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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Duane Rousselle, PhD on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Duane Rousselle, PhD on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Duane Rousselle, PhD on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@duanerousselle?source=rss-452e35df90bd------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 08:31:24 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Question of the Society]]></title>
            <link>https://duanerousselle.medium.com/question-of-the-society-cd45ffb9a3ca?source=rss-452e35df90bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cd45ffb9a3ca</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lacan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Duane Rousselle, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 08:56:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-17T08:56:49.327Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The following is a transcript of “Question of the Society: Society, School, Psychoanalysis,” addressed to the Pakistan Psychoanalytic Society.</em></p><p><strong>Wild Psychoanalysis</strong></p><p>You are invited to know about the Pakistan Psychoanalytic Society. Moreover, the Pakistan Psychoanalytic Society is invited to know about itself.</p><p>Many of you will have come to know about the Society through its public activities. These have been efforts to establish an opening for psychoanalysis from within the existing discourses of this country. We are the first, and currently the only, psychoanalytic training pathway inside of Pakistan. It is a decidedly Freudian pathway, the reason for which is clear enough: as a matter of definition, the psychoanalytic field is Freudian. Our orientation, without compromise, is Lacanian; which means that it is based upon the teachings of Jacques Lacan, who, in 1964, when he founded his psychoanalytic School, called for a “denunciation of the deviations and compromises that encumber [the] progress [of psychoanalysis] while degrading its use.” It was a call for a return to Freud.</p><p>We are not one year old as a Society; as a circle, we are three. The measure of our progress will not be in years since birth but in the active steps taken to install and defend coordinates for psychoanalysis in the context within which we act for ourselves. Taking measure, then: the Society, being an invention of the Circle, has introduced a foothold against what Freud called “wild psychoanalysis.” It has done so through efforts to link with the School of Lacan, through its public activities, and through the promotion of cartel work.</p><p>In any case, in these last few years, have we not followed in the footsteps of Freud? Another dimension of wild psychoanalysis, other than the betrayal of its technique due to inadequate training; there is also psychoanalysis as practiced without the Other of its profession, including other analysts. Freud’s text, titled “Wild Psychoanalysis,” was published in 1910, the same year as the founding of the International Psychoanalytic Association. In it, he wrote:</p><blockquote>[I]n view of the dangers which may be anticipated from the practice of ‘wild’ psychoanalysis for the patients as well as for the subject [<em>der Sache</em>] of psychoanalysis, no other course was left to us. In the spring of 1910, we founded an international psychoanalytic society, in order to be able to disclaim responsibility for the acts of all who do not belong to us, and who call their medical practice ‘psychoanalysis.’</blockquote><p>Freud’s appeal, in the establishment of an international psychoanalytic society, can be read as an act of responsibility for psychoanalysis. What does a Society make possible for the transmission of psychoanalysis, and what does the School of Lacan introduce that the Society cannot establish through its institutional practice?</p><p><strong>The Subject of the Society</strong></p><p>The Pakistan Psychoanalytic Society has not been without provisions for psychoanalytic transmission: it has never been without a meeting place, people who’ve opened space for its work, and companions who accompanied its passage from the university and clinical establishments into the psychoanalytic circle. The conditions from which the Society has emerged are not the same as those conditions which sustain analytic discourse. Another discourse has been adopted, one which distinguishes the Society from the others. This is a psychoanalytic Society, which, I think, has been a site for the installation of psychoanalytic coordinates. The manner in which I’m speaking today is an expression of those efforts, and should not, therefore, be regarded as another effort to open up pathways from within discourses other than the one in which I’ve now been inscribed.</p><p>I am speaking from within the discourse into which I have been inscribed, raising a question of the coordinates that constitute my position within it. I raise a question of the psychoanalytic society, effectuating the work of the society. To raise the question assumes that there is indeed a subject of the Society. I suppose that there is a subject of the Pakistan Psychoanalytic Society, and that there is also a desire. And I suppose that this desire is interpretable.</p><p>Lacan outlined a social logic of small groups peculiar to the study of psychoanalysis, named “cartel.” We have inscribed this logic to a greater or lesser extent as the organizing principle of our Society. There is, therefore, the cartel, named “executive committee.” The word “executive” at least brings with it a sense of action. It has been formed by those who have taken it upon themselves to orient the activities of the Society, which means, those who have declared a desire to work in the interests of the Society by transmitting psychoanalysis. And, in turn, the Society recognizes those who have undertaken this:</p><ul><li>The Society’s secretary, and its cartel delegate, is Ruqayya Abdul Qadir.</li><li>The Society’s treasurer and clinical seminar coordinator is Anita Hassan.</li><li>The Society’s reading seminar coordinator is Moonis Azad, PhD.</li><li>The Society’s second reading seminar coordinator is Muhammed Abdullah Ali Farhan.</li></ul><p>In the year prior, each was referred to colloquially as a “repeater,” and more playfully as a “repeat offender.” … Their offence was only to have fallen from the university and psychological clinics into psychoanalysis. This year there has been an expansion of transmission, even if our activities are fewer in number. There has also been an expansion of membership. New repeaters have emerged, based upon their work in the prior year: Shaftain Nasser, Romaise Munawer, and Karishma M. Iqbal.</p><p>It is curious that institutional language has taken hold, an argot, as it were, with such signifiers emerging as “repeaters” and “repeat offenders.” These are signifiers of the Society, and no one has been excluded from taking them up. They outline something of an orientation that has settled into the Society, a signal of its progress from the wilderness. There is one signifier that’s not been used as frequently, though I’ve tried to put it into circulation, namely <em>Surakh, </em>which is the Urdu word for hole, spelled “h-o-l-e.” Immediately after the Society was announced, I introduced the signifier of the hole into our institutional language. In 1975, Lacan said not only that “the signifier makes a hole,” but he added that “the unconscious is the Real […] insofar as it is holed.”</p><p>We can say that the hole circumscribes an impossibility, around which the signifying order and the analytic discourse are necessarily organized. Lacan concluded: “my discourse is founded on a hole.” The question is whether the Society can sustain itself in relation to the hole, by placing it as the agent of its discourse, or will the Society necessarily seek a mode of retreat through identifications, routines, or other answers, already settled; worse, will the Society abandon the field, returning each one to the discourses from which they’ve fallen, … to fend for themselves?</p><p>I am isolating three signifiers, each written in lower case letters: <em>repetition</em>, which is a variation on repeating, <em>routine</em>, which is a mode of repetition captured by the imaginary, and <em>stability</em>. We’ve discussed the question of repetition, which seems to me to be necessary for a psychoanalytic Society. As for routine, Jacques-Alain Miller elaborated its consequences in both Freud and Lacan’s calling into question any routinization of the transmission of psychoanalysis: there is always the danger, says Miller in his course, of the psychoanalytic Society falling into routine. As for the third signifier, stability, I’m introducing it after extracting it from Lacan’s teaching so as to bring it to bear on the conditions necessary for sustaining analytic discourse. Stability therefore operates against the temptation for repetition to fall into routine.</p><p>The development of Statutes is therefore secondary to the analysis of the desire of the Society. Lacan had said to the Italians, who sought to establish a School, that the test of their efforts would involve stability. Stability, then, in terms of the ability to maintain analytic discourse. He said: “in order to make a seat of psychoanalytic discourse, the society must be put to the test, which will be settled on the basis of its stability.” Im the psychoanalytic Society, it is not a question of deliberation, of whether or not agreement or disagreement will prevail, nor a matter of whether one should exclude difficult personalities in our midst; the question is whether or not there is a subject of the Society which faces the test to defend analytic discourse or retreat.</p><p><strong>Freud and the Group</strong></p><p>Lacan noted that Freud’s analysis of group formations, of what distinguished the crowd from the group, came ten years after the establishment of his International Psychoanalytic Association. In his text, titled “The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956,” which you can go read if you wish, Lacan stated the following:</p><blockquote>We must begin with the remark, which has never before been made, to the best of my knowledge, that Freud started the International Psychoanalytic Association along its path ten years before he became interested, as we see in his text <em>Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego</em>, in the mechanisms that make an organic group, such as the Church or the army, like a crowd.</blockquote><p>Lacan continued:</p><blockquote>Had he become attentive to these [group] effects earlier on, Freud would no doubt have wondered about the field left to the dominance of the function of the boss, in an organization which, in order to sustain his very speech, certainly could, as in the models he studied, strike a balance by resorting to a symbolic link — that is, to a tradition and a discipline — but not in the same manner, since the objective of tradition and discipline in psychoanalysis is to call into question their very crux, along with man’s relation to speech.</blockquote><p>What is Lacan proposing here? He’s proposing the following: that the questioning of tradition and discipline in psychoanalysis is itself part of the tradition and discipline of psychoanalysis. It is a question raised regarding that which repeats in the form of routinization, and its implications for the stability of psychoanalytic discourse. The hole that has been opened up within existing discourse through the Freudian device known as the unconscious, leads away from the sort of group which, according to Freud, thinks in images, without critical faculty, knowing neither doubt nor uncertainty, without any limits and so without impossibility. Moreover, Freud had been led to conclude that “groups never thirst after truth but instead demand illusions, and cannot do without them.”</p><p>What is the relation of the subject of the Society to psychoanalysis? What does the psychoanalytic Society want from psychoanalysis? The Society’s subject is not reducible to its individual members, though the question concerns each insofar as I suppose that the question produces effects for them. This is not without interest for psychoanalytic transmission, which means this: a psychoanalysis taken as far as possible toward its conclusion. Lacan repeated, though never in quite the same way, that the end of analysis concerns the passage from analysand to analyst. For example, in Seminar XV: “the analysand who has come to the end of the analysis in the act, if there is one, carries him to become a psychoanalyst.” Can the subject give an account of the passage from analysand to analyst? There is a device within the School, named the “Pass,” which places this possibility into question.</p><p><strong>Desire of the Group</strong></p><p>Jacques-Alain Miller, in his text, which you can find on our website, titled “The Turin Theory of the Subject of the School,” stated the following, with respect to the Italian case of establishing a School:</p><blockquote>The Italian School does not yet exist from the legal point of view. From the subjective point of view, it does indeed exist, and we come together under its signifier. What is the status of the School before it becomes a legal subject? It is caught up in a desire, it comes into being in the form of a desire before coming into being in the form of a legal subject. It is this that has to be circumscribed. It does not only exist in the form of a vague or abstract desire, it exists already in the form of School events, that is, conversations, meetings, conferences, publications, the creation of multiple entities of transmission and research, and in the new articulation given to entities already in existence.</blockquote><p>I propose that this statement can be brought to bear upon the question of the psychoanalytic Society. What does our society and its activities make present of a desire for psychoanalysis? What does it manifest in terms of the relationship of the Society to the School?</p><p>On the question of the Society’s desire, there is also the possibility of identification. Freud placed identification at the centre of his analysis of group formations, and his reading of Dora’s cough offered him a relatable example: the symptom was interpreted as an identification with her father. Identification thus provided an answer to the question of being, suturing the hole in being. Lacan had added that “there is a beyond to identification,” which is taken up, according to Lacan at one point, in the passage of analysand to analyst. For Freud, something analogous to identification occurs in groups, particularly when they transform from crowds via the establishment of a leader: libidinal ties to its leader, or else libidinal relations to the others, its members.</p><p>Miller’s theory of the subject of the School asks what in the life of the group cannot be reduced to identifications. The School’s challenge to the Society is not one which asks for it to forgo Eros, but to preserve each one’s relation to psychoanalysis as if it were a fact of psychoanalytic transmission. Hence, Thanatos, death drive, preceding the Society, returns, but precisely in the Eros of the Society. Collective formation within the School is not premised entirely upon a principle of dissociation, that is, of subjective loneliness in the cause of psychoanalysis … a cause worth defending. In this way, the transmission of psychoanalysis seems to depend upon the elevation of the cartel, and in the manner in which each takes up analysis and supervision for themselves; without discounting, also, the fact of the “pass” as a measure of progress in analytic transmission.</p><p>By way of concluding, I would like to quote another passage from that text by Miller:</p><blockquote>A community came out of Freud’s desire which took the form of a Society, the analytic Society, of which the bedrock is the savage horde described in his text <em>Totem and Taboo</em>. This is linked to a father who is a living signifier, from which follows, after his death, the constitution of a fraternal syndicate, an elite of comrades, a mafia in a word, around his grave. Everything indicates that Freud’s desire was retained in the Oedipal logic, where the existence of a universal [community] is sustained by its antinomy with the one-who-is-not-like-the-others.</blockquote><p>I am isolating the “one-who-is-not-like-the-others” to the dignity of a concept. It is a one of pure difference in relation to other signifiers, that is a signifier one. One apart from the group, and yet, like Georg Simmel’s “stranger,” in his modern sociological essay, is nonetheless a member without belonging to the group. The “one-who-is-not-like-the-others” is one apart, set apart, as it were, from the Eros of the group, and yet, nonetheless, precisely, within the group. In Freud’s Oedipal logic, this is the one who is the father, or the leader. However, in the cartel, the one-apart is functionally taken up by the role of what is called a “plus-one,” that is, one who provokes elaboration of work for each one within the group according to their own solitary relation to psychoanalysis. It is a function which promotes the circulation around a hole, and due to which, evokes desire. The cartel is a provocation which utilizes the hole to establish a movement from identification toward transference, that is, not to the subject-supposed-to-know but rather to the work of the School whose product is psychoanalytic knowledge.</p><p>How can this effect be preserved in a Society, and to what extent? What lessons does it provide to the psychoanalytic Society? While the plus-one and the cartel do not guarantee that the group will escape its own identifications, nor its libidinal relations across cartelsands; it avoids the crowd while including provisions for provoked elaboration. In part, this distinguishes the School from a Society, organized around shared identification. Lacan’s invention of the School does not therefore render the analytic Society unnecessary. Rather, it establishes a place from which the Society can extract questions of itself concerning what sort of collective formation serves the transmission of psychoanalysis within the particular context in which each Society finds itself; it does this by promoting the singular relation of each one to psychoanalysis as a profession.</p><p>Miller concluded: “Lacan’s desire went beyond the Oedipus, and from him came, not an analytic society, but a School.” In other words, the analytic Society is by its very nature tempted by the model of Oedipus, and by the retreat into existing discourses such as the International Psychoanalytic Association<em>. </em>This does not imply that the Psychoanalytic Society is without a necessary function for the transmission of psychoanalysis. It is from the Society that a subject emerges in its relation to psychoanalysis, a subject which can be circumscribed, and which can be brought up against the question of the School and psychoanalysis. Hence, alongside the three signifiers I mentioned earlier, to be written in lower case letters, namely <em>repetition,</em> <em>routine</em>, and <em>stability</em>, I am introducing the following additional three signifiers, each written, as is customary, with the first letter capitalized: <em>Society</em>, <em>School</em>, and <em>Psychoanalysis.</em></p><p><strong>The Remaining Question</strong></p><p>The question which remains: what does the Pakistan Psychoanalytic Society want from psychoanalysis? I am not intending to announce or establish a new program of work as a separate line of activity alongside existing work […] I am raising a question that modulates ongoing work. The question of the Society is precisely this one, what does the Pakistan Psychoanalytic Society want from psychoanalysis? […] It’s not a question I’m imposing upon the Society, … it’s the question that the Society is asking.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cd45ffb9a3ca" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[On the Politics of Psychoanalytic Societies: A Few Thoughts From Pakistan]]></title>
            <link>https://duanerousselle.medium.com/on-the-politics-of-psychoanalytic-societies-a-few-thoughts-from-pakistan-63d0bb916dd1?source=rss-452e35df90bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/63d0bb916dd1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[freud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lacan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Duane Rousselle, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 07:14:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-20T07:30:24.994Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For more than three years, spreading Lacanian psychoanalysis in Pakistan, challenges have emerged, leading, in one case, toward dissolution of the group formation. These are fundamental challenges to the spread of psychoanalysis, the latter of which promotes personal analysis, formation of cartels, supervision, and, through these, a fostering of transference to the School.</p><p>A provision for Eros has been installed in what’s been called our “Pakistan Psychoanalytic Society,” to which I’m quick to append “&amp; Circle.” The PPS and PPS&amp;C, not to be confused, since the former has been elevated to steering cartel of the latter, within which itself is included, thereby charging itself with a responsiblity: promoting the transmission of Lacanian psychoanalysis in the country.</p><p>The ‘scattered and ill-assorted,’ therefore brought into tension, rather than relief, by the Eros of group experience; raising the question of the Society and its politics. I bring to this a question of the Society as charged with the spread of psychoanalysis and not with the politics inspired by any group experience. In other words, the Society would not be a psychoanalytic discourse because of the constant bowing before the temptation to replicate existing societies, those which are without psychoanalytic cooridinates known to mark any counterpoint whatsoever.</p><p>Jacques-Alain Miller, in his seminar titled “The Analyst’s Banquet,” said: “[t]he question is ‘can analysts only make a society like any other, like non-analysts — who do it very well, especially through identification?” Or, can they install psychoanalytic coordinates for themselves? Does a psychoanalytic society have a duty incumbent upon itself to remain committed primarily to the training of psychoanalysts without collapsing due to the temptation toward existing political, academic, or segregative societies? Coordinates for training have a place within the Society, as a shared Ideal of its group formation, even if they are placed into question; and even if they thereby return to Thanatos, its scattering and ill-assorting: a duty to return constituents to training, the mainspring from which its Society has emerged.</p><p>A trap has been set for any Society: its steering cartel are also those who, due to experience or knowledge, or both, are placed into transference, and, therefore, an expectation of governance. Its plus-one is therefore subjected to a question, even demand: the subject supposed to know the politics of the Society. Its President becoming analyst of the society, fielding demands and queries from its members, and thereby dutifully presenting the distinction, ever more apparent, between the psychoanalytic Society, with its political implications, and the psychoanalytic School; transference to the latter being essential for any Society to overcome the political discourse into which it becomes constantly thrown.</p><p>A Society is implicated in politics, to a greater or lesser extent. It thus has one foot outside of its mission, which is the ground upon which it stands, namely, the spread of psychoanalysis; this mission is not lost upon its President, at minimum, and its steering cartel, more or less. The reasons for this are clear: an executive committee, so-called “steering cartel,” alongside the financialization of the PPS&amp;C’s activities (e.g., money in the bank), invites either a democratic solution (e.g., each member votes on the direction of the group; which could be the worst way forward, much worse than dissolution), or an apparently autocratic one (e.g., “I trust our president’s decisions”).</p><p>The latter being more desirable, should the president recognize the role into which he has been placed by his work, which is that of the subject supposed to know. Premature liquidation of such an effect will do nothing for the spread of psychoanalysis anymore than it would, within analysis proper, promote a mature end to the analysis. Rather, its function for the facilitation of the direction of the Society until such time as its members have passed through the greater part of their own analysis, is the strength of a politics subjected to the interests of psychoanalysis.</p><p>After ex-communication from the Société Française de Psychanalyse, Lacan’s move was not to found another “Society,” but rather a “School,” namely the École Freudienne de Paris. It was a shift not only in name but also in the fundamental logic of the psychoanalytic group experience. Non-analysts were invited into the School, subject to the promotion of cartels, or what Miller has called ‘micro-societies.’</p><p>In the PPS, an executive committee is formed on the basis of each members’ (1) work in prior years within the Society, (2) a satisfaction of the condition of being in analysis with someone proximate to the School, and (3) duty of spreading Lacanian and Freudian psychoanalysis in the country, of thereby establishing a field which is Freudian. While the PPS&amp;C promotes cartels, the executive cartel does not meet its conditions in its entirety: the cartel is currently made up of <em>mostly </em>non-analysts, which is not exactly the same principle as a School inviting <em>non-analysts. </em>In the School, on the contrary, its executive committees are made up exclusively of Analysts.</p><p>Moreover, the executive committee of the PPS separates itself in function from its general membership and from the wider circle, whereby the rank of general member is decidedly affixed to those newly established ‘repeaters’ who’ve worked in the prior year for the Society’s interests and are willing to register their desire to do it in the year ahead. Taken together, then, there is hierarchy: (1) executive committee, or ‘established repeaters,’ under its President as ‘plus-one,’ who maintains the ‘hole’ and thereby is the recipient of transference; (2) general membership, whose promise provides an opportunity to raise themselves to it, and; (3) the ‘wild’ circle, which is a proxy or interface between existing discourses and the one that is now coming into formation vis-a-vis the School.</p><p>There is always, at-least-one with transference to the School, within the executive committee; and until now, that is, and shall be, the President. This does not require transference to the School or psychoanalysis, but it does require that one does not block the activities which are crucial to the training which grounds the group experience and the analysis upon which it is founded.</p><p>Miller adds:</p><blockquote>This is why a School is not an Analytical Society. [W]hat makes a society different from a School is that [the latter] necessarily doesn’t have people working at the top. The Society is supposed to be headed by people who have worked, who are already retired, or who can be retired. In a School, you don’t retire. And, precisely, what we’ve preserved, at difficult times in the School of Lacan, was the chance to establish transference to Lacan’s work — not to block the ways of transference of Lacan’s work.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=63d0bb916dd1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Scribbles on Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” (1894)]]></title>
            <link>https://duanerousselle.medium.com/scribbles-on-freuds-the-neuro-psychoses-of-defense-1894-c054a619c581?source=rss-452e35df90bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c054a619c581</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freud]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Duane Rousselle, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Aug 2026 08:56:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-30T08:56:13.620Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I</p><p>Freud claims to have discovered, through his case-work, the origin of pathological ideas in symptoms among phobics and obsessionals. He calls it a “psychological theory of phobias and obsessions.” And here he describes them in terms of symptomology. He then moves on to claim that at the same time he was working on a theory of hysteria, or rather a new theory, which finds something in common with the origin of hysterical symptoms, as well as phobic and obsessional. Finally, he claims that there is a common origin in psychosis as well as neurosis.</p><p>He begins with a discussion on the “change” he discovered was required in his prevailing theory of hysterical neurosis. Hysterical neurosis allows us to conclude that consciousness is split, but it does not allow us to speak conclusively yet about the origins of this splitting. Freud explores Breuer’s theory that splitting in hysteria is subsequent to psychological development and “acquired.” He adds: “it comes about because the ideas which emerge in hypnoid states are cut off from associative communication with the rest of the content of consciousness.” This would point toward what in other areas we can call the “fantasmatic scene,” inasmuch as it governs a particular associative connection, stifled, stuck, which fuels splitting and therefore desire, but which is itself cut from the wider associative connections governing the actual movement of signifiers.</p><p>Freud goes on to attempt to refute Janet’s claim that splitting is primary rather than acquired. Freud had attempted to show that splitting is actively maintained by the patient rather than something at the base of one’s psychical behaviors and decisions. This implies, if my earlier claim is correct about fantasy, that it fantasy is actively maintained in the here-and-now of patient behavior rather than an actual foundational moment in childhood. This accounts for the longevity of the foundation in time, one which repeats rather than forms an actual basis. This also serves the thesis of Lacan that “repression and return of the repressed” are the same function: the effect is precisely attributable also as cause. The fantasy is actively presented, or staged, almost as if by the will of the neurotic patient. At this stage, Freud calls it “defense hysteria,” which shows that hysteria is not entirely foundational but a defense against something, perhaps the real which exists beyond and through the fantasy.</p><p>From this, Freud attempts to transfer some ideas to phobias and obsessions. He refers to patients who cannot resolve contradictory thoughts, between an idea and the ego, for example, and so forgets about the contradiction entirely, becoming passive, and moves forward without surmounting the conflict. It is an attempt to ‘not think it,’ also characteristic, says Freud, of many female patients whose defence against sexual thoughts by putting it out of mind. Of course, this is no assurance of the incapable thought being erased. This is what led Freud to remind his readers that many of his patients, by attempting to push the thought out of mind, actually allowed it to reappear through pathological disturbances: hysteria, obsession, or even hallucinatory psychosis. Since ‘forgetting’ does not diminish the libidinal charge of the associated idea, which is repressed, but merely displaces it into the symptomatic condition itself. Freud nonetheless says that the defense does, in a way, diminish the libidinal connection, but only at the expense of the symptomatic remainder: “turning this powerful idea into a weak one, in robbing it of the affect — the sum of excitation.” However, he continues: “but the sum of excitation which has been detached from it must be put to another use.”</p><p>Defense therefore seems to describe a condition whereby one defends against excitation in order to reintroduce it through another more management, and even more acceptable, means, that is, in the symptom; yet, the symptom is nonetheless something according to which one can assume diminished responsibility, particularly at the level of the ego, and to which one can say, as if by alibi: “I demand for this symptom to be cured, but only if it means that you leave my defense intact.” Of course, the defense cannot be left intact if one wants to treat the symptom; at least, not in the same way.</p><p>Now, Freud begins to show the differences in defenses across the three cases: hysteria, phobia, and obsession. For hysteria, he claims that the excitation aroused by the incompatible idea is “transformed into something somatic.” This is from where he produces the name: “conversion.” A conversion symptom, therefore. At this point, it is worth noting that in every case, the defense, according to Freud, is a defense against a traumatic moment; this is what Lacan will later refer to as a “hole.” The question of defense against the hole, that is, of foreclosure of the hole, is appropriate in the discussion of neurosis. In the case of psychosis, Lacan will go on to say it is not foreclosure of the hole, per se, but foreclosure of the function which installs the hole, namely the paternal signifier.</p><p>The fact that one can restore the displaced idea in hypnoid states, through suggestion, demonstrates, according to Freud, not that splitting is fundamental but rather that conversion is fundamental; thus, it is a shift from repression as the mechanism toward the particular mechanism of repression that is the quality of its defense: the hysteric converts the excitation, to bring it into another psychical group. Freud wrote that hysterics have the capacity, that is “a psychophysical aptitude for transposing very large sums of excitation into the somatic innervation.”</p><p>II</p><p>Freud moves onto obsession where the affectively charge idea doesn’t convert into somatic symptoms but rather attaches to other incompatible and inconsistent ideas, forging connections which are precisely of the domain of the logic of the signifier, abstract, and often largely intangible upon its immediate presentation. The affect is forged as a “false connection,” where the analyst might ask: why should that affect be tethered to that other idea? Freud admits that in obsession, the origin can sometimes be less clear than in hysteria. Hence, in obsession, one can find the false connection, but not so easily discover the origin — except that it must have happened. It’s a “dislodged or transposed” anxiety. However, the obsessional can come to admit that these are dislodged or transposed sexual scenes.</p><p>Unlike hysterical conversion, obsessional defenses do not always provide much benefit to the patient. The affect remains nonetheless the same, rather than displaced. The obsessional ideas, in three cases presented by Freud, all female, return, even if there are protestations, to an incompatible sexual idea.</p><p>III</p><p>In each case, the affective charge was separated from its originating sexual idea; the idea was able to reveal itself in consciousness, but without the affective charge at its strongest. Freud argues that there is another example of defense: the ego rejects the incompatible idea entirely, and behaves as if it never occurred, even in the first place. This is the psychotic defense. Freud defines hallucinatory psychosis: “the accentuation of the idea which was threatened by the precipitating cause of the onset of the illness.” Freud provides some basic examples: “the mother who has fallen ill from the loss of her baby, and now rocks a piece of wood unceasingly in her arms, or the jilted bride who, arrayed in her wedding dress, has for years been waiting for her bridegroom.”</p><p>Freud’s conclusion: these three forms of defense can in fact be present in one person.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c054a619c581" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Scribbles on Benjamin’s “Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”]]></title>
            <link>https://duanerousselle.medium.com/scribbles-on-benjamins-work-of-art-in-the-age-of-mechanical-reproduction-d4ee75bc4f12?source=rss-452e35df90bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d4ee75bc4f12</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[walter-benjamin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lacan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marxism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[art]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Duane Rousselle, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 29 Aug 2026 07:43:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-29T07:45:19.216Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Walter Benjamin undertook his critique of the age of reproduction, this mode was still in its infancy. Benjamin directed his efforts toward the status of the object vis-a-vis its authenticity and reproducibility in the literate age whose logic was best characterized by Marshall McLuhan as one of sequentiality, unidirectionality, and discreteness. What he could not foresee was the birth of intelligence machines, those which elevate novelty to the dignity of the repeated encounter with rupture, such that each production situates not the loss of distinctiveness and authenticity, but precisely the convergence of authenticity and distinctiveness. The man whose partner has abused him will, upon each encounter, recognize it as the unique circumstance in which he found himself, each partner not being at all related to the last, and, certainly, he himself having exited from any responsibility for inviting this repeated encounter with difference.</p><p>One could not have easily foresaw the thread which connected scientific management and the production line to that of universal creativity: whereas the one operated in a world of finite laws, governed by a logic of repression, the new scene presents itself not as a coherent worldview but as an infinite universe whose laws are a consequence of process rather than informative or determinative of those processes: we are like the man set into the wild in the video game Minecraft, having to chip away at the infinite wild so as to carve out some space for ourselves: it’s a matter of existence, of survival. The subject chips away at the world to build the cave within which his subjectivity can rest.</p><p>In both cases, whether in Benjamin or Marx, the effort was to move backward in order to understand what is coming ahead. Thus, Benjamin wrote that “[Marx] went back to the basic conditions underlying capitalist production and through his presentation showed what could be expected of capitalism in the future.” Yet, this picture was certainly too optimistic: the conditions would have been established for the abolition of capitalism. Quite to the contrary, one cannot predict the contingent logic of capital, such that capitalism would appear to have abolished <em>itself</em> if only in order to give way to an advanced stage, one which recedes through its advancement, namely that of “feudal capitalism,” or, to be even more precise, capitalism proceeding in a feudal mold. It is the reduction of dialecitc to the logic of repetition. In this stage, markets are, as Varafoukis correctly identified, governed by systems of feudal envelopes, of which there are a finite list. Take, as an example, the Amazon market, which follows the logic of cloud capital and which sets parameters upon the markets under its purview. Thus, state capitalism renews itself, sure, but through the conduit of capital itself rather than through the legislative or prohibitive powers of the state.</p><p>It is the analytic power of the twin concepts “superstructure” and “base” which has truly lost its conceptual power: in the case of artificial intelligence, the superstructure demonstrates itself to be consistent with the logic of the base, the latter folding into the former, such that one is tempted toward another thesis, once again that of McLuhan’s, namely that media constitutes a sort of gravity, the laws of which prove a simple thesis: that we shape our tools and our tools shape us. This Freudian/Lacanian-McLuhanian thesis obscures the approach which emphasizes the environment within which exchange occurs, in order to pivot to the question concerning the symptomatic dimension of our tools; the foremost of which may very well be that of money. Freud returned money to the body, and to the ‘hole,’ demonstrating that all tools are indeed more than simply extensions of the body but have their basis therein: the body being either a stick or a donut with a hole.</p><p>The thesis of Freud finds footing here: all tools, all gadgets, especially those of scientific capitalism, constitute efforts to surpass the limits of the body until, quite simply, we can confirm, as we have with artificial intelligence, that we also have no need of the world of limits. Hence, the phallic orbit within which so much of social theory and social science has proceeded; Freud and Lacan had exposed another logic, that of the feminine, whose “not-all” logic proceeds according to the contingent encounter. It is on the basis of the S1, collapsing into the real, that the capitalist discourse has any foothold whatsoever.</p><p>The intervention point for Benjamin is not in the mimicry of art, but in the <em>volume</em> of mimicry permitted by the expansion of our tools: hence, in the age of mechanical reproduction, mimicry is elevated. In the movement of the discussion of the printing press, lithography, tracing, and so on, it is the tool which captures Benjamin’s imagination, and it is the tool which becomes subsumed under a faulty Marxian framework which imposes onto it, not a reduction of its conceptual weight but rather an amplification of the analogy of an erroneous and distracting structure: base and superstructure. Lets agree to never reduce structure to concept again; Marxists having made examples of the problem, and media ecologists, psychoanalysts having found a way out. At the very least, the base and superstructure model operates in the age of housing, not in the age of foreclosure where radical homelessness pervades and the original analogy loses its track.</p><p>It is to the question of a work of art’s status as a media object, that is as a tool, or, in the final analysis, a symptom, which is lost upon Benjamin at each interval when it is discovered: hence, the reduction of the authenticity of art-work to its place in space-time, that is, to suppose it as an object of considerable mass. This places the work of art in the age of the filing cabinet, without recognizing the longing that one must have for yesterday’s files by way of this thinking: the filing cabinet, claimed McLuhan, brought the office worker to the office (space) for a certain period of time, say 9am until 5pm (time). The cloud archive distributes the workers in space-time, revealing the incredible lightness of being.</p><p>The description of a “withering” of aura, therefore succumbs to an affectation of nostalgia: trying to solve today’s problems with yesterday’s tools. Yet, for Benjamin, it is the detachment of the object from its aura that is symptomatic, and not the attachment of the aura to its object. This is the first major error in judgment made by Benjamin, since the symptom can, in many cases, especially in hysterical neurosis, be brought back to the body. It is when, through interpretation, something of the symptom can be dislodged, a movement from sign to signifier or from concrete to abstract, that the weight of the symptom begins to present itself. Let us call this the therapeutics of the object.</p><p>In this case, the therapeutics of the object is treated by the advancement of capitalism. Benjamin writes that “to pry an object from its shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception whose ‘sense of the universal equality of things’ has increased to such a degree that it extracts it even from a unique object by means of reproduction.” To maintain the “anti-capitalist” position, one first must enter capitalism.</p><p>One wonders if the latest stage in fact challenges Benjamin’s thesis, casting it to the dustbin of history: in the age of artificial intelligence, the age of artistic production, there is not a universal equality of objects but rather a heightened sequential diversity of objects, where, one by one, each object stands alone, and its barely discernible traits are felt as eerily/errily similar to any other, but without any obviousness that this is the case. What repeats, therefore, is what never can repeat again. In the age of the collapse of dialectic to repetition, one should therefore think through the great challenge of Max Stirner to the Marxists, namely that by killing God we have indeed only renewed him in a purer form, by which he meant that we have not got any better: from dialectics to repetition, … its worse.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d4ee75bc4f12" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Scribbles from the workbooks…]]></title>
            <link>https://duanerousselle.medium.com/scribbles-from-the-workbooks-ee1eacc1b443?source=rss-452e35df90bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ee1eacc1b443</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Duane Rousselle, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 07:31:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-25T15:41:32.318Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the question of those British psychotherapists who come every year for a few short days to visit us in Pakistan — long enough to shake a few hands, but never long enough as to contribute to the necessary formation of any psychoanalytic movement that would be close to the experience it promotes. The question of payment — namely, who has paid the price for the trip and for the lodging — matters much less than the fact that these moves are leveraged for metrics and outputs that provide fuel to the university discourse, and the reigning ideologies. It’s even a matter of exposing the ideological commitments which obscure any possible encounter with psychoanalysis: eclecticism, shrouded in a moral voice which seeks to develop puppets alienated in the voice of the other.</p><p>Only to be swept up in a new colonial game: that of having one’s voice softened in one’s very attempt to discover in it an edge, by ventriloquists, hidden behind the good enough breast, whose motivations demonstrate, through the act, that formation is secondary rather than preliminary.</p><p>Why shouldn’t I be bold enough to say it plainly? No psychoanalysis is possible within such conditions. Destitution, the wish for a better life, means that those tempted by the game may actually get what they wish for — but lose, in the process, any psychoanalytic formation; and indeed, along with it, any psychoanalytic initiative that would proceed from one’s own position; thereby forgoing the development of coordinates that are essential in the pass to the analyst provided that one restores the edge which had been blunted by mimicry, credit chasing, and other confabulations.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ee1eacc1b443" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Orientation by Surprise (Keynote)]]></title>
            <link>https://duanerousselle.medium.com/orientation-by-surprise-keynote-642906e8739f?source=rss-452e35df90bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/642906e8739f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[karachi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lacan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surprise]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Duane Rousselle, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 08:36:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-12T08:44:30.249Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“Orientation by Surprise: Psychoanalytic Coordinates for Professional Practice in Pakistan”</p><p>Transcript of Keynote<br>Psychology Congress 2026<br>A Behavioral Science Perspective<br>Department of Psychology, University of Karachi<br>August 12th, 2026</p><p>1.</p><p>Asalam Alaykum. I’d like to begin by expressing my gratitude to Professor Dr. Farah Iqbal, Chairperson of the Department of Psychology and Conference Secretariat, University of Karachi, for the kind invitation and generous hospitality. I’d also like to acknowledge the presence and efforts of all of the organizers and distinguished guests of this conference. Thank you.</p><p>It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to say something by way of orienting our discussions over the course of this conference. I’d like to begin with a confession: I was surprised to be invited to deliver this keynote. Admittedly, this is not the first time that I’ve been surprised in this way. However, it’s the first time that I’ve put myself to work to answer the question, “why?” Why have I been asked to provide this keynote? I think the answer may be of some interest to some of you, so I’m going to try to develop it.</p><p>I eventually realized that the answer to this question had much less to do with me than with something that concerns every profession represented in this room: the place of surprise in our work. So, my answer is rather simple: we often recognize in one another not only expertise, but a certain desire within the work itself. Psychoanalysis has taught me to take that desire seriously. I call that a “resolute desire,” which sustains the work.</p><p>A resolute desire is often mistaken for stubbornness, dogmatism, fixation. But they are not the same thing. Stubbornness resists contingency; a resolute desire welcomes it.</p><p>The question I want to leave with you is therefore a simple one: can we greet contingency with an open hand? In other words, can one bear to place oneself in the midst of those surprises which inevitably present themselves to us in our personal and professional lives? Moreover, can one do so within the context of prevailing social structures whose effects are often, on the contrary, to predict, plan, or calculate results in advance? Alongside every science devoted to generalization or prediction or therapeutics, narrative, or meaning, there is also a science of the singular; one not concerned with eliminating surprise but with learning how to orient oneself in relation to it. As for psychoanalysis, it places surprise at the very heart of its practice. This question is especially relevant to psychology, where we encounter human behavior precisely because it refuses to be completely anticipated. I raise this question for you to explore privately: can you bear to explore the consequences of these surprises which inevitably characterize so much of your interpersonal and professional lives? How do you greet the surprise when it extends its hand toward you?</p><p>The fact is that psychoanalysis arrived in Pakistan as a surprise. It has remained here through the initiative of a few who reached back toward it with their repeated participation and work. These ‘repeaters,’ as I playfully refer to those who return to the work, are pioneers; and they work without any guarantee of credit, recognition, success, or reward. So, if I am surprised to be here then it is because I could not have predicted that something of this psychoanalytic orientation would have landed in Pakistan; I could not have calculated how best to ensure that it would be welcomed, particularly within the halls of higher education and the eclectic infrastructure that characterizes this country’s vibrant clinical institutes.</p><p>[Lights shut off, microphone stops working. Duane continues without microphone in the dark]</p><p>The surprise which has oriented my work here has extended further still: I never quite know where my words will lead when I am invited to speak. Honestly, when I speak in forums such as this one I feel that I am taking some ‘risk.’ It’s a convenient word, “risk,” because although it is not etymologically related, it carries for me an unexpected phonetic resonance with the Arabic word “rizq,” spelled “r-i-z-q,” with which many of you may be familiar. In any case, for each surprising invitation, I am forced, like anyone else, to invent something that might not only resonate but perhaps also open a pathway to the experience that I’m promoting.</p><p>[Lights turn back on]</p><p>We have more than enough power in this room, don’t we?</p><p>These efforts have produced results which are immediately apparent: a few people introduce themselves after I speak, and they indicate that they’ve taken some interest in what was said. I contend that there is no amount of intonation, gesticulation, or intellectual persuasion that can necessarily guarantee those results.</p><p>[Lights shut off, microphone stops working. Duane continues without microphone]</p><p>“Orientation-by-surprise” … is the position from which I attempt to speak and work. It is not a position that <em>guarantees</em> effects, but one that remains open to them. By orientation, I do not mean a method that guarantees outcomes. Rather, I mean a way of positioning oneself when outcomes cannot be guaranteed. Although every scholar or practitioner has some relation to surprises in their work, they are not necessarily oriented by them. And that makes quite the difference. The fact is that we are constantly surprised in our pedagogical or clinical work. We are surprised, for example, when we enter the classroom with carefully planned learning outcomes only to encounter a student question that takes the lesson somewhere we did not anticipate. Some of you have experienced the difficult situation of arriving at your classroom only to be confronted with technological problems that throw you into contingency: how can I present what I’ve prepared without guardrails?</p><p>We are also surprised, as clinical practitioners, when a patient presents a new fact about their suffering that forces us to reconsider an initial diagnosis, a treatment plan, or even our own assumptions about what brought them to us. These are the facts of the trade, and surprises are just as much a clinical or pedagogical fact as they are a social fact. We are born into a world full of surprises, and yet most of our discourses and structures are designed to mitigate those surprises, to overcome them, to capture them, and so on.</p><p>I propose that we think about how to orient ourselves in this surprising world, and how we might allow surprise to become more fundamental to our professional experiences. Prevailing institutions, discourses, and practices are not always designed to accommodate surprise; they often translate it into existing frameworks of knowledge or expected behaviors. ‘Can you bear to put yourself in the throes of surprises?’ is a question well worth sitting with, and one that can be foundational for the resolute desire that is required for the work that we do.</p><p>Now, I’d like to move to a second point.</p><p>2.</p><p>If surprise is the condition of our work, then speech is the medium through which many of those surprises are delivered. As I see it, there are two fundamental ways that something surprising can be delivered in speech. First, there is the so-called ‘slip of the tongue,’ when we intended to say one thing, but something else was in fact said. I’ll return to that in a moment. Second, there is the surprising fact that we can sometimes say something that has never been said before. The condition for this second fact is that there be ‘something impossible to say.’ When there is something that is impossible to say, it is a bit like speaking into the void. For example, when I came to this country, not only I was surprised by the interest that people already had in psychoanalysis, but I was confronted with the difficulty of speaking about it as a profession within the context of Pakistan. I will say it like this: this is a country without an established relationship to psychoanalysis.</p><p>So, it might seem surprising that Pakistan can have its own orientation to psychoanalysis. That’s our chance. It’s an opportunity to speak into the space where something has not yet been established. This is what I mean by speaking into the void: speaking where there is no established guarantee that one will be heard, recognized, or understood. Despite the fact that it is impossible to say something about psychoanalysis in Pakistan, I am nonetheless attempting to say something about it. This act of saying can itself produce effects. Why? Firstly, because speech, being the medium that all of our professions share, is a special medium: it is in the nature of speaking that you do not know what you’ve said until after you say it. Already, this is enough for us to ground a rather compelling science of these beings who speak in our classrooms and in our clinics.</p><p>I’ll provide you with a rather silly example. If I say “I like pizza,” then you might immediately conclude that “Duane likes pizza.” But the sentence can continue: “‘I like pizza,’ said Yousuf, ‘but as for me, I’m not fond of it.’” You see that the meaning that initially appeared has been subverted by what came later. The point is that meaning is not always present before one concludes what one is saying. Quite simply, you cannot know what is being said until after you say it. Begin, therefore, when possible, by distinguishing <em>what has been said </em>from what one is <em>saying. </em>It’s a distinction of the <em>said </em>and the <em>saying. </em>One could have every intention to say something, indeed one could make every plan to do so; but it just takes a slight change in intonation, a slip of the tongue, or a later utterance for the entire thing to derail into another meaning.</p><p>So do not make your conclusions prematurely. There are cases when speaking into the void means that one can pioneer something that hasn’t yet been said. When one is speaking into the void, there is no guarantee that what is said will resonate; and yet, one can nonetheless persist in saying it. We do not know what will be said at this conference about behavioral science and psychology, we cannot predict what effects might be produced by our efforts here; and we cannot foresee what surprises are in store for us over the duration of this congress. We operate without any guarantee that what we say will land. And it has been the same with psychoanalysis in this country: we are in the time of <em>saying it.</em></p><p>Hence, when I was first welcomed in Pakistan, before I knew that this place would become something like a home for me, I did not at all take it upon myself to spread psychoanalysis far and wide. My ambitions were more modest: I came here to work at the Aga Khan University. It came as a surprise that others were interested enough in psychoanalysis to continually gather in its cause, and to provide platforms for psychoanalytic talks and discussions. What began next as an ambitious task of trying to capture thousands into its net, mutated into an equally ambitious task of trying to train a few so that a resolute desire might emerge in each of them, which alone can assist the spread of psychoanalysis.</p><p>But soon colleagues began to ask me the question concerning the history of psychoanalysis in Pakistan. It was a question that tormented me. I struggled with it. First, I asked myself: “who am I as a <em>gora</em>, visitor to this country, to tell the story of its psychoanalytic history?” The question persisted until I resolved to reflect the question back upon those who asked it, putting them to work to construct something of an answer to it. In the end, even they were left largely empty handed: speaking into the void of our psychoanalytic history. To confront that obstacle directly: there has not yet been a continuous institutional history of psychoanalysis in Pakistan. However, what we encounter is not simply an absence, but an open space in which something possible can emerge. Let this be a lesson to all of you who struggle to say something that hasn’t been said yet.</p><p>My profession is built upon testimonies of the curious fact that saying something can sometimes produce effects, including a reduction in the potency of our suffering. Let’s not mistake this for a naive belief that speaking is always therapeutic. In some cases, speaking can in fact increase suffering, even perpetuating it. We are all familiar with the classic case of the person who goes on rambling forever, with apparently limitless vocal effusions, and so our only choice is to walk away. So speaking is not by itself a panacea. For example, there’s no guarantee that you’ll be heard, or even that you’ll be heard in the way you intended to be heard. Moreover, there is no guarantee that you’ll have an audience for what you say. There was no established audience for psychoanalysis when it first emerged to lay bare the discontents of late modern civilization, and there was no established audience when psychoanalysis first began to find a footing in Pakistan. There is rarely an established audience when any genuinely new orientation first begins to speak.</p><p>I want to conclude with the following point, then: despite the valuable tools that are currently on offer in the behavioral sciences, those which elevate standards of measurability, prediction, generalization, quantification, evidence, and outcome; the fact is that they will never have the last word. There is no discourse or social structure on this planet that will ever have the last word. This ‘missing last word’ leaves open the possibility that we may yet be surprised by what it is that we are saying. If we can bear to remain in the midst of these surprises, with an openness to what emerges, a commitment to repeated work, and the courage to speak where nothing is guaranteed, then we may discover that the void is not an obstacle but .. an invitation .. to simply go on <em>saying it.</em></p><p>Thank you so much for listening.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=642906e8739f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[surākh]]></title>
            <link>https://duanerousselle.medium.com/sur%C4%81kh-515df8dd74a8?source=rss-452e35df90bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/515df8dd74a8</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Duane Rousselle, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 08 Aug 2026 21:20:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-27T03:15:39.097Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have put into question my place within the psychoanalytic society, Pakistan — a place not to be conflated with “role” except by lapsing into a discourse whose coordinates would not bring us any closer to what psychoanalysis can offer whatsoever.</p><p>The question is, ‘what makes a psychoanalytic society tick?’</p><p>“President,” appeals to the analogy of gravity: an assumption of mass, not without which a rapport seems to have been made possible with objects in space-time. But a psychoanalytic society, insofar as it is committed to an ethic, cannot assume President to be an object of considerable mass.</p><p>More appropriate: assume by black hole. At least this allows the desire of the analyst a return into psychoanalysis.</p><p>Jacques-Alain Miller in “Being is Desire,” distinguished the desire of the analyst (which is not unrelated to repression and lack) from the hole in the after-pass (as cause of desire). The president within an analytic society has a role to play only as surākh, hole.</p><p>Lacan’s “Founding Act” was a call for work which, “within the field Freud opened […] can restore the cutting edge of its truth?” This requires “sustained critique” capable of “denounc[ing] the deviations and compromises that encumber its progress and degrade its use.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=515df8dd74a8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The New Propagandhi Album]]></title>
            <link>https://duanerousselle.medium.com/the-new-propagandhi-album-157d9ce9b66e?source=rss-452e35df90bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/157d9ce9b66e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[propagandhi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[anarchism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[punk]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Duane Rousselle, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 12:14:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-06T17:42:11.375Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am a bit late to the game on this one. There is something interesting about the <em>return </em>of Propagandhi.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FLT8tWHRy05k%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DLT8tWHRy05k&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FLT8tWHRy05k%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/be30056a958b91db67cf523739764a12/href">https://medium.com/media/be30056a958b91db67cf523739764a12/href</a></iframe><p>Trends suggest a resurgence of ‘angry’ punk and hardcore music within popular culture. However, something has shifted in the lyrical content: if the prior lyrical themes were oppositional, focused essentially on social structure and hysterical revolutionary subjectivity, the new productions seem to focus on existential angst, and themes having to do with death and one’s own place in the world.</p><p>After a long gap in production, the Canadian punk-hardcore band Propagandhi have produced a new album tited “At Peace.” The album develops a number of themes having to do with ‘growing old,’ being ‘at peace’ and yet still having a few fits of ‘blinding rage,’ and opens into an anti-suicide track that attempts to isolate the ‘gift’ of subjectivity itself, which is just as enigmatic as anything else.</p><p>I welcome the new album and the new sound. The new battle is not against social structure per se but about defeating the death drive and inventing a way forward with one’s ‘gift,’ indeed, to invent a place for it in the world. The album punctuates this point, and leaves it open: “You may feel ill-equipped and aimlessly adrift, but you were sent here with a Gift. What will you do with it?”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=157d9ce9b66e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Love & War in a Sad Time: Part 2]]></title>
            <link>https://duanerousselle.medium.com/love-war-in-a-sad-time-part-2-9a2a436d2823?source=rss-452e35df90bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9a2a436d2823</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[freud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[melancholy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Duane Rousselle, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 12:00:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-27T12:01:35.511Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Note: What follows are slightly edited transcriptions from two seminars led for the European Journal of Psychoanalysis in 2022.</em></p><p><em>War has now become our reality. It is no longer a ‘knowledge’ transmitted to us from history books and assessed as if from a calm distance. We cannot escape its horrors. Millions of people lost their homes, thousands were killed — and violence continues. A painful knowledge is actively constructed by each one of us, shared through our conversations. This three-weeks philosophical and psychoanalytic lecture and discussion series will explore the following two questions: (1) what knowledge is relevant to what is at stake in times of war?, and (2) how can love survive a war? Join us as we try to invent a way to address love in a time of war.</em></p><blockquote>2</blockquote><p>I don’t know how to begin. To be honest, I typically don’t know when it will end either. I’ll begin in the future, in the infinite future within which we are all now caught.</p><p>For this reason, I deeply appreciate what Simone said during our discussion two weeks ago concerning the future, though my response was a bit moronic and premature. I said something like: ‘in a time of general war, there can be no future.’ There is <em>only </em>‘future.’ Perhaps this can teach us something about depression, melancholia.</p><p>I won’t claim that I’ve found many insights in the work of Franco Berardi, except one, which is worth highlighting, concerning the relationship of melancholic depression and the future. If I claimed two weeks ago that melancholia relates to an affirmative jouissance then today I aim to broach a theme concerning the affirmative future. Fortunately, I have a limited amount of time to do so, so I’ll get on with it.</p><p><strong>The Future Lasts Forever</strong></p><p><em>The Future Lasts Forever. </em>This was the English translation of the title of Louis Althusser’s biographical work. It was a book about murdering his wife. But it was also a book about melancholia psychosis, written by a person in the midst of it.</p><p>How does the book begin?</p><p>It begins with a description of the murder. We typically presume that the future occurs as a consequence of determinations occurring from the past. There is some sort of prior causal sequence. Hence, in criminal investigations there are discussions of ‘motives,’ or ‘intentions,’ which are, according to them, prior causes, causes originating from the past but giving rise to a culminating event: a pivotal transgression of the law. The field of criminology introduces these sorts of logical processes for punctuating sequences of events in history. In this way, criminologists, I would say, are often historians. In any case, the book begins from within the moment of a terrible event, beyond the transgression of the law, in the future; then it proceeds toward the development of a series, a narrative, <em>about the past. </em>This narrative about the past is nonetheless delivered from within the space of a limitless future.</p><p><strong>After the Fact</strong></p><p>To put it simply, the consequences become motivating. In this case, they motivate the writing of a book. When I read the passage about the murder, I notice that it happened quickly, without any forewarning: there are very few words dedicated by Althusser to describing it. He only tells us that he was silently massaging her neck, that he was pressing his thumb and forefingers together, and then, suddenly, he realized, <em>after the fact, </em>that she was dead. If I may, I’d put it like this: ‘his body just did that.’ Given the circumstances, to quote a great melancholic of political history: ‘what is to be done?’ Althusser went in search of a historical narrative, a history, in search of a prior cause unavailable to him during the attack. But there were only <em>consequences; </em>so we get a verbose biography instead. In fact, the book reads as a biography which was delivered according to a strange historical sequence.</p><p>Okay, he strangled her. She was a Russian sociologist who, in his words, became a mother to him. When reading the book I find myself suspended within that horror of the opening few pages, without any resolve, and without any sufficient explanation. Yet, the book was aimed to provide, precisely <em>that, </em>an explanation. At the very end of the book we find the final words, which are also the first words, that is, the very title of the book. And we also discover some love and beauty at the end. Yet, what is striking to me is that this love and beauty does not at all negate the unthinkable horrors that motivated the murder. They seem to co-exist, even, toward the end, in the same concluding paragraphs. Althusser was caught within a limitless future; yes, but <em>from the very beginning. </em>It is interesting how this limitless future bleeds into his past. Consequently, he remained, as he put it, ‘perpetually young.’ This expression could have been taken from Marinetti’s ‘Futurist Manifesto’: <em>we the young, the strong, the living futurists!</em></p><p><strong>Freedom Affirmed</strong></p><p>I will read the final passage from Althusser’s biography to you:</p><blockquote>I have also learnt what it is to love […] without the least coercion. To sum up, it is a question simply of freedom. Why did Cezanne paint […] at every available moment? Because the light of each moment is a gift. So, despite its dramas, life can still be beautiful. […] I feel younger now than I have ever […] Yes, the future lasts a long time.</blockquote><p>The great thinker of ideological determination wrote, here, about <em>freedom </em>in the affirmative sense. It is not a passage about freedom denied, since, as he put it, he learned how to love <em>without </em>coercion. Real love. In his prior work on ideology the signifier ‘freedom’ was ‘over-coded’ by prior determinations of superstructure. But in his future work there was testimony concerning the ‘freedom’ to love and the ‘freedom’ of beauty. But for the earlier Althusser, ideology never proclaimed itself to be ideological, by definition: that is, it always claimed to be <em>free </em>of its determinations. Hence, to claim to be free of ideology was precisely to be ensnared by those forces of the past, the ideological state apparatuses, including the schools, media, churches, family, and so on. The signifier slips out of these confines in the later work, frees itself of its ideological determinations: ‘freedom <em>without </em>coercion,’ meaning, finally, <em>without </em>ideology.</p><p>At this point I would claim that the ideological state apparatuses shifted into a different register for Althusser. To keep it short, ideology became <em>paranoiac. </em>Hence, to take a simple example, Althusser, in his late teaching, his biography, wrote:</p><blockquote>Everyone […] can judge the powerful role that certain violent organizations have played in my life. I used to refer to these as the <em>Ideological State Apparatuses</em>, and I am surprised I have been unable to do without them in understanding what happened to me (30).</blockquote><p>The ideological state apparatuses, which hitherto were said to operate through freedom and consent, suddenly became <em>violent </em>and <em>intrusive </em>apparatuses, taking on the characteristics of what he previously named the <em>repressive </em>state apparatuses. And at this moment Althusser made another adjustment to his theory: he moved away from his prior conviction that the schools (which, in turn, replaced religious institutions) were the central ideological apparatuses, toward a claim that the family was central: ‘it is an irrefutable fact that the family is the most powerful ideological state apparatus’ (105). So, in his earlier work, the schools were dominant, and, in his final work, the family was dominant. I will provide one more example, quoting Althusser:</p><blockquote>What I discovered during my captivity was how much I enjoyed living with people other than my father and mother and away from the world of books, the classroom, and the family flat. In short, I was free from the most frightful, appalling, and horrifying of all the ideological state apparatuses […] namely the family.</blockquote><p>He claimed to be <em>free</em> from the family. However, what we learn from his biographical book was, paradoxically, that he never had a family, in the traditional sense, from the very beginning. This world never existed for him. I return, therefore, to this concept of ‘world.’ I realize that I forgot to give you the simple definition of ‘world’ last time: a ‘world’ is a space within which <em>lack </em>is operative; that is, where lack is <em>not lacking. </em>Incidentally, Althusser reminded us of this fact of the ‘inexistence of the world,’ and this fact of its inexistence was already buried there <em>as a secret to be discovered in his past.</em></p><p><strong>Capitalism is the Alternative</strong></p><p>I would claim that it was also the big secret to be discovered from Marxism: there never was a world. I’m trying to provoke you. I’m not sure how far I can take this claim. But, if it is true, then there cannot be any possible discussion of ‘alternatives’ to capitalism. Capitalism is <em>already </em>in the position of ‘alternative,’ of what Lacan called ‘not-all.’ The long-standing debates between Marxists and anarchists were therefore always framed in the wrong way. Marxists reproached anarchists, historically, in the following manner: ‘yes, we agree with you about the problem of capitalism, but what is your alternative?’ There have been many attempts to respond to that question, notably from Peter Kropotkin, but also, in recent history, by Colin War in his <em>Anarchy in Action. </em>You should take the time to read <em>Anarchy in Action </em>because it goes to tremendous lengths to try to demonstrate that there are already anarchist alternatives to capitalism hidden in plain sight, <em>like a seed beneath the snow. </em>He pointed to the postal service, gardening, and so on. As for Althusser, these were incorporated as essential aspects of capitalism. In any case, in the last 20 years there have been no shortage of attempts from anarchists about how the future society might be organized.</p><p>‘Prefigurative politics’ has been a buzzword among anarchist fraternities in the West to indicate that they have already charged themselves with the task of building the future we want to see now, in the present. We find this also in the work of Hakim Bey, who provocatively asked: are we doomed to never taste future ‘freedoms’ today, shall we endlessly postpone those autonomous zones, or can we taste some of them today? We could trace an entire lineage of anarchistic thinking in this regard. […]</p><p>Anyway, the problem is <em>worse </em>than the Marxists and anarchists were capable of admitting: capitalism <em>is the alternative. </em>This is why we endlessly hear politicians make the following claim: ‘state communism, fascism, tyranny, religious rule, and so on, … capitalism is an alternative to all of those!’ Moreover, capitalism is the view from the future, looking backward at the horrors of communism, fascism, feudalism, and so on. This implicit perspective is nonetheless perfectly consistent with the world of Alexander Dugin, in Russia, who claims that there have been three great columns of modernity: ‘communism,’ ‘fascism,’ and a lingering ‘liberal capitalist democracy.’ For Dugin, these political programs are quite simply <em>passe, </em>and Dugin imagines himself to be speaking to the West from the perspective of the future, mother Russia. As for Althusser, he comes out the other side of his historical determinations, only to discover the secret that was hidden behind those determinations <em>in the final instance.</em></p><p>I can imagine somewhere in the sequence between his essay on the ideological state apparatuses and <em>The Future Lasts Forever, </em>something like an ‘ethics seminar.’ That’s how it was for Lacan. Before Lacan’s late teaching, about the future, before things became about what’s worse than the paternal function, there was a curious ‘ethics seminar.’ It introduced the theme of transgression in the figure of Antigone. Ultimately, what was the transgression? Put simply, it was a transgression beyond the laws of a world, the so-called ‘phallic order.’ It was this transgression that led him toward a conception of <em>jouissance as such; </em>it was the first time that we see jouissance isolated as such, as <em>das Ding. </em>For Althusser, though, the transgression went beyond the confines of the ‘final instance.’ This was a favored expression from Althusser, <em>in the final instance. </em>In the final instance, the subject hits the wall of prior historical determinations, the contours of a world. These determinations come from the past. Through the work of interpellation there is a world. Suddenly, rebellions, civil wars, and revolutions become thinkable. And Althusser was certainly a revolutionary thinker.</p><p><strong>Althusser’s Fraternal Order of Police</strong></p><p>How does interpellation function according to Althusser? A police officer shouts, ‘hey, you there!,’ and, in turning 180 degrees, recognizing oneself as a subject of the officer’s address, the subject becomes subject <em>qua </em>Other. It <em>seems </em>to be a hysterical structure. What is fascinating to me is that the police officer is not at all interjecting a ‘No!’ In other words, the officer is not functioning in this example as a ‘non-du-pere.’ There is no prohibition of jouissance in Althusser’s example. He did not claim that the officer produces a world for the subject by robbing him of some sort of enjoyment. Moreover, he did not claim that the <em>repressive </em>state apparatus produces the subject, through an enforcement of the law. Rather, and he made this quite clear, it is <em>ideology </em>which interpellates the subject, not the paternal law. What the officer did was what you would have perhaps least expected: he fraternized with the subject, which means that he recognized the subject <em>as such. </em>Thus, Althusser transforms the police officer into a brother. And the subject recognizes himself there within the officer’s world for fear of <em>not knowing what he is as a subject beyond the ‘you there!’</em></p><p>This is no small matter. It is a thread that leads us from the future toward the past. It is a thread that leads us back to the thesis I formulated last week on singularities and fraternities of jouissance. The point is this: the transgression of the law already happened. Whereas the futurist manifesto confronted the obstacle to transgression, and therefore a desire to go beyond the final instance, here, the transgression, I would claim, has already happened. The manifesto says: ‘there are barriers to the future, barriers which we are obliged, ethically, to overcome, to surpass, to transgress.’ Yet, from the point of view of the manifesto, this has not yet happened. It is as if the future is missing and it needs to be opened. But this wasn’t quite the position of the anarchists. Mikhail Bakunin, for example, always had one foot on either side of the wall. He wrote: ‘to the anarchists, the International must serve as a direct model for the new society, a microcosm of the free future.’ The modern Western anarchists saw themselves already with one foot in the future, bringing it back to the rest of us into the present. No wonder Althusser claimed once, in an interview, unequivocally, that he was an anarchist and not a Marxist.</p><p><strong>Death by Landscape</strong></p><p>In any case, all of this reminds me of a short story written by a well-known Canadian author, Margaret Atwood. It was titled “Death by Landscape.” It’s told from the perspective of an older woman who begins by staring into some wilderness paintings and seeing everywhere within them a missing young girl. We learn that when she was younger she was sent by her family into the forest for a canoe camp with other young girls. Notably, there are no men. She became close friends with another young girl, becoming, as she put it, inseparable from her. And one evening, while playing with her near a large cliff named ‘Lookout Point,’ she heard a loud sound of excitement from her friend. That’s how she described it: ‘excitement.’ Suddenly, her friend vanished forever. This is when the trouble seems to begin. In the future, the girl is seen everywhere precisely <em>as missing. </em>It is one of Atwood’s classic post-apocalyptic narratives. It began, like many of her stories, including her famous “Oryx and Crake,” in the future, that is, in melancholia.</p><p>What happened next? We are immediately brought backward, into history. Ah! I noticed that I just used the word ‘hys-tory.’ In the 1970s, Lacan made this word resonate with ‘hysteria.’ You just take away that ‘hiz’ and replace it with a ‘hiss,’ spelled with a ‘y.’ He mentioned the word when discussing his first important patient, a paranoid psychotic named Aimee. I didn’t say ‘his-story,’ but rather ‘hys-story,’ which is a story of the ‘hiss’ (emphasis placed on the ‘s’). Lacan qualified this concept by claiming that the analyst is authorized only by ‘hyss-’ self, which means, through ‘hyss-story.’ I quote him: “there remains the question of what could drive anyone, especially after an analysis, to hyss-toricize himself on his own account.’ Well, that’s precisely what Althusser did, in his way. Lacan continued — and this is a striking passage: ‘a hyss-story is not eternal [which means that it is not limitless] because its lifetime is only serious if it refers to the seriality of a limit.’</p><p>Miller somewhere claimed that hysteria is important in ‘hyss-story’ because it reminds us of the distinction of ‘one’ and ‘Other.’ Hysteria implies precisely that there is a world, even if, truth be told, the hysteric positions herself against the laws of that world. Miller said: ‘if meaning and the laws of language are deployed in history [spelled with ‘his’], on the other side of the coin we have the real cut off from speech; as Lacan says more precisely, it is a real that talks <em>all alone. </em>We have in this expression the ‘<em>all alone.’ </em>This phrase is the signal that we are neither in ‘hystory’ nor ‘hysteria.’” I’ll rephrase this final point: when the ‘real’ speaks <em>all alone, </em>as in, say, the delusional insult, there is neither ‘hystory’ nor ‘hysteria.’ As for me, I would say that, currently, due to the war, I am <em>not without a world, </em>at least for the time being, precisely because I am speaking to all of you. I find myself returning to the past: the work of Althusser, early Lacan, and old texts from Atwood. I realize that I am not without making use of them. Lacan said, in his late teaching on James Joyce: ‘one can do without the non-du-pere, provided that one makes use of it.’</p><p>I will come to a conclusion. A few days ago I was speaking to the Slovenian Philosophical Association. I discovered that I couldn’t properly articulate myself concerning the war and its consequences. Instead of trying to say something new, I repeated myself. I realized from this later one that the loss of a world is also the loss of a field within which speech can occur. Yet, for all of that, I also realized that when worlds collapse there are still attempts to say something, to reach out to the Other. I would call these attempts inventions. Those who have been traumatized by the loss of a world sometimes, in fact, quite frequently, invent solutions for themselves: costumes, crafts, or even philosophical concepts, neologisms. The latter was Deleuze’s way. These concepts reach out to the world. When you recognize these concepts — ‘era of singularities,’ ‘partifular affirmations,’ and so on — you grip me by the hand, and you begin the preliminaries of world construction with me. In my next course, […] I will try to re-invent anarchist theory. [Note: this was eventually published as Psychoanalysis and Post-Anarchism]. I hope some of you will join me for that.</p><p><strong>Depressive Realism</strong></p><p>In any case, I’ll end with the following comment. Just before the war began I was teaching a course on love in Russia. I remember saying, spontaneously, the following: ‘one has to be stupid to fall in love.’ It reminds me also of something I said to students in a master’s program at the same university: ‘I might be stupid but I’m not an idiot!’ Okay, I was producing, without realizing it, a typology of ‘dupery.’ Lacan said the <em>non-dupes err</em>. It is an instructive statement, and a very important one. Finally, I also realized that when I was discussing melancholia last week, I used the word ‘moron.’ This added a third position: ‘moronic,’ ‘idiotic,’ and ‘stupid’ positions. These are perhaps three types of non-dupery. I really like what Natalie Wulfing once wrote somewhere:</p><blockquote>Freud […] in fact thought that the melancholic had an uncharacteristic access to the truth, in his self reproaches, which separated him from ordinary human beings who did not have such lucidity. It would cast him as a ‘non-dupe.’ Thankfully, with Lacan, we think the <em>non-dupes err</em>…</blockquote><p>I’m not willing to think <em>against </em>melancholia. In other words, I want to think <em>with </em>melancholia, and the melancholic’s truth. Let’s call it my ‘depressive realism.’ Maybe the melancholic is a moron, a <em>non-dupe</em> who realizes the ‘big secret,’ and therefore admits that she is not duped by it. However, the idiot remains trapped in the world, the ‘prison-house of language.’ It is in this respect that we can speak of <em>idiot-ology. </em>Even Althusser believed that the world was populated by idiots, by ‘common humanity.’ Lacan in fact believed that there were ‘non-dupes,’ this was, precisely the point. I quote him: ‘the point of what I have to say to you […] is pinpointed from the fact that there are non-dupes. [T]he non-dupes are those that refuse to be captured by the space of the speaking being, […] they are those who keep their hands free of it.’ As for me, I prefer to speak. Maybe it’s stupid. The stupid person knows how to <em>not </em>be <em>without </em>a world, even during a time of general war. Stupidity is an ethics of the future. It is the ethics of psychoanalysis during a time of general war.</p><p>Thank you so much for listening to me.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9a2a436d2823" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Love & War in a Sad Time: Part 1]]></title>
            <link>https://duanerousselle.medium.com/love-war-in-a-sad-time-part-1-e04f8db2460f?source=rss-452e35df90bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e04f8db2460f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[freud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Duane Rousselle, PhD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 11:52:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-27T12:01:42.470Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Note: What follows are slightly edited transcriptions from two seminars led for the European Journal of Psychoanalysis in 2022.</em></p><p><em>War has now become our reality. It is no longer a ‘knowledge’ transmitted to us from history books and assessed as if from a calm distance. We cannot escape its horrors. Millions of people lost their homes, thousands were killed — and violence continues. A painful knowledge is actively constructed by each one of us, shared through our conversations. This three-weeks philosophical and psychoanalytic lecture and discussion series will explore the following two questions: (1) what knowledge is relevant to what is at stake in times of war?, and (2) how can love survive a war? Join us as we try to invent a way to address love in a time of war.</em></p><blockquote>1</blockquote><p><strong>Generalized Foreclosure</strong></p><p>Whatever it is that I am going to say today is meant also as a preliminary rebuttal to Slavoj Zizek (perhaps some of you know that I have been pursuing a friendly debate with him for the last few years). It is also a continuation of the discussion opened up with Bracha L. Ettinger, in my own way, during her guest lecture last Sunday in our ‘Love &amp; War in a Sad Time’ lecture series.</p><p>These cordial discussions imply that there exists a field of dialogue, communication, and, indeed, civil society. However, my approach has been to begin from their inexistence. In other words, I begin with the inexistence of the big Other. For Lacan, this was supposed to be the ‘big secret of psychoanalysis.’ We should therefore ask for whom this remains a secret.</p><p>It seems to me that the very logic of secrecy has shifted; I have gone to great lengths in some of my prior work to convince sociologists of this point: <em>the secret is out! </em>In other words, who among us does not already know this ‘big secret’ regarding the inexistence of the Other? I would say that secrets are no longer shared internally among some constituents of an overarching social group. It is not, therefore, as the classical sociologist Georg Simmel once claimed in his essay on secrecy and secret societies: that secrecy exists as a bi-product of implicit social prohibitions against the sharing of <em>too-much </em>information with one another within a complex interactive social order.</p><p>In any case, my point of departure is rather to think about the invention of a civil society from the period of its inexistence. It is a different approach than the one which begins from within the supposed field of symbolic language and then proceeds to remark upon the decline of its efficiency. It also points toward a thesis brought forth a few decades ago, I think, by Jacques-Alain Miller, namely ‘generalized foreclosure.’ I would ask you to keep this expression: ‘generalized foreclosure’ in mind for the time being.</p><p>Our current dialogue, the very fact that we are communicating with one another, or seem to be, suggests that we are not operating within a situation of ‘generalized foreclosure.’ As Miller has put it: ‘the structure of foreclosure is the opposite of the structure of communication.’ But in what technical sense is foreclosure opposed to communication? I want to formulate a preliminary answer to this question by highlighting a few points made by Lacan during his earlier teaching on psychosis in his third seminar. In particular, I want to examine a case he mentioned in passing of paranoid delusions by a young psychotic woman.</p><p>Firstly, Lacan noticed that when she told her narrative she spoke in such a way that ‘no element [was] subject to reticence, [and she did not allow] any room for the wrong interpretation, of which she was certain in advance.’ Delusional statements manifest themselves as prior certainties, which means that the ‘subject supposed to know,’ a technical term from Lacan, is not in the location we expect. The supposition of knowledge in the Other, incarnated (as it was, classically, in the clinic) in the analyst, is eclipsed by a presupposition concerning the Other. Hence, it is a movement from <em>supposition vis-a-vis the Other </em>toward <em>presupposition of the Other. </em>In such a situation, presuppositions cannot be rendered into statements of doubt since that would imply a negation of the prior certainty. Conversely, then, doubt implies a negation of certainty, and it emerges against the backdrop of what Lacan called ‘lack.’ In other words, doubt exists when lack enters the scene, that is, when certain affirmations have, by some miracle, become mortified by the signifier; or, if you like, by civil society, civilization, or culture. I want to pause here for a moment in order to make a stupid provocation, in order to set the stage for my second point.</p><p><strong>Normal Delusions</strong></p><p>It is not as many practitioners claim that paranoid delusions indicate the detachment of the patient from reality. <em>Whose </em>reality? Rather, it is clear that delusions are a testimony of ‘too much’ reality. The trademark of delusional statements are certainty, grounded in reality, and not, as to be expected, detachment from the psychoanalyst’s measure of reality. The latter is a measure of the analyst’s certainty. This leads me to my second point: delusional statements are not exclusively produced by those diagnosed with psychosis. We should not presume that neurosis constitutes the general norm against which psychosis deviates. Rather, Lacan placed delusions into a more general framework: ‘we all have a little something in common with delusionals. I have within myself, as you have within yourselves, what there is that is delusional in the normal man.’ It was a remark concerning the pervasiveness of delusional statements among neurotics. We all have our certainties, prior convictions, and dogmas. And make no mistake: secularism, relativism, and so on, are also, in some sense, cunning bedrocks of certainty. The point of analysis is to surpass the threshold of neurotic exception and to broach the substratum of certainty, at which point one locates a radical kernel of the symptom. It is an affirmative symptom, resistant to mortification, … incurable.</p><p><strong>The Insult: Reality is Speaking</strong></p><p>I want to make a third point which concerns the place of the insult. The aforementioned young woman claimed that she was insulted: she said that a man passing her called her a ‘sow.’ Lacan noted that immediately before making this statement she also said that she was just with the pork butcher. Incidentally, he mentioned also, in passing, that some clinicians observed psychotic patients making movements in their throats and with their lips before the insult was articulated. We infer from this that the insult was in some sense already lodged inside of the body, rather than arising, entirely from without. But this should be further qualified: it <em>does </em>arise from without, because the body is, for the patient, already <em>without. </em>The point was that the insult was present already in the body, and this body is registered somehow in the field of the Other. In psychosis this symbolic Other is absent, foreclosed; the Other shifts into another, external, register.</p><p>A short clinical vignette about the externality of the body in psychosis: a young boy, while playing, frequently brought his hands up to his eyes, pressing thumb and forefinger together, not unlike the Buddha, but twitching and flapping his remaining fingers, while making sharp sounds with his mouth. The same child complained of being abused, bullied, hit by other children in the playground. The boy had his mother’s sympathies, but the teachers could not confirm evidence of the bullying. What fascinated me was that this child could speak so well about a great many topics, but never about the movements of his body. At best, he would state, after prompted: ‘my body just does that.’ Something of the body was foreign to the body, external in relation to the field of symbolic language, … without words. From what register, then, does the insult ultimately come? I return to a quotation from Lacan regarding the young psychotic woman:</p><blockquote>‘Sow,’ what is that? It is effectively her message, but is it not rather her message to herself? […] [T]he important thing is that ‘Sow!’ has been heard really, in the real. Who is speaking? Since there is a hallucination it is reality that is speaking.</blockquote><p>I repeat, ‘it is reality that is speaking.’ The insult comes from reality, the real. And what about the defense? Ultimately, the insult was itself a defense against ‘too much’ reality. There is still one further point that interests me. The entire defense mechanism operates outside of the masculine dimension, outside of the ‘phallic order,’ if I may be permitted that expression, and in accordance with what Lacan, much later, defined as <em>feminine jouissance; </em>this later became <em>jouissance as such. </em>In his third seminar he said: ‘the entire intimate life of these [psychotic] patients has unfolded outside the masculine element, they have always made the latter into an outsider with whom they have never been in harmony, for them the world is essentially feminine.’ This is where I wanted to bring the discussion today, in order to begin to stage my own intervention — and perhaps I will do so a bit too quickly.</p><p><strong>The Feminine World</strong></p><p>I want to turn toward this concept of a ‘world,’ which is, as you’ve just heard from Lacan, ‘essentially feminine.’ […] But what is a world? It is a concept that has been threaded throughout the history of philosophy. As you probably know, it was an important concept for Heidegger; but also for many others, including Alain Badiou, who claimed, not so long ago, that we are in a time ‘devoid of world,’ that is, a ‘worldless universe.’</p><p>Last week Bracha invited us also to feel the world’s pain, which I take to mean that the world is suffering, and that it is perhaps even in the process of mortification. In any case, I do not want to trace an intellectual history of the concept. But I do want to credit Julie Reshe, who, through endless discussion and dialogue — while wandering the streets of Nur Sultan, Budapest, Vienna, and Cork, and even wherever the hell we are now — helped me to arrive at a simplified definition. A world certainly relates to this field of language, to its symbolic or communicative efficiency, anchored by a prohibition. This is what determines, in turn, the subject’s inclusion therein, as missing. Perhaps there is no humanity without a world. The prohibition has traditionally occurred through the paternal ‘No!,’ the ‘Non-du-Pere.’ Hence, within a world, something of enjoyment, of jouissance, is prohibited by the Non-du-Pere, the signifier. This mortification of jouissance is perhaps the price of admission into a world. But the question remains: what happens to those who haven’t paid the price of admission?</p><p>It is important from a sociological point of view to explore what consequences there have been as a result of the weakening of this prohibition in Western societies since the 1970s. We could claim that nothing has changed, that today’s logic is the same as that of the 1930s; that war is a repetition of the same logic. As we shall see, this is not my position. In any case, the project of the decline of the prohibition function was advanced strongly by Slavoj under the banner of ‘the decline of symbolic efficiency.’ Where does this theory lead us if not toward a feminine world? Moreover, what is the difference, if any, between the turn toward a societal ‘injunction to enjoy’ and, my own phrase, the ‘particular affirmation of jouissance?’ My hunch is that the affirmation of jouissance is certainly not its mortification. When the universal prohibition against jouissance wanes, that is, when the space of lack goes missing, there emerges a worldless universe sustained by ‘particular affirmations.’ Hence, there is a transition from ‘universal prohibitions <em>against </em>jouissance’ toward ‘particular affirmations <em>of jouissance.</em>’</p><p><strong>Particular Affirmations</strong></p><p>My work in so-called ‘psychoanalytic sociology’ has been to indicate where this leads. Particular affirmations operate across all scales and strata, which means that they are micrological (e.g., psychological and relational), mesological (e.g., <em>within </em>and <em>across </em>institutions, organizations, and social movements), and macrological (e.g., <em>within </em>and <em>across </em>cultures and social structures, ideologies, and so on). My claim has been that it leads us toward a logic of <em>general war, </em>and toward the concomitant proliferation of ‘fraternities of jouissance,’ or what I name ‘singularities.’ This expression — ‘fraternities’ — was used by Lacan at the end of his controversial and pivotal seminar ‘… <em>Or Worse.</em>’ When the Other does not exist, what is worse, that is, when it has been foreclosed in the symbolic, it leads toward the possible emergence of fraternities, singularities, closed in upon themselves, insular, alone; finally, they become Other to themselves, One. This means that there are no internal fissures, scissions, antagonisms, and so on. This is how Marie-Helene Brousse has put it recently: ‘[i]t is against the background of generalized foreclosure that fraternity unfolds.’ I am therefore not yet ready to abandon this theory of ‘generalized foreclosure,’ although many of my colleagues, some of whom might be classified by others as ‘Millerians,’ have abandoned it.</p><p>Eric Laurent provided a simple formulation of the logic of such groups:</p><blockquote>1. ‘A man knows what is <em>not </em>a man;’</blockquote><blockquote>2. ‘Men recognize themselves among themselves;’</blockquote><blockquote>3. ‘I declare myself to be a man for fear of being convinced by men that I am not a man.’</blockquote><p>I want to point out that ‘man’ is a social category, so I see now reason why we can’t say, for example: ‘a leftist knows what is <em>not </em>a leftist; leftists recognize themselves among themselves; I declare myself to be a Leftist for fear of being convinced by Leftists that I am not a Leftist.’ This is why, today, to be a <em>real </em>Leftist, implies that one abandons the social category of Leftism. In any case, Laurent claimed that this logic of the group emerged in the context of the waning of prohibitions.</p><p><strong>Singularities (not Singularity)</strong></p><p>Singularities present certainties, become oddly defensive in relation to the insults which they testify to be coming at them from without. Hence, we hear complaints from various movements today concerning racism, transphobia, and so on: the world is attacking them. I do not intend to claim that racism, transphobia, and so on do not exist in the world. That is not my point. However, I want nonetheless to place some of today’s newest radical social movements within the context of the Russian government’s self-professed humiliation, which they continuously cite, that is, in relation to the insults which come to them from the United States government, from NATO, and the Western world more generally.</p><p>These tendencies are strikingly different from those preceding them in cultural history. I will provide an admittedly simplified example. During the early days of queer theory we often heard the following example from Judith Butler: an individual stands in front of the bathroom door, doubting their fit within the hegemonic conception of femininity or masculinity. These are statements of doubt: one doubt’s one’s own subjective inclusion within the dominant gender paradigm. This discursive position is precisely what Lacan described as hystericism. I think we should be prepared to admit that a new position has become foregrounded in recent decades. Today’s most vocal movements testify not to doubts <em>within </em>a hegemonic gender paradigm but rather to certainty <em>against </em>the insults from the world around them. It is not: ‘why am I what the Other claims me to be?,’ as a mode of (what Althusser called) interpellation, but rather ‘I <em>am </em>this gender, so why do you, the Other, insist on doubting it?’</p><p>The old psychoanalytic joke about the chicken often told by our friends in the Slovenian school should be radically questioned on the basis of its presuppositions: a man goes to his psychoanalyst and complains that he is a piece of corn and that there is a giant chicken trying to eat him. Okay, after several months of analysis he is cured, but he returns not long after. The analyst exclaims: ‘I thought I cured you, you no longer believe that you are a piece of corn!’ The man responds: ‘I know that you idiot! But the chicken doesn’t know it!’ In our age, when even comedy feels insulting, we should nonetheless examine the structure of the joke. I can imagine that the analyst, after admitting the patient, becomes immediately canceled and labeled ‘seed phobic.’</p><p>I am not suggesting that it is the job of the analyst to cure him of anything, but this is precisely what the joke suggests. I am merely remarking upon the strange time in which we live and the new logic which has now presented itself. A similar logic occured to me recently while Julie, Zoe, and I were fleeing from Russia. I began to hear people discuss ‘airplane ethics.’ The idea is that you should place the oxygen mask on yourself before you can provide assistance to the person beside you. This analogy falls apart during our recent crisis. Why? Well, for many people in Ukraine, but also those in Russia, it was simply unthinkable that one could so easily get onto an airplane to even think about saving another person. The airports were among the first to be captured throughout all of Ukraine. The airport in Rivne, where Julie’s mother is currently, was captured quite early. And, moreover, with the sanctions in Russia, flights became scarce in Russia. So — what can we do? We must help ourselves first, perhaps, but precisely because there is no Other to help.</p><p>Hence, the idea of recognizing the suffering of the Other as our own suffering seems a bit of a moot point: it supposes that we live in a world, and that, moreover, we are not <em>without </em>the Other; or, put another way, it supposes that there is a separation of subject and Other. I hope you understand my point: I am not reminiscing about the golden age of ‘queer theory,’ nor am I longing to reestablish some patriarchal world order. I am simply charting the shifting terrain of knowledge in the contemporary world.</p><p><strong>General War</strong></p><p>In any case, it seems to me that knowledge is increasingly designed in advance to be obviously correct. Moreover, these new wars are occuring not <em>within </em>a world, that is, an overarching social bond, but rather <em>between singularities; </em>or, more precisely, the war is against the social bond as such. In a time of <em>general war, </em>when insults and violence intrude upon us from without, <em>civil wars </em>— defined as political uprisings, revolutions, rebellions, and so on — become unthinkable. The war hits you from without; it is not an information war, as we are being told, but rather a war of affirmations. For example, in Russia, today, it is unthinkable that there might be a revolution. Nobody dares to say it publicly, either in Russia or in the West. The Western sanctions against Russia have effectively defunded all internal spaces of opposition: those spaces are now suffocated, drowned, by the lack of access to resources. These places included ‘civil society,’ namely, universities, media outlets, museums, and so on. The same spaces that are being suffocated in Western society. One by one, they collapse, or are transformed, within Russia, into Putinized spaces. These were the counter-hegemonic blocs that Antonio Gramsci described as being essential for civil war, and, eventually, for revolution. We in the West applaud those who go to the streets to protest and yet we have removed all sources of support for them. And Vladimir Putin’s repressive state apparatus has functioned to effectively remove all cases of internal opposition before they even begin. This indeed is what fascinates me: the FSB, Russian Federal Security, are capable of stopping protests <em>before </em>they begin.</p><p>When an individual stands alone on a street in Russia, holding a simple blank sheet of paper, he or she is briskly arrested. The FSB already knows in advance the political intent of the blank sheet of paper. And so do we. This logic is also apparent in the infamous moment before the invasion, when President Biden claimed that he saw, within the eyes of President Putin, the soul of a killer. Putin’s response was that Biden was seeing his own soul reflected back at him. I believe that we should add that when Putin looks into the eyes of the Western world and sees imperialist ambitions, military expansionism, and so on, does he not also see his own soul reflected back at him? This is how the insult functions in a time of disillusionment. Take another example: consider the prevalence of so-called ‘cancel culture’ within the West. Now, consider Russian ‘foreign agent’ laws. In both cases, the intent is to render consistent the internal space of the fraternal group, to spit out antagonism, such that nothing can be lacking and no doubts can be made about who is ‘inside’ the singularity and who is ‘outside.’</p><p><strong>Disillusionment and War</strong></p><p>The key task we have before us concerns the invention of a world such that political uprisings and revolutions are once again thinkable. I do not believe that Freud had any recourse to this notion of invention. He was trapped, as Bracha put it, within the ‘phallic order.’ Okay, I do not believe that this is the end of the story. It seems to me that the world also collapsed for him during the times of war. While Julie and I were trying to make our way to Ireland, we passed through Vienna, and we went to an exhibit in the Freud museum precisely about the expulsion of psychoanalysts during war times. Not long after the first world war, after his patriotism waned, he wrote his essay ‘Thoughts for the Times of War and Death.’ I long overlooked this essay, but it was recently brought to my attention by Julie Reshe from her discussions with Catherine Malabou. Freud used this concept — ‘disillusionment’ — in the context of war. So, on the one hand there was this concept of ‘disillusionment,’ and, on the other hand, there was the more popular concept of ‘illusions’ (associated with the spaces sustained by religion and civilization, which, in turn, gave rise to the neuroses). Disillusionment is an effect of the loss of a world. To get a sense of what is at stake, I shall quote him:</p><blockquote>‘[w]e cannot but feel that no event has ever destroyed so much that is precious in the common possessions of humanity, confused so many of the clearest intelligences, or so thoroughly debased what is highest.’ [And then he wrote:] ‘it seems as though humanity is really dead.’</blockquote><p>For me, this really resonates.</p><p>Freud described the way in which those whose voices were characterized by reason quickly regressed to infantile behavior. As the war broke out, our university, in Russia, became something of an example of this: those who hitherto struck me as modest and sincere in their work, and careful in their thinking, suddenly launched themselves into heightened paranoia regarding the intentions of others around them. During a faculty meeting, I witnessed administrators and faculty screaming, swearing, and insulting one another, quite openly, and without any prohibition or consequences, each accusing the other of suffering some sort of horrendous moral lapse. It wasn’t long until the students split themselves into groups, each against one another, and against their professors, even against their families. Julie and I were attacked by faculty and administrators for fleeing, and my family were harassed and attacked for initiating a fundraiser for us. I read last week that students in Russia have begun to report their professors to the FSB. A professor who graduated from Harvard was silently fired for teaching courses on the war, and he quickly fled to Poland and then took up work at Stanford. I was forced to remove my lectures from YouTube, and so on. In any case, what Freud extracted from the war, from all of this, which was of lasting psychoanalytic import, was a conception of the ‘death drive.’ It was a concept that emerged during the context of the suffering of a world.</p><p><strong>Jouissance</strong></p><p>As for Lacan, he eventually abandoned this concept, after extracting something of lasting importance from it: the concept of jouissance. Jacques-Alain Miller put it like this: ‘what is striking is that Lacan, proceeding into the dark zone, abandons the Freudian language of drives. From the Freudian drive, he extracts <em>jouissance.</em>’ This concept, jouissance, is different from the drives because it remains fundamentally, categorically, in the late teaching of Lacan, <em>without humanity. </em>Put another way: jouissance is lawless, without a world. So, I would say that the “gene-real” war is not a moment of intense ideological manipulation, intensified symbolic fictions, propaganda, and so on. It is not, as Baudrillard declared about the Gulf War: simulacra. It is not the loss of the Real, the eclipse of the real by the sign, and so on. It is precisely the prevalence of the real, the loss of simulations, fictions, and so on: it is ‘too much’ real. During the time of gene-real war, we do not witness destruction in a world but rather the destruction of the very foundation upon which a world might be sustained, along with its subsequent points of internal opposition. Wars are not principally processes of ‘negation.’ It is much more troubling: gene-real wars are affirmative, positive processes. We cannot therefore disband with the concept of jouissance as such, though there are many within the Lacanian field who are today — precisely at the moment of its importance — calling for the abandonment of the concept. The concept of jouissance can help to orient us amidst the lawlessness and limitlessness of war.</p><p>Immanuel Kant maintained that wars lead us toward the establishment of a perpetual peace (e.g., through the construction of symbolic contracts, peace treaties, trade agreements, and so on). This is one path. However, it is clear that today we have reached a general incredulity toward peace treaties, marriage contracts, and symbolic constructs of any kind. It is why I have claimed that today’s brand of authoritarianism is quite different from those of the past. For example, fascism was typically understood as an intensification of prohibitions against particular social actors within a shared world. You know, it was an explicit prohibition against social inclusion for Jews, Freemasons, Communists, Homosexuals, and so on. The contemporary moment is capable of producing a similar effect but through an altogether different logic. For example, in India, several years ago, the Citizenship Amendment Act was put into place, which did not explicitly and universally prohibit Muslims from citizenship but rather affirmed only the <em>particular citizenship rights </em>of selected groups (such as Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, Christians, and so on). Note that it was a movement away from social bonds anchored by universal prohibitions toward those based upon the particular affirmations of singularities, fraternities of jouissance. Implicitly, Muslims are excluded from the social bond. What we witness today are the prevalence of affirmative cultures whose convictions are unshakable against potentially mortifying singifications: indeed, Muslims, in India, are not mortified by the signifier, but are rather erased without any language being used against them by the law whatsoever.</p><p>The question at the fore concerns whether there can be any ‘symbolic efficiency’ in such circumstances of particular affirmative, or, if you like, permissive, jouissance. Slavoj recently spoke for an hour and a half about my work with Todd McGowan. Both defended a notion of symbolic efficiency within the West while also critiquing the theory that we live now in a paranoiac society. However, they might have asked where I found this idea. For them, it is derided as a ‘Millerian’ notion, and therefore dismissed as ‘not Leftist,’ ‘simply clinical,’ ‘neoliberal,’ ‘anarchist,’ and whatever else. But, I’ll share with you a little secret. It is even a bit of a joke. I took this idea from Slavoj himself. I quote him:</p><blockquote>The paradoxical result of […] the ‘inexistence of the Other’ (of the growing collapse of symbolic efficiency) is precisely the re-emergence of the different facets of a big Other which exists, effectively, in the Real, and not merely as symbolic fiction. The belief in the big Other which exists in the Real is the most succinct definition of paranoia […] and full reliance on paranoiac fantasy […]: today’s typical subject […] indulges without restraint in paranoiac fantasies about conspiracies, threats, excessive forms of enjoyment of the Other.</blockquote><p>It is a theory put forward precisely from Slavoj, at the heart of his work. Yet, he has turned away from this inhuman dimension of his own work, unable to recognize himself in it, but seeing it, instead, in the eyes and soul of his intellectual opponents. I was once one of Slavoj’s students and assistants, and, in recent years I have become a friend and a colleague. In a word, when Slavoj looks into my work and sees a dangerous idea, he is seeing his own soul reflected back at him. There is a transition from a position which claimed that there is a ‘decline of symbolic efficiency,’ and, consequently, the emergence of paranoiac social bonds, toward one which he now claims is characterized by ‘symbolic efficiency,’ the prevalence of ‘symbolic fictions,’ and so on.</p><p><strong>The Frozen Dialectic</strong></p><p>I see the time now and I still have some points I want to make. So I am going to try to make them a bit faster. The first has to do with this insistence among some continental philosophers to think about the Ukrainian-Russian war in terms of the dialectics of master and slave. There is a problem here, I would say. The master-slave dialectic was ported into Lacan’s earlier work from Hegel through Alexander Kojeve. I can’t develop it as deeply as I would like today, but I do want to say the following: in extraordinary psychosis, as in cases of severe autism, and, moreover, in delusional statements, there is a freezing of the dialectic. It implies that one does not confront a master signifier — a signifier that kills, murders, jouissance. For Slavoj, as for Vladimir Putin’s intellectual aide, Alexandre Dugin (a Moscow sociologist), the current war is best characterized as a fight to the death struggle for recognition. Hence, the threat of nuclear war is itself a weapon that one uses in order to establish masters and slaves. The first one to withdraw from the struggle effectively recognizes the other as master.</p><p>Okay, but a key point is being missed here. Who are the key players in this war? There are not simply two sides: the West, and Russia. There are also, for example, Ukrainians, and, loosely put, many of them are involved in real acts of courage by confronting and transgressing the obstacle of death; they refuse death as a limit, remaining in place like masters. President Zelinsky famously said to the Americans: ‘ I don’t need a ride, I need weapons.’ He clearly chose the fight rather than the flight. The cost is not therefore Western lives. The cost includes Ukrainian lives, and, during the beginning of the war, misled young Russian soldier’s lives. In such circumstances it does not seem to me that one can easily speak of dialectics. For example, in Lacan’s 17th seminar, he mentioned what lays at the foundation of every master-slave dialectic: the renunciation of jouissance, the negation of affirmative jouissance:</p><blockquote>[The] Hegelian proposition [begins with] the master and then the slave. [Y]ou can […] identify [the slave] here by way of the term <em>jouissance, </em>which, first, he did not want to renounce and which, secondly, he did indeed want to, since he substitutes work for it, which is not at all its equivalent (171).</blockquote><p>The slave works, and in working exchanges his jouissance for the master signifier. Thus begins the long waiting game within which he plots his future revolution. What freezes in the current war is the work of negation. In the core of every delusion, by definition, there is a freezing of the dialectic. Lacan confirmed this also in his third seminar, when he claimed that the delusional statement ‘is altogether striking [because] it is inaccessible, inert, stagnant, with respect to any dialectic […], any attempt to integrate it into a dialogue […] [is impossible.] The phenomenon is ‘closed’ to all dialectical composition.’ It seems to me that dialogue among those involved in the conflict is impossible: by their own testimony, neither of the sides believes that dialogues will help, and yet all sides insist on its necessity. In other words, they long to believe that dialogue will be possible, but have nonetheless made it impossible for it to be achieved.</p><p>Perhaps I will try to develop this point more the next time that I speak. For now, I want to begin to approach a conclusion. I want to make another remark about ‘generalized foreclosure.’ I want to quote something Slavoj wrote in his book <em>The Ticklish Subject</em>:</p><blockquote>[W]hen, today, one speaks of the decline of paternal authority, it is <em>this </em>father, the father of the uncompromising ‘No!,’ who is effectively in retreat; in the absence of his prohibitory ‘No!,’ new forms of the phantasmic harmony between the symbolic order and <em>jouissance </em>can thrive again […]. What these deadlocks indicate is that today, in a sense, ‘the big Other no longer exists’ — but in what sense? […] it never existed in the first place.</blockquote><p>The non-du-pere never existed in the first place.</p><p>This, I would claim, is perhaps the most precise statement to have ever surfaced in the last twenty years on the theme of ‘generalized foreclosure.’ It was not written by Jacques-Alain Miller, but rather by Slavoj Zizek. In pointing this out I am not intending to be insulting. Rather, my intention, in this dark, sad, and strange time, is to orient myself toward the invention of a space of humanity. The big secret about the inexistence of the big Other has implications: when the secret is <em>out</em>, there is a new orientation toward knowledge. I want to quote Marie-Helene Brousse on this point:</p><blockquote>Places for the secret tend to be ever more scarce. Yet the secret is one of the foundations for the possibility of a peaceful society, co-existence, as well as the possibility to live. […] The secret is not only oriented towards others, indeed the Other, it is also a secret for its keeper. Psychoanalysis is one of the rare locations where the secret of the enjoyment of speaking bodies still has its place.</blockquote><p><strong>The Secret is Out</strong></p><p>When the secret is out — this point is perfectly clear — no argumentation or dialogue is required about it. But when the secret is <em>in, </em>that is, shared, one by one, among constituents of an overarching social bond, then, truth be told, there is an Other. I am not interested in secret societies but I do believe that it is essential that society have some relationship to the secret. Singularities do not offer such a space. Yet, as Brousse has put it, psychoanalysis retains something of the secret in a suffering world. What is even fascinating to me is that Lacan’s continued reference to secrets, over and over again, in his 6th seminar (on ‘desire and its interpretation’) was always paired with a symbolic meaning to be deciphered, interpreted, discovered. You get a sense of the meaning of a secret — the secret of dreams, for example — through psychoanalytic interpretation. Yet, half-way through that seminar, he approaches a limit: ‘[t]his is the big secret of psychoanalysis: there is no Other of the Other.’ It was at this point, immediately, that he returned, immediately, to the topic of delusions, a topic that preoccupied him just three years prior.</p><p><strong>Totality and the Sociological Imagination</strong></p><p>This tension between delusion and symbolic fiction can also be found in the work of Slavoj Zizek. His dependence upon Marxist doctrine, particularly the work that was produced before his <em>Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts, </em>that is, before 1845, points toward a political notion of ‘totality.’ What, in a word, is totality? Totality, as a concept, shares the logic outlined also by C. Wright Mills in his ‘sociological imagination.’ Roughly, it is the explication of the symbolic Other, of interpretations of the symbolic Other, the entire network of signifiers obscured by the imaginary commodity form. Hence, in the theory of commodity fetishism, one can see the commodity as an object onto itself, exchanged for a certain amount of money on a market. However, what is obscured are all of the relationships among workers, all of the labor, and so on, that went into producing that commodity. We can also see this tension at play in the Marxist notion of alienation. Put simply, alienation for Marx, before 1844–5, was always alienated, or estrangement, from an object <em>within a social order. </em>Hence, you were estranged from the product of your labor, from other workers, and so on. Okay, the situation is worse today. This is the point. I quite like this expression used by Yanis Varafoukas, former Greek minister of finance: capitalism has evolved out of itself. As such, increasingly, we are not alienated from our productive activities, from other workers, and so on. Rather, it is worse: we are estranged from the social bond as such.</p><p><em>The social bond itself has become strange to us.</em></p><p>I’ll stop here and see what points need to be developed further for the next time we speak.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e04f8db2460f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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