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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Dmitri S on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Dmitri S on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@dsenchenko?source=rss-75dec64c8aa6------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Dmitri S on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@dsenchenko?source=rss-75dec64c8aa6------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Coming Soon: Insured Tokens]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/complifi/coming-soon-insured-tokens-2b15f4c6d2f7?source=rss-75dec64c8aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b15f4c6d2f7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dex]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dmitri S]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Aug 2022 09:32:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-12T09:32:57.089Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Make bullish bets with downside protection.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NKSLFDIdIJ4KSu4b0ssCPw.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>This post is for general information purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any investment, or to issue or trade derivatives, and should not be used in the evaluation of the merits of making any financial or investment decision.</em></strong></p><p><strong>TL; DR</strong></p><ul><li>Insured tokens are regular tokens packaged together with downside protection. You enjoy the usual, unleveraged price upside, but your losses are capped by a “price floor”.</li><li>First rolling out iETH, iBTC, and iMATIC (the ‘<em>i</em>’ stands for ‘insured’) with 7-day rolling insurance, freely tradable vs CompliFi AMM throughout the cycle.</li><li>Insured tokens are paired with their corresponding underlying assets, their key pricing metric being the % premium you pay over the underlying price in return for the downside protection.</li><li>As with all CompliFi derivatives, there are no margin calls or liquidations.</li></ul><h3>iTokens In Simple Terms</h3><p>As the name suggests, insured tokens are simply a combination of a regular token + insurance policy, rolled over automatically every 7 days until the derivative is sold.</p><p>This i(nsured)Token policy works as follows:</p><p><strong>Market Goes Up / Sideways:</strong> If the underlying token’s price increases or stays the same, insurance does not pay out.</p><p><strong>Market Goes Down:</strong> If the underlying price declines, then you are compensated for the $ difference between the price at the start of the period (aka “price floor”) and the price at the end. Insurance coverage is limited to price declines of up to 20% — after that, you start losing money.</p><p>Suppose spot ETH trades today at $2,000, and you buy 1 iETH for $2,080 (4% premium).</p><p>After 7 days ETH price is down 20% to $1,600. With price floor set at $2,000, iETH will settle at 1.25 ETH (1.25 * $1,600 = $2,000), compensating you the difference. Instead of being down 20%, you are only down 3.8% due to the premium you paid (2,000/2,080 -1).</p><p>If on the other hand ETH price goes up over the same period, your insurance will not pay out and iETH will settle at 1 ETH, meaning you are $80 worse off than if you simply held the underlying asset. In other words, insured tokens outperform when the market declines by more than the insurance premium you pay.</p><h3>Pricing &amp; Trading</h3><p>Under the hood, each insurance token is structured as a combination of the underlying asset and two put options — one long and one short:</p><p><strong><em>underlying token + long put @ price floor + short put @ 80% of price floor</em></strong></p><p>The last two components represent the insurance premium, and they always have a value ≥0. In other words, insured tokens always trade above regular tokens. The size of the premium differs for each token — the more volatile it is, the higher the cost of insurance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uwPYdlil9J2jeS3BbiskWA.png" /><figcaption>Simulated price of the insured token vs the underlying asset</figcaption></figure><p>Insurance tokens can be traded at any point throughout their lifecycle. CompliFi AMM prices insured tokens using the Black-Scholes formula and provides a market for them throughout the entire lifecycle.</p><h3>For Liquidity Providers</h3><p>Insured tokens are issued from the same WETH, WBTC, and WMATIC pools that issue CompliFi’s covered call options.</p><p>Since the two instruments represent bets in opposite directions, they provide a natural, if imperfect, hedge against each other — when one trader buys an ETH call option and then another buys iETH, risk exposure of the pool is almost always improved.</p><p>When a pool sells an insured token, it writes a 7-day insurance policy and collects an upfront premium. In the simple case when the policy is held to maturity, the pool makes money <strong>unless the market declines by more than the premium it received</strong>. In other words, the policy pays out less than it cost.</p><h3>Planned Launch of Insured Tokens</h3><p>Insured tokens iETH, iBTC, and iMATIC are set to go live on August 18th, 2022.</p><p>Liquidity Providers in native pools ETH, BTC &amp; MATIC do not need to take any action to collect premiums paid by traders buying into insured tokens.</p><h3>All feedback is welcomed 🤗</h3><p>Our team awaits your suggestions!</p><p>Don’t hesitate to drop them in our <a href="https://discord.gg/rCZ7kJbjPs">Discord #general channel</a>.</p><p>Join the heated discussions and meet other community members who are the first to put their hands on V2.</p><h3>About CompliFi</h3><p>The true decentralized derivatives platform with unique features unseen on other trading platforms &amp; AMMs. CompliFi <strong>users can trade derivatives with no margin calls, liquidations, or defaults.</strong></p><p>Trade x5 Perpetuals &amp; Covered Call Options on a variety of tokens.</p><p>Liquidity providers at CompliFi get to enjoy high APYs on stablecoins &amp; tokens thanks to raw trading fees &amp; premiums paid by traders.</p><p><strong>Explore CompliFi: </strong><a href="https://compli.fi/"><strong>Website</strong></a><strong>| </strong><a href="https://twitter.com/CompliFi_Pro"><strong>Twitter</strong></a><strong> | </strong><a href="https://discord.com/invite/3j4D8mu7me"><strong>Discord</strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b15f4c6d2f7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/complifi/coming-soon-insured-tokens-2b15f4c6d2f7">Coming Soon: Insured Tokens</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/complifi">CompliFi Protocol</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Understanding CompliFi’s x5 Leveraged Token]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/complifi/understanding-complifis-x5-leveraged-token-e849daf5eaf2?source=rss-75dec64c8aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e849daf5eaf2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dmitri S]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Feb 2021 06:03:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-18T20:45:19.438Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*n-Hx8I8rovbxUKIRz5KY6Q.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>This post is for general information purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any investment, or to issue or trade derivatives, and should not be used in the evaluation of the merits of making any financial or investment decision.</em></strong></p><p><strong>TL; DR</strong></p><ul><li>The x5 leveraged token is designed as an intuitive way to take on leveraged exposure to anything, as long as it has a price feed on Ethereum.</li><li>Starting with ETHx5 and BTCx5, backed by USDC collateral. More instruments to come.</li><li>All CompliFi derivatives come in long-short pairs, and the protocol redistributes a fixed amount of collateral between them to generate returns. More on how this works for the x5 below.</li><li>We explain the distinction between nominal value (derivative’s claim on collateral) and its market price, and how we can value the x5 token by comparing it to a well-known options strategy.</li></ul><h3>CompliFi Basics</h3><p>Before we dive in, here is a reminder of the key features of CompliFi. For a more detailed explanation, please have a looks at our documentation, white papers and other blog posts.</p><p>CompliFi is designed as a combination of a derivative issuance protocol with an AMM. The basic flow is as follows. LPs send collateral (currently USDC, but can be any ERC20) to the protocol, which mints their chosen derivative and places it straight into the appropriate AMM pool. Traders can then buy and sell derivatives as they would any other token on Uniswap.</p><p>All CompliFi derivatives are minted in pairs – two tokens akin to the long and the short positions. A portfolio that contains both in equal amounts is riskless relative to the collateral, and can be redeemed at any time, even prior to settlement.</p><p>Individually, the long and the short position tokens change value as the protocol redistributes the fixed amount of collateral between them depending on what happens to the derivatives underlying variable (e.g. price of ETH).</p><p>CompliFi derivatives have a finite maturity. At present, all derivatives fluctuate with the market for a period of four weeks. After that, the derivatives are settled and can be swapped back for the collateral by their ultimate holder at any time.</p><h3>The x5 Token in Simple Terms</h3><p>The x5 token was designed as an intuitive way to get leveraged exposure to any chosen asset with an on-chain price feed. All tokens start off with a nominal value (aka claim on collateral) of 1 USDC. Over the course of its life, the token’s nominal value rises or falls at 5 times the rate of the underlying asset over the same period, but within the corridor of 0–2 USDC.</p><p>Let’s consider ETHx5 as an example. The corresponding long-short token pair is ETHx5 Up and ETHx5 Down. The “Up” token multiplies the percentage change in ETH price by 5, and the“Down” token by -5. In other words, a 1% increase in the price of ETH would result in the nominal value of ETHx5 Up rising by 5%, at the expense of a corresponding decline in ETHx5 Down. If ETH falls by 1%, the situation is reversed.</p><p>When ETH price hits + or -20%, one of the tokens will have a nominal value of 2 USDC and the other zero. These are the nominal value ceiling and floor — nominal value of an x5 token can never go higher than 2 USDC, or below zero (i.e. you would never receive a margin call).</p><p>If you hold a token that’s maxed out on nominal value, but want to maintain exposure to the upside, you could swap it for the same one from a later series (i.e. with a later settlement date). You would thus be crystallising your return on the maxed out token and using the profits to acquire fresh exposure.</p><h3>Market Value of the x5 Token</h3><p>So far, we have been talking about the nominal value of the derivative, defined as the amount of collateral you would receive if settlement occurred right now. Let’s suppose again that you are sitting on a winning token with a 2 USDC nominal value, but you are a week away from settlement. Its value cannot rise any higher, but it could go lower if markets change direction. As a result, you would struggle to find a rational buyer for your position at 2 USDC. However, you would likely find it much easier to sell it at a discount, giving the buyer some nominal value upside to look forward to. This rationale is what gives rise to the difference between a derivative’s nominal value and its market price. Calculating the size of that difference is where things get a little technical.</p><p>Ultimately, the market always decides what the value of an asset should be, and each investor may well have their own approach to valuing a derivative. Below, we will give a brief overview of the methodology that CompliFi AMM uses to price the x5 tokens in every block prior to executing any trades.</p><p>To begin with, we have observed that the payoff functions of the x5 Up and Down tokens (i.e. nominal value given a change in underlying variable) are identical to some fairly common options strategies – Bull Call Spread and Bear Put Spread, respectively – applied to a hypothetical asset with a price of 5+5*(% change in price of underlying asset). Both of these options strategies have been extensively studied, and much of their intuition carries over to the x5 token. We strongly encourage the reader to take advantage of the wealth of relevant educational materials available on the web.</p><p>This is great news, since identical payoff functions mean identical market values. Both of the option strategies comprise a pair of European options — instruments that are quite well understood, and which we could value using the Black Scholes formula with appropriate inputs. Of these inputs, the only tricky one is the volatility parameter of our hypothetical asset with the price of 5+5*(% change in price of underlying asset). However, with volatility defined as the standard deviation of log returns, and we encourage the reader to verify that for any given ETH (or other) price process and any increment within it, the log return values for ETH are identical to those of our hypothetical asset. In other words, our hypothetical asset has the same volatility as ETH.</p><p>In summary, valuing the x5 leveraged token boils down to valuing a portfolio of two European options on an asset with a known volatility parameter. Here is what it looks like on a chart for ETHx5 Up (ETHx5 Down follows the same pattern in the opposite direction).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_Uufa-6Rn_PRCNGYshbnqA.png" /></figure><p>A few important points to note here. First, as derivatives approach settlement, their market value converges to nominal value. In simple terms, if you are a minute away from maturity, it is quite unlikely that the final nominal value (i.e. what you get paid at settlement) will be very different from what it is now, and the market reflects that.</p><p>Second, at 0% change in ETH, the ETHx5 Up is priced below nominal value (correspondingly ETHx5 Down is priced above). This is not a mistake, but a property of this derivative. Like the Bull Call Spread and the Bear Put Spread, the x5 would normally be considered “near-zero vega” (vega being the sensitivity of price to volatility of the underlying variable). At volatility levels commonly seen in conventional financial markets, this gap between market price and nominal value would be a rounding error. In the crypto market however, the “near-zero” part starts to matter, and this gap will likely be a regular occurrence for ETHx5 and BTCx5.</p><p>Lastly, when nominal value reaches its lower or upper bound, at 0 and 2 respectively, the market price does not. Say you are a week away from maturity and the price of ETH declined by 20% since the start of the Live period. Your nominal value stands at zero, but it only takes a small recovery in ETH to get you back into positive territory, and a whole week for that to happen. It makes sense for an asset like that to have a market value&gt;0.</p><p><strong>As ever, please remember that decentralised derivatives are an early experimental product. Even if you have a solid fundamental understanding of financial engineering (which you absolutely should have to even consider committing capital to such instruments), you may still lose money for any number of reasons. As a rule of thumb, please assume that you will lose all of the capital you put in.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e849daf5eaf2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/complifi/understanding-complifis-x5-leveraged-token-e849daf5eaf2">Understanding CompliFi’s x5 Leveraged Token</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/complifi">CompliFi Protocol</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Introducing CompliFi AMM]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/complifi/introducing-complifi-amm-d48ebccb97dc?source=rss-75dec64c8aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d48ebccb97dc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dmitri S]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Feb 2021 07:25:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-01T10:43:11.073Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>This post is for general information purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any investment, or to issue or trade derivatives, and should not be used in the evaluation of the merits of making any financial or investment decision.</em></strong></p><p><strong>TL; DR</strong></p><ul><li>We started off with a derivatives issuance protocol – a “synthetic risk factory” that can mint a wide variety of ERC20 derivatives.</li><li>We are now combining it with a novel AMM focused on handling extremely volatile assets. Derivative issuance goes under the hood, users get the familiar AMM interface.</li><li>Market making in derivatives is hard. We spent a lot of time figuring out how to protect LPs without stifling trading volumes.</li><li>End users of risk can now purchase a range of x5 leveraged tokens. More instruments are on the way.</li><li>All CompliFi derivatives currently have a finite maturity. Our next priority is to structure them into perpetual instruments.</li></ul><h3>Why Derivatives Need a Different AMM</h3><p>A few months ago, we launched CompliFi as a pure derivative issuance protocol – one that can create instruments which redistribute value between users based on any oracle-measured change in the world. We like to think of it as a synthetic risk factory. It takes value (pretty much in any on-chain form) as raw material and returns the same value structured into a derivative – one that would never get liquidated and would always pay what’s promised.</p><p>The process is simple: you pick a derivative from a variety of available specs, send collateral to a vault and receive equal amounts of two ERC20 tokens, akin to the long and the short positions in your chosen derivative. No market risk is incurred – when the long and the short tokens are held in equal amounts, they cancel each other out and can always be swapped back for the underlying collateral.</p><p>At this point, you have derivatives, but no risk. There are two ways you can go from here. Either you sell one side of the trade and keep the exposure you want, or, if you are an LP or market maker, you could sell both at a premium. Sounds easy enough – the derivatives are ERC20s like any other, so why not just go to Uniswap or Balancer, create a market and let the AMM magic happen? That’s what we thought, until we ran some simulations.</p><p>The reality is that the current AMMs are simply not designed to handle the swings in value that derivatives can often experience. Arbitrage traders would take huge bites out of LP portfolios and impermeant losses can get out of control. What’s more, finite maturity of the derivatives means that the impermanent losses crystallise and become permanent at settlement – LPs cannot just wait them out. On a side note, existing perpetual derivative designs do not solve this problem, but simply reshape it into counterparty risk, as we discuss in more depth in our earlier posts.</p><p>We came to the conclusion that the only way to both give traders the much-loved AMM experience and protect LPs is to build a new kind of AMM.</p><h3>How It Works</h3><p>Our approach to building a derivatives-focused AMM starts with Uniswap, the most popular and well-understood design. Then, we simply introduced the necessary changes in response to any problems we encountered. It took us on a much longer journey than we expected.</p><h4>1. Disconnecting Slippage and Prices from Pool Balances</h4><p>To begin with, we focused on two issues. First, we wanted to be able to control slippage without the need to add or remove assets. Slippage plays a big role in protecting LPs from market fluctuations, and we wanted to be able to tailor it to a given derivative’s volatility. Second, we found it inconvenient that AMM prices are rigidly connected to the quantities of assets in the pools. Setting the correct price often means LPs have to add more of some asset than they want to, which is a waste of capital and dilutive to returns.</p><p>Our solution – add leverage to the Uniswap invariant. Using individual leverage coefficients for each of the pool assets, we allow LPs to ”trick” the invariant into thinking there is more, or less, of each asset than in reality – you get the effect of committing the ideal amount of capital to the pools without having to actually do it. More formally, we have found a way to decouple terms of trade from LP portfolios. A detailed discussion of the design can be found <a href="https://compli.fi/files/Leveraging%20Uniswap.pdf">here</a>.</p><h4>2. Getting Arbitrage under Control</h4><p>Our next hurdle was excessive arbitrage. While slippage does provide LPs with some protection, it does so at the expense of trading volumes. For volatile instruments, you had to crank it up so high that you might as well not bother creating a market.</p><p>The solution came from the realisation that the AMM actually has access to much of the information that allows traders to arbitrage it. CompliFi derivatives already rely on a decentralised oracle for settlement, so why not use the same oracle to reprice them in every block prior to the first trade? We went on to build a flexible mechanism that can do just that for a range of instruments. Among its components is an on-chain implementation of the Black-Scholes formula for valuing options.</p><p>It is important to keep in mind that derivative pricing is complicated and often subjective, and our mechanism is but an early attempt that leaves many questions for future research. Nonetheless, we see it as a big step forward.</p><p>Complexities of pricing aside, the goal of this feature is to contain arbitrage to within the 13 seconds of the ETH block time and the accuracy margin of the oracle (e.g. +/- 0.5% for Chainlink’s ETH/USD feed). Within those bounds, traders have the information that the AMM does not, and could profit from it. For context, Uniswap is entirely “blind” to the external market.</p><h4>3. Addressing LP Exposure</h4><p>Having cut arbitrage to a manageable level, we saw a new problem arise. Almost inevitably and in the normal course of trading, our simulations showed LP portfolios getting drawn away from the riskless state where the amounts of long and short tokens are equal. Once that happens, LPs effectively hold a naked derivative position. They may get lucky and make a lot of money from it, but there would also come a time when the opposite happens and their portfolios go up in flames. In order to make liquidity provision a steady, market-agnostic, fee-generating business, we needed to address LP portfolio risk.</p><p>We dealt with the problem in two ways. First, we set limits on the possible magnitude of the naked derivative exposure – AMM will refuse to perform a trade that pushes LPs out of their predetermined risk bounds.</p><p>Second, we introduced the idea of dynamic fees. In simple terms, if a proposed trade lowers LPs’ exposure, the AMM charges a very low fee for it. In the opposite direction, the fee increases rapidly with the additional exposure that it causes (quadratically under the current design). As a result, LPs get ample financial compensation for taking on market risk. Traders get economically discouraged from performing certain transactions, but on the flipside, they enjoy lower fees in most other situations than would be possible under the flat transaction fee model.</p><h4>4. Current AMMs Are Not Designed to Sell Assets in Bulk</h4><p>Our final hurdle stemmed from the original design philosophy of AMMs. They are much more a portfolio rebalancing tool than a shopping mall, in that they don’t allow traders to efficiently acquire large portions of an asset in the pool. This is great if LPs want to have their portfolio maintain fixed proportions by asset value. It makes much less sense if LPs have minted an inventory of derivatives and want to sell them on to end users.</p><p>Suppose we have a pool with three assets: two derivative tokens representing the long and the short positions, and USDC. A pattern where traders alternately acquire small amounts of the long and the short tokens for USDC would result in a steady flow of fees to LPs without exposing them to excessive risk – basically the ideal scenario. However, under the classic Uniswap invariant, the increasing amount of USDC in the pool would soon suppress its value to the point of making this trading pattern uneconomic.</p><p>To solve this problem, we made use of a property, shared by all CompliFi derivatives, that a portfolio containing equal amounts of long and short tokens has a fixed value in terms of underlying collateral. For USDC-backed ETHx5 leveraged token for instance, 1 long token + 1 short token = 2 USDC. This property is how CompliFi derivatives are minted in the first place— you exchange collateral for both sides of a trade.</p><p>We integrated this relationship into the AMM simply by using our issuance protocol as another pool, on par with the one that enables derivative vs. derivative trading. Combining these two orthogonal markets creates a new type of invariant with the properties we were looking for. For a visual analogy, imagine skateboarding in a swimming pool shaped like a half-sphere. Wherever you go, you will eventually go up an increasingly steep wall – that’s what happens to price when you buy more and more of an asset from a Uniswap pool. Our modification effectively turns the half-sphere into a half-pipe. It still gets steep when you trade derivative vs. derivative, but it’s flat in the direction of the symmetric derivative portfolio vs. collateral. This means the desirable trading pattern described earlier is now possible.</p><p><strong>These four modifications on top of Uniswap comprise the CompliFi AMM. Much of what we have described happens behind the scenes, and the UX remains largely the same for both traders and LPs. However, this does not mean our AMM has made derivatives “easy” or “safe”. They remain extremely complex and volatile instruments that require deep expertise, and the AMM is an early-stage, experimental product — a good rule of thumb would be to assume you will lose all of the capital you put in.</strong></p><h3>What Comes Next</h3><p>Our next objective is to create perpetual instruments on top of the finite-maturity CompliFi derivatives. These instruments would have very similar financial characteristics and retain the crucial “no liquidation, no default” property. Should they wish, holders would still have recourse to the constituent finite-maturity derivatives and, consequently, to the underlying collateral.</p><p>Eliminating friction caused by the need for settlement would not only improve and simplify user experience, but also pave the way for CompliFi instruments to play a greater role in the decentralised asset management space.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d48ebccb97dc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/complifi/introducing-complifi-amm-d48ebccb97dc">Introducing CompliFi AMM</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/complifi">CompliFi Protocol</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[AMMs Have a PR Problem, Not an Impermanent Loss Problem.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/complifi/amms-have-a-pr-problem-not-an-impermanent-loss-problem-8e7d82b5f42f?source=rss-75dec64c8aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8e7d82b5f42f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uniswap]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dmitri S]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2020 15:59:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-23T15:59:01.774Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A popular narrative against Automatic Market Makers (AMMs) like Uniswap has been that their liquidity providers (LPs) are constantly getting arbitraged and suffer “impermanent losses” — both unnecessary evils that can be avoided by switching to a limit order book (LOB) protocol. I started this post as an attempt at a defensive counter-narrative. Having finished, I feel like limit order book protocols, whether on- or off-chain, will soon struggle to hold on to users.</p><p><strong>TL;DR</strong></p><ul><li>AMM strategies can be replicated “manually” in limit order book environments, hence they are not a separate beast from regular market making strategies.</li><li>If AMM strategies can live in LOB environments, so can impermanent losses. Actually, they always have. They just aren’t called “impermanent”.</li><li>LPs are getting arbitraged because they (sort of) choose to be, not because AMMs are bad. It’s the price of not acting on new information as quickly as conventional market makers do.</li><li>One day soon, AMMs will cover a wide range of market making mini-strategies and LPs will use them as “smart limit orders”. And that’s going to be happening outside of LOB environments.</li></ul><p>The discussion below assumes some understanding of impermanent losses. <a href="https://medium.com/@dsenchenko/impermanent-losses-in-uniswap-like-markets-4315359ea9b1">Here</a> is an overview if you need one.</p><h3>AMM strategies can be replicated accurately (enough) in limit order book environments</h3><p>Suppose a trader is looking to exchange one asset for another on Uniswap. Does there exist a hypothetical limit order book, with the same liquidity as the Uniswap pool, that gives the trader the same price and slippage, no matter the trade they want to make?</p><p>For the sake of simplicity, we will assume zero fees in both trading environments. We use Uniswap as our go-to example for the same reason, but the argument also applies to its mathematically trickier peers — Curve, Balancer and others.</p><p>To construct such a limit order book, we start with a Uniswap pool (x_0,y_0) and two hypothetical trades ( -<em>△</em>x, <em>△</em>y) and (<em>△</em>x’, -<em>△</em>y’). Then, using the path independence property, we fragment each of these trades into smaller ones that together result in the same economic outcome. <strong>Figure 1</strong> depicts this process for one of the two trades.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iGUtDYXN-utx_dN5oygQjg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1</figcaption></figure><p>Next, let us imagine that each of these small trades resulted from the fulfilment of an entire, single limit order with a price that equals the average price of the corresponding Uniswap trade. Now, let us put these imaginary limit orders together into a single order book, as depicted in <strong>Figure 2</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0HQZ95SYpxhI3P6Hqn6m4A.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2</figcaption></figure><p>The continuous lines in <strong>Figure 2</strong> are the hypothetical exact representation of the invariant equation in limit order book form. We can make our order book construction arbitrarily accurate by making the two original un-fragmented trades cover more of the domain, and by fragmenting them into a greater number of smaller transactions.</p><p>This method allows us to recreate any static Uniswap pool in order book form. In order to reflect the dynamic aspect of the AMM strategy, we simply require that, after every trade, the limit order book is reconstructed using the same method, but with the new state of the liquidity pool.</p><p>One could make the argument that not all such reconstructions would be completed in time before the next trade arrives. However, that would seem to mainly point to an LOB deficiency, rather than a significant issue with the approach itself. Moreover, two consecutive trades vs. an “un-reconstructed” order book in the same direction resemble a single combined trade, while the second trade occurring in the opposite direction seems unlikely altogether, since the trader is better off waiting for the reconstruction to occcur.</p><h3>If AMM strategies have counterparts in limit order book environments, so do impermanent losses</h3><p>The “loss” part of the impermanent loss comes from the fact that every AMM trade occurs at an average price that is below the post-trade market price. What does that look like in context of our constructed order book? The trade fills a sequence of limit orders, each at an increased price. Once a new order is filled, it makes the preceding ones look bad — they all resulted in transactions at a price that’s worse than the latest one.</p><p>There is no unique feature in our constructed order book that causes these losses. Short of pulling all liquidity from the market, there is no market making strategy, automated or otherwise, that eliminates the risk of such a loss. Some strategies may be better at minimising it than others, but I for one have not seen comprehensive research that shows that AMMs consistently underperform. The problem seems to be that for AMMs, these losses are relatively easy to quantify and turn into great ammunition for negative PR.</p><h3>AMMs may be getting arbitraged now, but that will not last</h3><p>Another common narrative is that AMMs cannot gain new information except when users transact with them, therefore they lag regular markets and can be arbitraged by traders who have the more up-to-date price information.</p><p>The arbitrage does indeed take place, but it can be viewed from a different perspective. It is also the result of LPs simply choosing not to respond to new information by changing the amount of liquidity they provide to an AMM, or by trading against it. In other words, they are ignoring the as yet un-automated bit of market making work, and paying for it.</p><p>Could it be that AMM creators brought this upon themselves? Did they lull LPs into inaction by telling them that AMMs will do all the work for them? What if instead they talked about how AMMs would make market making progressively easier, asymptotically approaching the point where you could just put liquidity in and forget about it, but right now AMMs still need active human participation?</p><p>It feels like this arbitrage problem is a case of a good tool, slightly misused. AMMs basically automate certain, increasingly large portions of a comprehensive market making strategy. These automated portions have been promoted as comprehensive strategies in themselves, but they are not really (or at least shouldn’t be all of the time). If interpreted as tools in their wider context, AMMs could be hugely useful even for the most sophisticated players.</p><p>What about on-chain AMMs being slower than off-chain markets — would that cause arbitrage to persist? Pro-active LPs and arbitrageurs compete for value on the same on-chain terms, and neither has a relative speed advantage within a given blockchain environment. The fact that some external market has already adjusted to a new price does not give either side an upper hand — both have to spot the opportunity based on the same public information, create a blockchain transaction and get it mined ahead of competition.</p><h3>AMM is the “smart limit order”</h3><p>Imagine we are in some distant DeFi future, like 12 months away, where there are 50 AMMs with fundamentally distinct invariants, each meant to embody a market making mini-strategy that is optimal for a particular asset under certain market conditions.</p><p>LPs have their liquidity spread across these AMMs, in unique proportions that reflect each LP’s subjective perception of the future. Then, a new piece of information comes out, and a change in strategy is required. With a few clicks of a button, LPs change the AMM “weights” within their market making portfolio. As easy as that, a new optimal configuration has been implemented.</p><p>And all the while, behind the scenes, teams are competing to create new and better AMMs, ones that internalise the clicks that LPs have been making manually to date. As the share of the overall market liquidity residing in AMMs (or even simply on-chain) increases, so does the richness of information and reliability of signals that AMM designers can leverage to improve their products. All that LPs are left to do is sit back, look smart and wonder why anyone would choose to do all the hard work within a limit order book environment.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8e7d82b5f42f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/complifi/amms-have-a-pr-problem-not-an-impermanent-loss-problem-8e7d82b5f42f">AMMs Have a PR Problem, Not an Impermanent Loss Problem.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/complifi">CompliFi Protocol</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Can Derivatives Help LPs Generate Greater Returns from AMM Pools?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/complifi/can-derivatives-help-lps-generate-greater-returns-from-amm-pools-9119a5fc400b?source=rss-75dec64c8aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9119a5fc400b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dmitri S]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2020 08:37:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-02T08:37:12.111Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>This post is for general information purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any investment, or to issue derivatives, and should not be used in the evaluation of the merits of making any financial or investment decision.</em></strong></p><p>Automated market makers like Uniswap and Balancer provide a simple way for liquidity providers to put their portfolios to work – just place your tokens into liquidity pools, sit back and observe the eternal battle between trading fees and impermanent losses. The key decisions you have to make revolve around picking tokens that will be actively traded, but whose price movements are unlikely to make your impermanent losses feel suspiciously permanent. But what if, for a given market movement, you could meaningfully boost the resulting trading fees?</p><p>Suppose, instead of putting your assets directly into liquidity pools, you use them as collateral to mint derivatives on CompliFi. Then you create AMM markets in those derivatives.</p><p>You would have an inventory of instruments to choose from, catering to a wide range of market conditions, and offering various forms of leverage and insurance across a broad range of underlying assets. Haven’t found what you are looking for? You could structure your own derivative, based on any type of ERC20 collateral and any oracle, all without dealing with governance. Issue the right instrument at the right time, one that gives risk takers exactly what they want, and you could charge higher trading fees for it.</p><p>You could pick instruments according to your volatility/risk appetite. Two different derivatives based on the same underlying asset (e.g. price of ETH) could amplify the underlying volatility to different degrees. More volatility likely means more trading fees, but also more risk that needs to be managed.</p><p>A lot of that risk materialises through the same type of impermanent losses you incur when funding liquidity pools in the underlying asset. What’s new is the design feature in CompliFi that enables you to easily measure naked derivative exposure in your LP portfolio.</p><p>All CompliFi derivatives share an important property – a portfolio that contains equal quantities of primary and complement derivative tokens is riskless relative to the underlying collateral. When you mint, you always receive equal quantities of primary and complement tokens, and you can redeem them for the original collateral at any time (less protocol fees). Once these derivatives go into AMM pools and trading begins, this symmetry would naturally be broken. Your portfolio would then contain more of one side of the derivative trade than the other, and that overhang is your naked exposure. You should certainly monitor it (and know where your comfort zone lies) as part of your wider risk management strategy.</p><h3>Say you are funding a WETH vs USDT pool. What could you do instead?</h3><p>You could turn your WETH and your stablecoins into a wide variety of derivatives. Here are just a few examples, not chosen based on any inherent advantages. Also, we have chosen scenarios where one of the assets is swapped for derivatives, and the other is kept in its original form. However, if you are the kind of person who thinks 2020 has been pretty chill so far, you could use both assets to mint derivatives and pair those up in a variety of ways. But seriously, unless you are intentionally looking for a very specific risk structure, please don’t.</p><p>The liquidity pools referred to below can be created right now on Balancer, and a number of other similar AMMs. Uniswap would also work, but their approval for CompliFi derivatives is still pending.</p><p><strong>Option 1: Insured ETH vs USDT</strong></p><p>Keep your USDT, use WETH to mint <a href="https://docs.compli.fi/derivative-specs/weth-collateral/insured-eth">Insured ETH</a>. The primary tokens you get are essentially regular ETH with downside protection (for insurance buyers). Complement tokens behave as regular ETH if price goes up, and decline in value twice as fast otherwise (for insurance sellers).</p><p>Liquidity pool 1: Insured ETH (Primary) vs USDT</p><p>Liquidity pool 2: Insured ETH (Complement) vs USDT</p><p><strong>Option 2: ETH Call Option vs USDT</strong></p><p>Keep your USDT, use your WETH to mint <a href="https://docs.compli.fi/derivative-specs/weth-collateral/eth-call-option">ETH Call Options</a>. This gets you a primary token that is the long position in the call option with strike price = ETH price at the beginning of the derivative’s Live period. The complement token is effectively a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Covered_call">covered short position in the call option</a>.</p><p>Liquidity pool 1: ETH Call Option (Primary) vs USDT</p><p>Liquidity pool 2: ETH Call Option (Complement) vs USDT</p><p><strong>Option 3: BTCx5 Leveraged Token vs WETH</strong></p><p>For a bit of variety, you could keep your WETH, and use USDT to mint <a href="https://docs.compli.fi/derivative-specs/usdt-collateral/btcx5-leveraged-token">BTCx5 Leveraged Tokens</a>. You will get primary tokens that amplify changes in BTC price fivefold, and complement tokens that do the same, but in the opposite direction. Returns on both the primary and complement tokens are capped at +100%. The trading pairs below are a bit of a left field choice, but we have all seen stranger things.</p><p>Liquidity pool 1: BTCx5 Leveraged Token (Primary) vs WETH</p><p>Liquidity pool 2: BTCx5 Leveraged Token (Complement) vs WETH</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9119a5fc400b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/complifi/can-derivatives-help-lps-generate-greater-returns-from-amm-pools-9119a5fc400b">Can Derivatives Help LPs Generate Greater Returns from AMM Pools?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/complifi">CompliFi Protocol</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Introducing CompliFi Protocol]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/complifi/introducing-complifi-protocol-4ca8ace577d8?source=rss-75dec64c8aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4ca8ace577d8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dmitri S]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2020 17:07:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-02T08:34:33.988Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>This post is for general information purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any investment, or to issue derivatives, and should not be used in the evaluation of the merits of making any financial or investment decision.</em></strong></p><h3>TL;DR</h3><ul><li>CompliFi (compli.fi) is an issuance protocol on Ethereum for derivatives that do not default. There are no collateral calls, no liquidations, no counterparty risk.</li><li>Derivatives are just the start. Complex synthetic investment strategies, insurance contracts and much more is possible. We aim to build a <strong>universal</strong> <strong>contingent value transfer protocol.</strong></li><li>Send collateral to CompliFi, receive equal amounts of two ERC20 tokens representing opposite sides of a derivative trade. Keep the risk you want, sell the other. If you are a market maker, sell both at a spread.</li><li>Derivatives are regular ERC20 tokens, not coupled to any captive trading environment, tradable like any other ERC20 on third party protocols. CompliFi is only used to issue and redeem.</li><li>No admin/governance authority over user funds, ever.</li></ul><h3>Do derivatives even default?</h3><p>A derivative involves multilateral promises of payment contingent on future state of the world. Making sure the losing side delivers on their promise is hard. In conventional finance, this job is done together by regulators, central counterparties, internal risk management departments and the judicial system. Associated costs run into hundreds of billions per year, yet we still get epic failures like the 2008 subprime crisis.</p><p>Derivative protocols on DeFi tend to manage counterparty risk but adopting a single technique from conventional finance – they ask users to post collateral that partially covers their potential downside and, if the downside starts to materialise, they ask users to post more. If users refuse, derivative positions are liquidated and proceeds are used to cover the liabilities.</p><p>When markets move slowly, and there is plenty of block space to get collateral top-up transactions mined in time, the system tends to work. Problems begin when these conditions no longer hold:</p><ul><li>If the market moves too far too fast, topping up collateral may no longer make sense – users will abandon their positions to be liquidated. Except, the collateral that is already there may not be enough to get everyone paid in full. The “winners” on the other side of the trade will not be able to collect.</li><li>When users do want to meet their collateral calls, but can’t due to block capacity constraints, their positions also go into liquidation. Then, the same capacity constraint can prevent the liquidation process from yielding fair value. When a significant portion of potential bidders are excluded, the underlying collateral could be sold too cheaply. The final outcome is again the failure of winners to collect their payoff.</li></ul><p>As a result, derivatives backed by such counterparty risk management systems are not a “call option on Asset X”, but rather a “call option on Asset X with material but not well-defined risk that issuing Protocol Y will fail to ensure full payoff”.</p><h3>How does CompliFi eliminate counterparty risk?</h3><p>The risk arises from the fact that most regular derivatives have unbounded potential payoffs, which cannot be fully collateralised upfront. For instance, suppose you buy a synthetic leveraged token. If the price of the underlying asset keeps on rising, so does your payoff, and someone has to fund it. For that someone, there is no finite amount of collateral that could be posted upfront to guarantee coverage of their liabilities in every market scenario.</p><p>CompliFi addresses this problem by modifying all derivative payoffs to fit within a fixed pool of collateral, effectively “cutting off” the unbounded bits that cause all the trouble. What you get as a result are derivatives that look very much like their conventional counterparts, but have a pre-determined floor and ceiling for how much the holder can gain/lose. Once this feature is baked into the payoff function, every instrument can be fully collateralised upfront and will never default.</p><h3>I want to issue some derivatives. How does it work?</h3><p>For a detailed overview of the protocol’s architecture, please have a look at the <a href="http://docs.compli.fi/">documentation</a>. In short, users interact with Vaults — smart contracts each of which encapsulates the properties of a particular derivative specification. From the outset, CompliFi has a wide range of derivative specs, and more can be added by any user. We will periodically create vaults for some of derivative specs, so as to maintain a baseline issuance schedule, but anyone can create vaults whenever they want. Once a vault has been created, the process goes as follows:</p><ol><li>Send collateral to a Vault smart contract containing specs of a particular derivative. In return, you receive equal amounts of two ERC20 tokens — “<strong>primary</strong>” and “<strong>complement</strong>” — representing opposing derivative bets that together always have a claim on the same amount of collateral you submitted (similar in to the long and short positions, but not quite the same). No market risk is incurred by this action — you can exchange a symmetric primary+complement portfolio for collateral at any time.</li><li>Sell whichever one of primary and complement assets you don’t want, keep the other (if you are a market maker, sell both). Your buyers are likely to be people looking to issue the same derivative, but keep the opposite side. If you are an LP or market maker, you can put both assets up for sale.</li><li>Once you have “de-coupled” the primary and complement assets, you have the risk you were looking for. As the market moves, the protocol will redistribute collateral within the vault between the primary and complement asset classes, causing the instruments to change in value and generate their specified returns.</li><li>To exit your position, you can do one of three things: a) wait until settlement to claim your final share of collateral directly from the vault; b) take profit early by selling you position on the secondary market; c) acquire tokens corresponding to the opposite side of the trade until you have a symmetric (risk-free) portfolio, and swap it for collateral from the vault at any time.</li></ol><p>All CompliFi derivatives have a fixed term, and their corresponding vaults go through three states in their lifecycle:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*44K7wuQABUt-eyIHGVSQMQ.png" /></figure><p>At the outset, a typical derivative’s lifecycle would consist of a 7-day Minting period, followed by a 28-day Live period, after which there is no time limit on when users can redeem. Settled derivatives essentially become value-neutral wrappers for fixed amounts of collateral.</p><p>Our baseline issuance schedule will feature a new series, or “vintage”, of instruments created every week — as soon as one vault goes from the Minting state to Live, a new one for the same instrument will be created and will start accepting collateral. As a result, there will be several vintages of the same derivative trading at the same time, allowing you to roll over your position by trading into a later vintage.</p><h3>Things to keep in mind when trading CompliFi derivatives.</h3><p>All CompliFi derivatives are ERC20s, tradable like regular risk assets on the existing DeFi infrastracture. What is different is how properties of the derivatives evolve as their state changes from Minting to Live to Settled.</p><p>During the Minting state, the derivatives are “disconnected” from the market. Their share of the underlying collateral does not change (i.e. their nominal values are constant). Each derivative effectively represents a fixed amount of collateral + as yet inactive risk component. This property would likely have significant impact on minting state price dynamics — the derivative-collateral trading pair, for instance, could exhibit behaviour closer to a stablecoin-stablecoin pair in the same currency, rather than a pair of uncorrelated risk assets.</p><p>With the change of state from Minting to Live, the risk component in the derivatives becomes active, and their nominal value starts to fluctuate. In other words, during the Minting period one could potentially use an AMM like Curve to trade the derivative-collateral pair (note that one of the assets may need to be batched in order to make Curve’s 1:1 refence price suitable). If, however, LPs leave their liquidity in this pool until after the derivative goes live, there is a good chance they will get burnt. Moving liquidity to an AMM with greater invariant curvature &amp; slippage before the end of the minting period should solve the problem.</p><p>Once a derivative is settled, its collateral-denominated nominal value is constant forever — it effectively becomes a value-neutral wrapper.</p><p>Finally, keep an eye out for <strong>arbitrage opportunities</strong>. At any point in the derivative’s lifecycle, the protocol offers to swap equal amounts of primary and complement assets for a fixed amount of collateral. If you can buy this symmetric portfolio cheaper on the secondary market, you’ll have a riskless profit. During the minting period, arbitrage can work in the opposite direction too.</p><h3>What can be issued using CompliFi?</h3><p>In the simplest terms, what CompliFi does is</p><ol><li>Takes a fixed pool of <strong>any</strong> collateral and tokenises it into two asset classes.</li><li>Specifies <strong>any</strong> rule that redistributes the collateral between the two asset classes based on the change in the state of the world within a fixed period of time.</li><li>Measures and interprets the realised change in the state of the world using <strong>any</strong> external oracle (and soon to be multiple oracles) and redistributes collateral according to the rule in (2).</li></ol><p>Basic financial derivatives are the obvious use case for this design. From there, it is only a short step to generalised synthetic investment strategies —you can just as easily create an instrument that relies on more than one oracle and mimics a complex portfolio of assets. Whether you are trader who just wants to take on a particular risk, or a trading protocol looking for an easy inventory and counterparty risk management solution for synthetic assets — we’ve got you covered.</p><p>What about arbitrary insurance contracts? Agreements of the form “you pay me X now, and I will pay you Y if a particular insurance event(s) occurs during a certain period of time” fit neatly into the CompliFi mould. The missing puzzle piece is a more versatile type of oracle — one that is able to estabilish occurence of events that are more subjective in nature than changes in asset prices (a difficult task, but a number of projects are making great progress).</p><p>The number of applications we see is huge. We are not planning to expand into any of them. Instead, we aim to focus on creating a <strong>universal contingent value transfer protocol</strong> that helps you build your DeFi business.</p><h3>Who can add new derivative specifications to CompliFi?</h3><p>Anyone. We have decided to take all curation out of the core protocol. Any user can add to CompliFi any derivative specification that relies on any on-chain oracle and uses any ERC20 collateral asset. Moreover, author of a derivative specification also sets the <strong>author fee</strong>, which is a percentage of submitted collateral they will receive whenever anyone mints the derivative they have created.</p><p>Specifications available from the start can be found in the <a href="http://docs.compli.fi/">docs</a>, and vaults that use them can be minted through app.compli.fi .</p><p><strong>Please do your own thorough due diligence on every derivative specification you plan to interact with.</strong></p><h3>Governance and Risks.</h3><p>Our goal is to keep governance to an absolute minimum. The soon-to-be-decentralised governance authority covers the protocol fee (currently set at zero), the upper limit for the author fee, and a proxy mechanism over the Vault Factory to allow for easy updates.</p><p><strong>Governance cannot remove or modify any existing derivative specifications, nor to influence an already created Vault in any way</strong>. In particular, user funds cannot be extracted from a Vault other than through regular rules of derivative issuance and redemption.</p><p>The Vaults’ self-sovereignty has obvious advantages, but also carries risks. Vaults accept external oracle data &quot;as is&quot;, and governance does not have the authority to modify the incoming data. At the same time, Vaults rely on availability of appropriate oracle data in order settle. Should an oracle fail, associated Vaults may be prevented from settling, and will remain in a state that allows users to only swap symmetric primary-complement portfolios for collateral (if the oracle recovers, all goes back to normal).</p><p>This symmetric swap capability offers users faced with a problematic Vault two potential solutions. First, a user could acquire on the secondary market assets that would turn their existing portfolio into a symmetric one. Second, a smart contract could be deployed that declares a fair settlement price and offers all who agree to submit their derivatives, which would then be combined into symmetric portfolios and swapped for collateral. In both cases, the publicly known “true” settlement price serves as the focal point for such “community settlement”. <strong>Please make sure you are comfortable with this feature before using the protocol.</strong></p><p><strong>As of the time of writing, the protocol has not undergone an external audit. Please do your own due diligence and use at your own risk!</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4ca8ace577d8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/complifi/introducing-complifi-protocol-4ca8ace577d8">Introducing CompliFi Protocol</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/complifi">CompliFi Protocol</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Impermanent Losses in Uniswap-Like Markets]]></title>
            <link>https://dsenchenko.medium.com/impermanent-losses-in-uniswap-like-markets-4315359ea9b1?source=rss-75dec64c8aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4315359ea9b1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uniswap]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[automated-market-maker]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency-trading]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dmitri S]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2020 17:11:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-14T08:22:10.890Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Where they come from and what can be done about them</h4><p>Liquidity providers to the <a href="https://uniswap.exchange/">Uniswap</a> exchange and other Constant Function Market Makers such as <a href="http://curve.fi/">Curve.fi </a>and <a href="http://balancer.io/">Balancer.io</a> are known to suffer from “impermanent losses” — a phenomenon where certain trading patterns result in a loss of value of the liquidity pool, despite its growth from trading fee income. In this article, we try to look at the nature of impermanent losses from an intuitive perspective, and investigate the possibility of designing a fee mechanism that would eliminate them.</p><p>For an introduction to Uniswap and an additional point of view on impermanent losses, we refer the reader to this insightful <a href="https://medium.com/@pintail/uniswap-a-good-deal-for-liquidity-providers-104c0b6816f2">article</a>, while this <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.03380">paper</a> offers a deeper look at Uniswap’s underlying mathematics.</p><h3>Impermanent losses in Uniswap under zero fees</h3><p>The Uniswap model of a market for assets <em>x</em> and <em>y</em> is based on simple formula, aka the “invariant”:</p><p><em>q(x)*q(y) = k</em></p><p>where <em>q(x)</em> and <em>q(y)</em> are Uniswap’s reserves in the corresponding assets, and <em>k</em> is a constant. The rules of the game are that any transaction <em>(−△q(x), △q(y))</em> where quantity <em>△q(x)</em> is withdrawn by the trader in return for <em>△q(y)</em> is permissable if the following expression is satisfied:</p><p><em>(q(x)−△q(x))(q(y)+△q(y))=k.</em></p><p>Current market price of <em>x</em> in terms of <em>y</em> (aka the marginal price) is the negative of derivative of <em>q(y)</em> with respect to <em>q(x)</em>, which for Uniswap also happens to equal their ratio:</p><p><em>−dq(y)/dq(x) = k/q(x)² = q(y)/q(x)</em></p><p>Now let us consider what happens to the marginal price when a user withdraws <em>△q(x) </em>and adds <em>△q(y)</em>. It is easy to see from the above formula that price of <em>x</em> is declining in <em>q(x). </em>In other words, by withdrawing <em>△q(x) </em>from reserves, the trader is raising the price of <em>x.</em></p><p>Marginal price, however, is only relevant in the theoretical case where the user is trading in infinitesimally small quantities, and for valuation of the liquidity pool. The actual price paid by the trader is somewhere between the marginal prices before and after the trade.<strong> In other words, the protocol is permitting a trade at a price below one at which the liquidity pool will be valued immediately after that trade concludes, thereby giving rise to impermanent losses</strong>. This fact is illustrated on the chart below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A1aOjiDt1CV3bL_lOwu80g.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1</figcaption></figure><p>Impermanent losses would be erased if a trader then transacted in the same amounts and in the opposite direction, reverting the reserves to their original state. However, until and unless that happens, the losses stand.</p><h3><strong>Is it possible to eliminate impermanent losses?</strong></h3><p>In practice, Uniswap liquidity providers are rewarded with fees that partially compensate them for incurring impermanent losses. This naturally begs the question — is it possible to design a fee mechanism such that liquidity providers would never incur impermanent losses?</p><p>One way to tackle this problem is to set the fee for every trade to equal the impermanent loss. This approach makes an unrealistic assumption that each trade encapsulates the entirety of price movement to the new market equilibrium. As a result, it should not be viewed as a “solution”, and we will pursue it mainly as a mathematical excersise with a potential to provide useful insights.</p><p>First, let us adjust Figure 1 to incorporate a fee ℰ&gt;0, deducted by the protocol from assets that traders contribute to reserves in order to withdraw others. In simple terms, when a trader adds <em>△q(y)</em>, the protocol pretends that the actual amount is <em>△q(y)−</em>ℰ, and calculates the corresponding <em>△q(x)</em> accordingly. Then, having gained ℰ “for free”, the protocol upgrades the invariant’s constant from <em>k_0</em> to <em>k_1</em>. Please note that to improve legibility we will use <em>q(x) </em>and <em>q(y) </em>to represent both starting reserve levels and the general reserve variables.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bY7LKWe1YOT5BTQhjkL5_g.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2</figcaption></figure><p>To derive ℰ that always cancels out the impermanent loss, we set the actual price paid by the trader to equal the post-trade marginal price:</p><p><em>(q(y)+△q(y)) / (q(x)−△q(x)) = △q(y) / △q(x)</em></p><p>We introduce ℰ into the above equation by noting that the protocol calculates <em>△q(x) </em>by feeding <em>△q(y)−</em>ℰ into the pre-trade invariant. This allows us to solve for ℰ with the following result:</p><p>ℰ/<em>△q(y) = (△q(y)/q(y)) / (1+△q(y)/q(y))</em></p><p>To simplify interpretation, we redefine the fee as a percentage of added assets, such that <em>%_fee</em>=ℰ/<em>△q(y)</em>. Further, we set <em>z=△q(y)/q(y)</em> to represent added assets as percentage of pool size. That gives us the following expression:</p><p><em>%_fee = z/(1+z)</em></p><p>This function is strictly increasing, and matches Uniswap’s fixed percentage fee of 0.3% when the trader contributes assets in the amount of roughly 0.3% of their reserve. Below that trade size, Uniswap charges a fee that is higher than the associated impermanent loss.</p><p>Finally, we note again that our fee mechanism is certain to have other, undesirable properties. For instance, we strongly suspect that it violates the “path independence” condition — loosely speaking, breaking up a trade into pieces may no longer yield the same result as transacting in one go. As a result, the mechanism would almost certainly be open to attacks unless deployed in context of a more holistic approach. For a deeper examination of the issue, we refer the reader to this recent <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.10001">work</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4315359ea9b1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Decentralised Money At The Crossroads]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/thecapital/decentralised-money-at-the-crossroads-22508fa71b79?source=rss-75dec64c8aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/22508fa71b79</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dmitri S]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Sep 2019 09:13:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-08T03:01:44.920Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L7dQaGPWmkR54PuXv8swhQ.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Decentralized Money At The Crossroads</strong></h3><h4>Blockchain technology is set to challenge the State for control over money</h4><p>Since the first coin left the mints of Lydia in the 7th century BC, issuance of money has remained squarely within the purview of the state. The power to unilaterally redistribute society’s claim on economic resources has become an indispensable tool of government, whether deployed towards a positive social outcome or to extend the life of a failing regime.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*k8Jik6fFqlzmRTSQWls3Pw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The advent of electronic money added a new dimension to the state’s already formidable grip on the financial system — the ability to control money it already issued. Physical cash was replaced with an entry in a ledger of a state-regulated institution, and seizing funds became a matter of a few pen- or keystrokes. No more need to enter homes or places of business, to break into strongboxes. Indeed, the tables have turned so completely that every time we use electronic money, it is with the government’s tacit approval.</p><p>The trend of ever-increasing state control over money has gone largely uncontested, until now. The emergence of blockchain technology has raised the possibility of a different world — one where an individual’s ability to assert property rights over money is not contingent on consent from a central authority. Now, just over a decade since Bitcoin’s genesis block, the technology is starting to catch up with its early promises, and the prospect of truly usable decentralized money is beginning to materialize. If progress continues unobstructed, the money paradigm will shift. Powers that governments have long taken for granted will return into the hands of the individual, and the ripple effects of this change will be felt across the fabric of modern society. To no one’s surprise, the state is not looking like it will stay on the side-lines. Decentralized money is now a prominent feature on regulatory agendas, and the first steps are being taken in what is shaping up to be a long war. Below, we try to sketch a roadmap for what is to come.</p><h3><strong>What Is At Stake?</strong></h3><p>Picture a world where decentralized money plays a prominent role in the real economy. Prices are denominated both in fiat and crypto, transaction volumes are significant in both. Consensus protocols that underpin decentralized money are secure, fast and scalable. Privacy is the default and disclosure is a choice. Who are the winners? Who are the losers? What are their likely courses of action?</p><h4><strong>The State</strong></h4><p>Suppose decentralized money is adopted overnight, and governments wake up to a new reality without a chance to prepare and adapt. What would be the first question on their agenda? Or perhaps the second one after “whose fault is it?”. I am going to go out on a limb and say “can we still levy taxes?”.</p><p>On the face of it, this new reality looks like a fiscal nightmare and, for once, from the state’s perspective. Individuals and businesses can transact without the government’s knowledge, and only selectively disclose financial flows. True prices paid for goods and services are difficult to establish, verifying profit and income calculations near impossible. Undisclosed crypto addresses are the tax havens of the decentralized age. Cryptography stands in the way of enforcement action, and settlement of a tax bill requires the explicit consent of the payer. If this were to come true, would anyone bother paying taxes at all? Are we one step away from anarchy?</p><p>A deeper dive reveals a less dramatic picture. Opportunities for illicit behavior are unlikely to expand far beyond what physical cash and the fiat system already cater for. Offering customers to transact off the books still runs almost the same risk of being reported. Flows of goods and services continue to be as visible and measurable. Any decrease in risk associated with illicit behavior can likely be counterbalanced by an increase in severity of punishment under the law.</p><p>Perhaps most importantly, authorities would naturally amass a database of “compliant” crypto addresses, where users have agreed to a level of ongoing disclosure sufficient for government’s comfort. Those addresses would then likely be declared the only ones eligible to transact within its economy. Whether you want to buy a coffee or a house, you would need the money that is demonstrably compliant.</p><p>In effect, the money supply would become segmented into “white” and “grey” domains, with the latter relegated to marginal use cases and thus penalized in terms of value. “Grey” does not necessarily mean “illegal”, but merely reflects the fact that provenance has not been established to the satisfaction of a particular authority. Indeed, the same address could be considered compliant in one jurisdiction, but not in another. All in all, we look to have ended up in a system where untaxed gains accrue in the form of second-rate decentralized money and bringing them back into the compliant domain is difficult and/or expensive. Sound familiar?</p><p>The powers that the state initially lost seem to have been granted straight back, and it all looks like business as usual for the economy. Has nothing really changed then?</p><p>Not quite. The outcome may look similar, but not the mechanism that underpins it. The state no longer operates a proprietary monetary system. Instead, individuals continually reaffirm their consent to grant the state certain powers within a decentralized construct. When the state performs its duties to the society’s general satisfaction, it is indeed business as usual. In times of social discontent, however, things could get interesting.</p><p>Imagine that a number of individuals and businesses, as an act of protest, withdraw their capital, in whole or in part, from the compliant domain of money supply. In an act not dissimilar to voting out a government, they would instead defund it. A small group can be labeled tax evaders and jailed. Not so with a sufficiently popular movement, and neither can it be ignored. The state would be operating on increasingly short rations, and printing fiat is unlikely to be an effective countermeasure — flight to the decentralized alternative could immensely amplify the resulting devaluation. Short of a brutal regulatory clampdown and use of force, the only realistic option for the government is to engage with the protesters to re-establish social consensus. In the longer term, the desire to steer clear of such confrontations could mean a more balanced approach to policy and improved government accountability.</p><p>Is this threat of non-compliance a credible one? Would protesters have to subsist on contraband cigarettes, or would a self-regulated sub-economy quickly emerge? The required technology would be readily available and barriers to implementation would be few. The answer thus depends on the depth of support for the issues being protested. Beyond doubt, however, is the fact that the adoption of decentralized money would shift the balance of power within the social contract from the state to the individual.</p><h4><strong>The Individual</strong></h4><p>Despite all its inequity and inefficiency, it is hard to deny that the current monetary system, in developed economies at least, has done a very difficult job reasonably well. Then, is there any real appetite for the benefits of decentralized money? Will the empowerment theme resonate? Will consumers get a better deal?</p><p>Let’s tackle the consumer angle first. Even at this early stage, it is clear that decentralized money will bring about lower transaction costs across the board and increase competition in many if not all areas of financial services. As a result, some of the financial flows previously destined for corporate profits would instead turn into additional spending power for consumers. The global payments industry alone boasts close to<a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Financial%20Services/Our%20Insights/Global%20payments%20Expansive%20growth%20targeted%20opportunities/Global-payments-map-2018.ashx"> $2 trillion</a> in revenue, so benefits should be sizeable. On top of that, consumers can expect a myriad of adoption incentives coming their way, with some data privacy on the side. Sounds like a great deal by all accounts, but keep in mind that we are still operating in the hypothetical endgame.</p><p>What of the empowerment angle, does it have much relevance? Firstly, it links directly into the age-old private property narrative — the direct power you have to defend your home and physical assets can now be extended to electronic money (in fact, cryptography would give you a degree of control that you are never likely to achieve over physical property). In most developed democracies at least, neither your home nor your electronic money is under daily siege. Yet, the desire to be in control of what is yours is an ever-recurring theme. It is cropping up in an increasing number of contexts, from various aspects of data privacy today to personal mobility in the near future. Practically on all fronts, the individual is rapidly losing ground. What is more, an increasing number of people are starting to realize what they have lost, and the resulting frustration is only likely to keep rising. Arguably, decentralized money provides the individual with the single biggest opportunity for a win, for a chance to regain control over their claim on the economy they helped build.</p><h4><strong>The Financial Industry</strong></h4><p>As things stand, private banking institutions play a uniquely privileged role in the monetary system. In a fractional banking model, liquidity in the hands of businesses and individuals is in fact “commercial bank money”, issued by institutions acting as exclusive intermediaries between central banks and the real economy.</p><p>This exclusive arrangement has two major consequences. First, monopolistic access to central bank money comes with exclusive opportunities to make a profit. Examples of this privilege range from banks’ use of near-free liquidity provided in the course of quantitative easing to make speculative market bets, and to the simple fact that commercial bank deposits available to consumers pay a lower interest rate, under most circumstances than central bank deposits only available to banks themselves. Second, banks get to force their credit risk onto depositors and, in times of crises, onto taxpayers. In simple terms, if you hold a deposit in a bank that has issued too many bad loans, then your money is at risk. The only way you can avoid this exposure altogether is by not using electronic money at all, which is not a realistic proposition for most of us.</p><p>By definition, this position of privilege would not be replicated within the decentralized monetary system. New leaders will emerge in the space, making it unlikely that current market shares would be carried over into the new regime intact. In other words, decentralization will likely both shrink the financial sector profit pool and decrease the legacy institutions’ share of it.</p><p>Faced with this prospect, what strategy can we expect the financial industry to adopt? Seems unlikely it would willingly evolve to the detriment of its own profitability, especially when the new reality does not yet look inevitable. A more rational course of action would be to deploy resources towards preserving the current state of affairs. Decentralized money does not exactly fit into most existing regulatory frameworks, and lobbying for an adversarial approach of prohibitive legislation and aggressive enforcement seems like an obvious and a well-trodden path.</p><h3><strong>State of Technology</strong></h3><p>We are in the early days of decentralized money. Both the concept itself and its constituent technologies are still under development and far from their mature form. Yet the adversarial environment that will be its natural habitat dictates that even the early choices may prove critical. We will highlight one particular design decision, popular among many current industry leaders, that may present itself as low-hanging regulatory fruit and set the tone for things to come.</p><p>One of the widely accepted requirements for decentralized money is price stability. Without going into excessive detail, proposed solutions to this problem can be divided into two categories — those that rely on the fiat financial system, and those that do not.</p><p>Recipe followed by the first category is simple — place fiat and/or highly liquid and stable financial assets (e.g. government bonds) with a regulated financial institution and issue blockchain-based units of value (stablecoins) that represent a claim on the underlying assets. In case of purely fiat collateral, stability is achieved almost by definition, since the underlying asset and the reference for stability are one and the same. Use of a wider range of instruments necessitates certain design adjustments, but the ultimate price stability is not really in question. Theoretically, combining this approach with a truly decentralized blockchain protocol gives you an instrument that ticks most boxes for what decentralized money should be. Indeed, such instruments are already widely used on crypto exchanges and are actively being considered for wider applications.</p><p>Except, what you actually get is an enhanced electronic version of the bearer bond — an instrument of choice for money laundering that has long been phased out. It is difficult to imagine that any regulator would countenance bringing it back. On top of that, imagine that a bank agrees to hold the fiat deposit that underpins such an instrument. What if the instrument is then used as a means of payment in a drug deal and is seized by law enforcement? Is the drug dealer a customer of the bank? Is the bank facilitating the crime? Whatever the interpretation, this situation is untenable from today’s regulatory perspective, and something has to give.</p><p>In an ideal world, a decentralized self-regulation framework would be phased in, perhaps making the coin even less attractive for illegal activity than its fiat counterpart. In practice, the shortest path to a satisfactory regulatory outcome is to extend the current framework to cover the new asset. That means every participant of the ecosystem would have to be KYC’ed and AML’ed by a central authority, and regulators would gain the power to unilaterally seize funds considered to be in breach of the law. In other words, enforcing existing regulations means breaking decentralization.</p><p>Whether or not this outcome materializes is a question of bargaining power. Does the fiat-backed construct have sufficient immunity from regulatory pressure to buy time and push for a compromise?</p><p>As its name suggests, the fiat deposit that underpins it is under the effective control of the regulator. Seizing it in response to non-compliance would immediately collapse the whole system. Arguments have been made that spreading collateral across a wide range of jurisdictions could decrease exposure. In reality, regulatory regimes in the majority of developed economies are highly aligned and often act in synchrony (e.g. FATF). As it happens, these are the very jurisdictions where most of the assets suitable as collateral originate. Indeed, even if only one of the many jurisdictions acts to seize or encumber its share of assets, the result may well be mass panic among users and a game of financial musical chairs, where the one standing is left with the collateral shortfall.</p><p>Given this balance of power, the conversation between fiat-backed coins and regulators is not likely to be anything but a one-way street. Signs point to an outcome where the model is brought fully into the regulatory fold, and the technology is co-opted by the banking sector to serve as an extension of the fiat system.</p><p>Can other approaches fare any better? Does removing dependence on the fiat system shift the balance of power enough?</p><p>Given the current trajectory of technological development, it is not unreasonable to expect a workable and largely uncompromised design for decentralized money to emerge in the near future. Albeit as yet unproven, there is a number of approaches to price stabilization that do not rely on the fiat system, removing the associated attack surface either substantially or entirely. In combination with resilient consensus and privacy, we would arguably be approaching a situation where attacking the decentralized money construct as a whole is less effective than going after its users. The question then circles back to our earlier discussion — will users care to put up a fight?</p><h3><strong>Which Way Now?</strong></h3><p>Decentralization is on a collision course with a long-established order backed by significant political and commercial interests. It offers glimpses of a better world, but its ultimate impact will be shaped by the regulatory response that it elicits. A restrictive regulatory agenda would cause the decentralized space to split: one part would become fully compliant, but offer decentralization in name only; the other would remain loyal to its original values, but would be forced to adopt an adversarial attitude to their implementation. This situation is unlikely to yield the best social outcome. Resources deployed within the compliant space would primarily seek to benefit the same interests that brought about the restrictive regulatory agenda in the first place. The “rebels”, on the other hand, would be forced to focus on building up defenses against state-sponsored attacks, rather than on implementing the vision of a more balanced society. Yet, as things stand, this adversarial future is exactly where the industry seems to be drifting. Can something be done to shift the course?</p><p>Regulatory agenda with respect to decentralization is driven by two factors — the duty to prevent significant risks to the economy and the rule of law, and the need to accommodate the political pressures involved.</p><p>Given the magnitude of changes that decentralization could bring about, it is more than reasonable for regulators to step in. The problem, however, lies in the fact that existing regulatory toolkits do not have the instruments to deal with decentralized systems without breaking them. In order to avoid the prospect of a chainsaw being employed where a scalpel is called for, the decentralized industry has little choice but to co-opt the narrative of social responsibility, articulate the risks involved and offer decentralized solutions to address them before regulators can act.</p><p>The willingness of regulators to accept this dynamic, however, comes down to the question of political pressure. As things stand, that pressure comes primarily from the financial industry and state institutions that are the very symbol of centralization. The only way to shift the balance is to get the public on board. Changing the popular perception of crypto from that of a financial gamble to the instrument of social empowerment is not an easy task, but one that needs to be tackled urgently for the benefit of all.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vHEtowfLCPGp377318tdKg.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://twitter.com/Alt__Magazine">Altcoin Magazine</a></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F3c1144%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F3c1144%2F&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/4b37fd61c8660dc2cbfe8232dfa683e2/href">https://medium.com/media/4b37fd61c8660dc2cbfe8232dfa683e2/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=22508fa71b79" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/thecapital/decentralised-money-at-the-crossroads-22508fa71b79">Decentralised Money At The Crossroads</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/thecapital">The Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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