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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Rich Firth-Godbehere on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Rich Firth-Godbehere on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Rich Firth-Godbehere on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Today is a Good Day To Lie]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://drrichfg.medium.com/today-is-a-good-day-to-lie-7c5f53f79bce?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1280/1*bGb8i0rbGdbYbvtv7A0EnA.jpeg" width="1280"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">Dominic Cummings, the architect of Brexit and right-hand man to Boris Johnson&#x2019;s early days in government, has spent a day in Parliament. A&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://drrichfg.medium.com/today-is-a-good-day-to-lie-7c5f53f79bce?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
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            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dominic-cummings]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cummings]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lying]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emotions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rich Firth-Godbehere]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 May 2021 17:24:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-27T13:59:00.082Z</atom:updated>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[What Is It This Time?]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://drrichfg.medium.com/what-is-it-this-time-8f7f4c31dcfe?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/705/1*2Dhd7oW9SFWTfdXjtHtQLA.jpeg" width="705"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">&#x201C;It&#x2019;s about time you started writing more regularly&#x201D;, my inner voice keeps telling me. Recently, I&#x2019;ve been trying to find ways to find&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://drrichfg.medium.com/what-is-it-this-time-8f7f4c31dcfe?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
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            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emotions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[time]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rich Firth-Godbehere]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Sep 2019 10:20:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-16T15:16:41.789Z</atom:updated>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Emotion Science Keeps Getting More Complicated. Can AI Keep Up?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/how-we-get-to-next/emotion-science-keeps-getting-more-complicated-can-ai-keep-up-442c19133085?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[singles]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emotions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rich Firth-Godbehere]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Nov 2018 19:07:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-28T19:07:26.438Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>We may never be able to build a machine that can recognize the full diversity of human emotional experience</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eFW-uLm1TRmytl3AH9nSRw.png" /></figure><p><strong>In the early 1990s, Lisa Feldman Barrett had a problem. </strong>She was running an experiment to investigate how emotions affect self-perception, but her results seemed to be consistently wrong. Eight times in a row, in fact.</p><p>She was studying for a Ph.D. in the psychology of the self at the University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. As part of her research, she tested some of the textbook assumptions that she had been taught, including the assumption that people feel anxiety or depression when, despite living up to their own expectations, they do not live up to the expectations of others.</p><p>But after designing and running her experiment, she discovered that her test subjects weren’t distinguishing between anxiety and depression. They weren’t differentiating between fear and sadness, either. According to the model that dominated emotion science at the time, there were <a href="https://howwegettonext.com/silicon-valley-thinks-everyone-feels-the-same-six-emotions-38354a0ef3d7">six distinct basic emotions</a>—fear, sadness, anger, happiness, surprise, and disgust—and everyone in the world was able to not only experience them, but distinguish clearly between them. This had been conclusively demonstrated 20 years before by Paul Ekman, the psychologist who had traversed the world and found seemingly concrete evidence that everyone, everywhere, felt those six emotions, and that they were reflected in universal, and distinct, facial expressions.</p><p>For Barrett, it didn’t make sense that her test subjects were experiencing emotions in a way that didn’t fit this model. She wondered if perhaps these people were making mistakes; if only she could find out which people were getting their emotions “right” and which were getting them “wrong,” she could teach the mistaken participants how to better understand their own selves. She even blamed herself for developing a faulty experiment, and thought about becoming a clinical psychiatrist — leaving the research to people who could get the “proper” results.</p><p>But she became sure that she hadn’t made an error. And the more she looked through her data, the more she <a href="http://circleofwillispodcast.com/lisa-feldman-barrett-bonus-material">realized</a> that it wasn’t her mistake — it was Ekman’s. The six universal emotions didn’t exist. She soon found other studies — conducted in the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/234837419_Facial_and_Vocal_Expressions_of_Emotion">lab</a> as well as <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4752367/">out</a> in the <a href="https://psyarxiv.com/pf2q3/">field</a> — that also indicated Ekman’s model was wrong.</p><p>Barrett found herself asking the question: If the definition of emotions set forth by Ekman and others is incorrect, then what <em>are</em> emotions? This isn’t just an academic exercise. It’s central to the question of whether we’ll ever build an artificial intelligence that experiences emotions just like we do. And part of the solution depends exactly on <em>whose</em> experiences you’re talking about.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0co1MSD0w-hTBJUR77iLWQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>One example of just how our model of emotions has changed thanks to Barrett’s work can be seen in a new game, </strong><a href="http://thevaultgame.com/"><strong><em>The Vault</em></strong></a><strong>.</strong> The game is a time-traveling puzzle, in which the player wanders through different historical scenarios and solves challenges in order to progress — and the solutions come from understanding how certain emotions were experienced in each section’s period of history. (Full disclosure: The Centre for the History of Emotions at Queen Mary University of London, which co-developed the game, is where I work.)</p><p>The game’s premise is that emotions are not static or universal, but instead change over time. It tries to immerse the player in unusual, unfamiliar sets of feelings — like acedia, caused by a disconnection with God or the universe. There’s also another low feeling, melancholia, which is marked by sensations of the body being filled with a horrible black bile, and involves an experience of bodily distortion, such as believing one’s legs are made of glass.</p><p>For me, the interesting thing about this game is that no matter how well I learn to understand past emotions, I’m not sure I’ll ever be able to really “feel” these emotions in the same intuitive way that people did in the past. This raises a question: If we humans are unable to fully experience some emotions that were undoubtedly real, like melancholia, purely because of the historical context in which we live, will machines ever be able to really <em>feel</em> anything at all?</p><p>This doesn’t just apply to historical emotions, either. Ekman may have documented hundreds of facial expressions from different cultures around the world, but his six basic emotions (inspired by the work of Charles Darwin) came from a small set of American faces, which Ekman then imposed as a framework over the expressions seen elsewhere in the rest of the world. There’s a bias embedded here. Why does he, or anyone else, get to reduce the diversity of human facial expressions, tones of voice, and other behaviors down to any kind of shortlist?</p><p>In the 17th century, the standardization of many European languages was <a href="https://www2.bc.edu/marian-simion/th406/readings/0420anderson.pdf">often shaped by the arbitrary choices of book printers</a>, who picked one way of spelling a word over another — this, in turn, shaped cultural expression. Emotion science faces the same problem. Choosing localized emotional variants as if they’re going to be the same for thousands of people, or even millions, opens the way to a self-fulfilling standardization of emotions, rather than to the understanding and appreciation of what we already have. Psychologists have this kind of problem all the time with the “<a href="https://www.apa.org/monitor/2010/05/weird.aspx">WEIRDs</a>.” That term refers to white, educated people from industrialized, rich, democratic countries — in other words, the typical North American or European undergraduate studying psychology, who also happens to be the typical volunteer for a psychological study. This research bias undermines any quest for universal human traits from the start, and the same cultural blind spots are notorious in the tech industry.</p><p>One of the architects of <em>The Vault</em>, Thomas Dixon — a historian of emotions who pretty much wrote <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/from-passions-to-emotions/9E152739407029F882D0384D0670E49F">the standard text on the subject</a> — told me that, just as “each culture (and each individual) [has] their own different repertoire of feelings,” there should be “no reason why an AI machine should not be able to learn those patterns.” However, Barrett also argues that faces, voices, and behaviors associated with emotions could well change not only from culture to culture but subtly <a href="https://www.affective-science.org/pubs/2012/emotions-are-real.pdf">from person to person</a>. Are we ever going to be able to build a machine that can recognize the full diversity of human emotional experience? Or are we going to build one that only recognizes a small sliver of that diversity, and so forces its users to change their behavior to match?</p><p>We could take a huge liberty here, and assume that eventually AI could be programmed free of these cultural biases — but with the benefit of years more research, Barrett has concluded that emotions are much more complicated than faces and voices. She, along with James Russell, helped develop a more nuanced system than Ekman’s, the “<a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/record/2002-08416-007">psychological construction of emotions</a>” model. It posits that emotions happen when the brain takes a number of factors — internal feelings, what’s going on in the outside world, what individuals have learned throughout their lives from family and culture, and so on — and “constructs” an emotion by processing all of those psychological components simultaneously in parallel.</p><p>Similarly, the brain recognizes emotions in other people by observing both others’ bodily or facial movements and the contexts in which people make those gestures. When it comes to the question of whether any AI can ever experience emotions, it’s that factor — understanding all of these broader cultural contexts — that proves the undoing of the machines.</p><p>For example, take this picture of my face and arm:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KDTNGx08Qc7Hr0K6" /></figure><p>Do I have road rage? Or am I celebrating hearing on the radio that my team has scored?</p><p>Even humans struggle at figuring this kind of thing out. If we want to put emotion-detecting AI in self-driving cars that can <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/23/a-car-which-detects-emotions-how-driving-one-made-us-feel">take control from a human and pull over when they detect road rage</a>, my celebratory fist pump (not that my team scores <em>that </em>often) could mean I end up spending time stuck on the side of the street getting angrier and angrier at my annoyingly intelligent car.</p><p>To avoid roads jammed with furious drivers, the ability of emotion-processing AI to understand context is essential — and context requires knowing something emotion scientists call <em>value</em>. This is the meaning that we construct about the world around us. If you see me pumping my fist, my value to you depends on whether you thought I was violent (in which case my value is as a threat); whether you knew of my fabled physical cowardice (in which case my value to you is as a joke); whether you were watching the game with me and supported the same team (in which case my value to you is as a friend) or a different team (in which case my value to you is, possibly, as an enemy).</p><p>But understanding value isn’t as easy as building a database of all these different factors. We don’t construct databases of memory and emotion, either. As Barrett explains, “Brains don’t work like a file system. Memories are dynamically constructed in the moment, and brains have an amazing capacity to combine bits and pieces of the past in novel ways.” Our brains seem to use disparate feelings and memories to build a framework of categories for understanding context; these categories are then filtered and distorted in ways that help us react appropriately to new experiences. This is one of the key reasons why eyewitness testimony is often unreliable in court, and cross-examination is an essential part of the legal <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-24483-6_46">process</a>.</p><p>For a machine to understand the emotions I’m feeling during my fist pump, it needs to contextualize all of this: memories of fist pumps and scowling faces; memories of what a car is; memories of different sports; reactions to sports; memories of how rarely my team scores; how I feel about my team; an analysis of my driving; an understanding that those are tears of joy, not sorrow (or anger); and so on. The sum total of this mishmash? An emotion.</p><p>Machines may remember things perfectly, but the human emotional process only works <em>because</em> it’s so fuzzy — it makes cognitive dissonance possible. A machine might have to think that a scowl and a fist is a threat but simultaneously know that I’m not a violent person. Which information should it react to? The brain can do this with hundreds of bits of conflicting data, and we usually end up able to handle new contexts that might seem logically impossible to an AI. My car might not just pull over — it could shut down completely in the middle of the highway. Then I’d be <em>really</em> angry.</p><p>The idea that human memories aren’t simply recording devices but are a categorical system that helps us thrive and survive is known as “dynamic categorization.” It’s a model that’s now <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?hl=en&amp;as_sdt=0%2C5&amp;q=dynamic+categorization+brain&amp;btnG=">taken as a given within the field of psychology</a>, and researchers in other nonscientific fields, such as history, also use it. Thus, forcing an AI to access memories chosen for it would still impose a narrow set of WEIRD-like values onto this hypothetical feeling machine, but developing an AI that can create its own humanlike memories and values as it learns would avoid this pitfall. However, as far I’m aware, there don’t appear to be AI or computer systems in development that use dynamic categorization when thinking about memory, let alone emotion detection.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0co1MSD0w-hTBJUR77iLWQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Let’s say we solve the two major problems I’ve raised.</strong> Our AI can recognize faces, voices, and behavior, and it uses dynamic categorization to store and recall information. What we’ve built is a machine that only <em>recognizes</em> emotions. It’s a metal psychopath — it can’t <em>empathize</em> with me. I, for one, don’t like the idea of being driven around by one of those machines.</p><p>Our final step in building a feeling machine is to introduce feelings. The ability to understand the value of the world around an organism did not evolve separately from the senses that let us know about the world around that organism. Without feelings of revulsion caused by smell and taste, we all would have died from eating rotten food long ago. Without hunger, we’d starve. Without desire, we wouldn’t reproduce. Without panic, we might run toward the saber-toothed tigers, not away from them. And, just as the model of the five traditional senses is <a href="http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20141118-how-many-senses-do-you-have">nowhere near comprehensive in terms of the sense abilities that humans actually have</a>, we also have a wide and diverse range of internal feelings, known in psychology as affects.</p><p>Affects aren’t emotions, but rather judgments of value that create pleasant or unpleasant sensations in the body, either making us excited or calming us down. Affects help us to evaluate context, telling us whether it’s a dog to trust (and domesticate) or a tiger to flee. To feel affects, our AI needs one more thing: a body. Affects can’t exist without one. As Barrett has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HlJQXfL_GeM&amp;feature=youtu.be">argued</a>, “A disembodied brain has no bodily systems to balance, it has no bodily sensations to make sense of. A disembodied brain would not experience emotion.”</p><p>A feeling machine’s body doesn’t have to be a <em>Blade Runner-</em>style flesh-and-blood replica of a human. It could be a virtual body, built entirely from lines of code. Unfortunately, most AI developers who imbue their creations with an understanding of emotions — even those who connect their creation to a body of some kind — are building machines that, at best, react in simple ways to basic stimuli like sight, sound, and pressure. More, much more, is needed to truly create a feeling machine.</p><p>That said, building such an AI would be an effective way to figure out what that “much more” is. Right now, we have only a few clunky options to test our ideas about emotion on humans: we can get people to take a survey; we can put them in loud, claustrophobia-inducing metal tubes and ask them to “feel emotions as they would naturally”; or we can study the effects of physical alterations of the brain, whether due to an accident or as a side effect of surgery.</p><p>When it comes to seeing emotions directly, we’re still fumbling in the dark. A feeling machine could turn on the light.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0co1MSD0w-hTBJUR77iLWQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>We can imagine that we’ve cracked it. </strong>We’ve done the experiments and we’ve created a machine that can experience affects, read context, and understand value — and all those abilities have been synced up perfectly in order to construct emotions. Plus, we’ve managed not to imbue our creation with our own cultural biases. We have an emotional, feeling machine. There’s one final issue.</p><p>Creating a machine that experiences emotions doesn’t tell us if we have a machine that <em>feels</em> emotions in the same way we do. It might act as if it does, it might say that it does, but can we ever truly know that it does?</p><p>Let’s go back to that example of the self-driving, road rage-detecting car. Sure, it might understand why I’m scowling and raising my fist, and may empathize with me — it understands the value of my gesture. But what we’ve got here is just a kind of clockwork approximation of something that feels empathy, and we still don’t fully understand how all the gears mesh together to “feel” an emotion. For all we know, that ability to feel may still prove impossible to artificially induce.</p><p>Perhaps that doesn’t matter. After all, I can’t even be sure if you, the human reader of this piece (and not the many machine readers that are also indexing it for search engines, although, hello, how are you?), really feel emotions in the way that I do. I can’t climb inside your brain. Barrett <a href="https://www.affective-science.org/pubs/2012/emotions-are-real.pdf">argues</a> that emotions depend not only on a human mind’s perception of its own affects, contexts, and values, but also on how those perceptions work “in conjunction with other human minds.” If we — or other AI minds, even — think that a machine can feel, is that enough?</p><p>The question then is: Should we judge something based on how it experiences emotions, or whether it experiences them at all? We treat animals differently based on intelligence, for example, but where does emotion come into play when trying to draw the line between a “machine” and a creation that is “artificial, but alive”?</p><p>The distinction between an AI that only <em>appears</em> terrified of death and an AI that is <em>genuinely afraid </em>is an important one if we ever have to turn the machine off. Can we even make that decision if there’s ambiguity? The philosopher Chidi Anagonye, a character on the sitcom <em>The Good Place</em>, faced just this dilemma:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FetJ6RmMPGko%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DetJ6RmMPGko&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FetJ6RmMPGko%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/fc846a851fbd82b57692d3635b7abbd2/href">https://medium.com/media/fc846a851fbd82b57692d3635b7abbd2/href</a></iframe><p>Ultimately, whether or not we produce machines with emotions may depend not on the skills of scientists but on the ethical objections of ordinary people. I have few suggestions on this front — but if I were contemplating a career in philosophy right now, I’d be thinking about making my central field the ethics of emotion AI. There’s much to be done.</p><p><em>This is the second part of a two-part story. Read part one: “</em><a href="https://howwegettonext.com/silicon-valley-thinks-everyone-feels-the-same-six-emotions-38354a0ef3d7"><em>Silicon Valley Thinks Everyone Feels the Same Six Emotions</em></a><em>.”</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AowhxJ4uXyCTq0iNqKAgzQ.png" /></figure><figure><a href="https://howwegettonext.com/"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*zioeEki6nad2HT65Nx8D0g.png" /></a></figure><p><em>Please click on the applause button to recommend this article to your friends. For more from How We Get To Next, follow us on </em><a href="http://twitter.com/howwegettonext"><strong><em>Twitter</em></strong></a><strong><em> </em></strong><em>and </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/howwegettonext/"><strong><em>Facebook</em></strong></a><em> and sign up for our </em><a href="https://storythings.us7.list-manage.com/subscribe/post?u=ac3c63206e0226f0b2c43f01d&amp;amp;id=f18977f495"><strong><em>newsletter</em></strong></a><strong><em>.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=442c19133085" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/how-we-get-to-next/emotion-science-keeps-getting-more-complicated-can-ai-keep-up-442c19133085">Emotion Science Keeps Getting More Complicated. Can AI Keep Up?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/how-we-get-to-next">How We Get To Next</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Do You Feel With A Plastic Brain?]]></title>
            <link>https://drrichfg.medium.com/how-do-you-feel-with-a-plastic-brain-8eecd8ee7593?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[language]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emotions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[neuroscience]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rich Firth-Godbehere]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Sep 2018 16:01:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-09-14T16:01:02.006Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>Plastic brains and how we see colours might be the clue to how the understanding of emotions can vary from person-to-person, culture-to-culture.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xC39DSpsskPU34Ue" /></figure><p>Recently, I read two very interesting and thought-provoking books: Guy Deutscher’s <a href="https://archive.org/stream/ThroughTheLanguageGlass/Through%20the%20Language%20Glass_djvu.txt"><em>Through the Language Glass</em></a><em> </em>and Bruce E. Wexler’s <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Brain_and_Culture.html?id=siPtAAAAIAAJ&amp;redir_esc=y"><em>Brain and Culture</em></a>. By taking these two works together, I think hints at how the nature/nurture question in Emotion research can be solved by the way we learn to understand the world as children through language.</p><p><strong>More than Words</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/140/0*vqOfyAhUylIxluUG.png" /></figure><p>Deutscher’s<em> Through the Language Glass, </em>follows a linguistic Alice through a wonderland of cultural construction. Split into two parts, it begins by taking us through ‘the language mirror’ into the rather troubled relationship between colours and the words we use to describe them.</p><p>As it turns out, the languages you speak can change how you understand colour. In some languages — like Russian for example — light blue and dark blue are two different colours. Other languages don’t differentiate black and blue, or green and yellow. The people who speak these languages can see that these are different shades of colour, they just group different bits of the visible light spectrum in different ways.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/289/0*goM5rXNohqB8ZoZz.jpg" /><figcaption>William Gladstone by Mayall, 1861, Creative Commons</figcaption></figure><p>British Prime Minster William Gladstone’s was one of the first people to notice that different language speakers treat colours differently. In a book he wrote about Greek poet Homer, <a href="https://archive.org/stream/studiesonhomerho03glad#page/410/search/colour"><em>Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age</em></a>, noticed the poet’s rather odd use of colours. Both Homer’s Iliad and his Odyssey are filled with wine-soaked seas, black skies and violet sheep. That different people talk about colours differently is not a new observation.</p><p>Deutscher noticed something that Gladstone did not. He argues that as societies become more complex, the more labels for colours we find. The reason for this, Deutscher thinks, is because simple cultures don’t need complicated words. For example, if you live in a jungle, the only useful words for colours might be ‘green’ and ‘brown’ for the trees, ‘red’ and ‘yellow’ for ripeness, and perhaps ‘white’ for light and ‘black’ for dark. Therefore, other colours aren’t needed. With this set, you can describe the sky as a darkened green, or a lightened form of black. Thee word ‘blue’ is not needed.</p><p>Deutscher points out that children find colour words very difficult to learn; they are often able to identify square or triangular shapes long before a yellow or red ones. Understanding colours does not seem to be innate, even if seeing them is.</p><p>There is a worrying idea that goes along with Deutscher’s argument. Something called the <a href="https://linguistlist.org/ask-ling/sapir.cfm"><em>Whorf-Sapir hypothesis</em></a>. To cut a long story short, this hypothesis suggests that our understanding of the world is developed through language, and that we cannot understand anything for which our language lacks the words. This means that people with different languages live in entirely other worlds from each other: you actually see the world differently depending on what language you speak.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/363/0*HGDlmG8wIEQqFeIl.jpg" /><figcaption>James, George Wharton, <em>Koch-i-vent-i-wa, a Hopi man making moccasins at Oraibi</em>, ca.1898. California Historical Society Collection, 1860–1960, Creative Commons</figcaption></figure><p>The Wharf-Sapir hypothesis came from a <a href="http://neamathisi.com/literacies/chapter-1-literacies-on-a-human-scale/whorf-on-the-hopi-language">study</a> of the ‘Hopi’ people by Benjamin Lee Whorf in the 1930s, who in turn based his ideas on previous work by Edward Sapir (among others). Whorf’s study suggested that the Hopi language had ‘no words, grammatical forms, constructions or expressions that refer directly to what we call “time”, or to past, present, or future’ and that as a result the Hopi ‘has no general notion or intuition of <em>time </em>as a smooth flowing continuum in which everything in the universe proceeds at an equal <a href="http://www.generalsemantics.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/articles/etc/8-1-whorf.pdf">rate</a>’. According to Whorf, the Hopi saw the world differently to English speakers; so differently that it’s impossible for us to grasp their understanding, or rather lack of understanding, of time.</p><p>Whorf’s hypothesis is flawed for a number of reasons. One of the most famous reasons comes from philosopher Donald Davidson who in ‘<a href="https://www2.southeastern.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/conceptualscheme.pdf">On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme</a>’ and it’s very simple. In the article, Davidson suggested that the ‘triangulation’ — the ability for different people to point to a the same thing and agree what it is — makes translation of anything possible.</p><p>Deutscher,too, has no time for Whorf. For example, he points out that English speakers are quite capable of understanding what is meant by taking joy from another’s misfortune, with or without the word <em>schadenfreude</em>.</p><p>There is another problem with Whorf’s hypothesis, however. Whorf didn’t really study the Hopi language in the round. He studied the Hopi language as described to him by a member of the Hopi he knew who lived locally. When anthropological linguist Ekkehart Malotki eventually did a proper study of the Hopi in the early 1980s, it led to the a page of his book becoming one of the greatest examples of academic pwnage in history.</p><p>Turn page vii of the introduction to Malotki’s book <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=XSeGmS4uXykC&amp;q=pu%27+antsa#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false"><em>Hopi Time</em></a>, and you’ll find a virtually blank page with the words:</p><blockquote>“After a long and careful study and analysis, the Hopi language is seen to contain no words, grammatical forms, constructions, or expressions that refer directly to what we call ‘time’.” (Benjamin Lee Whorf ‘An American Indian Model of the Universe’, 1936)</blockquote><blockquote><em>pu’ antsa pay qavongvaqw pay su’its talavay kuyvansat, pàasatham pu’ pan piw maanat taatayna</em><strong><em> </em></strong>[Then indeed, the following day, quite early in the morning at the hour when people pray to the sun, around that time then, he woke up the girl again] (Ekkehart Maltoki, Hopi Field Notes, 1980)</blockquote><p>Ouch indeed. Would you like more cream for your burn, Dr Whorf?</p><p>Deutscher doesn’t think that the idea of language affecting a worldview should be dismissed altogether, though. Instead, he gives the example of groups who use geographical centres for direction — north, east, south, and west — rather than egocentric ones — such as left and right — as evidence for what he calls the ‘Boas-Jokobson Principle.’ He names this after, linguists Franz Boas and Roman Jakobson from whom Deutscher drew the idea.</p><p>Deutscher’s Boas-Jokobson Principle suggests that not all language can change a worldview, but the bits of language that <em>must</em> be expressed a certain can. For example, if an English person were asked who they were going away this weekend, they could answer without giving away the gender of the person they are going away with; in many languages where nouns and adjectives are gendered — such as French — it wouldn’t be so easy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*uBBjoIU7jjfjSMUz.jpg" /><figcaption>One thing or two? The hand and arm.</figcaption></figure><p>Deutscher, whose first language is Modern Hebrew, points out that Hebrew has one word for both hand and arm, so they ‘think’ of the hand and arm as one unit as they have no other choice. This does not mean that they cannot understand that there might be a boundary, anymore than an English person might be unable to understand that an apple is masculine to a German. According to Deustcher, these forced words do affect his understanding of secondary languages at a deep level, no matter how fluent he becomes in those secondary languages.</p><p>Coming back to colours, Deutscher reminds us that what we see is not what is real. Humans, contrary to popular belief, do not see with their eyes but with the workings of their occipital lobes. Colours and objects are filtered, distorted, and tweaked to fit the patterns our mind has come to expect through a combination of billions of years of evolution, culture, upbringing, and language.</p><p>So it’s possible that people really do see the sky as <em>grue</em>, or <em>blueack</em>. Russians see the dark sea as one colour and the bright sky as another and find it odd that we don’t. It also means that if children learn how to recognise where North, South, East and West are at all times from an early age, it becomes as natural a part of their universe as left and right.</p><p><strong>Plastic Fantastic</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/269/0*3lTZ2wvrd5hmw1hL.jpg" /></figure><p>The second book, Bruce E. Wexler <em>Brain and Culture</em>, turns around a simple premise: the human brain is plastic, able to mould itself not only around evolved innate patterns, but also through external input. This is especially true during childhood and adolescence, as it is in this period that our neuronal structures are particularly plastic, and so the external influences of our youths shape the ways we view the world for the rest of our lives.</p><p>Each generation has a different developmental experience, as influences come not only from parenting but also beyond — extended family, friends, the TV, and so on. Each generation then attempts to shape the environment based on the mental world they created develop while they were young. As Wrexler explains, it is the ‘ability to shape the environment that in turn shapes our brains that has allowed human adaptability and capability to develop at a much faster rate than is possible through alteration of the genetic code itself’.</p><p>In short, brains have evolved to be shaped by society and culture.</p><p>Wrexler’s is a biocultural approach to the nature/nurture debate; a biological explanation for what cultural psychologists call ‘mutual constitution’: the feedback and influence on brain and behavior caused equally by psychology, society, and culture.</p><p>So how does it work?</p><p>Well, firstly, as children, our brains are pretty plastic — not in the sense that they are made from oil and you can wrap a sandwich in them but in the sense that they can be moulded and remoulded. In the adult brain, the plasticity continues but slows down; this is why at Latin class I still bang my head on the table over simple words like <em>mox</em>, while my younger cohorts take to it like a rubber duck to soapy bath water. The important point is that young plastic brains are pretty mouldable.</p><p>Wexler identifies two main ways that he thinks this moulding happens: ‘imitation’, and ‘internalization and identification’. Imitation is just that, copying others either by doing things that help us reach our goals — imitation of ends — or by copying actions that help us judge someone or something — imitation of values.</p><p>The best way I can think to explain this is with a common or garden adolescent. Lets call her ‘Julie’ and her friend ‘Helen’ to protect the innocent.</p><blockquote><em>Julie comes home one day and says, “Dad, I want to be a vegan?”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Dad looks at her with a mixture of confusion and respect, and replies: “okay, why?”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>“Because Helen became a vegan” says Julie “and she’s dropped two dress sizes [imitation of ends].”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>“I see,” answers Dad, “is that really the best reason to become a vegan?”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>“Well, I don’t want to be fat cus Helen says that fat people are disgusting [imitation of values]”.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>“If Helen told you to jump of a cliff, would you do it?” asks dad.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>(and so on…)</em></blockquote><p>The other way Wexler thinks the the brain is shaped is through ‘Internalization and Identification’. This is how a child learns to understand feelings, attitudes, beliefs, worldviews, and so on, from those around them. They internalise beliefs and identify with holders of beliefs that seem to help them in some way. Be that fitting in, doing better at sport, or playing with the best toys.</p><p>What is particularly striking to Wrexler is how divergent people have all hit upon something similar ideas. The idea that the adult seems to be created by the child is nothing new: a famous supposedly 17th century supposedly Jesuit quote is “Give me the child for seven years, and I will give you the man.”</p><p>Different branches of psychology have their own frameworks for this Jesuit idea. Freud’s psychoanalytic ‘assimilation of one ego to another one’; behavioral psychology’s observations of the greater susceptibility of children to forms of conditioning; cognitive psychology’s accelerated ‘schemata’ (patterns of thought and behavior) development; anthropology’s theories of ‘learning through play’; even observations of the workings of ‘memes’ from psychologists like <a href="https://www.susanblackmore.uk/the-meme-machine/">Susan Blackmore</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/0*eX0qEB2EN_6J7bNE.png" /></figure><p>What does this mean for language? Wrexler points out that ‘language itself is only realized through imitation’. Areas of the brain are linked to understanding and speech, such as Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area, but if these areas are damaged in children, their brains are plastic enough to find other ways to understand language in another area.</p><p>Bringing these two books together, we have a scenario in which language is developed alongside our propsitional attitudes (beliefs, desires, doubts — in short the building blocks of a worldview) and is, in fact the best way in which propositional attitudes can be articulated one to another. If our language does not have a word for blue, it is difficult for us to understand the concept of blue just as English speakers cannot conceive of light and dark blue as separate entities, but Russian speakers can. Language is the tool by which our parents shaped our plastic neurons, and while we can understand other linguistic schemes, our own primary language will remain embedded in our sociocultural cores.</p><p><strong>And now, some emotions.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*qYPRyWIpqeOOQzEZ.png" /><figcaption>Representation of Core Affect, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/en:Creative_Commons">Creative Commons</a></figcaption></figure><p>What if emotions are similar? What if the neurochemicals and other complex reactions within our brains and bodies are innate and there are universal feelings that are felt by everybody, just as every healthy eye will see light with a wavelength of 462nm and a frequency of 645Thz (blue). These feelings, or ‘affects’, just like the colours, are evolved responses, helping us to mate, remain in groups, avoid danger etc. But, we can only understand them according the words our cultures provides us with during childhood.</p><p>If a culture wants to call the neurochemical release that creates a need to run away by its own discrete term, say, <em>flight</em>, and another emotion for the need to defend yourself caused by similar sensations, say, <em>fight</em>, while another culture ties these similar chemical releases to both fleeing and preparedness for fighting, like the English <em>fear</em>, then they <em>are </em>different because the understandings are different. The English would have the emotional equivalent of <em>grue</em>, while our hypothetical (also known as a 17th-century English speaker) would have <em>green</em> and <em>blue</em>. This doesn’t mean that the light that causes grue, green, or blue doesn’t exist universally, but nor does it mean that grue, green, or blue are universal. They are understood by the cultures in the only they way they can; through the pathways created by the developmental of language.</p><p>This is a way to end the nature/nurture, psychology/culture dichotomy facing emotion research, and in fact suggests an anthropological approach to studying emotions in history; using comparative and ethnographic techniques to see if, say, 15th century love and modern love occupy the same place in the emotional spectrum and, if not, what that can tell us about people and emotions, then and now.</p><p>As usual, the answer to the nature/nurture question might be “yes”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8eecd8ee7593" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why You‘re The First To Feel Awkward.]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://drrichfg.medium.com/does-this-feel-awkward-88144e6e2bd2?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/635/0*-rmz1Nrkap01BZ-n.jpg" width="635"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">You may think that feeling awkward is something we all do and always have. But the emotion of &#x2018;awkward&#x2019; might just be something new, and&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://drrichfg.medium.com/does-this-feel-awkward-88144e6e2bd2?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://drrichfg.medium.com/does-this-feel-awkward-88144e6e2bd2?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/88144e6e2bd2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[awkward]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emotions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rich Firth-Godbehere]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Sep 2018 16:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-09-09T06:24:48.102Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Silicon Valley Thinks Everyone Feels the Same Six Emotions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/how-we-get-to-next/silicon-valley-thinks-everyone-feels-the-same-six-emotions-38354a0ef3d7?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/38354a0ef3d7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[emotions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[singles]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rich Firth-Godbehere]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Sep 2018 15:31:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-04T13:17:59.511Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>From Alexa to self-driving cars, emotion-detecting technologies are becoming ubiquitous—but they rely on out-of-date science</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J74Ltz0SljnrNp0dhTk9iA.png" /></figure><p><strong>The world is being flooded with technology designed to monitor our emotions. </strong>Amazon’s Alexa is one of many virtual assistants that detect tone and timbre of voice in order to better understand commands. CCTV cameras can track faces through public space, and supposedly <a href="http://fortune.com/2015/11/09/wal-mart-facial-recognition/">detect criminals before they commit crimes</a>. Autonomous cars <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/23/a-car-which-detects-emotions-how-driving-one-made-us-feel">will one day be able</a> to spot when drivers get road rage, and take control of the wheel.</p><p>But there’s a problem. While the technology is cutting-edge, it’s using an outdated scientific concept stating that all humans, everywhere, experience six basic emotions, and that we each express those emotions in the same way. By building a world filled with gadgets and surveillance systems that take this model as gospel, this obsolete view of emotion could end up becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, as a vast range of human expressions around the world is forced into a narrow set of definable, machine-readable boxes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0co1MSD0w-hTBJUR77iLWQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>The science used to underpin most contemporary emotion-detecting technologies began with a grieving teenage boy.</strong> Paul Ekman was born in 1934, the child of a pediatrician father and an attorney mother. He spent his youth dreaming of emulating his hero, Ferdinand Magellan, hoping to someday make discoveries that would change the world.</p><p>When Ekman was 14 years old, his mother’s depression resulted in her suicide. At <a href="https://www.exploratorium.edu/video/search-universals-human-emotion-dr-paul-ekman">a 2008 talk at San Francisco’s Exploratorium Museum</a>, he discussed how, even at such a young age, he felt he “had to do something to make up for the fact that [he] wasn’t able to rescue her.” His dream of discovery shifted from geography to the uncharted regions of the mind.</p><p>Just one year later, in 1948, he dropped out of high school — he was highly intelligent, but frequently clashed with his teachers — <a href="http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Ekman/ekman-con1.html">to become an undergraduate at the University of Chicago</a>. (At the time, students only needed two completed years of high school to apply to some colleges.) Heavily influenced by Freud, Ekman went on to complete a PhD in psychotherapy, studying the depressed. He was fascinated by nonverbal communication, studying patients’ body language and hand movements. Before long, he realized that his patients represented a biased sample: he was studying the survivors of depression, not those who had succumbed to the worst of their illness. He <a href="https://www.exploratorium.edu/video/search-universals-human-emotion-dr-paul-ekman">mused that</a> “the road to understanding human behavior and getting back to help people like [his mother] was not by looking at abnormal behavior but at normal behavior.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*o90D3J0YT7kusbq8v71yVg.png" /></figure><p>Depression was an emotional disorder, so the man who had idolized Magellan finally found his own quest: to discover if all humans experienced a set of common emotions.</p><p>By this time, the 1960s, Ekman wasn’t the only person to have gone searching. The acclaimed anthropologist Margaret Mead had already spent years traveling the world, demonstrating that cultures express emotions differently. Most famously, Mead had lived during the 1920s on the small island of Ta’ū, in American Samoa, in an effort to discover if the emotional upheaval experienced by American and European adolescents was universal. She found that young Samoan women had none of the strong morality-linked feelings, like anxiety and disgust, that their contemporaries experienced in the United States. For example, it was quite normal for Samoan women in their late teens to engage in guilt-free casual sex before getting married and beginning a family. In 1928, when Mead’s <a href="https://archive.org/stream/comingofageinsam00mead/comingofageinsam00mead_djvu.txt"><em>Coming of Age in Samoa</em></a><em> </em>was published, her findings shocked American readers, and provided strong evidence that fundamental human experiences — including emotions — varied from culture to culture.</p><p>Mead’s work — finding evidence that emotions, and other social phenomena, were culturally constructed — had a huge influence on 20th-century feminist thought and activism. She promoted the idea that free love was a way to break free of male dominance, and that upbringing, not genetics, played a central role in the way people behaved. After <em>Coming of Age in Samoa</em>, Mead found more and more examples of how the Western way of thinking about emotion didn’t translate to the experience of non-Western, indigenous peoples. Her 1932 book <a href="https://archive.org/details/changingcultureo00mead"><em>The Changing Culture of an Indian Tribe</em></a>, for example, documented cultural conflicts that had beset a Native American “Plains tribe” (she did not specify which one) as its members moved away, often with difficulty, from traditional practices and toward Western behaviors and emotions.</p><p>By the late 1960s, Mead’s views were all but scientific consensus in the West, and emotions were considered far from universal. Ekman had his doubts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0co1MSD0w-hTBJUR77iLWQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>To understand why Ekman had problems with Mead’s research, we can look to Charles Darwin. </strong>In 1872, he wrote <a href="http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?pageseq=1&amp;itemID=F1142&amp;viewtype=text"><em>The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals</em></a>, which points out that some instinctual actions — like raising an eyebrow in surprise — are shared by animals and humans. For Darwin, this was further evidence that humans and other animals had some kind of common evolutionary ancestor, as well as that emotions had some kind of biological, innate source. It was also a way to avoid outraging pious Victorians by claiming that they acted like animals; he thought that it would be much more persuasive to do the opposite, and point to cute, humanlike behavior in pets.</p><p>In 1955, Mead wrote the foreword to a reprint of Darwin’s essay, but she critiqued it as a historical curiosity. In her opinion, it wasn’t a work that held up in light of more modern research. Darwin’s <em>Expression</em> had a huge influence on Ekman, however — and by the time <em>Expression </em>was republished again in 1998, it was Ekman’s turn to write a foreword. He <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/v20/n23/eric-korn/how-far-down-the-dusky-bosom">defended Darwin’s initial hunch</a>, because the consensus had flipped. Innate emotions were in again, and it was Ekman’s research that was responsible.</p><p>It should be noted that Darwin was far from the first to suggest that emotions were innate. More than two millennia ago, Aristotle <a href="https://www.loebclassics.com/view/aristotle-physiognomics/1936/pb_LCL307.87.xml">wrote</a> about how “some men, who are in no sense alike, have the same facial expressions.” Nor was Aristotle the only ancient philosopher who thought this way. It was received wisdom throughout antiquity, persisting well into the late 17th century. Artist Charles Le Brun, influenced by Descartes’ <a href="https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1649part2.pdf"><em>The Passions of the Soul</em></a><em>, </em>wrote a treatise arguing that high art should make more use of exaggerated facial expressions — and he included sketches of what he considered to be some of the more fundamental expressions. He died before his <em>Méthode Pour Apprendre à Dessiner les Passions </em>was published in 1698, but his sketches had a huge influence on European art theory for centuries afterward.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r4eeVs5elklpqM8TFTh-AQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>Sketches of emotional facial expressions, Charles Le Brun, 1698.</strong> Image credit: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Charles_le_Brun,_The_Expressions.jpg">Public domain</a></figcaption></figure><p>Le Brun was drawing on the practice of physiognomy, which stated that not only were faces the gateway to passions but they were also a way to access a person’s soul. Ugliness betrayed sin, and if a person looked like an animal then that individual would have similar attributes to the beast. Physiognomy and its offshoots, like phrenology, remained popular into the 20th century, and provided justification for many popular prejudices. For example, the contents page of U.S. physician James W. Redfield’s 1852 book <a href="https://publicdomainreview.org/collections/comparative-physiognomy-or-resemblances-between-men-and-animals-1852/"><em>Comparative Physiognomy</em></a> gives a list of what would now be regarded as typically racist resemblances: “of Jews to goats,” “of Aztec children to mice,” and even “of Turks to turkeys.”</p><p>While the writings of Darwin and Ekman never go as far as justifying physiognomy, the idea that the face can give our hidden thoughts away is an old idea that has taken many forms through history. It continues to persist today.</p><p>By 1964, Ekman was <a href="https://1ammce38pkj41n8xkp1iocwe-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Body-Position-Facial-Expression-And-Verbal-Behavior-During-I.pdf">struggling</a>. He couldn’t study emotional behaviors without defining them precisely first, but nobody had yet been able to do that. This was when psychological theorist Silvan Tomkins, who would go on to become one of Ekman’s closest collaborators, introduced him to Darwin’s <em>Expression</em>. Ekman found Tomkins’ theoretical arguments in favor of innate human emotions to be more persuasive than Margaret Mead’s arguments in favor of culturally relative ones. He became convinced that, if he was going to test his hypothesis, he needed to first figure out a way to accurately quantify minute human facial expressions. Then he could see if there was a link between those facial expressions and inner, universal emotions.</p><p>Ekman spent the next eight years alongside Tomkins and another colleague, Wallace Friesen, <a href="https://1ammce38pkj41n8xkp1iocwe-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Facial-Affect-Scoring-Technique-A-First-Validity-Study.pdf">developing their method</a>. Ekman and Friesen tested their approach by asking students in the United States, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Japan to match photographs of facial expressions with words or stories related to emotions. It quickly became apparent that a basic set of six facial expressions was linked to the same six emotions in all of those places.</p><p>Those emotions were happiness, anger, sadness, disgust, surprise, and fear.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DSr5LLmIMv4jTyeG" /><figcaption><strong>Examples of six of the basic emotional faces, as used in Ekman’s research. Clockwise, from top left: anger, fear, disgust, sadness, happiness, surprise.</strong> Image credit: Paul Ekman</figcaption></figure><p>By chance, another researcher, Austrian ethnologist Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, independently published similar <a href="https://archive.org/details/ethologybiologyo00eiblrich">findings</a>. The results seemed to vindicate Ekman’s belief that there was a set of basic, universal human emotions, and that facial expressions were how to identify them.</p><p>However, there was a loophole: all of the test subjects studied by both Ekman and Eibl-Eibesfeldt had seen Western media of some sort, whether photographs, films, or television programs. Ekman <a href="https://www.exploratorium.edu/video/search-universals-human-emotion-dr-paul-ekman">realized</a> that, in order to truly test his hypothesis, he “needed to study people that had not seen the outside world.” Nearly 20 years after his mother’s death, Ekman could finally feel like Magellan, flying in an old Cessna to Papua New Guinea in search of an isolated tribe.</p><p>Ekman and Friesen entered a series of mountain ranges in the Southeast Highlands of Papua New Guinea, looking for a group of people as yet untouched by Western mass media. In the dense forest of the Okapa Valley, they were led to the Fore people, whom Western anthropologists had encountered for the first time only two decades earlier. The Fore lived on both the north and south sides of the Wanevinti Mountains, clustered in huts on the hillsides and almost cut off from the rest of the world. With a jeep and some patience, you could just about drive to the region via a rough track.</p><p>Once they reached the Fore, Ekman and Friesen screened their potential test participants. They needed people who had never seen movies or other Western media, and thus could not have been influenced by Western emotional responses; who did not speak any form of English; and who had never lived near or worked with an outsider. They found 189 adults and 130 children who fit the bill. The idea was to use the same photos and stories that the researchers had used everywhere else. Knowing that the Fore spoke three dialects, Ekman and Friesen put their translators through rigorous training in an attempt to make sure that varying translations of the stories would not influence the experiment.</p><p>Despite having never seen photos before, the Fore who took part in the experiment caught on quickly. The adults were shown three facial expressions, and the children two, along with a single-sentence story — for example, “This person is about to fight.” If the expressions were universal, the stories ought to be linked to just one of the pictures. They were. As often as 93 percent of the time, the Fore chose the same matching pairs of stories and expressions as the previous, less isolated research subjects had. Ekman and Friesen thought that they had nailed it, proving that all humans, everywhere, felt those six basic emotions: happiness, anger, sadness, disgust, surprise, and fear. The pair published their <a href="https://1ammce38pkj41n8xkp1iocwe-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Constants-Across-Cultures-In-The-Face-And-Emotion.pdf">results</a> in 1971. Margaret Mead was stunned.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hsRyA9cGUnZrm4VW5sCtrA.png" /></figure><p>Ekman could have left it there, but his curiosity wouldn’t let him. He wanted to know how Mead and the others could have been so wrong. He wondered if these expressions, while universal, were influenced by how each specific culture thought someone <em>ought</em> to behave. He ran another experiment. This time, he showed students in the U.S. and in Tokyo a series of American Navy medical training films of severe burns and limb amputations: “The worst stuff I could find,” said Ekman. One group was left to watch these films alone; the other was joined by an authority figure — a scientist in a white coat. Ekman secretly filmed the subjects’ facial expressions. The people who were joined by an authority figure reacted differently: the Japanese participants masked their reactions and remained stoic and stone-faced, while the Americans exaggerated their expressions. The people who were alone reacted in the same way, whether they were in Japan or the U.S. It was the presence of the authority figure in the room — the Margaret Mead in a white coat — that had triggered the differences between the groups. The anthropologists, <a href="https://1ammce38pkj41n8xkp1iocwe-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Universals-And-Cultural-Differences-In-Facial-Expressions-Of.pdf">Ekman suggested</a>, were seeing what their subjects wanted them to see.</p><p>Curiously, regardless of who was in the room with the students, if the recordings were slowed down, you could still see slight traces of the six facial expressions. Ekman theorized that, despite cultural differences, these universal expressions couldn’t be completely suppressed. He gave them a name: “<a href="https://www.paulekman.com/resources/micro-expressions/">micro expressions</a>.”</p><p>Ekman’s success has led to other discoveries. One of the more recent examples, in 2008, came when UCLA anthropologists Gregory Bryant and H. Clark Barrett ran a version of Ekman and Friesen’s experiment that used <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/63b4/1c482b7c239961bcacc443f9cd5cfa4766a6.pdf?_ga=2.49883174.1081565355.1535454620-1434691900.1535454620">voices</a>. Instead of the Fore, the Shuar people of Ecuador served as the group with which U.S. subjects were compared. Both groups were asked to listen to sentences that translated easily between English and Shuar — plain phrases, like “The dog is in the house” and “She ate the fish,” that don’t reveal any emotional information on the part of the speaker. All that changed was the timbre of the voice. The participants were then asked to select one picture of a facial expression from five choices, to best represent the emotion being expressed by the voice they heard. Again, the results between the groups were similar, suggesting that, despite learned differences, universal basic emotions can also be spotted in speech.</p><p>Ekman’s studies, and to a lesser extent the work of Bryant and Barrett, are still considered definitive by many. Every week, dozens of peer-reviewed papers that build on the categories of basic emotions are published. Disney even made a movie using five of them as characters: <em>Inside Out</em>. Understandably, technology companies have put a similar amount of faith in the researchers’ work.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0co1MSD0w-hTBJUR77iLWQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Where Ekman’s basic emotions and the digital age meet, emotion technology has risen. </strong>Without emotions, an artificial intelligence lacks a large part of what makes something sentient; and a machine that can’t understand emotions can’t react in a human way to commands. Examples of this science in action aren’t just confined to universities and Silicon Valley, either.</p><p>Nearly one-fifth of U.S. adults <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/07/47-3-million-u-s-adults-have-access-to-a-smart-speaker-report-says/">have an Amazon Echo or equivalent smart speaker</a>, like Google Home. Amazon wants people to trust their virtual assistant, Alexa, so they use whispers, shouts, and varied pitch and speed to indicate emotions, and to make her sound more <a href="https://www.cnet.com/html/feature/amazon-alexa-echo-inside-look/">human</a>. She’s also been programmed with so-called “delighters”: randomized, humanizing responses, such as terrible jokes, beatboxing, and silly songs. Alexa also analyzes our voices <a href="https://venturebeat.com/2017/12/22/amazons-alexa-wants-to-learn-more-about-your-feelings/">to work out our moods</a>. When you get annoyed, Alexa will calm you down. When you are happy, she can join you in your joy. All of this works. It works so well, in fact, that many of you will not have found my description of a computer program as “she” or “her” unusual.</p><p>The teams behind Apple’s Siri, Microsoft’s Cortana, and Google’s Assistant are each developing emotion detection systems that use both voice and facial recognition — the same facial recognition technology that can already be used to access an iPhone X.</p><p>Emotion-detecting technology and artificial emotions are also being used for protection. <a href="http://go.affectiva.com/auto">Affectiva</a> wants to monitor drivers, identifying the emotions in their voices, their body language, and their facial expressions. If you get a bad case of road rage, or slump at the wheel, their Automotive AI can take control of the car, drive you to the nearest safe place, and, if necessary, call first responders.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uUwfwf2y8voKZTQ_w3dQkQ.png" /></figure><p>Artificial emotion technology is also being deployed as a crime-fighting tool. Since 1978, Ekman has been personally teaching people to detect micro expressions. He’s trained operatives and officers at the CIA, Scotland Yard, the Department of Homeland Security, and many others; he even taught teams at Pixar how to animate micro expressions into characters’ faces. His work also inspired a TV series, titled <em>Lie to Me</em>, on which <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ARX0-AylFI">he worked as an adviser</a>. However, the show’s glossy production is misleading about how easy it is to “read” someone’s micro expressions. In 2007, the TSA launched a program called Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT — airport security officers were trained to read micro expressions in the faces of passengers waiting for planes, in an effort to identify terrorists. <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/tsa-spot-program-is-scientifically-bogus-2015-5?r=US&amp;IR=T">It was a complete failure</a>. The stress of flying makes passengers look and act in atypical ways, and micro expressions, if they exist at all, are naked to the human eye. The TSA’s results were usually worse than guesswork.</p><p>Where humans fail, technology picks up the slack. The University of Rochester, in New York, has crowdsourced <a href="https://www.rochester.edu/newscenter/data-science-facial-expressions-who-if-lying-321252/">photos of more than a million faces, to build a database of micro expressions</a>. It’s a way to train computers to assess whether someone waiting in line at the airport might be a terrorist. Gone are fallible human brains, replaced by emotion-detecting AI that watches humans in airports, through CCTV, and in police interview rooms. This isn’t science fiction — the sunglasses of some <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-police-go-robocop-with-facial-recognition-glasses-1518004353">Chinese police officers</a> already have <a href="https://www.popsci.com/how-facial-recognition-tech-works-china?Bb123hhovMhIVvLI.03">face recognition technology</a> built into them.</p><p>Developing emotion-detecting technologies would be much more difficult if it weren’t for Ekman’s discovery of basic emotions and micro expressions. Programming software is easier when emotions can be categorized and measured. But here’s the problem — in that every one of these systems seems to run into a problem of some kind when progressing beyond small-scale trials. Once you try to apply the basic model of emotions at scale, instead of in a lab, it starts to look less infallible.</p><p>That may be because emotions aren’t as simple as Ekman thinks they are.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0co1MSD0w-hTBJUR77iLWQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>There are three problems with the idea that there are only six basic emotions.</strong></p><p>The first is that, despite everything, there still isn’t a definition of “emotions” that everyone agrees on. Almost every paper for the last 50 years has included its own version. Psychologist Robert Sternberg calls an emotion “a feeling comprising physiological and behavioral (and possibly cognitive) reactions to internal and external events”; neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp defines it as “intense arousal of brain systems that strongly encourage the organism to act impulsively”; and social psychologist Phoebe Ellsworth says emotions are a process that is “initiated when one’s attention is captured by some discrepancy or change.” (<a href="http://www.indiana.edu/~p1013447/dictionary/emodefs.htm">Even this partial list of different definitions shows how much variation there is</a>.)</p><p>This might be because the concept of “emotions” is a relatively recent one. Historian Thomas Dixon claims that the English word “emotions” has only been used as it is now <a href="https://cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/39850420_2120314654923228_4056112190300618752_n.pdf/10.1177_1754073912445814.pdf?_nc_cat=0&amp;oh=18a8135054784d05132779e27615ddb5&amp;oe=5B8B1105&amp;dl=1">since the early 19th century</a>. Before that, our feelings were subject to a more subtle categorization. There were “passions,” felt first in the body, then the mind; “affects” in the body, but beginning with thought; and “sentiments” to guide moral choices and judgments in artistic taste. We can’t definitively categorize something when its definition has been in flux for so long.</p><p>The second, and bigger, problem lies with Ekman and Friesen’s Papua New Guinea experiment itself. There were three main issues with this study. First, they weren’t the first people to meet and document Fore customs — anthropologists <a href="http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=psyche.012d.0784a">Ronald and Catherine Berndt</a> had studied the North Fore in 1953, and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00223349608572817">missionaries and government patrols</a> had already visited the South Fore before then. By the time Ekman visited them, the Fore, once known for aggression toward outsiders and for ritual cannibalism, were growing coffee and using money. (<a href="https://www.exploratorium.edu/video/search-universals-human-emotion-dr-paul-ekman">Ekman has talked about</a> the request made by his funders for receipts, joking about how he had to keep ledger entries for expenses such as a “blessing from the local witch doctor.”) There is only a low likelihood that any members of the Fore remained entirely isolated from the rest of the world by the late 1960s.</p><p>The second issue with the study lies in the use of translation. What were the single-sentence “stories” translated to, exactly? Any translator will tell you that translation is not a case of swapping the words in one language for the words in another. If you do that, you get Google Translate-style results. Even words in related languages can be difficult to match, too. Translating to a language like Fore, which is extremely distant in relation to English, amplifies this problem, regardless of how well-drilled the translators are.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S6djT1-rdGXmGwjT0NhNdw.png" /></figure><p>The third issue with the experiment is the faces in the photos. In real life, facial expressions are rarely as explicit or exaggerated as in Ekman’s photographs. Recent studies by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oS1ZtvrgDLM">psychologist James Russell and his team</a> have shown that when more realistic faces are used, children may not recognize the emotions until they are as old as eight. Younger kids don’t know if a “disgust” face is supposed to be disgust or anger, for example. More recently, a group led by psychologist Lisa Feldman Barrett <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2017/4/10/15245690/how-emotions-are-made-neuroscience-lisa-feldman-barrett">has found</a> that if you provide a wide range of facial expressions in photos, and allow participants to group them into categories of their choosing, those categories don’t match from one culture to the next.</p><p>This leads to the third of our larger problems — that there is now more than just one list of basic emotions, depending on whom you ask. Furthermore, there are ways of understanding emotions that don’t require them to be either universal or simplistic. For example, the <a href="http://ivizlab.sfu.ca/arya/Papers/Others/Emotions/Core_Affect.pdf">Psychological Construction of Emotion Theory</a> is gaining significant support in the emotions research community. It suggests that, while we do all feel similar things — called “core affects” — numerous factors are part of the “construction” of an emotion. Such factors include the way we were raised to understand these feelings, the language we use to describe them, the situations we’re in when we feel them, our memories of other situations in which we experienced those feelings, and many other elements. Emotions cannot be reduced to just a feeling and a face.</p><p>It now looks as though emotions are not universal, after all. Even if there are experiences that all humans share, like a “yuck” feeling that keeps us away from moldy food, these are expressed by different cultures in different ways, and not always with the same facial expressions or vocal cues. Sadly, this nuance seems not to have filtered down to developers and programmers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0co1MSD0w-hTBJUR77iLWQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>People are already being monitored in airports; many Americans already have Alexa or her friends in their homes; self-driving cars already exist (even if you can’t buy one just yet).</strong> All of these systems have gone wrong. Alexa has <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/amazon-echo-alexa-record-conversation-privacy-security-a8368231.html">broadcast private conversations to unsuspecting recipients</a>, self-driving cars have <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/7/17327682/uber-self-driving-car-decision-kill-swerve">crashed into pedestrians</a>, and anyone who has tried to use the supposedly state-of-the-art facial recognition systems at passport security knows what a frustration they can be.</p><p>Do we really want these devices and systems to keep us calm, judge our road rage, or spot our criminal tendencies? How long before someone is wrongly accused and convicted for something that a pair of sunglasses reports they were going to do?</p><p>A new pseudoscience of physiognomy is developing, in which the faces of criminals are detected using digital versions of Charles Le Brun’s work. Deviations from expected, universal expressions of emotion are not to be tolerated. As a result, the many and diverse ways of emotional expression, which vary from culture to culture, might have to merge into one, reducing the rich tapestry of expression found across the world — and causing what emotion researcher William Reddy calls an “emotional regime.” If this regime spreads across the entire world in the near future, as it may well do, Ekman’s basic emotions might become universal, after all.</p><p><em>Part two of this story is </em><a href="https://howwegettonext.com/emotion-science-keeps-getting-more-complicated-can-ai-keep-up-442c19133085"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AowhxJ4uXyCTq0iNqKAgzQ.png" /></figure><figure><a href="https://howwegettonext.com/"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*zioeEki6nad2HT65Nx8D0g.png" /></a></figure><p><em>Please click on the applause button to recommend this article to your friends. For more from How We Get To Next, follow us on </em><a href="http://twitter.com/howwegettonext"><strong><em>Twitter</em></strong></a><strong><em> </em></strong><em>and </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/howwegettonext/"><strong><em>Facebook</em></strong></a><em> and sign up for our </em><a href="https://storythings.us7.list-manage.com/subscribe/post?u=ac3c63206e0226f0b2c43f01d&amp;amp;id=f18977f495"><strong><em>newsletter</em></strong></a><strong><em>.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=38354a0ef3d7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/how-we-get-to-next/silicon-valley-thinks-everyone-feels-the-same-six-emotions-38354a0ef3d7">Silicon Valley Thinks Everyone Feels the Same Six Emotions</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/how-we-get-to-next">How We Get To Next</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Renaissance 2.0: Digitising History]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-snippet">I&#x2019;ve just been reading Timothy J Riess&#x2019;s book, Knowledge, Discovery and Imagination in Early Modern Europe: the Rise of Aesthetic&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://drrichfg.medium.com/renaissance-2-0-digitising-history-9f14d1cdb013?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://drrichfg.medium.com/renaissance-2-0-digitising-history-9f14d1cdb013?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9f14d1cdb013</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ideas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-humanities]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rich Firth-Godbehere]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 25 Aug 2018 16:01:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-25T16:01:03.354Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Feeling the Music 1: Pushing down; Dragging up.]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-snippet">Short and regular musings on making music and how it relates to emotions</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://drrichfg.medium.com/feeling-the-music-1-pushing-down-dragging-up-26d354abd677?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://drrichfg.medium.com/feeling-the-music-1-pushing-down-dragging-up-26d354abd677?source=rss-8de5713f055a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/26d354abd677</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[performance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emotions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[music]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bass]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bass-guitar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rich Firth-Godbehere]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Aug 2018 12:57:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-21T12:57:22.984Z</atom:updated>
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