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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Edward Pinnegar on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bottlenecked: why Alderney is in decline — and how to solve it.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@edwardpinnegar/bottlenecked-why-alderney-is-in-decline-and-how-to-solve-it-cc7e2275bf0c?source=rss-881b1fc662b9------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Edward Pinnegar]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 08 Mar 2025 16:46:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-10T12:57:42.860Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Bottlenecked: w<em>hy Alderney is in decline — and how to solve it.</em></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lfY440SMlw5Z1AwPLVzW9Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>One of ten Aurigny aircraft serving the Channel Islands inter-island routes at their 1990 peak, landing at Alderney. Photograph courtesy of Giles Woodhouse</figcaption></figure><h3>Setting the scene</h3><p>Here are some facts about Alderney which are true, as of March 2025.</p><ul><li>If Alderney were a country, it would now have the oldest population, by median age, in the world. The median age of people in Alderney is 58 (source: States of Alderney, <a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=175856&amp;p=0">Electronic Census Report 2023</a>).</li><li>With 68 older people to every 100 working age people, if it were a country, Alderney’s old age dependency ratio (OADR) would be the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND.OL">2nd highest in the world</a>.</li><li>37 per cent of people in Alderney are now over 65. In 2001, that number was 24 per cent; in 1981, 22 per cent. If rates of births, deaths and migration stay the same, the average age will hit 65 by 2047.</li><li>Wages in Alderney are 26 per cent lower than in Guernsey; 14 per cent lower than in the UK, and six per cent lower than in North East England, the UK’s poorest region. In practice, this means people in Guernsey earned, on average, £10,800 more than people in Alderney in 2023. People in the UK earned, on average, £14,700 more.</li><li>The gap between average wages in Guernsey and average wages in Alderney is increasing at half a per cent every year. The Alderney/UK wage gap is increasing by closer to one per cent every year.</li><li>Air passenger numbers to Alderney have more than halved compared to 1990. Since 1990, Alderney has lost half of its air routes. Average fares on Alderney’s remaining air routes, to Guernsey and Southampton, have almost doubled in real terms in 30 years, while passenger numbers have halved.</li><li>The subsidy for Alderney’s air services is lower than any comparable island community in Britain. In November 2024, the States of Guernsey <a href="https://gov.gg/article/202829/PR-takes-steps-to-reduce-taxpayer-funded-subsidy-on-Alderney-air-links">cut it</a> by 25%, saving 0.07% of its annual budget. A return flight from Southampton, a flight of half an hour, now costs between £220 (for the first four tickets sold) and £370.</li><li>Alderney is only 30 miles from Jersey, but there is no transport — by air or sea — between the islands. Jersey had 1.47 million passengers in 2023; Alderney had fewer than 50,000. Alderney lost its scheduled air route to Jersey, a flight of 15 minutes, in 2010. The route had been served since 1935.</li><li>As of 2025, it costs a minimum of £335 return to fly from Jersey to Alderney, on two 15 minute flights with different companies, taking an average of 4 hours each way, via Guernsey. The Jersey to Alderney route is now 60 times as expensive by distance as the average easyJet flight. At £5.70 per mile, this is among the most expensive air routes in the world. For context, easyJet’s total revenue per seat mile in Q1 2025 was 9.54p (source: <a href="https://corporate.easyjet.com/investors/regulatory-news/news-details/2025/Trading-Update-for-quarter-ended-31-December-2024/default.aspx">December 2024 easyJet Trading Update</a>).</li><li>By the same metric, the Southampton to Alderney route (£3.08 per mile) is 32 times as expensive as the average easyJet flight by distance. The Guernsey to Alderney route (£3.13 per mile) is now 33 times as expensive.</li><li>This phenomenon is not limited to Alderney. The Guernsey to Jersey route (£3.52 per mile) is 37 times as expensive by distance as the average easyJet flight.</li><li>Alderney is now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-63397512">experiencing</a> <a href="https://guernseypress.com/news/2025/02/03/urgent-repairs-to-alderney-runway-sees-flights-cancelled/">multi-day</a> stoppages to flights, due to holes in its runway. Rusty debris <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/clywj7qw28lo">falling off</a> its air traffic control tower, also beyond the end of its design life, has led to further disruption. <a href="https://www.gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=182738&amp;p=0">A freedom of information request revealed that no regular surveys are being undertaken on the aerodrome buildings</a>. The States of Guernsey has spent £2.1m over 10 years patching the runway. Its potholes can now be seen from space.</li></ul><p>These observations show that Alderney is becoming relatively <strong>poorer</strong>; much <strong>older</strong>; and much more <strong>isolated</strong>.</p><p>This essay will show these phenomena are:</p><ul><li>recent;</li><li>not inevitable;</li><li>soluble within practical political and financial means.</li></ul><h3>A summary in 400 words</h3><p>From the 1950s to the turn of the new millennium, Alderney achieved huge success. Its population almost doubled. Its fundamental strengths of low taxes, natural beauty and high trust were unleashed by convenient and affordable transport to and from the outside world, including the UK.</p><p>Since the millennium, Alderney has entered decline, and this decline is now accelerating at an alarming pace.</p><p>The evidence shows that Alderney only flourishes when all the islands are properly connected — but that they have ceased to be.</p><p>Alderney’s late C20th boom was facilitated by the success of offshore finance in Guernsey and Jersey, which fuelled huge demand for inter-island transport, with a fleet of 10 aeroplanes flying 20 return flights per day. Alderney, in 1990 a market of 100,000 passengers, was able to ride the coattails of a market of more than 200,000 passengers next door.</p><p>This system was eroded in 2000s, and collapsed in the 2010s. The Guernsey — Jersey route has lost 62% of its passengers. Inter-island air fares are now double those of 30 years ago. Alderney’s transport is now expensive and unreliable, provided by two planes, whose costs must be met by a market of 50,000 people.</p><p>For the island to flourish again, its demographics must stabilise and its economy must diversify. But neither of these changes are possible unless the bottleneck of expensive, unreliable transport is solved.</p><p>Current policy is breaking Alderney. It is impoverishing its people and immiserating its poor. And it is straining to their limits both the political relations of Alderney and Guernsey, in fiscal union since 1948, and Guernsey’s finances. It serves no one at all.</p><p>Guernsey’s loss of good connections to Jersey, whose economy is growing faster and where pay is pulling ahead, is also likely harming productivity and wages across the Channel Islands.</p><p>The States of Guernsey now faces a choice. Accept galloping costs and escalating decline, or re-establish the old system to allow Alderney to flourish again. The alternative is far worse than stasis. Rather, it is demographic decline; a steady loss of viability of the community; growing fiscal costs to Guernsey; and, ultimately, the depopulation of Alderney.</p><p>This is not a forecast; these processes have already begun. It is the duty of any competent, democratic government to take measures to stop them.</p><h3>A data vacuum — and its consequences</h3><p>Alderney’s current predicament feels clear to all who know her — but the conversation about how to solve the island’s problems has suffered badly from a lack of underlying data and hard evidence. It has, one might say, been extremely “vibes-based.” (One article last year <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/watch-why-growing-carehome-led-one-filmmaker-focusing-alderney/">alleged</a> that an astonishing 72% of Alderney’s population was over 75; this would be 1,560 people; the real number is 17.5%; 367 people in 2021).</p><p>This vacuum of evidence has led to anger, inaction and a cycle of damaging policy-making. Alderney people, remembering better times, have focussed on issues like <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c1e89jwe8wvo">aircraft types and operation models</a>. A flow of petitions and letters has been extremely well-intentioned, but has generally meant shouting the same thing but louder, at the same deaf ears, rather than trying to restore their hearing.</p><p>Meanwhile, Guernsey politicians, responsible for <a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/government">providing most services</a> in Alderney, have failed to do anything to address the causes of Alderney’s decline, instead balking at the widening gap between costs and revenues. This has led them repeatedly to scrap and delay plans to rebuild the island’s crumbling airport, and to reduce air subsidies, which are now far lower per head than any comparable island community in Britain — a decision for which Guernsey’s most senior politician, Lyndon Trott, <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/trott-pr-should-be-lauded-cutting-aurignys-alderney-subsidy/">said in November 2024 he should be “lauded”</a>. Mr Trott has long argued for cuts to Alderney, including, in 2018, closing Alderney’s airport, to be replaced by a boat — a plan which would have cut capacity (and therefore bums on seats — and in hotel beds) by at least 65%, with impossible disruption in winter. It would have represented economic annihilation for Alderney, already reeling from a decade in recession.</p><p>This essay makes the case that there is a very close — and empirical — relationship between provision of regular, affordable air services to and from Alderney, i.e., making it possible to travel between the island and the outside world. In the absence of proper evidence as to the strength of this relationship, policy-makers continue to erode these links on grounds of cost, in the vain hope that Alderney might somehow break even.</p><p>Noting this evidence gap, this essay presents new data, derived from my own analysis of historic census and transport data across all the Channel Islands. It suggests that policy-makers who think they might cut Alderney back into the black are destined for disappointment.</p><p>But it is not an appeal for more money for Alderney, whose former prosperity did not flow from government intervention.</p><p>Rather, I will set out the scale of the decline which Alderney now not merely faces, but has entered.</p><p>And I will make the case that the way in which the Channel Islands were connected in the second half of the last century was uniquely efficient, and that returning to this system is the only way to solve Alderney’s problems within the islands’ present financial and political means.</p><h3>Boom and bust</h3><p>The observations at the beginning of this essay tell an alarming story about Alderney’s present. It would be easy to think “it was always thus; what do you expect of a small island, but to be poorer and older than its neighbours?”.</p><p>Yet it was not always thus. The data is clear that the late C20th, and most markedly after 1971, was a boom time for Alderney in demographic terms, both on its own terms, and compared to its neighbours.</p><p>Indeed, in the second half of the last century, Alderney was a stand-out demographic success story.</p><p>Its population almost doubled, from 1,328 in 1951 to 2,294 in 2001. It grew faster than its neighbours, including the UK, and of its growing population, more of them worked. From 1971 to 2001, Alderney also stopped aging. A steady and significant increase in the proportion of the population over 65, from 1951 up to 1981, suddenly halted.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*VZGipSvN_zmkiqJP.png" /><figcaption>Sources: <a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/data">Alderney</a>, <a href="https://gov.gg/article/152471/Archive-of-publications-Census-population-employment-and-earnings">Guernsey</a>, <a href="https://www.gov.je/StatisticsPerformance/Population/pages/censusresults.aspx">Jersey</a> census data</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*rFkEUQ4KnnIn1gc8.png" /><figcaption><em>Sources: </em><a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/data"><em>Alderney</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://gov.gg/article/152471/Archive-of-publications-Census-population-employment-and-earnings"><em>Guernsey</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.gov.je/StatisticsPerformance/Population/pages/censusresults.aspx"><em>Jersey</em></a><em> census data</em></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8WZ-QPjO0C5HN8mJ.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: States of Alderney, </em><a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/data"><em>Alderney historical population and employment data</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>If you were reading this as a Guernsey politician (as, I flatter myself to think, perhaps you might be), you will have absorbed years of bad news about Alderney — so it might be hard to believe that things could ever have gone well for it.</p><p>In Evelyn Waugh’s <em>Scoop </em>(1938), William Boot’s Uncle Theodore is in the habit of singing “change and decay in all around I see”. Waugh writes:</p><blockquote>Decay, rather than change, was characteristic of the immediate prospect…It was his habit to sing the same line over and over [as he awaited] the morning papers. <em>(</em>Scoop, <em>pp. 18, 23)</em></blockquote><p>Fittingly, it is no longer possible to read a morning paper in Alderney; they are no longer delivered there. But when you do read news about Alderney, it is easy, like Uncle Theodore, only to see “change and decay”.</p><p>Yet Alderney remains an island of extraordinary assets and virtues, which have over the years attracted thousands of people to visit, live and work there. It enjoys low taxes, high trust, omnipresent natural beauty, and fantastic food: excellent restaurant and local <a href="https://www.facebook.com/p/Alderney-Free-Range-Pigs-100064834264789/?locale=en_GB">pork</a>, <a href="https://www.visitalderney.com/see-do/shopping/alderney-farm-shop/">beef</a> and <a href="https://alderneyroots.com/">organic veg</a>. It has 20% income tax, no corporation tax, no capital gains tax, no inheritance tax and (for now) no VAT.</p><p><a href="https://gov.gg/taxcap">Tax is capped</a> at £65,000 for new residents, yet Alderney’s houses are two thirds <a href="https://courtofalderney.gg/article/158005/Price-Paid-Data">cheaper</a> than in Guernsey, and c.10% cheaper than those in the UK. All this is, in theory at least, just 30 minutes’ flight from Southampton airport, itself a one hour direct, fast train to central London.</p><p>I point this out not as a quasi-nationalistic paean, but as an important part of an argument that the island’s decline is not inevitable. In an essay which focusses on decline, these virtues would be easy to forget.</p><p>In practice, the period between 1968 and 2008 saw the potential of these assets unleashed by excellent inter-island transport. The period of the island’s greatest demographic and economic success was one in which it was regularly, reliably and cheaply connected to its neighbours.</p><p>Alone, these assets are not enough to keep the island on a prosperous path. In the last twenty years, as air services have declined, the island has entered decline in turn, and this is now accelerating.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IK3jbd9PMRV_V7he.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: States of Alderney, </em><a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/data"><em>Alderney historical population and employment data</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>The first decade of the millennium was a turning point for Alderney. Between 2001 and 2011, the population of under 15s, previously stable, declined by 35.6%; the island lost 35% of its children; 120 children.</p><p>In the first decade of the 2000s, Alderney lost 326 workers, therefore losing 30.0% of its 2001 workforce in just one decade. The employment rate dropped from 76.7% to 56.6%, reversing all of<em> </em>the last half century’s gains. By 2011, the employment rate was 5.4% lower even than in 1951, when 62.0% of the working age population was employed. While it has since made a partial recovery, the jump on the chart above from 2011 to 2016 is illusory — the number of employees in fact only increased by just 21; the data shows that those who lost their jobs during the 2008 recession, by and large, left. Today, of those who work, more workers than ever are employed in the public sector.</p><p>Haemorrhaging its young meant that the ratio of the island’s population began to skew elderly with enormous speed:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2zci5mpm7Y8rUwDn.png" /><figcaption><em>Sources: </em><a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/data"><em>Alderney</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://gov.gg/article/152471/Archive-of-publications-Census-population-employment-and-earnings"><em>Guernsey</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.gov.je/StatisticsPerformance/Population/pages/censusresults.aspx"><em>Jersey</em></a><em> census data; UK: World Bank data via </em><a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/united-kingdom/age-dependency-ratio-percent-of-working-age-population-wb-data.html"><em>Trading Economics</em></a><em>. The Y axis moves from decades to individual years after 2011. Pre-2011 data not available for Guernsey</em></figcaption></figure><p>This wasn’t simply because of the decline in the number of young families. Between 2001 and 2021, the over 65 population actually increased, from 543 to 781; the under 65 population decreased from 1,751 to 1,317.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*N7yijgsjgi1p0QeD.png" /><figcaption><em>Sources: </em><a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/data"><em>Alderney</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://gov.gg/article/152471/Archive-of-publications-Census-population-employment-and-earnings"><em>Guernsey</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.gov.je/StatisticsPerformance/Population/pages/censusresults.aspx"><em>Jersey</em></a><em> census data</em></figcaption></figure><p>In the famously aging Japan, for every 100 working age people, there are 50 pensioners. With 68 older people to every 100 working age people, if it were a country, Alderney’s old age dependency ratio (OADR) would be the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND.OL">2nd highest in the world</a>.</p><p>Let’s consider how Alderney would look in 2025 had its demographics continued on the trajectory they were on in 2001. Again, the data shows that the first decade of the 2000s was the turning point.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*w9lzGvV9xlgAylST.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: States of Alderney, </em><a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/data"><em>Alderney historical population and employment data</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>To spell out the difference, on its current trajectory, the average age of Alderney’s population will hit 65 in 2047. On its 2001 trajectory, this average would not have been reached until the year 2246; 199 years later. Two centuries of demographic decline was inflicted in the space of one decade.</p><p>At the same time, tourism, from the 1970s the mainstay of Alderney’s economy, began to hollow out. Between 1990 and 2023, air passenger numbers declined by more than half, from 105,458 to 49,546:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WE1s5jaK9diZLFf8BDwGnw.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.caa.co.uk/data-and-analysis/uk-aviation-market/airports/uk-airport-data/">CAA airport statistics</a></figcaption></figure><p>While all the Channel Islands’ tourist industries declined over this time period, Alderney suffered in particular, experiencing more than double the rate of loss of its neighbours:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QyUiTlX4PNsIf_2tWjbjnA.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.caa.co.uk/data-and-analysis/uk-aviation-market/airports/uk-airport-data/">CAA airport statistics</a></figcaption></figure><p>I’ll return to the decline in Alderney’s transport links below, but first, let’s consider the nature of demographic and economic decline.</p><p>Having lots of older people isn’t a bad thing, in itself. Many people are living in better health for longer, and the idea that everyone stops working at 65 is now seriously outdated. Older people in Alderney make a huge contribution to the island; volunteering, looking after grandchildren, spending money on island supporting local businesses, and, in some cases, working.</p><p>However, it’s still true that many people do stop working, or work very little, after this age. And as the UN <a href="https://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/methodology_sheets/demographics/dependency_ratio.pdf">explains</a>:</p><blockquote>A high dependency ratio indicates that the economically active population and the overall economy face a greater burden to support and provide the social services needed by … older persons who are often economically dependent.</blockquote><p>Common sense, as much as any data, tells us that a flourishing community needs a good balance of children, young adults, middle-aged people and older folk in order to thrive, and to sustain itself.</p><p>Under the <a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=131846&amp;p=0">1948 Agreement</a>, which establishes a fiscal union between the islands, Guernsey is responsible for providing health and social care in Alderney. These services are famously expensive to provide — and they are more expensive still in small islands, where suitably trained staff often have to be flown in and accommodated. In practice, if Alderney continues to age at its current rate, it is destined for ever-greater economic dependency on Guernsey.</p><p>Yet Guernsey politicians already rail against Alderney’s lack of self-sufficiency, and there have been extensive calls for the 1948 Agreement to be reviewed. (A review was <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/1948-agreement-review-halted/">halted</a> by Covid, but is likely to be <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/1948/">re-established</a>). The States of Guernsey’s <a href="https://gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=178689&amp;p=0">accounts</a> suggest that Alderney’s deficit was £8.62m in 2023.</p><p>It is inevitable that the island’s current trajectory will place ever greater strain on this relationship. Indeed, Alderney’s experience, beyond the data, points to a community which is growing less resilient and more fragile.</p><p>Let’s take the example of the island’s healthcare system. It shows that these problems aren’t theoretical: they have already begun. They evince an increasingly fragile island in which the state is having to play an ever greater role — and a role obviously incompatible with the low rates of tax which underpin Guernsey’s success.</p><p>A decade ago, the island had two privately-owned doctor’s surgeries. One of them closed in 2015 after Guernsey police <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/apr/03/police-raid-channel-islands-gp-surgery-patient-deaths">raided</a> the surgery, and the GP’s home, due to suspicions about patient deaths. A report <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-35779008">later found</a> that Guernsey’s health department acted “without sufficient weight of evidence”, and a police investigation found “no evidence of criminality”. Guernsey’s health minister apologised to the doctor for his department’s handling of the affair.</p><p>After that, the island was down to one surgery. In 2022, its owner announced that it would <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/statement-alderneys-only-gp-practice-closing-week/">close</a>. The islands’ governments stepped into the breach, nationalising it. GPs were drafted in from Guernsey. A senior and experienced “head of Alderney care” was hired, and an “Alderney Care Board” was established. Alderney’s health spending <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/alderneys-spiralling-healthcare-costs-need-addressing/">increased</a> by 7x in one year; Guernsey data is not immediately available but is understood to have leapt.</p><p>Meanwhile, Alderney’s ambulance service was, for decades, provided by volunteers, but after a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-59968271">critical report</a>, in 2022 they resigned, meaning the service must now be provided by the States at the cost of c.£500,000 per year.</p><p>The aging population means that Alderney’s care home has run out of space. Some people who would otherwise live there now have to live in the hospital instead; beds which would ideally be used by other patients. The care home extension works are now <a href="https://guernseypress.com/news/2024/12/23/call-for-inquiry-into-handling-of-alderney-care-home-extension/">83% over budget</a>, years behind schedule, and will deliver just thirteen new rooms, at £182,000 per room. The scheme is now subject to a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx2eppw9wk1o">public inquiry</a>.</p><p>Care home beds are <a href="https://www.gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=102818&amp;p=0">subsidised</a> by the Guernsey and Alderney taxpayer at £33,100 per year; the resident <a href="https://www.connaughtcare.org/long-term-residential-care/">pays</a> only £17,020. Unlike the UK, the benefit is <a href="https://www.gov.gg/longtermcarebenefit">not</a> means-tested based on income or assets. This feels commendable, but the effect is to put an even greater strain on the working population.</p><p>In any case, all this would all be difficult enough to cope with if Alderney were growing richer at the same time. But, perhaps not surprisingly, it isn’t.</p><p>The States of Guernsey only began to collect significant economic data in Alderney from 2015 onwards, but the data that there is tells an alarming story about how much people are able to earn in Alderney. For reasons which are unclear, Alderney household income data <a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/data">has not been published since 2017</a>. But in 2017, the average household income (equivalised, after deduction of social security contributions, income tax and imputed housing costs) was one third (33.5%) higher in Guernsey (£42,440) than it was in Alderney (£31,798).</p><p>As of 2023, wages in Alderney were 26 per cent lower than in Guernsey; 14 per cent lower than in the UK, and one per cent lower than in North East England, the UK’s poorest region. In practice, this means people in Guernsey earned, on average, £10,800 more than people in Alderney in 2023. People in the UK earned, on average, £14,700 more.</p><p>Worse, the gap between average wages in Guernsey and average wages in Alderney is increasing at half a per cent every year. The Alderney/UK wage gap is increasing by closer to one per cent every year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Qy5JpAdA2dTr5IGT.png" /><figcaption><em>Sources: </em><a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/data"><em>Alderney Annual Earnings Bulletins</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://gov.gg/article/152471/Archive-of-publications-Census-population-employment-and-earnings"><em>Guernsey Quarterly Earnings Bulletins</em></a><em>, Office for National Statistics </em><a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/bulletins/annualsurveyofhoursandearnings/2024"><em>Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings</em></a><em> (ASHE). Pre-2015 data not available for Alderney</em></figcaption></figure><p>Cost of living data isn’t collected in Alderney, but prices in the shops are routinely 15% — 20% higher than in the UK. In practice, this means that someone working in Alderney is likely to be c.30% poorer, in terms of their actual purchasing power, than someone in the UK — despite the UK’s own extremely stagnant wages.</p><p>So, to put it another way, work an hour in Alderney, and the fruits of your labour are about 30% less stuff than if you’d worked an hour in the UK. Compare Alderney to some better paying countries in the Western world, and the numbers would be scarier still. So why on Earth would you want to try to make a living in Alderney?</p><p>Other costs are higher too. The January 2025 UK <a href="https://www.uswitch.com/gas-electricity/guides/average-gas-and-electricity-bills-in-the-uk/">average</a> is 25p per unit of electricity, compared to at least <a href="https://alderney-elec.com/electricity/electricity-charges/">43p</a> in Alderney (excluding various other standing charges, per room and for meter rental), where all electricity is still generated by burning diesel. Despite immense wind resources, and although the States of Alderney is doing commendable work on its <a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/article/191762/Alderney-Future-Energy-Strategy">energy strategy</a>, the Channel Islands still have almost no renewable generation. Most properties are heated by oil, which costs 98p per litre in Alderney; 23% dearer than in Guernsey, and 51% dearer than in the UK. Academic research shows that high energy prices have a significant negative effect on GDP growth (<a href="http://sterndavidi.com/Publications/Growth.pdf">Stern, 2004</a>; <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=1715855">Stern, 2011</a>).</p><p>Then consider that a return flight from Alderney to the UK, a flight of half an hour, now costs an average of c.£305 per person.</p><p>High prices hit the poorest families hardest, because they spend the greatest share of their income on necessities, and on goods and services more generally. Richer people are, self-evidently, more able to cut back on luxuries, or simply save a bit less.</p><p>I’m not from Alderney. My grandfather lived there, and I visited often during his lifetime; but anecdotal evidence is that being poor in Alderney is extremely tough.</p><p>Simply, wages are low, and it’s difficult to leave. Guernsey’s <a href="https://gov.gg/alderneyrespolicy">housing law</a> either traps Alderney people in Alderney, or compels them to leave for the UK. Alderney doesn’t have a sixth form, so anyone wishing to study beyond 16 must do so in Guernsey. But to stay on and work in Guernsey, they can only work in jobs with an Employment Permit, for which an employer must apply and pay. The States of Guernsey <a href="https://www.gov.gg/pmaboutemployment">says</a> that these permits:</p><blockquote>allow a person to live in [Guernsey] because they are working for a specific employer in a specific [full-time] job. These permits are often time limited and have conditions attached … If [a] condition is broken, the Permit becomes invalid.</blockquote><p>Translated into plain English: “lose your job, if you were even lucky enough to find an employer who’d hired you on a Permit, and back to Alderney you go”. So Alderney people pay their taxes to the States of Guernsey, but their right to work in Guernsey is, in practice, very limited.</p><p>Alderney remains a place of beauty, populated by many kind and enterprising people, but signs of failure and decline now abound.</p><p>Many are put off the first one: the increasingly obscene cost of getting to the island —now averaging c.£305 for a return trip to or from the UK, on a flight taking just half an hour, paid to the state-owned airline. At £3.08 per mile, this is 32 times as expensive as the average easyJet flight by distance (see further analysis below). For most people who might consider a trip to Alderney on its merits, this is an unjustifiable expense, when the same fare can take one person to New York, or an entire family to Spain, and back.</p><p>Even if you pay your £305, you may find your flight cancelled. Alderney’s airport is now in an advanced state of decrepitude, years overdue for works which have been repeatedly delayed and cancelled, with no replacement plan in the offing. The island increasingly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-63397512">experiences</a> <a href="https://guernseypress.com/news/2025/02/03/urgent-repairs-to-alderney-runway-sees-flights-cancelled/">multi-day</a> stoppages to flights, due to a combination of <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/channel/2022-04-17/aurigny-apologies-as-more-alderney-flights-are-cancelled">not having enough planes</a>, and holes in its runway.</p><p>The airport’s terminal building was built as a temporary structure in 1967. Its runway <a href="https://www.gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=159690&amp;p=0">reached the end of its design life in 2014</a>. In 2014, the States of Guernsey <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-25948059">voted</a> to prepare proposals for refurbishment. In 2017, it <a href="https://gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=107761&amp;p=0">included</a> the works in its Financial Plan, to be completed by 2021. In 2022, it <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-64006084">voted again</a> to rebuild and extend the runway. In 2024, it <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/channel/2024-07-03/unaffordable-airport-plans-scrapped-as-price-tag-hits-37-million">scrapped</a> the plans. No new plan has since been published.</p><p>The States of Guernsey has spent £2.1m over 10 years patching the runway. Its potholes can now be seen from space:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*y7k6cbtOE-2Ue6qi.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Source: Airbus satellite imagery (author’s own composite image)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Rusty debris <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/clywj7qw28lo">falling off</a> its air traffic control tower, also beyond the end of its design life, has led to further disruption. <a href="https://www.gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=182738&amp;p=0">A freedom of information request revealed that no regular surveys are being undertaken on the aerodrome buildings</a>.</p><p>It is <a href="https://nats-uk.ead-it.com/cms-nats/opencms/en/Publications/aip-supplements/EG_Sup_2024_015_en.pdf">no longer possible</a> to buy aviation fuel at the airport; nobody will fund a new tank. This means commercial flights have to carry more reserves, which can worsen delays in bad weather. Light aircraft, which used to be <a href="https://www.ukairfieldguide.net/images/imgexec-4191.jpg">enticed</a> from England by VAT-free fuel, increasingly stay away, while the airport’s operating losses have escalated. The fuel truck is slowly rusting away in the salt air.</p><p>Alderney’s airport is, increasingly, a built monument to decline and political dysfunctionality.</p><p>Otherwise, in just the last decade, Alderney has lost <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/channel/2017-01-24/islanders-in-alderney-to-lose-only-natwest-branch">two</a> <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/alderney-left-devastated-decision-close-lloyds-bank/">of</a> its three banks, its <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/channel/2023-07-09/penguins-in-a-post-office-schoolchildrens-art-fills-empty-shopfronts">post office</a> and many of its shops, its <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/channel/2018-08-17/islanders-in-alderney-petition-to-reinstate-24-7-medevac-services">out-of-hours air ambulance service</a>, <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/channel/2023-07-09/penguins-in-a-post-office-schoolchildrens-art-fills-empty-shopfronts">a pub</a>, its PwC office (staff now work remotely), a <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/channel/2017-01-05/alderney-business-blames-aurigny-planes-for-closure">fishing shop and mail order angling business</a>, its only a permanent dentist, its flying instructor, and probably much else I have forgotten or don’t know about.</p><p>Post used to arrive in the morning, with the newspapers. Now there are no newspapers, and the post often takes days to arrive.</p><p>Transporting a sports team or a school class off-island is increasingly a matter of lottery wins and four-leafed clovers. The 2023 semi-final of the Muratti inter-island football tournament, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muratti_Vase">which has run since 1905</a>, was nearly cancelled for the first time since the Nazi occupation when Aurigny <a href="https://jerseyeveningpost.com/sport/football/2023/02/22/muratti-semi-final-in-doubt-after-flight-cancellation/">cancelled the Jersey team’s flight</a>. The team said:</p><blockquote>It’s become easier and cheaper to play a fixture in London than it is Guernsey or Alderney. With flights, ferries and possible overnight stays, the costs could become astronomical.</blockquote><p>To fund <a href="https://alderneytripsfund.weebly.com/">school trips</a>, the island has turned to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4ge00ky4wwo">jumble sales and charity house clearances</a> — one of the few beneficiaries of an aging population (we donated many of my late grandfather’s belongings thus) — although there is always a shortfall, meaning the poorest pupils sometimes have to stay at home. And the unreliability of flights means that anyone wanting to catch a flight onwards from the UK must add at least a day’s buffer to ensure they don’t miss it — incurring yet more cost.</p><p>Alderney’s swimming pool and gym, funded by c.£350,000 of charitable donations from islanders, and a further £250,000 of taxpayers’ funds, sits <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/alderney-swimming-pool/">unfinished</a> and <a href="https://guernseypress.com/resizer/v2/XDRGYB2RDBANFFP76HLI4FADAY.jpg?auth=9a6f69644f1d0802cae45ade18b1671772ca93dc3d1a90b2a046d74dc2ba7d86&amp;width=1200&amp;height=900">derelict</a>. The project ran into structural problems, due to failures in construction and project management (see CBL Consulting structural appraisal, October 2021, from p. 27 onwards of <a href="https://alderney.sch.gg/sites/default/files/documents/2022-05/Feasibility%20study%20for%20St%20Anne%27s%20School%20Sporting%20Facilities.pdf">this report</a>).</p><p>The report notes that:</p><blockquote>…it should be appreciated the work [was] undertaken by a group of individuals that have the best interest of the Alderney community. A number of the most significant issues that have been encountered would not have been known to them.</blockquote><p>Guernsey has had a state-funded leisure centre since 1976, with a gym, 25 metre, 6-lane indoor pool, and a separate 10m children’s pool. Guernsey and Alderney taxpayers paid £2.5m for it (£19.0m in today’s money), and it continues to be subsidised by the islands’ taxpayers by hundreds of thousands of pounds per year.</p><p>Half a century on, Alderney still has no swimming or similar sports facilities, state-funded or otherwise. So, the people of Alderney sought to put this right off their own back—thereby making a huge investment in their own public health, without any assistance from the States of Guernsey, to which they pay their taxes. But it was too big and complex a project for the community to deliver successfully on its own.</p><p>Just as Alderney’s crumbling airport is increasingly a monument to Guernsey’s political dysfunctionality, so its derelict swimming pool is a monument to the folly of expecting an increasingly fragile community to fend so much for itself.</p><p>Any Alderney person will tell you that things were very good in the old days, and are very bad now. This can sound like pure nostalgia, in an island which was never short of it, but all the available data shows the same thing. In the sharpness of the contrast it shows between the extent of Alderney’s former success, and that of its later decline, the data is shocking.</p><p>It shows that Alderney has entered a state of accelerating demographic and economic decline. But there is nothing within it to indicate that such decline is inevitable. Robert Lucas, an economist interested in the concept of economic development, showed that <a href="https://extranet.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/docs/darcillon-thibault/lucasmechanicseconomicgrowth.pdf">the consequences of economic growth on human welfare are “staggering</a>”. But conversely, the consequences of an absence of growth are also staggering. Alderney is now suffering from them.</p><h3>Golden child to basket case: what’s gone wrong for Alderney</h3><p>Economists like to call the three decades of prosperity which France enjoyed after the War, “les Trente Glorieuses” (thirty glorious years).</p><p>We have already established that Alderney enjoyed its own Trente Glorieuses, from (sometime before) 1971 to (sometime after) 2001. The caveats are necessary, since we only have each decade’s census to go on; there were no other official statistics compiled just for Alderney in those days. So:</p><ol><li>How did Alderney go from golden child to basket case, and so quickly?</li><li>If Alderney has the fundamental assets and virtues set out above, why are they no longer enough to keep it prosperous?</li><li>What can those who are interested in pulling Alderney out of its economic and demographic nose-dive learn from this experience?</li></ol><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3202550">Best and Burke (2018)</a> summarise academic findings on the preconditions for economic development neatly:</p><blockquote>Many factors have been found to contribute to faster economic growth, including macroeconomic and political stability, health and education investment, effective institutions, trade openness, geographical conditions, and favorable conditions for private enterprise.</blockquote><p>Alderney retains many favourable conditions for private enterprise; it enjoys low taxes, comparative macroeconomic and political stability, openness to trade. Investment in health and education could be better, but is certainly greater now than it was in the island’s Trente Glorieuses. What has changed most markedly is the island’s connectedness, i.e., Alderney’s “geographical conditions”. It has not unmoored itself from the Bailiwick of Guernsey to sail 500 miles into the Atlantic, but the severe deterioration of its connections to the outside world has had, perhaps, a similar effect.</p><p>The evidence shows that Alderney flourished when its assets and virtues were unleashed by regular, reliable and affordable transport. Such excellent provision did not arise as a result of government policy. It arose through <strong><em>(a) some good luck</em></strong>, and <strong><em>(b) economies of scale</em></strong>. A potted history is necessary to explain both phenomena.</p><p>In 1967, the Channel Islands were connected together pretty badly. Alderney’s transport was provided by British United Airways (BUA), with 15-seater de Havilland DH.114 Herons, load restricted to 13 passengers, which were costing the airline dearly. By 1967, they were losing £50,000 a year; almost £1m in today’s money.</p><p>BUA had few economies of scale to pay for its Alderney flights; the much more popular inter-island Jersey — Guernsey route was operated by the state-owned BEA. Eventually, BUA ran out of patience, and proposed to cut its Alderney — Guernsey route.</p><p>Enter stage left (to abridge this story considerably) a rich and rather gallant, patrician figure called Sir Derrick Bailey, 3rd Baronet, DFC, with a brand-new eight-seater Islander aeroplane which he wanted to put to work. His new firm, Aurigny Air Services, took on the inter-island route from 1 March 1968. The route was started on the basis of a two-week trial. The trial continues 57 years later. This was the <em>good luck</em>.</p><p>Guernsey and Jersey, meanwhile, were linked by BEA. In a vignette of the inefficiency of a nationalised behemoth, BEA operated only twice-daily flights, with nothing until the early afternoon. Operated as a ‘W’ pattern on another service, the frequency and timetable was wholly inadequate for emerging business demand. BEA had previously been much more nimble, operating up to ninety-five flights a week between the islands with older, but far better sized, eight-seater de Havilland DH.89 Dragon Rapides. But it had been forced to reduce the number of daily flights substantially when it had retired them in favour of the larger, fifty-seater Vickers Viscount 701, a type far less economical on such a short hop.</p><p>The seasonality of the Channel Islands operation already made it a prime target for cost-cutting, and when BEA looked to make economies in 1968–69, the Guernsey — Jersey route faced the chop. Operating its last scheduled service between the islands on 31 March 1969, sole operation of the link passed to Aurigny. Here began the <em>economies of scale.</em></p><p>Very shortly afterwards, offshore finance in Guernsey and Jersey exploded. This fuelled huge demand for inter-island transport, which grew steadily through the 1970s and 1980s. Aurigny’s fleet grew steadily, from two aircraft to eleven. So successful was its service that Bailey went back to the manufacturers of his Islander aircraft and asked them for something bigger. The Trislander, a stretched Islander with three engines and 18 seats, entered commercial service with Aurigny on 29 June 1971.</p><p>In their first summer season in operation between April and October 1972, the Trislanders operated 2,623 hours of flights, and during that period, 73,361 passengers were carried by the whole fleet; more than double the figures reported to the Board of Trade for the entire first year of Aurigny’s operation in 1968. The brochures of the manufacturer, Britten-Norman, would feature a prominent quotation from Sir Derrick Bailey that ‘from the first to the last, the Trislander proved to be all we had hoped for’.</p><p>The system Aurigny created was one of informal, unintended solidarity, where each island picked up the others’ slack. It meant that on summer weekends, when business passengers were few, Aurigny’s aircraft could be deployed to fly tourists to the islands, and in particular to Alderney, flying up to fifteen flights each way from Southampton. On winter weekdays, when tourists were nigh-on non-existent, the aircraft were kept busy shuttling chaps in suits between the offices of flourishing offshore banks and trusts of Jersey and Guernsey.</p><p>In 1989, Aurigny would use its fleet of nine 18-seater Trislanders and one eight-seater Islander to carry 207,551 passengers on its Guernsey — Jersey route, with 24 flights daily, each way, in summer. The route representing some 66.3% of the company’s overall passenger numbers, with demand up 44% even on 1979.</p><p>For Alderney, this meant that the island, then a market of 100,000 passengers, was able to ride the coattails of a market of more than 200,000 passengers next door. In total, the overheads of Aurigny’s fleet of ten aircraft were shared, in 1990, between 318,091 passengers. In return, they connected the islands together more reliably, regularly and affordably than at any time in their history.</p><p>This was not a transport system designed specifically for Alderney; it was one which worked for all the Channel Islands; but no other system could possibly have served it better — and no other system ever has. A rising tide lifted even the smallest boat.</p><p>The evidence shows a clear relationship between the total number of people flying to and from Alderney, and the number flying between Jersey and Guernsey:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Wcym5UTJrxnFrUsCD8KKiA.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: </em><a href="https://www.caa.co.uk/data-and-analysis/uk-aviation-market/airports/uk-airport-data/"><em>CAA annual airports data</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>Statistical analysis reveals a strong positive correlation (r = 0.839) between Guernsey — Jersey route volumes, and total Alderney passenger volumes, supporting the hypothesis that Alderney’s air transport market benefits from a flourishing Guernsey — Jersey route. This relationship is statistically significant (p &lt; 0.0001), and explains approximately 70.5% of the variance in Alderney’s passenger volumes (R² = 0.705). While this correlation does not establish causation, it reflects the fact that provision of transport to Alderney has historically been most plentiful when its neighbouring islands have been properly connected.</p><p>In plain English, the Channel Islands used to be one transport market with one provider, in which the smallest player benefited from its position in a much bigger market.</p><p>(You could observe that this system was not created by the state, but this would be to miss a crucial ingredient: it was maintained by a highly protective licensing system which protected Aurigny’s monopoly. The rationale, in a small and intensely seasonal market, was to prevent an interloper from creaming off the best of the summer demand, which would otherwise allow the permanent one — Aurigny — to keep going through the winter. But otherwise, it was true that this very clever system was a matter of private enterprise, and a classic case of a free market solving an otherwise intractable problem.)</p><h4>Death by a thousand cuts</h4><p>This system has now been lost. It was eroded in 2000s, and collapsed in the 2010s. The Guernsey — Jersey route has now lost 62% of its passengers from its 1989 peak, falling from 207,551 passengers to 76,798 in 2023. Inter-island air fares are now roughly double those of 30 years ago in real terms. Alderney’s transport is now expensive and unreliable, provided by two planes, whose costs must be offset as far as possible by a market which in 2023 was just 49,546 passengers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nS9eaLwp39_yRSc5ldb5vA.png" /><figcaption>Aurigny routes using its Alderney-capable fleet, 1990 (nine Britten-Norman Trislanders; one Britten-Norman Islander) vs 2024 (two Dornier 228NGs). Sources: <a href="https://www.caa.co.uk/data-and-analysis/uk-aviation-market/airports/uk-airport-data/"><em>CAA annual airports data</em></a><em> and author’s own historical datasets. Map made using </em><a href="http://www.gcmap.com/"><em>Great Circle Mapper</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>In short, this is why flying to Alderney has never been — at least since the 1930s — more unreliable and expensive (and, in summer, often impossible; there aren’t enough seats).</p><p>Various factors concatenated to destroy this system.</p><p>First, all the islands’ tourism industries were besieged by the low-cost airline boom. This hit Alderney hardest. Since 1990, Guernsey’s passenger numbers have declined 26%; Jersey’s by 23%; Alderney’s by 53%. The reason for this is pretty straightforward. The low-cost boom happened because the airline industry <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/022916/economic-analysis-lowcost-airline-industry-luvdal.asp">learnt to scale up</a>. New economies of scale allowed the price of longer flights, with larger planes, to plummet. Yet where the size of the markets or aeroplanes mean such scale is impossible, prices have stayed the same, or even risen.</p><p>For context, in 1968, a London — Malaga return fare on BEA, for a day time flight, was an extraordinary £54.10s (£787 in today’s money); in 1972 a Southampton — Alderney return averaged £13 (£151 in today’s money). Flights to Malaga are now much cheaper; flights to Alderney are now much more expensive. So, while none of the Channel Islands can compete with Spain on price, the effect on the smallest markets is most acute. Alderney — whose runway is the same length as it was in 1968, when <em>Flight</em> magazine described its airport as “anachronistic”, has been hit the hardest.</p><p>Flying to Alderney on Aurigny is now 3,254% more expensive by distance than flying on easyJet. This claim sounds ludicrous, but it is borne out by the data; the calculation is easy to replicate.</p><p>The Southampton to Alderney route is now 32 times as expensive as the average easyJet flight by distance, costing £3.08 per mile. easyJet’s total revenue per seat mile in Q1 2025 was 9.54p (source: <a href="https://corporate.easyjet.com/investors/regulatory-news/news-details/2025/Trading-Update-for-quarter-ended-31-December-2024/default.aspx">December 2024 easyJet Trading Update</a>).</p><p>By the same metric, the Guernsey to Alderney route (£3.13 per mile), a flight of just ten minutes averaging £160 return for an adult, or £135 return for a child, is now 33 times as expensive as the average easyJet flight by distance.</p><p>This phenomenon is not limited to Alderney. The Guernsey to Jersey route, operated by Blue Islands at a cost of £3.52 per seat mile, is now 37 times as expensive by distance as the average easyJet flight. In 1988, a day return on Aurigny cost £23; £63 in today’s money; you could choose from up to twenty flights each day. Today a return averages £170, and passengers have a choice of three flights. The pattern of service on the inter-island routes has returned to almost an exact replica of 1967, the pre-Aurigny era.</p><p>Second, since the turn of the millennium, the islands’ air services have become extremely fragmented. This has further eroded the potential for economies of scale.</p><p>In the early 2000s, the islands’ air routes became the subject of proper <a href="https://jerseyeveningpost.com/news/2003/07/03/guernsey-flights-monopoly-ends/">competition</a> for the first time since the 1960s. Le Cocq’s Airlink (later renamed Rockhopper, then Blue Islands) was founded in 2001, and by 2004 was competing with Aurigny across its network. Aurigny, meanwhile, was nationalised in 2003 by the States of Guernsey, to protect its direct air links to London. The consumer benefited fleetingly from the fare wars — but the competing airlines made vast and unsustainable losses as a result. In 2004, Aurigny made a <a href="https://guernseypress.com/news/2005/04/30/aurigny-loses-2m-at-nearly-6000-a-day/">£2 million loss</a>, at the time was the worst in its history. So it tried to cut its way back to the black.</p><h4>A case study of the consequences of fragmentation</h4><p>Consider the ability to get from Alderney to its most prosperous near neighbour; Jersey, 30 miles south. Both islands are clearly visible from one another, but they are utterly cut off. Alderney lost its scheduled air route to Jersey, a flight of 15 minutes, in 2010. The route had been served, with the exception of the Nazi occupation, since 1935. There is now no transport — by air or sea — between the islands. The route was served by Aurigny from 1968 to 2004, carrying, on average, 12,800 passengers per year (and 18,000 per year in the late 1980s).</p><p>In 2003, Rockhopper, the competitor, decided Aurigny was resting on its laurels, and thought it could make a better go of it. In October 2004, Aurigny pulled out of the route, saying the market was too small for two operators. Passenger numbers then halved, to 4,530 by 2006, and Rockhopper scrapped regular flights. Since 2010, there has been no scheduled transport, by air or sea.</p><p>As of 2025, it now costs a minimum of £335 return to fly from Jersey to Alderney, on two 15 minute flights with different companies, taking an average of 4 hours each way, via Guernsey. The Jersey to Alderney route is now 60 times as expensive by distance as the average easyJet flight. At £5.70 per mile, this is among the most expensive air routes in the world.</p><p>Alderney’s lack of connections to Jersey matter a lot. Jersey had 1.47 million air passengers in 2023; Alderney had fewer than 49,546. Jersey’s population is 60% larger than Guernsey’s; its GDP is 90% larger. Its financial sector and other travel-intensive business is more developed than Guernsey’s, allowing Jersey to “reach critical mass to … <a href="https://gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=118046&amp;p=0">sustainably serve a wider route network</a>”. <a href="https://guernseypress.com/news/2025/01/25/guernseys-economy-is-stagnating/">Jersey’s economy grew by 7% in 2023; Guernsey’s shrank by 2%. Jersey’s economy has grown by 18% since 2009; Guernsey’s has grown by only 5%</a>.</p><p>It’s not just Alderney which is losing out from being cut off from its most prosperous near neighbour. The world over, the biggest conurbations have the highest wages. The smaller the conurbation, on average, the lower the pay. Bad transport makes people worse off because it makes big conurbations behave like smaller ones. Why? Pay is high in cities because talent flows to its best match… ideas collide and multiply… ambition finds its partners, and strives harder to keep up with its competitors.</p><p><a href="https://www.centreforcities.org/reader/why-big-cities-are-crucial-to-levelling-up/">Research</a> from the Centre for Cities shows how most countries in the developed world bear this pattern out — except Britain, where the principal factor seems to be that our towns and cities are so badly connected as to behave as smaller places than they really are:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/968/1*rB6aW_HSH3lgzommcEh1Bw.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.centreforcities.org/reader/why-big-cities-are-crucial-to-levelling-up/"><em>Why big cities are crucial for levelling up</em></a><em>. </em>Centre for Cities, 6 February 2020. Data from ONS, Mid-year population estimates; ONS, Regional gross domestic product (GDP) reference tables; Centre for Cities, Competing with the Continent Data tool; BEA, Gross Domestic Product; BLS, Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment; <a href="https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkm">https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkm</a></figcaption></figure><p>Of course, the Channel Islands will never be cities, but the corpus of economic evidence would suggest that their increasing isolation is doing them harm. Indeed, this could be an important factor in explaining the increasing economic divergence between Jersey, which is pulling ahead, and Guernsey, which is stagnating.</p><p>Incidentally, on this measure, Alderney appears to punch far above its weight:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z5Sak2ulGV3WJ0kQCeV25w.png" /><figcaption><em>Sources: </em><a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/data"><em>Alderney</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://gov.gg/article/152471/Archive-of-publications-Census-population-employment-and-earnings"><em>Guernsey</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://www.gov.je/StatisticsPerformance/BusinessEconomy/pages/nationalaccounts.aspx"><em>Jersey</em></a><em> economic data</em></figcaption></figure><p>While it is possible that Alderney’s GDP data may be skewed by its size (with only 863 workers, only 81 of whom work in finance, and a cluster of trusts and financial firms; Ireland experiences the <a href="https://archive.ph/0hcAK">same</a> <a href="https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/publications/economic-letters/vol-2021-no-1-is-ireland-really-the-most-prosperous-country-in-europe.pdf">phenomenon</a>), this is still a remarkable performance which underlines the island’s economic potential.</p><h4>Fragmentation accelerates</h4><p>After a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-guernsey-11291576">botched 2010 merger attempt</a>, Blue Islands <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-13180584">pulled out</a> of Alderney in 2011, leaving the state-owned Aurigny as the sole provider of Alderney’s connections to the outside world. But Blue Islands continued to gain market share from Aurigny on the Guernsey — Jersey route. Aurigny <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-guernsey-35344332">gave up the route</a> in 2014, having operated it for 46 years. Recognising the market was too small to support two operators longer-term, the airlines, quite sensibly, attempted a <a href="https://www.jcra.je/media/2598/c1018gj-media-release-cicra-consults-on-aurigny-and-blue-islands-codeshare.pdf">codeshare co-operation agreement</a> — but this <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-guernsey-35344332">fell apart</a> within two years.</p><p>The Guernsey — Jersey route was, historically, the backbone of the success and viability of Aurigny’s Alderney operations. Without it, they lost their spine.</p><p>All historical evidence points to the fact that the inter-island market is not — and has never been — large enough on its own to pay two airlines’ overheads in the long-term.</p><p>Fragmentation, and competition in markets too small to support it, has led to the destruction of the network which once linked the Channel Islands together. Now, instead of a network, two separate operators fly their own smaller networks, with different planes. Consequently, the economies of scale, which are foundational to the business models of low-cost airlines, have been lost.</p><p>Efficiency is lower; operating costs are higher and are distributed by ever fewer passengers; fares are higher; barriers to communication with the outside world are higher; economies are smaller. This is a simple causal chain which the data bears out.</p><p>So, as the market’s fragmentation accelerated, so did the competitors’ losses.</p><p>Blue Islands was privately funded by the late Derek Coates, a healthcare entrepreneur. Its accounts are not published, but it was understood to have lost millions during in this period. Aurigny was nationalised in 2003 to preserve Guernsey’s links to London, so its own losses were a much more public affair. By 2013, its debts were reported at £12m, and for the first time, Guernsey’s deputy Treasury minister attributed “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-23243341">the vast majority</a>” of its losses to the Alderney routes. In 2015, the States of Guernsey <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-34525973">paid off</a> £24.3m of the airline’s accumulated and anticipated losses.</p><p>At the same time, Aurigny was faced with a need to replace its 45 year old Trislanders, which it used on its inter-island and Alderney services since 1971. By 2014, Aurigny was the last operator of the type in the northern hemisphere, with maintenance costs rocketing and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-34767851">parts in increasingly short supply</a>. A 2012 <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422fd5840f0b613460009af/BN2A_MK.III-2_Trislander_G-BDTO_04-13.pdf">incident</a> in which an aircraft lost an engine and struggled to maintain altitude over the Channel focussed regulators’ minds. <a href="https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/domains/air-operations/air-operations-general">New EU regulations</a> compelled the company to install ‘emergency exit lighting’; this more closely resembled fairy lights, since the Trislander had no aisle, and every other seat had its own door. In May 2014, Aurigny obtained States approval for an uncapped <a href="https://gov.gg/article/117074/Treasury-Ministers-statement-on-Aurigny-Air-Services---aircraft-acquisitions">loan</a> to purchase three replacement aircraft for Alderney.</p><p>It chose the Dornier 228. The Dornier was a perfectly capable aircraft type, with 57 aircraft in service worldwide in 2018, but it was also increasingly niche. The company chose to operate a mixture of second-hand and new aircraft, but the second-hand aircraft which the company purchased were unreliable. One (G-SAYE, built in 1985) had a modification for which, it transpired — after purchase — that paperwork was missing, which meant it routinely had to fly without passengers’ bags. The other (G-LGIS, built 1988) was shortly to require a new wing. The decision to mix second-hand and new aircraft meant that pilots required two sets of training.</p><p>In an attempt to stem growing losses, the initial idea of four planes dedicated to Alderney became a promise of three planes… which ultimately became a reality of two. The States of Guernsey <a href="https://gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=121881&amp;p=0">disclosed</a> that this decision was expected to save only £300,000 per year, but it would leave Alderney <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/dismay-over-dornier-reductions/">reliant on one plane</a> for the <a href="https://gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=153025&amp;p=0">c.140 days per year</a> when one or other is having major annual maintenance. When the remaining one breaks down… <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/aurigny-looking-options-add-resilience-alderney-links/">there are no flights</a>. G-LGIS, one third of Aurigny’s remaining fleet capable of flying to Alderney, never got its new wing. Instead it spent several years sitting out in the salt air, and eventually left Guernsey in 2024, in pieces, by ship.</p><p>Any proper policy-making process would have seen a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-green-book-appraisal-and-evaluation-in-central-government/the-green-book-2020#:~:text=The%20value%20of%20all%20benefits,(NPSV)%20of%20a%20proposal.">Net Present Social Value</a> calculation, which would balanced any savings from the proposal against an estimate of its wider economic impact. This exercise would most likely have produced a strongly negative number — but there is no indication that this ever took place. A policy decision with profound and lasting consequences in relation to Alderney’s prosperity was taken in isolation, apparently without the requisite analysis.</p><p>The situation for the new aircraft was, it turned out, hardly better. The production line hardly existed. RUAG, a Swiss firm, was sub-contracting much of the manufacturing to HAL, an Indian firm based in Uttar Pradesh, and then assembling aircraft, at a rate of just one or two per year, in Germany. Deliveries faced lengthy <a href="https://www.ch-aviation.com/news/58412-ruag-delays-delivery-of-do228ng-to-aurigny-until-2q18">delays</a>. RAUG sold its production rights to US defence firm General Atomics in 2020, and <a href="https://gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=153025&amp;p=0">the need to ship parts from the US by Fedex has haunted Alderney with multi-day flight delays for years since</a>. A fleet of just two aircraft, and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-17825646">Aurigny’s decision to downgrade its in-house maintenance facilities</a> to save money, means that keeping a large stock of parts on-island cannot be justified — yet replacements are often not “just on time”.</p><p>Another victim of this steady erosion was Guernsey’s direct air route to France. The Guernsey — Dinard route was <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/aurigny-dropping-dinard-route/">cut in 2019</a>; Aurigny had operated a direct French service from the island since 1972. The company cited low demand and “a need to focus the Dornier resources on the Alderney operation”.</p><p>Being forced to focus its increasingly limited inter-island fleet on Alderney, and to fit within the strictures of formalised public subsidies, meant that operating a direct air route from Guernsey to France no longer made sense. In the 1990s, a Trislander had night-stopped at Dinard for a 7.35 a.m. flight to Jersey — landing at 6.55 a.m.— to allow passengers to connect to British Airways’ 7.15 a.m. Jersey — Heathrow service; a classic example of the sharing of overheads, which the subsequent erosion of this system now renders impossible.</p><p>Meanwhile, co-operation has continued to defy the Channel Islands’ airlines. In 2018, Aurigny again attempted to compete with Blue Islands on the Guernsey — Jersey route, as well as the Guernsey — Southampton route. Again, it paid an atrocious price. At the start of 2019, losses were forecast at £4.4m; a few months later the forecast was <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/bid-force-aurigny-jersey-and-southampton-routes-2/">upgraded</a> to £7.6m. The actual figure was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-53177159">£9.7m</a>, of which £2.8m was said to be attributable to Alderney.</p><p>Covid was a disaster, but it had a silver lining for Aurigny and Blue Islands; it put Flybe, their long-term nemesis on the Channel Islands — UK routes, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1007996/flybe-plc-operating-profit/">out of its misery</a>. This has allowed Aurigny to swing back to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3gqx4l1v55o">profit</a> for the first time in more than a decade, because taking over some of Flybe’s Guernsey routes allowed more — you guessed it — economies of scale. In practice, the same planes could spend more of the day, flying more people around, making more of a profit in the process.</p><p>Blue Islands is now predominantly a Jersey-based airline. Its profit/loss figures are not known, although it took an <a href="https://www.gov.je/Government/PlanningPerformance/Pages/MinisterialDecisions.aspx?docid=33C73A43-F489-4998-89C6-EFFE206F4334">£8.5m loan</a> from the Government of Jersey during Covid, <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news/blue-islands-pays-back-almost-fifth-85m-gov-covid-loan">on which it would need to increase its repayments from their current rate in order to meet the December 2028 deadline (although this has already once been extended)</a>. It is not known whether this loan is being re-financed through private credit, or whether repayments are being funded from revenue. Blue Islands has also benefited from Flybe’s disappearance from the Jersey market, although it faces far greater competition from easyJet and other airlines than Aurigny does in Guernsey; Jersey has a longer runway.</p><p>Aurigny and Blue Islands co-operate on the Guernsey — Southampton route, but exist otherwise as separate entities, with their own fleets attempting to serve different markets. In 2023, <a href="https://www.caa.co.uk/data-and-analysis/uk-aviation-market/airlines/uk-airline-data/uk-airline-data-2023/annual-2023/">CAA data</a> shows that Aurigny’s ATR aircraft were used for 6.1 hours per day; Blue Islands’ for just 4.1. By comparison, easyJet averaged 9.9 hours per day; British Airways 10.2.</p><p>Aurigny’s Dorniers, used for its Alderney routes, flew for just 2.6 hours per day — a situation not helped, as set out above, by being unable to use both aircraft at a time in case one of them breaks down, leaving no back-up. (A note of caution — these figures can be slightly illusory, when it only takes ten minutes to fly a planeload of passengers from one island to another, so the time flown metric would always look less impressive than number of flights operated. But nevertheless, these numbers are very low.) A 2018 consultants’ report <a href="https://www.gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=121818&amp;p=0">pointed out</a> (p. 31) that crew costs per seat on the Dornier were 16x higher than on the ATRs; again, the price of having a very small fleet with low levels of utilisation.</p><h3>The question of subsidies</h3><p>Up to some time around the mid-2000s — a precise date would be inherently subjective — flights to Alderney did not make a loss. Overheads were shared across a much wider business which, in almost every year from 1968 to 2004, made a profit. As the operation shrunk, losses mounted. As early as 2011, Aurigny began to make drastic <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-14589154">cuts</a> to the Alderney — Southampton service. As above, in 2013, the island of Alderney entered the public firing line, for the first time, blamed for the company’s losses. Thereafter, a cycle began to take hold.</p><p><strong><em>Fewer passengers → higher fares → businesses close → families leave → fewer passengers → losses increase → higher fares… </em></strong>etc.</p><p>This phenomenon is evinced in the demographic and economic data, and examples of fares, set out above.</p><p>For this reason, attempts to cut the islands’ air services back into the black have, typically, been in vain. The process of increasing fares merely tightened the bottleneck on Alderney’s prosperity, by impeding a key ingredient for economic activity — connections to the outside world.</p><p>Two instances of ‘chucking money at the problem’ have been (a) by the state, a botched and salami-sliced capital procurement programme of Trislander replacement, and (b) by various attempts, attempts to bribe consumers away from competitors with unsustainably low prices. The outcome of the first scheme has been severely to weaken the resilience and reliability of Alderney’s connections to the outside world — and to increase their expense, to both the passenger and the taxpayers, to a parlous level. The outcome of the second has been Channel Islands air services becoming more fragmented than at any time since 1967. The results of both have left nobody satisfied.</p><p>But there has also been a third attempt, and it is the final piece of the puzzle which must be examined before we can draw some more definitive conclusions. This is the formalisation of subsidies for Alderney’s air services.</p><p>From 1935 to the mid-2000s, with the exception of the mid- to late-1960s, flights to Alderney either broke even, or made a profit. They benefited from the economies of scale explained above. From the mid-2000s, as patronage continued to decline and the operation shrunk, their bottom line grew weaker. By the 2010s, they were, undoubtedly, formally loss-making.</p><p>This is not an unusual situation. Flights to small islands the world over, when laid on especially as Alderney’s nowadays are, almost never make a profit. Economies of scale — and the effects of their absence — apply across the world, not just in the Channel Islands. Some people in Alderney, used to decades of the old, more efficient system, still find this hard to believe, and <a href="https://guernseypress.com/news/voices/readers-letters/2024/11/29/ticket-hike-has-damaged-alderneys-tourist-industry/">petition Guernsey to publish Aurigny’s management accounts</a>, perhaps in the hope of discovering some undue creativity.</p><p>Yet, as of 2024, no other comparable island community in Britain has unsubsidised air services, and <a href="http://LIST OF PUBLIC SERVICE OBLIGATIONS">165 air routes across the EU</a> operated under formal subsidies, through Public Service Obligations (PSOs).</p><p>By the 2010s, Aurigny’s losses on the Alderney routes were being, de facto, subsidised by the taxpayer — because it ran up debts which the taxpayer paid off (£24.3m in 2015).</p><p>In 2017, the States of Guernsey proposed to formalise the subsidy for Alderney through a PSO. This was a perfectly sensible policy response. The chosen level of subsidy for Alderney is the principal determinant of the level of fares — so it is a matter of social and economic development policy. Before the PSO, such decisions were effectively left to Aurigny. The company had to decide, in essence, how much its Gatwick profits should subsidise its Alderney losses. In a democracy, social policy — and the use of taxpayers’ money — is usually thought a matter for governments, rather than airlines, to decide.</p><p>The process collapsed <a href="https://guernseypress.com/news/voices/comment/2019/03/25/pso-collapse-is-bad-for-all-involved/">twice</a>, before a five year agreement was signed in 2021, funding Aurigny £2m per year. The States of Guernsey is under no obligation, under the 1948 Agreement, to subsidise air services to Alderney, and its decision to do so was enlightened and welcome.</p><p>However, in November 2024, the States of Guernsey <a href="https://gov.gg/article/202829/PR-takes-steps-to-reduce-taxpayer-funded-subsidy-on-Alderney-air-links">cut the PSO funding</a> by 25%, saving just 0.07% of its annual budget. The decision was taken in isolation of any other policy measure. It was taken without consulting Alderney, nor was it communicated in advance; Alderney States members heard the news in the media. Guernsey’s most senior politician, Lyndon Trott, <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/trott-pr-should-be-lauded-cutting-aurignys-alderney-subsidy/">said he should be “lauded”</a> for the decision.</p><p>Alderney’s air fare subsidies were already lower than for any comparable island community in Britain, and as a result of this decision, they are now lower still:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AUnPNReXb1FcynBr68M0mA.png" /><figcaption><em>Sources:</em> <em>published tender values for </em><a href="https://www.publiccontractsscotland.gov.uk/search/show/search_view.aspx?ID=JAN522225"><em>Orkney</em></a><em> (Papa Westray, Westray, Eday, Stronsay, North Ronaldsay, Sanday); </em><a href="https://www.find-tender.service.gov.uk/Notice/000985-2024/PDF"><em>Shetland</em></a><em> (Fair Isle and Foula); and </em><a href="https://www.publiccontractsscotland.gov.uk/search/show/search_view.aspx?ID=APR476982&amp;fbclid=IwY2xjawIO39VleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHRQEi4fPVSc4lwBPi-Nb9C-dJ1HVyoW7sF_FHyUm0TejR8s_5LYKn8j1gw_aem_mXIyQRpdwDJg-bpVwGx1nQ"><em>Barra, Tiree and Campbeltown</em></a><em>; States of Guernsey Policy &amp; Resources committee </em><a href="https://gov.gg/article/202829/PR-takes-steps-to-reduce-taxpayer-funded-subsidy-on-Alderney-air-links"><em>statement, 14 November 2024</em></a><em>; author’s own analysis</em></figcaption></figure><p>This is one reason why Alderney’s air fares are now far higher than any comparable island community:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*o9wZEhN5jIi1pF3zPh2KZg.png" /><figcaption>Sources: <em>published tender values for </em><a href="https://www.publiccontractsscotland.gov.uk/search/show/search_view.aspx?ID=JAN522225"><em>Orkney</em></a><em> (Papa Westray, Westray, Eday, Stronsay, North Ronaldsay, Sanday); </em><a href="https://www.find-tender.service.gov.uk/Notice/000985-2024/PDF"><em>Shetland</em></a><em> (Fair Isle and Foula); and </em><a href="https://www.publiccontractsscotland.gov.uk/search/show/search_view.aspx?ID=APR476982&amp;fbclid=IwY2xjawIO39VleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHRQEi4fPVSc4lwBPi-Nb9C-dJ1HVyoW7sF_FHyUm0TejR8s_5LYKn8j1gw_aem_mXIyQRpdwDJg-bpVwGx1nQ"><em>Barra, Tiree and Campbeltown</em></a><em>; States of Guernsey Policy &amp; Resources committee </em><a href="https://gov.gg/article/202829/PR-takes-steps-to-reduce-taxpayer-funded-subsidy-on-Alderney-air-links"><em>statement, 14 November 2024</em></a><em>; </em><a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/61c324de73ba797d2d3c9846/t/648b20267418207fcce24598/1686839334618/Shetland+Fares+-+valid+from+1st+July+2023.pdf"><em>AirTask</em></a><em>; </em><a href="https://www.loganair.co.uk/media/0sioftc0/fares.pdf"><em>Loganair</em></a><em>; </em><a href="https://www.aurigny.com/"><em>Aurigny</em></a><em>; author’s own analysis</em></figcaption></figure><p>All the Scottish fares have available significant senior citizen and child discounts, which are not available for Alderney.</p><p>Orkney spends £2.2m per year on inter-island air services, with a budget <a href="https://www.orkney.gov.uk/media/em3pr3mp/oic-key-facts-and-figures-2024-25.pdf">one seventh</a> the size of Guernsey’s, and has recently funded a third aircraft for the fleet. Shetland spends 3.7x Alderney’s subsidy per resident per year, on a budget which is <a href="https://www.shetland.gov.uk/downloads/file/7694/budget-book-2024-2025">one third</a> the size of Guernsey’s, on flights to Fair Isle (population: 60) and Foula (population: 38), retaining a fleet of two aircraft for a population less than five per cent of Alderney’s.</p><p>In addition, residents of Shetland, Orkney, the Western Isles, Caithness and parts of Sutherland also benefit from 50% off most air fares through the <a href="https://www.airdiscountscheme.com/">Air Discount Scheme</a>, funded by the Scottish Government. The Scottish Government spent £19.4m on <a href="https://www.transport.gov.scot/publication/transport-scotland-section-70-return-2023-24/air-services-air-discount-scheme/">air fare</a> <a href="http://6,460,789.29">subsidies</a> in 2023/24, in addition to the PSOs above. This is equivalent to an additional c.£225 per head for the eligible Scottish islands (this is a conservative estimate; it is not possible to calculate a more precise figure, as there is no public data to allow calculation of a more robust weighting of take-up between the eligible island and eligible mainland populations).</p><p>The Scottish Government also provided <a href="https://www.hial.co.uk/news/article/186/hial-publishes-annual-report-for-2023-24#:~:text=During%20the%20year%2C%20HIAL%20received,loan%20funding%20for%20commercial%20activities.">£50.7m</a> in subsidies for Highlands &amp; Islands Airports Limited, and a further <a href="https://www.transport.gov.scot/publication/transport-scotland-section-70-return-2023-24/clyde-and-hebrides-ferry-services/">£232m</a> for <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caledonian_MacBrayne">CalMac</a> ferries.</p><p>I have not analysed the Isles of Scilly’s situation in detail, as there is no PSO in place. However, the islands’ travel company, the Isles of Scilly Steamship Company (ISSC), which has a monopoly on services by sea, and which enjoys overwhelming market share in the air, <a href="https://www.islesofscilly-travel.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Annual-Report-2024.pdf">acknowledges that it uses profits from its sailing division to fund losses within its aviation business</a>. This was expected to amount, de facto, to a £600,000 subsidy in 2024. ISSC also offers a year-round <a href="https://www.islesofscilly-travel.co.uk/islander-news-and-booking/travel-club-information/">15% discount on air fares for residents</a>.</p><p>Looking further afield, at £40.36 per passenger (rather than per head of population; the EU does publish such data), Alderney’s 2024 subsidy rate was extremely low compared to <a href="https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9168af3e-67c7-430f-b46c-61b76236d8cb_en">any other comparable example in the EU</a>. Most subsidies, including for much larger aircraft benefiting from economies of scale, exceed £100 per passenger.</p><p>Interviewed by an Alderney radio station after the announcement, Jonathan Le Tocq, Guernsey’s minister for external affairs, said he was shocked to discover on visits to Scotland that:</p><blockquote>Many of the islands that used to have air routes no longer did… I suddenly realised we have major, major advantages.</blockquote><p>This is not true. The only places in Scotland to have lost air services in recent years are two islands in Shetland; <a href="https://www.shetlandtimes.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/129548-129572.jpeg">Papa Stour</a> (population: 15), and <a href="https://www.vladi-private-islands.de/fileadmin/islands/europe_atlantic/sale/Great%20Britain/out_skerries/out_skerries-1.jpg">Out Skerries</a> (population: 40). No island of a similar size to Alderney (population: 2,157) has lost its air services. Rather, there is a clear pattern is that services elsewhere are actually improving. Local and national governments in Britain and across the developed world are recognising that regional economic development is only possible if it is underpinned by proper transport.</p><p>The decision to cut the subsidy further, based on an absence on evidence and without communicating with Alderney, was, in both its form and its style, an immaculate exemplar of the island’s woes. It was a decision to narrow the bottleneck on Alderney’s prosperity and success, and to accelerate its cycle of decline. The subsidy is now set at a high enough level still seriously to rankle some Guernsey politicians and taxpayers, but low enough that it has no hope of supporting any recovery for Alderney. It was counterproductive for all parties — yet there is now talk, behind closed doors in Guernsey, of yet further cuts.</p><p>‘Death by a thousand cuts’ is a cliché, but this essay shows that it is perfectly apt to describe the Alderney’s trajectory. The States of Guernsey is not to blame for Alderney’s decline, but its decline has regrettably, been accelerated by political dysfunctionality and short-termism. In general, it is guilty of inaction rather than of action. But too many decisions have been taken without proper evidence, or kicked down the road for years. The few investments which have been made have later been eroded, or reversed.</p><p>In trying to understand the States of Guernsey’s motives and goals in how it makes policy in relation to Alderney, it would be remiss not to consider the attitude of Lyndon Trott, Guernsey’s most senior politician, towards Alderney.</p><p>Mr Trott has long argued that the 1948 Agreement places unjust obligations upon Guernsey. This is a perfectly reasonable argument, but even his friends would admit that Mr Trott is afflicted by a certain antipathy towards Alderney. Despite many invitations and after decades in Guernsey politics, he is thought never to have visited the smaller island, just 18 miles north-east of Guernsey. Mr Trott has argued that the Alderney has <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/deputy-trott-stands-alderneyaurigny-comments/">too many flights; that its Southampton route, the island’s only route to England, is not a ‘lifeline’</a>; and, as above, that its airport should be closed and replaced with a boat.</p><p>Yet Mr Trott’s attitude to subsidies elsewhere gives the fair-minded observer reason to believe that he regards Alderney as being deserving of, for some reason, especial harsh treatment. That very same Mr Trott who said that Alderney’s only mainland route, served by Aurigny Air Services since 1 January 1970, ‘<a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/deputy-trott-stands-alderneyaurigny-comments/"><em>should NOT [sic] command a material subsidy from the Guernsey taxpayer</em></a>’, sat on the committee which procured and signed off an £825,000 subsidy for Flybe to operate a <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/guernsey-heathrow-link-restarted-flybe/">short-lived Guernsey-Heathrow route in 2019</a>. This once-daily, mid-afternoon link was at the time Guernsey’s sixteenth to the mainland, and its fourth to London. It competed with the taxpayer-owned Aurigny’s own route to Gatwick, served five times daily. In 2017, the subsidy for every Alderney passenger was about £60.20 per head; for Heathrow it was £66, even without accounting for the cost of people switching away from Aurigny’s taxpayer-funded service. Aurigny went on to sink to a record loss of £9.7m that year.</p><p>Mr Trott also supported an £80m revamp for Guernsey’s airport, and £23m for Aurigny to acquire a jet aircraft for its Gatwick route. He also <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news/focus-herm-most-expensive-school-british-isles">voted to re-open the school on the island of Herm, for four pupils; in 2025 it operates at a cost of £100,000 per pupil, compared to £4,900 for pupils in Guernsey.</a> He was appointed OBE “for services to Guernsey” at the 2025 New Year Honours.</p><p>I would aver that any politician’s legacy in Channel Islands politics will be far more impressive if they manage to solve Alderney’s problems by turning it round, than if they attempt to solve Guernsey’s “Alderney problem” by trying to cut it off. We would all rather be in the care of surgeons who can heal a wound than of those who prefer to hack off the limb.</p><p>Alderney’s decline costs Guernsey money, because Guernsey is responsible for the provision of essential services in Alderney. No re-negotiation of the 1948 Agreement is likely to see the UK, which requested that the islands reach the Agreement in 1948, allow Guernsey to shed these responsibilities to any meaningful degree. Yet the States of Guernsey continues to take active decisions which worsen it. This is bad for taxpayers in both islands. And it is terrible for the people of Alderney — and in particular for its poor and for its children.</p><p>Were Guernsey to be successful in unilaterally re-writing its obligations to Alderney, the logical consequence would be more swinging cuts.</p><p>The main prize, for those who wish to do this, is to allow Guernsey to cease paying for Alderney’s airport in its current form, and to cease subsidising its air services. We have already established that cutting the island’s links to the outside world causes its economy and its population to shrink. Were either of these projects to take effect, the cost of paying for the remaining transferred services would leap as depopulation accelerated, obliterating many times over the savings from failing to provide proper transport.</p><p>Having torn up the 1948 Agreement, it would be logical, and quite consistent, for Guernsey politicians to say: ‘Spending per pupil at St Anne’s School is unfairly much higher than at St Sampson’s,’ and to close Alderney’s school; ‘the Mignot Hospital is now very costly. We must make difficult decisions,’ and to close the hospital.</p><p>Trying to get Alderney to fund these services itself would likely require rates of taxation in excess of the UK’s — destroying what Guernsey acknowledges to be its own USP in attracting and retaining sufficient residents. Alderney would be forced to make huge cuts to its own public services in order to stay solvent. So, either way, the cycle of depopulation, particularly of those with wealth, options and a preponderance to pay for a hugely disproportionate share of public services through their taxes, would inevitably accelerate — likely fast.</p><p>Alderney would be likely to resist such changes by all available political means. A constitutional argument of this magnitude, instigated by the States of Guernsey, would be likely to undermine its reputation for political stability and rational policy-making. In circumstances of radical, unilateral changes with severe negative consequences for its future, Alderney may ultimately judge it to be in its best interests to petition the King-in-Council to leave the Bailiwick of Guernsey. It could seek to replicate the arrangements within the Agreement with another party, most likely Jersey, the UK, France, or as an overseas collectivity of a sovereign state further afield, offering a new partner exclusivity as to its energy resources.</p><p>Jersey, increasingly more prosperous and with stronger public finances than Guernsey, may be persuaded. But if Alderney had to seek other partners, Guernsey would quickly find itself dragged into a row with the UK, which would resist either the loss of sovereignty, or the obligation to pick up the tab. My entirely personal opinion is that, in this event, the UK would ultimately bring to bear sufficient pressure on Guernsey, such that it might decide it was in its best interests to change course.</p><p>‘Managed decline’ for Alderney is a chimera. There is no realistic way in which it would play out without doing substantial harm to Guernsey, in political or financial terms. Assuming Guernsey was unable to renege on the 1948 Agreement entirely, it would most likely expose Guernsey to a growing deterioration in Alderney’s deficit, as population decline gathered pace. In 2023, this was £8.63m; were it to average £12m per year until 2075 — likely a conservative estimate — it would cost the islands’ taxpayers £600m.</p><p>It is squarely in the States of Guernsey’s interests to diminish Alderney’s deficits, and it will be far easier; far less painful in political and diplomatic terms; far less detrimental to the welfare of some of the Bailiwick’s poorest and most vulnerable people; and, anyway, almost certainly cheaper; to achieve this through economic development, rather than through a guillotine of cuts.</p><h3>The options for the future</h3><p>Politicians in Guernsey who would like to shed their present responsibilities to Alderney like to say that it’s up to Alderney to solve its own problems. This is entirely unrealistic, because it misunderstands the true balance of power.</p><p>It is obvious to any impartial observer that it is the States of Guernsey holds the policy levers which will determine Alderney’s future, and only the States of Guernsey which has the power to reverse Alderney’s economic decline. It collects Alderney’s taxes and operates all its essential public services. The States of Guernsey’s budget is over 87x that of Alderney’s; <a href="https://www.gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=182881&amp;p=0">£650m</a> vs <a href="https://alderney.gov.gg/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=182798&amp;p=0">£7.4m</a>. It owns, and gives strategic direction to, its state-owned airline, which holds a monopoly on air services to Alderney (and no other serious operator is interested; we know this because the PSO process collapsed twice, in 2018 and 2019, <a href="https://guernseypress.com/news/voices/comment/2019/03/25/pso-collapse-is-bad-for-all-involved/">when nobody brought forward an acceptable bid</a>, even with the £2m annual subsidy then offered — since cut.)</p><p>In the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the States of Guernsey is the national government; the States of Alderney is, in most respects, a district council. The similarity of their names does not equate to a similarity in powers, functions or capability.</p><p>We have already established that the decline in the islands’ transport links is the most consequential reason for Alderney’s economic decline — and that solving this problem is the first, foundational step to bringing about the demographic change and economic development which will enable its recovery and prosperity.</p><p>The challenge which has confronted policy-makers of all shades has been to do this at an acceptable cost to passengers and to politicians. This essay makes the case that this is impossible under the current model of air service delivery, because it prevents the economies of scale which were once present.</p><p>Compared to any other comparable remote community, Alderney’s air services receive only a very limited subsidy. However, Guernsey’s current fiscal deficit, and its rancorous and inconclusive <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx2ykd4vg36o">debate</a> over tax rises, make political acceptance of a higher level of subsidy very unlikely; rather, it is looking towards yet more cuts for Alderney. Some cultural factors are probably at play; Orkney and Shetland, being archipelagos, retain a respect for the existence and ways of life of small islands, whereas, with its more suburban character, large financial sector, politically totemic low taxes and <a href="https://www.bailiwickexpress.com/news-ge/uphill-battle-save-guernesiais/">decline of its own vernacular culture</a>, these days this is, understandably, less evident in Guernsey. This is not something which is easily solved.</p><p>Instead, therefore, the only way to square the circle — to create a system with economies of scale and resilience to deliver affordable and reliable air services — is to take steps to restore the old system of connecting the islands together. In practice, this means that one airline needs to operate all the inter-island routes in the Channel Islands, as well as the Alderney — Southampton route, and ideally also to France, using the same fleet of aircraft. Delivery must move back from the model shown on the right, to something much closer to that shown on the left:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rKhp43uFj3dBiI6qeQU4Vw.png" /><figcaption>Aurigny routes using its Alderney-capable fleet, 1990 (nine Britten-Norman Trislanders; one Britten-Norman Islander) vs 2024 (two Dornier 228NGs). Sources: <a href="https://www.caa.co.uk/data-and-analysis/uk-aviation-market/airports/uk-airport-data/"><em>CAA annual airports data</em></a><em> and author’s own historical datasets. Map made using </em><a href="http://www.gcmap.com/"><em>Great Circle Mapper</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>There are a number of ways in which the States of Guernsey could implement this strategy.</p><p>At present, the Guernsey — Jersey route, the backbone of the inter-island routes, is served by Blue Islands with a thrice-daily service, extremely expensive by historical standards at a cost of £3.52 per seat mile (37 times as expensive by distance as the average easyJet flight). In 1988, a day return on Aurigny cost £23; £63 in today’s money; passengers could choose from up to twenty flights each day. Today, a return averages £170, and passengers have a choice of three flights. The pattern of service on the inter-island routes has returned to almost an exact replica of 1967, the pre-Aurigny era. Blue Islands uses ATR 72s on the route, which cannot land at Alderney with the runway at its current length — and the States of Guernsey has already decided against extending it.</p><p>The States of Guernsey could look to form a joint venture between Aurigny and Blue Islands to operate this network, potentially with the involvement of some private capital to allow Blue Islands to continue to have a stake in this route. Alternatively, were Blue Islands unwilling to participate, the States of Guernsey could apply a licensing regime to the Guernsey — Jersey route which made it conditional on operation of the whole inter-island network; Blue Islands could then decide if it wanted to operate it. Co-operation between the airlines would likely be the better course.</p><p>In either event, this would leave both firms’ ATRs to operate the longer, regional routes from Guernsey and Jersey, with a fleet of four or five smaller aircraft operating the inter-island network, Alderney — Southampton route, and perhaps a French route. I am agnostic as to the precise aircraft type; each has pros and cons; but a minimum of four aircraft (five if fewer than 19 seats) would be required in order to provide sufficient frequencies and resilience. Consideration should be given to procurement of two further Dornier 228s; alternatively a new fleet of Twin Otters or Tecnam P2012 Travellers could be acquired.</p><p>Competition should not be permitted on these routes; rather, the licence to operate the routes should have detailed service level agreements setting out a framework for fares and minimum frequencies, agreed closely with the operating airline and reviewed regularly by a board comprised of the airline; the States; an independent third parties with experience in the provision of very small-scale community air services; and a further independent third party with regulatory experience. This is important in preserving the benefits of a unified market and economies of scale, while preventing the problems of monopoly.</p><p>Separately, consideration should be given to whether full security is necessary in Alderney. By regulation, aircraft with 19 or fewer seats may operate from smaller airfields with simplified security procedures, under certain conditions. For airports where terminals are unable to accommodate passengers without the necessary level of screening, a net saving may still be available through establishment of smaller, portacabin terminal buildings nearby; Hebridean Air Services formerly used this arrangement at Islay. This would require some dynamism and flexibility from airport authorities, but it could lower operating costs at Alderney, where security staff are often deployed temporarily from Guernsey, staying in hotels. It could also enable lower fees per passenger at other airports, and make the service more time-competitive with Guernsey — Jersey ferries, which operate from town-to-town.</p><p><em>(It should be noted that if Southampton were unable to accommodate this arrangement, the </em><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-green-book-appraisal-and-evaluation-in-central-government/the-green-book-2020"><em>Net Present Social Value</em></a><em> (NPSV) of the proposal would most likely be negative, since the macroeconomic cost of Alderney losing its mainland link would likely dwarf the smaller, marginal saving from abolishing security checks.)</em></p><p><strong>The States of Guernsey should now set aside the necessary funding and Public Service resource — and if necessary procure external expertise — to bring forward a business case for this model. </strong>The business case should make a robust and comprehensive estimate of the private and social benefits to all the islands from the vast improvements in interconnectivity which this model would present, compared to ‘do nothing’. It should also evaluate a reasonable central case for the ‘managed decline’ scenario which represents ‘do nothing’ for Alderney. Quantitative analysis should be undertaken in line with the UK’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/transport-business-case/transport-business-case-guidance">Transport Analysis Guidance</a> and <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62050fc78fa8f510a66d3660/transport-business-cases-levelling-up-toolkit.pdf">Levelling Up Toolkit</a>.</p><p>This is a detailed exercise if it is to be done properly, but it is worthwhile in answering the question of whether this model provides the answer — and in building a sufficiently robust case for it to stand up to the likely political scrutiny. My strong sense, having analysed capital business cases for the UK Government, is that it would generate a strongly positive NPSV; i.e., accounting for all the costs and benefits, it would present a very substantial net benefit to the Bailiwick compared to ‘do nothing’.</p><p><strong>This solution wouldn’t just stand a good chance of turning round Alderney. By strengthening Guernsey’s links to Jersey, it would remove the bottleneck on Guernsey’s connections with an economy almost double its size, and which grew seven per cent last year.</strong></p><p><strong>Restoring affordable, reliable and regular transport links is not just about preserving one island community — it is an important part of addressing the growing economic gulf between Guernsey and its nearest neighbour, and ensuring a more stable and prosperous future for the Channel Islands as a whole.</strong></p><p>Finally, a less technocratic point. The debate about Alderney’s future is increasingly not one about air services, but one about its future. Guernsey’s financial situation makes it tempting to see Alderney as expendable, and it is more visible — and a softer target — than, say, the parish of Torteval (which also, almost certainly, does not break even, and benefits from a far wider range of public services).</p><p>Competent, democratic governments have a duty not to treat their weakest, poorest citizens, or regions, with indifference or distain. The duties of a good government extend further than merely insulating themselves from the suffering of their poorest. Recognising this, the care of Alderney was entrusted to Guernsey by the Privy Council — and the Sovereign — in 1948.</p><p>In 1948, Alderney was in a disastrous mess; its houses were gutted by the occupation, and after the war it had been run as an extremely unsuccessful communal farm. It was not an island which was paying its way — which was why it needed help. Guernsey took on a fiscal drain, and with its support, the island flourished. Alderney had a spectacular half century, but now, increasingly, it is becoming impoverished again.</p><p>It is up to this generation of politicians, in both islands, to live up to the spirit of cooperation and magnanimity which inspired their predecessors. To attempt to cut Alderney adrift would be to abandon an increasingly vulnerable community — a frankly appalling abdication of responsibility by the state, with equally appalling consequences for Alderney’s people, in particular its most vulnerable, and, most likely, Guernsey’s taxpayers.</p><p>The data presented here prove wrong the argument that Guernsey’s constitutional arrangements with Alderney trap the smaller island inexorably in a welfare trap. The 1948 Agreement is as it has been for 77 years, and for at least 50 of them, Alderney flourished.</p><p>The 1948 Agreement is not the problem; Alderney’s growing isolation is. For the island to flourish again, its demographics must stabilise and its economy must diversify. But neither of these changes are possible unless the bottleneck of expensive, unreliable transport is solved. Alderney’s recent decline is not insoluble nor irreparable, and it is the duty of all those who have a hand in governing to do what they can to stop it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cc7e2275bf0c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The road to Margate Pier: politics in the post-truth age]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@edwardpinnegar/the-road-to-margate-pier-politics-in-the-post-truth-age-cfb3b98cee30?source=rss-881b1fc662b9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cfb3b98cee30</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Edward Pinnegar]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 31 Oct 2016 23:12:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-01T10:21:42.244Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ywoeqB236dG4LFTOfn8U_Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mmmm yah kiss my oompa loompa post-truth lips (Matt Brown via Flickr)</figcaption></figure><p>In just over a week’s time, it is perfectly likely that United States will have chosen a President-elect who won his way to power <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/07/01/donald-trump-has-been-wrong-way-more-often-than-all-the-other-2016-candidates-combined/">despite the fact that 78% of the things he says are lies</a>.</p><p>Yet he may not have won the White House ‘despite’ his high Pinocchio ratings as much as <strong>because</strong> of them. ‘Post-fact politics’ has become one of the commentariat’s favourite clichés of 2016, but its intellectual foundation is deeper than Mr. Trump’s pockets and more modern (and more complex) than Ancient Greek demagoguery served up like a three thousand year old takeaway.</p><h4><em>A philosophical phenomenon</em></h4><p>‘There are no facts, only interpretations,’ scribbled Nietzsche in an 1886 notebook, in what would become one of the precepts of post-modern philosophy. This snappy dictum prefaced a century characterised by discoveries that undermined the very basis of the existence of an objective reality, normative ethics, and free will; the destruction of such fundamental assumptions coming to shape the post-modern age as a relativist age. ‘The world,’ as Schopenhauer put it, ‘is my representation.’</p><p>Whilst 21st century states have not torn down — for instance — their criminal justice systems in response (the relativist basis of the judgment that we are better off continuing to live <em>as though</em> such certainties do indeed exist being a splendid irony), a firm philosophical foundation was thus laid for a decline in popular reverence for facts as a basis for decision-making. Yet the political landscape in 2016 hints at the view that attempts to emancipate, where the people were previously oppressed by facts or narratives as part of a wider Gramscian cultural hegemony, have <a href="https://granta.com/why-were-post-fact/">proved counterproductive</a>. Maurizio Ferraris, an Italian philosopher and critic of the nihilistic outcomes of hermeneutics, points out that ‘the advent of media populism provided the example of a farewell to reality that was not at all emancipatory’.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*C-PokX_xJ_zS2zVImY4hPA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Who dunnit? Leopold and Loeb after the ‘perfect crime’ (Deutsches Bundesarchiv via Wikimedia Commons)</figcaption></figure><p>Indeed, Darrow’s landmark 1924 <a href="http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/free-will/darrow-and-determinism">deterministic defence</a> of Leopold and Loeb, two Chicago students who kidnapped and murdered a schoolboy with no specific motive, was exceptional precisely because post-modern states and their peoples continue to function without account for post-modern thought. We recognise that the appearance of the existence of free will and objective rights and wrongs is so influential that to attempt to live without them would likely be impossible and would almost certainly unpleasant. Nevertheless, precisely because the nature of ‘objective truth’ is indeed illusory, it may be that we are witnessing the first spectacular fall of a great Enlightenment assumption upon the post-modern sword.</p><h4><em>A polycephalous phenomenon</em></h4><p>How, and why, do such grand suggestions manifest themselves in practice? Why now?</p><p>Nearly thirty years of growing prosperity (with some exceptions), which likely shaped expectations of growing prosperity, came to an abrupt end when nearly every ‘expert’ (those stalwarts of the fact industry) in Christendom and beyond failed to spot the causes of the financial crisis that wiped out years of pay-rises for most earners. Gordon Brown had not <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/recession/3497533/Gordon-Brown-admits-he-was-wrong-to-claim-he-had-ended-boom-and-bust.html">‘abolished boom and bust’</a>. The coincidental existence of accusations that politicians may be both incompetent (in not foretelling or preventing the crash) but also devious (in nicking parliamentary expenses, and in an era of constant scandal fed by an irreverent post-Profumo media) should naturally lead to distrust.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/468/1*HHTkrHQ9DsZwmFUH92y6oA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Trust me; I’m a politician. Now pay for my duck house (Solent News &amp; Photo Agency)</figcaption></figure><p>That these have coincided with an age of <a href="http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=22955">increasing political ignorance</a>, the advent of adroit social media algorithms which fuel the validation of self and views through the much-discussed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/12/how-technology-disrupted-the-truth">‘echo chamber’</a>, with a greater division between those with degrees and those without (an American with no college degree finds their income <a href="http://www.finfacts.ie/Irish_finance_news/articleDetail.php?US-pay-productivity-gap-Real-wages-for-typical-worker-flat-since-1970s-119">much as it was in 1974</a>), and with the rise of ‘alternative’ media organisations (Kremlin-funded RT pushed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/22/mh17-five-bizarre-conspiracy-theories-zionist-plots-illuminati-russian-tv">five different theories</a> which absolved Russia of responsibility after the MH17 shoot-down), compound to create perhaps the perfect post-fact storm.</p><p>Moreover, research has shown that people who seek ‘alternative’ news sources — even if they are correct in their estimation, as in Italy and Russia, that the ‘mainstream media’ is not subject to a sufficient degree of editorial independence — are <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/525616/data-mining-reveals-how-conspiracy-theories-emerge-on-facebook/">most likely to believe conspiracy theories</a>. This leaves them most open to the sort of manipulation discussed below.</p><p>So, in essence, facts are out-dated, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/09/in-a-world-of-post-truth-politics-andrea-leadsom-will-make-the-p/">elitist and unpatriotic</a>. We are, in Michael Gove’s now infamous words, ‘<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c?segmentid=acee4131-99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754ec6">fed up of experts</a>’. It is an irony of a scale which befits the peculiarities of our age that, as Secretary of State for Education, he used to employ people to impart knowledge to others for a living.</p><h4><em>A politically convenient phenomenon</em></h4><p>Yet even if people did care for facts, <a href="https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3466/Perceptions-are-not-reality-10-things-the-world-gets-wrong.aspx">study</a> after <a href="https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3188/Perceptions-are-not-reality-the-top-10-we-get-wrong.aspx">study</a> has demonstrated the existence of a ‘perception gap’ (this polite Ipsos term is a nice way of saying that, on the whole, we are just wrong about most things). And we’re getting <a href="http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=22955">more wrong</a>. It is worth considering, with respect to this, whether post-fact politics is not an innocent phenomenon, nor some inevitability of circumstance. Post-fact politics require post-fact politicians. Did Donald Trump propose the wall (which Mexico will <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/jul/26/how-trump-plans-build-wall-along-us-mexico-border/">never pay for</a> and which wouldn’t work anyway), and the likely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/27/donald-trump-deport-11-million-migrants-is-that-even-possible">impossible</a> deportation of 11m migrants because he thinks it possible? Or because he wishes to use voters’ misconceptions as to the proportion and net contribution of immigrants to obtain power?</p><p>Did Matthew Elliot (former CEO of Vote Leave) really want to spend another <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/emma-pike/post-truth-politics-in-britain-and-what-that-means-for-america">£350m a week on the NHS</a> (and cuts to income, corporation and heating bill taxes, agriculture, industry, road-building… <a href="http://www.voteleavewatch.org.uk/leave_campaigners_try_to_drop_their_false_promises">the list goes on</a>) when he’d previously set up and spent five years at a lobby group which <a href="http://press.strongerin.co.uk/post/144510823542/leaveeu-co-founder-arron-banks-confirms-support/embed">campaigns to drastically reduce its funding</a>, or was he attempting to harness misconceptions about how much the EU costs Britain in order to achieve a wider goal related to many Brexiteers’ more niche constitutional interest in sovereignty?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*303kw0ihykbq_yBQ4-QF5g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mr ‘I ❤️ the NHS’ Brexit in a previous guise as swashbuckling tax-cutter</figcaption></figure><p>In the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-news-donald-trump-leave-eu-campaign-facts-dont-work-arron-banks-lies-referendum-a7111001.html">words</a> of Arron Banks, founder of the Leave.EU campaign: ‘The Remain campaign featured fact, fact, fact, fact, fact. It just doesn’t work. You have got to connect with people emotionally. It’s the Trump success.’ Politicians, it seems, have discovered how to exploit political ignorance to their own political and personal ends. Pomerantsev’s <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Nothing-True-Everything-Possible-Surreal/dp/1610394550">magisterial 2014 book</a> on the rôle of truth in Putin’s Russia — surely the caricature of the phenomenon — bears a title which captures the <em>zeitgeist </em>of a post-fact world: ‘nothing is true, and everything is possible’.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/334/1*nfsyACM6cNyUaA0V9xSTpQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ukraine’s nothing to do with me m9 (Kremlin Presidential Press and Information Office)</figcaption></figure><p>As for Britain, post-truth politics have now entered the mainstream. Theresa May, for instance, knows very well that research shows that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/sep/23/theresa-mays-grammar-school-claims-disproved-by-new-study">grammar schools contribute to inequality</a>, but aware of their enduring popularity amongst certain target voter types (TVTs; I know them all too well — I worked for the Tories) proposes their reinvigoration as a prop for her social mobility agenda. In not considering EU migrants as <a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/news-articles/1114/051114-economic-impact-EU-immigration">net contributors</a> as a factual premise for discussion as to the extent to which controls should be placed on their employment, the government’s tone thereon is also post-truth (Ipsos has shown how wildly perceptions differ from reality on the issue — see above). In pandering to political ignorance she can face up to populist angst, but in failing to confront it she legitimises the <em>modus operandi </em>of the populists. Her predecessor’s same, quiet, cowardice in attempting to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36582391">play the post-truth game to square populist circles</a> ultimately led to his own demise. Mrs. May will have to hope for luckier stars.</p><p>(I am less interested in whether or not immigration or grammar schools are good policy choices than in pointing out that debates around them are — to put it kindly — a good aeon away from being ‘evidence-based’.)</p><p>So who is to hold such cynicism to account? Arise Jez, who is scarcely better. Mrs. May, alas, faces an opposition which is populist for falafel-gobblers and irrelevant to much else. That — in his worldview that a capitalist élite fail ordinary workers, and in a style of campaigning which is primarily emotional — he is a populist, is a given, but is Jeremy Corbyn a post-truther in his claims that (against expert opinion) all would be well on the railways if we exhumed British Rail’s sullen corpse? (It would probably still look more appealing than one of their <a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Rail_sandwich">sandwiches</a>.) That £120bn can be <a href="http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2015/08/12/how-much-of-the-tax-gap-is-collectable/">found down the back of the tax avoidance sofa</a> to fund his big-spend Britain? (Answers to HMRC on the back of a postcard.) No. He isn’t nearly cynical (nor — some would say — clever) enough. He may be wrong, but he doesn’t try to use other people’s wrongness to further his own political goals. He is post-fact, rather than post-truth, even if many of his supporters <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/media/2016/06/it-true-pr-firm-full-blairites-orchestrating-labour-coup">joyfully inhabit the post-truth world</a>. Yet — thus far — he is losing the battle against Mrs. May, who has aped his language and whose post-truth tactics are paying off. In 2016, lying big wins big.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*6dQxydICeCX_DgoJt6seWg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Jez I Can… protest against my own decision to remove the Shadow Minister for Mental Health from the shadow Cabinet (less post-truth, more oops) (Alan Collins)</figcaption></figure><p>Modern disciples of Gramsci who dreamed that the age of popular tech would castrate capitalist media barons and emancipate the masses should be sorely disappointed; algorithms’ counterintuitive creation of personalised, monist media, the decline and fall in the status of facts, and the increasing ubiquity of relativism, leave the hegemonists newly enfranchised and our consciousness falser than ever. Voltaire springs to mind: ‘those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you commit atrocities’. One does not need a particularly developed understanding of European history to wonder whether the consequences of such an acrimonious divorce of politics from truth are likely to be nasty indeed. That haunting aphorism, ‘nothing is true, and everything is possible’, rings in the ears.</p><p><em>Edward Pinnegar is reading Human, Social and Political Sciences at the University of Cambridge. He also </em><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Edward-Pinnegar/e/B005BJJ4SO"><em>writes on</em></a><em> aviation history, and is currently working on an authorised history of Aurigny, the Channel Islands’ airline, for publication in 2018. You can follow him on </em><a href="http://twitter.com/pindog"><em>Twitter</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cfb3b98cee30" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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