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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Dror Trieman on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Dror Trieman on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Can HSM technology make blockchain wallets and transactions safer?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/orbs-network/can-hsm-technology-make-blockchain-wallets-and-transactions-safer-8e91dc48f1a2?source=rss-2a49d011ac71------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[hms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industry-insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dror Trieman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jan 2019 15:39:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-07T15:39:09.257Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How hardware security modules could protect your crypto assets</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*h8H5EfLB0s-oTs_shXRYmA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image by Rachel Skiba</figcaption></figure><p>As a security consultant for blockchain projects at Orbs, one of the recurring concerns I hear from customers is how to protect the private keys of their hot and cold wallets.</p><p>A hardware security module (HSM) is a tradition security solution which manages digital keys and is been used widely in PKI environments and in the financial sector.</p><p>At first glance, using of a HSM might be the perfect solution for blockchain-based solutions. The HSM generates key pairs, has secure storage, and can off-load cryptographic operations from the entire system.</p><p>In a series of stories, I will try to answer this hypothesis, by describing authentic use-cases, analysis of the market offering, code examples and a forecast for the future.</p><h3><strong>What exactly is an HSM?</strong></h3><p>A HSM is a physical device or a cloud service that safeguards and manages digital keys — facilitating encryption, decryption, signing, verification. The motivation behind HSM is to provide a safe environment to interact with a private key. Without this environment, the key is at risk of being exposed. These modules traditionally come in the form of a plug-in card or an external device that attaches directly to a computer or network server.</p><p>A HSM is a cryptography device responsible to govern the entire life cycle of private keys. This life cycle includes generation, distribution, rotation, storage, destruction and archiving. It is specifically designed and built to create a tamper-resistant secure environment for cryptographic operations which is fast and secure — without compromising the secret keys it contains .</p><h3><strong>How are they used today?</strong></h3><p>Today, HSM devices are primarily used by the retail banking industry to provide high levels of protection for cryptographic keys and customer PINs used during the issuance of magnetic stripe and EMV chip cards — and the subsequent processing of credit and debit card payment transactions.</p><p>The focus is usually on hot wallets’ private keys because these have online real-time interactions. Exposure of private keys can be the doomsday for a blockchain project. When a threat actor has access to the private keys, it is usually a game over. This can be either a professional hacker, a script kiddie, or even an insider that could misuse the funds of an organization. On these instances, HSM can be a fantastic security ally for private key management — something with is at the top of everyone’s mind in the blockchain community.</p><p>HSM is built on top of specialized hardware and has a security-focused OS. It has a limited monitored access channel and implements a role-separation mechanism for operation and administration of the device. The main supported cryptographic operations are true random number generation (TRNG), symmetric and asymmetric key generation, hash functions computations, encryption and decryption, and signing and signature verification. The HSM generates key pairs, has secure storage, and can off-load cryptographic operations from the entire system.</p><h3><strong>How could they protect blockchain wallets?</strong></h3><p>The address of an account in the blockchain is usually derived from the value of a public key. This public key has a correspondent private key, and this key-pair apply the rules specified by the blockchain such as length and encoding schemes. The generation of such key-pairs should take into consideration several fundamentals aspects such as true randomness source, generation algorithm &amp; environment, distribution process, and others.</p><p>Blockchain solutions usually store hot wallets’ private keys at databases, local files, often encrypted but sometimes as plaintext, or even as plaintext at public Github repositories — which is a very bad idea. In these architectures, a security breach or a developer mistake might result in exposure of the private keys.</p><h3><strong>How can HSMs be used to improve blockchain security?</strong></h3><p>There are many ways in which HSM devices can be used in blockchain, leveraging this established hardware technology to protect keys. After all, this emerging industry needs more and better solutions to protect currencies and mitigate risks of theft, hacks, or security breaches.</p><p>Below, I’m outlining six potential uses of HSM hardware to foster security in blockchain:</p><ol><li><strong>Generation of private and public key pairs: </strong>the HSM needs to support the blockchains specific <a href="https://blog.goodaudience.com/very-basic-elliptic-curve-cryptography-16c4f6c349ed">elliptic curves</a>, Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchain uses <a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Secp256k1">Secp256k1</a> elliptic curve, Stellar uses <a href="https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/">Ed25519</a>.</li><li><strong>Secure storage for private keys</strong> : Elementary but important to keep in mind. Your private key(s) must remain secure and private — just like you would keep your credit card’s PIN number guarded. Failing to do so could lead to disastrous consequences. Your private keys unlock access to something that it’s yours. From access to your funds or your employees’ identities. Protecting your private keys equates to protecting your fingerprints when using biometric credentials.</li><li><strong>Sign and verify transaction</strong> : send valid transactions to the blockchain by signing them and verify transactions whenever needed. This is a common use case of HSM in the banking industry, where people connect their devices to their account in order to approve a transaction.</li><li><strong>Hierarchical deterministic wallet support </strong>: Ability to derive key-pairs in a secure environment from a single key master according to <a href="https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki">BIP32</a>.</li><li><strong>Encrypt, decrypt and use keys records from key databases</strong> : Solutions which maintain a significant number of keys need to use key databases to store these keys. The HSM can receive an encrypted key and use it within the secure environment to use it.</li><li><strong>Logging</strong> : Track usage of keys in a way that is more robust than normal logging. Being able to audit and monitor how and when keys are used can offer an additional layer of security.</li></ol><p>There are many security breaches in the blockchain space, and as the industry grows so does the demand for better and safer ways to interact with the blockchain. From making secure crypto transfer to sharing confidential corporate data, security will remain at the top of the agenda.</p><p>Banks and other institutions have been wrestling with this type of challenges for decades and it is important for the blockchain community to embrace tried and tested solutions such as HSM, which might be crucial in helping blockchain evolve and mature.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F5e0f11%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F5e0f11%2F&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a66ac2133517ec6d8d70b2c47bfd656b/href">https://medium.com/media/a66ac2133517ec6d8d70b2c47bfd656b/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8e91dc48f1a2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/can-hsm-technology-make-blockchain-wallets-and-transactions-safer-8e91dc48f1a2">Can HSM technology make blockchain wallets and transactions safer?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network">The Orbs Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Security Analysis for Blockchain: November 2018]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-november-2018-dceba32c61a8?source=rss-2a49d011ac71------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dceba32c61a8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industry-insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dror Trieman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 Dec 2018 12:40:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-20T11:08:01.317Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-E7RgUqFIHQYCE2caPOfxA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image by Rachel Skiba</figcaption></figure><p>Hello community! In the <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-september-octob-2018-86f26f949dd4">last post</a> we’ve analyzed EOS and Ethereum smart contract breaches alongside with hacking to Cryptocurrency exchanges. It feels like every month the mixture is about the same, and every two months we have a 51% attack.</p><p>This month we inspect a 51% attack on a small blockchain, along with the a cryptocurrency exchange which disappeared after a hack (or an exit scan), twitter scams, an ERC20 token scam, and an interesting study which shows that too many Ethereum smart contracts shared common code, and therefore share future vulnerabilities.</p><p>The post is end with more interesting blockchain security stories of the month.</p><p>Enjoy.</p><h4>Twitter scams — Target and Google accounts (13 November 2018)</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/220/0*jKDI3E8rmKs-fXF5.png" /></figure><p>Damage scale: $32,700 (in BTC)</p><p>What happened:</p><ul><li>Hackers managed to publish a twit using the Target account (almost 2M followers), asking to send small amount of cryptocurrency in order to participate a $30M Bitcoin giveaway</li><li>Same target account was used in another twitter scam at the same week, taking over a menswear verified account and rename it to Elon Musk</li><li>Hackers got some BTC in these incidents</li><li>At the same day, Google G Suit’s account (over 800K followers) was twitted a similar message, asking users to send between 0.1 to 2 BTC and get ten times of the amount</li><li>Luckily, it seems nobody sent BTC to the address at the Google’s twit</li></ul><p>Our thoughts:</p><ul><li>Everyone knows the Nigerian prince scam and that this kind of offers are too good to be true</li><li>Last month was the annual cyber-security awareness month, awareness to scams should be an integral part of the guidance and training</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/11/13/target-cryptocurrency-scam-bitcoin-hack/">Report about hack of Target’s twitter account</a>, <a href="https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/11/15/official-google-twitter-account-hacked-in-bitcoin-scam/">Report about hack of Google’s twitter account</a></p><p>Related attacks: It’s not the same attack, but it reminds me somehow a tricky scam I’ve analyzed last year —<a href="https://bitfalls.com/2018/04/13/creative-new-scam-honeypot-private-key/"> the Minerium scam</a>.</p><h4>51% Attack on AurumCoin</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/508/0*iGfU50t3_pni5lec.png" /></figure><p>Who: <a href="http://www.aurumcoin.com/">AurumCoin</a> is a cryptocurrency which says it works according to the golden standard and the currency is intended to backed up by gold in the future.</p><p>Damage scale: $550,000 (in AU)</p><p>What happened:</p><ul><li>AurumCoin claimed it was hit by 51% and some tokens are missing from Cryptopia’s wallet, <a href="https://www.cryptopia.co.nz/">the last</a> is an Australian cryptocurrency exchange</li><li>It is assumed that an hacker sent AU tokens to Cryptopia wallet and change it for a different cryptocurrency, and then a 51% attack occurred and reversed the original AU tokens to Cryptopia</li><li>For some reason, AurumCoin accuse Cryptopia for the hack</li><li>AurumCoin is a small infrastructure with small number of miners, therefore low average hash rate. It is easy to rent hash power and perform a 51% attack</li></ul><p>Our thoughts:</p><ul><li>Dealing with a small blockchain which uses a popular hash function involves risks, such as the 51% attacks, users should be aware of these risks when using these kind of cryptocurrencies</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://www.finder.com.au/the-aurumcoin-cryptocurrency-says-it-was-hit-with-a-51-attack">Report on the attack</a>, <a href="https://248qms3nhmvl15d4ne1i4pxl-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/aurumcoin-crypto-exchange-hack.jpg">Official statement on the hack by AurumCoin</a></p><p>Related attacks: <a href="http://fortune.com/2018/05/29/bitcoin-gold-hack/">51% attack on Bitcoin Gold</a>, <a href="https://beincrypto.com/hacker-to-live-stream-51-attacks-as-educational-tutorials/">51% attack experiment on Einsteinium</a>, <a href="https://blog.zencash.com/zencash-statement-on-double-spend-attack/">51% attack on Zen Cash</a> — <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-june-july-2018-102f7a3436c">was published in the June-July analysis</a></p><h4>MapleChange (29 October 2018)</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/509/0*rQyQqg1sro8hSlYa.png" /></figure><p>Who: MapleChange was a small Canadian cryptocurrency exchange.</p><p>Damage scale: $6M (in Bitcoin)</p><p>What happened:</p><ul><li>MapleChange revealed it has fallen a victim to a hack at <a href="https://twitter.com/MapleChangeEx/status/1056579816239943681">a twit</a></li><li>The exchange also stated that “due to a bug, some people managed to withdraw our funds from the exchange” and they running an investigation</li><li>They also said no refund is available at the moment</li><li>After a day, MapleChange started a series of twits saying some of the alt-coins have returned to their original owners</li><li>Some light were shed on the vulnerability itself, critical code lines were commented out and caused the catastrophe</li><li>People from the crypto community says its all an exit scam by the MapleChange founders</li><li>Since October 30, there were no updates on the <a href="https://twitter.com/maplechangeex">company’s twitter account</a></li></ul><p>Our thoughts:</p><ul><li>When using a centralised crypto-exchanges this kind of scam/hack might happen, when it is also a small unknown exchange, the risk is much higher.</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://ethereumworldnews.com/maplechange-crypto-exchange-hacked-for-913-bitcoin-btc-exit-scam-likely/">Report on the hack</a>, <a href="https://bitsonline.com/maple-change-hack-exit-scam/">Does the “hack” is actually an exit scam</a>, <a href="https://pastebin.com/PZD3Qb35">Technical explanation about the exploit</a></p><p>Related attacks: <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-august-2018-e38cf8d50c62">See the Altex.Exchange case in the August analysis</a></p><h4>Oyster Protocol (29 October 2018)</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/0*ww0lfKyS65zEpJHA.jpg" /></figure><p>Who: <a href="https://oysterprotocol.com/">Oyster Protocol</a> is a data storage solution on top of <a href="https://www.iota.org/">IOTA DLT</a>, with a match ERC20 token, <a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/oyster/">Oyster (PRL)</a>, on top of Ethereum blockchain.</p><p>Damage scale: $300K (in PRL tokens)</p><p>What happened:</p><ul><li>Oyster tokens’ trading volume went up by 900% in a short period of time</li><li>At the same time, the price of the token went down by 60%</li><li>Oyster officials released a statement that the Oyster smart contract has passed 3 different audits and no bugs were found</li><li>But at the second part of the statement, they also said “someone” took over the ownership of the contract and successfully minted new 3 million PRL tokens</li><li>This “someone” is actually the original co-founder and architect of Oyster project</li><li>The Oyster CEO said one of the recovery options is to deploy a new token and replace 1:1 ration with old PRL tokens, without the new 3 million which were minted</li></ul><p>Our thoughts:</p><ul><li>This act reminds me the using of “safety hatch” by other blockchain projects, users should be aware that smart contract with safety hatches are susceptible to such incidents</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://www.livebitcoinnews.com/oyster-protocol-founder-exploits-smart-contract-trapdoor-to-mint-and-sell-3-million-prl-tokens/">Report on the hack</a></p><h3>More Interesting Blockchain Security Stories</h3><p><a href="https://www.ccn.com/war-bitcoin-cash-startup-launches-mining-pool-to-attack-altcoins-bch-forks/">Bitcoin Cash established mining pool to attack its forks</a> —SharkPool — A startup by Bitcoin Cash builds a mining pool to fight with its forks and alt-coins which “doesn’t fulfill Satoshi’s original vision for Crypto-currency”.</p><p><a href="https://smartereum.com/40465/ethereum-latest-update-report-reveals-that-ethereum-eth-ecosystem-might-be-affected-by-lack-of-diversity-in-smart-contracts-eth-usd-price-today/">Most Ethereum smart contracts share common code</a> — Research on the first 5 million blocks (now it has over 6.8M blocks) shows that less than 10% of Ethereum smart contracts are unique, therefore lots of smart contracts might share vulnerabilities.</p><p><a href="https://www.ccn.com/bitmain-sues-mystery-bitcoin-thief-who-hacked-its-binance-account/">Bitmain sues the hacker who hacked its Binance account</a> — This case is interesting, because Binance and other service providers will be summons to court and might be required to deliver private information which will reveal the identity of the hacker.</p><p><a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/11/12/hackers-threat-pay-857-in-bitcoin-or-your-secret-life-goes-public.html">Spray and pray attacks ask for BTC or your secret life will be exposed</a> — Hackers spraying leaked email accounts to ask for BTC. They actually doing you a favour not locking your Check if your email account has been compromised in a data breach <a href="https://haveibeenpwned.com/">here</a>.</p><p><a href="https://blockchainreporter.net/2018/11/29/unbound-tech-offers-blockchain-developers-solutions-with-bank-grade-security/">Unbound releases open-source code for MPC </a>— Multi Party Computation (MPC) is a hot domain in the crypto market with several startup companies which build MPC solutions. An interesting move by Unbounded. Here’s a <a href="https://github.com/unbound-tech/blockchain-crypto-mpc">link</a> to the Github repo.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F5e0f11%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F5e0f11%2F&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a66ac2133517ec6d8d70b2c47bfd656b/href">https://medium.com/media/a66ac2133517ec6d8d70b2c47bfd656b/href</a></iframe><p>Like what you read? Check out our GitHub projects and join the community:</p><ul><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/orbs-network-go">orbs-network/orbs-network-go</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/orbs-spec">orbs-network/orbs-spec</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/orbs-network-typescript">orbs-network/orbs-network-typescript</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/lean-helix-go">orbs-network/lean-helix-go</a></li></ul><p><em>Join the Orbs community:</em></p><ul><li><em>GitHub: </em><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network"><em>https://github.com/orbs-network</em></a></li><li><em>Telegram</em>: <a href="https://t.me/orbs_network">https://t.me/orbs_network</a></li><li><em>Twitter</em>: <a href="https://twitter.com/orbs_network">https://twitter.com/orbs_network</a></li><li><em>Reddit</em>: <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/ORBS_Network/">https://www.reddit.com/r/ORBS_Network/</a></li><li><em>Read the Orbs white papers</em>: <a href="https://www.orbs.com/white-papers">https://www.orbs.com/white-papers</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dceba32c61a8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-november-2018-dceba32c61a8">A Security Analysis for Blockchain: November 2018</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network">The Orbs Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Security Analysis for Blockchain: September-Octob 2018]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-september-octob-2018-86f26f949dd4?source=rss-2a49d011ac71------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/86f26f949dd4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industry-insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dror Trieman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Nov 2018 15:11:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-20T11:09:54.039Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A Security Analysis for Blockchain, September-October 2018</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oob2ytR0Lby5BYcHQPHEMA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image by Marina Rudinsky</figcaption></figure><p>Hello community,</p><p>The <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-august-2018-e38cf8d50c62">August analysis post</a> focused on vulnerabilities within cryptocurrency infrastructures such as Monero and Bitcoin Cash. Once again, these incidents emphasize the need for collaboration within security issued within the community.</p><p>This post summarizes the incidents of September and October. It consists of several hacks of smart contracts in Ethereum and EOS and hacking to exchanges.</p><p>I’ve also attached interesting related stories from the last two months.</p><p>Enjoy</p><h3>Zaif (September 19, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/0*KQst_-oJP0vQ6mRX.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://zaif.jp/">Zaif</a> is a Japanese crypto-exchange.</p><p>Damage scale: $60 million (in Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash and <a href="https://monacoin.org/">MonaCoin</a>)</p><p>Attack vector: <a href="https://support.zaif.jp/hc/en-us/articles/360009495634-How-exactly-did-the-unauthorized-access-occur-">Undisclosed</a></p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>Since September 14, deposit and withdrawal services have been unavailable for the exchange users.</li><li>According to Zaif, unauthorized access to a hot wallet caused the loss of 5,900 BTC, as well as Bitcoin Cash and MonaCoin</li><li>Zaif’s team has not released more details because it asked the Japanese authorities to help with the investigation of the robbery</li><li>It turns out that several months before this breach, Japan’s Financial Services Agency (FSA) issued a warning to Zaif about its internal management system and security measures</li><li>The exchange did not react to the FSA recommendations</li><li>Zaif told authorities that an employee’s PC had been hacked</li></ul><h4>Our Thoughts</h4><ul><li>We assume the hack of an employee computer was probably a successful phishing attempt. October was the <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/national-cyber-security-awareness-month">national cybersecurity awareness month</a> in the US, but it would be a good time to remind even non-American blockchain-based projects to invest time in cybersecurity training for their employees</li><li>A good resource we recommend for basic cybersecurity training is <a href="https://sudo.pagerduty.com/for_everyone/">PagerDuty Security Training for Anyone</a></li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000093.000012906.html">PRTimes</a>, <a href="https://www.cryptoglobalist.com/2018/09/20/almost-6000-bitcoin-btc-stolen-as-japanese-coordinated-exchange-zaif-gets-hacked/">CryptoGlobalist</a></p><h4>Related Attacks</h4><ul><li>It is mentioned that the same method was used at the Bithumb hack in July 2017, several millions of USD in cryptocurrency was stolen and customers’ data has been compromised</li></ul><h3>SpankChain (October 9, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="×ª××¦××ª ×ª××× × ×¢×××¨ âªSpankChainâ¬â" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*-K6DCk3XtrFPRBz8YUthZw.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://spankchain.com/">SpankChain</a> is an adult entertainment blockchain project on top of the Ethereum blockchain.</p><p>Damage scale: Over $40K (in ETH and BOOTY tokens)</p><p>Attack vector: Smart contract vulnerability</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>An attacker took advantage of <a href="https://medium.com/@gus_tavo_guim/reentrancy-attack-on-smart-contracts-how-to-identify-the-exploitable-and-an-example-of-an-attack-4470a2d8dfe4">reentrancy bug</a> in the SpankChain smart contract, similar to the bug at the famous DAO</li><li>The technical team realized it has been hacked only 24 hours after the breach, and immediately took down the site</li><li>The company said it was working on Airdrop of ETH and BOOTY to reimbursement users who lost their funds in the hack</li><li>In the official report, SpankChain stated they had not performed a security audit for the specific contract which has been hacked, considering it “quite expensive”</li><li>A few days after the hack, the CEO of SpankChain was contacted by the attacker, who then sent him the private key to the stolen funds! In return, SpankChain offered him a small reward</li></ul><h4>Our Thoughts</h4><ul><li>This kind of incident affects, not in a positive way, on the blockchain technology and community and by investing a few thousands of dollars on a good security audit for the hacked smart contract would have avoided it</li><li>It isn’t the first time the attacker returns the stolen funds, it also happened at <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/cryptocurrency/hacker-returns-26-million-worth-of-ethereum-back-to-hacked-company/">CoinDash ICO hack</a>, only back then the hacker returned Ether which was worth millions of dollars. It is still unclear why hackers return the stolen funds, but it can be a comfort to the victims</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://medium.com/spankchain/we-got-spanked-what-we-know-so-far-d5ed3a0f38fe">Official report by SpankChain</a>, <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/11/spankchain-spanked/">TechCrunch</a>, <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/spankchain-says-hacker-returned-stolen-crypto-funds/">Coindesk</a></p><h4>Related Attacks</h4><ul><li><a href="https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/">The DAO Hack</a> — One of the most notorious events in the Ethereum blockchain history, an event that caused the hard fork of the Ethereum blockchain, to Ethereum and Ethereum classic</li></ul><h3>DEOSgames (September 9, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="×ª××¦××ª ×ª××× × ×¢×××¨ âªDEOS gamesâ¬â" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*UlDj1nVRmTSROZ4knBWctg.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://deosgames.com/">DEOS Games</a> is a decentralized games application running on top of the EOS blockchain</p><p>Damage scale: About $24,000 worth of EOS</p><p>Attack vector: Smart contract vulnerability</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>In less than hour, the DEOS app made 24 payments to an EOS account interacting with the DEOS Games contract, an account which had been created less than a day before</li><li>According to the transaction on EOS, every time the malicious account deposited 10 EOS, it received about 20 times that amount back from DEOS Games contract</li><li>DEOS Games stated in a tweet, “It is a good stress test and we got significant improvements on contract level.”</li><li>It is unclear which vulnerability was exploited at the DEOS Games contract, or if there is perhaps another vulnerability in the EOS core</li></ul><h4>Our Thoughts</h4><ul><li>It wasn’t mentioned how DEOS Games found out about the hack, but as we suggested at <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-june-july-2018-102f7a3436c">June-July post</a> at the Bithumb hack, a simple monitoring script can detect such anomalies. We assume DEOS games have such tools and probably are very experienced with such frauds attempts.</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/09/10/eos-betting-platform-hacked/">Report on TheNextWeb</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/DEOS_Games/status/1039096917807058944">DEOS Games twit about the hack</a></p><h3>NewDex (September 18, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*Lw-cXqwmFdHaN1Vo.jpg" /></figure><p><a href="https://newdex.io/">NewDex</a> is a decentralized exchange based on EOS blockchain.</p><p>Damage scale: $58,000</p><p>Attack vector: Undisclosed</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>A malicious account created an EOS-based token with the name “EOS,” like the name of the native blockchain currency</li><li>This account — oo1122334455 — issued 1 billion tokens with the name “EOS” and tried to deposit them as EOS native currency, a ruse that the NewDex system fell for</li><li>The hacker traded the fake tokens for EOS native currency</li><li>Some of the real EOS native currency were then sent to Bitfinex to be traded with other cryptocurrencies</li><li>The NewDex team apologized for the incident but hasn’t published any plans to compensate users</li><li>Further investigation on NewDex infrastructure revealed that Newdex doesn’t use smart contracts to verify the tokens users send</li></ul><h4>Our Thoughts</h4><ul><li>The fact NewDex does not verify tokens via its smart contracts leads one to the conclusion that NewDex is just a user account handling the users’ trades and traders are under the impression it’s a decentralized exchange!</li><li>This incident is very irritating for two primary reasons: Firstly, NewDex is clearly not functioning as a real decentralized exchange and only pretends to be one. They do the matching at a centralized server (<a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/eos/comments/9f8oki/psa_newdex_is_not_a_decentralized_exchange/">look at the Reddit post</a>). Secondly, the fact the system doesn’t even check the authenticity of deposited tokens</li><li>When a trader is engaging with small crypto exchanges, it is critical to do due diligence, search for blog posts and opinion articles</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/09/18/eos-hackers-exchange-fake/">Report on the hack</a>, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/eos/comments/9f8oki/psa_newdex_is_not_a_decentralized_exchange/">Newdex isn’t a decentralized exchange — post on Reddit</a></p><h3>EOSBet Casino (14 September &amp; 15 October 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*BQY_J9-IWFVR_nma.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.eosbet.io/">EOSBet</a> is a gaming platform on EOS</p><p>Damage scale: $200,000 + $338,000 (both in EOS)</p><p>Attack vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in smart contracts</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li><strong>First hack:</strong> EOSBet announced it had been hacked, stating “the bug wasn’t minor…we’re still doing forensics” and took the platform offline</li><li>The company announced later that there was a bug in an assertion statement, and other games were also attacked using the same method</li><li>According to <a href="https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/09/14/eos-gambling-app-hacked/">TheNextWeb</a>, “Hackers were able to call the ‘transfer’ function externally using a fake hash”</li><li>An EOS account with a very similar name to that of the official EOSBet account sent a small amount of EOS to the attacker with a message demanding to return the stolen funds or else they will hire a team of lawyers and pursue the attacker</li><li>The same account approached EOSBet users and tried to convince them to transfer EOS for BET tokens, the official EOSBet game token</li><li>Back online, EOSBet has since published a detailed report on the hack, promising their contracts are now safe and the vulnerability patched</li><li><strong>Second hack:</strong> One month later, another vulnerability was exploited by hackers and over 142,000 EOS were stolen</li><li>The stolen assets were moved to Bitfinex and Poloniex, crypto exchanges, and there the tokens were frozen</li><li>The company reported they were working with these two exchanges to recover the funds</li></ul><h4>Our Thoughts</h4><ul><li>Smart contracts on EOS are relativity new and these incidents are birth pangs for any new platform</li><li>If the community learns from smart contract vulnerability exploits, both the platform and the platform’s reputation will ultimately benefit</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/09/14/eos-gambling-app-hacked/">Report on the first hack</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/@eosbetcasino/eosbet-transfer-hack-statement-31a3be4f5dcf">EOSBet statement on the first hack</a>, <a href="https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/10/15/eos-dapp-hacked/">report on the second hack</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/@eosbetcasino/eosbet-statement-on-hack-and-1st-dividend-distribution-a5c9aa617eaf">EOSBet statement on the second hack</a></p><h3>More Interesting Blockchain Security Stories</h3><ul><li><a href="https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/09/21/bitcoin-flaw-could-have-allowed-dreaded-51-takeover/">Bitcoin flaw could have allowed dreaded 51% takeover</a> <strong>— </strong>A vulnerability in Bitcoin Core could have caused a crash of numerous nodes and an attacker could have performed 51% attack at relativity low cost</li><li><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-19/hackers-target-bitcoin-with-leaked-nsa-software-tip-report-says">Hackers use Eternal Blue exploit to mine cryptocurrency</a> — Hackers design and unleash crypto-mining malware which takes advantage of unpatched Microsoft Windows systems to mine Monero</li><li><a href="https://www.nasdaq.com/article/hacks-bugs-and-exploits-growing-pains-for-the-4-billion-blockchain-cm1025532">Growing pains for EOS blockchain</a> — A summary of the EOS blockchain so far, discussing RAM costs, dApps and more</li><li><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rCAEqH37TWk">Binance CEO says security is the most basic thing for cryptocurrency exchanges </a>— An interview with Binance CEO from Malta’s Delta Summit</li><li><a href="https://ethereumworldnews.com/51-percent-attack-einsteinium/">51% attack on minor blockchains </a>— It’s cheap to mess up minor blockchains by renting hashing power and manipulating the chain</li><li><a href="https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/09/139603-two-young-men-in-oklahoma-charged-with-14-million-crowd-machine-crypto-hack/">Two men charged with $14 million crowd machine crypto hack</a> — Another <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/20/what-happens-when-hackers-steal-your-sim-you-learn-to-keep-your-crypto-offline/">Sim-swap scam</a> in the US</li></ul><h3>The Monthly Updates</h3><p>The monthly security analysis delivers analysis and post-mortem on interesting blockchain security incidents and events in an executive-summary format. There are many posts on security incidents within the blockchain domain. Here, we’ll provide a high-level overview and try to focus on the essence, express our opinion and give references for further inspection.</p><p>Like what you read? Check out our GitHub projects and join the community:</p><ul><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/orbs-network-go">orbs-network/orbs-network-go</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/orbs-spec">orbs-network/orbs-spec</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/orbs-network-typescript">orbs-network/orbs-network-typescript</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/lean-helix-go">orbs-network/lean-helix-go</a></li></ul><p><em>Join the Orbs community:</em></p><ul><li><em>GitHub: </em><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network"><em>https://github.com/orbs-network</em></a></li><li><em>Telegram</em>: <a href="https://t.me/orbs_network">https://t.me/orbs_network</a></li><li><em>Twitter</em>: <a href="https://twitter.com/orbs_network">https://twitter.com/orbs_network</a></li><li><em>Reddit</em>: <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/ORBS_Network/">https://www.reddit.com/r/ORBS_Network/</a></li><li><em>Read the Orbs white papers</em>: <a href="https://www.orbs.com/white-papers">https://www.orbs.com/white-papers</a></li><li><a href="https://orbs.com/#boxzilla-126"><em>Sign up for the Orbs newsletter</em></a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=86f26f949dd4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-september-octob-2018-86f26f949dd4">A Security Analysis for Blockchain: September-Octob 2018</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network">The Orbs Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hexa Labs — A Security Analysis for Blockchain: August 2018]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-august-2018-e38cf8d50c62?source=rss-2a49d011ac71------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e38cf8d50c62</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoincash]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dror Trieman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 16 Sep 2018 11:54:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-09-17T11:40:27.279Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oob2ytR0Lby5BYcHQPHEMA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image by Marina Rudinsky</figcaption></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?url=https%3A%2F%2Fplay.ht%2Farticles%2Fe38cf8d50c62&amp;src=https%3A%2F%2Fplay.ht%2Fembed%2F%3Farticle_url%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fmedium.com%2F_p%2Fhexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-august-2018-e38cf8d50c62&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=play" width="700" height="185" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/6a8ffd78093ac4213836eed595bec11c/href">https://medium.com/media/6a8ffd78093ac4213836eed595bec11c/href</a></iframe><p>The <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-june-july-2018-102f7a3436c">June-July analysis post</a> got positive reviews from our clients, partners and different players in the blockchain community. I’ll hope this month post will serve the community as well.</p><p>This month was considerably quiet regarding <em>published</em> security breaches, we hope it will stay that way.</p><h3>Monero and Altex.exchange (July 30, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*g3Bx1SJhbu31kMIt.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://getmonero.org/">Monero</a> (XMR) is a cryptocurrency with a focus on confidentially and untraceability, it is the native coin of the Monero blockchain. <a href="https://altex.exchange/">Altex.Exchange</a> is a small crypto-exchange.</p><p>Damage scale: Undisclosed, but was enough to shut down the exchange.</p><p>Attack vector: Software bug</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>Crafted transfer transactions exploited a display bug in the Monero’s wallet code, an open-source code.</li><li>The exploit causes the wallet to display a double amount rather than the real amount which was sent — i.e if you sent 1 XMR in a crafted manner, the receiver would have seen you have send 2 XMR.</li><li>Some Monero forks, such as <a href="https://arqma.com/">ArQmA</a>, were also influenced by this vulnerability.</li><li>A researcher found the bug and contacted the Monero’s team via <a href="https://www.hackerone.com/">HackerOne</a> platform at the beginning of June. Monero’s team released a fix at the end of July.</li><li>Other Monero forks were notified too about this bug.</li><li>At the beginning of July, Altex announced it suspends all <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CryptoNote">CrypoNote</a> based coins because of a bug in the wallet’s code.</li><li>At the end of July, Altex published a tweet saying they’ve suffered from a double-counting bug. They suspended all trading on their platform.</li><li>Since this tweet, no further update has been released by the Altex team — trading is still unavailable and a new registration is disabled.</li></ul><h4>Hexa Labs Thoughts</h4><ul><li>As said in the previous post regarding the vulnerabilities found on the EOS platform, bug-bounty programs are great and empower the entire blockchain community.</li><li>Even though other forks of Monero were notified about the bug, it was too late for the Altex exchange. It would be interesting to think about a decentralized mechanism which notifies trading platforms about such bugs that can siphon their wallets.</li></ul><p>References: <a href="http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1sqk2fh">Altex.Exchange announcement about the losses</a>, <a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/377592">Report on the bug and fixation at HackerOne</a>, <a href="https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/08/02/monero-wallet-bug-sees-altex-exchange-suffer-major-loss/">Article by newsBTC on the case</a></p><h3>Bitcoin Cash (August 10, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="×ª××¦××ª ×ª××× × ×¢×××¨ âªbitcoin cashâ¬â" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/0*txU1O30KCixwdim6.jpg" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.bitcoincash.org/">Bitcoin Cash</a> is a cryptocurrency, a <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hard-fork.asp">hard fork</a> of the Bitcoin blockchain. It has the fourth biggest market capitalization according to <a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/">CoinMarketCap</a>.</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>BitcoinABC, an open-source and full-node implementation for Bitcoin Cash, in May released an official report on a critical vulnerability within their code.</li><li>According to the report, a threat actor can construct a malicious transaction which would be accepted by a specific version of BitcoinABC but will be rejected by all other versions of Bitcoin Cash implementation.</li><li>One possible result of such a bug would have been a fork of the Bitcoin Cash blockchain, since miners with the susceptible version would have accepted malicious transactions and other miners wouldn’t have.</li><li>BitcoinABC states they have directly provided a patch to relevant mining pool operators.</li><li>At the end of the report, BitcoinABC thanks the person(s) who disclosed the vulnerability and ask him or her to come forward and receive a reward.</li><li>In August, a researcher at MIT Media Lab — Cory Fields — revealed himself as the person who notified BitcoinABC about the bug.</li><li>Fields says he is involved in the Bitcoin Core project — Bitcoin primary software implementation.</li><li>Because Bitcoin has lots of common code with Bitcoin Cash, Fields occasionally inspects the latter code in order to learn and deduce issues which might be relevant for Bitcoin Core.</li><li>During one of Bitcoin Cash’s inspections, Fields saw that pieces of the transaction validation code were refactored. The review process of this change took a week and was done by two reviewers only. NOTE: Approve changes in such a critical code will usually involve more reviewers and last longer.</li><li>Fields thought it would be interesting to see those changes. He says the critical bug was found in less than 10 minutes.</li><li>He shared his thoughts about (1) anonymously disclosed the bug (2) in a secure manner (3) only to BitcoinABC developers. Anonymity to protect himself, and the last two to protect the Bitcoin Cash blockchain and value.</li><li>He also mentioned he did it because he hopes that if someone will find a vulnerability in Bitcoin Core code, that someone would report it discreetly and securely as possible.</li><li>Later on, he tried to anonymously contact BitcoinABC, but found it to be a difficult task — there was no bug disclosure policy and the BitcoinABC <a href="https://blog.github.com/2009-04-15-github-issue-tracker/">Github issue tracker</a> specifically requests to “contact people privately.”</li><li>In the end, he encrypted a detailed report to one of the BitcoinABC developers with the developer <a href="https://medium.freecodecamp.org/how-does-pretty-good-privacy-work-3f5f75ecea97">PGP</a> public key. BitcoinABC decrypted the report and started to work on the fix.</li></ul><h4>Hexa Labs Thoughts</h4><p>We brought this case up again because the post from August raised several points the community should pay special attention —</p><ul><li>The blockchain community is a supportive community: There are disagreements between Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash crowds, but Fields who represents the Bitcoin community, understood the risks and implications of such a bug to Bitcoin Cash, and did what he could to protect the eco-system’s overall reputation and Bitcoin Cash holders.</li><li>Update critical code: Mistakes happen all the time and it’s okay that they do from time to time, but when refactoring such a critical code, much greater time and effort should be invested on code review.</li><li>Anonymous bug disclosure: It is important to protect the person who wishes to disclose the bug. He shouldn’t suffer any consequences in the event the bug was executed.</li><li>Appropriate bug disclosure channels and schemes: The strange part is the fact that it wasn’t easy to get the attention of BitcoinABC developers. Fields had to ping them several times in order to get some attention. Blockchain projects should have clear and secure communication channels to report bugs and other security issues. <a href="https://gemini.com/security/#reporting">Here’s an example</a>.</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://medium.com/mit-media-lab-digital-currency-initiative/http-coryfields-com-cash-48a99b85aad4">Post by Cori Fields about the vulnerability and the disclosure process</a>, <a href="https://www.bitcoinabc.org/2018-05-07-incident-report/">Vulnerability report by BitcoinABC from May</a></p><h4>Related Attacks</h4><ul><li>This incident reminded me of the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/08/accidental-bug-may-have-frozen-280-worth-of-ether-on-parity-wallet.html">Parity multi-signature wallet bug</a> from last November. During the Parity incident, someone triggered a “suicide” function in one of the multi-signature libraries and caused hundreds of thousands of Ether to stuck in those wallets. That loss of hundreds of millions of dollars could have been prevented, according to the <a href="https://paritytech.io/a-postmortem-on-the-parity-multi-sig-library-self-destruct">official post-mortem post</a>. This time, BitcoinABC and Bitcoin Cash holders were much luckier.</li></ul><h3>Bitfi Hardware Wallet (August 1, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zaw8y5EcES8H3WaW" /></figure><p><a href="https://bitfi.com/">BitFi</a> is a global payments company which launched an “unhackable” hardware wallet for crypto-currency.</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>On June, Bitfi announced on Bitfi Wallet, the first “unhackable” hardware wallet.</li><li>John McAfee, the creator of McAfee, the first commercial anti-virus software, had joined the Bitfi team and acknowledged the fact that the Bitfi technology is indeed unhackable.</li><li>The wallet supports several crypto-currencies and has features such as automatic updates mechanism and online-dashboard.</li><li>The security community wasn’t so pleased with the “unhackable” statement and some negative reviews started to appear on social media and other platforms.</li><li>On July, Bitfi &amp; McAfee announced a $100,000 reward to anyone who can hack Bitfi wallet — a Bitfi wallet loaded with $50 of BTC will be sent to people who will try to hack it. According to the announcement, if they’re able to get the BTC, a reward of $100,000 will be served.</li><li>At the end of July, the reward was increased to $250,000.</li><li>OverSoftNL, a research security firm, tweeted it had gained root access to the device, but didn’t prove it had access to the $50 of BTC the wallet holds. Social media went crazy about “the hack” of Bitfi.</li><li>Neither Bitfi nor McAfee responded to OverSoftNL tweet.</li><li>At the end of August, Bitfi removed the word “unhackable” from their website.</li><li>The reward for hacking Bitfi has increased again to $20 million.</li><li>As of the beginning of September, you can’t buy Bitfi from the official Bitfi website because it has sold out. The saga continues.</li></ul><h4>Hexa Labs Thoughts</h4><ul><li>Indeed, it is a strange story. One of the basic axioms of security is that <em>everything</em> — and we mean <em>everything</em> — is hackable. The fact the John McAfee, a controversial character in the security community, makes a statement that his product is “unhackable” annoyed many. We will continue to follow this story.</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/06/19/1526755/0/en/Bitfi-and-McAfee-Announce-First-Truly-Unhackable-and-Open-Source-Crypto-Wallet.html">Launch Bitfi wallet</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/officialmcafee/status/1024385313966379010">reward is increasing to $250K</a>, <a href="https://rya.nc/bitfi-wallet.html">negative review on Bitfi</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/OverSoftNL/status/1024684201575108615">OverSoft announced root access to the wallet</a> , <a href="https://cryptonewsreview.com/john-mcafee-is-now-basically-offering-20m-to-hack-his-wallet/">Reward increasing to $20M</a>,<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45368044"> Bitfi remove unhackable claim from their site</a></p><h3>More Interesting Blockchain Security Stories</h3><ul><li><a href="https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/lazarus-hacking-group-targets-cryptocurrency-macos-users/">Cryptocurrency-stealing malware which targets Apple OS machines</a>: A few years ago, Apple OS machines were considered “safer” than Microsoft and Linux systems. I hope you don’t still believe it. Don’t neglect security because you think Apple is more secure. There’s also a great <a href="https://www.cybereason.com/thank-you-mac-attack-webinar?utm_campaign=WR%202018-06%20Mac%20Attack&amp;utm_source=hs_email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_content=64141782&amp;_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8eC137KTsAEnmjje9a-QSfT0aT2FOc1FWJhNrComa9VDn5wAIpyaE3riaK66gQPmeud0fDG5gZasjGY9h1PXq5Vf8JbQ&amp;_hsmi=64141782">MAC attack webinar by Cybereason</a>, worth watching.</li><li><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cryptocurrency-at-t-lawsuit/u-s-investor-sues-att-for-224-million-over-loss-of-cryptocurrency-idUSKBN1L01AA">Digital identity theft behind heist worth $23.8 million</a>: A Cryptocurrency investor filed a lawsuit again AT&amp;T because the telecom giant failed to protect the investor’s digital identity due to a <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/20/what-happens-when-hackers-steal-your-sim-you-learn-to-keep-your-crypto-offline/">SIM swap fraud</a>. Who keeps $23.8M worth of crypto in a hot wallet controlled by a mobile phone?</li><li><a href="https://www.necn.com/news/new-england/Boston-Man-Joel-Ortiz-Bitcoin-Cryptocurrency-Theft-Charges-California-489775191.html">Boston man accused of stealing $2 million in cryptocurrency</a> — more SIM swap frauds in the US.</li><li><a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2160387/chinas-biggest-ever-bitcoin-hacking-case-sees-three-held-over">Massive Bitcoin theft in China</a> — A massive cryptocurrency heist in northwest China. There’s not much technical information about it, expect the fact the arrested suspected were hackers since a young age :0</li><li><a href="https://www.influencive.com/can-blockchain-strengthen-IoT-Device-Security/">Post on Blockchain and IoT Security</a>-A brief readable post on the combination of blockchain and IoT to improve the latter security.</li></ul><h3>The Monthly Updates</h3><p>The monthly security analysis delivers analysis and post-mortem on interesting blockchain security incidents and events in an executive-summary format. There are many posts on security incidents within the blockchain domain. Here, we’ll provide a high-level overview and try to focus on the essence, express Hexa Labs’ opinion and give references for further inspection.</p><h3>About Hexa Labs</h3><p>Hexa Labs is a blockchain solutions consultancy helping established large-scale consumer brands create their own fair and stable decentralised economies.</p><p>Among our clients you can find Zinc, PumaPay, COTI and other successful blockchain projects.</p><p>Visit us at <a href="https://www.hexa-labs.com/">Hexa-labs.com</a></p><p>Like what you read? Check out our GitHub projects and join the community:</p><ul><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/orbs-network-go">orbs-network/orbs-network-go</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/orbs-spec">orbs-network/orbs-spec</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/orbs-network-typescript">orbs-network/orbs-network-typescript</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network/lean-helix-go">orbs-network/lean-helix-go</a></li></ul><p>Join the Orbs community:</p><ul><li><em>GitHub: </em><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network"><em>https://github.com/orbs-network</em></a></li><li><em>Telegram</em>: <a href="https://t.me/orbs_network">https://t.me/orbs_network</a></li><li><em>Twitter</em>: <a href="https://twitter.com/orbs_network">https://twitter.com/orbs_network</a></li><li><em>Reddit</em>: <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/ORBS_Network/">https://www.reddit.com/r/ORBS_Network/</a></li><li><em>Read the Orbs white papers</em>: <a href="https://www.orbs.com/white-papers">https://www.orbs.com/white-papers</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e38cf8d50c62" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-august-2018-e38cf8d50c62">Hexa Labs — A Security Analysis for Blockchain: August 2018</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network">The Orbs Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hexa Labs — A Security Analysis for Blockchain: June-July 2018]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-june-july-2018-102f7a3436c?source=rss-2a49d011ac71------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/102f7a3436c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[orb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bancor]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dror Trieman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Aug 2018 06:48:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-21T13:07:33.611Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oob2ytR0Lby5BYcHQPHEMA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image by Marina Rudinsky</figcaption></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?url=https%3A%2F%2Fplay.ht%2Farticles%2F102f7a3436c&amp;src=https%3A%2F%2Fplay.ht%2Fembed%2F%3Farticle_url%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fmedium.com%2F_p%2Fhexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-june-july-2018-102f7a3436c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=play" width="700" height="185" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/460a64924978ff1f7bb3c431498244bb/href">https://medium.com/media/460a64924978ff1f7bb3c431498244bb/href</a></iframe><p>After several months working in Israel’s blockchain industry as security lead for Hexa Labs — Orbs’ sister company within the larger Hexa Group of companies — I’ve met dozens of managers, researchers, developers, lawyers, and business consultants working on innovative projects dealing with hundreds of millions of dollars in both fiat and cryptocurrency.</p><p>Most of these people told me they can’t keep pace with the <em>tremendous</em> number of security incidents in the blockchain domain. At least once a week, there seems to be news of another crypto heist, with last week’s major story covering the KICKICO breach.</p><p>I believe people in the industry should be aware of these security events, as well as relevant news and trends. When you hear about an incident, your first instinct should be to think whether or not that same attack vector can be used against <em>your</em> venture and if your current security plan mitigates this risk.</p><p>Even though the community embraces knowledge-sharing and the open-source philosophy, information on security breaches often remains confidential for obvious reasons. Usually, specific details are undisclosed such as damage scale, exact vulnerability, and the victim’s identity.</p><p>This blog delivers interesting blockchain security incidents and events in an executive-summary format. There are many posts on security incidents within the blockchain domain, here I’ll provide a high-level overview and try to focus on the essence and give references for further inspection.</p><p>Without further ado, let’s go over the security incidents of June-July 2018:</p><h3>KICKICO (July 27, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/696/1*2G5lzoUKSFeYnYdKNO8k0A.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.kickico.com/">KICKICO</a> is a blockchain crowdfunding website for ICOs</p><p>Damage scale: 70,000,000 <a href="https://etherscan.io/token/0x27695e09149adc738a978e9a678f99e4c39e9eb9">KickCoin</a> (~$7.7M — estimated fiat value of stolen tokens during the hack)</p><p>Attack vector: Access to private key of a smart contract</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>Several KickCoin token holders complained tokens disappeared from their wallets</li><li>The hackers who got access to the KickCoin smart contract owner destroyed 40 existing accounts and issued 40 new accounts with the same token balances. See these <a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc236dbbff81dc8f0c390813a132a57c7d6128f8fe41bdfce71709ac634fa12fb">destroy</a> and <a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf5d80f955b2fe146fef0eefb8d5ccbff3571c3c302921f51dfae3a934819cf43">issuance</a> examples from Etherscan</li><li>By doing that, the total KickCoin token supply and token holders number stayed the same</li><li>KICKICO team were able to <a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc478731d4876c0a669e83df7489c1e08a67e755f60fc96614be2db1177178093">change the smart contract owner</a> value to a different account — their <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x1d6835b6242d4062b99e2cca41b08ad1de059ec4">cold wallet account</a> — thus stopping the heist</li><li>KICKICO said they will return all lost tokens to their original owners</li><li>KICKICO started to destroy the tokens the attackers issued, <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xe44a1c8cff9dcfb35aa1af9817aa5e8e4c32cc8b#tokentxns">example from Etherscan</a></li></ul><h4><strong>Hexa Labs</strong> Thoughts</h4><ul><li>Hackers tried to disguise the heist with an interesting technique (reassign tokens ownership and total supply), but awareness by the token holders prevented more damage</li><li>The KICKICO team acted fast to change the contract owner — a smart move minimizing damage and exposure</li><li>It would be interesting to learn how the hackers got access to the token private key in the first place</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://medium.com/@kickico/kickico-security-breach-issue-under-control-all-kickcoins-will-be-returned-ebe65a491dec">Official statement by KICKICO</a>, <a href="https://coinfrenzy.io/kickico-experiences-a-hack-and-loses-7-7-million/">CoinFrenzy</a></p><h4>Related Attacks</h4><ul><li>It is worth mentioning that KICKICO suffered several attacks during their ICO last year. Read more <a href="https://medium.com/@kickico/how-they-tried-to-hack-our-ico-d348659dc4">here</a></li></ul><h3>Hola Free VPN and MyEtherWallet (July 9, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/695/1*vq9HY5XkzveTmJrRzGMNvw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3ASnNQm1sufbA3ILeVQgiA.png" /></figure><p><a href="http://hola.org/">Hola</a> is a popular free VPN service; <a href="https://www.myetherwallet.com/">MyEtherWallet</a> is a popular client-side interface for Ethereum wallets.</p><p>Damage scale: Unknown</p><p>Attack vector: Clients’ phishing</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>Hackers gained access to Hola’s Google Chrome store account, and uploaded a malicious extension to the store</li><li>Users which used the compromised extension were exposed to a phishing attack. When the user browsed MyEtherWallet in non-incognito mode, the extension injected a malicious JavaScript tag which redirected users to a phishing website</li><li>Hola noticed the malicious version a few hours after it had been deployed. It is unknown precisely how many users downloaded and used that version. Hola replaced the malicious version with an official one</li><li>Hola have notified both Google and MyEtherWallet, in addition to making sure the hacker’s site is down</li></ul><h4><strong>Hexa Labs</strong> Thoughts</h4><ul><li>It was a sophisticated attack which might have caused severe damage to Hola &amp; MyEtherWallet users. It would be interesting to learn how Hola’s team discovered the hack</li><li>It wasn’t disclosed how the Hola’s store account was compromised, but we suggest verifying and double-checking that all of your accounts are configured to require <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-factor_authentication">MFA</a>, use a password-manager to generate strong passwords, and avoid password reuse.</li><li>When using browser extensions for sensitive operations, make sure to understand the risks</li></ul><p>References: <a href="http://hola.org/blog#/chrome-compromise">Official statement by Hola</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/myetherwallet/status/1016542459185119232">MyEtherWallet urgent tweet</a></p><h4>Related Attacks</h4><ul><li>At the end of July, <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/cryptocurrency/google-removes-real-ethereum-wallet-from-web-store-but-leaves-fake-one-alone/">Google removed the official Metamask’s Chrome extension</a> from the Chrome Web Store, but left behind a fake one.</li></ul><h3>Bancor (July 9, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kZdtTl-z-fxW903k05NCtw.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.bancor.network/">Bancor</a> is a blockchain project which allows immediate liquidity for ERC20 tokens.</p><p>Damage scale: $23.5 million (in Ether, <a href="https://etherscan.io/token/0xa15c7ebe1f07caf6bff097d8a589fb8ac49ae5b3">NPXS</a>, <a href="https://etherscan.io/token/0x1f573d6fb3f13d689ff844b4ce37794d79a7ff1c">BNT</a>)</p><p>Attack vector: Undisclosed</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>A compromised wallet was used by the attackers to withdraw ETH, NPXS and BNT tokens from a BNT smart contract and other contracts</li><li>Bancor says no client wallets were compromised</li><li>A safety hatch protocol feature was used to freeze the stolen BNT tokens</li><li>The Bancor trading platform was shut down for a few days</li><li>$10 million of BNT tokens were recovered</li><li>A compromised wallet means someone attained the ability to generate and sign legitimate transactions. We don’t know how the wallet was compromised, but we suggest making sure to use proper multi-signature wallets and hardware wallets to control high-profile accounts.</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://twitter.com/Bancor/status/1016420621666963457">Bancor’s first detailed response</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/Bancor/status/1017012630639259654">Bancor’s clarification</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/the-great-bancor-robbery-and-what-we-should-learn-from-it-185a0a90afb4">Leonid Beder’s post on the hack</a>, <a href="https://www.bitrates.com/news/p/bancor-loses-235-million-in-cryptocurrencies-after-security-breach">BitRates</a></p><h3>Tether (June 28, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*o99ylGZea5MmQXefocjUwg.png" /></figure><p>Who was affected?: An undisclosed crypto-exchange was affected by rumors surrounding Tether (USDT)</p><p>Damage scale: Unknown</p><p>Attack vector: Lack of data validation</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>A Chinese cyber-security company, SlowMist, published a post which recharged a Tether account on an exchange by changing the value of a field in a transaction</li><li>A rumor about a vulnerability in the Tether mechanism was spread online</li><li>Several exchanges announced they weren’t exposed to said vulnerability</li><li>SlowMist claims the vulnerable exchange suspended Tether trade</li><li>After further investigation, SlowMist claimed “This vulnerability is not the USDT’s own vulnerability, but some [unnamed] exchange platform’s databases do not strictly verify the status of the ‘valid’ parameter.”</li><li>The name of the exchange has still not been disclosed</li></ul><h4><strong>Hexa Labs</strong> Thoughts</h4><ul><li>At the root of this was a poor integration implementation by the exchange with the Tether currency. When listing a new cryptocurrency or token on a trading platform, it is <em>critical</em> to understand the intricacies of the new protocol.</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://twitter.com/SlowMist_Team/status/1012362798137872384">SlowMist tweet</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JwLmLXhRmx4">Nugget’s news video</a>, <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/cybersecurity-analysts-find-tether-double-spending-vulnerability">CoinTelegraph</a></p><h3>Bithumb (June 20, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*W8igxtboL5BLYjaAKZdkEA.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.bithumb.com/">Bithumb</a> is a popular South Korean crypto-exchange</p><p>Damage scale: $17 million in cryptocurrency</p><p>Attack vector: Little information is available. What is known is a hot wallet was hacked, but details are scant.</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>“We noticed that between last night and today early morning, about 350,000,000,000 KRW worth of cryptocurrencies have been stolen” — a deleted tweet by Bithumb</li><li>All withdrawal services were temporarily halted and the company moved all cryptocurrencies to cold wallets</li><li>Bithumb asked clients to stop depositing crypto in their wallets, but some clients reportedly continued doing so for some time afterwards</li><li>Bithumb worked with the Korea Internet &amp; Security Agency (KISA) and other entities to figure out how the hack took place</li></ul><h4><strong>Hexa Labs T</strong>houghts</h4><ul><li>It has been reported the heist happened at night, like many breaches. Using monitoring tools on hot wallets, cold wallets, and blockchains is crucial to detecting breaches as quickly as possible</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/bithumb-exchanges-31-million-hack-know-dont-know/">CoinDesk</a>, <a href="https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/06/20/bithumb-cryptocurrency-hack/">TheNextWeb</a>, <a href="http://bithumb.cafe/archives/33767">Bithumb report and announcement on compensation plan</a></p><h4>Previous Attacks</h4><ul><li><a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/south-korean-bitcoin-exchange-bithumb-hacked-ethereum-2017-7">A year ago</a>, a hacker breached a Bithumb employee’s PC and stole details of some Bithumb users. An unknown amount of Bitcoin and Ether was also stolen</li></ul><h3>CoinRail (June 10, 2018)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/696/1*FprWohkEZYUnk8rxUdOtlg.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://coinrail.co.kr/intro">CoinRail</a> is another South Korean crypto-exchange.</p><p>Damage scale: Ether, <a href="https://etherscan.io/token/0xa15c7ebe1f07caf6bff097d8a589fb8ac49ae5b3">NPXS</a>, <a href="https://etherscan.io/token/0x4ce6b362bc77a24966dda9078f9cef81b3b886a7">NPER</a> and others ($40M)</p><p>Attack vector: Undisclosed</p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>Attackers hack CoinRail systems and a range of ERC-20 based tokens was stolen</li><li>All trade at CoinRail was suspended</li><li>CoinRail claims 70% of the stolen funds can be recovered, but 30% is lost</li><li>The hacker tried to sell some of the stolen tokens at IDEX, a decentralized asset exchange. CoinRail states that IDEX froze assets from the hacker wallet address</li><li>CoinRail was reopened at mid-July but full recovery process isn’t completed yet</li></ul><h4><strong>Hexa Labs</strong> Thoughts</h4><ul><li>The Ocean, an ERC20 trading platform, claimed some addresses related to the hack were previously marked as suspicious. They suggested that exchanges should check if addresses with negative marks were interacting with their platforms. This idea sounds interesting, but the implementation should be considered carefully because it might affect honest blockchain users.</li></ul><p>References: <a href="http://archive.is/1SVgZ">CoinsRail official statement</a>, <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/coinrail-exchange-hacked-loses-possibly-40-million-in-cryptos/">CoinDesk</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/the-ocean-trade/hack-attack-volume-1-coinrail-4ec680f47538">The Ocean’s analysis</a>, <a href="https://news.bitcoin.com/crypto-exchange-coinrail-recover-cryptocurrencies/">Bitcoin.Com</a></p><h3>ZenCash (June 3, 2018)</h3><p>Who: <a href="https://zencash.com/">ZenCash</a> is a privacy-oriented blockchain system built on zero-knowledge cryptography, using <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equihash">Equihash</a> PoW protocol.</p><p>Damage scale: 22,900 <a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/zencash/">ZEN</a> ($687,000)</p><p>Attack vector: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UxyGt58EPa4">51% Attack</a></p><h4>What Happened</h4><ul><li>Equihash is a popular mining algorithm used by other currencies such as ZCash and Bitcoin Gold</li><li>It means a significant computing power is dedicated to compute Equihash and this computer power can be routed between several blockchains</li><li>There are several commercial mining pools which offer Equihash computing power for rent</li><li>The attackers probably rented Equihash computing power from mining pools and reorganized the ZenCash blockchain several times — the largest rollback being the reversal of <em>38 blocks</em> within the ZenCash blockchain, which allowed the hacker to double-spend ZEN</li><li>Mining pools contacted ZenCash about the attack and exchanges were notified to increase transactions confirmation with ZEN currency</li><li>Less than two weeks after the attack, ZenCash published a proposal to modify the consensus protocol and use penalty system to reduce this risk</li><li>ZenCash is revising their white paper. It is unclear if they will include proposals to fight 51% attacks or hard fork the blockchain</li></ul><h4><strong>Hexa Labs Thoughts</strong></h4><ul><li>ZenCash notified their exchange partners about the attack almost immediately, as should be, but there’s massive reputation damage to this project</li><li>When developing a decentralized project, choosing the right blockchain is a crucial decision for the future project success. One needs to consider the ecosystem and hackers from different vantage points, specifically of different phases of the venture, including before mass-adaption. In this case it was profitable for the hackers to rent hashing power and perform a 51% attack on the ZenCash blockchain</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://blog.zencash.com/zencash-statement-on-double-spend-attack/">ZenCash official statement</a>, <a href="https://bitcoinist.com/zencash-target-51-attack-loses-500k-double-spend-transactions/">Bitcoinist</a>, <a href="https://blog.zencash.com/zencash-leads-the-fight-against-the-51-attack/">ZenCash proposal to fight 51% attacks</a>,</p><h3>Previous Attacks</h3><ul><li>Last May, a <a href="https://bitcoinist.com/51-percent-attack-hackers-steals-18-million-bitcoin-gold-btg-tokens/">51% attack took place on the Bitcoin Gold blockchain</a>. In July, the <a href="https://cryptovest.com/news/bitcoin-gold-btg-hard-fork-implements-new-mining-algorithm/">Bitcoin Gold community changed the PoW algorithm</a> to keep away <a href="https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/what-is-an-asic-miner/">ASIC miners</a> and prevent future 51% attacks</li></ul><h4>EOS Vulnerabilities (May-June-July … Honestly Ongoing)</h4><p>Who: EOS, 3rd generation blockchain for decentralized apps</p><h4>What Has Happened</h4><ul><li>EOS has raised almost $4 billion in a year-long ICO.</li><li>The new blockchain promises to enable millions of transactions per second and eliminate transactions fees — solve some of Ethereum worst drawbacks</li><li>A Chinese internet security firm, Qihoo 360, discovered several critical vulnerabilities at the platform just before the projected launch at June</li><li>The bugs allowed an attacker to execute an arbitrary remote code on EOS nodes and even take full control of the node</li><li>Around the same timeframe, hackers scanned the internet for EOS nodes which accidentally exposed private keys through an API misconfiguration. The scan started only a few hours after the Qihoo 360 report was released</li><li>It seems like there’s no direct connection between the two, and the later related to a GitHub bug report which was published</li><li>EOS have reported fixing all bugs. It also published its Bug-Bounty program</li><li>A few days later, another white-hat hacker found bugs at EOS software and got a $120K reward from EOS</li><li>The program is ongoing. EOS has paid out over $340,000 to ethical hackers.</li></ul><h4>Hexa Labs Thoughts</h4><ul><li>Open-source practices prove themselves as a useful methodology. On the one hand, the business does a striptease putting its source code on Github for all to see. Yet on the other hand, the community helps in achieving more secure and efficient code</li><li>Bug-Bounty programs make sense both for the business and the white-hat hackers</li></ul><p>References: <a href="https://cryptoslate.com/ethical-hacker-exposes-vulnerabilities-in-eos-code/">CryptoSlate</a>, <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/misconfigured-eos-blockchain-nodes-under-attack/">Beeping Computer</a>, <a href="https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/06/05/hacker-eos-cryptocurrency/">TheNextWeb</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/eosio/calling-all-devs-the-eosio-bug-bounty-program-is-live-7219c625a444">EOSIO declare Bug-Bounty program</a></p><h3>About Hexa Labs</h3><p>Hexa Labs is a blockchain solutions consultancy helping established large-scale consumer brands create their own fair and stable decentralised economies.</p><p>Among our clients you can find Zinc, PumaPay, COTI and other successful blockchain projects.</p><p>Visit us at <a href="https://www.hexa-labs.com/">Hexa-labs.com</a></p><p>Join the Orbs community:</p><ul><li><em>GitHub: </em><a href="https://github.com/orbs-network"><em>https://github.com/orbs-network</em></a></li><li><em>Telegram</em>: <a href="https://t.me/orbs_network">https://t.me/orbs_network</a></li><li><em>Twitter</em>: <a href="https://twitter.com/orbs_network">https://twitter.com/orbs_network</a></li><li><em>Reddit</em>: <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/ORBS_Network/">https://www.reddit.com/r/ORBS_Network/</a></li><li><em>Read the Orbs white papers</em>: <a href="https://www.orbs.com/white-papers">https://www.orbs.com/white-papers</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=102f7a3436c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network/hexa-labs-a-security-analysis-for-blockchain-june-july-2018-102f7a3436c">Hexa Labs — A Security Analysis for Blockchain: June-July 2018</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/orbs-network">The Orbs Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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