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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Eddy Meng on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is Sherrone Moore A Good Coach? From A Sports Science Perspective]]></title>
            <link>https://eddy-meng.medium.com/is-sherrone-moore-a-good-coach-from-a-sports-science-perspective-20c1df9ab75e?source=rss-d87d84775341------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[head-coach]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[college-football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[michigan-football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eddy Meng]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2025 11:56:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-06T12:09:19.342Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/0*egMWEETwzexivcpf.jpg" /></figure><p>Recent Interwebs forum grumblings on Sherrone Moore around Michigan’s performance against Wisconsin (for example, one On3 forum thread title reads, “Sherrone is back, and this is awful”) got me thinking about what the research says about the impact of head coaches on wins and losses. I did a bit of digging with AI’s help, and below are some pretty interesting findings.</p><p><em>TLDR: Sherrone’s sample size is too small, this being his 2nd season, but his ability to recruit at a high level and his win rate in close games suggest that he could develop into a successful head coach with a very positive impact on wins, so long as he improves on how his teams perform against ranked opponents.</em></p><p><strong>Impact of Head Coaches on Winning</strong></p><p>Needless to say, this is a difficult topic to research because there are so many variables, including factors such as the talent level of a team. But there is a body of sports science research that finds correlation between head coaches and wins. An influential University of Chicago study estimated that head coaches account for <strong><em>20% to 30%</em></strong><em> </em>of the variation in team outcomes, which is significant, and the impact is greater in college vs pro sports.</p><p>A head coach’s impact can be broken down into several buckets:</p><p><strong>1. Accumulation of talent. </strong>This goes without saying, that there is absolute correlation between talent level and wins, but there is nuance in how college football head coaches impact talent acquisition. What a head coach can control is to hire a good staff and support organization that can effectively identify and recruit talent, and to develop that talent. But the head coach may not directly control other factors such roster budget (i.e. NIL and revenue share dollars) and prestige of the team/institution.</p><p><strong>2. Tactics.</strong> This about the Xs and Os, i.e. technical expertise. This also includes a coach’s ability to think critically and adapt his/her tactics in real time in response to what happens on the field of play. But as much as we might argue about a coach’s tactical nous, there is research that shows that game planning is actually <strong><em>less impactful</em></strong> than leadership (below).</p><p><strong>3. Leadership.</strong> This is about a head coach’s soft skills such as communication, motivation, empathy, and emotional intelligence, all of which work together to get the best of out of the players. A head coach is the driving force to build culture, motivate, gain trust, instill confidence, and effectively communicate the game plan. There is growing research showing that these leadership skills are more important to a team’s sustained success than tactical expertise in a head coach. And, there is some research suggesting that a head coach who leads by empowering players to make decisions on the field (more autonomy and flexibility) is more effective than a system pedant who obsesses over how things should be done on every down.</p><p>There is also research that suggests that an important indicator of how good a head coach is can be found in results in close games. When there is significant talent disparity, better talent will win games most of the time regardless of what a head coach does. But when games are close, in high leverage situations, that’s where critical thinking under pressure, adaptability, and the ability to lead come to the fore. What that in mind, let’s take a deeper dive into win rates.</p><p><strong>Win Rate in Close Games.</strong></p><p>I had AI compile overall records and records in close games (which I defined as games decided by a score of 7 points of less), for Sherrone Moore, Jim Harbaugh, Nick Saban, Dabo Swinney, Pete Carroll, James Franklin, Marcus Freeman and Lincoln Riley. And just for fun, I also had AI to compiled these coaches’ records for games against teams ranked in the top 25, as a proxy for playing opponents where there is less talent disparity.</p><p>This is kind of a random list, but I tried to include Hall of Famers (Saban), coaches who are great recruiters (Saban, Swinney, Carroll), Sherrone’s immediate predecessor (Harbaugh), coaches renowned for their soft skills (Carroll), coaches that are great recruiters but tend to struggle in big games (Riley, Franklin), and another young head coach at a big time program (Freeman). Note that for Saban and Franklin, I included their overall college record, not just from their time at Alabama and Penn State, respectively. And for Moore, I did not include the games he coached in 2023 as acting head coach when Haubaugh was suspended.</p><p>Here is how they stack up:</p><p><strong>Overall Win Rate:</strong></p><p>1. Carroll (83.6%)</p><p>2. Saban (80.6%)</p><p>3. Swinney (78.4%)</p><p>4. Riley (77.3%)</p><p>5. Freeman (75.0%)</p><p>6. Harbaugh (73.5%)</p><p>7. Franklin (68.4%)</p><p>8. Moore (64.7%)</p><p><strong>Close Game Win Rate</strong></p><p>1. Moore (100%)</p><p>2. Carroll (78.6%)</p><p>3. Freeman (71.4%)</p><p>4. Swinney (61.2%)</p><p>5. Harbaugh (59.1%)</p><p>6. Riley (59.0%)</p><p>7. Saban (58.4%)</p><p>8. Franklin (51.1%)</p><p><strong>Win Rate Against Teams in AP Top 25</strong></p><p>1. Carroll (79.5%)</p><p>2. Freeman (70.0%)</p><p>3. Saban (66.7%)</p><p>4. Swinney (59.7%)</p><p>5. Harbaugh (56.1%)</p><p>6. Riley (54.5%)</p><p>7. Moore (42.8%)</p><p>8. Franklin (32.1%)</p><p><strong>3. What Does It All Mean?</strong></p><p>This is admittedly far from a full analysis. I picked several factors that sports science research suggests as where a head coach might have the greatest impact on wins, as well as certain (but probably not complete) indicators of good coaching. I picked several coaches somewhat randomly to serve as a comparison for Sherrone. But the intent here is just a fun and surface level look at how Sherrone might rate as a head coach. With those caveats in mind, this is how I would score Sherrone:</p><p>1. Leadership: B+</p><p>This is completely subjective, but Sherrone communicates effectively in public settings and seems to be more of a players’ coach than a Belicheck-esque authoritarian. His players and assistant coaches seem to respond to him as a leader and are loyal to him and the program. He’s not a rah-rah type of leader in the mold of Pete Carroll, but he has his own style and it seems to resonate with those around him.</p><p>2. Talent Acquisition: B</p><p>Sherrone is off to good start, leveraging NIL dollars to assemble 2 top 10 recruiting classes. He’s recruiting better than Harbaugh at the end of Harbaugh’s tenure. He was also able to bring in impactful transfers such as Justice Haynes. But I gave him a B because Michigan should always recruit well, given its tradition, prestige and, with its more recent embrace of NIL, roster budget.</p><p>3. Tactical expertise: C</p><p>Without a coaching background, I find it hard to give a tactics grade, so this is again completely subjective. Sherrone seems like he’s still finding his feet in terms of in-game management, and the OL (his area of his expertise) is still struggling in his second year. He also seems somewhat stuck in his ways as far as playing “smash”, insisting on playing man-ball even when he might not have the personnel for it. That being said, according to research, tactical nous is not where a head coach has the biggest impact on winning, so this grade has less weight in the overall evaluation.</p><p>4. Critical win rates: Incomplete</p><p>Sherrone’s record over less than 2 seasons is simply too small of a sample size. His overall record is impacted by not having a playable QB on the roster he inherited, as well as a compressed time frame to assemble staff after Harbaugh left for the NFL after winning the National Championship. That being said, a few things do stick out:</p><p>- He wins close games, where head coaches do have an impact, according to research</p><p>- But so far he hasn’t done well against ranked opponents where there is arguably less disparity in talent</p><p>This is a strange inconsistency. You would think that playing ranked teams would result in close games, where Sherrone has done well, yet his win rate against ranked teams is not great (sitting above only James Franklin). I think one possible explanation is that his losses to ranked teams have often not been close games (e.g. Texas loss by 19, Oregon by 21, Washington by 10), while his wins against ranked teams <em>are</em> close (e.g., beating USC by 3, OSU by 3, Alabama by 6).</p><p>This means perhaps that Moore has yet to turn a <em>losing</em> effort against a ranked team into a <em>close game</em>. His skill seems to be winning the games that are already close, but the elite coaches are able to keep losing games close and pull away in winning games. This points to an important area for development and needs to be monitored as his sample size gets bigger to see what patterns will emerge.</p><p>Based on the above, and on emerging trends in sports science research, my overall conclusion is this: <strong><em>Sherrone has shown signs in his brief tenure of having a very positive impact on wins from doing well in key areas of leadership, acquiring talent, and winning close games. But an important area of development is to be more competitive against ranked opponents, which is critical in a playoff setting.</em></strong> More time is needed to see if these early positive trends will hold or revert to the mean, but the early returns are largely positive.</p><p><strong>4. Bonus Observations</strong></p><p>1. Pete Carroll looks to be incredibly underrated. Everyone talks about Saban, and being Michigan fans, we all worship at Jim Harbaugh’s feet, but Carroll is at the top of every win rate category, especially in high-leverage situations.</p><p>2. At the other end of the spectrum, James Franklin is turrible. He recruits at a very high level yet is at the bottom of every win rate category, meaning that he has not been able to translate the talent on his teams into expected wins.</p><p>3. As much criticism as Lincoln Riley gets, especially on his defenses, his win rates are not all that different from Harbaugh’s. Riley seems pretty solid, but we hold our maize and blue noses at him because he does it differently (i.e. with pass offense).</p><p>4. Marcus Freeman and Sherrone seem to be on similar trajectories, early in their careers. It will be really interesting to see how these 2 young coaches develop, especially where both are at institutions with comparable prestige, visibility and resources.</p><p>That is all.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=20c1df9ab75e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Sports Analytics Perspective on Michigan Football’s 2025 Recruiting Class]]></title>
            <link>https://eddy-meng.medium.com/a-sports-analytics-perspective-on-michigan-footballs-2025-recruiting-class-243c10b1c9d4?source=rss-d87d84775341------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/243c10b1c9d4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bryce-underwood]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[michigan-football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[college-football]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eddy Meng]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 04:33:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-13T00:55:58.398Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q6Al2R7ZEn-nh27Dn8lIOQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>If you came here for esports, sorry to disappoint you, I’ve been out of that game for awhile. But I remain fascinated by sports science and sports management, especially from a front office perspective, and I miss writing about it. So this post is in the spirit of what I started with esports, but pivoting back to my roots: Michigan football!</p><p>I’m a University of Michigan alum and have been a Michigan football fan for as long as I remember. In the last few years, I’ve been following the seismic changes in college football spurred by the transfer portal and Name-Image-Likeness (NIL). I won’t go into these changes in any detail, but the combined effect on college football, especially when when coupled with the coming revenue sharing, means that college football will be “college” in name only — it will quickly complete the transition into semi-pro sports with 7-figure salaries.</p><p>This is long overdue, in my opinion. Collegiate revenue generating sports have long exploited student athletes who receive paltry in-kind scholarships while the sport generates billions of dollars off the backs of their labor. But this is not about that. I’m interested in the coming professionalization of the college football front office.</p><p>As a semi-pro sport, college programs’ front office will need a complete makeover in order to manage 8-figure roster budgets, assemble rosters through traditional high school recruiting as well as the transfer portal, scout thousands of players, work with agents, negotiate player contracts, stay on top of the latest in sports science (strength and conditioning, nutrition, injury management), potentially manage salary caps as the rules evolve, and, the most interesting for the purposes of this post, build an advanced analytics department.</p><p>I got to thinking about how analytics can be applied to college football recruiting after reading an On3 article about what was <a href="https://www.on3.com/boards/threads/into-the-blue-a-behind-the-scenes-look-at-a-wild-2025-recruiting-cycle-for-michigan.1668904/">happening behind-the-scenes</a> on Michigan’s NIL transformation in the middle of this recruiting cycle, and also watching an On3 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U0EKPYysGdg">interview with Michigan Football GM Sean Magee</a> where he talks about using NFL positional value concepts in building college rosters.</p><p>And I went down the rabbit hole of trying to find what analytics are publicly available that might shed some light on how a modern NFL front office might look at college football recruiting. In other words, as college football professionalizes, how can pro football analytics be applied to roster construction?</p><p>In the below, I’ll go in depth on: (1) how NFL teams allocate their roster budget based on concepts of positional value, (2) how positional value based on roster budget allocation compares to positional value based on WAR metrics, (3) how NFL WAR differs from college football WAA and what why these differences matter, and (4) how positional value plays out in how NFL teams approach roster building through the draft vs. free agency. And with all that as background, I’ll try to draw some conclusions on what went well in Michigan’s 2025 high school recruiting, what didn’t go well, and consequently what our priorities should be in the transfer portal in the coming weeks.</p><p>TLDR: Michigan GM Sean Magee’s shadow looms large over this recruiting class, which becomes apparent through the lens of sports analytics.</p><p>But first, here are a few caveats.</p><p>This started as a forum post on On3’s Wolverine fan site, but it got longer and longer until it went way over On3’s 1,000 word limit, so I moved it here. This piece is still in that spirit of an informal forum discussion written by a Michigan fan. I won’t pretend to be objective.</p><p>I don’t have any inside information and am relying on media reports. I don’t have all the facts and might not even might have the right facts. But I think that’s OK because this post is less about actual events and more about the exercise of applying analytics to a set of assumptions.</p><p>And, my apologies in advance for the length of this monster. As with all my posts, this started with a simple idea but then took on a life of its own. This post was easy to start but hard to stop. Anyway, hopefully the conclusions at the end will offer sufficient payoff for bearing with me.</p><p>OK, grab some coffee and let’s dive in.</p><p><strong>(1) NFL roster budget allocation.</strong></p><p>Let’s start by looking at how NFL teams spend by position, as a proxy for how the NFL values different position groups. The below is from the top 4 NFL teams from 2013–2022 from <a href="https://www.bruinsportsanalytics.com/post/nfl-positional-spending">Bruin Sports Analytics</a> (a student-run sports data science org at UCLA). Note that this data is from the top NFL teams from each season, so the data reflects the approach taken by the best front offices with championships aspirations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*3BJ7GPzS5OGYDtXhVzOEdA.png" /></figure><p>To make this data more useful, we need to look at the number of players in each position group. On offense, NFL teams might carry 9 OLs, 6 WRs, 4 RBs, 3 TEs and 2–3 QBs. On defense, they might have 7–8 LBs, 5–6 CBs, 4–5 interior DLs, 4–5 edge rushers, and 4 safeties on their roster. (Yes, this is missing kickers, which is a glaring omission.)</p><p>With that in mind, let’s look at some observations about the offense:</p><ul><li>The most noticeable budget line is for OLs. Keep in mind that this is split among as many as 9 OLs, but nonetheless, it’s plain to see that good teams will spend to win in the trenches.</li><li>No surprise, but QBs are a huge budget priority and probably disproportionately so for QB1, considering that QB3 is likely a scout team guy on a cheap contract while QB2 is likely a journeyman on an affordable contract.</li><li>Continuing with QBs, the article makes an interesting observation which I will quote here: “<strong><em>The prevalence of teams with quarterbacks as top earners underscores the widely acknowledged importance of this position in the NFL</em></strong>. It signals an acknowledgment that success often hinges on the performance and leadership of the quarterback. On the other hand, the notable presence of championship teams where quarterbacks do not feature prominently in the highest-paid positions suggests an alternative philosophy. This may indicate a strategic prioritization of building a well-rounded roster and distributing financial resources across multiple positions rather than concentrating them on a singular player.”</li><li>In other words, <strong><em>there are two ways to approach QB pay that can both be successful</em></strong>, and I’ll come back to this point later on when I specifically look at the value of signing 5-star QB Bryce Underwood.</li><li>NFL teams spend as much on WRs as on QBs, but note that the WR budget is spread across twice as many players.</li><li>RBs and TEs? Not a priority for NFL teams and we will see why in the next section when we look at their WAR.</li></ul><p>On defense:</p><ul><li>Edge rushers are the top priority on defense, on a per-player basis, even more so than CBs.</li><li>But DBs as a group (combining CBs and safeties) is close to edge rushers, and are top 3 in positional value across all positions.</li><li>Given the numbers at the DL position, interior DL are just as important as CBs. Again, winning teams will spend to win in the trenches.</li><li>LBs are lower priorities but WAR will have something different to say about that.</li></ul><p><strong>(2) NFL positional value by Wins Above Replacement (WAR)</strong></p><p>Spending pattern is one way to look at positional value, but what about winning? What position groups correlate more (or less) with wins, and does this differ from positional value based on team spending?</p><p>The best metric to assess impact on wins in probably WAR. This is what a Pro Football Focus (PFF) <a href="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/5f1af76ed86d6771ad48324b/5f6a67e0957a471f8a59fdf5_Eager_PFF_WAR.pdf">white paper</a> says: “We find that PFF WAR at the player level is more stable than traditional, or even advanced, measures of performance, and yields dramatic insights into the value of different positions. The number of wins a team accrues through its players’ WAR is more stable than other means of measuring team success.”</p><p>And PFF does have WAR data for the NFL. This is WAR <a href="https://www.pff.com/news/nfl-using-pro-adjusted-wins-above-average-to-examine-positional-value-in-the-nfl-draft">PFF, for the 2020 NFL season</a>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/576/1*Y7kLmVLc6ZJq4pvBINNPWw.png" /></figure><p>When we compare positional value based on roster spending vs. WAR, there are some interesting things:</p><ul><li>No surprise at all but QBs have the highest positional value, whether measured by roster spend or by WAR. Measured by WAR, QBs have 2x the impact on wins vs. the next highest position group.</li><li>The most glaring difference when comparing positional value from roster spend vs. WAR is at the LB position. LBs look to be the ultimate undervalued position group — they have WARs that outpace what they are paid.</li><li>While NFL teams tend to spend more on WRs than DBs, DBs have slightly higher WAR value than WRs, suggesting that DBs are a bit undervalued as well.</li><li>Edge rushers and OTs are more important to winning, followed by TEs on offense, than interior linemen on both sides of the ball. This adds some color to the large roster budget allocation for OLs where the bulk of the spend is actually for edge rushers and tackles.</li><li>The low WAR for RBs is consistent with the low roster spend on this position.</li></ul><p>So, it looks like NFL front offices are fairly disciplined on spending to optimize WAR, with the exception of undervaluing LBs and to a lesser extent DBs.</p><p><strong>(3) College football positional value by Wins Against Average (WAA)</strong></p><p>I couldn’t find any WAR analysis for college football, but PFF did have some WAA data for college players. WAR and WAA have important differences, and a comparison is not apples-to-apples. But that’s all I could find, so I’ll try to make the best of it.</p><p><em>(This is a somewhat nerdy aside but there is some </em><a href="https://www.pff.com/news/college-football-an-introduction-to-college-waa"><em>PFF college WAA data for 2014–2019 </em></a><em>— I won’t use this data set because “replacement value” for these college WAAs is based on an average FBS level player, whereas “replacement value” for PFF’s NFL WAR is based on comparing players to an average NFL replacement player. But there are something like 134 college FBS programs while there are only 32 NFL teams, and thus college WAA is based on a much wider spread of talent level than NFL WAR. I’m just not sure whether comparing this set of PFF college WAA data to the PFF NFL WAR data has much value.)</em></p><p>The below is also from PFF where they provide <a href="https://www.pff.com/news/nfl-using-pro-adjusted-wins-above-average-to-examine-positional-value-in-the-nfl-draft">college WAA from the 2020 season</a> based on the top 32 players at each position — I assume PFF chose 32 players to try to mirror their NFL WAR, where the NFL has 32 teams:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/528/1*Rz2NryJ0gWhy6ojumEs9Cg.png" /></figure><p>I compiled the two sets of data below, to map NFL WAR against College WAA:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/367/1*v-6IGRmzp5wttfWvO7Ha9w.png" /></figure><p><em>(Green highlights are where college positions have a higher impact on wins vs. the NFL, and red highlights are where college positions have a lower impact on wins vs. the NFL.)</em></p><p>Here are some observations:</p><ul><li>Generally, the differences in the impact on wins among position groups in college is less pronounced vs. the NFL for most position groups. For example, in the NFL, QBs have a WAR of 53.3 while college QBs have a WAA of 18.2. Even though college QBs are still 2x as impactful on wins than the next position group, this smaller spread arguably suggests that the difference between high-end talent and average talent on wins is less pronounced in the college game vs. the pros. That kind of makes sense, because: (1) college players are still young adults who are early in their development cycle — they are not yet able to use their tools to the fullest extent, whereas NFL players are grown men who are closer to being fully developed, and (2) college schemes are less complex and are presumably easier execute, which means that less talented players have more of a chance to have success in the college game.</li><li>Of course this begs the question: <strong><em>was it smart to spend a ton of NIL on 5-star QB Bryce Underwood at the expense of losing lower rated QBs Carter Smith and Brady Hart, when analytics tell us that the talent disparity might not have as big of an impact on win differential?</em></strong> This is a critical question but I will come back to it at the conclusion of this post.</li><li>RBs are much, much more important to winning in college vs. the NFL.</li><li>WRs are also more important to winning in college vs. the pros, but not by a big margin — in fact, DBs as a group are still more impactful on winning.</li><li>LBs were undervalued in the NFL, but they look to be even more so in college, where they have a higher impact on winning vs. the NFL.</li><li>The rest of the position groups under college WAA tend to shake out similarly to NFL WAR.</li></ul><p><strong>(4) NFL approach to draft vs. free agency</strong></p><p>Positional value plays out in the NFL not just in terms of roster budget allocation and WAR, but also in how teams approach roster building through the draft vs. free agency (which might be useful for how a college GM might approach high school vs. portal recruiting).</p><p>The NFL approach is driven by a few key considerations:</p><ul><li>Which positions can be impacted immediately by rookies/young players (on cheaper contracts) vs. positions that require more time to develop?</li><li>Which positions are more system-dependent and would benefit from development within a system vs. positions that find immediate success based on raw athletic skill?</li><li>Which positions are difficult to fill, where scarcity breeds intense competition (and higher compensation) for players at that position?</li><li>Conversely, which positions are more of a commodity, and thus making it easier to fill those roster spots?</li></ul><p>These considerations play out as follows:</p><ul><li>QBs are arguably the most system-dependent, so teams will prioritize QBs in the draft, especially those with QB1 potential, to groom them in their system.</li><li>Positions where raw athletic talent allow rookies to contribute early are prioritized in the draft, including CBs, edge rushers and (later in the draft) RBs.</li><li>OTs take more time to develop, but OTs are athletic freaks who are difficult to find, so OTs are also prioritized in the draft — you take them when you can get them.</li><li>NFL teams are less prone to reach to spend draft capital at positions with less scarcity, such as WRs, interior linemen, LBs and safeties. It’s not that teams won’t draft these positions, but they consider positional value for <strong><em>where </em></strong>in draft to go after these positions.</li><li>Regardless of position, free agents must be proven performers — teams want immediate production from their free agents instead of “potential”.</li></ul><p><strong>(5) Application to our 2025 recruiting class</strong></p><p>Thanks for making it all the way here. This is the money shot: applying all of the above to our 2025 recruiting class, what are some key conclusions?</p><p>First, I want to lay out my assumptions on which players received significant NIL packages in this recruiting cycle. There are likely more recruits who received NIL packages, but the players below seem to have been given significant dollars, based on the previously-cited On3 article written by the always excellent EJ Holland:</p><ul><li>QB Bryce Underwood (5 star)</li><li>WR Andrew Marsh (4 star)</li><li>Edge Nate Marshall (4 star)</li><li>LB Nathaniel Owusu-Boateng (4 star)</li><li>Safety Jordan Young (4 star)</li><li>CB Shamari Earls (4 star)</li></ul><p>Here are my observations:</p><p>(1) Paying $10M (or whatever the amount was) for Bryce Underwood is absolutely the right thing to do. It’s not open to debate based on advanced analytics, and is not a surprise to anyone, that high-end QB talent gives teams the best chance at winning, over any other position group by a significant margin, especially if you can recruit them out of high school to be developed within a team’s system.</p><p>But going back the issue that a college QB has less impact on college wins vs. a pro QBs’ impact on NFL wins: what should we make of this? Even though it’s clear that teams should invest heavily on QBs, was it worth it to spend a huge glob of NIL dollars to land Underwood at the expense of losing QBs who were rated lower by recruiting services, but that talent differential to Underwood might be less pronounced in terms of wins?</p><p>Of course we’ll never know but it’s fun to speculate — I’ll try to unpack this in several ways:</p><ul><li>It is always better to have more talent than less. This is especially true at QB where the position group has 2x the impact on wins than any other position group. In other words, any talent gap at QB is magnified because of their out-sized impact. So if Underwood gives us a slightly better chance to win vs. Smith/Hart, we take that all day, every day, especially when we have the resources. If we are the Yankees or the Dodgers in terms of college football resources, we go after the Ohtani’s because we can.</li><li>Let’s go back to the earlier point made by Bruin Sports Analytics that there are two ways to approach QB pay that can both be successful: either paying a premium for QB1 or spreading the spend to build a more balanced team. In this light, Michigan seems to be taking the approach that we’re going to invest and build around a high-end QB for the next 3 years because Underwood is good enough to give him responsibility for program success. Don’t throw stuff at me, but what if he’s a bust? The beauty of the modern college game is that rosters can be rebuilt on an annual basis, which enables teams to pivot quickly — if Underwood doesn’t work out, or if we don’t find another generational QB talent later on, then we simply re-tool the roster go back to Jim Harbaugh-esque complimentary football and can still be successful.</li><li>There are two important corollaries: (1) to maximize Underwood’s impact, the roster needs to be built around his super power (his arm), and (2) where there is a measure of parity in talent (as there arguably is at the top of the B1G), what gives one team an edge over other teams? Probably coaching. In other words, the NIL dollars spent on Underwood is more justifiable if Michigan designs an offense that will maximize his skill set. Thus, not only is paying top dollar to land Bryce Underwood the right move, but letting Kirk Campbell go to upgrade the offensive coordinator position is also the right move. Can’t have one without the other.</li><li>Given that college QBs have a much shorter shelf life because they’re (nominally) in school, in my view, the right offensive coordinator should be someone who is not an ideologue, but rather someone with a track record of scheme flexibility who adapts to the QB talent that he has to work with.</li><li><strong><em>So the job is not done — Sherrone needs to nail the offensive coordinator hire to get maximum impact from spending on high-end QBs. </em></strong>Literally just now, I saw a report that <a href="https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/42901186/sources-michigan-targeting-unc-chip-lindsey-new-oc">Michigan hired Chip Lindsey</a> as its new offensive coordinator. It’s not a sexy choice and I don’t know much about him, but the fact that he has had success at UNC with Drake Maye in 2023 but also had success in 2024 with a run-oriented offense tells me that (1) he has the ability to build an offense around a high-end QB, but (2) he also adapts to what he has. Seems like a solid choice.</li><li>Of course there are non-analytics reasons to go all in on Underwood. For example, keeping a hometown kid in Michigan sends an important message to future in-state recruits and local coaches. And there is no better way to announce our entrance on the NIL stage than by flipping the consensus #1 high school player from a southern school. And if other top players want to play with Underwood, that’s even better.</li></ul><p>(2) Let’s continue with the other recruits/positions:</p><ul><li>DBs have a big impact on team wins at any level of the game. Athletic CBs can play early, so allocating NIL dollars for CB Shamari Earls was smart. Same goes for spending to flip safety Jordan Young. We ended up with 5 DBs in this class and might not be done: thumbs up from the analytics.</li><li>Upping the offer for an edge like Nate Marshall was smart. Same for out-spending Colorado to land get NOB at LB. Both positions have the next highest impact on wins after the skill positions, and thus another analytics thumbs up.</li><li>Passing on WR Derek Meadows because he wanted to be paid like Bryce Underwood? The analytics approve from a value perspective — Alabama might have blown their entire WR wad on one guy at a position where, although important to winning, a college team will keep as many 10 WRs on the roster. I guess Kalen DeBoer didn’t learn much from the Michigan beat down in the national championship game. (Same can be said for Ryan Day but I digress.) But the analytics also remind us that WRs have the 2nd highest WAA on offense, so there’s work to do.</li><li>Missing on TE Andrew Olesh? The analytics shrug and say, whatever. Even if he turns out to be the unholy son of George Kittle and Travis Kelce, TEs are not a position where individual contribution has a high impact on winning. (The Olesh flip to Penn State is such a James Franklin move — all flash, no substance.)</li></ul><p>But that’s only half the story. What’s critical from the analytics is to prioritize the following in the late high school signing period and portal recruiting:</p><ul><li>WRs have the highest college WAA after QBs: we need to restock the WR room with multiple proven performers after missing out on some high-end high school talent, especially if we want to tailor an offense to maximize the impact of Underwood’s arm.</li><li>RBs and LBs are the 3rd and 4th respectively on college WAA after QBs and WRs. We seem to be in good shape at RB but analytics say we pay top dollar to retain Jaishawn Barham and Ernest Hausmann.</li><li>Next up on college WAA are edge rushers and OTs. Derek Moore should get a hefty check to stay, and we should make an offer that edge Zahir Mathis can’t refuse. Same for continuing to prioritize 5-star OT Ty Haywood (especially where proven OTs are not typically found in the portal).</li><li>Interior DLs are surprisingly low on college WAA. These analytics may not apply to talents like DTs Mason Graham and Kenneth Grant who generate as much pressure as edge rushers. But if we have top talent at the edge, that might soften the blow if we lose one or both star DTs. So maybe DTs are more about rebuilding depth through the portal.</li><li>Although interior OLs are lower on positional value, we will need bodies after losing several potential starters to the portal.</li></ul><p>These conclusions are not earth-shattering, and some seem fairly obvious. But what is fascinating is that Sean Magee’s shadow over how the 2025 recruiting class was assembled is plain to see, when looking through an analytics lens. <strong><em>Every move we made in recruiting (that I could see) was consistent with what the analytics say. </em></strong>This is a critical development because it shows that a historically staid and conservative program like Michigan is embracing modern concepts that will compliment its vast revenue and NIL resources to set the groundwork for keeping the program in the chase for championships for years to come.</p><p><strong>(6) Parting thoughts.</strong></p><p>We are at the end, I promise. Here are some bonus parting thoughts:</p><ul><li>In just about every major pro sport, there is research that shows correlation between roster spend and wins. Culture, coaching and development are important, but as college football professionalizes, the baseline for success will be spending optimally to acquire the best talent. And thus I completely agree with On3 forum member Jim_S who said that Sean Magee is the most important hire for Michigan football since Jim Harbaugh. He seems to have the breadth of experience (gained from both college and pro football) that a college GM needs for Michigan’s sustained success.</li><li>An interesting question that every college program will eventually face is how to structure the football organization: who leads the program, the GM or the coach? (Please Baby Jesus don’t put a bureaucrat AD at the top…) If it were me, I would do what every major pro sports team does, and that’s having a GM at the top with authority to hire/fire coaches. We’re already seeing that at Stanford, where Andrew Luck has that type of authority. There might be exceptions where coaches with a proven track record of personnel management could be positioned be at the top of the organization, such as a Belicheck, a Saban, or even a Jim Harbaugh. But as college football professionalizes, job specialization will emerge where most coaches won’t be able to handle or excel at roles beyond Xs and Os.</li><li>It’s been said that the best judge of how good a NFL front office is, is how well they draft in the later rounds — in college football, the best GMs might be the ones that are also successful at developing high risk/high reward or undervalued high school talent. In the age of roster mobility, a program isn’t stuck with a player for 4 years if he doesn’t work out. And if rules allow for it, teams can place protections in contracts such as incentive-heavy compensation, shorter term, team options, or even crazier, buyout fees if a guy develops and gets poached by another program. All of these tools should be in a good GM’s tool belt. Using these tools well might be the difference maker “at the edges” where programs with similar resources are competing for similar talent.</li><li>Lastly, with 105 roster spots and Queen Jolin Ellison money, we have room for the occasional FU recruit. Whatever we end up paying Chase Herbstreit, his FU value to further screw with OSU minds is completely worth it. Proposed nickname for Chase: teabag.</li></ul><p>That is all.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=243c10b1c9d4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[End of Watch]]></title>
            <link>https://eddy-meng.medium.com/end-of-watch-b603099a9ad8?source=rss-d87d84775341------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b603099a9ad8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[overwatch-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[videogames]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esports-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[guangzhou-charge]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eddy Meng]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Jan 2023 07:33:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-20T05:35:52.499Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/819/1*hWb3p64gNuCsVnFV1P6c3g.jpeg" /><figcaption>My son Jasper draws his favorite player, Hotba (please excuse typos, he’s just a kid…)</figcaption></figure><p>December marked the end of my adventure with the Charge, and thus ends my Overwatch League journey.</p><p>I leave with a sense of gratitude for being one of the privileged few to have had a front row seat to see the league and a team being built from the ground.</p><p>But I worry about the league’s future. I worry that the league’s downward trajectory is approaching a point from which it might not recover. This is what I want to talk about in this (really long) post. I will also share my thoughts on the path forward, if you indulge me for one last time.</p><p>Before I start, although I have an insider view, nothing in this post contains anything confidential. What I talk about here can be pieced together from what astute observers of the league have already said. Or, astute observers could reach the same conclusions based on what’s in the public domain. (ChatGPT might have been able to do this, and kept it at a more reasonable length….)</p><p>This is important because I’m not here to show where the skeletons are, that’s not the point. I want to tug on a few threads that are already floating about and show where they might lead — OWL has been my life for the better part of 5 years, and I want to see the league succeed as much as anybody else. That’s where this is coming from.</p><p>Let’s dive in.</p><p>There have been some concerning trends in the past few seasons and in this current off-season. But I want to go beyond the blemishes and trace the trajectory back to its starting point because the problems run deeper. They were drawn on OWL’s blueprint itself.</p><p><strong>OWL Business Model</strong></p><p>The business of pro esports teams is challenging. Costs can be high (the biggest piece being player salaries) relative to revenue opportunities that have traditionally been limited to sponsorships and prizing. Sponsorships are typically not long term deals, so sponsorship revenue might vary quite a bit from one year to the next, and one good year might not guarantee much for the next. Prizing depends on results, which require investment in rosters but are never easy to come by in any competitive endeavor, and teams usually end up sharing most of it with players.</p><p>One of the few ways to scale the business it to add teams, which means multiplying costs while taking on more variable revenue. It’s a challenging business to run sustainably, and passion often keeps team owners in esports more than the business of esports.</p><p>OWL wants to change all of that. The league would not only take esports mainstream off the back of a game with a cast of lovable characters in a colorful universe, but it would show the industry how to build a meaningful business.</p><p>OWL’s key to unlocking esports’ business potential is its franchised business model, taking cues from traditional sports.</p><p>In franchised sports leagues, owners typically buy in with a substantial franchise fee. In return, owners are entitled to certain exclusives such as league revenue share, opportunities for additional team revenue, and the potential to realize outsized returns from an eventual sale or IPO of the franchise.</p><p>A franchised league’s revenue model is typically structured so that the league reserves commercial rights where it can leverage its position to monetize on a collective basis, the primary one being media rights for official competition. League revenue is pooled and distributed to teams as revenue share (and the league typically takes a cut off the top to recoup costs and earn profits before distribution to teams).</p><p>Teams have their own revenue opportunities such as sponsorship sales to supplement league revenue share. In sports, an important team entitlement is the right to host home matches that generate revenue from ticket sales, food &amp; beverage sales, merchandise sales, event sponsorships, and even luxury boxes and naming rights. Event revenue can be substantial for sports teams; for example, Manchester United has historically generated about one-third of its revenue from home matches.</p><p>But the ultimate prize is franchise value. Franchise owners have the opportunity to realize gains from capital appreciation of the underlying franchise, and it can be substantial. Looking at Manchester United again, the current owner purchased the team in 2005 for US$1.4 billion and the team was valued at US$4.6 billion recently by Forbes (and there is speculation that a bidding frenzy might drive that much higher).</p><p>Growth in franchise value requires high demand for a limited number of franchises, and thus an important function of the the league is to protect franchise value by managing that scarcity and protecting teams’ position at the top of the ecosystem from any encroachments on their exclusive entitlements.</p><p>High demand requires, as a baseline, that business fundamentals are sound, so potential buyers/investors will look at financial metrics such as revenue and profitability. The amount of hype, cultural capital, glamour or clout that are associated with owning a team also drive demand among the wealthy. It’s not surprising when traditional sports lean into that by conducting sales under a bidding process.</p><p>OWL’s business model is similar to franchised sports leagues: to buy in, owners pay franchise fees (some of the highest in esports), which give them exclusives around league revenue share and team commercialization rights. Home matches is one of OWL’s key differentiators from other esports — the league was built with city-based teams that have rights to host homestands in their respective home regions. Like sports teams, OWL teams have a live event revenue kicker.</p><p>Also like sports teams, the value of the OWL franchise is the prize. This potential for outsized returns is critical to the league’s business model. It’s how the league attracts owners to invest in a business that has traditionally struggled to be profitable. Many sports teams operate at a loss, but the eventual value realized from franchise appreciation makes it worthwhile — the OWL business model relies on the same kind of parachute.</p><p>Value creation for teams is not the only thing that makes OWL a giant step forward. If the franchised business model works, it would create something that rarely exists in the industry: world class esports controlled by the game publisher (through its wholly-owned league office and its IP licensing regime) that stands on its own as a business, and thus does not require direct financial support from the game publisher.</p><p>Game publishers always struggle with esports: to what extent does esports benefit the game business to justify the significant spend required to create and maintain it? OWL’s business model would solve that because the league would be self-sustaining. League operations are bankrolled by franchise fees paid by team owners. Teams fund their own operations from league revenue share and additional team revenue opportunities, supplemented by the opportunity to attract investment leveraging franchise value.</p><p>In essence, risk is shifted from the publisher to teams in a significant way. Blizzard bakes the cake and eats it too, because OWL is a giant megaphone to keep the game at top of mind and the publisher doesn’t write the check.</p><p>All of this makes OWL a game changer. Unfortunately, it hasn’t worked out that way, at least not for teams.</p><p><strong>Rubber Meets Road</strong></p><p>OWL started off with a ton of momentum, but much of that has dissipated over the course of the last 5 years. Covid of course has had a seismic impact on everything everywhere all at once. Years without meaningful new game content has contributed to the stagnation, and the current economic downturn hasn’t helped. But while these factors did widen the cracks, fault lines have always existed in the business model itself.</p><p><em>Shaky revenues</em></p><ul><li>Event revenue: live events turned out not to be a significant revenue driver. For those with experience putting on large events, it should be pretty clear from the scale of team homestands (+1,000 seat venues, premium set and stage, high production value, on-site practice rooms) that they are labor intensive, overall costs are high (especially venue rental), and profit margins are likely thin. Most OWL teams don’t have owned venues or in-house event staff, so there are no cost efficiencies. Moreover, achieving cost efficiencies and scaling event revenue require an increase in the number of homestands that come with a level of spending that most teams will not commit to.</li><li>Media rights: the league’s Twitch and subsequent YouTube deals were groundbreaking, and they have been the backbone for league revenue for the first 5 years. But those were sold more than 3 years ago, when OWL viewership and overall esports hype were at their peak, and there were a handful more platforms competing for rights. While the 3-year YouTube deal ended on a high note with record playoff viewership, that was one good month at the tail end of a long decline. It’s unclear whether that one month momentum will carry into 2023. So it remains to be seen to what extent the league will continue to monetize media rights, especially in this economic climate.</li><li>Sponsorships: due to declining viewership and buzz, both the league and teams have steadily lost sponsors. Sponsorships hit lows after the sexual harassment allegations against Blizzard came to light. The current economic climate makes things worse: when the economy tanks, marketing dollars are one of the first things that brands will cut. Will the end-of-2022 momentum help with sponsorships sales? There are a few variables: we need to wait and see if momentum carries into 2023, in China we need to wait and see if the game is even available (more on this later), and if in the best case these are all trending up, then there is a timing issue. Revenue from viewership momentum takes time to percolate before reaching teams, as the sales cycle for major sponsorships (especially large consumer brands) could take up to 12 months.</li></ul><p><em>Difficulty accessing capital</em></p><p>Teams needed deep pockets at the start of OWL to fund not just their franchise fee obligations but also day-to-day operations. Today, teams still <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/hype-around-esports-fading-investors-145815674.html?guccounter=1&amp;guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&amp;guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAJR21Np-2z3vaa0WMRoM6FbEifaclEqqtMfpdmVZRwmJiEbH9jxwQhtB9IarNHWrfc9ie1ByFiBHKjfnei5ODuwSNFaCAml3MvUFXMTPdf9FiyIO8uMaiWu6uhU86PQ5Fy75TTxFdCjS8MjNsGtjQC4ejpOePhKmmerLIPPrwOk1">operate at a loss</a>. Because there are no profits to put back into the business, teams need to go back to the well for additional funding.</p><p>But that becomes difficult when team financials show declining revenue and mounting losses that, in turn, make it nearly impossible to ever recoup the franchise fee debt. That franchise fee debt sits like a grapefruit-sized tumor on team balance sheets and creates a significant barrier to fundraising, especially in the current liquidity crunch that impacts private investors and corporate parents alike.</p><p><em>Decaying foundations</em></p><p>As I mentioned above, growth in franchise value is critical to the OWL business model — it’s the parachute that allows teams to find an exit and stop the hemorrhage.</p><p>To that end, walls were erected around OWL to ensure that other parts of the competitive Overwatch ecosystem won’t threaten OWL’s place at the top. The higher the franchise fee, the higher the walls.</p><p>Let’s take a look at the semi-pro T2 scene through this lens:</p><ul><li>The league needs a vibrant T2 to have a talent pipeline … but it can’t be too vibrant so as to encroach on OWL viewership and commercial opportunities.</li><li>OWL teams have the right to forcibly buy out any T2 player … but for this buyout to be effective, the league needs as many T2 teams as possible to participate under Blizzard’s Overwatch Contenders umbrella. So Blizzard ends up being solely responsible for T2. But because T2 inherently can’t have too much success, it has no commercial prospects and is a pure cost for the game publisher.</li><li>To protect franchise value, there is no path for T2 teams to get into OWL through promotion, and T2 has a built-in ceiling to ensure it cant’t have too much success … but then what reasons exist for teams to enter T2?</li><li>3rd party organizers are unlikely to get a license from Blizzard to have OWL teams play at their tournaments, because that would de-value OWL media rights … but there is no incentive for 3rd party organizers to organize T2 tournaments for a feeble Contenders scene.</li></ul><p>With all that, it’s no surprise that T2 is dying on the vine. Many T2 teams are player-organized and thus pay no salary, relying solely on prizing to survive.</p><p>The most vibrant T2 scene is probably collegiate Overwatch in North America, which is quite telling because it’s organized by intercollegiate nonprofit associations with teams funded by university endowments or athletic department budgets. In other words, collegiate Overwatch lives because it’s not a business.</p><p>With a decaying T2 scene that necessarily results from the OWL business model, the entire competitive Overwatch ecosystem is becoming dangerously top heavy with a growing void beneath.</p><p><em>What about China?</em></p><p>OWL pioneered a global league with teams across 3 continents. While constant cross-region play is compelling for fans, the league takes on a huge challenge to operate in multiple international markets. Unfortunately, the league has not been very good at it.</p><p>Let’s look at China as an example.</p><p>China is the largest games and esports market globally. It has one of the largest player bases for the game and is the single largest viewership country for OWL broadcasts. With the game transitioning to free-to-play, it’s likely the single largest growth opportunity for the game and the league.</p><p>However, there is a gap in the league’s operating structure in China where NetEase as the game publisher has no direct obligation or reward tied to how the league performs. The league ends up managing China pretty much on its own with a handful of staff.</p><p>Tencent dominates esports in China. They operate the premier Chinese esports properties and built a veritable machine to dominates mind-share for fans, brands, the media and regulatory agencies (an important stakeholder in China). This includes hundreds of staff working directly in their esports leagues and teams, as well as hundreds more that work for Tencent owned or controlled businesses in live streaming, online media and event production.</p><p>This means that instead of having access to the resources of the 2nd largest gaming company in China that is also a natural rival to Tencent, the league takes on the Tencent machine with its handful of staff. That staff does their best, bless their hearts, but they are fighting with toothpicks.</p><p>The pending NetEase divorce feels like a crippling blow. Just as momentum has picked up after years of decline, the game and league broadcasts are likely to go dark within the next 10 days. And there might be a lengthy dark period given the process for Blizzard to sign a new partner and navigate regulatory approvals.</p><p>So the Chinese teams find themselves asking: what’s the point? Why bother at all, when most Chinese fans can’t even play the game or watch their favorite teams play?</p><p><em>Emerging competitors</em></p><p>Competitors have emerged to vie for teams’ attention and resources, and their business models are increasingly moving away from requiring their partner teams to put themselves into 8 figure debt to participate.</p><p>An interesting comparison is VALORANT’s VCT. VCT takes a hybrid approach where it doesn’t collect franchise fees from partnered teams, yet partnered teams still receive exclusive entitlements such as guaranteed spots in leagues and stipends.</p><p>Perhaps freed from the expectations of partnered teams on returns from franchise fees, VCT’s castle walls are not as high as OWL’s. VCT provides paths for non-partnered teams to ascend through qualifiers to international leagues to compete with partnered teams and receive stipends. While there is a cap in 5 years on the number of teams that can ascend into expansion partnered spots, a rotation mechanism provides an evergreen ascension path for non-partnered teams.</p><p>VCT is the shiny new thing, but there are other emerging esports that do not require high buy in fees. Time will tell how these structures actually turn out and whether their business models might end up crippling their leagues, but the fact that there was high demand for VCT partnerships shows that stiff competition exists for where teams invest.</p><p>(Why would VCT ever provide franchise-like entitlements to partnered teams without amassing a bankroll from franchise fees? I’ll come back to this critical question later.)</p><p><em>Alternate universe?</em></p><p>This is a bit off-topic but it’s worth a detour: is there an alternate universe where the OWL business model would have worked? More specifically, if the game started as free-to-play (and assuming Blizzard churned out content at a commensurate pace), would the growth of the game not hit a wall within 18–24 months of launch and thus there would be continuing momentum and demand in this alternate universe?</p><p>League of Legends also has franchised leagues with significant franchise fees, and there still seems to be demand for franchises (at least in the LEC where there is even talk of expansion). That LOL is free-to-play and one of the most popular games ever likely contribute to that kind of demand, so in our alternate universe, maybe the OWL business model has a better chance to work.</p><p>But the real point of this detour is to show another flaw: there is a mismatch between the game business model at the start and the OWL business model. The flaw is that the level of demand needed to make the OWL business model work requires a growth in OWL audience that outpaces the growth of a game that can’t scale like a free-to-play game. Achieving that audience size requires OWL to pull in a significant number of fans who don’t play Overwatch. That’s hard to do in any esports, let alone a multiplayer game as dynamic and fast-paced as Overwatch which is difficult to follow even for those that play the game.</p><p>This begs the question: now that the game is free, is the OWL business model salvageable? I don’t think so. Not with some of the highest franchise fees in esports and the losses that teams have accumulated over the last 5 years (and hence the extended timeline to recoup), and not in the current liquidity crunch.</p><p>Ok, let’s get back on topic.</p><p><em>Current state: cost cutting</em></p><p>OWL teams are in trouble. More teams than ever are significantly cutting costs despite end-of-2022 momentum. Even well-funded teams are reducing their burn, whether it’s out of financial prudence or because they are shifting resources to leagues that offer friendlier terms or better prospects.</p><p>There have always been low budget teams in the league, but this off-season takes it to another level. There are significantly more pro players out of contracts today than in any previous off-season, and if they do find jobs, they are likely looking at pay cuts.</p><p>The unprecedented pool of free agents is a result of teams releasing players for cheaper alternatives as well as teams releasing players at the end of the season to avoid paying salaries during the off-season.</p><p>But here is the most insidious reason for some of the recent cost cutting: winning doesn’t translate into more revenue, so why spend? When team-sourced revenue is in decline and franchise value is near zero, the league revenue share becomes the most significant source of team revenue. But league revenue share doesn’t care where a team finishes in the standings. When the perverse incentive of tanking for better earnings start to appear, then competitive integrity starts to erode.</p><p>A viable competitive scene needs an evergreen talent pool to draw from. For the next generation of OWL players who are already struggling in a fallow T2, they are likely asking themselves why they should tie their future to crap job prospects.</p><p>A viable league also needs an engaged fanbase. But we are seeing roster mania <em>en masse, </em>where for the first time in OWL’s existence, entire rosters are turning over, even on playoff teams. This type of turnover leads to teams losing their identities. Will fan engagement waver when fans have less reason to invest their passion for teams that look different every year?</p><p>It’s not just pro players that are facing an uncertain future. There is an entire economy built around OWL that includes people working at the league office and within OWL teams in support roles. Vendors and agencies employ people that support the league and teams on everything from broadcast operations to content production. There are journalists, player agents, on-air talent, content creators, etc. etc. All these people are chasing their own version of the OWL dream, and they are also impacted by cost cutting.</p><p>The entire esports industry is going through a correction. Revenue prospects are declining and even the biggest teams are tightening their belts across multiple games. Attracting investment, too, is harder to come by across the board as the esports sector has fallen out of favor.</p><p>When an industry goes through correction, the healthiest businesses with real profits have the best chance to survive while the weakest are culled. OWL teams with their franchise fee tumor might end up having some of the most difficult moments in the current economic cycle.</p><p><strong>Paths Forward</strong></p><p>Like I said at the start, I want to see the league succeed as much as anybody else. I believe there is still a path for that, if there is a fundamental reset of the OWL business model.</p><p>In somewhat Godfather terms, the path forward is to leave the franchise fee, take the cash flow.</p><p>The market has spoken on OWL teams: there is no demand. When there is nothing further to be gained from scarcity, the starting point for a reset is to forgive remaining franchise fees and distribute what remains back to teams.</p><p>The game is now free-to-play and there are revived prospects for the game’s second act. Blizzard has done this before, where it locks itself in a shed for a few years and releases an expansion that takes the game to new heights. If the magic works on OW2, that comes with a thirst for more than 20 teams competing for 6 months out of the year. Removing the franchise fee lowers the castle walls, which in turn allows for wider participation from the rest of the ecosystem and thus more hands to help grow the pie.</p><p>A second key component of the reset is for teams to receive financial support, even as franchise fees are deprecated. Removing debt helps, but but the reality of our industry is that esports doesn’t monetizing well enough (yet) for teams in elite leagues to survive without some baseline cash flow.</p><p>Financial support for OWL teams could take many forms.</p><p>Blizzard as the game publisher could allocate a portion of its annual marketing budget to support teams. Let’s do some simple math and assume that the game generates $500 million in annual revenue. I have no idea what the actuals are, but $500 million is not far-fetched (and might be conservative) for a top game with global reach. 10% comes to a $50 million annual marketing budget, and teams should have an opportunity to earn a portion of that. Marketing fees for teams can be tied to performance marketing metrics or made available as subsidies for homestands.</p><p>None of this is charity because surely there is marketing value from all the exposure and engagement generated by league competition and team content, or from the collective reach of teams’ social channels as a direct marketing tool, or from live events to engage the core player base.</p><p>Another form of publisher support could be to funnel a portion of game revenue to teams. This enables fans to express their fandom by helping to fund their favorite team. Some of this exists today from sales of team-branded skins, but the revenue is paltry if you just think about your in-game experience — when was the last time you saw someone using team skins, and if you did, what is that ratio to the hundreds of other cosmetic options? More is needed, whether it’s shared through an in-game compendium dedicated for esports or team bounties tied to their fans’ in-game purchases. Let’s do some math with the same $500M — if teams are allowed to earn 5% of that, it comes to $25M which is slightly above $1M per team per year.</p><p>Again, none of this is charity: teams earn their share by engaging people who play the game and thus keeping them in the game ecosystem. None of this is novel: examples exist in other esports and smarter people can figure out better ways to do it.</p><p>I suppose the threshold question for providing financial support to teams when there is no bankroll of franchise fees to draw from, is whether Blizzard believes that world class competitive Overwatch provides enough value to its game business.</p><p>Going back to VCT and the question I posed earlier on why Riot would pay stipends to partnered teams without collecting franchise fees: actually, there <strong><em>is</em></strong> consideration, it’s just not cash. The consideration is teams spending their own funds to field a team (which, like OWL, is not cheap when there are minimum roster sizes and salaries) and producing content. Riot sees sufficient value in the exposure and engagement for their game that result from teams’ commitment to VCT.</p><p>The VCT business model shows Riot taking back risk from teams—the publisher bet on themselves that they will figure out how to monetize VCT well enough, or how to derive enough value from the game through VCT, to backstop stipends. And high demand for VCT partnerships shows that teams value cashflow to feed mouths more than a potential payday that may or may not come down the road.</p><p>Again, time will tell when rubber meets the road how VCT and other emerging business models will work out. But regardless of outcome, these business models are a very different take on how those publishers calculate the value of esports to their games.</p><p>Coming back to how Blizzard answers this question: each publisher needs to answer this through its own lens. If Blizzard answers “no” to whether it sees sufficient value to pay teams outside of what the franchise business model generates, I think it’s a perfectly valid answer. There’s no bad faith, it just means that their math is different. But then the logical next step after franchise fee relief should be to unwind OWL and hand Overwatch esports back to the community.</p><p>What about China?</p><p>Things look bleak with the game and OWL broadcast going dark. But I actually see the NetEase divorce as a rare opportunity for a reset. It’s an opportunity for Blizzard to find a local publisher that is willing to take financial risk and reward tied to the success of the league.</p><p>If this happens, it might lead to an injection of resources to fight for the league’s future in a critical market.</p><p>If this doesn’t happen, the markets will have spoken again: Chinese OWL has limited value to both the Chinese Overwatch game business and to Blizzard. And that becomes the opportunity for a reset: the league should consolidate OWL into a smaller North American league. This downsized league might turn out to be the right size because it’s a better match with the league’s North America-centric capabilities. The league brings in revenue mostly from its reach in the West, and China doesn’t monetize as well as the West, and thus the league revenue base will likely stay intact despite this consolidation. And so the remaining North American teams should come out ok because they will take home a bigger piece of the same pie.</p><p>In turn, competitive Overwatch in China should be licensed to organizers that are better equipped for China, under more suitable formats.</p><p>There is a common thread that runs through the path forward: most if not all of it lies at Blizzard’s doorstep. As it should, because an IP owner ultimately has control over how its game is exploited and it enjoys all the benefits therefrom. The IP owner is best positioned to create esports, decide how/to whom the dollars flow, and flip the switch to evolve.</p><p>In some sense, in any esports, teams are subjects with limited agency that ultimately serve at the pleasure of the master licensor. The path forward, then, is largesse to forgive debt and to pay a decent wage.</p><p>Just a few last points.</p><p>First, the league needs to act decisively. Each day that the current state continues means team losses continue to compound, and the entire mass (mess?) will continue to accelerate toward terminal velocity. Please, please don’t just punt this to Microsoft. If that happens, we may not see any significant change until 2024 (if the league gets there at all).</p><p>Second, a reset means that the league — and all of us engaged with it — will need to accept less. OWL set out to be a game changer. It had ambitions to be the best. Those grand aspirations, the shooting for the stars, is what attracted so many of us to its orbit in the first place.</p><p>OWL got many things right. I think city-based teams do lead to a more engaged fanbase; OWL has some of the best and most consistent branding in all of esports; without region-locked rosters, we got to see spectacularly diverse rosters that have never been tried in other esports; the league’s big splash beginnings did help to push esports a bit further — even if a few smalls steps — into mainstream consciousness.</p><p>And in the attempt at value creation, OWL’s intention — no, <strong><em>our </em></strong>intention, because we all believed — was true.</p><p>But we failed, and it’s ok. It’s ok to be top 5 instead of being the best. It’s ok to follow in others’ wake instead of leading from the front. It’s ok to be practical and mimic what works instead of being the visionary. Accepting less is better than being too proud to change and dying on its own sword.</p><p>OW2 provided a spark of hope, and something pretty damn good could yet emerge, if the league is willing to let go and evolve.</p><p>We come to the end and I close with a personal note.</p><p>I worked at Blizzard for over a decade before joining the Charge. My first day at Blizzard actually started with meetings on China partnerships. I would eventually go on to be on the team that, through literal sweat and tears, put together the original NetEase partnership.</p><p>Now, that comes an end and hopefully life begins anew for Blizzard in China.</p><p>In the Charge’s first season in L.A., I stayed with the team for a few months and brought my family. My oldest son Jasper was 5 years old and we put him in a local preschool. We’d hang out at the team house after school and wait for afternoon scims to end. The highlight of his day was when Hotba came out of scrims and gave him a piece of candy (hence the pic at the top). That’s all he really understood about what was going on back then.</p><p>Now, Hotba is still my son’s favorite player and he actually plays the game after school (as a Hog main, ugh) with his best friend.</p><p>Things have truly come full circle for me, and the time is right to say farewell.</p><p>As always, thanks for reading.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b603099a9ad8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mid-Season Adjustments]]></title>
            <link>https://eddy-meng.medium.com/mid-season-adjustments-d96856f3501f?source=rss-d87d84775341------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d96856f3501f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[videogames]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[guangzhou-charge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[overwatch-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esports-business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eddy Meng]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jun 2021 05:15:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-21T05:15:57.728Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iY-h83v9uJc7kBwLgEk58Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>The view from Canton Tower in Guangzhou</figcaption></figure><p>It’s been a disappointing first half of the season. As you probably know, coaching has been a topic that’s been top of mind for us — I’ll touch on our coaching change and also give some thoughts on OWL coaching in general.</p><p>We lost some key starters after the end of the 2020 season (<a href="https://medium.com/@eddy.meng/a-look-back-a-peek-ahead-219aa2e23314">which I’ve written about previously</a>). We knew early last season that we would need to do a partial rebuild for 2021, so we started our scouting process last July. After the season ended, we conducted a month-long trial process. We hired a new head coach, and went after and signed the players that fit the new coaching staff’s roster vision.</p><p>With a roster that featured several new starters and rookies, led by a young coaching staff, we built an off-season schedule around 2 periodization blocks where each block included 10–14 days of training and ended with an exhibition match, to try to accelerate the process for building team synergy.</p><p>We were generally pleased with how the team progressed through these 2 blocks, and felt confident that our preparation and planning were sound.</p><p>But after Lunar New Year, once the team reported to our facility in China to start pre-season training, we started to see some worrying trends. When looking at key metrics that we track internally, we saw signs that we were plateauing as we got closer to the start of the season, and were falling behind other teams’ progression. Ultimately our May Melee performance were true to those warning signs.</p><p>As the May Melee ended, we focused on preparing for the season’s first hero rotations set for the June Joust. We were not thinking about a coaching change because we value continuity (we were one of the few teams to not make coaching changes during our first 2 seasons in the league), we committed to a new roster that was built around our coach’s vision, and finding a new coach mid-season would mean searching from a limited candidate pool.</p><p>New coaches face learning curves and we were prepared to fight through that. I won’t get into specifics because we still have lots of respect for our previous head coach, but I do want to make clear that we did not release him because of poor results. Our coaching change really was a mutual parting of ways.</p><p>This coaching change was unexpected and really threw us for a loop. It left us without a leader for June Joust, because we wanted to take the time needed to find the right candidate that could hopefully help us turn things around for the rest of this season and also lead us in 2022.</p><p>Having gone through 2 head coach searches in the past 8 months (ugh), I want to give some insights into the qualities that we look for in a head coach.</p><p>Fans tend to think about a head coach as the team’s in-game Yoda, emerging from the cave after days of theory-crafting to reveal the perfect comp etched on stone tablets. Some of the candidates we’ve interviewed also view the role of the head coach as primarily focused on in-game strategy.</p><p>But for us, that’s a limited view of a head coach’s responsibilities. Here are some of the qualities that we look for, in addition to X’s and O’s:</p><ul><li><strong>Leadership</strong> — motivate players, build (and rebuild) their confidence, hold them accountable, and lead them through adversity.</li><li><strong>People management</strong> — manage relationships with his staff and his players in and out of the game, which requires, among other things, pro-active and transparent communications, resolving inevitable conflicts, and importantly for a mixed team like ours, building trust with players from different backgrounds.</li><li><strong>Resource management</strong> — the head coach will have a staff of assistant coaches and analysts at their disposal, and it’s important for the head coach to be able to maximize efficiency and output through setting up an effective organizational structure with clear roles &amp; responsibilities. (One common trait we see from Contenders teams is that coaching staffs tend to be small, sometimes there is only the head coach, and these coaches are used to doing just about everything themselves. So they don’t always come to OWL with an ability to manage a staff.)</li><li><strong>Identify talent</strong> — a successful team is built on the foundation of good players, and thus the head coach must be able to evaluate players to build a roster that fits the vision for the team.</li><li><strong>Player development </strong>— some coaches want their own guys or work better with established players. That might fit some teams, but not for us. We believe in player development as an organization, so we look for a head coach that is committed to (and ideally has a track record for) developing young players.</li><li><strong>Network</strong> — having a deep network among OWL and Contenders teams helps to identify and recruit good players and assistant coaches/staff. This is a valuable resource and a plus for candidates.</li><li><strong>An open mind </strong>— OWL is a hyper-competitive primordial soup made up of some of the best and brightest in esports, where adaption is constant. A good head coach must have the aptitude (and humility) to continually learn and improve to stay ahead.</li></ul><p>For traditional sports fans, this list is not new: a <a href="https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/29263878/top-nba-head-coach-prospects-tyronn-lue-tom-thibodeau-chris-finch">recent article from ESPN</a> says that “it simply isn’t enough for a [NBA] head coach to have an elite basketball mind, or even be a leader of 15 basketball players. [They] must have an instinct for the task of management … [and] organizational skills”.</p><p>But NBA coaches are typically in their 40s and 50s, having honed their craft for decades. In contrast, most OWL head coaches that we see are in their 20s, sometimes only a year or 2 removed from being pro players, with no training except from observing their previous coaches, and often without life experiences that could help them develop the leadership and management skills that we’re looking for. That’s the reality for a young industry like esports. We try to mitigate that by having good staff to fill in the gaps while the young coach develops on the job. For example our GM has over a decade of leadership and management experience from the military and from a business career, to help mentor our head coach.</p><p>With all that, it should come as no surprise that there are some interesting trends emerging in OWL around experience and continuity. At the mid-season point, we’ve seen correlation between wins and these key variables: teams led by head coaches who have previous OWL head coaching experience, a core of returning starters from last season, and lower number of rookie starters.</p><p>In particular, there is significant correlation between win percentage and teams led by head coaches with previous OWL head coaching experience, more so than in previous seasons.</p><p>It’s important to note that <em>correlation</em> doesn’t mean <em>causation</em>. In other words, it might not necessarily be the case that hiring an OWL head coach will lead to wins. The correlation might be the result of, for example, teams with good players and results being more likely to retain their coach, or a shallow pool of new coaching talent, etc. But nevertheless, it’s becoming more apparent than in previous years that experience and continuity do matter. (Which shouldn’t be surprising given the expansive skills required to be a good head coach, and coaches developing those skills through hands-on experience.)</p><p>Another emerging correlation might be roster budget. I suspect that there is better correlation this season between how much a team spends on players and wins. There are still exceptions where a few bigger budget and lower budget teams are mid-table, but I think the correlation is somewhat stronger than in previous seasons. (Disclaimer: this is based on my own guesses because actual roster budgets are not — and due to legal requirements cannot be — shared among teams.)</p><p>An interesting picture emerges from all of this, that as OWL heads into its 4th season, there are signs of the league’s maturation where experience and continuity are becoming competitive advantages. And rising correlation between roster budgets and wins also points to this maturation, where teams are starting to get better at correctly valuing players who impact winning.</p><p>This maturation means that good organizations will be rewarded for their ability to analyze, accumulate and retain knowledge. It means that OWL teams are not only competing on the field, but that our organizations and front offices will also be competing from our desks.</p><p>So now you are probably asking why, if we’re so smart, we’ve just hired our 2nd head coach in 8 months. Mea culpa. For those who have been in positions to make hiring decisions, I hope you can sympathize with the reality that regardless of how extensive the interview and vetting process is, there is no guarantee of making the right hire. The best one can do is to make good hires most of the time.</p><p>And if we’re honest with ourselves, there was a bit of <em>hubris </em>from our previous success, where we thought our shit don’t stink and overlooked certain risks in making some key decisions.</p><p>The bottom line is that we’re not very good right now, and we need to get back to the grind to try to get better. Hopefully our recent changes are small steps down that path.</p><p>Thanks for reading.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d96856f3501f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A look back, a peek ahead]]></title>
            <link>https://eddy-meng.medium.com/a-look-back-a-peek-ahead-219aa2e23314?source=rss-d87d84775341------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/219aa2e23314</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[guangzhou-charge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esports-news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esports-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[overwatch-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eddy Meng]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2020 05:58:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-13T05:58:39.703Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>2020 by the numbers</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/847/1*wtxxLUle2_dcpYAS8O5xmg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Team photo 2020 B.C. (Before Covid)</figcaption></figure><p>This season was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of winning the Summer Showdown, it was the age of playoff disappointment, it was the epoch of Covid-19….</p><p>What a year it’s been (understatement of the century) and we’re eager to put it behind us, but I want to take one last look back in the context of some sobering numbers.</p><p><strong>168</strong>: that’s the total number of days that our players, coaches and team manager spent in quarantine this year. Our guys had to go through 14-day quarantine when entering (and re-entering) S. Korea to join our training base, returning to their home countries to renew visas, and traveling to countries where the U.S. consulate had not yet shut down to schedule P1 visa interviews in the early days of the pandemic (that was during the age of innocence when we planned to head to L.A. to escape the pandemic and start our season).</p><p><strong>29</strong>: out of the approximately 250 days from the start of the year until our last match in mid-September, our full squad of players were together in one training facility for a grand total of <strong>29</strong> days. These <strong>29</strong> days were all in January before we moved our training base from China to S. Korea — after that, our Chinese and Western players had to deal with travel and visa restrictions brought on by the pandemic that forced them to go in and out of S. Korea throughout the season (and in Wya’s case, never being able to join the team in Seoul which sadly may have hindered his development).</p><p><strong>14</strong>: is the total number of matches where one of Eileen, Nero and NeptuNo were not available to play due to being in quarantine or traveling to secure/renew visas. That’s <strong>50%</strong> of our 28 matches this season including tournaments and playoffs where one of our core contributors (who competed for starts when available to the team) could not play.</p><p>That’s enough of that. All teams faced similar challenges this year and we were certainly not the only ones impacted by the pandemic. But I do want to pause to applaud our players, coaches and staff who — despite the interruptions, uncertainties and patchwork lineups—persevered to bring home the Summer Showdown trophy and finish 5th overall in the league.</p><p>Now I’ll widen the lens a bit.</p><p>Check out the below, which lists the combined regular season records and win percentages (i.e. wins divided by total matches) from the first 3 seasons of the league:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/613/1*SiFv1VAkmPwir44gDiPSGg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Combined regular season records for OWL S1, S2 and S3</figcaption></figure><p>We’re <strong>#5</strong>. And we’re <strong>#2</strong> among S2 expansion teams, a fraction behind Vancouver.</p><p>I combined the regular season records the first 3 years of the league — if you do this only for the 2 years we’ve been in the league (2019–2020), this table looks a bit different when excluding S1 records. San Francisco would displace NYXL as #1, Shanghai moves ahead of us, Florida jumps to mid-table, etc., but we’d remain near the top.</p><p>There are a few points that I want to make, in looking at this table. (Ok ok aside from bragging a little while we can, which I apologize for but feels so damn good to do, because it’s so damn hard to win at this level.)</p><p>First, kudos to our players. Especially our Class of 2019, the founding members of our team that fought with us for 2 season. This group includes Rio, Chara, Eileen, Nero, Happy and Shu. Together, they started out as a slept-on group that were mocked by the league’s own analysts, but ended this year as MVP candidate, Summer Showdown champions and among the most prized free agents of this off-season.</p><p>Second, I want to comment on an <a href="https://www.ggrecon.com/articles/the-four-horsemen-of-the-roster-building-apocalypse">article</a> from GGRecon which posited that there is “a strong correlation between team budget … and end of regular-season standings”. I disagree. Teams at the top of this table do spend, but, from what I can gather anecdotally, some of the bottom teams spend just as much (if not more).</p><p>We don’t have access to other teams’ roster budgets, but the league does share score cards that let us know which quartile our roster budget rests (without identifying any of the other teams). Based on these score cards, I can tell you that while we are in the top quartile in win percentage, we are not in the top quartile in roster budget. This is one of the metrics that we strive for, to over-achieve on a sort of “dollars per win” basis.</p><p>Don’t get me wrong, we’re not cheapskates — we invest in our players and coaching staff, we have a full support staff of managers and analysts, and we’re going to unveil our world class training facility in the coming months.</p><p>But I think this does point toward an emerging identity for our competitive operations where, looking at this year’s 2 NBA finalists, we aspire to be more like the Miami Heat organization that <a href="https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2899630-the-heats-secret-sauce">values identifying and developing young talent</a> and less like the Los Angeles Lakers organization that acquires established stars in the transfer market.</p><p>After 3 seasons of OWL, I think it’s starting to emerge which teams take what approach. And as several teams are undergoing a reset or full rebuild this off-season, it will be interesting to see which path they choose. For fans out there, instead of just thinking about your team as full budget or low budget, it might also be interesting to look at your team (and think about their success or failure) through this type of lens.</p><p>There’s no right or wrong approach, both the Lakers and the Heat made the NBA finals this year, and many teams are probably a hybrid, but we lean toward Pat Riley thus far.</p><p>Third, to get back to our Class of 2019, you’re probably wondering about the elephant in the room, that given the success of our core group, why the hell did we let Shu, Nero, and Happy leave in free agency?</p><p>We actually started talks with all 3 players as early as the 2019 off-season about potential extensions and continued these discussions throughout this season, but in the end each player had his own reason for choosing free agency.</p><p>In Shu’s case, we knew that while he was open to extending with us, he really wanted to test his value on the open market.</p><p>In Nero’s case, he’s been transparent with us about his desire to be on a team with more of a Western presence. And as 2020 wore on, it became obvious that given continuing uncertainties around Covid-19 related travel and visa restrictions, we as a team can’t risk our starters missing matches in 2021, and Nero shouldn’t put his future value at risk by missing chunks of the season.</p><p>And in Happy’s case, he told us after his first season with us that because esports careers tend to be brutally short, he was eager to chase life experiences that may not be possible after his career is over. He wanted to experience living in the U.S. and being on a Western team. He gave us his all, and in return we wanted to help him reach his goals — we put Happy in touch with one of the best agents in the business who has a great network among Western teams, and wished him the best (while smiling through our tears).</p><p>We feel like proud parents watching our kids leave the nest. We feel like we did our jobs to provide them with their first opportunity and help them develop, and their next big fat contracts are sort of like a validation of what we want to achieve as an organization.</p><p>So as we assemble our roster for 2021, we want to try to hold fast to what we believe in — trust our scouting to find the next class of young talents, work with coaches who believe in player development, invest to retain while looking for value in the transfer market, and always strive toward winning a championship.</p><p>Thanks for reading.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=219aa2e23314" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The happy few, band of brothers]]></title>
            <link>https://eddy-meng.medium.com/the-happy-few-band-of-brothers-ee129722f573?source=rss-d87d84775341------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ee129722f573</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[team-culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[guangzhou-charge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[teamwork]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esport]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[overwatch-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eddy Meng]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2020 17:27:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-12T14:27:01.695Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tmDyLalncsABHhdI0mwEhw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Post-match interview, after we won the Summer Showdown</figcaption></figure><p>Summer Showdown champions — wow, I still pinch myself when I see that. A year ago we were still trying to shake off a disastrous losing streak, and even a few months ago we were struggling to stay above .500.</p><p>We’ve had an amazing run recently and we’re really proud of our team and what they’ve accomplished, so I want to take the opportunity to look back at how each of our players came to our team, and also try to give a peek into their personalities outside of the game.</p><p>Here they are, in alphabetical order.</p><p><strong>Chara</strong>: Chara was one of the first players we signed to our inaugural season roster, and it was especially gratifying on a personal level because Chara was estranged from his family back then — when he decided to pursue a pro gaming career, his parents didn’t support his decision, and I think he and his father especially had their differences. Back when Chara’s Meta Bellum team went on break, he would stay at the team house while everyone else went home to their families because he didn’t want to (couldn’t?) go home. Since Chara joined our team, he and his parents have reconciled, which is an awesome story. But his first season was a difficult one and Chara received a lot of criticism from our Chinese fans, which was especially difficult for a deeply sensitive soul like Chara. But he persevered and stepped up when the opportunity came in the middle of this season. Now, whenever he makes a clutch play, live chat on Chinese streams is filled with “Sorry Chara” apologies from fans that criticized his play last year. How’s that for a redemption arc!</p><p><strong>Cr0ng</strong>: after the 2019 season when we knew that we were going to lose Hotba, we first chased but lost out on a high-profile free agent off-tank. We then identified several targets from Contenders through trials. We prioritized Cr0ng after our Assistant General Manager John interviewed several of our targets in person — John was adamant that we pursue Cr0ng because he was so impressed with Cr0ng’s hunger to be great, his humility and team-oriented personality, and his passion for our team (he turned down several other offers to join us). At our pre-season boot-camp, Cr0ng struggled early on with his performance and with English language comms. But by the end of boot-camp, our coaches said that he showed the most improvement of anyone over the course of boot-camp. Outside of the game, Cr0ng takes care of his body by working out regularly, and he is meticulous about keeping a consistent sleep schedule.</p><p><strong>Eileen</strong>: he didn’t get an invitation to participate in our first wave of trials in late 2018 (how stupid were we?!), but once the coaches saw his performance (and his unique ability to flex across both hitscan and projectile heroes), he became a top priority. One of our key selling points for Eileen was Assistant Coach Tydolla, the two of them hit it off immediately and to this day they have a very close bond. Check out Eileen’s <a href="https://twitter.com/GZCharge/status/1279779631852253184?s=20">emotional embrace with Tydolla</a> after we beat Shanghai. Eileen was known in China as Mr. Runner Up because his teams always finished second, and admittedly he did struggle at times with nerves and confidence in some of our big matches. But a turning point might have been our match against Seoul back in early May, where due to a coaching mistake, we couldn’t substitute in Happy for Eileen on Hanamura, but we still won the map with Eileen. That seemed to give Eileen a boost in confidence — he asked for more responsibility and his confidence soared as our team saw more success. Looking back, that substitution error may have been the seed that led to his breakout performance throughout the Summer Showdown.</p><p><strong>Happy</strong>: Before the start of the 2019 season, Happy thought about changing his in-game name and asked a bunch of people for their opinions — but just about everyone he asked told him not to, because Happy always seems happy and so his name was spot on. Happy is one of our Korean players who most enjoys being on a mixed team, where a cross-cultural environment allows him more room to be his happy and laid-back self. But underneath that smile, Happy is a killer, he’s one of the most intense competitors on the team — winning is extremely important to him, and he is one of our hardest workers because he believes in the reward of the grind in perfecting his craft. Happy gained a bit of weight this year, and our Chinese fans refer to him as H A P P Y (the added space between letters connotes wider girth), in a loving way of course.</p><p><strong>NeptuNo</strong>: Our coaches targeted NeptuNo after trials because they valued his veteran leadership, his game IQ that allows him to help solve problems in-game, and his shot-calling. NeptuNo had offers from other teams but he chose us. He said he had so much fun playing with Shu during trials, and he embraced coming to China because to him it was a once-in-a-lifetime experience. In his short time with our team, we’ve learned a lot from him — we learned to value players who are passionate about wanting to part of our team, and who embrace what others might shy away from in terms of the experience of living in China. Our coaches have also evolved to implement a more open feedback loop, where input from smart players like NeptuNo are sought after. NeptuNo is another poster child for a key characteristic of some of our most successful players — he loves to grind and practice.</p><p><strong>Nero</strong>: Like Eileen, Nero didn’t participate in our trials until later in the process. Before we offered Nero, we had targeted another Western DPS but we moved on after this player expressed reservations about living in China. That wasn’t the case with Nero, who comes from a great family that embraced sending their son to China for the experience. Nero has a unique personality where he can get along with anyone and everyone — during our first ever boot camp in late 2018, Nero was actually the player that formed friendships with both Korean and Chinese players, and acted as a sort of initial glue to bring our players together. Fast forward to this past May, and Nero was struggling with burnout. And so now it was our turn, as our coaches and players tried to rally to take care of their baby brother. Nero missed training time due to having to renew his visa and spending 14 days in quarantine when he came back to Seoul, and so he didn’t see playtime in our Summer Showdown matches. On match-days, coaches ask Nero to watch the match in the dug-out area and provide feedback to his teammates, but Nero gets too nervous in the dug-out so he ends up running around the facility trying to find a place to watch on his phone and avoid having a coronary.</p><p><strong>Rio</strong>: when we were putting together our first ever roster before our inaugural season, we looked to build from a strong tank line. Our coaches valued Rio for his flexibility to play all tank heroes at a high level and for his consistency, so we signed him to be the anchor for our team. Rio is a mellow dude who never gets too high or too low. He’s so easy going that, when we held our first scrims, I recall that we had questions about whether he could be a forceful shot-caller. But over time, he has become an effective in-game leader while doing it his own way, being a steady and calming voice when shit hits the fan. He’s like the team dad, despite being one of our youngest players.</p><p><strong>Shu</strong>: like Eileen and Nero, Shu wasn’t on our radar until later in our trial process before the 2019 season. Before we found Shu, we had already signed Rise who was one of the best flex supports in Korea Contenders, but he was only 17 and would miss the first part of the 2019 season. So we looked for someone who could fill in until Rise came of age. As Shu trialed with our team, we started hearing Jjonak comparisons from the coaches — hyperbole abounded throughout the trial process so we didn’t get too excited. But then Shu popped the hell off when the season started and never relinquished his starting spot. As far as his personality, Shu is a character. Our Chinese fans call him Sibal King because he spews a constant stream of cuss during games and on his streams. He’s brash, talks trash, aspired to be a hair stylist before going pro, and he loves his mom and his fluffy Pomeranian. Shu is just a one-of-a-kind personality who is supremely comfortable in his own skin.</p><p><strong>Wya</strong>: In our off-season trials, we invited our then academy team T1W to participate and focused on their DPS and tank players. But after seeing Wya perform, our coaches thought that he was the true carry for T1W from his flex support position. Wya comes from Heilongjiang in the North, and he speaks with thick Northern accent which is a bit unusual in our home region in the South. Wya speaks pretty good English — his English is completely self-taught from watching American movies and TV dramas.</p><p>And now for some unsung heroes.</p><p><strong>Assistant GM John</strong>: as some of you might know, as Covid-19 began to spread in China, we moved most of our team to Seoul. We had built up our org in Guangzhou to support the team, but with Covid-19 induced travel and visa restrictions, most of our staff could not travel to Seoul when the team relocated, and John and our team manager Cassis were on their own to spin up a training facility from scratch, and to take care of our players as Covid-19 then raged through S. Korea. At one point, Cassis’ visa ran out and had to return to Taipei, so John was on his own to manage our team for more than a month. Through it all, John was exactly the leader we needed to not only to help us survive, but to create an environment where we started to thrive.</p><p><strong>IT Manager Gai</strong>: right before our final match vs. Shanghai in the Summer Showdown, Happy had problems with his mouse pad — he uses a ginormous mouse pad and we tried several back up options but couldn’t find something that was big enough where he felt comfortable. So we called and visited a bunch of shops but it was Sunday after 6 p.m., and most stores in Seoul were closed. Just when we started to go into full panic mode, we discovered that it was a mouse issue, not a mouse pad issue. But the story doesn’t end there. Happy uses the discontinued Logitech G303 mouse, which is getting harder to find — before the season started, we struggled to find a back-up G303 for Happy (especially with Covid-19 impacting international shipping), but our IT Manager Mr. Gai came through and sourced a back-up G303. So, moments before our biggest moment, playing in the Summer Showdown finals against the best team in the league, Happy plugged in Mr. Gai’s back-up G303 and everyone breathed a huge sigh of relief when it worked without any hiccups.</p><p>####</p><p>I compiled these anecdotes together with our competitive team leadership. Reminiscing about how our players came to join our team triggered some conversations around roster construction, which I will close with.</p><p>We are fortunate that some of the best players on our team started out as plan B’s. Despite not landing the players we initially targeted, we signed some incredibly talented players who ended up better fits than the plan A’s that we didn’t sign.</p><p>Part of that is probably due to luck, but I think part of that also speaks to the fact that at this highest level of competitive Overwatch, there may not be a big gap in skill between plan A and plan B type players. And further, if we assume that gaps in individual skill across OWL teams are not sizeable, then what separates winning teams might be more about drive, work ethic, mental fortitude, group cohesion, team culture, good coaching, and patience (i.e. giving a talented group of players sufficient time to develop and reach their full potential — it took us 1.5 years).</p><p>I don’t mean for this to come off as us patting ourselves on the back after solving the mysteries of the universe. One look at our map differential (compared to those of other top teams) will tell you that our margin of error is small, and with all our 5-map wins, we might be only a handful of plays away from being middle-of-the-pack.</p><p>And this is not going full Jerry Krause (who infamously said that organizations win championships, not players, when he had Michael Jordan on his team). For sure, the primary reason we won a championship was because of our players.</p><p>These are intended as working hypotheses with the benefit of hindsight.</p><p>But most importantly, to get back to our players, I hope these anecdotes allow our fans a peek at an awesome group of young men.</p><p>Thanks for reading.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ee129722f573" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Put me in, coach!]]></title>
            <link>https://eddy-meng.medium.com/put-me-in-coach-3c079f4bc272?source=rss-d87d84775341------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3c079f4bc272</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[guangzhou-charge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[overwatch-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esport]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eddy Meng]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2020 16:07:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-31T03:03:45.217Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Vm3hOy2ExcyD1SAq9miGqg.jpeg" /></figure><p>It’s already March 27 and our season is just about to start. How crazy is that?</p><p>To put it mildly, our last few months have been a bit crazy, driven by — obviously — the Covid19 outbreak. I want to open up the curtains a bit to give a peek into what we went through to even be in a position to play our first match tomorrow.</p><p>Here are some high(low?)lights:</p><ul><li>As some of you are just now experiencing in the West, our business and operations staff have been working from home since the end of January. Many of our staff are new to the organization and new to their roles, having been hired after the 2019 season ended as we transitioned our operations from L.A. to China. So we’ve been learning to work together remotely across multiple regions to manage nightmarish logistics at the height of the Covid19 outbreak in China and S. Korea, even as we were all just starting to get to know each other. (Apologies to anyone who has been on calls with me with my kids screaming in the background.)</li><li><a href="https://medium.com/@eddy.meng/six-days-in-january-80e226e0cc9f">As I wrote previously</a>, we moved our players from China to S. Korea right after Wuhan was locked down. But our Chinese players and coaches didn’t have Korean visas (and some of them still don’t), so they couldn’t travel with their teammates to Seoul. The end result is that we haven’t been able train and hold meetings/review sessions together as a full team under one roof since the end of January.</li><li>After the bulk of the team moved to Seoul, they had to fend for themselves because the support staff we hired in China couldn’t travel and thus couldn’t do much to help on the ground in Seoul. This meant that our GM John and Team Manager Cassis had to find training and housing solutions literally upon landing in Seoul, coordinate on visas (more on that craziness below), source PCs and equipment, provide daily support, while keeping an eye on everyone’s health and safety as the Covid19 outbreak hit S. Korea.</li><li>Our marketing efforts were significantly impacted. The marketing team we built in China still can’t travel, so we haven’t been able to create as much content as we would like, to engage our fans. We made a significant investment to build a 3,000 square meter training facility in Foshan with multiple scrim rooms, streaming booths, team kitchen and pantry, work space and meeting rooms, and a fully functional gym — this beautiful facility is now sitting empty while our team trains out of a hotel conference room with borrowed PCs in Seoul.</li><li>As for visas, as mentioned above, our Chinese players/staff need visas to enter S. Korea, while our Chinese, Korean and European players/staff need visas to enter the U.S. As if that weren’t complex enough, because of the Covid19 outbreak, Korean and U.S. consulates in China stopped processing visas for an extended period, while U.S. and most Asian countries implemented travel restrictions and mandatory quarantine. So when the league pivoted toward makeup matches in Los Angeles after our homestands were cancelled, we had to start a mad scramble to accelerate our work on U.S. P1 visas. The players that moved with the team to Seoul were able to quickly complete their P1 interviews and secure their visas at the U.S. consulate in Seoul, but for our Chinese players who couldn’t travel to Seoul (because they didn’t have visas), we had to find a third country: (a) that allowed Chinese travelers to enter and stay long enough to pass the requirement from U.S. immigration that forbid entry from anyone who had been in China for 14 days prior to entry, and (b) where the local U.S. consulate accepted applications for P1 interviews from foreign applicants. In our harried effort to secure visas, at one point we had players spread across 4 different countries. But then, less than 24 hours before getting on the plane to L.A., after we somehow managed to secure P1s for enough players to field a starting roster, after getting our hopes up that we could finally take the stage, the league made the decision to cancel the L.A. makeup matches. The league absolutely made the right decision, but … F#@%^#CK!</li></ul><p>We’re not the only ones to have gone through any of this, as the other Chinese teams have gone through similar levels of suck.</p><p>We still have lots of work to do and problems to solve. We have several players/staff who just returned to China from their visa fishing expedition in Southeast Asia, and we need to find a way for them to join their teammates in Seoul. We’re still training out of a converted hotel meeting room. We haven’t received our swaggy Jeff Staple jerseys to wear. Our guys can’t get in their regular workouts, which have been a core part of our team activities. We will continue to work with the league to figure out how to manage the rest of the season’s schedule and logistics. And we need to continue to be vigilant about our players’ health and safety even as the curve has seemingly flattened in this part of the world.</p><p>But for now, it’s enough that our guys get to play tomorrow. Truth be told it doesn’t matter to me how we do this weekend, it’s enough that our team has stayed together through unprecedented adversity to even get to play. It’s enough that we finally get to do what we all love and came here for, and that’s to cheer our best 6 against the other side’s best 6.</p><p>Time to pop off let’s go!</p><p>Thanks for reading.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3c079f4bc272" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Six Days in January]]></title>
            <link>https://eddy-meng.medium.com/six-days-in-january-80e226e0cc9f?source=rss-d87d84775341------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/80e226e0cc9f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[overwatch-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[guangzhou-charge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esport]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eddy Meng]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jan 2020 06:01:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-01-30T11:44:25.245Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*3dq0fA1w217p9Y8UbW1CGQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Six Days in January</strong></p><p>As expected, the Overwatch League announced that homestands in China in February and March have been cancelled, due to safety concerns arising from the coronavirus epidemic. I’d like to give a first hand account of what our team went through during the period leading up to this announcement.</p><p>We had an eventful off-season at the end of 2019 with multiple critical projects that we were managing concurrently, from free agency, to venue planning for 2020 homestands, to building our esports training facility, to recruiting and hiring to fill key roles in our organization.</p><p>By the time our players convened for pre-season training camp in January, I began to see some light at the end of the off-season tunnel. We felt good about our off-season roster moves. We were on track for our first homestand in February. Our new training complex was starting to take shape. We built an awesome organization in Guangzhou with new talents. Our new players were meshing well with our returning players, and our new competitive leadership were thriving in their new roles. We had a solid logistics plan for our two extended trips to the U.S. later in the season. So I finally started to feel as if we were getting over the off-season hump and back into the rhythm of training and competing.</p><p>Then came news out of Wuhan.</p><p>Around the second week of January, just as our players were settling into scrims, we started to hear more reports about a new strain of coronavirus with an epicenter in Wuhan. Within days, we started to hear about fatalities and the virus spreading beyond Wuhan to neighboring provinces.</p><p>At this point in mid-January, we started educating our players on some basic preventative measures such as increased hygiene, wearing facial masks, and reporting any fever or illness immediately to our staff. We identified our local hospital of choice and set up processes around bi-lingual support staff on 24/7 standby to take any sick players to the hospital. Our Assistant General Manager John is an ex Army medic, and we felt that we were in good hands and that things were under control heading into the Lunar New Year break.</p><p>On January 22, I traveled with our events director Anne to Shanghai for some business meetings. While everyone was well aware of the outbreak in Wuhan, there was still a seeming sense of normalcy. I’d say on that day only 2 or 3 people out of 10 wore facial masks, but I did see a few heavy duty N95 rated facial masks being worn. I took the subway for my afternoon meeting, and it wasn’t until Xiaotu suggested later on that I avoid the subway that I was reminded of the outbreak.</p><p>On the next day, January 23, things spiraled downward quickly, starting from the startling news that travel had been suspended to and from Wuhan. This unprecedented lock-down was a wake up call, and triggered our first thought about contingency planning — what happens if the virus situation gets worse? Or if travel restrictions start to impact the Guangzhou region, or that other countries start to restrict travel to/from China? How do we protect our players, how do we reassure our players’ families who are thousands of miles away, and how do we protect our organization?</p><p>Another variable in all this was our homestands. We started to hear that sports and other live events were being cancelled, so could our homestands be far behind? Our first conversation with the league occurred that afternoon, to give our feedback on contingency plans for China homestands (although the league had been monitoring developments well before the 23rd).</p><p>The following days on January 24 and 25, we started to look into the possibility of moving the team to South Korea as a contingency plan. Aside from the basics of flights and hotels, it became apparent that our Chinese players and staff would not be able to leave immediately because they did not have Korean visas — our first 2020 match in Seoul is in March, but it never occurred to us that we’d need visas to travel in January. So this contingency plan would be a solution for only part of our team.</p><p>Over that weekend, all sorts of shit started hitting the fan, from more news about the rapid spread of the epidemic, to Shantou (a city in Guangdong, our home province) announcing confusing restrictions on travel which was overturned hours later, to reports of neighboring countries considering restrictions on entry from travelers from China, to tourist spots in China and Hong Kong being shut down.</p><p>By Monday morning on January 27, our contingency plan was no longer a contingency — our staff (who were home for the holidays) started to book flights, to check on visa timelines for our Chinese players and staff, and to prepare communication plans around our players moving to South Korea. There was a conference call with all four Chinese teams and the league scheduled for the the next morning on January 28, to discuss the status of homestands in China — we decided before then that unless the league went forward with homestands in China, we were moving our training base to Seoul as soon as possible.</p><p>And on that Tuesday call, as expected, the Chinese teams and the league quickly aligned on the inevitable, to call off the China homestands in February and March. And we immediately made arrangements to move our non-Chinese players to Seoul that afternoon.</p><p>It’s unbelievable, looking back, how rapidly this escalated in six days from January 23, when we heard about Wuhan being locked down, to moving our training base to Seoul on January 28.</p><p>But our work has just begun. We need to expedite visas for our Chinese players and staff, so that they can join their teammates in Seoul. We don’t have a place to train in Seoul — our priority was just to get there as soon as possible and we didn’t have time to figure out how to manage training. As I write, our competitive leadership is working on getting training facilities set up in Seoul by early next week. Even then, it’s not optimal from a competitive standpoint because we will have already missed a week of training, just weeks before the start of the season, and because our Chinese players and coaches are separated from the rest of the team, and it’s not 100% clear that they can even join the team in time for the start of the season.</p><p>For sure, our pre-season preparation has been adversely impacted, ahead of what was already going to be a challenging season to find enough training time, given the travel schedule. But that’s ok, because health and safety are all that matters right now.</p><p>I just hope and pray that by the next time I write about our team, we are all in a better place. That there are no more tragedies from the epidemic, our local staff in Guangzhou and Foshan stayed out of harm’s way, our team will have moved back to our home base, and we’re neck deep in getting ready for our July homestands.</p><p>Until then, please take care and stay safe.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=80e226e0cc9f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mid Season Reflections]]></title>
            <link>https://eddy-meng.medium.com/mid-season-reflections-f84456d4215f?source=rss-d87d84775341------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f84456d4215f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[esport]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[overwatch-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[organizational-culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[guangzhou-charge]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eddy Meng]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Jun 2019 03:03:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-05T04:29:19.715Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YX6vWn_uRmKn1d-qmilH4g.png" /><figcaption>Pre-game vs. Houston Outlaws</figcaption></figure><p>On the eve of the start of Stage 3, I’d like to share some reflections on the first half of the season.</p><p>I started and stopped writing this post multiple times during the first half of season because I wanted to talk about our emotional roller coaster ride, but found it difficult to put in words the extent of the highs and lows in full technicolor to those outside of the team cocoon. It’s like the Plato cave allegory, where words can only provide a fleeting glimpse of flickering shadows that represent (poorly) the true exposed nerves rubbed raw.</p><p>A fellow esports traveler calls it the agony and ecstasy of esports. Kind of like <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P2AZH4FeGsc">that line from the Wide World of Sports</a> back in the day, “the thrill of victory and the agony of defeat” — but for those of us involved with the team, it’s that by a factor of 10, where a win means sleepless nights from an excess of euphoria, and yet a loss also means sleepless nights from an excess of misery.</p><p>I think the highs are so high, and the lows so low, because we as an organization are so emotionally invested in our young men and we want so much for them to succeed. And we die a little inside when they don’t.</p><p>So that’s one of my lasting impressions from the first half of the season, the sheer agony and ecstasy of being part of an esports team.</p><p>But you probably came here to find out what I have to say about Stage 2, where we went from fighting for a playoff spot on the last day of Stage 1 to almost breaking the league’s consecutive map loss record in Stage 2. The rest of this post will be my perspective on what happened.</p><p>Commentators and fans have focused on our difficult schedule in Stage 2. While true, I think that’s only part of the story because the losses also exposed some core issues that we need to fix.</p><p>I think a part of what happened in Stage 2 was that we were slower to adapt viz. other teams in the league. Evolution occurs at an accelerated pace in the Overwatch League primordial soup, where the best minds in competitive Overwatch work on exposing tendencies and weaknesses of their opponents. And when teams started adapting to how we play, I think we were a bit slow to find the counter to their counter.</p><p>In my view, this was due to several factors.</p><p>First is inexperience. Veteran teams that have lived through multiple cycles of OWL-paced rapid change, with existing systems and processes in place, have inherent advantages over new teams. I believe this played a part in several new teams experiencing dips in Stage 2, while some veteran teams turned around from Stage 1 slumps.</p><p>Second is communication. More specifically, we had issues with our communication system. It’s not just about language fluency, but also about having a system that gives our players and coaches the tools to communicate at speed with efficiency and depth in order to achieve optimal coordination under fire.</p><p>Third, facing top tier teams in Stage 2 meant that mistakes we might have gotten away with when facing other teams were heavily punished, and we were less able to individually skill our way out of difficulty. And in turn the losses bred doubt and impacted confidence levels, which made us more tentative. With each loss, we looked less and less like the aggressive Team Press W from Stage 1.</p><p>All of these issues were magnified in the current meta where communication and coordination are valued at a premium while hesitation is punished.</p><p>Identifying the problems was the first step — next comes what we did in response.</p><ul><li>Our competitive leadership devoted significant resources to address cracks in our communication system, drilling down to who needs to make what calls, and how, under which specific situations.</li><li>We added group English lessons that focused on in-game communication (instead of individual sessions on conversational English).</li><li>There were frank (and necessarily uncomfortable) team meetings to address breakdowns between specific players, to hold each other accountable.</li><li>Resources were added to bolster our analytics capabilities.</li><li>Our support staff spent a lot of time outside of the training room to make sure that team chemistry did not fracture under the stress of mounting losses.</li></ul><p>But just as important as what we did was what we did <strong>not</strong> do: we avoided what has been <a href="http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/26821790/lakers-20-failed-reboot-nba-crown-jewel">coined in NBA circles</a> as “culture killers”. From day 1, we prioritized clear roles and responsibilities on the competitive side of the organization, and we respected those lines throughout the toughest moments. There were many ideas and suggestions but at the end of the day, competitive decisions are made by our competitive leadership. (For example, there’s absolutely no place in the coaching room for my bronze strats.) This is important because clarity on who makes what decisions means clarity on who is accountable for the outcome of those decisions.</p><p>There will come a time when we look back at our decisions and results to do a full evaluation, but that becomes difficult when accountability is blurred. Moreover, breaching those lines ultimately leads to a breakdown of the culture that we want to build.</p><p>In closing, while Stage 2 was pretty rough, one positive outcome was that it shined a light on some core issues that need to be addressed in order for us to find sustained success. Learning from growing pains is part of the journey. While fixes won’t happen overnight, I’m confident that our staff took the right steps to start to address those things. I’m also hopeful the foundational work that the team put in will start to pay off in the second half of the season.</p><p>Our road to Philly starts up again this week, and I’m ready for more agony and ecstasy. But my heart could do with a bit less agony, please….</p><p>Thanks for reading.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f84456d4215f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Guangzhou boot camp: cinema! (Part 3 of 3)]]></title>
            <link>https://eddy-meng.medium.com/guangzhou-boot-camp-cinema-part-3-of-3-44325774370d?source=rss-d87d84775341------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/44325774370d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[esport]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[guangzhou-charge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[overwatch-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eddy Meng]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:57:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-01T01:59:45.830Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/718/1*hq2Yq2AGh1uqOD4VGbJhxg.png" /><figcaption>A Korean explaining English to an American</figcaption></figure><p>This is the last of three posts about our December boot camp in Guangzhou. In the first two, I talked about <a href="https://medium.com/@eddy.meng/guangzhou-boot-camp-first-big-test-of-our-startup-part-1-of-3-1a4821102ec0">operational challenges</a> and our <a href="https://medium.com/@eddy.meng/guangzhou-bootcamp-of-food-and-grit-part-2-of-3-1ff9b42613da">players’ experience</a>, and in this post, I’ll go into how our initial marketing communication plan came together at boot camp.</p><p>Prior to boot camp, our marketing efforts were focused on big “one-off” beats for team branding and roster reveal. Boot camp was the first time we were officially together as a team, and was thus the starting point for us to begin to tell our story with some consistent arcs. To do that effectively, we needed to think through what we want to communicate to our fans and why, at this particular juncture in time. We wanted to formulate a communication plan that wove common threads through every piece of content that we publish.</p><p>At the beginning of boot camp in early December, the inflow of new fans to our owned channels had slowed. This was somewhat expected because there was the inevitable drop off in momentum after big announcements about our brand and roster, and as the other expansion teams amped up their marketing. But we suspected that another contributing factor was the growing perception that we were going to be a bottom tier team.</p><p>As I <a href="https://medium.com/@eddy.meng/startup-owl-expansion-team-from-china-makes-it-to-the-pacific-challenge-d4902e9ca23f">mentioned previously</a>, the league’s Watchpoint season preview that aired last November compared us to the historically bad Shanghai Dragons from 2018. That opened the door for others to pile on.</p><p>When looking at why the pundits rated us so low, I would place their assumptions into three buckets:</p><p>(1) Communication problems due to our mixed roster;</p><p>(2) Most of our players are not well-known outside of their respective regions (aside from a few who made their mark at World Cup); and</p><p>(3) While no-one straight out said this, I think an unspoken assumption was that a Chinese organization could not successfully build and manage a competitive mixed roster.</p><p>I won’t argue these points — that’s not why I’m writing this post. I mention these points because these were the external perception that our communication plan had to account for. Ultimately, actual wins and losses will matter much more than preseason rankings when it comes to how we are perceived, but for an expansion team, the race has been on to win over fans since the second half of 2018, so we needed to try to change the prevailing perception so that our marketing efforts could start to gain traction as we ramp into the start of the season.</p><p>So how did we tailor our communications to address the prevailing perception about our team?</p><p>On the first issue of communication challenges, we wanted to address that as early as possible by releasing content showing that English is our lingua franca, and that many of our coaches and players could already communicate in English.</p><p>Going back in time to when we were starting to scout players, one thing that stood out when we approached the <a href="https://twitter.com/TheMetaGaming">Meta Gaming</a> organization was that they included English lessons in their weekly routine. (I applaud team owners like <a href="https://twitter.com/wontons">John Kim</a> who have their players’ best interests at heart, by developing their players’ language skills to increase their opportunities.)</p><p>Our General Manager Ethan also targeted players in trades who could bring previous experience from successful mixed teams, as well as players who toiled in North America and European Contenders.</p><p>English skills were more of a challenge for the Chinese player pool. We knew that Eileen needed to work on his English, but we saw in him an eagerness and openness to new life experiences, so we were confident that he would work hard to improve his language skills. Onlywish stood out during trials because he is one of the better English speakers on our team — it astounds me that he is entirely self-taught, having reached pretty good proficiency by watching American movies and learning English songs.</p><p>We knew all of that within our own walls, and our job as marketers was to show that side of the team to our fans.</p><p>The right moment came spontaneously during what I recall was the second or third day of boot camp. Our coaches held evening sessions after dinner to work on call-outs. These early sessions got a bit raucous with lots of shouting and laughter, and our videographer YC was there to capture those moments.</p><p>For the photographers out there, you’ll know that the great ones have a talent for making themselves invisible. YC was actually a new hire that we onboarded right around the start of boot camp, and within a matter days, he had established a rapport and trust with our players to be in their midst with his camera to shoot like the proverbial fly on the wall.</p><p>In that particular evening call-out session, YC caught our guys in a light moment debating whether the call-out for a particular location in a map should be “movie” or “cinema” — it ended up with a <a href="https://twitter.com/GZCharge/status/1073956610832244736">Korean (Hotba) trying to explain the finer points of English to an American</a>. We could not have scripted a better way to show that our team was able to communicate to some degree in English, because it’s practically impossible to make or understand jokes in a language without at least basic competency.</p><p>We followed that up with other social media content that was purposefully crafted to show each coach and player speaking English.</p><p>I should mention that our Chinese fans are super sharp. As soon as we put that content out, they immediately picked up on what we were trying to communicate, and they understood that we were actively addressing the team comms issue . And they went a step further to point out that how our team performs this year might turn on how quickly our Chinese players could level up their English. Our Chinese fans almost always pick up on the nuances in our marketing content, so much so that sometimes it feels like they can finish our sentences before we do.</p><p>Next up was the the challenge of finding ways to make our players more recognizable as emerging talents. Ultimately, that recognition comes from performing well on stage, and there wasn’t much we could do in December. But what we could do was to make our players more recognizable to our own fans — the opportunity to do that was at a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRG1zFocGKQ">fan meet-up </a>during boot camp.</p><p>OWL teams during the 2018 season didn’t have the luxury of time that the 2019 expansion teams had to engage with their home town fans — some teams in 2018 weren’t able to travel to visit their home cities until after the season. But by making the pivot to boot camp in Guangzhou primarily for P1 visa purposes, a huge side benefit was that players had the chance to spend a few weeks getting to know the city that they represent and the fans that will be the most vested in the outcome of our season.</p><p>The atmosphere at the fan event was amazing, our fans embraced our new team and I think all of us were a bit surprised by that kind of warmth and welcome.</p><p>My favorite moment during the fan meet-up came early, when our players were introduced. When it was Hotba’s turn, several fans broke into spontaneous shouts of “cinema”. That word became kind of an early rallying cry for the team, and it was pretty cool that it was the result of a planned communication from our team.</p><p>And now for the last assumption that a Chinese startup organization did not have the wherewithal to build and manage a competitive international team.</p><p>What was our plan to let our fans know that our team is well managed? Umm, you’re looking at it. That’s right, one of my motivations for writing these posts is to ease our fans’ fears that we’re going to screw it up. I want to show that, behind the scenes, we had a team of seasoned professionals who made thoughtful decisions to put our players in position to compete to the best of their abilities.</p><p>If you’ve followed my posts, you’ll recall that I talked about our experience in building professional organizations, how our operations team managed to overcome visa hurdles so that our team could show our strength at the Pacific Challenge, and generally how we approach problem solving in what I believe is a systematic way. All of that are examples of communication with intent, to reinforce a critical communication pillar for us to demonstrate professionalism in our organization in order to inspire confidence in our team.</p><p>The proof is in the pudding. Ultimately our results in the coming months (in wins and losses, but also in how strongly our cultures takes root and how we handle adversity) will be the best indicator of our organizational capabilities. But hopefully our past marketing and communication efforts have laid the groundwork so that fans are more willing to listen to our offer to invest their passion in us.</p><p>It’s hard to believe that we’re two weeks away from our opening match against Chengdu. The last few months have been such a blur, and it feels weird to be writing about boot camp in the past tense already.</p><p>I’ll close this boot camp series with a last thought on communication strategy. I’m a firm believer that each act of marketing is either a deposit in or a withdrawal from the brand bank. And thus every word we say, each image or video we post, should be done with clear intent. It’s amazing to me that our Chinese fans are so tuned in to our communications in catching every nuance. It also nerve wracking. I imagine this is what it feels like for musicians on stage in front of a tuned in audience, where doing well means much love but mistakes can’t be hidden. Everything is magnified and the stakes are higher but we welcome it, it will push us to always try to be at our best.</p><p>I hope to continue these posts as we head into the season. Suggestions for topics are welcome — please feel free to let me know via Twitter @meng_eddy.</p><p>Thanks for reading.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=44325774370d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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