around to draw the Serbain Centrebacks with them. Unlike against Switzerland in Pic 3, Marcelo wasnt afforded similar freedom was largely locked down by Serbain counterpart Antonio Rukavina.</p><p>Serbia were different in approach compared to the switzerland game, having Sergej Milinkovic savic play more deeper than a number 10 role &amp; instead Ljajic as a 10. Instead of 2 destroyer pivots like Matic &amp; Mihajlovic in Switzerland game, they opted for more technical secure options like Milinkovic savic play alongside matic &amp; having Ljajic meant Serbia wanted more possesion in midfield, which also proves wingers Kostic &amp; Tadic coming inside more &amp; Both fullbacks having more higher average positions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ir_lIFc9NpGlDYK38mNuug.png" /><figcaption>Pic 12: Shot Freeze Frames courtesy of Statsbomb in the game of Serbia vs Brazil</figcaption></figure><p>A quick glance back to Pic 11 provides a clue as to Jose Paulo (known as Paulinho) getting his goal. In a chance that had 0.297xG as seen in Pic 12, which was the highest in the game, we can see Pualinho get into a good goalscoring position inside the box solely because someone like coutinho operating in the left channel meant Sergej Milinkovic savic had to choose Between follwing him or casemiro or in simpler words, a 3v2 ensued in midfield for Brazil that helped Paulinho have no markers cover him just like we see in Pic 11.</p><p>The 2nd goal scored by Thiago silva from a corner saw Serbian player send 2 markers away to corner field which may have meant Silva would have better chances to score but nonetheless the xG of shot amounting to 0.236 meant it was a good chances that they took.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2DKNTi32R5G4jIP93zPpOg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 13: Shot Map for Both Teams</figcaption></figure><p>The plain shot maps give some more better perspective on chance creation, Serbia had some better chances based on Expected goals (xG) lookig at size of scatters in Pic 13, 4 of them right around center of the Box. Brazil though took lot of lesser quality chances but converted 2 great chances.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VocOScNtE76oS9hOcNPHCg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 14: Pressure Event Map for Serbia &amp; Brazil</figcaption></figure><p>It’s the pressure maps that offers the best perspective of the game. With more than the thrice of Pressures made by Serbia than Brazil, it could in one way point to high pressure game owing to some high pressure events in opposition box. But pressures around their Box meant Brazil were good in possession, this might also be proven solely by Brazil’s cluster of pressures centered in opposition box.</p><p><strong>THEN &amp; NOW: THE IMPORTANT PLAYERS THAT REMAIN AHEAD OF QATAR FROM 2018</strong></p><h4>1) Neymar Jr.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DSwBSDU9YFIoX_iQAkdMOQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 15: Neymar’s 2018 World Cup</figcaption></figure><p>Neymar was fresh of his 1st season at Paris St. Germain in the buildup to the 2018 World cup &amp; was at the time 26 years old given responsibility to lead the Selecao to conquer the world for a 6th time. With 2 Goals &amp; 2 assists ,the surface level statistics might have meant Neymar’s campaign wasn’t better than the one he had in 2014 with 4 goals &amp; 1 assist but in many other advanced metrics Neymar was Brazil’s best facilitator accumulating 3.7npxG &amp; 2.7 xA translating to 0.74npxG &amp; 0.54xA Per 90 minutes which show that the tournament was something he didn’t get credit for wrt advanced statistics. Neymar once again arrives into this world cup as the best attacking outlet of his country tasked to make his mark for his team.</p><p><strong>2) Sergej Milinković-Savić</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fulgn4K93GqIkM2RbbgaOA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 16: Sergej Milinković-Savić’s 2018 World Cup</figcaption></figure><p>Sergej Milinković-Savić was 23 during the 2018 World cup &amp; breaking out at Lazio, a club he’s still currently plying his trade at. He was seen as Serbia’s best midfielder tasked to make the team tick. Despite not getting Goals or assists, he accumulated 0.37xA per90 for the team but combinedly Serbia going out at group stages meant it was a disappointing end to the campaign for SMS. However with Serbian team now boasting better ranks in many areas, at age 27, SMS is now tasked to lead the midfield with his B2B skills.</p><p><strong>3) Granit Xhaka</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rxf03wBAhkA1ExR2zBTnkw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 17: Granit Xhaka’s 2018 World Cup</figcaption></figure><p>Xhaka at 25 was coming off Wenger’s final season at Arsenal but by then had established himself as a key proponent for the Swizterland national team. Over last few years, despite up &amp; downs in Club career, he’s now a key player in Mikel Arteta’s Arsenal &amp; expected to lead Switzerland team out of the group similar to like how they did 4 years ago.</p><p><strong>CONLCUSIONS: THE 4TH TEAM PLAYS A CRUCIAL ROLE</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1NJy1yi7-VVV2RNcAdqLiA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 18: Cameroon are no pushovers &amp; will play a crucial role in deciding the group</figcaption></figure><p>Considering All 3 have to play Cameroon in the group, it will be crucial how the teams gets result against them. Unlike Costa Rica, Cameroon are a capable team that can throw a spanner in any of the team’s fortunes &amp; this is where how teams &amp; their Important players can influence with their performances.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=add89e25a0d0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Magpies Project: A look at Newcastle United since their Takeover in 2021]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul/the-magpies-project-a-look-at-newcastle-united-since-their-takeover-in-2021-225882d48dbb?source=rss-215e598d7b72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/225882d48dbb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[newcastle-united]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul VN]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Oct 2022 15:40:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-23T15:40:36.360Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kd2-8OdxFUkj32tsCc1UnA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 1: A full house for Eddie Howe’s Newcastle as St. James’s Park</figcaption></figure><p>Back in 7 October 2021, an year since Newcastle were taken over by Saudi Led PIF consortium, a lot has changed for the Magpies. The then Incumbent Coach Steve Bruce made way for Eddie Howe and in the 2 successive 2 windows that followed, new players made their way into the club to don the famous black and white colors.</p><p>In this article we look at some key metrics and tactical asepcts of how since an year of takeover the magpies have taken shape under Eddie howe.</p><p><strong>HOW HAVE THE NUMBERS SHAPED IN THE 1ST YEAR UNDER NEW OWNERSHIP</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ss8zjsflYw_nv5rcgUSg0w.png" /><figcaption>Pic 2: npxG Timeline for Newcastle United Before and After Takeover (Eddie Howe’s appointment can be taken as actual start of New Regime)</figcaption></figure><p>After a Lackluster 20/21 under Steve Bruce, which saw Newcastle finish with less than 1 average npxG over the season, the conversations for Takeover began early into 21/22 season. By 20 october, Steve Bruce agreed for a compensation and few days Later Eddie Howe was appointed as coach. Howe’s appointment saw slight increase in average npxG for Newcastle as they avoided relegation despite not winning any of their 1st 14 games as under Howe, they won their last 12 games out of 18.</p><p>By 22/23 season now, we can see Eddie Howe’s Newcastle maintain a very big margin in average npxG than previous seasons after a great summer transfer window showing that Howe is the right man to take Magpies forward.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*V0txYlHDQ8mDM-ocUOdaxA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 3: xGA Timeline for Newcastle United Before and After Takeover (Eddie Howe’s appointment can be taken as actual start of New Regime)</figcaption></figure><p>In terms of defensive improvement, Eddie Howe managed impressive turnaround even before getting backed in transfer windows that followed by reducing xGA of magpies drastically compared to under steve bruce’s start to 21/22 and this season in 22/23 it has reduced slightly more to back the fact Howe ‘s appointment brought stability at back for Magpies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1EmUO3eFDjGwy_zNfo-B5A.png" /><figcaption>Pic 4: Attacking 3rd Touches Timeline for Newcastle United Before and After Takeover (Eddie Howe’s appointment can be taken as actual start of New Regime)</figcaption></figure><p>Coming to how many Touches Magpies took inside their attacking 3rd showcases improvement in playing style of team. The appointment of Howe saw Newcastle immediately improve on his Predecessor’s attacking 3rd touches taken on average and by this season in 22/23, the amount has gone up significantly showing howe’s ability one more time to lead the project.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3NoPv9wFTsLydg_Dmk8Tug.png" /><figcaption>Pic 5: Passes into Final 3rd Timeline for Newcastle United Before and After Takeover (Eddie Howe’s appointment can be taken as actual start of New Regime)</figcaption></figure><p>As we saw previously the touches taken in attacking 3rd, it was also imperative to look at how well magpies improved on playing passes into final 3rd and the amount of it shows if Newcastle became a team willing to take risks. Under Howe, his 21/22 saw slight improvement taking the job almost halfway into season and by 22/23, we now see more passes played into the final 3rd which completes a thorough look at what Howe’s appointment with right recruitment strategy has done for Magpies.</p><p><strong>WHAT ARE THE NOTICEABLE CHANGES IN TERMS OF SETUP AND TACTICAL PLANNING FROM BRUCE ERA TO HOWE ERA</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GIveaWvTGrVHwY9XFd4Utw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 6: The Average Locations of Players for 1st 12 games under Steve Bruce in 21/22</figcaption></figure><p>Steve Bruce’s 21/22 started off with a 0W-6L-6D in his 1st 12 games, by which time the Takeover talks started. With no victories, Bruce’s tactical setups were easier found out as he depended often on numerical overloads in centre or on either flank relying solely on Saint Maximin and Joelinton for Progression who were played closer to each other.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BbvgDJqGk0kC2ofEFVUOvA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 7: The Average Locations of Players for 1st 12 games under Eddie Howe in 21/22</figcaption></figure><p>After Howe took over, Newcastle’s Ideas got more clear with now Joelinton having average positions more deeper and with Howe discovering a Fraser-Saint Maximin playing as the 2 advanced forwards from the Manchester United game as seen in Pic 7 and even use Trippier in Inverted role sometimes like in the game against Everton in home where they recorded their 3–1 win as seen in Pic 7.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SXv_yI_gZHqTNlKVcnNTGw.png" /><figcaption>Pic 8: The Average Locations of Players for Last 12 games under Eddie Howe in 21/22</figcaption></figure><p>Towards the end of season, as Newcastle avoided the Relegation drop, Howe continued to opt for more Overloads using Saint maximin and others on left flank to try isolate the side and play through one of the forwards partnering him, which were either Ryan Fraser or Almiron. The addition of Bruno Guimaraes in January meant his countryman Joelinton would be given more freedom to move forward as we see Joelinton’s average positions more in opposition half compared to in Pic 7 where we saw Joelinton play more deep.</p><p><strong>THE BRUNO GUIMARAES</strong> <strong>FACTOR</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vepHlSxmkA649lVzA6TPJQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 9: A xT threat map of Newcastle’s Record January Buy Bruno Guimarães</figcaption></figure><p>On the last day of January, Newcastle spent £40M on Lyon’s Talented 23 year old Bruno Guimarães whose arrival bolstered Newcastle’s strength in midfield. His January signing set the tone for Howe’s system to take shape which in 22/23 has seen Newcastle rank significantly in many metrics and centre of it is Guimaraes who’s been the crucial part of generating it, often operating in all zones of central and halfspace areas with his tenacious workrate.</p><p><strong>THE FUTURE</strong></p><p>Newcastle will continue to get better with more backing as they set to build the Team in Howe’s Image. The foremost quality of any coach is to make best use of players and oversee their growth which Howe in space of One year has done a lot. With better backing Newcastle will slowly play regular European football and compete well in it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=225882d48dbb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ISL 21/22: A look at each team’s ideas using xT (Expected Threat) and correlation with shape…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@doodlemerahul/isl-21-22-a-look-at-each-teams-ideas-using-xt-expected-threat-and-correlation-with-shape-265225c446b4?source=rss-215e598d7b72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/265225c446b4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-football]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul VN]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Sep 2022 14:25:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-18T14:25:15.092Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>ISL 21/22: A look at each team’s ideas using xT (Expected Threat) and correlation with shape implemented</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l2x82AwtAtzo2y-uty4EFA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pic 1: Hyderabad FC were crowned the champions in the 21/22 ISL season beating Kerala Blasters in the Final</figcaption></figure><p>After <strong>Statsbomb </strong>Released the Event data for all the games of the 21/22 ISL season, it was intriguing to see so many great ideas come up from many people to look at different trends and analyze their favorite teams and players alike.</p><p>For myself, I long wanted to analyze Expected threat(xT) and how over a course of season can it help determine patterns that team use to generate consistent threat. With the ISL data available I set out to do the same.</p><p><strong>A Short Note on Expected Threat (xT)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ECKVHFWCBaH3eaovq_afpQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 2: An Image released by <strong>The Atheltic </strong>to highlight Various zones of Threat.</figcaption></figure><p>In simpler words, the word Expected threat explains itself as the threat that next few actions of a team from a particular position from where the ball is moved can lead to a goal and this threat is assigned a number. The difference between the zone where a player started to where the player moved the ball using any action being a pass or a ball carry is taken as the xT generated with that move.</p><p>In pic 2 for example you can look at various zones with a value assigned to them and any time the ball is moved from one zone to another, the xT is increased if the difference between final and initial zones are positive and decreased if negative. This concept can give rise to how teams might set up to increase the threat they generate.</p><p><strong>1. Expected Threat with Passes from ISL teams in 21/22</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e4PeMyWUr1ZPfkK3oFvgXg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 3: A Collection of Heatmaps of starting Locations of <strong>Completed Passes</strong> that had Positive xT (Goal Keeper Passes excluded)</figcaption></figure><p>Pic 3 shows a collection of Heatmaps that indicate starting positions of successful or completed passes that had positive xT. While it’s evident that almost all teams depended on wide areas to generate positive threat passes, most teams preferred left flank and Left halfspace as a source. While Hyderabad raked up the most xT with passes, their passes starting locations was mostly out of their own half, while Jamshedpur’s the only team whose most Threatening passes were from their attacking half.</p><p>Bengaluru FC and ATK Mohun Bagan had their threatening passes start out from right often while Bengaluru is an exception with generating a good amount of threatening passes from closer to middle of the Pitch.</p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>Expected Threat with Carries from ISL teams in 21/22</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9G4arTrD_eCdFAIHUNxFCA.png" /><figcaption>Pic 4: A Collection of Heatmaps of End Locations of Completed Ball Carries that had Positive xT</figcaption></figure><p>While passes provided an interesting insight, Ball carries end locations which generated positive xT give much more detail into some teams. A good example from Pic 4 is FC Goa’s end locations of Positive xT generating Ball carries, which was mostly on the right flank in attacking 3rd. It’s also interesting to note that teams that generated higher xT with passes also generated higher xT with carries and Vice versa, while end locations of the carries have a balance in terms of end locations on both flanks.</p><p>Both Pic 3 and Pic 4 show that most teams were setup to avoid generating threatening passes or carries centrally and hence in general moving around the ball to flank was main source of any Positive xT moves for almost all teams.</p><p><strong>3. Can Passing Networks of Teams Provide evidence of Correlation to Pic 3 or Pic 4??</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O4t9Q8dypgA0wLkPCBFD-w.png" /><figcaption>Pic 5: A collection of Pass Maps for Hyderabad FC’s 21/22 ISL season</figcaption></figure><p>Looking at Pic 3 and Pic 5, Hyderabad FC, which generated the most xT with their passes had their Heatmap of positive xT difference passes largely start from their left. In the passing networks in all the games this season, we can see Hyderabad FC usually pushed their Left back very high and made more stronger network of passes with their left sided players and in many other games their average player shape was oriented towards the left.</p><p>Hence it can be said that Hyderabad FC, a team with highest xT difference generated with their passes relied on left overloads or progression ways and hence their xT map was useful to give us insight into where they preferred to attack from and Pass networks gives us idea on the “how” part.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OlHZzH-E-QLowqvKbitbKQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 6: A collection of Pass Maps for Bengaluru FC’s 21/22 ISL season</figcaption></figure><p>Another look back at Pic 3 shows Bengaluru FC’s heatmap where their positive xT passes was spread considerably across both flanks where it was dense higher on right hand side and density on left was more in their own half while there was a significant portion around central areas. A look at Pic 6 confirms that Bengaluru preferred pushing their right sided FB’s or even CB’s higher and had their shape oriented towards that flank. and more often than not relied on a lone Pivot to circulate.</p><p>This is another example that proves that looking at Passes with Positive xT alone can give us an idea of what a team can be trying to do and evidence usually can be provided by Pass networks of the said teams.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zjwOGJugJark_k0hI00bCQ.png" /><figcaption>Pic 7: A collection of Pass Maps for ATK Mohun Bagan’s 21/22 ISL season</figcaption></figure><p>For one Last time, a 3rd lookback to Pic 3 shows how ATKMB’s most threatening passes are from both flanks and importantly from their own half unlike Hyderabad or Bengaluru we saw previously where Hyerabad was from the attacking half left side and Bengaluru FC’s was more from left flank inside their half and more from right flank from their attacking half.</p><p>A look at ATKMB’s pass networks do show how they are generally compact and their threat is from their own half based on strong networks amongst players drilled in a compact shape and network strength of passes between both flanks is generally balanced most games. This further strengthens opinion that look at Passes with positive xT value can tell the most about side’ setup and passing networks can give idea to correlate zones that teams exploit often.</p><p><strong>4. Passing and Carries, which teams are good at generating positive xT from either or both??</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qk0LOBGWZjiPVE_2mjv3Tg.png" /><figcaption>Pic 8: A scatter plot to look at the xT from carries and passes</figcaption></figure><p>In terms of creating Positive xT from Passes or Carries, Mohun Bagan are the most effective team that create from both completed passes and Carries. Their neighbors East Bengal have the least with Both completed passes and carries. Bengaluru FC who have 2nd least xT with Carries prove to show a preference for a better passing game.</p><p>Going back to Pic 5, 6 or 7, arrangement of players or compactness of team can prove whether teams preferred more passing positive xT or carry positive xT (like Odisha) or balance both. Hyderabad for example maintained spread out shape often that could help them balance both.</p><p>The Fair conclusion to this article could be that how teams set up can affect how their xT generation can be affected. Conversely Teams do work on setting themselves in ways to counter the threat or generate in certain zones using certain ways.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=265225c446b4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>