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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by drac on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cyber all the things]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/cyber-all-the-things-e7aacc138a2c?source=rss-1da199f383b6------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[opinion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sri-lanka]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[drac]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 May 2018 08:21:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-25T08:21:08.440Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sri Lanka’s cyber security strategy — talks the talk, but can it walk the walk?</p><p>At 7.36am on a sleepy Sunday morning, A. noticed a flurry of emails from Facebook sent to his Gmail address. In quick succession, Facebook told him that his account password had been changed; then his linked phone number; then his email. Finally, two new names appeared on his friend list and nominated themselves as <em>trusted contacts, </em>a Facebook term for closest friends.</p><p>Trying to login to his account, A. found himself locked out. In the space of ten minutes; years of photo albums, contacts, posts and personal messages were no longer accessible to him. Friends linked to his Facebook account started messaging him on other mediums, as the account started making erratic status updates.</p><p>This was the weekend where violence flared in Digana, Kandy — where Facebook and Whatsapp (among other media) were held culpable for the uncontrolled spread of messages intended to incite racial hatred and violence. For perhaps the first time in Sri Lanka, losing control of ones social media account was no longer just evidence of “<em>not being very good at technology, hahaha”</em> but had very real potential to cause damage to one’s reputation or become the subject of law enforcement investigation.</p><p>About three hours later, A. (a friend of a friend, whom I had also met socially a couple of times) got in touch with me; and we set about trying to regain access to his Facebook account.</p><p>About a month ago, the <a href="http://www.slcert.gov.lk/">Sri Lanka Computer Emergency Readiness Team</a> made public their <a href="http://nicstrategy.blogspot.com/2018/04/national-information-and-cyber-security.html">strategy document for 2018–2023</a>. Given the current woeful state of both awareness towards information security in general and preparedness for data security incidents, it’s difficult to fault the basic but very necessary steps proposed within the strategy document. Working off a <a href="https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/default.aspx">toolkit provided by the ITU</a>, the five pillar strategy for enhancing national infosec capacity proposes a variety of measures that include legislative, capacity building and organisational aspects.</p><p>The 2017 Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) places Sri Lanka at rank 71 (up one place from 2016) with a composite score of 0.419. In comparison to even its Asian neighbours, this is a surprisingly poor showing — Singapore is the global leader, Malaysia 3rd, India places 23rd globally, Philippines 37th, Bangladesh 53rd, Pakistan 66th.</p><p>It is a plausible argument that some indicators which contribute to the score, and ultimately the rank, are exercises in box ticking and have little real-world impact on actual resiliency to information security incidents. It’s equally plausible that Sri Lanka’s limited internet penetration (slightly under a third of the population has access to an internet connection) and hitherto poor reliance on internet enabled information systems has allowed it to fly under the radar inspite of its low score. Nevertheless, as more and more information is brought online, years of under-investment in capacity is becoming evident — breaches of information security are worryingly common-place among critical infrastructure in both public and private organisations.</p><p>It’s not all bad news though — this strategy document represents, in its ideal form, the first step in a golden opportunity to leapfrog years of hard won experiences by other nation states.</p><p>First and foremost, the main criticism to be leveled here is that the exact size and scale of the problem is concerningly opaque. The SLCERT official figures are reproduced below, and seem scarcely believable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/378/1*3HmTY4XMO4txDCuN0Q4k7A.png" /><figcaption>Cybersecurity related incidents reported to SLCERT — From the SLCERT Information and Cybersecurity Strategy of Sri Lanka document, pg 4</figcaption></figure><p>While there are understandable reasons why incidents may be under-reported when they concern individuals, it is my unequivocal opinion that state mandated (and critically, enforced) disclosure rules should apply to breaches. It could be argued that determining the parameters (size, the type of information breached) that constitute fitness for disclosure is a legislative task, but a strategic commitment towards transparency in incident reporting is currently lacking.</p><p>In this, as in many other issues related to information security and privacy, the elephant within (or rather without) the room for Sri Lankan policy makers is certainly that the majority of interaction with information systems carried out by Sri Lankan consumers is outside the immediate purview of Sri Lankan law.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/547/1*WpVnbxoewGKU_F-Rk2_Jxg.png" /><figcaption>Alexa top 8 sites accessed by Sri Lankans</figcaption></figure><p>The relevant part of the strategy document is reproduced below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/353/1*qO3YsrV3tQS5___6arfX-g.png" /><figcaption>SLCERT Strategy document, pg 9</figcaption></figure><p>How will this work in situations where the data is hosted in jurisdictions with different data privacy requirements; and in situations where there is no corporate entity present in Sri Lanka? The 9th most popular site in Sri Lanka (according to Alexa) is xhamster.com; a site that I am reasonably convinced will not have a corporate presence in Sri Lanka any time soon. The long tail of frequently visited sites contain many other examples of consumer data hosted beyond the reach of Sri Lankan law.</p><p>Even in enacting disclosure rules (and making organisations liable, as point 2.2.2 suggests); there are a number of pitfalls. Legislators would do well to learn from the <a href="https://www.sans.edu/cyber-research/security-laboratory/article/data-breach-disclose">morass of conflicting requirements in different US states</a>.</p><p>Capacity building is identified as a key aspect of the strategy document. Judging by the survey below, this is clearly necessary.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/371/1*SZW6l_pVeYVL2dUqKmTZVw.png" /><figcaption>SLCERT Strategy document, pg 13</figcaption></figure><p>But it is interesting that the survey facts in the strategy document, and also the SLCERT security handbook place a high value on changing passwords at periodic intervals.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/491/1*H3u0OrpuiCm3sp_kI9dr4A.png" /><figcaption>SLCERT Handbook on Information Security — pg 12</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/371/1*RtUK9olu5qT477MHeIyLMw.png" /><figcaption>SLCERT Strategy document pg 15</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html">NIST Digital Identity Guidelines</a> no longer mandate password changes be performed arbitrarily and changed their advice on doing so in 2016;</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1006/1*rj_SSyBFoB8S8lnKlJvgIA.png" /><figcaption>US National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Identity Guidelines</figcaption></figure><p>There is no requirement that the Sri Lankan standards unthinkingly follow the NIST guidelines in any shape or form (other national standard bodies have not adopted all these recommendations); but given the frequently occurring emphasis on password changes in a strategy document; I feel compelled to wonder if the NIST advice was known to the authors.</p><p>Back to my friend A., who had grown increasingly worried at the prospect of his Facebook account being hijacked by local instigators of racial violence. Although Facebook offers a variety of options in case of account breach, losing control of the email address to which an FB account was linked (this was broken into first by probably the same attackers) meant that it was impossible to roll back the changes to email, phone number etc that was made by the attackers after gaining control to the account.</p><p>Although there were still options to recover the account, our first concern was to ensure that A. was not held responsible for anything posted under his name in the intervening hours.</p><p>The 24/7 call centre to report incidents is, unfortunately, still at the proposal stage.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/298/1*70qc1xZR6X-wOv7b1A4Oqw.png" /><figcaption>SLCERT Strategy document — pg 7</figcaption></figure><p>Although attempts were made to get in touch with SLCERT, the response received at the time was quite similar to that below.</p><h3>Sri Lanka CERT|CC on Twitter</h3><p>@Dilshani_ The reasons why CERT cannot take action on what is posted on Twitter are, 1. Sri Lanka CERT does not control Twitter content, You&#39;ve to report Twitter inc. on abusive content posted on their platform. 2. Sri Lanka CERT is not a law enforcement unit who can do investigations</p><p>This begs the question, however, as to the point of a cybersecurity strategy which seems ill-equipped to deal with the most common examples of data breaches (problems with social media dominate reports to SLCERT by a fair margin). The recourses available to individuals in case of data breaches seem poor, and besides reporting the incident to (equally poorly equipped) law enforcement — there seems very little point to its existence.</p><p>In A.’s case, attempts at recovering his Facebook account were made even more complicated by the government deciding to block access to Facebook/Whatsapp and some other media sites. It was no longer possible for him to access even Facebook’s reporting sub-sites on any ISP without resorting to a VPN.</p><p>Sidebar: Does blocking access to sites, and coordinating responses fall under the purview of cybersecurity? Or is it the murky Ministry of Defence bailiwick of national security? Which agency manages the overlap between those two concerns? (the proposed NICSA, as outlined in the strategy document, has no legislative powers unless the proposed Cybercrime Act chooses to award them).</p><p>It’s clear that a cybersecurity (I’ve spent a lot of time wincing at the excessive use of the word <em>cyber</em>) strategy is long overdue for Sri Lanka. But if its formulation is essential, then rigorous and swift implementation is equally if not more so important. Some pieces of the puzzle (centralised data centers, shared expertise and policies regarding data security) are already in place but my personal observation has been that implementation and adoption has been haphazard at best. Too many government organisations subcontract website infrastructure to poorly vetted contractors and seemingly have little interest in expending time or money on the frequent maintenance and updates that modern internet facing software requires. At least some of the time, going it alone is due to the sheer red tape (and to be honest, loss of control) that hosting in an ICTA data centre represents.</p><p>Above all, it’s hard to convince citizens such as myself that privacy and data security are key when ISPs and the government routinely collude to send us their informational messaging. It’s difficult to be convinced of talk of resiliency when government endorsed monopolies (and in some cases, cartels) mean that one fishing boat dropping anchor off the Sri Lankan coast is enough to disrupt internet access to an entire country.</p><p>Like A. eventually had to, using personal resources is sometimes the only way to recover from a cybersecurity incident. Perhaps the implementation of this cybersecurity strategy for Sri Lanka will fix that, but from the heavy focus on incident mitigation; it is equally likely that the focus will be on fighting yesterday’s war.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e7aacc138a2c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/cyber-all-the-things-e7aacc138a2c">Cyber all the things</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka">Musings about Sri Lanka</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The curious case of Tikiri]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts/the-curious-case-of-tikiri-1c7550cba74f?source=rss-1da199f383b6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1c7550cba74f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sri-lanka]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[twitter]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[drac]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Apr 2018 09:29:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-04T09:31:56.257Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tikiri_Kobbekaduwa">Tikiri Kobbekaduwa</a> is, by the standards of a disinterested Colombo denizen such as myself, an unremarkable politician. Politics is clearly a family business (his father was a minister before him); and the last time he appeared in the public eye was when <a href="http://www.adaderana.lk/news/29465/tikiri-kobbekaduwa-to-resign-as-central-province-governor-">he resigned from his post as governor of the Central Province in 2015</a>, allegedly on being sent a letter requesting him to do so.</p><p>That should have been the end of it, yet another Mahinda Rajapakshe political appointee sent home when the government changed. For the most part, it was. The political news cycle shifted rapidly away from him. But Tikiri Banda Kobbekaduwa kept plugging away, and this is where I discovered him —of all places, <a href="https://twitter.com/tkobbekaduwa?lang=en">on Twitter</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/944/1*Lp4SyEQJHagVmqwp_q29Gw.png" /><figcaption>#lka political twitter gone mild — @tkobbekaduwa (on Twitter)</figcaption></figure><p>In recent days, parts of Sri Lankan Twitter has been beset by an old problem with a seemingly new menacing undertone. No longer are <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/botspot-twelve-ways-to-spot-a-bot-aedc7d9c110c">Twitter bots</a> the province of get-followers-quick scammers or seedy softcore porn camsites. The new hotness for Twitter automation is seemingly the subversion of the very fabric of democracy on which our socialist republic uneasily rests its well padded and amply subsidised political rear. Where random followers might have been ignored (or even welcomed, as some perverse proof of one’s social standing on the internet) in the early, halcyon days of Twitter, now each new follower is apparently a coiled viper nestled cosily in your followers list.</p><p>On the face of it, these bots could well be the work of some jobless student whiling away the time between her examinations. The technological know-how required to mass-follow dozens or hundreds of accounts has been widely available for years, and is an interesting (if rather pointless) exercise in programming skills. As far as bots go, these aren’t particularly interesting just yet — many (not all) have yet to tweet even once; and unlike the more sophisticated attempts at impersonation seen elsewhere, these bots drape the barest of fig leafs over their robotic origins. It’s even possible that multiple actors are getting in on the game, the waves of bot followers I’ve seen in the past few weeks can be divided into several different categories (those with recognizably Sri Lankan names and an attempt at forging a convincing identity, and those with just randomly generated usernames being just one of many distinctions that can be drawn).</p><p>It’s important to note here that bots are a useful, even essential part of Twitter for many power users. I run a hobby account (with a serious, underlying purpose) on which ~99% of the content is posted by a bot (as a disclaimer: my main account is not actually operated by a bot, although you can be excused for thinking this). Many popular accounts that everyone follows rely on automation to some extent, even if it is as minor as merely scheduling content to be posted at a convenient or optimal time. Twitter personalities and digital agencies have been relying on automation for marketing purposes on Twitter for years now. Even some local digital media agencies have gotten on board, even if the reasoning behind resorting to bots has not been the most ethical at times. One of the reasons bots are so attractive as a dodgy marketing proposition is because they can be used to simulate superficially constructed engagement metrics — like follower counts, likes and retweets on Twitter; or page likes on Facebook. On Twitter, other types of bots watch for keywords and respond to tweets that contain these (by liking the tweet, or retweeting it).</p><p>A specialisation of unethical practice, made easier by bots, is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astroturfing"><em>astroturfing</em></a><em>; </em>or the practice of simulating grassroots support for a brand, product or even political position. Automation allows a single individual to bring hundreds or thousands of seemingly unconnected twitter accounts to bear on any given account, or tweet.</p><blockquote>These bots can seriously distort debate, especially when they work together. They can be used to make a phrase or hashtag trend, as @DFRLab has illustrated <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/le-pens-small-online-army-c754058630f0">here</a>; they can be used to <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/battle-of-the-botnets-dd77540fad64">amplify or attack</a> a message or article; they can be used to <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/from-russia-with-hategroup-ae6ee4318b5b">harass</a> other users.</blockquote><p>While examples of <a href="http://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/08/twitter-bots-use-likes-rts-for-intimidation/">bots being used for intimidation are uncommon enough to make the news</a>, the Sri Lankan experience of Twitter is still a little different.</p><h3>Udara Dharmasena on Twitter</h3><p>Did a quick analysis to find the potential reach of Twitter Advertising in Sri Lanka. Total reach is between 98,000 - 148,000. We can assume that there are about 150,000 to 200,000 monthly active users on Twitter in Sri Lanka. #LKA #TwitterAds</p><p>Although Twitter estimates of 150,000 seem like a sizeable number, my sample of the population (from 2011 to 2015, and restarted in mid 2017) reveals a much smaller active userbase; with approximately 5% of the user base contributing close to 90% of tweets.</p><p>Some simple heuristics can be used to determine the likelihood of a botted Twitter account; and this is where things get interesting — the highest ratio of botted followers to following I’ve seen <a href="https://twitter.com/TKobbekaduwa/with_replies">was from Mr Kobbekaduwa’s account</a>. This is no evidence of wrongdoing on his part (besides perhaps an overly assiduous social media manager), many people (especially those new to Twitter) immediately follow back any account that follows them. But looking at his follower/following list provides an interesting forensic archive of the different waves of bot activity since 2014 that have targeted Sri Lankan accounts.</p><p>For the past couple of days, I’ve been mapping out the network of accounts that these bots seem to be following. There are clear outlier accounts (those that are followed only once by a given bot); but equally- there is a significant minority of accounts that seem to be targeted by multiple bots.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/943/1*-IpZ5BvwYLvUNQEaqagssg.png" /><figcaption>A selected portion of bot accounts (~100) and the Twitter accounts they follow. Sampled 2,500 accounts followed by approximately 40 bots (earliest Jan 2016, most recent 4th April 2018). The chokepoints in this network graph represent a bot account, and links fanning out from the chokepoint represent twitter accounts followed by the bot</figcaption></figure><p>For the network graph above, I removed Twitter suggested accounts and those with no connection to Sri Lanka. Although it is tempting to conclude that follow targets were determined by inspecting the location section of account bios; that does not hold to be universally true (approximately ~7% of the accounts with significant overlap by multiple bot accounts did not have Colombo/Sri Lanka or something similar as part of their bio).</p><p>While it is possible to glean some kind of strategy behind the following of accounts (there is a relatively small number of accounts that could have been used to seed the initial follow, which are indicated by the degree to which any given node is connected), I was a little more concerned about mapping how these accounts got to my (obscure) Twitter account.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/744/1*90Ln_EkpmiMLkHR8gMNEKg.png" /><figcaption>Network graph of bot accounts that also follow Twitter @drac (approximately last week of March 2018 to 4th April 2018)</figcaption></figure><p>Another interesting finding is that the latest wave of bot accounts seem quite careful not to follow too many recent accounts — this, a filter based on account age.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/668/1*xHU0ntGe0G3cK5_Ixjp2-Q.png" /><figcaption>Sample of ~2000 selected twitter accounts connected by 15 bots. Same data as above (slightly different parameters which include account age) but with an alternative presentation to make the number of nodes clearer</figcaption></figure><p>What, if anything, does all this mean? To me, the conclusions are fairly straightforward.</p><ul><li>Twitter has a problem reliably detecting automated follows on its platform. Alternately, their detection isn’t keeping pace with the sheer number of entities attempting this sort of behaviour. Approximately 8 (of 41) bots I analysed in the latest wave were throttled by Twitter [there is a warning when the profile is visited] and their followers were zeroed out. Two were reinstated a few hours later. None of the bot-like accounts with a creation date earlier than December 2017 were affected</li><li>Six bots in this sample had at least 1 tweet (or retweet) at the time of inspection. 1 followed classic bot behaviour (multiple language retweets), while others had 1–2 tweets or retweets. 2 other accounts (not in this sample) seemed like classic cryptocurrency advertiser bots and were therefore excluded</li><li>As they are, these botted followers are benign. They do not affect anyone’s use of the platform and there are no tweets emanating from most of these accounts. Unless there is some unrealistic self imposed requirement to maintain a follower list of unimpeachable credentials (or worse, of those with “real names”) there is nothing they can do to affect an individual user. However, there is reasonable cause to suspect that the mass follow is merely the first step in “laundering” these accounts to more closely impersonate an actual person. Of the accounts evaluated; 14 had a profile picture added on subsequent inspection, 3 had a bio. Twitter allows unlimited name/handle changes so it is plausible that these accounts will be renamed once a purpose has been determined for them by their creator.</li><li>If there is a compelling need to remove one’s account of these dastardly bots, reporting them is a (not particularly user friendly but socially responsible) way of getting rid. I run a personal auditing tool periodically for this purpose, but I understand not everyone can (or wants to) do this.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wsTdHEELgakYZLDBSCvaMQ.png" /><figcaption>Bots begone</figcaption></figure><p>I am personally not an advocate of sharing blocklists but if that’s an option anyone feels compelled to use — <a href="https://blocktogether.org/">BlockTogether</a> is an option worth exploring besides using <a href="https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/advanced-twitter-block-options">Twitter’s Advanced Block</a> Options functionality. Be aware that Twitter has occasionally discouraged use of mass-blocking software in the past and may do so again in the future.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1c7550cba74f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts/the-curious-case-of-tikiri-1c7550cba74f">The curious case of Tikiri</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts">Throwaway Thoughts</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Paying for medical professionals]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/paying-for-medical-professionals-126688411df5?source=rss-1da199f383b6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/126688411df5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sri-lanka]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[drac]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Oct 2017 06:48:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-16T06:48:36.253Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>(this is the second part on medical education in Sri Lanka — first is <a href="https://medium.com/@drac/doctor-can-i-have-your-numbers-please-d59a3a9d32be">here</a>)</p><p>Free education, which Sri Lanka has had for decades, comes at a cost. There is an obvious rupees and cents cost, which I’ll get into a bit later. But the real cost is opportunity. For as long as record keeping has existed, the number entering universities in Sri Lanka for tertiary education has fallen well short of those actually qualified to do so.</p><p>In 2014, a total of 143,739 qualified for admittance to higher education institutions but only 24,180 were actually offered entry. That’s just around 16%. This isn’t an exception by any means — in 2011, 22,016 students entered universities even though 142,516 qualified. The rate of growth is also minuscule, for instance from 2010 to 2011 — a mere 469 additional students were given places in state universities. Universities are already bursting at the seams trying to cope with vast numbers of students; but for every single student who gets in — there are still around 6 left out in the cold. For 2015 and 2016, the percentages of those entering was 17.14% and 18.68% respectively; a small improvement year on year.</p><p>Let’s drill down a bit further. The university qualification rate for A/L Biology (essentially, the pre-med stream) students in 2016 was around 50% of those who sat the A/L exam (actual: 53.26%). This rate has remained consistent over the past few years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/353/1*QOXoeMO9UvC6plP0LwRrIA.png" /><figcaption>Candidates (blue)/Qualified to enter university (red) for A/L Bio Science students, 2013–2016 (Ministry of Education, Annual Report 2016, pp 67)</figcaption></figure><p>From my previous post, we have an approximation of the number of medical students per year — on average, 1,000. Assuming boldly that everyone who qualifies for university wants to be a doctor (a bit of a stretch, I know) a mere 6% of those qualified are able to study medicine in a state university. As it is, only around 35% of the 3,500 or so admitted to university after doing A/L Biology actually studied medicine.</p><p>Is there pent up demand for more medical students? Given that establishment and operation of degree awarding medical colleges has many stakeholders in opposition, it’s hard to say. But looking at a few other streams may provide an indication:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/649/1*SkKI1yKtQKQNd24t2x84cw.png" /><figcaption>Graduate output in state universities for selected streams of study, University Grants Commission report 2014</figcaption></figure><p>In 2014, the graduate output of state universities nearly doubled by simply allowing external degrees to be awarded.</p><p>In the meantime, admissions to study medicine remained flat.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/523/1*P4KEwIgXPwlL1LRhw2YmkQ.png" /><figcaption>University education in Sri Lanka (via the Department of Census and Statistics Pocket Book, 2016 ch 13)</figcaption></figure><p>Plainly, the current system excludes too many from attaining a degree of their choice due to lack of resources.</p><p>I’ve referenced this <a href="http://www.profesl.com/%E0%B7%81%E0%B7%8A%E2%80%8D%E0%B6%BB%E0%B7%93-%E0%B6%BD%E0%B6%82%E0%B6%9A%E0%B7%8F%E0%B7%80%E0%B6%A7-%E0%B6%B4%E0%B7%9E%E0%B6%AF%E0%B7%8A%E0%B6%9C%E0%B6%BD%E0%B7%92%E0%B6%9A-%E0%B7%80%E0%B7%9B/">post questioning if Sri Lanka really needs private medical universities</a> before. There are many examples of flawed advocacy within that piece (and I’m being charitable with that description and his motivations) but none more so than the following [in Sinhala]:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/799/1*8bbpf0XUBOUURBtvdtwCnQ.png" /><figcaption>Written by an unnamed author on the “Professionals for Free Education” domain, allegedly sourced from a powerpoint presentation made to Colombo and Peradeniya medical faculties.</figcaption></figure><p>Let’s dissect his line of argument. The most important thing here is that comparing any of the UK, US or India to Sri Lanka’s system of medical education is not a like for like endeavour. Unlike Oxford, or Harvard — Sri Lankan medical schools are absolutely not open to anyone who may wish to apply. Even fee paying students, that rare phenomenon in Sri Lankan medical colleges, come from a small pool of candidates with other qualifying criteria. A fairer comparison will substitute the number of applicants metric in any of foreign universities for the entirety of the candidate pool in Sri Lanka.</p><p>Contrary to his contention, UK universities report a fairly high admittance rate overall (dependent on the university ranking and course). Via <a href="http://www.ibo.org/contentassets/5895a05412144fe890312bad52b17044/recognition---international-student-guide-uk--march2016---eng.pdf.pdf">IB reporting on UCAS statistics</a> for 2013, institutional acceptance rates range from 39% for Kings College London to 80% for the University of Exeter.</p><p>The examples used cherry pick the top ranked medical university in the UK, one of the most prestigious Ivy League universities in the US and a single medical university in India to show poor admittance rates. Look, he says. Sri Lanka isn’t bad. It’s shitty everywhere. While those examples may in fact be true (I didn’t bother fact checking); the candidate pool has many other universities to choose from.</p><p>Let’s try study at Cambridge University (any college) for medicine in the last five years as a counterpoint and you will find that the applicant/acceptance ratio is <em>very </em>similar to the current medical college system in Sri Lanka. Similar statistics are available for <a href="https://www.ed.ac.uk/files/atoms/files/disclosure_of_information_-_sept_2016.pdf">MBChB at the University of Edinburgh</a>. But those are still top tier universities in the UK.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/876/1*_z3Tsq-m7GSEhiM_tTigDQ.png" /><figcaption>Medicine at Cambridge University (applicants, offers, acceptance) over the last five years</figcaption></figure><p>Other universities at lower ranks offer much wider opportunity for candidates. For instance the Hull-York Medical College (a little obscure, I know) also publish their entry criteria; which looks a little different from the bleak picture painted earlier.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/763/1*a7VF9sfcT9W9GvBUijjxRg.png" /><figcaption>Applicant/offer numbers for the Hull York Medical College, UK</figcaption></figure><p>With all this information at our disposal, let’s try an apples to apples comparison. By a reasonable but arbitrary measure, let’s select the Colombo medical faculty as being the premier medical teaching establishment in Sri Lanka at this time. Places at this university college are in high demand. Let’s be generous and allocate 250 seats in any given year to this university. In Sri Lanka, therefore only 1 in 5 (or 20%) of all medical students get a seat at this university. Expand this to those entering university in the Biology stream and we’re now down to 6% or about 1 in 19. Expand this to all those in Sri Lanka who qualified to enter university after doing A/L Biology in any given year and we’re now at 1.13% (or about 1 in 100). What this means is that <a href="http://medical-schools.startclass.com/d/d/the-US">the Colombo medical faculty has a comparable admittance rate to the Mayo Research Clinic in Minnesota</a> with a fraction of the international reputation, prestige or research output.</p><p>Is my math flawed? Yes, under the artificial scarcity imposed by the present system; there will never be competitive applications to enter the Colombo medical faculty from the entire population that qualified for university.</p><p>Other countries with private, fee levying institutions offer a diverse pool of candidates the opportunity to study medicine. Sri Lanka, in comparison, only provides a smaller, closed pool of medical colleges of which the entry chance is smaller than the chances of any applicant entering the Johns Hopkins Medical College.</p><p>Sri Lanka spends a great deal of money on education.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/326/1*LA6UDbH-2WrgeMNUPELATQ.png" /><figcaption>Expenditure on education, Dept of Census and Statistics 2016</figcaption></figure><p>and yet by most global measures still spends too little.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*Oa2Omcrg9HQW-JBuptPSIA.png" /><figcaption>Expenditure on education in Sri Lanka; as a percentage of the GDP, as a percentage of government expenditure; and expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of total education expenditure (all figures from World Bank data, via UNESCO Institute for Statistics)</figcaption></figure><p>So how much does each student in the tertiary education system cost the state?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/540/1*WydpLS8ObwV6N8AspYSfyQ.png" /><figcaption>Cost per student in the Sri Lankan university system, University Grants Commission report 2014</figcaption></figure><p>Averages are misleading, since there aren’t many places on the planet where arts degree costs are as high as science/engineering degrees. According to <a href="http://www.sundaytimes.lk/130526/news/unions-vow-to-prevent-fee-paying-medical-students-squeezing-out-others-46335.html">this article</a>, fee paying medical students at Sri Lankan universities pay US $12,000 per year (1.85 million LKR at October, 2017 exchange rates – 9.2 million LKR for five years).</p><p>Of the entire student body in state universities, around 6% are medical students. Everything else being the same (it isn’t, we aren’t even considering the necessary increases in capital expenditure); a proportionate increase to expand output by 500 more doctors annually would require an expansion of the state annual tertiary education budget by (a very very approximate) LKR 500 million, and that’s assuming other streams of study and the university system as a whole gets no additional investment.</p><p>500 more doctors per year, as a reminder, will annually increase our physician density by approximately 4.5 per 100,000 as opposed to 3.0 per 100,000 at present. This means that instead of taking an entire century to catch up to Bulgaria’s physician density in 2017, we can now do it at the lightning quick pace of 75 years. This increase in expenditure would also catapult our slightly below global average spend on tertiary education into the heady echelons of top 20% among all nations.</p><p>Let’s tie all the facts from this post and the <a href="https://medium.com/@drac/doctor-can-i-have-your-numbers-please-d59a3a9d32be">previous part</a> together.</p><ul><li>Sri Lanka urgently needs more medical professionals (which must necessarily include an expansion in the numbers of medical officers) to deal with current and looming healthcare crises</li><li>Sri Lanka already has a low density of medical officers per unit of population. The very slow rate of expansion from the current monopoly of state sponsored medical educational institutes doesn’t help. Student admission numbers in 2015 and 2016 showed no growth whatsoever.</li><li>The current state medical education system (in common with the tertiary education in Sri Lanka) excludes many; and provides few with the opportunity to pursue medical education. The rate of candidates being selected to the Colombo medical faculty, for instance, is shamefully comparable to the acceptance rate for far more prestigious medical colleges in the US.</li><li>Educating a doctor currently costs the state anywhere up to LKR 10 million per head; a number that they would be hard pressed to expand to the point which physician density reaches global norms.</li></ul><p>Do private medical colleges (where private institutions and individuals bear the cost of infrastructure, education) sound unreasonable in this climate?</p><p>The point of these two posts was not to tediously re-litigate SAITM fit for inclusion in the ranks of medical colleges. I may have an opinion on that issue, but this is besides the point. The truth, hopefully apparent from the data shown across this series, is that Sri Lanka is in dire need of more medical professionals. Short of an unlikely infusion of funds into the medical college system at a near unprecedented scale; it appears the only feasible way to grow the numbers entering the medical profession is by opening the doors to private; and public/private partnership programs.</p><p>There are risks associated with opening the door to such partnerships. A dilution of quality, and entirely legitimate fears that this may be the start of a descent down a slippery slope where state sponsored (medical) education continues to be defunded at the expense of private programs. Unfortunately, it’s hard to stay sympathetic to those concerns when there are medical professionals actively seeking to sabotage private endeavour; when there are plenty of examples of how the populace of Sri Lanka has had their quality of life uplifted by better access to healthcare.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=126688411df5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/paying-for-medical-professionals-126688411df5">Paying for medical professionals</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka">Musings about Sri Lanka</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Doctor, can I have your numbers please?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/doctor-can-i-have-your-numbers-please-d59a3a9d32be?source=rss-1da199f383b6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d59a3a9d32be</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sri-lanka]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[drac]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2017 04:19:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-16T06:49:20.562Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Upton Sinclair once said it’s difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on not understanding it. I started this post as a detailed rebuttal to an unusual idea that <a href="http://www.profesl.com/%E0%B7%81%E0%B7%8A%E2%80%8D%E0%B6%BB%E0%B7%93-%E0%B6%BD%E0%B6%82%E0%B6%9A%E0%B7%8F%E0%B7%80%E0%B6%A7-%E0%B6%B4%E0%B7%9E%E0%B6%AF%E0%B7%8A%E0%B6%9C%E0%B6%BD%E0%B7%92%E0%B6%9A-%E0%B7%80%E0%B7%9B/">Sri Lanka really didn’t need any more doctors</a> (post is in Sinhala). Somewhere along the way, this became a <a href="https://twitter.com/ziobrando/status/289635060758507521?lang=en">tedious, overly long</a> treatise on why I think private tertiary education is essential to Sri Lanka’s standing in healthcare indicators that matter. Although the author of the post I linked to tries hard to make the case that private medical education is not really necessary, I believe the very opposite is true; of medical colleges in particular. How this pertains to SAITM is, to be clear at the outset, not the point of this post but can be inferred.</p><p>For those impatient to get to the punchline, there’s a tl;dr right at the end.</p><p>Let’s start with some necessary background — depending on context, Sri Lanka punches above their weight on some core indicators that concern the medical profession. You <a href="http://www.searo.who.int/srilanka/documents/policybriefsfinal.pdf?ua=1">could call Sri Lanka a success story</a> (also see: <a href="http://dailynews.lk/2017/03/20/local/110891/%E2%80%98sri-lanka-ranks-top-health-indicators%E2%80%99">Sri Lanka ranks top in health indicators</a>). Unfortunately, this is indeed context dependent; because the numbers rely on careful framing to look good. Comparing Sri Lanka to India and Pakistan; countries with by and large worse infrastructure, Sri Lanka looks a success story. This narrative is derailed somewhat if we also include Maldives, which handily matches Sri Lanka in some healthcare related statistics (and has improved faster from a much worse baseline position).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/897/1*S-sP_1H73o_zzYgFpblF3A.png" /><figcaption>Comparison — Sri Lanka vs Maldives (selected healthcare indicators). SL in green/red; Maldives in blue</figcaption></figure><p>But you could argue (and I have no doubt overzealous medical students will, since they have plenty of spare time these days) — Maldives has a mere 1/40th of the population of Sri Lanka. Yes, accurate — as SL in turn has 1/60th of the population of India. So why would we be comparing ourselves to Indian standards (as the linked article in the opening paragraph does, repeatedly) in an attempt to show all is well? A more pertinent framing would question if Sri Lankan health indicators are of a globally acceptable standard. Take maternal mortality, where Sri Lanka (approximately 30 deaths) outstrips most of its regional neighbours but is nearly three times higher than even poorer Eastern European countries.</p><p>(via stats from <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=LK-BG-MT-HU-PL-BA-GR-BY">World Bank Data</a>)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/867/1*E5tqlQQoHFUSX6vJHFRS0A.png" /><figcaption>Maternal mortality figures (per 1000) for selected countries, 1990–2015</figcaption></figure><p>Arguing to maintain status quo in healthcare is fundamentally for me a question of aspiration. When people do this (as the linked article performs significant contortions in trying to make the point), what they really argue for is standing still; with seeming complacence for how the population demographics and healthcare needs are changing over time.</p><p>The task of improving healthcare outcomes for a populace is a complex topic. While not being a policy maker in any shape or form, let me draw a few correlations (while reminding readers that correlation does not imply causation).</p><p>Since 1990, the number of medical officers in Sri Lanka per 100,000 has increased by 540% to 84.8 (Annual Health Bulletin, 2014). In fact, the number doubled in the decade from 2004 to 2014. Other key healthcare professionals (for instance, nurses by 320%) have increased as well, although by fewer than the number of medical officers. However, <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PUBL.ZS">the healthcare budget as a percentage of GDP</a> has not seen similar growth.</p><p>This era has coincided with significant gains made in some (but only some. more on this later) healthcare indicators that matter — by 2013, neonatal mortality and infant mortality had shrunk to less than half the 1995 figure (see the graphs above). Why do I go on about maternal mortality in particular? Because that is among <a href="http://www.who.int/healthinfo/universal_health_coverage/UHC_Tracer_Indicators_Metadata.pdf">several tracer indicators</a> (PDF) used to measure progress towards sustainable development goals for health.</p><p>Now, you could argue that there is no single (or simple) answer to why Sri Lanka’s healthcare indicators improved. Was it increased numbers of medical officers? Increased investment? Both? I can’t say and to be fair, neither can anyone else. But the correlation between better coverage of medical officers/physicians per unit of population and better healthcare is undeniable. From the same countries used in the previous example (where available)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/837/1*2L_dsCqiWVh02OX-mhT3aA.png" /><figcaption>Physician density per 100,000 population — Sri Lanka had 0.85 medical officers in 2014 (but due to differences in how physicians are counted by WHO, do not show up in these figures)</figcaption></figure><p>Is it a coincidence that SL maternal mortality is around 3x the countries I’ve selected; while physician density is less than 0.3? Yes, probably but it is worth noting nonetheless.</p><p>Unfortunately, while Sri Lanka has made huge progress in some primary healthcare indicators, they are not doing anywhere near as well in another category — non-communicable diseases (or NCDs, in the parlance).</p><p>Let’s take a big one — cancer. Look at the massive increase in incidences over the last three decades for breast and lip/oral cavity cancers in particular.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/337/1*IDuzwMiBFR2AwMAyUhGLSw.png" /><figcaption>Cancer incidence rates in Sri Lanka (via Annual Health Bulletin, 2015, pp 138)</figcaption></figure><p>The Annual Health Bulletin reports 71% of annual deaths in Sri Lanka now occur due to non-communicable diseases; of which cardio vascular disease accounts for nearly 30% (diabetes claims 9.4%). If that weren’t enough of an indication as to the changing nature of healthcare in SL, consider that around 14% of the population is over 60 years old at present; and this is expected to <em>double </em>by 2041.</p><p>How many doctors does Sri Lanka produce at present? The article linked in the first paragraph says around 1,325 without offering a citation. Accepting that figure prima facie, the University Grants Commission said 1,144 medical students graduated from state universities in 2014. Going back a few years, there were 797 in 2010, 1,061 in 2011 and 820 in 2012 (the 2012 figure includes dental students, for reasons I don’t quite understand). An average of around 1,000 per year seems consistent with figures from the Ministry of Health; which says that around 8–9% of medical officers in Sri Lanka were internees in 2014.</p><p>So in effect, Sri Lanka is adding about 1,000 doctors to the ranks of medical officers each year under the present system. This translates to an increase of about 3 per 100,000 population annually.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/182/1*zNHDjseLNEVLcfKk28jYbg.png" /><figcaption>Medical officers in Sri Lanka, per 100,000 population (Annual Health Bulletin, 2015 detailed table 9, pp 176)</figcaption></figure><p>Globally, Sri Lanka is near the foot of the table as far as physician density is concerned. This, <a href="http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/health_workforce/PhysiciansDensity_Total/atlas.html">from WHO statistics</a> (in 2010, SL had a density of 0.72 per 1,000, verifiable from the table above)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SCJCusVBxT7D-7FTFWkrRw.png" /><figcaption>Global physician density from WHO statistics — Sri Lanka highlighted</figcaption></figure><p>It’s possible to have worse healthcare outcomes with a higher physician density than Sri Lanka. Sudan had a density of 3.058 in 2014, Libya had a density of 2.092. What hasn’t been possible though, is to have a lower density and do significantly better than Sri Lanka, at least for the stats that I’ve uncovered. As an aside — let that sink in for a bit. Sudan has 2.5 times more physicians per capita than Sri Lanka. Bet they’ll keep that one out of the briefing notes for the anti-SAITM rallies.</p><p>This is already a lengthy post so let me tl;dr this one right up for you.</p><p><strong>Thesis</strong>: Sri Lanka is doing just fine with public (state sponsored) medical education.</p><p>But in truth — Sri Lanka only has state sponsored medical education at present — and at present levels is only capable of growing its density of medical officers at 3 per 100,000 on an annual basis. This means we will take approximately 47 years to catch up to Poland’s density in 2017; a century to catch up to Bulgaria.</p><p>Does it matter? Yes, if you accept that more medical officers can help (if not be wholly responsible) for improvement in key healthcare indicators for the 2030 SDGs. We are, for instance, an entire order of magnitude worse than 2016 Greece in maternal mortality statistics.</p><p>If you don’t consider improving those figures to be important, consider that the entire SL population is ageing rapidly and is estimated to double its share of senior citizens in just 23 years. In the meantime, mortality due to non-communicable diseases is climbing fast; much faster than the rate at which we currently produce doctors to treat those diseases.</p><p>Still feel like we don’t need more doctors? You might be alone in that.</p><p>Some proponents of free education in Sri Lanka will tell you that there is a simple solution to this. Increasing the funding to healthcare education will increase the number of medical professionals produced by the existing system. This way, the system can expand to meet rising demand.</p><p>In <a href="https://medium.com/@drac/paying-for-medical-professionals-126688411df5">the next part</a> (yes horrifically, there is a next part), we’ll take a look at what it costs the state to educate a medical officer today.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d59a3a9d32be" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/doctor-can-i-have-your-numbers-please-d59a3a9d32be">Doctor, can I have your numbers please?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka">Musings about Sri Lanka</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Digital payments in Sri Lanka — why not]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/digital-payments-in-sri-lanka-why-not-4d33bdd3059?source=rss-1da199f383b6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4d33bdd3059</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sri-lanka]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile-payments]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[drac]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Sep 2017 06:27:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-11T06:37:50.669Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are justifiable reasons to be proud of Sri Lanka’s 2,500 year (give or take a few years) culture and history. Tourists in the cultural triangle towards the centre of the country have the opportunity to ogle monuments built by rulers of long ago and take in the glorious ruins that are mostly what remain of those times.</p><p>Critics would suggest that Sri Lanka’s ability to conduct monetary transactions in a digital form are similarly mired in an era of long ago. Cash still rules the roost here; although credit/debit card penetration climbs steadily year on year. A particular sticking point for internet entrepreneurs in this country is the turgid speed (or lack thereof) in embracing digital payments.</p><p>This is the internet era, so when someone doesn’t like what they see — what do they do? They go to <a href="https://www.change.org/">Change.org</a></p><ul><li><a href="https://www.change.org/p/sri-lankan-government-unlock-all-the-features-and-services-of-paypal-for-sri-lanka">Sign the Petition</a></li><li><a href="https://www.change.org/p/enable-receiving-money-to-sri-lanka-through-paypal">Sign the Petition</a></li></ul><p>The local ecommerce (self styled) <em>mudalali </em>hasn’t exactly held back in his campaigning for this cause either.</p><ul><li><a href="http://www.sundaytimes.lk/161218/business-times/digital-payments-current-landscape-and-why-sri-lanka-should-not-get-left-behind-220649.html">Digital Payments: Current landscape and why Sri Lanka should not get left behind</a></li><li><a href="http://www.sundaytimes.lk/170910/business-times/stuck-in-the-stone-age-digital-payments-in-sri-lanka-258141.html">Stuck in the Stone Age: Digital Payments in Sri Lanka</a></li></ul><p>(To be fair to Lahiru, he has been pretty upfront about saying that enabling easier digital payments will directly benefit his business. Nothing like getting your interests declared out in the open)</p><p>The case for digital payments is well made, and to be honest — I don’t have much to argue with that. I’d like to see the same thing here. But as much as making a case for digital payments to become the norm in Sri Lanka; I think it’s instructive to work out why we’ve lagged behind other countries in its adoption.</p><p><strong>Sri Lanka’s economic outlook has been mixed to poor and shows little signs of sustained improvement</strong></p><ul><li>The World Bank thinks <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/sri-lanka">Sri Lanka’s ease of doing business is middling</a>. Or more pessimistically, decidedly average.</li><li>The Sri Lankan regulatory climate is, to be polite, inconsistent.</li><li>Policy making has displayed a tendency towards haphazardness in the past</li><li><a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/sri-lanka/government-debt-to-gdp">Sri Lanka’s debt to GDP ratio is frighteningly high</a></li><li>The exchange rate has been shockingly volatile (that graph says it all, really)</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*R7YIloIkI1p9zoDGY9iAzA.png" /></figure><ul><li>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Sri_Lanka">Sri Lankan economy is relatively small</a>, and recent strong growth doesn’t really make up for this</li><li>There are <a href="http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/htm/english/07_af_1fer/f_1.html">onerous restrictions on foreign currency transactions</a></li></ul><p>All this to say that businesses — especially businesses that deal with international currency transactions- will look at Sri Lanka and see a higher risk, lower reward market in which to ply their trade. That still doesn’t mean that homegrown institutions (banks, telcos or even startups) can’t fill what is clearly a void in the market.</p><p><strong>Sri Lanka’s internal conditions for high volume, high security finance are also decidedly average</strong></p><ul><li>Digital payments and transactions are theoretically easier to trace and tax, but it is still unclear if Sri Lankan institutions (for example, the IRS) will gain sufficient capacity to take on this additional burden</li><li><a href="http://www.sundaytimes.lk/170730/business-times/cb-says-further-probe-on-leakage-of-hnb-customer-info-251885.html">Banking data security is poor</a>. The incident referenced in the link is not an outlier.</li><li>Telco and other important <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/sri-lankan-teenager-hacks-presidents-website-to-try-and-get-exams-delayed">site security is not much better</a></li><li>The regulatory and legislative provisions for data breaches by payment processors, banks or other institutions that deal with financial data is either poor, or rarely enforced. Consumer protection is not great.</li><li>Consumer privacy is a pipe dream, although its significance cannot be understated when it comes to financial transactions.</li></ul><p>Fine. So Sri Lanka sucks and handing out grubby hundred rupee notes is in everyone’s future. That still doesn’t mean some enterprising young startup can’t come in and rule the local market.</p><p><strong>In common with most Sri Lankan startups, those dealing with finance or digital payments have an uphill task ahead of them</strong></p><ul><li>Local startups with their own payment or currency offering will have limited utility for international transactions. Contrast this with China; where the market is vast and yet, the dominant payment methods still come from the financial services arm of a large conglomerate (Alipay)</li><li>We have a similar scheme already (<a href="http://www.ezcash.lk/">EZCash</a> and <a href="http://www.mobitel.lk/mcash">mCash</a> — try two) but uptake, as far as I can see, has been limited. What I can conclude from this is that the products are there in some form, but other reasons (marketing? ease of use? I can only offer conjecture) prevent uptake. The <a href="https://vc4a.com/blog/2014/01/15/m-pesa-and-beyond-why-mobile-money-worked-in-kenya-and-struggles-in-other-markets/">M-Pesa story</a> could be instructive here.</li><li>There are other startups (I know of a couple) that seem stuck on regulatory hurdles. Despite the assertions in the guest op-ed earlier, <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/3056736/what-happens-when-we-become-a-cashless-society">cashless societies generally discriminate against the unbanked and those with less liquidity</a></li></ul><p>Some reasons for regulators to stubbornly shy away from digital payments are fear based. The regulatory climate for financial transactions is, in many ways quite conservative. This isn’t to say that scams don’t take place — finance companies in SL have a storied history of failures, and even smaller banks have not been immune. Putting conditions to prevent catastrophic failures is part and parcel of the regulator’s job; and local startups will have a higher burden of proof to establish that they’re in this for the long haul.</p><p>Digital payments, to be genuinely useful will have to be integrated with worldwide services (even Paypal will do, although Apple and Samsung Pay would be nice and PayTM would be fantastic). Capital flight and money laundering are also legitimate, undismissable concerns for services that integrate with the wider financial community.</p><p>And there you have it. Some of those reasons may never be fixed — the Sri Lankan market size isn’t going to magically double overnight; but there is value in increasing the surface area and reducing friction for smaller business to accept digital payments. Figuring out which of these problems can be addressed or mitigated might, I think, go some way towards making digital payments the norm in Sri Lanka, rather than the rare exception.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4d33bdd3059" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/digital-payments-in-sri-lanka-why-not-4d33bdd3059">Digital payments in Sri Lanka — why not</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka">Musings about Sri Lanka</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lies, damned lies and statistics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/lies-damned-lies-and-statistics-5a3c610a71e3?source=rss-1da199f383b6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5a3c610a71e3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mdg]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sri-lanka]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[development-sector]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[drac]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 May 2017 11:49:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-09T15:22:54.081Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Numbers are hard, let’s go shopping for some</p><p>There is a (probably apocryphal) story about Wikipedia’s origins that I can’t find a good source for anymore. The story goes that Jimmy Wales said (sarcastically) that he invented Wikipedia so he could win arguments at the pub.</p><p>A lot of discourse around Sri Lanka, especially in the development sector, is centred around experiences; impact assessed by compelling personal testimony. Even political discourse concentrates on emotive impact as opposed to dispassionate, hard cold numbers. Numbers which can lie, as anything can be made to; but nonetheless provide less wriggle room than mealy mouthed promises.</p><p>What does this all have to do with anything? I’ve been digging into statistics produced by Sri Lankan ministries and agencies; as well as Sri Lankan data provided by international bodies (UN agencies and the World Bank) as a hobby. I have a lot of criticism to level at Sri Lankan government agencies about many aspects of their operation; but most do produce annual bulletins. That they struggle with this task is apparent — evidence of clumsy formatting and sometimes frankly puzzling statistics (don’t even get me started on the use of spellcheck) are littered throughout these reports. But they produce this data, and it is usually posted on their website; to languish in obscurity thereafter.</p><p>But never lacking foolish ambition, I’m trying to read them all.</p><p>Why, you might ask. Well, at its most elemental and perverse — this is like Wikipedia’s apocryphal purpose; to let me win arguments on the internet. I kid, of course but it seems a truism that any observation about Sri Lanka’s state of development, politics, finance or pretty much any topic could stand to be injected with actual data as opposed to feelings. That people rarely do this is, to my mind, a two fold problem — cultural (which I am not even going to bother changing) but also accessibility. A 200 page report is hardly something one picks up unless one needs to.</p><p>Which now brings me to a recent puzzle — I noticed a tweet reminding us all of Road Safety Week with a shocking statistic as the basis for the infographic.</p><h3>Una McCauley on Twitter</h3><p>70 people die every week due to road traffic crashes in #SriLanka Road safety rules exist to keep you safe #SlowDown #RoadSafetyWeek</p><p>70 people a week is a frankly horrifying number. It’s also a compelling way of expressing a statistic that might otherwise seem trivial.</p><p>Being of a curious bent, and as explained above — I wanted to know more about this data point. So, off I went to the WHO site. The <a href="http://www.who.int/countries/lka/en/">WHO Sri Lanka country profile</a> seemed like a good first port of call; and I saw a PDF with exactly the topic of that tweet — <a href="http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_safety_status/2013/country_profiles/sri_lanka.pdf">Road Traffic Injuries</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/306/1*93vTj0Ejd8vuEpF5tRDi9Q.png" /></figure><p>But wait. It <a href="http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_safety_status/2013/country_profiles/sri_lanka.pdf">links to a PDF with 2013 in the URL</a>. That seems a little … dated.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/371/1*Ax-KGWBXWO0Bh0Gfr1EEJA.png" /><figcaption>Excerpt from WHO country report on road traffic safety, 2013</figcaption></figure><p>That PDF in turn includes a total from 2010, a full 7 years ago. The number given is 2483 (from police records); which adds up to a staggering 47.75 per week. Staggering, yes but not quite the 70 per week in the tweet.</p><p>So let’s try another source — <a href="http://www.transport.gov.lk/web/">The Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation</a>. Ah, yes — <a href="http://www.transport.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=279&amp;Itemid=0&amp;lang=en">Statistics</a>, it says.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/552/1*t7-yzg8UDGWcrqHzIM2fwg.png" /><figcaption>accident statistics for Sri Lanka in 2016, Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation</figcaption></figure><p>But wait, for 2016 this means there were 57.75 fatalities per week. Again, staggering but still not very close to the 70 in the tweet. Looking at earlier years, it doesn’t seem like there was a significant variation (an upward trend yes). There was no recent year where deaths reached that 70 per week figure.</p><p>At this point, I was willing to strike a blow for all those NGO protestors and give up. WHO fucked up? Yes, WHO did. Victory. Down with those international bodies and their sensationalist infographics sort of thing.</p><p>But, things aren’t that simple (When are they ever?). Off we go to <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/">World Bank Open Data</a>. And from there, <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.TRAF.P5">mortality caused by road traffic injury (per 100,000 people)</a> seems like exactly what I’m looking for, reproduced in the tweet below (disclaimer: I authored that tweet but the data is verifiable in the link above).</p><h3>🇱🇰 Policy Stats on Twitter</h3><p>In 2015, #lka mortality from road traffic accidents was 17 per 100000 people; a very slight decrease from 18 per 100000 in 2000 #transport</p><p>Ok, so to switch from one metric to another — assuming Sri Lanka has a population of 22 million; that gives total fatalities of 3740; which is 71.9 a week (21 million, 68.6 per week); both of which are in the approximate ballpark at least. But the data on WB Open Data was sourced from WHO! But WHO’s country profile for Sri Lanka didn’t have anything remotely resembling this number.</p><p>One last round of Googling.</p><p><a href="http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_safety_status/2015/en/">The WHO global status report on road safety</a> but crucially, for the year 2015. Jackpot. This doesn’t explain why the number they’ve reported is higher than anything seen so far; but it’s a start.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/364/1*IyL_6-jNcoZMMKgiV2c7Ug.png" /><figcaption>Excerpt from WHO Global Report on Road Safety, 2015</figcaption></figure><p>Finally, it seems like there is some light at the end of the tunnel. The number of fatalities is consistent with the Ministry statistics (2362 in 2013) but WHO have added their own special sauce on top and provided an estimate of fatalities — 3691 (which is indeed 70.9 fatalities per week).</p><p>Why this estimate was needed is explained in a note towards the end of the report (pg. 70 onwards) and makes interesting reading in its own right.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/664/1*gbjgsb4F3gEnaYsxKLL8FA.png" /></figure><p>Mystery solved.</p><h3>Shamara Wettimuny on Twitter</h3><p>Example of unreliability of #lka govt information. Mr. Nandasiri Peiris passed away months ago @ParliamentLK</p><p>As can be seen above, unreliability of information is by no means merely an lka government problem although it is perhaps telling that no one thought to question that tweeted statistic from the WHO country office.</p><p>The ethics of publishing an estimate (as opposed to actual numbers) without clear messaging is, of course, a little above my pay grade.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5a3c610a71e3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/lies-damned-lies-and-statistics-5a3c610a71e3">Lies, damned lies and statistics</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka">Musings about Sri Lanka</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Grabbing numbers out of thin air]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts/grabbing-numbers-out-of-thin-air-d2c8bc6745c2?source=rss-1da199f383b6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d2c8bc6745c2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[drac]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Apr 2017 03:59:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-08T15:31:38.145Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Something long suspected, but very recently confirmed — someone in <a href="https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/uk-surveillance-export-map">Sri Lanka has been granted a license to evaluate IMSI/IMEI catchers</a>. We have yet to uncover if this was followed by a purchase from a different vendor or if the process stalled at the evaluation phase. This is something of a watershed in my personal understanding of the capabilities of local law enforcement/intelligence agencies.</p><p>That local telcos would hand over data on their subscribers on being shown a court order was, I think, a reasonable assumption to make. Introducing IMSI catchers into the mix adds a new range of risks in using mobile devices, as IMSI catchers currently operate in many countries with very little oversight or transparency. Because of the widespread laxity and even nonchalance I’ve seen regarding mobile communication hygiene in Sri Lanka, this has to be a wakeup call for focus on better practices in the use of mobile devices in future.</p><p>What is an IMSI catcher? In short, as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMSI-catcher">the Wikipedia link</a> describes:,</p><blockquote>The IMSI catcher masquerades as a base station and logs the IMSI numbers of all the mobile stations in the area, as they attempt to attach to the IMSI-catcher. It allows forcing the mobile phone connected to it to use no call encryption (A5/0 mode) or to use easily breakable encryption (A5/1 or A5/2 mode), making the call data easy to intercept and convert to audio</blockquote><p>Again in the interests of clarity, an informal explanation of base station and other cellular network terminology and processes is relevant here: A base station provides the connection between mobile phones in the area and the wider telephony network run by a telecom operator. A base station divides a geographical area into a “cell”, an area that can usually be thought of as a hexagonal grid.</p><p>An IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is a series of digits that is used to uniquely identify a user of a cellular network. This is usually contained in the SIM card; and thanks to existing Sri Lankan requirements on providing identity at point of purchase — can be associated with a specific personal identity.</p><p>How cell phones work, in a simplified manner — periodically, each mobile handset will scan for eligible base stations that broadcast their availability (slightly more technically: a handset listens on the control channel for a system identification number [SID] provided by the SIM. The SID corresponds to a node on the telco’s home network — the network of cell towers used by the telco to provide service). On identifying base station(s) eligible to connect (each telco will have their own set of base stations), a handset will typically select the base station with the strongest signal and send a registration request which includes the IMSI (note that at this point, the IMEI can be requested by the telco network — the IMEI uniquely identifies the device being used to connect). There’s more to this (obviously) but this is the bare, relevant essentials of how cellular telephony works.</p><p>Enter IMSI catchers.</p><p>Assume a large group of people are gathered at a particular location. Social media is abuzz with updates from people on the scene. Mobile phones in hand, the group sends tweets and Facebook updates, calsl on more people to join them and uses both internet and mobile telephony to increase awareness of whatever is happening at that site. No matter whom their service provider/telco, each handset connects to a base station broadcasting the relevant SID. Suddenly, a high power base station comes online near the group and broadcasts the SID(s) that corresponds to one or more telcos. Within the space of minutes, most cell phones will attempt to “pair” with the higher strength proximal signal; providing their IMSI for authentication purposes. This process is transparent to the end user (unless diagnostic software is running on the handset).</p><p>The details of your mobile subscription has now leaked to someone running an IMSI catcher. For more active interference in mobile activity (as opposed to mere passive monitoring), IMSI catchers may perform a man-in-the-middle function and force a downgrade of encryption security on GSM voice calls, or even <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stingray_phone_tracker">perform jamming, locate a user precisely, or force a handset to give up some of its encryption keys</a>.</p><p>Why are IMSI catchers useful?</p><p>For law enforcement purposes, running IMSI catchers offer significant advantages over a request for information from cooperating telcos. For one, information is captured in real-time close to source and is not susceptible to errors or tampering by telco operators. IMSI catchers can operate in “camping mode”, where legitimate requests are forwarded transparently to the nearest base station. In this mode, all communications is intercepted by the IMSI catcher but detection can be quite difficult as the IMSI catcher operates in MITM (Man-In-The-Middle) mode. Once the IMEI has been extracted, the device can be followed around any network even if a different SIM is used. Tagging an IMEI in this way has legitimate uses in cases of theft, which is why it is supported by telecom regulatory bodies; but can be repurposed for surveillance as well. IMSI catchers also have an advantage of being relatively localised in effect, there is no need to analyse all the traffic through multiple cell towers and narrow down persons/devices of interest.</p><p>Why is this a change?</p><p>The working assumption always has been that most if not all telcos would hand over VLR (location register) and other information about their subscribers when compelled to do so. Even assuming optimal efficiency, this process is difficult (but not impossible) to complete in real-time. There is also the ability of more sophisticated IMSI catchers to provide active monitoring — disrupt cellular activity or make it easier to use secondary network monitoring to leak information. Active interference in cellular communications also now renders useless the precaution of using a new, previously unused mobile device/connection. Everything within a geographical area can be scooped up automatically and tracked at any point thereafter.</p><p>I’ve previously written [somewhat tongue in cheek, I might add] that <a href="https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts/holing-censorship-arguments-below-the-waterline-394c6088b56c">merely jamming signals or blocking access is the most elementary of all disruptions for network communications</a>. IMSI catchers allow the next level of network monitoring — real time access to cellphone communications and user locations that might have previously been considered privileged information. While it’s almost certain that offline analysis of network traffic is being used already by intelligence and law enforcement agencies, it is now a mistake to consider this to be the only vector by which communication can be monitored.</p><p>This presumption can be mirrored towards internet access — although telcos routinely block websites for various reasons, these blocks are trivially circumvented by off the shelf tooling or moderately savvy end users. However, the reality is that even low-end network monitoring solutions available to corporates have long possessed the ability to detect evasions of network policy (via tunnelling, VPNs etc) and deploy counter measures. It seems imprudent to assume this technology is not available to ISPs in Sri Lanka (as it already <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Coat_Systems">has been used elsewhere</a>).</p><p>IMSI catchers as a law enforcement tool are unfortunately here to stay due to their increasing deployment in other countries, and more importantly their rapidly dropping costs of purchase and licensing. Although licensed off the shelf IMSI catchers are still expensive (and are restricted purchases, even to government agencies); <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/article/2519733/networking/hacker-snoops-on-gsm-cell-phones-in-demo.html">someone with sufficient capability and a few grey-market imports could easily build their own</a>. The most coherent arguments against their deployment have come from the potential for wide scale abuse of privacy, rarely a consideration that has political interest in Sri Lanka. Even so, <a href="https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/20160818-Report-Gone_Opaque.pdf">reports indicate that obfuscation of IMSI catcher use is routine in many countries</a>, and the time to push for transparency and control of their use might actually be upon Sri Lankan civil liberties activists.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d2c8bc6745c2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts/grabbing-numbers-out-of-thin-air-d2c8bc6745c2">Grabbing numbers out of thin air</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts">Throwaway Thoughts</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How about them apples, doctor?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts/how-about-them-apples-doctor-b3caa7bcbb0f?source=rss-1da199f383b6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b3caa7bcbb0f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[medical-drama]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[saitm]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sri-lanka]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[drac]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Feb 2017 05:38:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-03T05:41:42.801Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What ails the medics and who do we blame for it</p><p>An opening disclaimer. I have no real qualifications to comment on matters medical besides the osmotic exposure of 1 season of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grey&#39;s_Anatomy">Grey’s Anatomy</a>, 5 seasons of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scrubs_(TV_series)">Scrubs</a>, about 8 seasons of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ER_(TV_series)">ER</a> and 2 seasons of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_Wing">Green Wing</a>. You get the idea. I don’t even play a lawyer on the internet, because I hear that’s the sort of thing that leads to lawsuits. In the interests of not prejudicing anything I say after this, I will not be disclosing how many seasons of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Knick">The Knick</a> I’ve watched (too few, to be frank).</p><p>After a civilised and unemotive round of questions and answers with <a href="https://twitter.com/cjs8000">cjs8000</a>, I heard some things I knew but also crucial pieces I hadn’t heard or realised beforehand; which changed my mind on the actual issue to some extent. I no longer think the SAITM ruling was an unqualified good (my first reaction was: yay, private universities. It’s not like doctors with their freebie vehicle permits will be paying to expand university education, right?).</p><p>tldr; the Sri Lanka Medical Council got outmanoeuvred and outlawyered by people motivated enough to use the legal system against them. You could call this a loophole in the regulations, but all that really says that the SLMC didn’t have the means and/or inclination to safeguard their position in a legal sense before any of this started.</p><p>This is how the system works today, post court ruling —</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qOFNl12nhbGRctxdTMItJw.png" /><figcaption>The route(s) to becoming a medical practitioner in Sri Lanka, in January 2017 (props to @cjs8000 for explaining bits of this. I had the order mixed up)</figcaption></figure><p>The court of appeals verdict is <a href="http://courtofappeal.lk/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&amp;view=category&amp;download=4020:ca-writ-1872016-dhilmi-kasunda-malshini-suriyarachchi-vs-sri-lanka-medical-council-a-others-hon-vijith-k-malalgoda-pc-j-pca-&amp;id=74:january&amp;Itemid=130">available online (PDF)</a>. Some background reading and explanation of their perspective (by medical students, I suspect — YMMV) are found <a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/804276106323782/permalink/1242827409135314/">here</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/Boo_Titanium/status/827145424045617153">here</a>. Note, they’re both in Sinhala so if you can’t read that lingo you’re SOL. There is also <a href="https://twitter.com/cjs8000/status/827207481050939392">this tweet</a>, which is part of a longer conversation.</p><p>Let’s summarise what is already known as part of the ruling and/or via other means:<br>a) The courts acknowledged that the SLMC is the body that enforces professional standards (like for some other highly skilled professionals such as architects, engineers)</p><p>b) The way <a href="http://srilankalaw.lk/Volume-V/medical-ordinance.html">the medical ordinance</a> (note: link doesn’t provide the entire ordinance, most of the text is paywalled) is set up now, the SLMC can and does provide recommendations to the ministry. There is no legal obligation for the minister to act on said recommendation. [Ed note: This situation is messed up but this is how other fields work too — see, for instance, the Minister of Sports has right of approval on selections to the SL cricket team. Welcome to politics, I suppose].</p><p>c) Parts of this ordinance have been in place since 1987, which I think is fairly relevant. It certainly predates the existence of SAITM and wasn’t inserted as part of some Machiavellian plot.</p><p>d) From the diagram above, the final check for competency of medical practitioner candidates is found in the common MCQ [f0r state medical students]/ERPM [for foreign medical graduates]. Once progressed to the intern/house officer level — interns deal directly with patients.</p><p>e) The courts found that SAITM had authority to confer degrees (this is part of the remit of the University Grants Commission) and while the medical council had the authority to conduct inspections and provide a recommendation, that is the extent of their legally mandated involvement.</p><p>f) The SLMC conducted an assessment and found SAITM wanting. On that basis (I’m assuming good faith, I suppose — more on this later), they refused to confer provisional registration as a medical practitioner on a graduate of SAITM. The courts deemed that the SLMC had exceeded its authority by doing so.</p><p>What does the medical community (by which I mean the medical students demonstrating on the streets, and the medical officers union) allege? That SAITM is unfit to produce medical practitioners, and therefore should not be allowed to continue. There is also an allegation that the Minister has a vested interest in seeing SAITM succeed. Unfortunately, the law only became an ass <em>after </em>the ruling was produced. The most extreme allegation is that underqualified interns from SAITM will cause irreversible harm to patients because they lack the quality/necessarily clinical exposure afforded to state medical graduates.</p><p>Let’s start with these one at a time.</p><p>I’m generally cynical of Sri Lankan state university people telling the world that degrees paid for by personal wherewithal (as opposed to taxpayer funding) are automatically of lesser quality. There’s been shit like that happening in my entire adult lifetime and then some. There’s 20 years or more of industry experience establishing that this link is tenuous at best. Nonetheless, a life of watching medical drama on television didn’t quite prepare me to assess the quality of medical graduates, so I can have very little educated insight to offer on this topic. I’ll even be charitable and assume the problems are specifically with SAITM and not private, pay-your-way universities in general (although some placards and slogans yelled on the streets certainly suggest the opposite).</p><p>The problem is also that this assessment of inadequacy was performed by a medical council that seemingly undermined their own authority with almost diabolical consistency. What medical students ranting on Facebook will rarely mention is the curious case of the KDU (the Kotelawala Defence Academy) mentioned in the court ruling; where facilities were deemed adequate by the SLMC inspection <em>even before construction had been completed on the teaching hospital</em>. What they also won’t mention is that the mechanism of recommendation to the minister was enshrined in the ordinance long before private medical colleges were available; and everyone seemed happy with that status quo. Questioning this process after an unfavourable ruling doesn’t exactly speak highly of the due diligence performed by the SLMC on their own remit. [Ed note: let me smartass my way into trouble by reminding medical people of the word <em>prophylaxis; </em>via the Greek <em>phulaxis, </em>an act of guarding].</p><p>Should the UGC be the sole determinant for degree awarding institutes? Should the Ministry of Health be allowed to ride roughshod over the recommendations of the medical council? I agree with the opinion that it shouldn’t, but this is precisely the SLMC’s job to sort out. If the SLMC is being unconstitutionally exclusionary or discriminatory in this process of assessment, that is precisely the sort of thing that courts of law (and lawyers) exist to handle. That the SLMC was unprepared for someone else’s day in court isn’t anyone else’s problem but theirs.</p><p>Does Sri Lanka need more doctors? I mean, we have walking paths now. Everything is fine, right? [lol]. The actual reality is chronic understaffing at many levels. See <a href="https://twitter.com/Sabithl/status/825614389549993987">here</a> (because he seems to agree with me and I cherrypick my arguments).</p><p>It’s easy to say “nobody likes doctors, they are cosseted and they earn more than the average person. They also got their education for free”. But they incur a significant opportunity cost in even getting to the internship stage (on average, medical students graduate 2–3 years after everyone else; and even then — still have a residency rotation and a specialisation before they can truly say they’ve arrived). At the end of that, they have the prospect of life in a rural area (good luck with official appointments anywhere near Colombo in the next decade, if ever). The specialists swanning around from hospital to hospital are truly the 1%, and it’s unfair to judge the medical profession by those standards.</p><p>The point of all this is to say — there are allegations of low quality graduates from SAITM but the medical profession is uniquely positioned to examine the factuality of this assertion. There is even a mechanism for it — if the interns are incompetent, they fail the residency. You could argue <a href="https://twitter.com/cjs8000/status/827221022298533888">this isn’t the intent of an internship</a> but if patient safety is at risk, why is reform deemed impossible? (Sounds like contesting a court ruling is easier than telling supervisors to keep a closer eye on their interns; which makes perfect Sri Lankan sense).</p><p>What really needs to happen is a standard examination procedure for all candidates, regardless of where they were educated (or how much taxpayer funding contributed to their degree). Again, this sounds easy to do in theory — the last revision of the examination procedure for foreign educated graduates was in 2009, this isn’t dusting off some archaic regulation from the early 1920s. Unfortunately for everyone concerned (but mostly for the patients), this also requires the cooperation of the Ministry of Health.</p><p>There is an unfortunate medical stereotype at play here - “<em>Doctor, why do I need this bitter pill?”. “Well,</em> <em>because I said so”</em>. Modern doctors never say this (at least, they’ve never said this to me — and I always ask). It just sounds like this issue has been communicated to the public at large in the most sensationalist manner possible (with more than a healthy dollop of self interest). It’s amazing that the response to an unfavourable ruling is an immediate attempt to strongarm a government into … I don’t know what … overturning a court of appeal ruling and undermining the judiciary?</p><p>This isn’t ending any time soon; because I have no doubt that counter arguments (and lawsuits) will follow thick and fast. But spare a thought for the discrimination that SAITM graduates will now suffer at the hands of both the public and their (clearly worthier, smarter, but above all state educated) medical brethren. Spare another moment to wonder at the brain trust in state medical schools who seemingly lack the imagination to protest a court decision without blocking the streets for everyone else.</p><p>“<em>Well, doctor. The protest didn’t work the last time, and the time before that. It seems the patient is unresponsive to our concerns. What do we do now? Protest some more. Dial those protests up to 11”</em></p><p>Expanding educational and employment opportunities <em>is</em> something that is an unqualified, unmitigated good. It’s surprising how few people actually seem to buy into it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b3caa7bcbb0f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts/how-about-them-apples-doctor-b3caa7bcbb0f">How about them apples, doctor?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts">Throwaway Thoughts</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[First they came for GPG keys]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts/first-they-came-for-gpg-keys-6d948a58c044?source=rss-1da199f383b6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6d948a58c044</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[drac]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Aug 2016 07:32:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-22T07:37:33.689Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>and you didn’t speak up, because what the hell is a GPG key</p><p>I saw this (not great advice for 2016, just to be very clear)</p><h3>Subha W on Twitter</h3><p>Tips/tools for activists to organise and mobilise safely: use Telegram&#39;s secret chat instead of Whatsapp #FemTechLKA</p><p>A few thousand words later.</p><figure><a href="https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/duty_calls.png"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*f7CaAqKTP3gYnx2xDanSmQ.png" /></a><figcaption>Too busy writing polemics on bad information security practices</figcaption></figure><p>Data security is a <em>hard problem to solve. </em>It seems like it shouldn’t — because humans have been encoding/encrypting things as long as they’ve had an alphabet. But securing your own personal communications and data is a uniquely individual problem.</p><p>Many drive-by workshops and tutorials are obsessively focused on overviews of tooling. There’s a good reason for this — only tooling information is truly general purpose and one-size-fits-most. Even when the workshop isn’t focused that way, participants tend to desperately search for a mythological perfect tldr; one that distills everything down to a single pithy tool choice. Unfortunately objectives of using said tool, the amount of information transferred, the number of participants in a secret exchange and their platform choices/technical sophistication (among many other factors) are all variables that make this decision more nuanced. What’s the tldr; on information security? There probably isn’t one. To put it in medical terms, you can self prescribe or listen to a witch doctor and it will probably be ok. Until it isn’t.</p><p>It’s easier to say (or remember, or tweet) “Use Signal, use Tor” than it is to say “Please apply all the OS updates when released and don’t install crapware on your notebook computer first, then talk about your tools for secure communication”. (Yes, it is equally possible to tweet both, but the latter seems orthogonal at first glance to communicating secretly with someone else)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*_RXDK6md3f-vToPhyK8U7w.png" /><figcaption>No one ever gets fired for using Signal or Tor (unless they’re using it to bypass corporate firewalls)</figcaption></figure><p>Not to sound like Mr Miyagi, but information security is much more about an ongoing process and mindset than it is about a set of tools. In many ways, there is still a tendency to treat data security as something fixable by an appliance or an arsenal of magic bullets; in the same way that one would employ a microwave oven or refrigerator.</p><p>It doesn’t quite work that way.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*GhWj2GHjMYVIEqfFTuFr2g.jpeg" /><figcaption>For the record, my office space is a little bit more spacious than the cube warren</figcaption></figure><p>I used to consult on information security practices for local and international organisations a few years ago. I now spend some of my time working on the same things in-house, with slightly more rewarding results. My focus with clients wasn’t on the dark and much Hollywood hyped arts of <em>whoa dude hacking</em>. My remit usually starts off differently (<em>make us really really secure</em>), and actually ends up with most of my time spent helping clients define what needed protecting from whom. Quite often, clients needed help articulating objectives; and once they did — they found the necessary changes to their day to day processes (which mostly lacked in information security hygiene in the first place) were prohibitively expensive.</p><p>Most organisations (not just Sri Lankan NGOs) have a significant, ongoing problem with disseminating and sharing information in visible, meaningful ways. Adoption of information systems is low, and prone to resistance from more entrenched workers. Skill levels are climbing but not steeply enough in my opinion. If you want to share electronic documents between remote field offices where no such capacity existed in the first place; you will usually go with the first workable solution proposed by a consultant; through an informal consult or one of your employees. Any kind of collaboration or information sharing is still a huge huge win in many sectors. So what happens when someone wants to stop this march towards progress for something as nebulous as “information security”?</p><figure><a href="http://www.slideshare.net/markieturbo/information-security-awareness-sept-2012-bis-handout"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/728/1*r748cAz2XyoJV84hhRp7OA.jpeg" /></a><figcaption>My bright young nephew shares files with his friends all the time. Why can’t we do that? I hate this security nonsense.</figcaption></figure><p>A typical brief goes something like this —</p><p><em>So, as you know — we face a number of threats to our data, from many different sources. We handle a lot of sensitive information, and we would like to communicate with our employees and also external parties securely.</em></p><p><strong>Small print: </strong>we don’t have much of a budget for this. <strong>Even smaller print: </strong>We don’t have (m)any trained specialists, we just have a part-time network guy who fixes our printers and helps us with Word documents. He doesn’t show up to work every day. <strong>Extra small print: </strong>most of our staff aren’t very technical people.</p><p>For your conventional Sri Lankan NGO that may be engaged in sensitive work in the field, doing <a href="https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/auditing/overview-threat-risk-assessment-76">threat analysis</a> (PDF) is of vital importance. I’ll be honest — I sometimes gauge how serious clients are about information security by offering to work with them on defining their threat model. How many hand-wave past this? Uncomfortably too many. Threat analysis is no mere theoretical exercise, because defining the potential for damage and the sophistication of your potential attacker vastly limits changes to your existing practices; and costs (by allowing concentration of resources on critical pieces of information).</p><blockquote>[A threat model is] a way of narrowly thinking about the sorts of protection you want for your data. It’s impossible to protect against every kind of trick or attacker, so you should concentrate on which people might want your data, what they might want from it, and how they might get it. Coming up with a set of possible attacks you plan to protect against is called threat modeling. Once you have a threat model, you can conduct a risk analysis. Source: <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/en/glossary/threat-model">EFF glossary entry on threat models</a></blockquote><p>Here’s a hierarchical sampling of entities that may compromise a non-governmental organisation’s data security:</p><p>a) Organisations that belong to or are sponsored by foreign states</p><p>b) the state; and/or its intelligence apparatus (with varying degrees of complicity from ISPs/telcos)</p><p>c) Technically skilled third parties hired either by (b) or competitors/interest groups</p><p>d) Insiders (disgruntled, technically incompetent or indiscreet employees, potentially those with a financial or social incentive)</p><p>e) Parties with whom you are sharing sensitive information</p><p>f) Technically skilled (possibly ideologically motivated) outsiders</p><p>g) Casual outsiders [ever had a friend pick up your phone and post to Facebook impersonating you? yeah, those people]</p><p>Wait. Does your prospective client say “we need to be bulletproof against the NSA on a shoestring?”. Walk, no <strong>run</strong> away if they really mean it. Sri Lankan organisations have had countless breaches (and that’s just the stuff we know about) by far less sophisticated adversaries. Do your candidate clients have difficulty prioritising types of information? These are indications of superficial thought being given to the actual mechanics of information security; and probably need to be fixed before any tools can be applied to a given problem. Do they have problems telling you who <em>should </em>have access to which types of information? This is less common, but still a surprisingly frequent occurrence in organisations where information systems are bolted on top of paper based record keeping. It’s probably possible to tool up your organisation to be impenetrable to most of the entities above; but no one gets there on day 1 (or to be frank, day 100).</p><p>What does all of this mean for those potentially curious about communicating securely, and protecting their data; ie, the promised land of everything being secret?</p><p>Some random truisms:</p><ul><li>Tool choices can and do come with caveats. Inappropriate use of a security tool is perhaps the easiest way to leak information. Unfortunately, tool choices are also a moving target. There <em>was </em>a time when Telegram was used by people for secure communications simply because WhatsApp communicated in the clear back then; and other secret-chat tooling (Threema, products by Silent Circle) was not widely available. Tomorrow, some genius cryptographer may discover a vulnerability in the Signal protocol; <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1177.pdf">just as some people did with MTProto</a> which is used by Telegram.</li><li>Using a tool (even with great training) is just a single step — <a href="https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&amp;px=Short-PGP-Collision-Attacks">PGP/GPG key IDs had a flaw exploited last week </a>. Updating the tool itself as well as your organisational code of best practices around using the tool are equally important. Even where GPG adoption has happened locally, most users work off a series of memorised recipes for encryption/decryption; which is not ideal.</li><li>A tool cannot magically fix your own information security practices if they were subpar earlier. Encrypting an email is great but less so if you slip up and add all the recipients on the cc: list. Encrypted chats are great, unless you slip up and add an unencrypted backup on another service like Google Drive. Encrypting data at rest is meaningless if you slap a post-it with a passphrase on the backup disk. Sending someone an encrypted message, then putting up a Facebook status asking if they got it is … not ideal.</li><li>The weakest link is not necessarily your own organisation but some other, perhaps higher profile establishment — for instance <a href="http://wikileaks.rsf.org/cablegate.html">Cablegate</a> did a great little number on local NGOs and some of their employees. Be careful of what is shared, with whom; and when. Funding proposals, requests for information and initial contact with potential sources can all be intercepted or leaked by third parties.</li><li><a href="https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/fireeye-how-stop-spearphishing.pdf">Spear phishing</a> is by far a more likely vector of attack than using a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-day_(computing)">previously undisclosed software vulnerability</a> on your computing device.</li><li>The best way to protect secrets is to not have them in the first place — many jurisdictions have a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law">key disclosure law</a>. Other places indulge in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis">rubber hose cryptanalysis</a>; which is not even remotely as cutesy as the name might suggest. Full disk encryption for your computing devices as a means of preserving secrets, therefore, is very useful in case of theft or misplacing a device but less useful against determined adversaries or border security in some countries.</li><li>Recommending tools on its own is meaningless. Install something on your mobile phone? What if your phone is already compromised? On a computer? What if your internet connection is not secure? Nonetheless …</li><li>Some potential tool choices to investigate in August 2016 (this list could be invalidated tomorrow by newer findings or advances in the field) — Tor, Signal, Wire, G(nu)PG (of those, <a href="http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/08/whats-matter-with-pgp.html">GPG/PGP tends to divide opinion</a> the most. Great tool, but poor usability). Look at VPNs for securing network traffic (but remember <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1922677/china-blocks-vpn-services-let-users-get-round-its-great">VPN traffic is not difficult to disrupt</a> and VPN providers also serve a large market of copyright violators).</li><li>Related to VPNs above, people/groups will use the same tools you do to facilitate illegal or objectionable activities. This means that <a href="http://themerkle.com/fbi-can-obtain-a-warrant-if-you-run-tor-come-december/">using some of these tools can be seen as an indicator of criminal activity in some jurisdictions</a>. Nonetheless, <a href="http://motherboard.vice.com/read/gchq-details-cases-of-when-it-would-use-bulk-hacking">a society where everyone uses encrypted, secure communications is arguably safer</a>.</li><li>Oh dear heavens, no.</li></ul><h3>Subha W on Twitter</h3><p>Two key things to look for in all technologies for safety: open source and encryption #FemTechLKA #feministactivists and digital security</p><p>Do not take any advice on security tooling or practices from people who do not work in the field. Even if they do work in the field, cross check their advice with multiple, <em>credible </em>sources. Ask these sources if a tool is an appropriate fit for <em>your </em>circumstances. There is a lot of misinformation out there, most of it dated or appearing to be unequivocal and/or authoritative without any basis for being so.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*WqlFrrISe5_MBfdqhNp2kw.jpeg" /><figcaption>My reaction after seeing some slide decks for information security workshops</figcaption></figure><p>Even <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/">the guides by the EFF</a> have their share of (legitimate) concerns and detractors so much so that the first version of their Secure Messaging Scorecard is no longer available online. <a href="http://classicprogrammerpaintings.com/post/147044648074/gentle-technical-discussion-on-irc-channel">Crypto nerds argue over these things to the death</a></p><ul><li>Be aware of local context when receiving advice (or offering it)</li></ul><h3>cerno on Twitter</h3><p>@subha_sl @chanux true. Alswys have access 2 a burner phone if possible.</p><p>Burner phones (or throwaway SIMs) are more difficult to acquire in Sri Lanka because of the requirement to produce valid identification on purchase. Sure, you can social engineer a guy off the street to buy one for you so perhaps it isn’t a big barrier; but when a telco is complicit in surveillance — burner phones tend to have a fairly short half life. If you think you know how to circumvent the checks; you’re probably missing something (or don’t need this guide in the first place).</p><ul><li>Sri Lankan surveillance infrastructure will massively benefit in the near future (costs, efficiency) from advances being field tested in other countries at present. In addition, <a href="http://research.dyn.com/2012/11/could-it-happen-in-your-countr/">Sri Lanka also appears in the list of countries that are vulnerable to a complete internet shutdown</a> (article is from 2012, but we have added two more links in the intervening half a decade so not much has changed). Our ISPs are already complicit in blocking access to various websites; with no definitive list of what is being blocked when.</li></ul><p>Did you read this far and not come away with a single concrete recommendation on software; nor an actionable item that will magically make all your stuff secure? Then I think I’ve done the job, because choosing your personal security tools on the strength of a single blog post or workshop is the very definition of insanity. Talk to practitioners about an audit of your organisation first, before discussing tool choices. Ask for caveats and alternatives for most proposals; as there are few instances where a single tool will be universal proof against all scenarios.</p><p>In my personal (and probably controversial) opinion, workshops are a useful first step at best for figuring out an information security strategy; be it personal or organisational. Paradoxically, given how I’ve tried to avoid tool recommendations — workshops really shine at giving a set of people (with disparate backgrounds) a good foundation on how to use a specific tool.</p><p>There is a truism that the most important information is (still) rarely committed to electronic memory. Sometimes the best information security strategy can be to not need one for very much information at all.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6d948a58c044" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts/first-they-came-for-gpg-keys-6d948a58c044">First they came for GPG keys</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/throwaway-thoughts">Throwaway Thoughts</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CEPA — the why, the rampant speculation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/cepa-the-why-the-rampant-speculation-775a31076a4?source=rss-1da199f383b6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/775a31076a4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[travel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sri-lanka]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[drac]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2016 09:22:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-01-21T10:16:03.400Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>CEPA is a trade deal between India and Sri Lanka. Regular, run of the mill stuff until someone noticed that it includes a clause about the IT industry (and dockyard workers, who presumably don’t get on Facebook as much). All hell has predictably broken loose, and Mark Zuckerberg probably has money for a new car from the increased adviews.</p><p>But let’s talk about the background to CEPA — keeping in mind that this is all fact free speculation, no one has seen more than a draft copy of the agreement, so no one knows what any of this is really about.</p><p>Let’s assume that everyone is a (kleptocratic, and at least mildly incompetent) rational party to this deal. Let’s even take statements made at face value and say it will involve no movement of professionals. Why would they be signing this trade deal now? From Sri Lanka’s perspective, I can only see these four possibilities.</p><ul><li>The SL IT industry is fine, but hitching our wagon to the number 1 star can only grow our prospects further, as most cross border trade and sharing tends to do in the medium and long term</li><li>The Sri Lankan IT industry is stagnant/under-performing (globally, the industry has grown at a much faster clip than SL has managed, so we have a smaller slice of the global pie than we used to in the late 90s). This agreement can help revive the industry [more on how later]</li><li>The Sri Lankan IT industry isn’t doing enough to employ fresh graduates because we are throttled by scaling problems (you need at least a few experienced people for near adult supervision). Expanding access to a larger market can only improve how many new people are employed by the industry year on year.</li><li>Opening access to IT and Dockyards are a couple of trade negotiation chips, to be bartered for concessions by the Indians in other areas. It can be galling to feel that your career and the industry you chose are a mere poker chip to be tossed onto a table for a trade negotiation as a makeweight. I’m sorry, sometimes that is how these things work — take agriculture in the EU as another example, or any number of line items in the TPP.</li></ul><p>Everyone talks about how terrible the Indian software industry is, and how Sri Lanka is of better quality and so on. I’ll dismiss the rank xenophobia, mild to vile racism for what it is; but no one talks about the upside. Yes, there are generic mumbled noises about trade being beneficial but what does that really mean?</p><p>When I cast envious glances at India (and I do), this is what I usually see and would like to have in Sri Lanka —</p><ul><li>Superb labour mobility. People move states for software jobs, they go to where the money is. In Sri Lanka, everyone just goes to Colombo (actually, please stay away. This city is crowded enough as it is — yes, I am kidding).</li><li>Arguably commensurate with their population, but India still has multiple city centres for IT — Bangalore, Hyderabad, Chennai, Pune being the names that come easiest to mind. Mumbai for fintech. Note how the capital city didn’t even get a mention here? This is how things are when you don’t live in a country with a primate city that hogs all the attention (like Colombo does)</li><li>Due to both those things above, employers have a real struggle with retention which means salaries are competitive, and growing ever higher (as a result of the maturity and longevity of the industry). It helps that their economy is less a cronyist, debt laden shitshow than ours is but I digress.</li><li>Indian outsourcing companies have done extremely well in pursuing and procuring contracts of mindboggling scale. Is it because they can promise (and deliver) a team of 500 (add a couple more 00s to that if you want) people in a couple of days? Sure. Is that the only reason? Of course not.</li><li>By virtue of many things (diaspora, relentless branding), many blue chip tech firms have development centres based in India (Amazon, Microsoft, Google and so on). Working at one of those places is not to everyone’s taste (certainly not to mine), but I’d rather have that option and not want it, than never have it at all.</li><li>Despite going off the rails a bit (post dotcom crash of 2001, slowdown in 2008), the larger offshore development houses based in India are EVERYWHERE on the planet. TCS has ventured into Africa, South America and are a presence pretty much everywhere else. I’d like a piece of that action. They’ve diversified markets (how successfully is another story, though)</li><li>Sri Lanka has ONE of everything. That’s it. Service company that deploys large projects? One company. Stock exchange and fintech work? One place. How many locally grown product companies do we have? You get the general idea. Is India better when considering their population and economy? Perhaps not, but 2 is still better than 1 because diversity.</li><li>They have more people who have experience in critical specializations that help businesses grow.</li></ul><p>You can legitimately dispute all these points. In fact, I could argue them either way. But ask yourself — if Sri Lankans are as good as people contend, why aren’t we getting 100% utilization and beyond in our industry? (no, we aren’t. please dont make me laugh by suggesting otherwise). Why are wages so low in comparison to India? [freelance market is a drop in the ocean compared to people who work at the multinationals]. Why haven’t blue chip tech set up development centres here? (yes, yes, Motorola. Whatever). Is it all down to scale? If that were true, how does Singapore, Taiwan and even Thailand get on in this world? <strong>Edit: </strong>I also find it amusing that Sri Lankan engineers think so little of their clients and employers that they assume allegedly lower quality and/or lower priced employees will be valued higher than they.</p><h4>What I’d like from a trade deal with India</h4><ul><li>Labour mobility for Sri Lankans to work in India (and yes, Indians to work in Sri Lanka). My ideal would be population adjusted equity. What we’ll get at best is like for like — a quota system like H1Bs, with a cap; minimum wage and designation. I’d like to make it easier for skilled specialists from Sri Lanka to move there (to gain exposure and make more money); and I’d like skilled Indian workers to come here to help us do stuff we’re not good at (please don’t kid yourself that we have enough people good at marketing, at client services, and many other aspects of professional software development that actually grows companies. Shoveling code around falls just barely within the top 10).</li><li>Access to their (collective) portfolio so we can get more of the projects that Indians don’t want to do (for price, or risk related reasons). Their wages are higher than ours, after all. I doubt this will happen, ever.</li><li>Access to training, consultations and specialized skills on a short term basis to help our industry grow</li><li>MoUs to help with investment, information sharing and sharing of work product. Also making it easier to open subsidiaries here</li></ul><h4>What I’d like as consequents to a trade deal with India</h4><ul><li>Holy shit, liberalize payment systems. Please do this yesterday (but see above about a cronyist, debt laden, balance of payment capsizing shitshow of an economy).</li><li>Make it easier to let people go — we have had layoffs in Colombo already, so that has precedent but only companies of a certain size can afford the labour tribunals that inevitably follow. This doesn’t mean compromising on workers rights, but making the labour market more flexible cannot possibly hurt</li><li>Give regulators enough teeth that they can crack down on people overstating qualifications, being underpaid or otherwise violating the terms of that (sadly hypothetical) labour mobility deal.</li><li>Find a way to encourage Indian companies to send more of their work here. Incentives could include labour credits, tax breaks (yes, per project. I would like to be serious but this would be open to all sorts of accounting abuses so call it a spitball)</li></ul><h4>Why this deal would be bad for some Sri Lankans</h4><p>In the same way we are silly for thinking of one billion people as being the same (bad quality, bad attitude, lazy, Virat Kohli, whatever ridiculous racial characteristic you want); the Sri Lankan IT/BPO industry is a many layered, complex beast. Let’s first dispell the illusion that every company employs people of the same robotically fantastic quality (they don’t), and further dispell the illusion that SLASSCOM represents or speaks for all of them (50% at best, probably lower). As with India, company quality and employee quality varies wildly here. Are some candidates from companies and universities not worth your time? Of course. What does it say about those companies and universities? Absolutely nothing.</p><p>Let’s look at some of the players in the IT industry by approximate class:</p><ul><li>Investor class (VCs, money men)</li><li>Employers (CEOs, board members and so on)</li><li>Middle management (technical, or general)</li><li>Mid level technical specialists</li><li>Entry level technical specialists</li><li>Freelancers/part time workers</li><li>Workers adjunct to the tech industry (support roles)</li></ul><p>Once separated out, you can probably figure out that incentives for a trade deal will be WILDLY misaligned between each of those parties. Investors and employers would love a trade deal, in the main because if you haven’t heard that hiring good people is the primary problem we have — then you aren’t in the tech industry at all. Having access to a larger pool theoretically (see hypothetical labour deal above) will yield better results. More people, faster expansion and more profits. Yay.</p><p>For middle management and mid level specialists, the picture is a lot more foggy. There will be more competition, from significantly qualified candidates. Even assuming a normalized distribution of talent (however you measure this); some of our best and brightest will be lured away to the exotic 45 minutes by plane ride away India, while some of theirs will end up here. Who sweetens the deal best gets the prize.</p><p>Entry level and freelancers are screwed, in essence — but this is unfortunately the global reality. It’s like being the lone all-rounder in a cricket team expected to bat, bowl, field, keep while the other team fields 11 people who are specialized and experienced in their roles. India has 1.2 billion people, and the entire IT/BPO industry of Sri Lanka (est 2014, a little high for my tastes) fits into 2–3 IT parks in Pune. You work out the odds.</p><p>This is why, when you look online — strident opposition vs some noise making vs “well, this is a good deal innit” tends to be separated out by where you sit in the IT/BPO industry hierarchy. The oddity is that all sides are “right” (technically correct even, which is the best kind of correct).</p><p>Honestly, I personally feel the SL IT industry has fallen behind, diluted professional skill (mainly due to constant migration of experienced professionals) and some deal is a near necessity if we are to stay competitive. But of course, I would think that because I am comfortably mid level, and haven’t had any problem finding work when I need it. Your mileage, unfortunately, depends entirely on your circumstances.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=775a31076a4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka/cepa-the-why-the-rampant-speculation-775a31076a4">CEPA — the why, the rampant speculation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/musings-about-sri-lanka">Musings about Sri Lanka</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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