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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Elshad Khanishli on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Elshad Khanishli on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Elshad Khanishli on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Gunpowder to GopherWhisper]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ekhanishli/from-gunpowder-to-gopherwhisper-c20370f5117c?source=rss-b025d340415c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mongolia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Elshad Khanishli]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 03:09:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-26T03:09:23.272Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How a China-aligned APT spied on Mongolia’s government using Slack, Discord and Outlook</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RZ9la9nIIGXWKVNCnffc6A.png" /></figure><p>In 1368, the Ming dynasty overthrew the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty and captured <em>Dadu</em>, modern-day <em>Beijing</em>, forcing the Yuan court to retreat north. Gunpowder weapons were already part of Chinese warfare at the time and would become increasingly important in later Ming conflicts with Mongol forces.</p><blockquote>658 years later, the battlefield looks a little different.</blockquote><p>In April 2026, ESET disclosed GopherWhisper, a previously undocumented China-aligned APT group targeting a Mongolian government institution. Its arsenal included seven custom tools, mostly written in Go. More interestingly, it used Slack, Discord, Microsoft 365 Outlook and file.io for C2 communication and data exfiltration.</p><h3>“How are you?”</h3><p>Everything in this piece follows from one number. During the investigation ESET identified multiple Slack and Discord API tokens sitting inside the backdoors, used them to connect to the associated accounts, and pulled down 6,044 Slack messages going back to 21 August 2024 alongside 3,005 Discord messages with the earliest dating from 16 November 2023 [1]. From the Outlook side they recovered 43 draft messages, one deleted message and five inbox messages [1].</p><p>ESET named the group in April 2026 because nothing in the toolset, the tradecraft or the targeting overlapped with any known actor [1]. It surfaced in January 2025 when a Go backdoor turned up on a system at a governmental organization in Mongolia, and the group is assessed to have been active since at least November 2023.</p><h3>Seven gophers and a speech model</h3><p>Seven tools, most of them written in Go, which is where the name comes from along with the <em>whisper.dll</em> filename of a side-loaded component [2].</p><p><em>JabGopher</em> is an injector shipped as whisper.dll and side-loaded by a legitimate whisper.exe, the C++ build of the Whisper speech recognition model, out of C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\ [1]. Before doing anything it checks whether a file exists at C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\Log\backup.log and quits immediately if it doesn’t. If the check passes it decrypts an embedded copy of <em>LaxGopher</em> and hollows it into a fresh svchost.exe.</p><p><em>LaxGopher</em> is the Slack backdoor. <em>RatGopher</em> is the Discord backdoor. <em>CompactGopher</em> is a file collector that compresses, encrypts and uploads to file.io. <em>SSLORDoor</em> is a C++ backdoor talking to a hardcoded IP. <em>FriendDelivery</em> is a loader that persists as a Windows service and injects <em>BoxOfFriends</em>, a Go backdoor that runs its command and control through Microsoft Graph draft emails [1].</p><p>Missing from all of it: how they got in. The whitepaper opens with tools already on disk and never addresses initial access. Public evidence is insufficient to determine the entry vector.</p><h3>Not everything called C2 is C2</h3><p>Slack is a bidirectional command channel. LaxGopher decodes a Slack API token and channel ID out of its own configuration using AES-CFB-128 with the hardcoded key <strong><em>ha,just_kidding!</em></strong> [1]. It connects using the open source slack-go library and then sits in a loop doing nothing at all until somebody posts the phrase <strong><em>How are you?</em></strong> to the channel, at which point it replies with <strong><em>I’m</em></strong> followed by the computer name. A backdoor with better manners than most colleagues. Commands then arrive as ordinary chat messages: cooom:1 opens a cmd.exe, command: passes strings into it, upload: pushes a local file into the channel, download: pulls everything in the channel down to disk. There is also a change: command that hands a specific host a new token and channel ID, moving it off the shared channel onto a dedicated one, which ESET notes makes the traffic harder for analysts to follow [1]. Slack is doing two jobs here, C2 and exfiltration, over the same connection.</p><p>Discord is the same idea with better crypto discipline and worse stage presence. RatGopher uses the discordgo library, announces its arrival with <strong><em>Hello, everyone! I’m coming!</em></strong>, and takes numeric command IDs rather than text: 1001 spawns a shell, 1002 feeds it commands, 2001 downloads from file.io, 3001 uploads to it, 4002 kills the backdoor [1]. It supports AES-128 in both CFB and CBC modes, and the operators can rotate the CBC key and initialization vector mid-operation by posting a message that begins <strong><em>Hello, this is</em></strong> followed by a name hardcoded in the implant [1].</p><p>Outlook is a dead drop rather than a channel, and the distinction matters. BoxOfFriends never sends an email. It uses the Microsoft Graph mail API to create a draft and then repeatedly overwrites it, so every new message destroys its predecessor [1]. Command routing runs through the recipient field: eight fake outlook.com addresses, each mapping to a different function, with the body carrying base64 or base58 encoded arguments and the XOR key parked in the subject line, derived from the last eight characters of the MD5 of the victim’s first MAC address [1]. Nothing leaves the drafts folder. Nothing is transmitted between two mailboxes at any point.</p><p>Worth a glance at those eight addresses, since somebody clearly enjoyed naming them: Adam, Seth, Enos, Cainan, Mahalaleel and Jared. That is the Genesis 5 genealogy, in order, wired into a command dispatch table. ESET doesn’t comment on it and I can’t tell you what it means, but somewhere in this operation there is a person who names things.</p><p>file.io is staging and nothing else. CompactGopher walks a directory, filters for .doc, .docx, .jpg, .xls, .xlsx, .txt, .pdf, .ppt and .pptx inside a specified creation-date window, encrypts the archive with AES-CFB-128 under the key <strong><em>korehappyhappyhappy+821054197565</em></strong>, uploads it, then deletes both the clear and encrypted copies behind itself [1]. The service accepts uploads without registration and deletes them after download or fourteen days. Whoever picked that key was having a considerably better afternoon than the person who picked <strong><em>ha,just_kidding!</em></strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gcOA1IlkkNE87nPSMFJUcA.png" /></figure><h3>They kept a garrison anyway</h3><blockquote>That last row is the one nobody quotes.</blockquote><p>SSLORDoor isn’t written in Go and doesn’t touch a cloud platform anywhere. It builds an OpenSSL socket to a hardcoded IP address, 43.231.113[.]50, hosted by Intelligent Tools and first seen on 24 March 2025 [1]. Messages get XORed with 0x3F, passed through an obfuscated RC4 routine with the key <strong><em>lsk2ksi9f</em></strong>, and pushed over port 443 as a raw byte stream that is deliberately not HTTPS [1]. The address appears twice in the binary, which ESET reads as a failover slot. Both copies contain the same IP, so the failover fails over to itself.</p><p>That backdoor was deployed against the same Mongolian institution as everything else. <strong>A group routinely described as having moved beyond attacker-controlled infrastructure was running a hardcoded IP alongside its Slack channel, at the same victim, in the same operation.</strong> They also signed RatGopher with stolen Google LLC code-signing certificates [1], which is not the behaviour of people trying to avoid owning things.</p><p>Persistence is conventional too. JabGopher installs a service masquerading as Windows Push Notification Local Service, while FriendDelivery installs one called bdreinitsvc, described as Microsoft Defender Reinit Service, and copies itself into a directory dressed up as a Bitdefender install [1]. The cloud platforms are one branch of this operation rather than the shape of it.</p><h3>Welcome to Outlook</h3><p>The operators used the same Slack and Discord servers to test the backdoors first, then reused them as live C2 without ever clearing the logs [1]. Everything from the development phase was still sitting in the scrollback when ESET arrived, like a group chat nobody remembered was public.</p><p>Links to four GitHub repositories the operators had apparently used as reference material while building the toolset, covering Go service installation, process injection, and two encryption libraries [1]. An early iteration of RatGopher’s Go source, uploaded from a developer path of ~/go/src/discord/bot_client/test1, written for Linux, calling /bin/bash, and visibly unfinished [1]. Enumeration output from the operators’ own machines, run for testing, showing a VMware virtual machine with a VPN adapter and a default-install Windows locale [1]. They ran their reconnaissance tooling against themselves and posted the results to the channel they later used for espionage.</p><p>And in the Outlook account, the Microsoft welcome message from account creation, never deleted, which dated the mailbox to 11 July 2024, eleven days before FriendDelivery was compiled on 22 July 2024 [1]. Two years of covert operations, and the thing that timestamped the whole build was Microsoft saying hello.</p><p>None of that is a detection failure. It’s a custody problem, and the custody problem is structural rather than careless, which is the part worth an article.</p><p>A rented VPS belongs to you. When it burns you rebuild somewhere else and the logs burn with it. A Slack workspace belongs to Slack, retains message history by default and indefinitely, and sits on infrastructure you cannot reach, wipe or audit even in principle. <strong>The moment you decide a collaboration platform is your C2, you have handed the complete archive of your operation to a third party and kept a token as the only lock on it.</strong> That token then has to live inside every implant you ship, because the implant needs to authenticate, which means the lock travels to every machine you compromise and sits there waiting for somebody to reverse it.</p><p>State the trade plainly and it stops sounding clever. Legitimate-service C2 buys traffic that blends into enterprise noise. It costs you the ability to ever destroy your own records. GopherWhisper paid that bill in full and the receipt is a 24-page whitepaper with their source code in it.</p><h3>Two data points and a time zone</h3><blockquote>The reporting settled on “China-linked APT” within about a day. The evidence underneath is two data points.</blockquote><p>The Slack workspace metadata carried the locale key zh-CN, and ESET is careful to note that Slack locales are set by users or workspace administrators rather than by the server [1]. The message timestamps cluster between 8am and 5pm once shifted to UTC+8, which matches China Standard Time working hours [1].</p><p>Both are configuration values under the operators’ control. Neither is code overlap, infrastructure overlap, or a language artifact recovered from a binary. ESET’s own phrasing stays at believe and most likely. There is also a small circularity worth flagging: the VPN adapter on the operator machine is read as probably present to get around blocks on Discord like those placed in China [1], which is a fair inference but one that quietly assumes the conclusion it supports.</p><p>So, graded. That the seven tools belong to a single actor: high confidence, resting on shared victims, shared infrastructure and documented relationships across the toolset. That the actor is China-aligned: <strong>low to medium, and the published evidence doesn’t carry it further.</strong> Mongolian government targeting is consistent with Chinese collection interest, though consistency with a motive has never been attribution, and treating it as such is how analysts end up defending judgements they cannot support.</p><h3>Same label, different animal</h3><p>Comparing this against recent cases produced a result I wasn’t expecting: they aren’t the same phenomenon.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7MHtrlQk6bCxP2ga-ZbEnw.png" /></figure><p>Gamaredon hides genuine command and control servers behind Cloudflare tunnels and workers, using third-party services to conceal C2 information and stolen data [3]. The service is a signpost, there is still a server at the end of it, and taking down the signpost doesn’t reach the server.</p><p>Evasive Panda’s CloudScout runs the opposite way, using web session cookies stolen from the victim’s browser to reach Google Drive, Gmail and Outlook without authenticating at all, which sidesteps two-factor and IP-based controls [4]. APT28’s AUTHENTIC ANTICS does something structurally similar inside Microsoft cloud, working from the victim’s own identity [5].</p><p>Only GopherWhisper puts the command channel itself inside the third party, on accounts it registered. <strong>Four campaigns, one label, four detection problems sharing almost no telemetry.</strong> A programme built for OAuth grant anomalies and session-cookie reuse will watch GopherWhisper walk straight past, because no victim identity is ever touched.</p><h3>Walls don’t work on this one</h3><p>Blocking the destination isn’t available. Slack, Discord and graph.microsoft.com are load-bearing for the organisation, and file.io is the only entry on the list that deserves a blanket denial.</p><p>The signal moves to the pairing. &lt;u&gt;Alert on process-to-destination combinations rather than destinations&lt;/u&gt;. svchost.exe holding a session to slack.com API endpoints is the finding. help.exe calling graph.microsoft.com is the finding. Neither destination is suspicious, both processes are legitimate, and only the combination is impossible.</p><p>&lt;u&gt;Look for regular-interval outbound requests from processes with no user interface&lt;/u&gt;. BoxOfFriends heartbeats on a default interval of 3,600 seconds, adjustable by command [1]. Regularity is the tell that survives when the destination can’t be one.</p><p>On managed tenants, &lt;u&gt;hunt for draft messages created and overwritten repeatedly and never sent&lt;/u&gt;. That pattern has almost no legitimate equivalent. It won’t catch GopherWhisper specifically, since the mailbox was consumer Outlook sitting outside anyone’s tenant, but it covers the same technique aimed at an account you actually control.</p><p>Two host-side checks, both cheap. &lt;u&gt;Flag service creation where the display name is plausible but the binary path isn’t&lt;/u&gt;, which catches bdreinitsvc claiming to be a Microsoft Defender service and JabGopher claiming to be a push notification service. And &lt;u&gt;alert on enumeration of Defender exclusion paths&lt;/u&gt;: the operators ran get-mppreference to find directories where payloads could be dropped without being scanned [1], and nobody outside your own administrators has a reason to ask that question.</p><p>One architectural note that changes how you test. JabGopher won’t run unless backup.log exists, and FriendDelivery validates a CRC32 of the legitimate executable that loaded it [1]. Both are execution guardrails, and both mean detonating these samples in a sandbox produces absolutely nothing. &lt;u&gt;Detection has to sit on the host&lt;/u&gt;, because the malware will look inert everywhere else you might reasonably look at it.</p><h3>Assessment</h3><p>GopherWhisper showed that a full espionage toolset can run its command and control through consumer collaboration platforms, at scale, for well over a year, against a government target. It did not show that infrastructure is obsolete, because the same operation ran a hardcoded IP throughout.</p><p>The technique isn’t novel either. Actors have used web services for command and control for a decade and MITRE has carried a technique ID for bidirectional web service C2 for years. What this campaign contributes is the clearest accounting anyone has published of what the technique costs.</p><p>The advantage is real but narrow: traffic that can’t be blocked by destination, and no infrastructure to buy, register or maintain. The price is custody. Records you cannot destroy, held by a company that will cooperate with researchers, unlocked by a credential you are structurally required to distribute inside every implant you deploy.</p><p>What the four cases give me together isn’t that APT infrastructure is disappearing. It’s that “abuse of legitimate services” has stopped working as a category. Channel-as-C2, dead-drop-resolver and stolen-identity models need different logs, different analysts and different starting assumptions, and a detection program built around any one of them is blind to the other two. That gap is worth closing this year, and closing it starts with the taxonomy rather than the tooling.</p><blockquote>In 1368 the Ming at least knew what a weapon looked like when they saw one. The harder problem now is that it looks like a Tuesday morning in Slack.</blockquote><h3>References</h3><ol><li>ESET Research, <em>GopherWhisper: A burrow full of malware</em>, white paper, 23 April 2026. <a href="https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/white-papers/gopherwhisper-burrow-full-malware.pdf">https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/white-papers/gopherwhisper-burrow-full-malware.pdf</a></li><li>Eric Howard, ESET, <em>GopherWhisper: A burrow full of malware</em>, WeLiveSecurity, 23 April 2026. <a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/gopherwhisper-burrow-full-malware/">https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/gopherwhisper-burrow-full-malware/</a></li><li>ESET Research, <em>Gamaredon in 2025: Leveraging tunnels, workers, dead drops, and new alliances</em>, 25 June 2026. <a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/gamaredon-2025-leveraging-tunnels-workers-dead-drops-new-alliances/">https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/gamaredon-2025-leveraging-tunnels-workers-dead-drops-new-alliances/</a></li><li>ESET Research, <em>CloudScout: Evasive Panda scouting cloud services</em>, 28 October 2024. <a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/cloudscout-evasive-panda-scouting-cloud-services/">https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/cloudscout-evasive-panda-scouting-cloud-services/</a></li><li>UK National Cyber Security Centre, malware analysis of AUTHENTIC ANTICS and attribution to GRU Unit 26165, 18 July 2025. <a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-exposes-russian-military-intelligence-unit-behind-malicious-cyber-activity">https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-exposes-russian-military-intelligence-unit-behind-malicious-cyber-activity</a></li><li>ESET, GopherWhisper indicators of compromise, GitHub. <a href="https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/tree/master/gopherwhisper">https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/tree/master/gopherwhisper</a></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c20370f5117c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Grand Theft Build]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ekhanishli/grand-theft-build-38abc5737f75?source=rss-b025d340415c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/38abc5737f75</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rockstar-games]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leaked]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[netflix]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[videogames]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gta-6]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Elshad Khanishli]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2026 05:10:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-22T05:27:44.474Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Grand Theft Auto VI Leaks</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mUgGUG9HoNgFw4iCg8K4fg.png" /></figure><p>Since 18 August, someone calling themselves LEEK has posted six clips of Grand Theft Auto VI, a game nobody is meant to see until November. [1] They shot their own name into a wall to prove it was real. They have not asked Rockstar for a single dollar, because they are being paid by the audience instead.</p><h3>The bullets in the wall</h3><p>Clips started surfacing around 18 August. Rockstar’s lawyers did what lawyers do and most of them were gone within hours, which left everyone arguing about whether any of it was genuine in the first place. A lot of people assumed it was GTA V with the contrast turned up. Rockstar still hasn’t confirmed a thing. [2] [3]</p><p>Then the leaker shot the word LEEK into a wall. [4]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PKpdZk_os6z7KJ7lkcLh-g.png" /></figure><p>I’d like to formally congratulate whoever thought of that, because as a technical claim it’s close to airtight. Posting a video proves nothing; people fake those before breakfast. Producing a specific string of characters on demand, out of bullet holes, in a location nobody has ever seen, is not something you do in an editing suite. It demonstrates <em>interactive control of a running build</em>. Public opinion turned within about a day, and it turned for a sound reason. [1]</p><p>Everything since has pointed the same way. A biplane over Vice City. The map of Leonida. A cutscene with a character drinking beer on a boat. At one point the leaker watermarked their own footage with an admission that they can’t drive, apparently after people started mocking their gameplay, which I find weirdly charming. [1] [2] [5]</p><p>Six clips so far. They went quiet for a day, let everyone assume an arrest, then came back with a Bugatti. [2]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R_76VswWPzPOKPbNtA0cgw.png" /></figure><h3>Nobody has asked Rockstar for money</h3><p>One clip went out after the leaker invited followers to vote on what should leak next by buying a <em>memecoin</em>. [1]</p><p>The public is funding the leak and setting the running order. The coin does well when attention does well, so the incentive isn’t to squeeze Rockstar, it’s to stay interesting. <strong>That’s a genuinely new shape, and it quietly removes the only control the victim had.</strong> You can decide whether to pay a ransom. Nobody gets to decide whether the internet is bored yet.</p><p>Take-Two lost around two billion dollars in market value over the week, then got most of it back, which says something a bit deflating about how much the market cares. The number was real while it lasted. [1]</p><p>The stated motive, for the record, is protest. The leaker’s argument is that digital preorders serve publishers rather than players, that anyone wanting money before launch should go back to pressing discs, and that other studios should behave or expect the same treatment. “Preorders were not created for gamers,” as they put it. [1] [6]</p><p><strong><em>It’s a protest with a token attached.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BtKtdrdkVt0Y5nKVPrLtNQ.png" /></figure><h3>Fighting a leak with a cease and desist</h3><p>Most clips have come down on copyright claims. At least one account distributing them has been suspended. Take-Two has gone to court for federal subpoenas to Microsoft and Discord seeking information about the leaks. [1] [7]</p><p>Which means the incident response function here isn’t the security operations centre. It’s a law firm, a takedown queue and two platform abuse teams. Everyone involved is good at their job and the material is still circulating, because takedown speed has never once beaten copy speed.</p><p>In a confidentiality incident there’s no restore point. You can’t patch a video out of somebody’s memory. <strong>Recovery, in the sense every disaster plan uses the word, simply isn’t on the menu.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZiL_eXZERFIXBv6fAy1ivQ.png" /></figure><p>Honestly, nobody knows what happens next, Rockstar included. Another clip. A statement. An arrest. Something worse than clips.</p><p>The Netflix special is on 28 August. Rockstar are going to sit through their own reveal wondering which parts of it people have already seen. Years of planning for that date. Now it’s a guess.</p><h3>References</h3><p>1. Scribner, H. “The Grand Theft Auto VI leak is speeding ahead without an exit in sight.” Axios, 21 August 2026. <a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/08/21/gta-6-leaks-gameplay-videos-maps">https://www.axios.com/2026/08/21/gta-6-leaks-gameplay-videos-maps</a></p><p>2. Tassi, P. “The GTA 6 leaker is leaking again, ending rumors of being caught.” Forbes, 21 August 2026. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/paultassi/2026/08/21/the-gta-6-leaker-is-leaking-again-ending-rumors-of-being-caught/">https://www.forbes.com/sites/paultassi/2026/08/21/the-gta-6-leaker-is-leaking-again-ending-rumors-of-being-caught/</a></p><p>3. Holt, K. “GTA 6 gameplay leaked ahead of its new trailer, and Rockstar is taking down the videos.” Engadget, 18 August 2026. <a href="https://www.engadget.com/2239548/gta-6-gameplay-leak-august-2026/">https://www.engadget.com/2239548/gta-6-gameplay-leak-august-2026/</a></p><p>4. “GTA 6 gameplay leaker has an actual build of the game, still posting leaks.” Push Square, 20 August 2026. <a href="https://www.pushsquare.com/news/2026/08/gta-6-gameplay-leaker-has-an-actual-build-of-the-game-still-posting-leaks">https://www.pushsquare.com/news/2026/08/gta-6-gameplay-leaker-has-an-actual-build-of-the-game-still-posting-leaks</a></p><p>5. “The latest GTA 6 leak confirms the leaker likely has or had access to a playable build.” PC Gamer, 20 August 2026. <a href="https://www.pcgamer.com/games/grand-theft-auto/the-latest-gta-6-leak-confirms-the-leaker-likely-has-or-had-access-to-a-playable-build/">https://www.pcgamer.com/games/grand-theft-auto/the-latest-gta-6-leak-confirms-the-leaker-likely-has-or-had-access-to-a-playable-build/</a></p><p>6. Marnell, B. “Apparent GTA 6 footage and map leak as Rockstar issues takedowns.” GameSpot, 18 August 2026. <a href="https://www.gamespot.com/articles/apparent-gta-6-footage-and-map-leak-as-rockstar-issues-takedowns/">https://www.gamespot.com/articles/apparent-gta-6-footage-and-map-leak-as-rockstar-issues-takedowns/</a></p><p>7. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., court docket. PacerMonitor. <a href="https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/66362353/TakeTwo_Interactive_Software,_Inc">https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/66362353/TakeTwo_Interactive_Software,_Inc</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=38abc5737f75" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why are Russian APTs acting like an Ex toward Azerbaijan?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ekhanishli/why-are-russian-apts-acting-like-an-ex-toward-azerbaijan-04c68db47f81?source=rss-b025d340415c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/04c68db47f81</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Elshad Khanishli]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 08:46:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-18T10:48:38.017Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Four years of Russian state hacking against Azerbaijan</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*eS9iGdO5g8rPp4xVPFod2g.png" /></figure><p>There is a specific kind of modern heartbreak where nobody actually breaks up with anybody. They stop replying. They do not unfollow. They watch every story you post, all the way through, and never once react. Months later you find out they are still logged into the Netflix account, because nobody ever thought to hit remove.</p><p>That, more or less, is the shape of Russian state cyber activity against Azerbaijan since 2022. Not a shouting match. Not a clean exit. Somebody quietly still having access, for years, and only announcing it when it suited them.</p><h3><strong>20 February, and the backups are gone</strong></h3><p>On 2 May 2025, Ramid Namazov, who chairs the Milli Majlis Temporary Commission against Foreign Interference and Hybrid Threats, walked through the findings at a public discussion titled <em>February 20 Attacks on Azerbaijani Media: From Cyber Intrusion to Disinformation</em> [1, 2]. Two teams had investigated separately, with no contact between them, and landed on the same conclusions from system logs, malware traces, and attacker behaviour [2]. Namazov named APT29, the group also known as Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, and The Dukes [1]. He also noted that the operation ran against the spirit of the Declaration on Allied Interaction between the two countries [1].</p><p>The attackers took the system administrator’s computer. Not a reporter’s laptop. The one with the keys. From there they reached the server holding backup copies of every online resource the group ran. Then they deleted the web server data and the backups in the same motion, wiped the media resources, and locked everyone out of the infrastructure [1, 2].</p><p>Then, after the outlets were restored with official support, they came back and tried again [1, 2].</p><p>Coming back after you have already disappeared has a name now. <em>Zombie-ing</em>. The difference is that when your ex does it at 1 a.m., you can just not reply.</p><p>Two more findings are harder to shrug off. Some of the attack traffic came from Azerbaijani IP addresses. And some of the people involved were physically in the country while it was happening, close enough that investigators identified the hotel they were staying in [1, 2]. Namazov also described a false flag element, which he put down to intelligence tradecraft rather than ordinary criminals [2].</p><h3>BMW for diplomats</h3><p>APT29 had been in the neighbourhood before, and that time it left a receipt.</p><p>In November 2023, Ukraine’s national cyber coordination centre published research on a campaign running since that September, aimed at embassy entities. The countries in the target set were Azerbaijan, Greece, Romania, and Italy, and it reached more than 200 email addresses [5, 6, 7].</p><p>The bait was an email offering a BMW for sale to diplomats, in an archive named <em>DIPLOMATIC-CAR-FOR-SALE-BMW</em> [5, 7]. The group had already run the same theme against diplomats in Kyiv earlier that year, which tells you what its conversion rate must look like. Somewhere in Europe, a career diplomat with a security clearance opened an attachment because the price seemed reasonable, and honestly, I am not going to be smug about it. We have all been three clicks deep into something at 11 p.m. that we would never have opened at 11 a.m.</p><p>The archive exploited CVE-2023–38831, a WinRAR flaw that let an attacker build a ZIP or RAR file which displayed a perfectly innocent document on screen while running code behind it [8]. The chain then pulled a PowerShell script from a server fronted by Ngrok, a completely legitimate tunnelling service, which made detection and attribution considerably more annoying [5].</p><p>Now the dates. CVE-2023–38831 began life as a genuine zero-day, exploited from April 2023 against cryptocurrency and stock trading forums [6]. RARLAB shipped the fix in WinRAR 6.23 that August [8]. The campaign against diplomatic targets started in September.</p><p>So the thing that reached diplomatic mailboxes was a one-month-old n-day. The countermeasure was updating a file archiver. Not a strategy. Not a platform. A version number that had been available for four weeks.</p><h3><strong>Still in your inbox, still not replying</strong></h3><p>The other Russian group with Azerbaijan in its documented scope is APT28, attributed to the GRU and tracked as Fancy Bear, Sednit, Forest Blizzard, BlueDelta, and ITG05. It has more aliases than a dating app power user.</p><p>Between late November 2023 and February 2024, IBM X-Force watched APT28 run phishing campaigns impersonating government organisations from a list of countries that included Azerbaijan, alongside Argentina, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Poland, Armenia, and the United States [9]. The campaigns abused the search-ms URI handler in Windows to fetch malware from attacker-controlled WebDAV servers, several of which appeared to be running on compromised Ubiquiti routers, which is a whole separate tragedy about the home networking gear in our lives.</p><p>One thing I want to be straight about, because it would be easy to blur and the piece would be more dramatic if I did. Azerbaijan appears in that campaign as an impersonated authority, not a confirmed victim. A lure document on Azerbaijani government letterhead tells you the group thinks that letterhead is persuasive to whoever it is writing to. It does not tell you Azerbaijani systems were breached. Treating the two as the same thing is how threat reporting ends up being ignored by the people who most need to read it.</p><p>Where APT28 leaves an actual trail of CVEs is webmail, and this is the bit that should make anyone running a mail server in this region sit up.</p><p>ESET documented a campaign it called <em>Operation RoundPress</em>, running through 2023 and 2024, attributed to APT28 with medium confidence [10]. The method asks almost nothing of the victim: send a spearphishing email whose HTML body carries a JavaScript payload exploiting a cross-site scripting flaw in the recipient’s webmail interface, then wait for them to open it in a browser. That is the entire interaction. No macro to enable. No file to run. No moment of doubt to override. The script reads and exfiltrates mail, contacts, and credentials, and in some cases sets forwarding rules so the collection carries on quietly for months, long after everyone involved has moved on to other problems. <em>Orbiting</em>, essentially, with an SMTP rule.</p><p>Four products, four flaws. CVE-2020–35730 in Roundcube during 2023, then CVE-2023–43770 in the same product from 2024 [10, 12]. CVE-2024–11182 in the MDaemon Email Server’s HTML parser, used as a genuine zero-day and most likely discovered by the group itself [10]. And CVE-2024–27443 in Zimbra’s calendar invite handling, where unsanitised input in the calendar header let JavaScript walk straight into the interface [10, 13].</p><p>ESET’s named victims are government bodies and defence companies in Eastern Europe, plus others in Africa, Europe, and South America [11]. Azerbaijan is not on that list and I have no basis for putting it there. It belongs in this article for a duller reason: Roundcube and Zimbra are everywhere in this region’s government, university, and mid-market mail estates, precisely because they are open source and cost almost nothing to run. The exposure class is local even where the confirmed victim list is not.</p><p>And separately, quietly, for years, APT28 has been working CVE-2023–23397, an Outlook flaw scoring 9.8 that leaks NTLMv2 hashes with no user interaction at all [9]. Microsoft patched it on 14 March 2023 [14]. Note the year, then keep it in mind.</p><h3><strong>The router that has been watching since 2018</strong></h3><p>Now we get to the part of the story where you find out they never actually left.</p><p>In July 2026, the NSA, CISA, the FBI, the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center, and partner agencies across thirteen countries published joint advisory AA26–194A, attributing a campaign running well over a decade to FSB Center 16, which answers to Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, Dragonfly, Crouching Yeti, Ghost Blizzard, or Static Tundra depending on who is writing that week [15].</p><p>Read the technique twice, because there is no exploit in it. The actors scan the internet for SNMP agents that accept default or common community strings, then send SNMP Set-Requests abusing the Cisco config-copy MIB to copy a device’s running configuration to their own infrastructure over TFTP [15, 16]. The community string is still “public” on a genuinely upsetting number of devices, most of them installed by somebody who left the company years ago and documented nothing.</p><p>Nothing gets implanted. There is no malware for endpoint tooling to find, because there is no endpoint. What the attacker walks away with is a complete map of your network and a pile of password hashes, and if the device uses a weak hash type, those hashes turn into working credentials in roughly the time it takes to make tea [16].</p><p>When scanning fails, there are two fallbacks. CVE-2018–0171, remote code execution in Cisco Smart Install, scoring 9.8, sitting unauthenticated on TCP port 4786, patched by Cisco in March 2018 and exploited by this group since at least November 2021 [15, 17]. And CVE-2008–4128, affecting end-of-life Cisco 871 routers, which CISA added to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on the day the advisory published [15, 16].</p><p>Nineteen agencies. Thirteen countries. One of the two vulnerabilities is old enough to vote, and in some jurisdictions old enough to run for local office.</p><p>This is not theoretical for Azerbaijan. In August 2025, Delta Telecom, one of the country’s principal backbone providers, took a DDoS attack, and the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport rerouted traffic through Azertelecom and Aztelecom while service held [18]. Redundancy did exactly what redundancy exists for, and that is a genuinely good outcome worth saying out loud. It also confirmed that the backbone layer is on somebody’s list, and the FSB Center 16 playbook is aimed at that layer specifically.</p><p>Four campaigns, four groups, one region, roughly four years. Time to put the dates in one place.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ArJ1y4xGLbmnp-X9DERnug.png" /></figure><h3><strong>What about the state numbers?</strong></h3><p>Azerbaijan publishes enough to see which way things are moving, as long as you read the figures next to each other rather than one at a time.</p><p>At the State Service for Special Communication and Information Security year-end briefing reported by AZƏRTAC on 2 February 2026, service chief Lieutenant General İlqar Musayev gave three numbers for 2025. Protection equipment on the AzStateNet network blocked up to 450 million malicious connections, of which 96,000 were caught by sandbox systems as malicious documents. Centralised antivirus across 93 government institutions and 55,000 users stopped 6,205,200 malicious activities, roughly 50.8% fewer than the year before. And the state e-mail service processed over 17 million messages while blocking over 5 million of them as malicious, roughly 38.5% more than in 2024 [22].</p><p>Endpoint activity halved. Mail volume rose by more than a third.</p><p>Read alone, the first number looks like a victory lap. Read together, the two say something less comfortable: the fight moved off the endpoint and into the inbox. Every single campaign described above arrived by email. Separately, the service logged 612 cyberattack indicators against government agencies between January and August 2025, slightly down on the same window the year before, against more than a thousand across all of 2024 [18].</p><p>Two things those numbers do not cover, and both are local. They describe state institutions sitting behind AzStateNet, while Azerbaijani banks, insurers, telecoms, logistics firms, and energy companies are outside that perimeter, buying their own filtering or quietly not buying it. And a falling indicator count is not a falling threat. Somebody already inside your backup server generates no indicators whatsoever. That is not a gap in the reporting. That is the entire business model.</p><h3><strong>Plot twist: they were not the only ones</strong></h3><p>Any article framing all of this as a purely Russian matter is selling you something.</p><p>Between late December 2025 and late February 2026, Bitdefender documented a multi-wave intrusion at an Azerbaijani oil and gas company, attributed with moderate-to-high confidence to FamousSparrow, a China-affiliated group overlapping with clusters tracked as Earth Estries and Salt Typhoon [23]. The way in was a vulnerable Microsoft Exchange Server through the ProxyNotShell chain, CVE-2022–41040 and CVE-2022–41082, patched by Microsoft in November 2022 [24]. The actor then re-entered the network three separate times despite remediation, dropping <em>Deed RAT</em> on 25 December 2025, <em>TernDoor</em> in late January or early February, and a modified <em>Deed RAT</em> in late February [23]. Bitdefender links the interest to the weight Azerbaijan now carries in European energy supply [23].</p><p>A patch available for three years. An intrusion that survived two cleanups. An entry point nobody was watching.</p><p>If the rest of this article is about the ones who never left the shared account, this is about the strangers who noticed a window was unlatched, climbed in on Christmas Day, and kept coming back after you nailed it shut twice.</p><h3>Wearing somebody else’s hoodie</h3><p>Here is the part that makes all of the above harder than it would have been in 2020.</p><p>In March and April 2024, Microsoft watched Secret Blizzard, which CISA attributes to Center 16 of the FSB, use the <em>Amadey</em> botnet to deliver its own <em>Tavdig</em> and <em>KazuarV2</em> backdoors onto devices belonging to Ukrainian military users [25]. Amadey is commodity crimeware. It sells on Russian-language forums and its day job is dropping a cryptocurrency miner on whatever machine it lands on. Microsoft assessed that the state group either rented it as a service or quietly helped itself to the command-and-control panels [25].</p><p>In an alert queue, that infection looks like a miner. A tired analyst closes it in ninety seconds and has done nothing wrong, because everything on their screen said crimeware. The FSB borrowed a criminal’s clothes and walked past the bouncer.</p><p>The traffic runs both ways. When the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia sanctioned 16 members of Evil Corp on 1 October 2024, the accompanying documentation recorded that Russian intelligence services had tasked the criminal group with attacks and espionage against NATO allies, and separately named a senior member as a LockBit affiliate from 2022 [26, 27].</p><p>Not everyone blurred, and this deserves saying because the convergence argument gets wildly overstated at conferences. Sandworm, the GRU unit tracked as APT44, has deployed more than 19 destructive malware families since 2022 and was still wiping systems at a Polish energy company in December 2025 with a wiper ESET named <em>DynoWiper</em> [28]. Its two ransomware deployments in 2022, <em>Prestige</em> and <em>RansomBoggs</em>, were costume rather than commerce, cover for destruction with nobody actually collecting [28]. Sandworm has never pretended to be anything other than what it is, which in this crowd counts as unusually honest. Recorded Future’s Insikt Group assesses that Moscow has shifted from passively tolerating its criminal ecosystem to actively managing it, sheltering the operators who supply intelligence value and dropping the ones who do not [29].</p><p>For a security team in Baku, the consequence fits in one line. <strong>The cheap loader on your endpoint is no longer evidence that whoever sent it is cheap.</strong></p><h3><strong>If you gave me one afternoon</strong></h3><p>Azerbaijan built the institutional answer in June 2026. President Ilham Aliyev signed a decree establishing the National Cybersecurity Agency as a public legal entity under the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport, formed on the basis of the Electronic Security Service and inheriting its rights, obligations, and assets [30]. Its remit runs to regulation and oversight, resilience of information infrastructure, detection and prevention of cyber threats, personal data protection, and public awareness [30], with a board of a chairman and three deputies [32]. That matters, and it also patches nothing whatsoever inside your building.</p><p>So if somebody handed me one afternoon inside an Azerbaijani bank or telecom, I would not spend it on strategy. Strategy is what you do when you have already done the boring things.</p><p>I would spend it on the table above, run against the asset inventory, then extended past it: internet-facing webmail, file archivers on executive and diplomatic workstations, build servers like TeamCity, and Cisco kit still answering SNMPv1 with Smart Install switched on. The router hygiene actions from AA26–194A cost nothing and fit inside the same afternoon. Disable Smart Install. Move to SNMPv3 with authentication and privacy. Block TCP 4786 and UDP 69 at the edge. Get reversible password hash types out of your device configurations [15]. If any of that takes longer than a week in your organisation, the finding is your change process, not your budget, and you should probably write that down.</p><p>Then I would go and look at the backups, because that is the lesson from February 2025 and it is the one most organisations here would fail today. The attackers reached the administrator’s workstation, then the backup server, then deleted the live data and the copies together [1, 2]. Three questions get you most of the way. Are the backups reachable with the same credentials as production? Is at least one copy genuinely offline or immutable? Has anyone actually restored from them recently, as opposed to reading a report that says the job succeeded? A backup nobody has ever restored is a hope, not a control, and hope has a poor record against APT29.</p><p>The last thing is unglamorous and legal. Azerbaijan’s law of 27 May 2022 requires organisations designated as critical information infrastructure subjects to run an information security management system, appoint a responsible person, report cyber threats, attacks, and incidents to the authorised body, and undergo external audit at least annually [31]. With the National Cybersecurity Agency now standing up as regulator [30], somebody in your building has to own that reporting line and be able to use it during an incident rather than three days later. The week you need it is a spectacularly bad week to discover it was never assigned to anyone.</p><p>Four years of this record point at one thing, and it is not sophistication. Every group named here can find new vulnerabilities, and one of them did. But what reached diplomatic mailboxes was a patched archiver flaw. What reached an Azerbaijani energy company was a three-year-old Exchange chain. And what reached a Baku newsroom’s backup server left no vulnerability number behind at all, because it did not need one.</p><p>Two of those are fixed by discipline. The third is fixed by looking, and by giving up the belief that a quiet system is a safe one.</p><p><em>They never post. They never reply. They are still watching every story, all the way to the end.</em></p><h3><strong>References</strong></h3><p>[1] “Parliamentary commission: February 2025 cyberattack on Azerbaijani media linked to Russia,” Caliber.Az, 2 May 2025, reporting the remarks of commission chairman Ramid Namazov via local media. <a href="https://caliber.az/en/post/parliamentary-commission-chairman-february-2025-cyberattack-on-azerbaijani-media-linked-to-russia">https://caliber.az/en/post/parliamentary-commission-chairman-february-2025-cyberattack-on-azerbaijani-media-linked-to-russia</a></p><p>[2] “Purpose and motives behind February 20 cyberattacks on Azerbaijan’s media revealed,” APA, 2 May 2025; the fuller account of the commission’s findings, including the two independent investigating teams, the false flag assessment, the domestic IP addresses, and the identification of individuals inside the country. <a href="https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/purpose-and-motives-behind-february-20-cyberattacks-on-azerbaijans-media-revealed-466631">https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/purpose-and-motives-behind-february-20-cyberattacks-on-azerbaijans-media-revealed-466631</a></p><p>[3] “Cyberattack targets Azerbaijani media: Who hit Global Media Group?”, News.az, 21 February 2025, citing Report.az and the Global Media Group statement. <a href="https://news.az/news/cyberattack-targets-azerbaijani-media-who-hit-global-media-group">https://news.az/news/cyberattack-targets-azerbaijani-media-who-hit-global-media-group</a></p><p>[4] “Cyber Attacks on Azerbaijani Media: A Current Threat and Precautions to be Taken,” Cyber Arts, 7 August 2025; the blocked second attempt of 23 February 2025. <a href="https://www.cyberartspro.com/en/cyber-attacks-on-azerbaijani-media-a-current-threat-and-precautions-to-be-taken/">https://www.cyberartspro.com/en/cyber-attacks-on-azerbaijani-media-a-current-threat-and-precautions-to-be-taken/</a></p><p>[5] “Russian hackers use Ngrok feature and WinRAR exploit to attack embassies,” BleepingComputer, 19 November 2023. <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/russian-hackers-use-ngrok-feature-and-winrar-exploit-to-attack-embassies/">https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/russian-hackers-use-ngrok-feature-and-winrar-exploit-to-attack-embassies/</a></p><p>[6] “APT29 group exploited WinRAR 0day in attacks against embassies,” Security Affairs, 20 November 2023; zero-day exploitation from April 2023 and earlier use by APT28 in August 2023. <a href="https://securityaffairs.com/154460/apt/apt29-targets-embassies-winrar-flaw.html">https://securityaffairs.com/154460/apt/apt29-targets-embassies-winrar-flaw.html</a></p><p>[7] “Russian Cyber Espionage Group Deploys LitterDrifter USB Worm in Targeted Attacks,” The Hacker News, 20 November 2023; includes the embassy campaign target countries and the CVE-2023–38831 attack chain. <a href="https://thehackernews.com/2023/11/russian-cyber-espionage-group-deploys.html">https://thehackernews.com/2023/11/russian-cyber-espionage-group-deploys.html</a></p><p>[8] NVD entry for CVE-2023–38831, WinRAR before 6.23. <a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38831">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38831</a></p><p>[9] “APT28 Hacker Group Targeting Europe, Americas, Asia in Widespread Phishing Scheme,” The Hacker News, 19 March 2024, reporting IBM X-Force research on ITG05 activity between late November 2023 and February 2024. <a href="https://thehackernews.com/2024/03/apt28-hacker-group-targeting-europe.html">https://thehackernews.com/2024/03/apt28-hacker-group-targeting-europe.html</a></p><p>[10] ESET Research, “Operation RoundPress,” WeLiveSecurity, May 2025. <a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/operation-roundpress/">https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/operation-roundpress/</a></p><p>[11] “Russian APT Exploiting Mail Servers Against Government, Defense Organizations,” SecurityWeek, 15 May 2025. <a href="https://www.securityweek.com/russian-apt-exploiting-mail-servers-against-government-defense-organizations/">https://www.securityweek.com/russian-apt-exploiting-mail-servers-against-government-defense-organizations/</a></p><p>[12] “CISA Warns of Roundcube Webmail Vulnerability Exploitation,” SecurityWeek, February 2024; CVE-2023–43770 patched September 2023, affecting versions before 1.4.14, 1.5.4, and 1.6.3. <a href="https://www.securityweek.com/cisa-warns-of-roundcube-webmail-vulnerability-exploitation/">https://www.securityweek.com/cisa-warns-of-roundcube-webmail-vulnerability-exploitation/</a></p><p>[13] Zimbra Security Center, release notes recording the CVE-2024–27443 calendar invite XSS fix in ZCS 9.0.0 Patch 39 (28 February 2024) and 10.0.7. <a href="https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Security_Center">https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Security_Center</a></p><p>[14] Microsoft Security Response Center advisory for CVE-2023–23397, Microsoft Outlook elevation of privilege, published 14 March 2023. <a href="https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-23397">https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-23397</a></p><p>[15] CISA, NSA, FBI, DC3 and international partners, joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA26–194A, Improve Router Hygiene to Protect Against Russian State-Sponsored Targeting, July 2026. <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-194a">https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-194a</a></p><p>[16] Picus Security, “FSB Center 16: How Russian hackers exploit routers via SNMP and Cisco Smart Install,” 14 July 2026. <a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/fsb-center-16-how-russian-hackers-exploit-routers-via-snmp-and-cisco-smart-install">https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/fsb-center-16-how-russian-hackers-exploit-routers-via-snmp-and-cisco-smart-install</a></p><p>[17] Cisco Security Advisory for CVE-2018–0171, Smart Install remote code execution, published March 2018 and subsequently updated for continued exploitation. <a href="https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180328-smi2">https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180328-smi2</a></p><p>[18] “Cyber intrusions in S Caucasus: Azerbaijan at frontline of hybrid conflict,” AzerNews, 6 September 2025; the figure of 612 cyberattack indicators against government agencies from January to August 2025, and the August 2025 Delta Telecom DDoS incident. <a href="https://www.azernews.az/analysis/247036.html">https://www.azernews.az/analysis/247036.html</a></p><p>[19] “US, UK Authorities Warn of Hackers Attacking Zimbra and TeamCity Servers,” October 2024, on the FBI, NSA, CNMF, and NCSC-UK joint advisory covering SVR exploitation of CVE-2022–27924 and CVE-2023–42793. <a href="https://cybersecuritynews.com/hackers-attacking-zimbra-teamcity-servers/">https://cybersecuritynews.com/hackers-attacking-zimbra-teamcity-servers/</a></p><p>[20] CISA, FBI, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska and NCSC-UK, joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23–347A, Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Exploiting JetBrains TeamCity CVE Globally, 13 December 2023; JetBrains patch issued mid-September 2023. <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a">https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a</a></p><p>[21] ESET, “Russian RomCom group exploits new vulnerability, targets companies in Europe and Canada,” 11 August 2025; CVE-2025–8088 exploited 18 to 21 July 2025, patched in WinRAR 7.13. <a href="https://www.eset.com/us/about/newsroom/research/eset-research-russian-romcom-group-exploits-new-vulnerability-targets-companies-in-europe-and-canada/">https://www.eset.com/us/about/newsroom/research/eset-research-russian-romcom-group-exploits-new-vulnerability-targets-companies-in-europe-and-canada/</a></p><p>[22] AZƏRTAC, “Xüsusi Rabitə və İnformasiya Təhlükəsizliyi Dövlət Xidmətində 2025-ci ilin yekunlarına həsr olunmuş müşavirə keçirilib,” 2 February 2026; figures given by service chief Lieutenant General İlqar Musayev. <a href="https://azertag.az/xeber/xususi_rabite_ve_informasiya_tehlukesizliyi_dovlet_xidmetinde_2025_ci_ilin_yekunlarina_hesr_olunmus_musavire_kechirilib-3997971">https://azertag.az/xeber/xususi_rabite_ve_informasiya_tehlukesizliyi_dovlet_xidmetinde_2025_ci_ilin_yekunlarina_hesr_olunmus_musavire_kechirilib-3997971</a></p><p>[23] “Azerbaijani Energy Firm Hit by Repeated Microsoft Exchange Exploitation,” The Hacker News, May 2026, reporting Bitdefender research on FamousSparrow. <a href="https://thehackernews.com/2026/05/azerbaijani-energy-firm-hit-by-repeated.html">https://thehackernews.com/2026/05/azerbaijani-energy-firm-hit-by-repeated.html</a></p><p>[24] “China-linked hackers target Azerbaijani oil firm in multi-wave attack,” SC Media, May 2026; the ProxyNotShell chain and the three deployment waves. <a href="https://www.scworld.com/brief/china-linked-hackers-target-azerbaijani-oil-firm-in-multi-wave-attack">https://www.scworld.com/brief/china-linked-hackers-target-azerbaijani-oil-firm-in-multi-wave-attack</a></p><p>[25] Microsoft Threat Intelligence, “Frequent freeloader part II: Russian actor Secret Blizzard using tools of other groups to attack Ukraine,” 11 December 2024. <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/12/11/frequent-freeloader-part-ii-russian-actor-secret-blizzard-using-tools-of-other-groups-to-attack-ukraine/">https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/12/11/frequent-freeloader-part-ii-russian-actor-secret-blizzard-using-tools-of-other-groups-to-attack-ukraine/</a></p><p>[26] US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Members of the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Evil Corp in Tri-Lateral Action with the United Kingdom and Australia,” 1 October 2024. <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2623">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2623</a></p><p>[27] Sophos X-Ops, “LockBit Links to Evil Corp,” 1 October 2024. <a href="https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/lockbit-links-to-evil-corp">https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/lockbit-links-to-evil-corp</a></p><p>[28] ESET Research, “DynoWiper update: Technical analysis and attribution,” covering the Sandworm wiper inventory since 2022 and the Prestige and RansomBoggs incidents of 2022. <a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/dynowiper-update-technical-analysis-attribution/">https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/dynowiper-update-technical-analysis-attribution/</a></p><p>[29] Recorded Future Insikt Group, Dark Covenant 3.0: Controlled Impunity and Russia’s Cybercriminals, 23 October 2025. <a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/dark-covenant-3-controlled-impunity-and-russias-cybercriminals">https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/dark-covenant-3-controlled-impunity-and-russias-cybercriminals</a></p><p>[30] Ministry of Digital Development and Transport of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “National Cybersecurity Agency established on the basis of the Electronic Security Service,” 2 June 2026. <a href="https://mincom.gov.az/en/media-en/news/national-cybersecurity-agency-established-on-the-basis-of-the-electronic-security-service">https://mincom.gov.az/en/media-en/news/national-cybersecurity-agency-established-on-the-basis-of-the-electronic-security-service</a></p><p>[31] Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan of 27 May 2022 amending the Law on Information, Informatisation and Protection of Information. <a href="https://president.az/az/articles/view/56622">https://president.az/az/articles/view/56622</a></p><p>[32] “Azerbaijan establishes ‘National Cybersecurity Agency’ — decree,” Trend.Az, 2 June 2026; charter approval and board composition. <a href="https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/4193500.html">https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/4193500.html</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=04c68db47f81" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ask three generations of engineers in the room: What is Cybersecurity?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ekhanishli/ask-three-generations-of-engineers-in-the-room-what-is-cybersecurity-705ae89cdc7a?source=rss-b025d340415c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/705ae89cdc7a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[computer-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Elshad Khanishli]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 01:22:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-12T02:07:56.989Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Защита информации-dı… Sistemləri attack-lardan qorumaqdı… Siber tehditler-ə qarşı savunmadı…</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qBWpgm-3NFhvYfOgz_YAjA.png" /></figure><p>The first generation worked in Russian, and not only in the sense that the material was Russian. The field was learned through Russian, discussed through Russian, and reported through Russian. Azerbaijani terminology for cybersecurity barely came into it, because there was no working need for it. Everyone in the conversation already had the Russian word, and the Russian word was precise.</p><p>The second generation read the standards in the original. They came up on English-language material, entered the field around and after 2018, and when they speak they reach for English nouns inside Azerbaijani sentences. The grammar is Azerbaijani, the technical words are not and nobody stops to translate.</p><p>That generation expected its usage to become the default. It has not. Among the engineers entering the field now, Turkish terms turn up in conversation: <em>siber güvenlik</em>, <em>sızma testi</em>, <em>zafiyet</em>, <em>saldırı</em>. Turkish technical material is easy to reach and easy to follow, and the vocabulary arrives with it.</p><p>Notice what is missing from that list. Russian, English, Turkish: three professional vocabularies in sequence, and in three decades none of them has been Azerbaijani. The words exist. <em>Kiberinsident</em>, <em>müdaxilə sınağı</em>, <em>təhlükəsizlik boşluğu</em> are all written into law and into the dictionaries. They are simply not what the room says.</p><p>None of the three generations is wrong. Each learned the field the way it was available to be learned. But it leaves the industry here with a question it has not answered: when we talk about our own work, in a stand-up, in a handover, in a phone call at two in the morning, when do we start naming it in our own language?</p><h3><strong>How technical vocabularies get built</strong></h3><p>Deliberate term-building in the Turkic world has a birthplace: Baku. The First Turkological Congress met in the Ismailiyya building from 26 February to 6 March 1926 [2], with 131 delegates, and adopted the principle of moving Turkic languages to the Latin script [3]. Azerbaijan had prepared the ground itself: Latinisation commissions had been at work in Baku since the early 1920s, and newspapers were already experimenting with the new script [2]. The congress went beyond the alphabet. Its resolution of 6 March 1926 on scientific terminology instructed Turkic languages to build terms first from their own most widespread words, to borrow from other Turkic languages before any others, to keep only those Arabic and Persian terms the masses had already absorbed, and to prefer common European roots for new concepts [4]. Türkiye’s own alphabet reform followed in 1928.</p><p>Türkiye then took the method further than anyone. In the winter of 1936 to 1937, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk personally wrote a 44-page geometry book at Dolmabahçe Palace, published in 1937 without an author’s name; the second edition of 1971 carries Agop Dilaçar’s preface attributing the work and listing the terms it introduced: <em>üçgen</em> for triangle, <em>açı</em> for angle, <em>boyut</em> for dimension, <em>türev</em> for derivative [5]. Most are still in use.</p><p>Three decades later the same method reached computing. In 1969, engineer Aydın Köksal coined <em>bilgisayar</em> for computer in a Hacettepe University procurement notice. He published 704 Turkish informatics terms in 1971 and a full dictionary through the Turkish Language Association in 1981, giving Turkish <em>yazılım</em> (software), <em>donanım</em> (hardware), <em>bellek</em> (memory) and more than 2,500 other terms built from native roots [6]. When a Turkish engineer says <em>derleyici</em> instead of compiler, that is the 1926 principle and the 1937 method still running.</p><h3><strong>The road Baku took</strong></h3><p>Azerbaijan’s computing vocabulary was built in the same decades by a different state, with a different policy. By the law of 11 July 1939, Azerbaijani writing was moved from the Latin to the Russian alphabet with effect from 1 January 1940; the restoration law of 1991 would later record that this was done against the people’s will, under pressure from the Centre [4]. From 1952, the republic’s official term-creation principles gave wide place to Russian and international forms, and research institutes across Azerbaijan produced roughly 200 Russian to Azerbaijani terminological dictionaries [7]. The result is the layer every Azerbaijani engineer still speaks: <em>kompilyator</em> (from Russian компилятор), <em>massiv</em> (массив), <em>translyator</em> (транслятор), <em>interpretator</em> (интерпретатор), <em>verilənlər bazası</em> as a direct calque of the Russian база данных, and <em>proqram təminatı</em> calqued from программное обеспечение.</p><p>The Russian layer is real, but it never covered everything. <em>Yaddaş</em>, the everyday word for computer memory, is native Turkic and owes nothing to the Russian память. <em>Şəbəkə</em>, the word for network, comes from the older Arabic stratum. <strong>The vocabulary was always a stack, never a monolith.</strong></p><p>Independence changed the script before it changed the words. By Law №33 of 25 December 1991, the National Council restored the 32-letter Latin-script Azerbaijani alphabet, describing the 1939 change as a historical injustice and explicitly invoking the recommendation of the 1926 Baku Congress [4]. The transition was completed by the decree Heydar Aliyev signed on 18 June 2001 on improving the application of the state language. The decree stated that favourable ground now existed for the free development of Azerbaijani as the language of an independent state, that conditions existed to eliminate the consequences of the injustices, pressures and distortions the language had suffered at various stages of history, and it created the State Language Commission under the President [4]. Institutional term-building followed: in 2012 the Cabinet of Ministers approved the statute of the Terminology Commission by Decision №277 of 26 November 2012, and days earlier, on 16 November 2012, the Commission had joined the first meeting of the expert committee on unified Turkic terminology in Istanbul [7]. A 996-page explanatory dictionary of informatics terms by İsmayıl Calallı, published in 2017 and released online by the ANAS Institute of Information Technology in June 2020, is the fullest map of the modern vocabulary [8].</p><h3><strong>Two laws, one test</strong></h3><p>Legislation is the cleanest place to compare naming choices, because a legal definition is deliberate, state-authorised and dated. Azerbaijan wrote its cybersecurity vocabulary into law with the amendment of 27 May 2022 [1]. Türkiye did the same with Cybersecurity Law №7545, adopted on 12 March 2025 and in force from 19 March 2025 with publication in Official Gazette №32846 [9, 10]. Same concepts, three years apart, two parliaments working independently.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3ocfGBDI_fkkpSFBBYSr9A.png" /></figure><p>The pattern is consistent. Where the two laws diverge, the Azerbaijani drafters reached for the Russian international form (<em>insident</em>, from инцидент; <em>konfidensiallıq</em>, from конфиденциальность; <em>infrastruktur</em>, from инфраструктура) or the Arabic stratum (<em>hücum</em>, <em>müdaxilə</em>), while the Turkish drafters reached for native derivation (<em>olay</em>, <em>gizlilik</em>, <em>saldırı</em>, <em>sızma</em>). <strong>Nobody in either parliament chose this consciously.</strong> Each drafting team wrote what sounded official in its own tradition, and the two traditions were set on their courses decades ago: one in 1952, the other in 1926 and 1937.</p><p>The counterexamples matter just as much. <em>Əlçatanlıq</em>, literally “reachable by hand”, is an elegant native Azerbaijani coinage for availability, lighter than the Turkish <em>erişilebilirlik</em>. And the Azerbaijani definition contains something the Turkish one does not: a fourth property, <em>mötəbərlilik</em>, covering adequacy, objectivity and usefulness, added to the classic triad of confidentiality, integrity and availability [1]. That is a substantive divergence from the international standard, not a translation artifact.</p><h3><strong>What this means for your security program</strong></h3><p>This history sits inside your documentation whether you notice it or not. Here is where it surfaces.</p><p>First, the compliance gap. ISO 27001 and most international frameworks define information security through three properties. Azerbaijani law defines it through four [1]. If your ISMS documentation maps controls to the triad, an auditor working from the statutory definition can legitimately ask what you do about <em>mötəbərlilik</em>. Decide the answer before the auditor asks the question.</p><p>Second, the register gap. The law says <em>kiberinsident</em> and <em>müdaxilə sınağı</em> [1]. Calallı’s dictionary largely agrees with the law [8]. Your engineers say incident and pentest, in English, inside Azerbaijani sentences. An incident response plan written in legal register will be executed by people who think in a different one. The fix is not to police anyone’s speech. It is a one-page bilingual glossary at the front of every policy, mapping the statutory term to the term your team actually uses.</p><p>Third, the obligation itself. The 2022 amendment requires critical information infrastructure subjects to run an information security management system, report cyber incidents to the authorised body, and undergo external audit by a cybersecurity service provider at least once a year [1]. Those duties are written in the statutory vocabulary. If your organisation is in scope, your reporting templates should use the law’s own terms, because that is the language the receiving body reads.</p><p>The state has been explicit that this is now a security question, not only a cultural one. On 1 August 2026, academician Rasim Alguliyev, Vice President of ANAS, described building the Azerbaijani language ecosystem in the virtual environment as securing linguistic sovereignty, an essential element of national cyber-sovereignty, and pointed to the National Terminology Information System as infrastructure already built [11]. Heydar Aliyev’s decree of 18 June 2001 treated language as a foundation of statehood [4]. The law President Ilham Aliyev signed on 27 May 2022 treats the naming of cyber threats the same way [1]. The through-line is twenty-five years long, and it runs directly into your policy folder.</p><h3><strong>Key takeaways</strong></h3><p>• Azerbaijani technical vocabulary is a <strong>four-layer stack</strong>: an Arabic-Persian base, native Turkic coinages, a Russian layer built deliberately after 1952, and an English layer arriving since 2000. The 2022 cybersecurity amendment shows all layers in a single definition [1, 7].</p><p>• Türkiye’s 2025 law names the same concepts from native roots, the continuation of principles adopted in Baku in 1926, applied by Atatürk in 1937 and extended to computing by Aydın Köksal from 1969 [4, 5, 6, 9]. The two laws are a controlled comparison of two naming traditions.</p><p>• Azerbaijani law defines information security through <strong>four properties, not the international three</strong> [1]. Map <em>mötəbərlilik</em> in your ISMS before an auditor asks.</p><p>• The practical fix for the law-versus-practice register gap is a one-page bilingual glossary in every policy, using the statutory terms wherever a document may reach a regulator.</p><p>• <strong>This week:</strong> open your incident response plan and check whether the words in it match the words in the law of 27 May 2022 [1]. If your organisation touches critical information infrastructure, they need to.</p><h3><strong>References</strong></h3><blockquote><strong>All online sources accessed 11 August 2026</strong><em>.</em></blockquote><p>[1] Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan of 27 May 2022 amending the Law on Information, Informatisation and Protection of Information; signed 27 May 2022, published 5 July 2022. Full text: <a href="https://president.az/az/articles/view/56622">https://president.az/az/articles/view/56622</a></p><p>[2] “First Turkological Congress and its lasting influence,” AzerNews, 29 June 2026. <a href="https://www.azernews.az/culture/260391.html">https://www.azernews.az/culture/260391.html</a></p><p>[3] “Baku Turkological Congress to be Commemorated in the Same Hall After 100 Years,” News Central Asia, 26 February 2026. <a href="https://www.newscentralasia.net/2026/02/26/baku-turkological-congress-to-be-commemorated-in-the-same-hall-after-100-years/">https://www.newscentralasia.net/2026/02/26/baku-turkological-congress-to-be-commemorated-in-the-same-hall-after-100-years/</a></p><p>[4] Presidential Library of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Azərbaycan dili” (in: Azerbaijan: State Symbols and Attributes), a compilation of primary documents containing the resolutions of the First All-Union Turkological Congress of 6 March 1926 (including the resolution on scientific terminology), the Law of 11 July 1939 on transferring Azerbaijani writing to the Russian alphabet (in force 1 January 1940), Law №33 of 25 December 1991 on the restoration of the Latin-script Azerbaijani alphabet, and the full text of the Presidential Decree of 18 June 2001 on improving the application of the state language. <a href="https://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf/atr_dil.pdf">https://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf/atr_dil.pdf</a></p><p>[5] Atatürk, M. K., Geometri, 2nd edition with preface by A. Dilâçar dated 10 November 1971, Türk Dil Kurumu, Ankara, 1971 (first edition: Ministry of Culture, Istanbul, 1937, published without author’s name).</p><p>[6] “Röportaj: Prof. Dr. Aydın Köksal,” BM Dergi, Bilgisayar Mühendisleri Odası, 14 March 2017. <a href="https://dergi.bmo.org.tr/bilisim-tarihi/roportaj-prof-dr-aydin-koksal">https://dergi.bmo.org.tr/bilisim-tarihi/roportaj-prof-dr-aydin-koksal</a></p><p>[7] “Terminologiya Komissiyasının yaradılmasının 90 illiyi,” Respublika, covering the 1952 term-creation principles, approximately 200 Russian-Azerbaijani terminological dictionaries, Cabinet Decision №277 of 26 November 2012, and the Istanbul expert committee meeting of 16 November 2012. <a href="http://www.respublica-news.az/index.php/elm-v-t-hsil/item/1053-terminolozhiya-komissiyasinin-yaradilmasinin-90-illiyi">http://www.respublica-news.az/index.php/elm-v-t-hsil/item/1053-terminolozhiya-komissiyasinin-yaradilmasinin-90-illiyi</a></p><p>[8] İsmayıl Calallı, İnformatika terminlərinin izahlı lüğəti, Bakı, 2017, 996 pp.; online release announced by the ANAS Institute of Information Technology, 14 June 2020. <a href="https://azsciencenet.az/index.php?id=2079&amp;lang=az&amp;mod=news">https://azsciencenet.az/index.php?id=2079&amp;lang=az&amp;mod=news</a></p><p>[9] Cybersecurity Law of the Republic of Türkiye №7545; text as submitted to the Grand National Assembly. <a href="https://cdn.tbmm.gov.tr/KKBSPublicFile/D28/Y3/KanunMetni/9ac32dc5-35ee-46a8-8c47-7a16ec35d36f.htm">https://cdn.tbmm.gov.tr/KKBSPublicFile/D28/Y3/KanunMetni/9ac32dc5-35ee-46a8-8c47-7a16ec35d36f.htm</a></p><p>[10] “7545 Sayılı Siber Güvenlik Kanunu,” Mondaq, 2 April 2025; adoption 12 March 2025, entry into force with Official Gazette №32846 of 19 March 2025. <a href="https://www.mondaq.com/turkey/security/1606732/7545-say%C4%B1l%C4%B1-siber-g%C3%BCvenlik-kanunu">https://www.mondaq.com/turkey/security/1606732/7545-say%C4%B1l%C4%B1-siber-g%C3%BCvenlik-kanunu</a></p><p>[11] “Academician Rasim Alguliyev: One of the vital missions of the digital state is to ensure linguistic sovereignty,” Institute of Information Technology, Ministry of Science and Education of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1 August 2026. <a href="https://ict.az/en/news/7694">https://ict.az/en/news/7694</a></p><p>[12] Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Information, Informatisation and Protection of Information, 3 April 1998, consolidated text. <a href="https://frameworks.e-qanun.az/3/c_f_3525.html">https://frameworks.e-qanun.az/3/c_f_3525.html</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=705ae89cdc7a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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