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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Douglas Lain on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[In Defense of Slavoj Žižek (A Zero Books VideoScript)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@douglaslain/in-defense-of-slavoj-%C5%BEi%C5%BEek-a-zero-books-videoscript-7e533cb09f1?source=rss-d063c47606b0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[slavoj-zizek]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Douglas Lain]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 26 Oct 2019 22:17:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-27T23:20:27.973Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FXJsLRe7m0ns%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DXJsLRe7m0ns&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FXJsLRe7m0ns%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/71c337f53772e6321018d1b016b3c752/href">https://medium.com/media/71c337f53772e6321018d1b016b3c752/href</a></iframe><p>Hello, Zero Books Readers, it’s me again Douglas Lain and in this video, I’ll be defending Slavoj Zizek from the most recent attempt to cancel him. This time the attack came in the form of an essay published in the often excellent publication Current Affairs.</p><p>What I try to do here is show that Slavoj Zizek&#39;s philosophical arguments aren’t just the ravings of a charlatan and that his political writings are attempts to intervene and challenge what Zizek would call the ideology of liberal modernity.</p><p>The most important thing to understand about the piece entitled “What is Zizek for?” by Thomas Moller-Nielsen is that it is a Gish Gallop.</p><p>What’s a gish gallop?</p><p>Here’s a quote from <a href="https://qz.com/905252/donald-trumps-lies-are-all-part-of-a-debate-tactic-called-the-gish-gallop/">Carl Alviani writing about Trump for Quartz Magazine</a> that defines the term:</p><p><em>A Gish Gallop is a well-established method of outmaneuvering rhetorical opponents with an overwhelming onslaught of dubious arguments. The Gallop works by leveraging two basic tendencies in human reasoning. First, it’s easier and faster to make a false claim than it is to disprove one. Second, if an opponent fails to disprove every single one of the spurious statements you state, you can claim victory on the leftovers.</em></p><p>If I were to refute every claim made in the essay this video would stretch out to the length of a feature film. Still, it is possible to offer a critique of this essay despite its inherent fallaciousness. And we should start where the essay starts, namely with this quote from Atra Taylor’s 2005 film simply entitled <strong>Zizek!</strong></p><p><em>What would be my — how should I call it — spontaneous attitude towards the universe? It’s a very dark one. The first one — the first thesis would have been — a kind of total vanity. There is nothing, basically. I mean it quite literally. Like, ultimately — ultimately — there are just some fragments, some vanishing things, if you look at the universe it’s one big void. But then, how do things emerge? Here, I feel a kind of spontaneous affinity with quantum physics, where, you know, the idea there is that the universe is a void, but a kind of a positively charged void, and then particular things appear when the balance of the void is disturbed. And I like this idea spontaneously very much, the fact that it’s not just nothing, things are out there. It means something went terribly wrong, that what we call creation is a kind of a cosmic imbalance, a cosmic catastrophe, that things exist by mistake. And I’m even ready to go to the end and claim that the only way to counteract this is to assume the mistake and go to the end. And we have a name for this, it’s called “love.” Isn’t love precisely this kind of a cosmic imbalance? I was always disgusted with this notion of “I love the world, universal love.” I don’t like the world. I’m basically someone in between I hate the world or I’m indifferent towards it. But the of whole of reality, it’s just it, it’s stupid. It is out there. I don’t care about it. Love for me is an extremely violent act. Love is not “I love you all.” Love means, I pick out something, and you know, again it’s this structure of imbalance, even if this something is just a small detail, a fragile individual person, I say “I love you more than anything else.” In this quite formal sense love is evil.</em></p><p>After presenting us with this quote Moller-Nielsen asks us to judge it intuitively. He offers us a multiple-choice test wherein our answer will determine not the truth about the Zizek’s monologue but rather what kind of person we are in relationship to Zizek:</p><p>Here are the choices:</p><p>A) Zizek’s monologue conveys something profoundly insightful.</p><p>B) Zizek’s monologue is insane gibberish</p><p>C) Zizek’s monologue is confusing. It may contain insight but it could be unbridled lunacy posing as philosophical profundity.</p><p>From my perspective the correct answer to this pop quiz would be C. Zizek’s monologue is confusing but could contain some insight. According to the Moller-Nielsen the correct answer is B. Zizek’s ruminations on the universe are unhinged or insane, and because he takes Zizek to be insane he doesn’t even attempt to interpret or refute Zizek’s claims.</p><p>Moller-Nielsen does not address Zizek’s argument because, he says, Zizek is a repetitive racist reactionary, but this is a fallacious argument against Zizek. Specifically, it is an example of the ad hominem fallacy.</p><p>Readers of Ben Burgis’ “Give Them an Argument, Logic for the Left” know that an “Ad Hominem fallacy is the logical mistake in reasoning we make when we take ‘Vile Person P believes Conclusion C’ to be a reason to reject Conclusion C.” For instance, if we say, “Richard Spencer supports universal healthcare and opposes U.S. airstrikes in Syria therefore it is wrong to support universal healthcare or oppose US airstrikes in Syria” we are committing the ad hominem fallacy.</p><p>Again, the argument that Zizek’s statements about the nature of love are incoherent or insane because Zizek is reactionary, racist, and repetitive is a fallacious argument. Further, the fact that Moller-Nielsen resorts to this fallacy at the very start of his essay is evidence that he is not interested in Zizek’s ideas at all. The aim is to do damage to Zizek’s reputation and not to refute Zizek’s political stances or philosophical arguments.</p><p>Nonetheless, I think it’s worthwhile to take a moment to interpret what Zizek is saying about love, and for me the best way to understand it is to consider a FB post that my mother-in-law recently shared:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/669/0*VhkOfHS2UBe3quCF" /></figure><p>In his book <em>First as Tragedy Then as Farce</em> Slavoj Zizek considers why it is that the topic of “toxic subjects” became popular in the late aughts. After describing several examples of how the ideology of toxicity plays out in our politics, including an example wherein Tunisian fishermen were put on trial in Sicily for “aiding and abetting illegal immigrants” after the fisherman had saved the immigrants from certain death from drowning. Zizek claims that Agamben’s notion of homo sacer, the one excluded from the civil order who can be killed with impunity, is fully operative in the heart of the very Europe that sees itself as the ultimate bastion of human rights. Still, Zizek asserts that the answer to the impulse to exclude the other as toxic is not to insist that the other is innocent, or that the other is non-toxic. It is, rather, to see the toxicity in yourself. <br>Zizek’s monologue on love points out the obvious, if uncomfortable, truth about even our most noble impulses and feelings. True bonding and love occur through the unjustifiable privileging of one person over all others. The immense power of fossil fuels is derived from prehistoric calamities. The very fact of our existence itself is the result of, as Zizek would say, a cosmic imbalance.</p><p>To return to the Toxic People meme: It at first appears to be a loving message, a message of healing, but it is predicated on the idea that a non-toxic identity and life can be had. Another way to understand the problem is to think of what Zizek says about new-age or permissive fathers.</p><p><a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/angst/201107/honesty-and-the-hidden-commands-we-give-youth">“Say you are a little girl and I am a totalitarian father. It is Saturday afternoon. I say, ‘I don’t care what you want to do, you have to visit your grandmother.’ You go but you secretly hate me and try to revolt and that is OK. That is good. But the monstrous permissive father will say: ‘You know how much your grandmother loves you, but visit her only if you really want to.’ Beneath the appearance of a choice is a much more severe order. Not only must you visit grandma but you must want to and like it.”</a></p><p>When considered again, in light of Zizek’s observations, we can see that this meme which is meant to be healing and helpful is instead totalitarian in the worst sense. Not only are we to stamp out the toxic other, we are to stamp out the toxicity in ourselves, but this toxicity is precisely where our humanity, our subjectivity, resides.</p><p>The fact that the liberal humanitarian order that wants to deny the contradictions within its own system of values, cannot stand to witness it’s own toxicity, and can become quite vicious when threatened with the revelation of its own ideological antimonies is made clear when one examines the tactics used in this hatchet piece in Current Affairs.</p><p>After resorting to an Ad Hominem approach to argumentation in the opening paragraphs Moller-Nielsen turns to cherry-picking evidence to make his case that Zizek is racist, reactionary, and so on and so on…</p><p>After dismissing the clearly radical premises of ZIzek’s book “Against the Double Blackmail” as what any “self-proclaimed leftist” would say or as standard or boilerplate leftism that the author, himself a “self-proclaimed leftist,” fully agrees with, Moller-Nielsen claims that Zizek adds a toxic supplement to the usual leftist formula. What Zizek adds is the idea that the Syrian refugees hold cultural values that are incompatible with the values of the West and that this incompatibility means that, quoting Zizek “we are definitely in the midst of the clash of civilizations” described by Samuel Huntington in his 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled, what else, “The Clash of Civilizations.”</p><p>According to Moller-Nielsen, Zizek defends Huntington’s thesis.</p><p>However, the reality is that Zizek doesn’t defend Huntington but problematizes or complicates his thesis in precisely the same way that Moller-Nielsen does in his essay on Zizek.<br> <br>Moller-Nielsen writes, in regards to the Western value of free speech, that the idea that Western culture is unified and settled is “an exceedingly gross simplification: for one thing, there are significant differences between Europe and America.”</p><p>But Zizek agrees with Moller-Nielsen on this point, as would have been obvious if Moller-Nielsen had used the whole sentence. Here’s what Zizek actually wrote:</p><p><em>“We are definitely in the midst of the clash of civilizations (the Christian West versus radicalized Islam), but in fact there are clashes within each civilization: in the Christian space, it is the United States and Western Europe against Russia; in the Muslim space it is Sunnis against Shias.”</em></p><p>Zizek goes on to suggest that we can’t consider the immigration crisis in isolation but have to think of it as the result of the totality of the capitalist order. He argues that changing the totality, as utopian as it might sound, is the only realistic solution to our current crisis. I would add that such a radical move would change the character of Europe and Syria, Westerner and Refugee, alike.</p><p>After this cherry-picked quote Moller-Nielsen writes several paragraphs denying that the refugees came from countries struggling with fundamentalist religious movements while he ignores that Zizek’s argument in The Double Blackmail is that the struggle to overcome fundamentalism should be understood as part of a more universal struggle to overcome Global Capitalism itself. Further, Moller-Nielsen’s claim that Zizek views Muslim immigrants as “inherently predisposed” towards grotesque fundamentalist practices is not only a misreading but a mischaracterization. Zizek not only believes that cultures can change, but his book On the Double Blackmail is a call for a radical struggle for cultural change in Europe and across the globe.</p><p>The fact that Moller-Nielsen considers Zizek&#39;s refusal to deny the toxicity of fundamentalism to be an embrace of “racist humanitarianism” demonstrates that he himself is caught up in the pervading totalitarian pseudo-humanitarianism that Zizek is writing against. Zizek is asking us to recognize our common humanity precisely through our common susceptibility to toxicity.</p><p>To understand what Zizek is getting at we should simply consider this: In 2017 Slavoj Zizek gave a lecture at Boston University. In it, he told many of the same jokes, made many of the same gestures, that followers of Zizek will already be very familiar with, and overall the lecture was the same as many he’d given before.</p><p>The title of that lecture was: Fear thy Neighbor as Thyself.</p><p>The next section of the essay in Neils-Moller’s essay is more substantive in so much as it does not rely on blatant mischaracterizations of Zizek’s views. Still, the arguments do take aim at Zizek’s character rather than at his ideas and, forthis reason, they ultimately fail.</p><p>All along the aim is to produce an indictment of Zizek as a leftist rather than to refutate Zizek’s ideas andpolitical prescriptions.</p><p>Before we get into the the arguments about electoral politics I should put my own cards on the table. During the 2016 campaign and especially after the election of Trump I came to believe that the only realistic way to properly ward off the threat of a rising reactionary right was to back a sincerely reformist and social-democratic left. I was not someone who was excited by the Sanders campaign in 2016 (although I did prefer him to Clinton) because I was still holding onto radical dreams born out the anti-WTO protests and then the Occupy Wall Street movement. More particularly, I was and remain fixated on Marx’s critique of political economy and the hope of the self-abolition of the working class, and Sanders’ campaign doesn’t seem to speak to my fundamental political concerns.</p><p>Still, after the election of Trump, I’m still willing to hold my nose and support the democratic socialist wing of the democratic party.</p><p>I don’t know if this is the right political calculation. Some of my former friends from the Sectarian Marxist left believe that a Sanders win will ultimately help the far right as the inevitable failures of social democratic reforms will only accelerate aright-wing reaction and bring on a general rejection of the idea of socialism. I think that there’s empirical data to refute this view. For example, the failure of the Syriza government may have led to the rise of liberal-conservatism but the fascist Golden Dawn party is now shuttered.</p><p>In any case, Zizek likewise believes that support for social democratic movements is the best way to respond to the threat from the far-right. However, in 2016 he went further than I did and argued that the left should NOT support centrist liberals even if this lack of support would, in the short term, help the right gain power.</p><p>Now, at this point, it’s important to point out that we have left the realm of pure ideology critique behind. We might still be able to pick apart ideological positions by looking for their logical inconsistencies, but the question of whether the left would be more likely to self-organize during a Trump administration than a Clinton administration isn’t a strictly logical question.</p><p>Given that politics don’t happen in a petri dish and that the conditions for our politics can’t be replicated, these sorts of strategic questions can’t be settled as questions of fact either. Instead, we have to work through what our political aims really are, what the best interpretation of the facts is, and accept some uncertainty.</p><p>This means that when Moller-Nielsen claims that Zizek’s arguments about Le Pen and Trump are patently absurd because “if it’s true that the election of Le Pen could possibly have triggered a left mobilization, it’s also true that “the election of Le Pen might not have given the French Left such a strong push” he’s falsely supposing that we are working on the level of logical necessity when we are, in fact, working on the level of probability. Zizek’s claim is not that a Le Pen victory would have brought a necessary left mobilization, but rather that it would have more probably brought such forces together than a Macron victory has. There is evidence in favor of Zizek’s argument. Under Macron the yellow-vest movement has emerged and, by some accounts, it has taken on a reactionary character.</p><p>Moller-Nielsen questions about Zizek’s stance in 2016 are mostly born out of what appears to be an intentional misreading. Many of them are written as rhetorical questions that could easily be answered. (For example, he asks why a reactionary victory in 2022 would be worse than a reactionary victory in 2016 and the answer is that as the neoliberal order disintegrates and conditions worsen the possible right-wing reaction/solution to the political failure gains in intensity.) But two of his questions are worth addressing.</p><p>The first is: “Why does ZIzek believe that it is impossible for leftists to vote for the lesser immediate evil now (e.g.) Clinton and Macron, while simultaneously organizing in order to enact more progressive political change in the future?”</p><p>The second is: “If Žižek really wants right-wing chaos [now rather than later], why didn’t he simply recommend voting outright for Marine Le Pen?”</p><p>The reason Zizek didn’t advocate for tactically voting for Le Pen (and why he walked back his original statement that he prefered Trump over Clinton) is that he believes that the masks we wear and the beliefs we espouse cynically come to dominate us. For Zizek the symbolic act has power and a vote for Le Pen would have a consequence ideologically and not just tactically. This is implied by Zizek’s own answer for why the left shouldn’t vote for Macron:</p><p>“After a Macron victory it will be too late to criticize Macron, the task will lose its urgency in the wave of self-satisfaction.”</p><p>Moving on from the 2016 election, I want to take a stab at addressing the claim that Zizek’s philosophical writings are the works of a charlatan. Moller-Nielsen gives us this quote:</p><p>“Here is the formula [of Less Than Nothing] at its most elementary: “moving” is the striving to reach the void, namely, “things move,” there is something instead of nothing, not because reality is in excess in comparison with mere nothing, but because reality is less than nothing. This is why reality has to be supplemented by fiction: to conceal its emptiness.”</p><p>Moller-Nielsen then asks if we are confused and then says, “I certainly was. How can something exist, and yet simultaneously nothing exist — or rather, less-than-not-exist? Furthermore, who — or what — is “supplementing reality by fiction,” if (less than) nothing exists? Are (e.g.) novels being written by things that don’t exist — or perhaps by things that don’t even not exist? Does Žižek exist? If he doesn’t — or if he doesn’t-even-not-exist — then who the hell wrote the book I’m reading? What’s more, who the hell is reading it?”</p><p>I’ll try to answer these questions:</p><p>How can something exist and yet simultaneously nothing exist?</p><p>This can happen dialectically.</p><p>That is, as per Hegel’s dialectics, the concept of being implies the concept of nothing or nothingness. For there to be the concept of being there must be the concept of nothing.</p><p>In the Science of Logic Hegel wrote: “<em>Being, pure being, </em>without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an other; it has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not be held fast in its purity if it contained any determination or content which could be distinguished in it or by which it could be distinguished from an other. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There <em>is nothing </em>to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact <em>nothing, </em>and neither more nor less than <em>nothing.”</em></p><p>Now, Hegel isn’t an easy philosopher to grasp, and a little context is necessary here. Hegel is a post-Kantian philosopher. He is not starting from a position of simple realism but from the perspective of transcendental idealism. To understand what this fact has to do with Zizek’s musings on being, nothingness, and the concept of “the less than nothing” we might start with Kant’s refutation of the Ontological argument for the existence of God.</p><p>Here’s how that argument usually goes:</p><p>God is defined as a perfect being. Existence is better than non-existence, therefore to understand the concept of God is to understand that God exists.</p><p>It’s a tricky little argument, one that Kant refutes this way:</p><p>“Existence or being is not a real predicate, not something that can be added to a thing, but rather existence is merely the positing of a thing in and of itself.”</p><p>So if we reread Hegel’s opening of the Science of Logic we can see that the being that Hegel is referring to is Kant’s being, the being that is not a predicate, that cannot be added to our concept of an object, such as God. It is, in itself, an empty concept.</p><p>When we posit the existence of God we presuppose his existence not as a predicate but as the very emptiness from which he could possibly appear.<br> <br>What Zizek would add to Hegel is the idea that this presupposition, this nothingness, isn’t neutral but is retroactively given a fictional quality. So, when we posit that God is a Spaghetti monster the nothingness that we posit along with positing this monster’s existence is different than the sort of emptiness that we imagine when we think of Yaweh arriving out of the formless void that was heaven and earth before he said “let there be light.”</p><p>Or, to give a secular reading of this, we can turn to Zizek’s own observation or joke about the difference between coffee without milk and coffee without cream. <br> <br>“It’s not the same thing: coffee without cream or coffee without milk.<br>What you don’t get is part of the identity of what you get.”</p><p>Moller-Nielsen asks: “Who — or what — is “supplementing reality by fiction,” if (less than) nothing exists?” The answer to that question is a dark one. Nobody is, or to put it differently, we are responsible for the fiction of ourselves.</p><p>Now, at this point those of you who are friendly to Moller-Nielsen and disapproving of Zizek are probably thinking that I’ve just demonstrated that I’m a charlatan just like Zizek. My defense here is to point out that if I’m a charlatan so is everyone who wrestles with ontology. We’ve run up against a fundamental problem in philosophy and nobody is free of the difficulty. Not Zizek, not Moller-Nielsen, not Stephen Pinker whom Moller-Nielsen quotes in his essay, and not even that most reasonable philosophy Noam Chomsky.</p><p>When Chomsky is asked about the nature of physical reality, or more to the point when he’s asked what is meant when we talk about being, he says:</p><p>“The term physical is just kinda like an honorific word, kinda like the word ‘real’ when we say ‘the real truth’. It doesn’t add anything, it just says ‘this is serious truth’. So to say that something is ‘physical’ today just means ‘you gotta take this seriously’.”</p><p>According to Chomsky the question of what is material and what isn’t comes down to what we know subjectively. We are, as per Chomsky, stuck within our own categories of understanding and do not have, possibly can never have, any coherent concept of materiality.</p><p>The difference between Chomsky and Zizek on the question of the physical or on materialism is that while Chomsky holds that we are ultimately cut off from the physical world. He thinks that we can’t even conceive of the physical in itself, but are stuck with an attempt to understand the categories that condition our cognition as best as we can.</p><p>Chomsky is aligned with Kant on this point while Zizek, by asserting that materiality itself incorporate the finitude we experience as epistemic into its own being, is siding with Hegel.</p><p>Now, Zizek could be wrong and his philosophy could turn out to be a dead end, but this wouldn’t make him a charlatan. Further, I think there would still be something worthwhile in Zizek even if he is ultimately wrong.</p><p>The primary aim of Zizek’s interventions is not to tell us who to vote for, nor is he hoping to shape people’s held beliefs about this or that religion or political crisis.</p><p>The main aim of Zizek’s intellectual project is to encourage us to think, or more to the point, to embrace a critical theory that will allow us to question the way we ask questions, to cross-examine our presuppositions.</p><p>That much, if nothing more, is certainly worth holding onto, and when people on the left serve up ad hominem attacks against Zizek, when they throw everything they have at him including misreadings and cherry-picked quotes, they not only do Zizek a disservice but they also hurt the left’s chance to develop a thorough going refutation of Zizek’s politics and philosophy.</p><p>These sorts of critics of Zizek should be considered the enemies of Zizek’s true critics.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7e533cb09f1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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