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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ellie Rennie on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ellie Rennie on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@ellierennie?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Ellie Rennie on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ellierennie?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[KOI and the Unicorn]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/block-science/koi-and-the-unicorn-d07e56bfce87?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d07e56bfce87</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge-network]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ellie Rennie]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Oct 2025 13:01:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-23T13:01:47.026Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A conversation inspired by a wall-hanging.</em></p><p>Ellie Rennie and <a href="https://michaelzargham.medium.com/">Michael Zargham</a></p><p>Earlier this year we were invited to give <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FyAQjN4P5lQ">a talk </a>on Knowledge Organisation Infrastructure (<a href="https://github.com/BlockScience/koi">KOI</a>) on short notice. In that talk we referred to KOI as enabling digital twins for communities, meaning that it can show how disparate knowledge within an organisation is connected. Sitting in a Uber immediately after the talk, we realised that the metaphor didn’t fit.</p><p>A digital twin is designed to predict, to pre-empt, to assert control. Engineers build them to monitor what is happening or to test what might happen before it happens. As BlockScience <a href="https://zenodo.org/records/13273682">has written</a>, that is “useful enough to be dangerous” [1]. A model and the world it tries to mirror can never quite align; the gap between them widens with every iteration, requiring humans <em>outside it </em>to recalibrate it. The more we treat the model as the thing it represents, the more we risk acting inside the simulation instead of the world being simulated.</p><h4>The Mirror</h4><p>A few months later, in Paris, we returned to this conversation after having published <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=5516298">this paper </a>on KOI-enabled Artificial Organisational Intelligence (AOI). The BlockchainGov symposium was being held near the Panthéon, not far from the Musée de Cluny — home to <em>The Lady and the Unicorn</em> tapestries. We stopped by. In one tapestry, the lady holds up a mirror for the unicorn: a magical creature, assisted to see itself, possibly for the first time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*guSu8U6rFoz_YtDsmEMJMQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Lady and the Unicorn (Sight), ~1500 A.D., Cl. 10831–10836</figcaption></figure><p>It struck us that our AOI model is more like that mirror than like a digital twin. A mirror offers feedback, not prediction. It doesn’t model or forecast, but allows the viewer to see itself and to see itself seeing. What appears in a mirror is continuous and co-present, not displaced into another space or timeline. It allows for self-attention, self-correction, even self-care.</p><p>While the mirror is a better analogy it also can be negatively construed. As feminist thinkers have noted, the mirror metaphor reinforces the idea of a bounded subject: the self who looks, recognises, and regulates. Philosopher and physicist Karen Barad considers such reflection as belonging to an ontology of separateness in which discrete entities observe each other from a distance.</p><h4>Diffraction</h4><p>Barad offers an alternative: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffraction">diffraction</a>. In physics, diffraction describes the <em>interference patterns</em> created when waves encounter one another. In Barad’s philosophy, it becomes a way of understanding how differences emerge through relation rather than separation. Where mirrors reproduce sameness, diffraction shows how things come to matter by overlapping and interfering. Barad writes:</p><blockquote>[T]he quantum understanding of diffraction troubles the very notion of dicho-tomy — cutting into two — as a singular act of absolute differentiation, fracturing this from that, now from then. <em>[2]</em></blockquote><p>And (elsewhere) asks:</p><blockquote>What if we were to recognize that differentiating is a material act that is not about radical separation, but on the contrary, about making connections and commitments? <em>[3]</em></blockquote><p>Diffractive apparatuses are arrangements through which relations themselves become visible. They show that knowing and being are co-produced, that the observer and the observed are entangled in the same ongoing event.</p><p>Perhaps AOI is less a mirror reflecting an organisation back to itself, and more of an apparatus through which relations can be perceived. Thanks to KOI, what appears in AOI isn’t an external image, but the material traces of contributions, knowledge and practices (the ways decisions, norms, and behaviours intersect). Diffraction is a helpful concept as AOI and KOI don’t just represent the organisation but take part in its continual becoming. It helps a group notice the patterns it is already making together, which enables self-attention and self-regulation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*udSUpgKY3Ruww0A3nmS7GQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Conceptualizing KOI and AOI as Mirror (remix from this <a href="https://kelsienabben.substack.com/p/computer-aided-ethnography-cae">Computer Aided Ethnography </a>article)</figcaption></figure><h4>Terraforming</h4><p>Our colleagues in ADM+S <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/29768624251358648">write</a> that digital twins belong to what Foucault first called “environmentality”: systems that sense, simulate, and steer behaviour through the management of conditions [4]. Rather than governing the environment from above, KOI invites participants to <em>terraform</em> from within: to shape the ground rules of the system together in order to form AOI.</p><p>Terraforming here isn’t about making distant worlds habitable. As with environmentality, it involves adjusting the game itself (the environment, which may be the organisation) rather than enforcing rules directly on the players (elaborated <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4570035">here</a>). The difference with terraforming is that the players are making those changes collectively rather than having the rules change on them without their knowing.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>KOI (and AOI enabled by KOI) don’t exist to model or predict a group; they become part of the infrastructure through which a group is continually composed. They help groups ‘see’ relation rather than representation and to adjust with that co-present view before them. Like the unicorn before its mirror, the group gets to self-reflect on its physical and non-physical (magical) properties. Like the tapestry, this is a woven and intricate thing to depict.</p><h4>References</h4><p>[1] Zargham, M, Sisson, D., David, S.J.D, Friedman, A.D., Cordes, R., (2024). <em>Comments Submitted by BlockScience, University of Washington APL Information Risk and Synthetic Intelligence Research Initiative (IRSIRI), Cognitive Security and Education Forum (COGSEC), and the Active Inference Institute (AII) to the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development National Coordination Office’s Request for Comment on The Creation of a National Digital Twins R&amp;D Strategic Plan NITRD-2024–13379</em>. <a href="https://zenodo.org/records/13273682">https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13273682</a></p><p>[2] Barad, K. (2014). Diffracting Diffraction: Cutting Together-Apart. <em>Parallax</em>, <em>20</em>(3), 168–187. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13534645.2014.927623">https://doi.org/10.1080/13534645.2014.927623</a></p><p>[3] Barad, K. (2010). Quantum Entanglements and Hauntological Relations of Inheritance: Dis/continuities, SpaceTime Enfoldings, and Justice-to-Come. <em>Derrida Today</em>, <em>3</em>(2), 240–268. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2010.0206">https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2010.0206</a></p><p>[4] Andrejevic, M., Horn, Z. E., &amp; Richardson, M. (2025). Value from digital twins. <em>Platforms &amp; Society</em>, <em>2</em>. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/29768624251358648">https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/29768624251358648</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d07e56bfce87" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/block-science/koi-and-the-unicorn-d07e56bfce87">KOI and the Unicorn</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/block-science">BlockScience</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Building the Loop: The Role of Ethnography in Artificial Organisational Intelligence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/block-science/building-the-loop-the-role-of-ethnography-in-artificial-organisational-intelligence-4c055fdf0c0c?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ethnography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[generative-ai-use-cases]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ellie Rennie]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Sep 2025 12:17:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-12T23:09:46.576Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The following is derived from a talk I gave at the </em><a href="https://2025.epicpeople.org/"><em>EPIC 2025</em></a><em> conference in Helsinki. You can read the full (co-authored) paper </em><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5516298"><em>here</em></a><em>. For a deeper dive into our ethnography tools (Telescope bot, Obsidian vault and plugin for KOI), see </em><a href="https://ellierennie.medium.com/building-feedback-loops-for-organisational-intelligence-telescope-and-koi-in-action-aca5ecbb5618"><em>this recent post</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>In his EPIC 2025 <a href="https://2025.epicpeople.org/keynotes/">keynote</a> discussion, Peter Sarlin of Silo AI pointed out that generative AI is best framed as the first massively successful consumer-facing AI <em>product. </em>Part of its innovation is an interface that makes it easy to query and elicit responses. Products like ChatGPT have been so successful that we risk mistaking such products for the full scope of what AI is or might be.</p><p>As <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5516298">our EPIC paper</a> argues, a problem with these products is that they strip away key processes that shape knowledge and determine how it is taken up in the world, including shared rules and group practices. Organisations are devices through which we enact this kind of social ordering. They coordinate their members’ actions through internal institutional structures.</p><p>We are asking: What if AI doesn’t erase organisational rules, practices and beliefs, but is informed and bound by them?</p><p>This is the horizon of what we are calling <strong>Artificial Organisational Intelligence (AOI).</strong></p><h3>What AOI Is (and Isn’t)</h3><p>AOI is not about AI doing the job of organisations. It’s not about replacing firms, universities, or communities with chatbots.</p><p>Instead, it’s about making organisation-level knowledge machine-readable so that it may be accessible and legible to humans through AI. <em>What if you could talk directly to an organisation rather than just a representative of the organisation?</em></p><p>The intelligence of organisations lives not just in their intellectual assets but also in their <strong>routines</strong> (Nelson &amp; Winter), in the <strong>boundaries</strong> they set and maintain (Star &amp; Bowker), and in the everyday improvisations and tacit skills that ethnographers have long documented (Orr). Other presenters at EPIC pointed out that the expertise held by teams is not necessarily known even to their managers.</p><p>AOI asks: how do we stitch knowledge objects, rules, routines, and practices together in ways that are machine-readable, without flattening them into a single database or losing what makes organisations (and teams) distinct and more than the sum of the individuals involved?</p><h3>Building the Infrastructure</h3><p>To achieve AOI, we need to connect two things:</p><ul><li>The systems where organisational knowledge already resides (such as Slack, GitHub, decision-making platforms, policy registers, memos and document repositories).</li><li>The local practices and tacit insights held by teams, community members, and researchers (keeping in mind that these too evolve in conjunction with automation processes).</li></ul><p>We cannot get to AOI until the underlying infrastructure exists to connect organisational knowledge objects with the governance of that knowledge. (Note that I use the word governance broadly here: how organisations sort, share and protect their knowledge matters for their ability to survive, stay on mission, and adapt).</p><p>That is the focus of our project. BlockScience is building <strong>KOI (Knowledge Organisation Infrastructure) </strong>as this foundation.</p><h3>KOI: A Protocol for Organisational Knowledge</h3><p>KOI connects knowledge where it already lives. It is a modular architecture that involves <strong>nodes</strong>, which are responsible for an observed space. A node can process what’s going on there, and then pipe it to other nodes. It also involves <strong>reference</strong> <strong>identifiers</strong> (RIDs) that can be used to order and describe the knowledge objects that nodes are processing. You can read more about the technical dimensions of KOI on BlockScience’s <a href="https://blog.block.science/a-preview-of-the-koi-net-protocol/">blog</a> and Metagov’s <a href="https://metagov.org/projects/koi-pond/faq">FAQ</a>.</p><p>One consequence is that organisations can share knowledge with each other without conforming to a single ontology. We can connect tools, which might include generative AI, to assist in translating across organisation ontologies.</p><p>This matters because every organisation has its own distinctive ways of sorting and governing. AOI depends on preserving those differences.</p><p>Rather than moving raw data, KOI helps us label, route, and govern knowledge with its context and rules intact. This makes it machine-readable with enforceable boundaries, which sets the ground for AOI. KOI is therefore a path to <a href="https://zenodo.org/records/17180091"><strong>regulative rather than generative AI</strong></a> — meaning that organisations can set and enforce boundaries that machines must respect.</p><h3>Where Ethnography Comes In</h3><p>Ethnography has always been about observing what is otherwise unseen, about making practices visible. In second-order cybernetics, the observer is part of the system. Our work takes that seriously: ethnographers aren’t just describing AOI, we are co-constructing it through our work.</p><p>We have begun using KOI to connect our own collecting, contextualising, and curating of organisational knowledge and events back into the organisations and communities we are working with. What began as tools for ethnography has become experiments in AOI.</p><p>In the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KESNaxl9f6M&amp;t=1s">demo</a> we produced for EPIC, ethnographic data flows through KOI across three organisations: BlockScience, Metagov and ADMS (our research team).</p><p>Our developer Luke Miller has two Obsidian vaults running, containing real notes from ethnographers Kelsie Nabben and Brooke Ann Coco. These notes are comments from Slack channels that people have consented to share (using our Telescope bot). The ethnographers have added field notes, links and quotes. We developed an Obsidian plugin that connects the vaults into KOI so that nodes can communicate with each other.</p><p>The outcome is that discussions about KOI from Metagov are sent to BlockScience’s KOI node, where they are grouped with ethnographic notes from BlockScience’s own Slack channel and other notes the ethnographers have chosen to share.</p><p>The result is a live <strong>cybernetic feedback loop</strong>, where ethnographic insights become part of the organisation’s intelligence.</p><p>AOI depends on such feedback loops: systems that sense, interpret, and act on information in ways that can be governed. Traditionally, AI governance talks about the human-in-the-loop. But that tends to treat the human as a last-minute check — a kind of moral authority.</p><p>AOI is about building the loop itself: specifying the pipes, the permissions, the shared practices that make feedback possible.</p><h3>Implications for Ethnography</h3><p>As we discuss in our <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5516298">written paper</a>, this changes ethnography itself, with implications for how we think about observation, interpretation and inscription. Importantly, ethnography is no longer about a single authored narrative output, but an ongoing, dynamic and participative knowledge production process.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><ul><li>AOI is not about replacing organisations with AI, but making their knowledge legible, governable, and usable by both humans and machines.</li><li>But this requires infrastructures like KOI that get us to regulative (not generative) AI.</li><li>Ethnographic practice is central because it observes and inscribes the tacit and invisible, and helps build the loops that make AOI possible.</li></ul><p>In one possible future, organisations could maintain their own local systems and practices, operating as a mesh with other organisations so that boundaries are not barriers to knowledge expansion, but help advance the productive capability of group endeavour.</p><p>To connect this to <a href="https://2025.epicpeople.org/keynotes/">Pauliina Rautio’s keynote</a>, what if the organisation here was not a firm but a land regeneration mission, where the contributions of animals, plants and humans are machine-readable? What if you could talk to the place itself? What if such ‘organisations’ could talk directly to each other, learn from each other?</p><p>It is still early days for our work. If you are interested in learning more, please reach out.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*K3-8CEmwKjzBZ7a9Q0q3Eg.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ninara/50365212727/in/photolist-2jJAT3F-d5Ngi5-cgUyds-2hQ6hAx-cgUxNN-df5tkb-2jJwonU-aUsNnv-dJkmPx-2jJA9JG-dJkmFB-d9dnTU-2hQ2GCu-aUsQuv-2jJzVUy-2jJAWLY-2jJAxgW-aUsQ3R-5EiFNP-aUsNLt-fFmLbw-aUsNap-aUsQiZ-7xAji5-aUsPiT-2jJAVz9-fF5bDv-dV1rHd-2jJALYg-9Ef4bM-aUsPvr-2jJBkQP-2jJwkzE-2jJAVKQ-2jJAVXi-2jJAS4S-fFmLkN-fFmLwy-df5sNQ-2jJA3PR-2qAUjxn-AoZ7YN-df5ttS-ftRpHh-aUsNvi-aUsNUP-8cyr6X-8AgNqJ-2n8mHqy-2oTmsSF">Aalto University by Ninara,</a> <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/">CC 2.0</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>The paper the talk is based on was co-authored with Kelsie Nabben, Michael Zargham, Jason Potts, Brooke Ann Coco, and based on technical work by Luke Miller and Matthew Green. Elianna DeSota and David Sisson are also core contributors to the project, which is a collaboration between </em><a href="https://www.admscentre.org.au/the-use-of-automated-knowledge-in-organisations-project/"><em>ADM+S</em></a><em>, </em><a href="http://block.science/"><em>BlockScience</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://metagov.org/"><em>Metagov</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4c055fdf0c0c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/block-science/building-the-loop-the-role-of-ethnography-in-artificial-organisational-intelligence-4c055fdf0c0c">Building the Loop: The Role of Ethnography in Artificial Organisational Intelligence</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/block-science">BlockScience</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Building Feedback Loops for Organisational Intelligence: Telescope and KOI in action]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/block-science/building-feedback-loops-for-organisational-intelligence-telescope-and-koi-in-action-aca5ecbb5618?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[obsidian]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethnography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ellie Rennie]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2025 06:38:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-19T19:36:18.162Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>What makes an organisation distinct isn’t just its outputs; it’s the continual processes of ordering knowledge — what is flagged, what is forgotten, and what gets passed along (and to whom). Our ethnography tools aim to make those processes machine-readable, and provide groups with the ability to set boundaries that AI and other data products must operate within.</strong></p><p>This article describes the evolution of the Telescope bot through the KOI protocol. Together, KOI and Telescope turn inputs from informal conversations within online community forums into organisational ordering and memory that can be continuously updated and used to implement procedures and boundaries for automated systems, including LLMs and agentic AI. Scroll to the end for a short demo. To read more about artificial organisational intelligence, see <a href="https://ellierennie.medium.com/building-the-loop-the-role-of-ethnography-in-artificial-organisational-intelligence-4c055fdf0c0c">this post</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/137/1*q2V9DJ8rV9cZ8DDS0x0xyg.png" /></figure><h3><strong>What is KOI?</strong></h3><p>Knowledge Organisation Infrastructure (KOI) is an open architecture and protocol developed by <a href="https://block.science/">BlockScience</a> with input from <a href="https://metagov.org/projects/koi-pond/project-details">Metagov</a>. KOI enables groups to organise and share knowledge on their own terms, providing a common framework for diverse groups to indicate what they know and to voluntarily share information without forcing them into a single unified database, closed source software, or sacrificing control over sensitive information [1].</p><p>At the heart of KOI are “<a href="https://metagov.org/projects/koi-pond/faq#rids">reference identifiers</a>” (or RIDs), a protocol also developed by BlockScience. RIDs are akin to library-style call-numbers that provide a systematic way to point to something (known as a ‘knowledge object’, such as a chat message, a document, or a spreadsheet) without handing over the item itself. Anyone who has the label can locate and request the original knowledge object to discover what’s in it, yet the label alone never reveals the full content.</p><p>KOI nodes look after these labels. A node might collect new labels, update existing ones or remove them when the underlying material changes. When nodes exchange these three simple signals with other nodes — “new,” “update,” or “forget” (FUN) — they weave themselves into a KOI-net. In that network, every participant can refer to and discuss the same pieces of knowledge even if the files live on different servers, are offline/non-digital, or belong to different organisations, as long as they are using shared RID labels.</p><p>As such, KOI allows groups to share a common map of “what we know” without forcing anyone to surrender their data or conform to a unified or centralised system or ways of knowing. A KOI node within a KOI network can call data from another node (if permissions are in place to do so), process data into new knowledge objects, or act on other systems, such as outputting to a Slack channel. As BlockScience’s Michael Zargham <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=702&amp;v=FyAQjN4P5lQ&amp;embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fread.readwise.io%2F&amp;embeds_referring_origin=https%3A%2F%2Fread.readwise.io&amp;source_ve_path=MzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMjg2NjY">describes</a> it, KOI is like duct tape and WD-40 that can be used to connect the sites where information is stored and used so that the labels travel but the material stays where it is. It is this toolkit for “stitching together”, as opposed to raw data being hoovered up, that enables groups of people and software agents to coordinate, share knowledge sets, and add boundaries and context over how that occurs. Genuinely processing knowledge is key to understanding the significance of KOI. As David Sisson and Illan Ben-Meir from BlockScience have <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4933063">articulated</a>, knowledge is achieved by continually organising and reorganising information, allowing us to link current actions with potential future outcomes.</p><p>As the KOI protocol’s job is to standardise how nodes talk to each other, not what each node does internally, groups remain free to encode their own rules and processes inside their KOI nodes. They can also set policies about what knowledge to share or not share externally by deciding which events to emit or which queries to answer. In the KOI-net <a href="https://blog.block.science/a-preview-of-the-koi-net-protocol/">beta demonstration</a>, for example, five nodes (a coordinator, two sensors, two processors) self-assemble into a knowledge processing network, but this is just one configuration. Future KOI-nets could incorporate more complex arrangements, including <em>community-defined rules</em> at the node level or higher-level governance where multiple communities connect their KOI-nets with negotiated policies. The Telescope deployment is the first to venture into this territory.</p><h3><strong>Telescope: From bot to KOI-net</strong></h3><p>Telescope <a href="https://medium.com/metagov/introduction-documentation-of-the-telescope-bot-cfd084beba87">began</a> as a simple qualitative data collection bot, designed to help overcome challenges that I and others in Metagov were facing in our research into onchain technologies and associated communities. Traditional ethnography involves a human researcher observing and taking notes, which doesn’t scale well to online communities where people can join and leave at any time, remain pseudonymous if they so choose, and where organisational knowledge is distributed across numerous platforms and places (e.g. Telegram, Slack, GitHub, blogs, voting platforms, the blockchain, and more). Lurking and logging conversations under these conditions can raise ethical issues, as participants may not be aware that research is taking place and could (in fact should) be suspicious of messages coming from unknown researchers. Telescope was first deployed as a Discord bot that could be invited into servers (i.e. Slack or Discord chat applications) to assist with data collection (first tested in <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4570035">this</a> ethnography). <strong>It is now evolving into a contextual, rule-based knowledge collection infrastructure through the KOI-net protocol.</strong></p><p>What sets Telescope apart from simple chat loggers is its consent mechanism and participative capabilities. Rather than vacuuming up all messages, Telescope relies on community members to explicitly flag which content is relevant to the research question. This is done via a 🔭 telescope emoji reaction. If someone in a participating Discord server considers a particular message to be important to the research, they can react to that message with the telescope emoji. The bot detects this and initiates a consent workflow: it will send a polite request via direct message to the author of the message, providing them with information about the project and asking for permission to include their content in the dataset. Only if the author gives consent will Telescope save that message to the research dataset and add it to a dedicated channel featuring approved collected posts where others can see the dataset evolve. Telescope can either be used by a researcher or by the organisation itself to crowdsource the curation of a qualitative dataset. In the latter, community/organisation members surface the insights they find noteworthy, a moderator approves the bot to make the request, and authors approve their inclusion. As we noted in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10778004221097056">this</a> paper, Telescope can help communities preserve and gain a deeper understanding of their own history, as the collected discussions can later be analysed or reflected upon by the community itself, not just the researchers.</p><p>My early experiments with Telescope revealed its limitations, which we have begun addressing through KOI. Because a telescoped message can be misleading or lack meaning in isolation, it is the ethnographer’s job to situate the comment in its original context and connect it to broader themes and events. With the help of Matthew Green (Research Assistant at RMIT University), I began using <a href="http://obsidian.md/">Obsidian</a> to import Telescope into Markdown files with specific fields to add contextual data (standardised using Obsidian’s template function) and links to other notes.</p><p>As we could not elegantly import Telescopes into Obsidian, we asked Metagov and BlockScience developer Luke Miller (who led the creation of Telescope and is now leading development of the KOI-net protocol) to build an Obsidian plugin. Luke suggested we first create a KOI node that receives Telescope data and sends only the approved messages to the researchers’ vaults, keeping any unapproved messages and data required for processing private. The resulting system enables the ethnographer to receive Telescopes into individual notes where they can easily add field observations, links and additional metadata. These Telescope notes can then be structured into maps of content along with other notes (including highlights and notes imported from reading software such as Zotero and Kindle, or content clipped from the web). The plugin syncs Telescope data and ensures that only those who have a key can access the data in the KOI node.</p><p>We have now further adapted the plugin so the ethnographer can send any kind of note (Telescope notes plus additional context, links, etc.) back to a KOI node and specify how it spreads through the network. For instance, a researcher using a KOI-augmented Obsidian vault can send notes that include the added ethnographic observations to other researchers on the team or to the community. How the community uses that data is then up to them. One possibility is that participants could query a collection of ethnographic observations using an LLM chatbot — essentially enabling community engagement with the research as it is happening. Alternatively, an LLM agent could subscribe to KOI events to receive live context as it is sent from the ethnographers, to help provide context for decision-making or feedback on a specific topic (see below).</p><figure><img alt="The digram shows circles with lines connecting them. The circles in the centre of the diagram are named as “Ellie’s vault”, “Brooke’s vault”, “Kelsie’s vault”. To the left are “Metagov Telescope” and “BlockScience Telescope”. To the right is an “Obsidian Manager” and to the top right is “BlockScience Slack”. The lines connecting them show the flow of knowledge objects between these actors in a KOI network." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AlHWsU2LpizAs7SB_HfExg.png" /><figcaption>Diagram by Luke Miller showing the connections between Telescope (which manages approved comments from both the Metagov and BlockScience slack communities), researcher Obsidian vaults (used by the researchers to add context, links etc to the messages), and the Obsidian Manager, which sends the processed and approved notes to the community (in this case, to BlockScience’s slack).</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Enacting Telescope</strong></h3><p>In summary, Telescope and KOI can help make organisational knowledge and its governance machine-readable so that it can be interacted with, including through AI. The trajectory of this capability as it progresses looks something like this:</p><ol><li>Telescope’s initial consent model is the first layer of governance in that no data enters the system without an individual’s permission.</li><li>The community can specify policies for the Telescope sensor node. For instance, a DAO might collectively approve sharing a certain subset of Telescope-collected insights with another DAO alliance.</li><li>Community members could join in analysis, developing an organisational reflective practice. Members might see patterns of their own activity (for example, “this week, discussions clustered around these themes”) derived from KOI-curated data. This could enhance self-awareness in organisations or communities and help them adapt governance in real-time. Because KOI can integrate with analytic tools and even AI, these insights could be generated automatically, but with clear provenance. Telescope and KOI can thus create real-time feedback loops between observation and action.</li><li>Telescope could also be used as a form of <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5018758">contribution system</a> by capturing contributions of knowledge through their reception. A contribution occurs not when the person adds the comment, but when someone else registers its importance by adding the telescope emoji or extending on the original post (like a citation). KOI’s RIDs make it easier to trace a piece of knowledge back to its origin and the chain of sorting and response (who collected it, who processed it). The community collectively filters and curates their knowledge, building a record of what is important (value creation) in the process.</li><li>KOI’s ability to add context to a node provides a means to create checks-and-balances for autonomous agents and encoding context and procedures that the node is required to follow. This paves the way for AI integration that’s operating within community-set constraints.</li></ol><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>In April, Benjamin Bratton, a Professor of Philosophy of Technology, posted OpenAI o3’s definition of “humans” to the social media platform X: “A self-modifying swarm of molecule-sized archivists that coax entropy into meaning by wrapping fleeting moments in elaborate chains of memory, prediction, and ritual”. If this is how an LLM ‘views’ us, KOI-nets are an upgrade that makes a variety of such processes more machine-readable and controllable on the human side. o3’s definition captures how we humans create meaning through culture and then stabilise, scale, preserve or communicate it through organisations, systems and infrastructures. KOI-nets support this pattern-preserving impulse, making our group knowledge systems interoperable without compromising our control over our <a href="https://ellierennie.medium.com/koi-pond-the-creation-of-a-synthetic-deme-999a6f1f3426">groupish</a> human methods (rules, labels, organisations) for avoiding informational decay and entropy.</p><h3>Demo</h3><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FKESNaxl9f6M&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DKESNaxl9f6M&amp;image=http%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FKESNaxl9f6M%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d2cee052d47f2b80d6c5720c1eb975b0/href">https://medium.com/media/d2cee052d47f2b80d6c5720c1eb975b0/href</a></iframe><h3>Credits</h3><p>You can view the git repositories for KOI <a href="https://github.com/BlockScience/koi">here</a>, for Telescope <a href="https://github.com/metagov/slack-telescope">here</a>, and Obsidian vault <a href="https://github.com/ellierennie/Telescope-Obsidian-Vault">here</a>. <br>Thanks to the following people for input into this post and for ongoing collaboration on the tools and concepts discussed.</p><p><a href="https://www.admscentre.org.au/the-use-of-automated-knowledge-in-organisations-project/">ADM+S (RMIT node)</a> researchers: Ellie Rennie, Matthew Green, Kelsie Nabben, Brooke Ann Coco. Jason Potts is leading the theory component of the project.</p><p><a href="http://block.science/">BlockScience</a>: Michael Zargham, Luke Miller, David Sisson</p><p><a href="http://metagov.org/">Metagov</a>: Elianna DeSota</p><p>[1] For insight into why we use the term ‘knowledge’ rather than ‘data’, read <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4933063">this piece</a> by BlockScience’s David Sisson and Illan Ben-Meir.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aca5ecbb5618" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/block-science/building-feedback-loops-for-organisational-intelligence-telescope-and-koi-in-action-aca5ecbb5618">Building Feedback Loops for Organisational Intelligence: Telescope and KOI in action</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/block-science">BlockScience</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is a good DAO (and how do we know)?]]></title>
            <link>https://ellierennie.medium.com/what-is-a-good-dao-and-how-do-we-know-2efa2943997b?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2efa2943997b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ellie Rennie]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jul 2024 08:10:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-22T03:54:10.646Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The following is a transcript of my talk at </em><a href="https://dawo24.org/"><em>DAWO24</em></a><em> in Winterthur, Switzerland, on 4 July 2024.</em></p><p>These days, I mostly introduce myself as an ethnographer of on-chain communities. People often misinterpret that as someone who studies ‘vibes’ or group sentiment inside Discord servers. Researching ‘community’ is instead about seeking to understand the sphere of activity that exists outside the market and the state, which, from my and others’ observations, is marginalized by contemporary institutions. Community technology initiatives are often dismissed as weak ‘alternatives’ to the mainstream, but for those involved, they are expressions of local meaning, knowledge, agency, cooperative action, and shared practice. While my training was in political science, I taught myself ethnography because, flawed as it is, it remains the only method for understanding group interaction and coordination, including when it breaks down or is undermined.</p><p>When I first encountered Ethereum in 2016, the notion of technology-enabled ‘sovereignties’ was not new to me (see <a href="https://www.comminit.com/content/our-medianuestros-medios">‘Our Media’</a>). What has been surprising is the speed at which it has become a viable prospect for a different institutional approach.</p><p>DAOs are not just bank accounts for subreddits, as Aaron Wright once said (although they can certainly be that too). DAOs are a technology that can assist groups in coordinating better internally and with each other. As a result, the domain we call civil society, community, or the third sector, can potentially develop capabilities that go beyond what firms do today. My talk today draws on various strands of my ethnographic research, projecting them into a possible future through a mash-up Entity that includes a DAO.</p><h4>The Entity</h4><p>The Entity I am going to describe does not exist but has elements of some real and observable projects. It involves:<br>- An automated bureaucracy (the DAO component).<br>- A system to organize knowledge and to collectively agree on the actions it hopes to achieve with that knowledge.<br>- A contributions system.<br>- A system for mutual support across entities that share a common interest/concern.</p><p>Why do we need another imaginary DAO?<br>My intention today is twofold:<br>1. To locate DAOs further along an evolutionary timeline of knowledge technologies in general.<br>2. To consider how we can know whether a DAO (or the entity associated with it) has remained on course.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NY7HUjBfEbMdFyT6Ok32xw.png" /><figcaption>Evolution of Human Knowledge-sharing Technologies</figcaption></figure><p>This rough table suggests evolution or transformation in knowledge-sharing technologies for individuals and organizations. The change described starts with private knowledge, which becomes increasingly shareable through technological advancements like writing, printing, and social media. The left column represents self-expression, where it’s up to the individual what they choose to share (within cultural and institutional boundaries). The right column represents activities conducted with others, where organizational rules make group efforts and relationships legible to the state and each other.</p><p>I use <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/violence-and-social-orders/F0EA15A67E790214408A7485DBC70F0D">North, Wallis, and Weingast’s (2009)</a> definition of organizations, which provides people with:<br>- A means to coordinate behavior.<br>- Where the organization is more than the sum of the actions of individuals.<br>- Involves internal rules, norms, and shared beliefs that influence how people behave within its boundaries (p15–16).</p><p>The individual column has dominated research on knowledge technologies to date, including work on platform governance and the political consequences of social media. Organizational or group knowledge has SAAS. Nonetheless, in a legally-constituted organization (including an unincorporated association), knowledge is generally only accessible to other organizations in a limited form through annual reports, marketing, and standards bodies, agreements, or industry associations where they choose to share with other organizations.</p><p>Firms have succeeded by internalizing costs, including knowledge management, so they have what they need at hand, thereby reducing transaction costs and developing or accruing capabilities. Communities, including associations, can struggle at this.</p><p>DAOs promise to level the playing field on some dimensions by automating processes, providing even the most loosely formed communities of interest, such as subcultures, with the ability to vote or manage a treasury. But they also have vulnerabilities, some of which are not to do with the code but relate to knowledge problems at the community level.</p><h4>The Future DAO &amp; Entity</h4><p>The DAO that lives in this possible future was established by a group of people seeking to regenerate an area of land. Those involved set out to give rights to nature and wanted to create what they called a self-defending ecological institution (here I am explicitly drawing on <a href="https://mirror.xyz/austinwadesmith.eth/tv9z1XXrtqQxDIxE8FygZ_W39NpkQJkVfrtjCtdbzA8">Austin Wade Smith’s</a> work). People contribute to regenerating and protecting this land through routine, ritualistic, or creative actions. These activities are recorded in a knowledge system that also holds information collected from monitoring equipment and processes.</p><p>The DAO is not designed to achieve a predefined impact or reach an externally set target but to aid efforts to keep an ecology intact and thriving, which requires that certain things be done and others avoided. Nature might have a deciding vote or economic power so that this land can never be used for pure extraction again. You are rewarded for contributing, and with that comes stewardship rights.</p><p>By this indeterminate point in the future, there are other similar autonomous ecological entities, and they have the ability to share knowledge and resources easily, to collectively govern areas of common concern. This DAO is not pure fiction — its code base is being created now.</p><p>A couple of months ago, I observed Regen Network create a pilot for such a DAO at Wilbur Hot Springs in California. My role there was to write a speculative ethnography — a fiction based on observations of that place and the components of the system being built (you can read that <a href="https://medium.com/@ellierennie/flume-eda6d81fed46">here</a>). From that experience, I take the animating purpose of the Entity and its associated DAO — the ambition to harness local knowledge and steer towards ecological benefit.</p><h4>The Robot Bureaucrat</h4><p>Standard definitions of DAOs begin with smart contracts and their use in solving coordination problems. I tend to agree with the following definition of DAOs, which emphasizes programmability:</p><blockquote>DAOs are limited-programmability robots where the limited programmability power is widely dispersed among users who can only adjust the program in accordance with hard-coded meta-programming rules <em>— </em><a href="https://delphilabs.medium.com/assimilating-the-borg-a-new-cryptolegal-framework-for-dao-adjacent-entities-569e54a43f83"><em>Delphi Digital</em></a></blockquote><p>There is a DAO-adjacent entity, which I will refer to as the Entity. From a political science perspective, the software component of a DAO is a robot bureaucrat tasked with implementing policies and procedures set by the political principals. It operates within a defined scope to produce services and coordinate activities among its members (see my extended explanation <a href="https://medium.com/@ellierennie/a-dao-is-a-bureaucrat-56e0e6a99782">here</a>). We know from experience now that DAO coordination problems extend beyond what smart contracts can achieve.</p><p>A functional bureaucracy is one that is not prone to political corruption. As per Fukuyama’s framework for assessing bureaucracies, a DAO must balance capacity and autonomy:</p><p><em>Capacity</em> refers to the DAO’s effectiveness in performing its designated tasks and services, including technical competence and the ability to execute functions reliably.</p><p><em>Autonomy</em> indicates the degree to which the software component of the DAO can operate independently, without political intervention and avoiding corruption.</p><p>These two goals bring us to knowledge problems and questions of governance, including membership boundaries, who the political principals are, and their ability to change what occurs in this DAO when needed. For this, our Entity needs technical capabilities too.</p><h4>Knowledge Organisation Infrastructure</h4><p>DAO-adjacent entities have knowledge needs. In the case of this future Entity, it needs to conduct planning, keep track of monitoring information, and retain knowledge offered by those who know about this land and its needs. Perhaps there is an Indigenous group involved who need to document stories and practices to activate and manage Indigenous cultural IP.</p><p>The Entity establishes a knowledge system that enables them not only to keep information but to express collective decisions over how that knowledge is used. They can govern their knowledge and decide who else it is shared with and on what terms. A <a href="https://metagov.org/projects/koi-pond/project-details">project</a> I am leading with Michael Zargham at Metagov is designed to achieve this. The KOI-Pond project is an early-stage attempt to create knowledge networks (see <a href="https://blog.block.science/knowledge-networks-and-the-politics-of-protocols/">this</a> article by Zargham and team at Blockscience). A KOI stands for Knowledge Organization Infrastructure, and it’s a graph structure within which knowledge objects can be described using reference identifiers.</p><p>The KOI enables people to express intents about how knowledge objects they are associated with will be used. This differs from privacy terms, which only say what you opt into and out of regarding how your data enters (or not) a system. The KOI-Pond provides agency and governability, which we hope will result in a governed context that provides automation technologies with parameters and boundaries.</p><p>An LLM can plug into the controlled context of the KOI. One aim of Metagov’s KOI-Pond is to ascertain whether the LLM produces outputs better informed by the organization’s rules, practices, and norms (as per <a href="https://medium.com/@ellierennie/koi-pond-the-creation-of-a-synthetic-deme-999a6f1f3426">this </a>article). The KOI is therefore a means to activate the collective intelligence of the Entity’s knowledge, a memory system that requires maintenance, classification, and sorting at a collective level. The Entity can also create specific microservices that use specific knowledge objects for particular purposes.</p><p>For our future Entity, the outcomes of using a KOI include better onboarding as people can easily access knowledge from before their arrival. It will be easier to rotate or hand over leadership because knowledge is shared, and there is a continuous collective agreement in place over how that knowledge is to be used. The Entity can also share that knowledge with other like-minded Entities, increasing the capabilities of all. The KOI, therefore, brings us closer to organizations that are ‘shareable’ in the sense of a mesh of organizational intelligence that enhances capabilities among networks of self-governing organizations.</p><p>The KOI also stores information about who is associated with a particular knowledge object, be it a team or an individual.</p><h4>Contribution System</h4><p>Attaching identities — individuals or teams — to knowledge objects is useful for sorting and expressing intents. If we add a contribution system, it also opens new economic capabilities. Contribution systems are not simply ‘work for a DAO’ tools. A contribution system is a general class of solution that<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4754267"> Jason Potts and I argue</a> is an under-recognized component of the emerging on-chain economy. They are an approach to addressing how an ensemble of people can cooperate under a rule system to achieve a common joint task that benefits from the participation of many, and who each seek to benefit from the joint production.</p><p>A simple example of a contribution system is academic citations (see <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733314000195">Kealey &amp;Ricketts 2014</a> who define a contribution good is defined as a good whose benefits are non-rival over contributors but that cannot be accessed by non-contributors).</p><p>Blockchains are contribution systems. For instance, Ethereum achieves security by rewarding validating nodes and penalizing them for bad behavior. Our work on contribution systems commenced from my <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4570035">ethnography of SourceCred</a>, which attempted to reward people for their contributions to the SourceCred product. The catch was that it was a permissionless organization — anyone could enter or leave at their will. SourceCred was a sophisticated piece of software. It did not simply record people’s actions but assigned a score based on how those actions were received — built on, liked, referred to etc. At times, the community made decisions to reward what doesn’t easily fit into our notions of work, including care work and community maintenance.</p><p>They also learned that membership boundaries are important. They lacked a sophisticated knowledge infrastructure (although there were attempts to organize their archives towards such a system), which meant that onboarding and passing on leadership roles were difficult. Newcomers would repeat lessons that had already been learned by others.</p><p>Our future DAO’s contribution system enables it to know who has contributed what. Importantly, by computing over contributions, it can help know the combined expressions of what those in the group deem important (intersubjective value). It does not just keep track of actions; it tracks when an action has been used, built on, or appreciated. In this Entity, people can come and go and (to a degree) offer what they think is useful. They can decide to weight actions related to some outcomes as more important than others. Without a legible contribution system, this could lead to extractive behavior — intentional or otherwise — or conflicting priorities. The contribution system means that efforts that produce useful outcomes are seen and rewarded.</p><p>There is a commons process occurring, whereby contributors are creating rules and ascertaining the quality of contributions according to those rules. Property may be created as a spillover — in the form of a token, access rights, etc. Property rights are agreements concerning the definition of an object, including its administrative description and enforcement. In this context, property rights do not originate from state enforcement but from the commons. These rights might be represented by tokens, and encompass access rights or serve as collateral, options, or resources for exchange with other entities.</p><h4>Connections Between DAOs</h4><p>There are other components to this DAO that are only just beginning to be developed. Importantly, it requires a means to connect to other DAOs. Last year, I commenced an ethnography of DAO DAO DAOs, which were attempting to create systems of mutual support across DAOs, initially through token swaps. That particular ethnography stalled because token swaps were not adequate on their own. At Edge Esmerlda recently, Jake Hartnell, a founder of DAO DAO, explained to me his recent work on a protocol for re-staking across DAOs, which is something our future DAO may instead utilize to strengthen ties with other like-minded DAOs and enable them to define what they may need to co-govern.</p><p>A parallel project called Coordi-nations/Network Nations out of BlockchainGov has been discussing this in relation to the concept of supersidiarity. Where subsidiarity entails a decentralization, it is done through a coordinating entity that devolves power to localized entities. Supersidiarity is where localized entities have the ability to coordinate and govern on points of common concern, but it is done as a bottom-up process (or middle-out).</p><h4>The Entity’s Use of These Systems</h4><p>Let’s now return to the future DAO and its associated Entity. It has developed an economy so that what is valued locally is rewarded accordingly, and that value is determined through the system itself, which is able to compute across all the contributions and recognize needs/gaps as they arise so that the group can steer towards these. The administrative burden is less than it sounds due to the automation capabilities of this knowledge and contribution system. The software component of the DAO administers tasks at the direction of the stewards (those who contribute and whose ongoing monitoring and expression of needs and actions are used to steer, in addition to the high-level deliberation that takes place around ceremonies/planning). There is no appointed leader; rather, leadership is something that anyone can step into as required because this automated support is in place. It is also possible for it to share knowledge with other DAOs and provide information to external institutions as required.</p><h4>How Do We Know if This DAO is Effective?</h4><p>In our current time, we measure DAOs by their TVL, values alignment within the community, resilience against governance attacks, and ability to withstand the weight of nation-state regulatory requirements. In this future time, we will focus on the extent to which collective knowledge is able to be activated as intended/expressed by those who govern over it. To know if this DAO is on course, we would ask the following questions:</p><p>- Does it encourage high-worth contributions?<br>- Do contributor rewards outweigh opportunistic speculation?<br>- What keeps people here (creativity, care, play, etc.), and is this also rewarded?<br>- Is routine and ritualistic work, such as infrastructure maintenance, sustainable and rewarded?<br>- Are there effective membership boundaries in place that minimize extractive behavior?<br>- Do the onboarding/offboarding processes, including through the use of LLMs, assist it in managing these membership boundaries?<br>- Can leadership be easily rotated?<br>- Does the DAO’s software bureaucrat minimize the administrative burden on the contributors?<br>- Can the DAO create networks with other DAOs over shared concerns?</p><p>By this point in the future, Entities like this can share knowledge. We now have a more precise picture of what that means:<br>- Increased capabilities resulting from local knowledge management and commons-style self-organizing.<br>- Coordination of knowledge and resources with other DAOs for mutual support over shared areas of concern.</p><p>The infrastructural components I have described could enable an organization’s knowledge to be shareable with other organizations, enabling new forms of institutions as they coordinate among themselves. That in turn may produce new practices, norms, creativity, and rituals that we cannot yet begin to imagine.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VHburmp0onUlcYjyqNTpwg.jpeg" /></figure><h4>About me</h4><p><em>I am a Professor at RMIT University and an Australian Research Council-funded Future Fellow working on the project “Cooperation Through Code”. My research is examining permissionless systems (including public blockchains) using ethnographic methods. I am also a Research Director in Metagov.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2efa2943997b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Flume]]></title>
            <link>https://ellierennie.medium.com/flume-eda6d81fed46?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eda6d81fed46</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[regenerative-economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ellie Rennie]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2024 00:36:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-03T04:38:03.961Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A Sulfur Punk story</p><p><em>The following is a speculative ethnography, drawn from observation of Regen Network’s Wilbur Hot Springs pilot sprint, 29 April — 4 May, 2024.</em></p><p>“Not a bear,” declared the technician, peering sceptically at the photo displayed before him. “Could be man-bear-pig” he chuckled. The image, cheerfully labelled “bear!” with a jaunty exclamation and a smiley face, featured a figure — small and hunched over, bundled up in a black hoodie, face obscured. The Steward, steadfastly serious and busy at her console, pinpointed the image’s origin near Flume’s outer perimeter where it bordered the private lands. Somehow the animal gate sensors, usually vigilant, had missed this probable human trespass. Her fingers began tapping out a silent rhythm of warning to the other Steward Council members.</p><p>Over almost an entire epoch, which was 4 months, small imbalances had been flickering through the system. Either these were faults in monitoring or something deliberate, possibly an extraction event. Overuse or theft of a resource was unknown here at the planet’s oldest autonomous ecological zone, which had successfully defended itself for almost a century. With a ceremonial week looming, the Stewards requested a technician. A balance for skills was initiated through PAM’s external interface — an exchange that could be fulfilled at any future time across ecological zones (with shared affinity) for a similar or different need. Accommodation and food would be provided under the code of hospitality.</p><p>‘I’ve entered a time capsule’ the technician had thought when he arrived three days ago. Old cane chairs and heavy tables were spaced around the enclosed veranda of the lobby. On them, small vases of flowers wilted in the sun. The eggy scent of the Fluminariam was masked by sweeter fragrances wafting from the reception. People wandered by in robes and loose clothing, hair in various states of dry.</p><p>The receptionist looked up warily, anticipating his introduction.</p><p>“I am here for the code upgrade”, he confirmed for her.</p><p>“It’s the wick-trimmer”, she called to a colleague before pushing a paper map towards him, her finger resting on a marked rectangle. “You’re in Solar 8, follow this path. And”, her gaze fixed him with a firm directness, “keep your gadgets out of sight. People come here to disconnect”.</p><p>Flume’s founding lore was accessible to any who queried the ceremonial interface — a geyser that had developed the power of speech. Other knowledge resided there too, including essential translations of beaver, jackrabbit and other animal communications (the squirrels, it turned out, were not a very serious species).</p><p>The technician decided to skip the geyser and go straight to the graph of knowledge objects that were PAM’s context. The policy on gadgets, he discovered, was one of many that predated the development of the autonomous ecological zone. Flume was first purchased by the original Stewardship Council — referred to in the old parlance as “founders” — more than half a century ago from someone known as a “psychotherapist”, which he took to mean mind healer. Those who had been using the pools prior to the change of ownership expressed their strong opinion that nothing should change. For instance, kerosene lamps, requiring a fulltime wick-trimmer, had only been replaced by electric lighting in 2006 (“And why systems workers are today referred to as wick-trimmers”, noted the technician). The Founders, hearing the community’s preference, committed to only undertake necessary maintenance and upgrades — at least to the cosmetic surface of the human habitations. Outdated wall sockets were left in place, further discouraging use of devices.</p><p>Behind the scenes it was a different story. The Founders, scientists themselves, wove a detailed mesh of sensors, inputs and algorithms that could read the land from within and above. Visitors and guests to the hot springs contributed to Flume’s planning, actions and monitoring, but they did so in analogue forms. Planning occurred through ceremonies. Actions would often involve ritual, song and poetry alongside weeding and burning. Monitoring took the form of hand-written logs and offline photos that would later be captured into the PAM by staff.</p><p>Very few visitors were even aware that the value produced via the PAM was the first living value to become machine readable. It had been made into a planetary-wide living capital by an entity first referred to as the Living Capital Fund and later the World Envelopment Bank, using the tools of old capitalism to cause its own demise. These included automated contracts to buy options and never short nature. Details, such as where the first dollars came from, were opaque.</p><p>The technician knew some of this, having travelled from his home autonomous ecological zone, which was also supported through the World Envelopment Bank in its early days. His home’s ecology had recovered from desertification, aided by various innovations, which had been resourced through option sales on biocredits. Other zones, led by Indigenous land managers, nurtured and harvested plants now crucial for human and animal nutrition, elevated through their ability to trace their intellectual property through the shared components of PAM known as the Institutional Interface.</p><p>As the living-economy had grown, places that remained in the old capitalist economy had faltered. The private property neighbouring Flume was one such place, now a haven for illicit markets, gangs and violence. Unable to balance resources directly, they relied on the dollar, existing in a state of constant information deficit in which humans were the only endpoint in the flow of capital. Their newly identified covert visitor, the Bear-man, was of that place.</p><p><em>Thanks to Regen Network and Wilbur Hot Springs for ideas, inspiration and soaking time.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xFCfg0rXJv-Mo98jVNqawA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The geyser at Wilbur Hot Springs</figcaption></figure><p><em>I am a Professor at RMIT University in Melbourne, working across the </em><a href="https://rmitblockchain.io/"><em>RMIT Blockchain Innovation Hub</em></a><em> and the </em><a href="https://digital-ethnography.com/about/"><em>Digital Ethnography Research Centre</em></a><em>. I am also an Associate Investigator (AI 🤖) of the </em><a href="https://www.admscentre.org.au/"><em>ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society</em></a><em> and a Research Director in </em><a href="http://metagov.org/"><em>Metagov</em></a><em>. I acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council, FT19010372. I use this Medium blog for work-in-progress ideas and reflections.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eda6d81fed46" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[KOI-Pond: The creation of a synthetic deme]]></title>
            <link>https://ellierennie.medium.com/koi-pond-the-creation-of-a-synthetic-deme-999a6f1f3426?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/999a6f1f3426</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ellie Rennie]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2024 22:59:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-23T22:59:18.350Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>TLDR: Metagov is experimenting with whether a community’s myths, knowledge, practices, rules and norms can be activated through LLMs and other technologies by creating a synthetic deme that mirrors its natural counterpart.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BfureoI8FPnPwMPe2nhQig.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@bady?utm_content=creditCopyText&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=unsplash">bady abbas</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/photography-of-purple-petaled-flower-near-body-of-water-during-daytime-XAkPN7aEGJM?utm_content=creditCopyText&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=unsplash">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>The KOI-Pond is <a href="http://metagov.org/">Metagov’s</a> experiment in creating a synthetic approximation of our existing group, including our collective knowledge, practices, myths, interests and rules. To achieve this, we are deploying an infrastructure first developed by <a href="https://blog.block.science/a-language-for-knowledge-networks/">BlockScience </a>called <a href="https://github.com/BlockScience/kms-identity">Knowledge Organisation Infrastructure</a>. Among other uses, KOI-Pond is a vehicle through which we can make use of the otherwise unshaped intelligence that resides in an LLM. The harnessing of an LLM by a group through its self-governed software infrastructure is a process of ‘re-deme-ification’. The purpose of this article is to explain what I mean by ‘re-deme-ificaton’, which requires a short summary of a field called Cultural Science. If my framing of KOI-Pond is correct then our experiment provides a basis for groups of any kind — organisations, communities, political parties, nations — to access new capabilities via generative AI that align with their existing culture and rules. To understand “re-deme-ification” I first need to define “demes” and “de-deme-ication”.</p><h4>What is a deme?</h4><p><a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/cultural-science-9781849666022/">Cultural Science</a>, first formulated by cultural studies luminary John Hartley and developed with innovation economist Jason Potts<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>, commences from the insight that culture makes groups and groups make knowledge. The cultural science word for a group is <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deme#:~:text=%CB%88d%C4%93m,of%20closely%20related%20interbreeding%20organisms">‘deme’ </a>(from the Greek dêmos, meaning a political group or population or closely-related organisms). Demes are ‘“we”-groups’ that develop through social learning, shared language, culture and ideas. When they collide, demes can produce innovation or descend into conflict. Cultural science described natural demes and their evolutionary function, bringing together cultural studies and evolutionary economics to argue that</p><p>· “the evolutionary function of culture is to create and sustain groups;</p><p>· the cultural function of groups is to make knowledge and act accordingly, while inter-group competitive conflict is a productive force for newness and innovation; and</p><p>· knowledge is the ‘currency’ of both economics (growth) and politics (contestation)” (<a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/53442">Hartley 2020</a>)</p><p>In a recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4795695">article</a>, Jason Potts draws on <a href="https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2023/02/what-is-chatgpt-doing-and-why-does-it-work/">Stephen Wolfram’s insight</a> that LLMs are “embeddings of embeddings” to argue that they commit ‘de-demification’. An LLM embedding is a mathematical process that captures semantic similarities in a low-dimensional space. Potts argues that “[t]hese new A.I.s made of embeddings of human language (the training set), they are us. And that training set, as language, is an embedding on human social, biological and physical reality”. The Cultural Science insight is that culture itself is an embedding, in that our semantic universe is coded into written language and in turn into our cultural mini-worlds (demes). However, while LLMs are trained on that the technical process of a mathematical embedding, they do so across a vast array of culture. The result is that knowledge is de-deme-ified:</p><blockquote>A trained LLM has ingested an enormously vast amount of culture. But it hasn’t experienced culture, in the way humans do. Rather, it has created an embedding of a vast sea of cultural elements. In the theory of cultural science (Hartley and Potts 2014), culture creates groups (demes) and groups create knowledge. That knowledge, de-deme-ified, has been reprocessed into an embedding <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4795695"><em>(Potts 2024)</em></a></blockquote><p>An LLM only becomes knowledge when it is prompted. Until that point it lies latent, not knowing what it knows. Potts’s conclusion is that we can now create what Hartley first dubbed “The Culturetron” (like a particle-collider for culture), “a powerful instrument to smash cultural elements together and study its properties in very precise ways”.</p><h4><strong>What is KOI Pond?</strong></h4><p><a href="http://metagov.org/">Metagov</a> is a place where people come to share knowledge and collaborate on “a governance layer for the internet that is empowering, creative, interconnected, and accountable”. Knowledge-sharing currently occurs through seminars, written-outputs and discussion (meetings or chat), and is integral to our development of new projects. Metagov’s KOI-Pond aims for Metagov’s collective knowledge to be accessible and deployable through a wider network of people and their inventions.</p><p>KOI stands for Knowledge Organisation Infrastructure. Our KOI-Pond combines the technologies of a knowledge management system (KMS) and reference IDs (RID), resulting in a graph-based database to support relationships between knowledge objects, users and groups within Metagov. The KOI-Pond can be accessed by a large language model (LLM) or other technologies. We intend for Metagov’s KOI to be guided by Metagov and imbued with its priorities, which will become clearer through the practice of incorporating knowledge and rules into KOI. Therefore, this project is much more than setting up an LLM for Metagov’s use; it is an experiment in 1) whether a community’s priorities can be reflected in the rules, sorting and boundaries that define KOI, and 2) whether this produces a useful technology that can propagate the knowledge which flows through and from Metagov. We hope to eventually observe knowledge-sharing between BlockScience and Metagov through the peer-to-peer KOI architecture (for more on this see <a href="https://blog.block.science/a-language-for-knowledge-networks/">Zargham &amp; Ben-Meir</a>).</p><p>The technical team is currently working on the <a href="https://github.com/BlockScience/kms-identity">reference ID</a> (RID) system that will provide our KOI with metadata on objects that live outside of it. Our expectation is that the RID system will eventually allow us to steer our KOI by weighting knowledge objects or specifying their relevance to certain uses (for instance, onboarding or for a specific team’s work). In the meantime, we are designing methods that will enable Metagov members to evaluate our KOI at different points in its development, including the information it has access to and the boundaries that are placed on that information via weightings, timestamps, confidentiality etc.</p><p>My hypothesis is that the KOI-Pond provides boundaries that are akin to a synthetic deme (a knowledge group). The more like Metagov’s natural deme it becomes, the more useful it will be to us, and to those seeking to interact with us.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion: Re-deme-ification</strong></h4><p>The KOI-Pond project is a first attempt at ‘re-deme-ification’, harnessing the dormant intelligence of large language models through the architecture of Metagov’s instance of a Knowledge Organisation Infrastructure called KOI-Pond. We are experimenting with how a community’s myths, knowledge, practices, rules and norms can be activated by creating a synthetic deme that mirrors its natural counterpart. By embedding Metagov’s distinct cultural DNA within the KOI-Pond, the experiment stands as a blueprint for integrating artificial intelligence into the epistemic processes of any collective, suggesting new pathways for innovation and interaction with knowledge groups.</p><h4>About me</h4><p><em>I am a Professor at RMIT University and an Australian Research Council-funded Future Fellow working on the project “Cooperation Through Code”. My research is examining permissionless systems (including public blockchains) using ethnographic methods. I am also a Research Director in Metagov.</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> I worked for John Hartley in 2003–2006 and he introduced me to Jason Potts (now my husband and collaborator). Needless to say, I witnessed this intellectual journey first hand.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=999a6f1f3426" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Regen contribution systems and variable property rights]]></title>
            <link>https://ellierennie.medium.com/regen-contribution-systems-and-variable-property-rights-6bc240046de3?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6bc240046de3</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ellie Rennie]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2024 18:58:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-02T01:44:12.310Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>In which I consider a regen-inspired type of property right that has variable security of title, conditional upon outcomes observed through contribution systems. Intended to incentivise high-quality land stewardship.</em></p><h4>Coordination Failure</h4><p>It is becoming widely accepted that our current systems for coordinating — the market and institutions — do not reach every sphere of activity. Many community efforts create value but that value stays local and remains invisible except to those directly experiencing it. Whether value is recognised has consequences for what is rewarded, protected, cultivated, prioritised, cared for, and built on. Resources that were once stewarded by a community can become prone to exploitation or neglect under our familiar institutional and market conditions.</p><h4>Valuation Failure</h4><p>An urgent and important example of this relates to how we value nature, including biodiversity and land management. There is a movement arising in on-chain communities called “regen” or “ReFi” that is developing various approaches to solving this, using phrases like “positive sum games” that can be hard to decipher (see Austin Wade-Smith’s <a href="https://mirror.xyz/austinwadesmith.eth/tv9z1XXrtqQxDIxE8FygZ_W39NpkQJkVfrtjCtdbzA8">essay on ecological institutions </a>for an excellent overview). In this article, I suggest one mechanism based on dynamic property rights, using a contribution system.</p><h4>A New Institutional Approach</h4><p>Contribution systems are a key technology that can bring tangible design possibilities to the emerging regen movement. These have arisen not in response to climate change but through the more mundane necessity within online communities (including DAOs) of how to align people on a shared mission and reward them for their efforts. These missions are taking place outside the typical construct of a firm, often in a permissionless organisation that is open to join and open to leave.</p><h4>Time Consistency</h4><p>Contribution systems are a computational means of recognising value. Think of academic citations that trace the lineage of ideas, ascribing value. A software product called SourceCred was one attempt to do this for a wider array of contributions. That particular system used a graph-based structure to represent people and their actions, and an algorithm that assigned value based on the dependencies between actions — whether something was liked, built on etc. The system was designed to compute across social consensus according to a local community’s priorities. One fascinating feature was that, if something you did years ago was suddenly picked up, you’d find yourself receiving rewards again even if you’d left (for the full story see my <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4570035">ethnography of SourceCred</a>)<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>.</p><p>A more straightforward example is <a href="https://protocol-guild.readthedocs.io/en/latest/">Protocol Guild</a>. The Ethereum network doesn’t assign a portion of its fees for maintenance. While the Ethereum Foundation awards grants which enable client teams to pay people, developers could earn much more for building apps on Ethereum than for maintaining the infrastructure. To resolve this coordination failure, <a href="https://twitter.com/trent_vanepps">Trent Van Epps</a> developed a system whereby people can donate or projects can pledge 1% of their native tokens to Protocol Guild. Those tokens get sent to a single wallet. The developers in the Guild then decide among themselves who is a valid contributor and rewards are weighted according to each contributor’s time working on the protocol. In this case, contributors end up with a basket of tokens that vest from projects, which provides an incentive to continue participating. Protocol Guild essentially uses a contribution system as a way to ensure commitment to the continued development of the Ethereum protocol.</p><h4>Ecological Contribution Systems</h4><p>Contribution systems are generally described as a means to reward labour — where value is derived from the inputs into production. I think they are much more than this. These systems are a new way of assigning value that goes above an individual worker’s input and collates a group’s notion of what is valuable that can extend through time. What does this have to do with biodiversity and land management?</p><p>During a recent <a href="https://conferences.law.stanford.edu/futurelaw2024/institutional-ecologies-recognizing-restoring-and-relating-with-nature/">Stanford CodeX Future Law workshop</a>, an attendee from Ecuador told me of his community’s project to create <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKOeUd03Zec">biocultural credits</a>, which are based on sustainable ecological practices of Indigenous people across 10000 hectares of jungle. A part of their model was a contribution system for the ongoing restoration and preservation of the land. Like others building contribution systems, this group was hoping to reward people’s contributions and find a way to fund their endeavours, but it opens up other possibilities, including devices that ensure biodiversity into the future.</p><p>Different ways of managing land across time already exist. Indigenous peoples have done it through kinship networks and ritual. Monarchies have done it by governance through hereditary decent. Farming families do it through inheritance too. Even the most positive examples only work until someone in that chain can’t or won’t do the job. How do we ensure continuity?</p><p>I own (with Jason Potts) a small patch of land in the sublime Rees Valley (NZ) that had been neglected for more than 30 years when we purchased it. During the 1880s it had been planted with European trees that, over time, had crowded out native species. Our repetitive efforts of removing invasive species from this land left me thinking — in a moment of exhaustion and frustration — that maybe that land should have been taken off the former owners. A visitor from the Department of Conservation told me it would have seeded far greater destruction throughout the valley and beyond had it not been for the efforts of neighbouring landholders (and their animals!). There was a time inconsistent coordination failure on valuation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gw72O9J5qZKoXAPr5C-DbQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Removing invasive species (Douglas Fir) in the Rees Valley in 2022, achieved through community networks</figcaption></figure><p>In a <a href="https://open-research-europe.ec.europa.eu/articles/4-66/v1">recent paper</a>, Carsten Hermann-Pillath discusses what it would mean to consider the human-nature relationship as one of reciprocity. A gift economy “that expresses an enduring relationship between the giver and receiver” rather than appropriation and compensation. He suggests that ritual (pure action that has an ordering factor to it), which is performed by humans and non-humans, can unite our human property of land with non-human territoriality and should be at the core of our governance. Such governance, I contend, requires a contribution system — possibly based on ritual rather than labour — that includes humans and non-humans on that graph and calculates intersubjective value. The notion of ritual matters as it moves away from impact measurement and reward and recognises that often it is ongoing mundane maintenance that is needed (Protocol Guild also recognises this).</p><p>Such a system would help us to coordinate a reciprocal relationship with nature, including ritual actions of land management that are performed by networks of people and non-humans learning off and responding to each other, putting animals to graze when required, sharing knowledge of plants, water and fire. New versions of carbon credits are not the answer<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>. However, we can design systems where actions taken now result in value for future generations by making local knowledge and contributions legible. That looks something like a graph of obligations and dependencies, weighted by those according to their local knowledge of what is needed. Non-humans might be included in this graph (a tree, for example). When the contributions stop then it’s time to sell, give or loan that land to those who will do better. This mechanism does not abandon private property, but would have a weakening effect on it; if you don’t uphold your side, there would be consequences — a return to easements, or the commons.</p><p>The amended private property right I am describing here aims to resolve the problem of extraction or neglect. It also acknowledges that putting land back into public hands is not always the answer as governments too can get things wrong. As my neighbour Iris Scott at Rees Valley Station <a href="https://www.amazon.com/High-Country-Woman-Valley-Station-ebook/dp/B009AL67Y8">has written</a>: “It sometimes feels as though we have a change of landlord every three years… it’s hard to believe that only twenty-five years ago the government of that time was encouraging intensification of farming in the high-country. Now this policy would be considered anathema by most”. She cites the <a href="https://qeiinationaltrust.org.nz/">QEII Trust</a> as a good example of what can be done, whereby landowners receive some support for regenerating land and in return provide public right of way over that land.</p><h4>Exclosure</h4><p><a href="https://jessykate.medium.com/coordi-nations-a-new-institutional-structure-for-global-cooperation-3ef38d6e2cfa">Jessy Kate Schingler</a> defines exclosures as ‘self-defending spaces of autonomous logics’. They are a class of systems design and institutional design that seeks to preserve localised value and practices but possessing a membrane that enables them to interface with legal rules.</p><p>A regen initiative such as I have described is an exclosure in that it needs to have its own logic that is based on that place, its species and the community (including animals) that perform mundane weeding, seeding and other rituals. It might have an interface that enables it to coordinate with other such local efforts around the globe and be made partially legible to institutions. In addition to legal structures such as property and easements, there might be consequences for risk/insurance, industry, food sovereignty etc.</p><p>Unlike a social credit system, a contribution system is not a totalising system of measurement but something that can be imbued with its community’s priorities and practices. They can be used to put more information into markets and make existing property systems more variable, in the process building defences around localised practices and value. The result could be that the hardest land regeneration sites become the most attractive because of their potential for improvement over time.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>John Locke’s homesteading principle described the origins of property as being established through appropriation and labour. Douglass North located property rights in legitimacy and institutions. Can we reengineer these notions so they orient forwards in time? One such possibility might be creating a private property right that diminishes when native biodiversity is depleted. Such a system would need a way to record contributions and to govern — a collective agreement over what is valuable not just now but for future generations. Rather than arguing over which type of property is best (commons, private or public), we might instead strengthen and weaken those rights over time to create <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5fs_4et9z4">self-defending ecological systems</a>.</p><h4>About me</h4><p><em>I am a Professor at RMIT University and an Australian Research Council-funded Future Fellow working on the project “Cooperation Through Code”. My research is examining permissionless systems (including public blockchains) using ethnographic methods. I am also a Research Director in Metagov.</em></p><p><em>This piece is in part a reflection arising from the Standford CodeX Future Law Institutional Ecologies workshop that I attended online in April 2024. Thanks to Tony Lai for the invitation. </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5fs_4et9z4"><em>This video</em></a><em> is a great summary of the conversation.</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> After they’d left the project, co-founder Dandelion said to me that one of its flaws was that it was unable to see negative contributions and deduct from people’s Cred score. My proposal for a diminishing property right would require this adjustment.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Working with <a href="https://apo.org.au/node/321467">Sophie Hartley</a> has informed my view on this.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6bc240046de3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Machine politics: The cultural science of permissionless systems]]></title>
            <link>https://ellierennie.medium.com/machine-politics-the-cultural-science-of-permissionless-systems-9e73da656a97?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9e73da656a97</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ellie Rennie]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Apr 2024 05:49:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-09T01:11:41.145Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Note (8 April 2024): The following is a first draft of an essay for the relaunch of the journal of Cultural Science. I am posting it here for feedback and will replace with the final version when it’s ready.</em></p><h4>Abstract</h4><p>The survival of permissionless blockchains is typically cast as a cryptoeconomic security problem for mechanism designers to resolve. This essay argues that, long-term, these networks may require something that looks more like a UNESCO protection convention for machine culture than an equation. Ethereum’s machine culture is observable through the formation of a ““we”-group” (Hartley &amp; Potts, 2014, p. 76), which is necessary for the establishment of common knowledge. While entry to the group is permissionless, maintaining membership boundaries demands active contributions from validator nodes. The paper discusses concerns that Ethereum’s consensus may be used for purposes beyond itself, making Ethereum vulnerable to external, non-machine political forces. As this begins to manifest, the need to safeguard Ethereum’s intrinsic machine culture becomes apparent — not merely for the sake of the blockchain but to maintain a stable foundation for emerging digital economies and governance structures.</p><blockquote>To summon DankShard, our guides point us to a Ceremony. All members of the Lands of Ether and abroad are encouraged to contribute. Each will add their unique contribution to the collective and in doing so, illuminate the path forward. <em>— EF Protocol Support Team’s (2022) call for participants in the KZG (trusted setup) ceremony.</em></blockquote><h4>Introduction</h4><p>Consider a network of computers that need to coordinate and reach agreement. Together they decide what’s in and what’s out, resulting in shared knowledge that people use to perform various activities including trade and decision-making. These machines can banish a nefarious actor from their network if it tries to undermine their shared view of reality. Both endemic rules and markets inform what happens between the machines, but neither the network’s economy or its institutions would exist without a collective coordination action. How do we explain the processes and agency of the machines in this network? While the question might seem like nothing more than an odd humanities expedition, how we answer it may one day inform whether the network is exploited or protected.</p><p>The network I am referring to is Ethereum, but it could be another Proof of Stake blockchain with sufficient decentralisation (Schneider, 2019). My proposition is that if we look deep into the workings of Ethereum, at how it holds together, we find <em>culture</em>. By this I don’t mean cultural products or the certificates that accompany them (such as non-fungible tokens) but the formation of what Hartley and Potts (2014) call ““we”-groups”, “demes” or “groupishness” that are a precursor to knowledge formation. While most discussions of blockchain consensus commence from game theory (a rather good example being Schär, 2020), cultural science helps to show how a permissionless system like Ethereum manages to endure, grow or falter by placing boundaries around its membership through an ongoing assessment of which actions are valid and useful, and which are melliferous.</p><p>The patterns and constraints of this machine culture warrant our attention independently from what can be built on a blockchain or the rules that can be enforced through it (such as Werbach, 2018). In Ethereum’s early years, validators have worked only on storing and securing Ethereum’s own data structure. As the blockchain grows, the validator set may be used for purposes beyond itself, making it vulnerable to external political dynamics. A counter-intuitive problem emerges; rather than protecting humans from machine culture, should we be protecting Ethereum’s demic processes from our own non-machine politics?</p><p>To explore this question, I start with a description of how validators enter the permissionless system of Ethereum and perform attestations to produce knowledge about the state of the blockchain, made possible through the threat of punishment. I then turn to a concrete example (first suggested by co-founder Vitalik Buterin) of how validators could be used in ways that destabilise external political configurations and how this in turn could destabilise Ethereum.</p><h4><strong>On-chain demes</strong></h4><p>According to cultural science, the function of culture is to form and sustain groups. Groups make knowledge, which is the “currency” of both politics and economics (Hartley, 2020, p.3). Culture is therefore “constitutively prior” to both (Hartley 2020, p. 7).</p><blockquote>A “we”-group is a locus of identity and cooperation. It determines, in advance of individual choice, with whom we may cooperate, and which other groups we may oppose. It is built around a <strong>common inheritance</strong> in ways of seeing the world and interpreting its contents and meaning. Culture is a system of references — through symbols and artefacts, and all manner of practices and prospects — that forms a knowledge base for a “we”-group. Culture is group-making knowledge <em>(Hartley &amp; Potts, 2014, pp. 76–77, my emphasis).</em></blockquote><p>Among humans, groups form through social learning via stories, art, fashion etc — a process that is aided and altered by communication technologies. A growing body of research is now focused on how intelligent machines such as recommender systems and large language models are “evolving as contributors in generating cultural traits” (Brinkmann et al., 2023, p. 1855), resulting in an infusion of machine culture into human culture<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>. Evolutionary selection, in these accounts, is a process whereby machines either select what humans learn or humans select machine behaviour (Brinkman et al., 2023, p. 1861). The machine culture of blockchain that I am describing is different in that it creates the virtual machine itself — a process of group selection from within a network of participating nodes, which commences with the network’s ability to manage its own membership whilst remaining permissionless.</p><p>The success or otherwise of that group selection then influences a range of other cultural and market processes. While these are not my focus here, successful permissionless blockchains produce state-like formations involving rules, markets, practices and rites. In Ethereum’s case, non-machine groups include a meritocracy of researchers who discuss and propose changes to the protocol (All Core Devs meetings) as part of a global scale polycentric system (Alston et al., 2022). An informational network extends through in-person meetings (Denver in late February), in Decentralised Autonomous Organisation governance forums, self-help technical forums (Dappnode’s Discord server), and social media platforms (Farcaster). There are ceremonies too, such as the 2023 “trusted setup” KZG Ceremony (quoted at the start of this essay), which was required to make Ethereum faster and reduce fees for users<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>.</p><p>All these group formations contribute to an infrastructure that people can use to coordinate because they are confident that the system works as promised (De Filippi et al., 2020) and produces a reliable set of facts about the world. Yet all of these various economic, political and cultural formations are only possible through the existence of the machine culture that occurs between nodes.</p><h4><strong>A virtual machine</strong></h4><p>In Ethereum, computers running the Ethereum client software — called nodes — keep the chain’s data structure live and intact, including the current state of account balances and smart contracts that exist within the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). The nodes share this “common inheritance” just as human culture is shared within groups of people. When a major protocol change is proposed (known as a fork upgrade), node operators effectively choose which version of the blockchain to support by updating their software clients (or not). If enough node operators perform the upgrade, Ethereum itself changes<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a>.</p><p>As described in the Ethereum documentation:</p><blockquote>The EVM’s physical instantiation can’t be described in the same way that one might point to a cloud or an ocean wave, but it does exist as one single entity maintained by thousands of connected computers running an Ethereum client […] At any given block in the chain, Ethereum has one and only one ‘canonical’ state, and the EVM is what defines the rules for computing a new valid state from block to block <em>(Ethereum Foundation, n.d.)</em>.</blockquote><p>The network becomes secure by becoming too difficult or expensive for a person or entity to spin up enough nodes to be able to form a majority and alter account balances in their favour (Nuzzi et al., 2024). For this to work, Ethereum needs to know which validators are in the “we”-group and which might be a “bad neighbour” (Hartley &amp; Potts, 2014, p. 78).</p><p>A key property in this machine culture is its permissionlessness, a term referring specifically to the fact that, from the standpoint of the protocol, a validator can enter the system and participate in block production processes without needing to go through an approval process.</p><p>It works as follows:</p><p>· The node operator undertakes to stake 32 ETH (individually or as a squad<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a>), maintain common computing hardware, ensure that the software clients are up-to-date and set correctly, and provide sufficient and ongoing internet connectivity to the node.</p><p>· Once these things are in place, the node’s client will wait for the validator to become activated on the network and assign it an identifier that enables it to be called upon to propose and attest to blocks (determined by a pseudo-random algorithm). The process repeats until the operator of the validator exits the validator system voluntarily or is exited by the network for being lazy or malicious.</p><p>While entry is not permissioned, remaining in the “we”-group requires some effort. A system that anyone can enter needs a way to get rid of those who try to undermine or destroy it. The validator deposit provides the means to punish and banish. Rewards can flip to deductions if a validator is slow or offline. In extreme cases — for instance, if the validator attempts to change history or votes on two competing blocks at the same time — the original deposit of 32 ETH may be ‘burnt’ (permanently removed from circulation).</p><p>The staking deposit is in part an incentive for node operators to maintain their node and not collude, but it also enables the network to self-correct when things go wrong. For example, for a block to be considered final, two thirds of all validators must agree on the state of the chain at certain intervals known as checkpoints. If more than one third of validators are offline or fail to submit correct attestations, the network will enter “a kind of emergency state” called an inactivity leak (Edgington, 2023). In this event, which briefly played out in May 2023 (Offchain Labs, 2023), attestations are paused and the stakes of inactive validators are reduced until participating validators again control 2/3 of the remaining stake.</p><p>The “groupishness” that is observable among validators is therefore not a club in the Buchanan (1965) sense of cooperative membership wherein the number of members is controlled at the point of entry (such as entry to a swimming pool). With Ethereum, receiving rewards from the beaconchain is non-rival to validators (with some randomness thrown in) but excludable to non-validators (as per Kealey &amp; Ricketts (2014) theory of contribution goods. See also Rennie &amp; Potts, 2024). Benefits are conferred on all users — a public good by-product — but validators benefit more for being contributors. Controlling who is a contributor is achieved through processes such as the inactivity leak whereby membership boundaries are formed by discerning good validators from hostile or lazy ones. Ethereum therefore exists and thrives through the actions of its spontaneous group of contributors.</p><h4><strong>Beyond consensus</strong></h4><p>For Ethereum’s co-founder Vitalik Buterin, a crucial question is what belongs on the consensus layer — among validators — as opposed to what happens at the application layer or through other off-chain processes. As Ethereum grows, developers are looking to utilise the validator set for purposes beyond Ethereum, including ‘re-staking’ middleware that uses Ethereum’s validators and staked ETH as security for other protocols.</p><p>In a blog post, Buterin (2023) paints a sci-fi picture of how various scenarios could impact on Ethereum’s own security. One such scenario involves a stablecoin oracle that leverages validator votes to<em> </em>establish prices every hour, with incentives to ensure accuracy and penalize deviation from the median retrospective vote. This system, initially promising, expands to cover additional currency indices. However, by 2034, a political crisis in Brazil leads to a contentious situation affecting the oracle’s operation. The crisis results in two competing Brazilian digital currencies (CBDCs), BRL-N (North) and BRL-S (South), each backed by different factions and international opinions, causing a split in the Ethereum community over which rate to support. The disagreement escalates into a proposal to fork the Ethereum blockchain, aiming to isolate validators supporting the “incorrect” currency rate, eventually causing two versions of the Ethereum blockchain<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a>.</p><p>Buterin’s story highlights the vulnerability of global, permissionless platforms like Ethereum to geopolitical events, contradicting its objective to remain a neutral ground beyond the reach of national and political conflicts. He writes:</p><blockquote>As soon as a blockchain tries to “hook in” to the outside world, the outside world’s conflicts start to impact on the blockchain too. Given a sufficiently extreme political event — in fact, not that extreme a political event, given that the above story was basically a pastiche of events that have actually happened in various major (&gt;25m population) countries all within the past decade — even something as benign as a currency oracle could tear the community apart <em>(Buterin, 2023)</em>.</blockquote><p>By asking that Ethereum’s consensus process not be exploited for other uses, Buterin is suggesting that, rather than safeguarding humans from machines, it may be more critical to protect Ethereum from external, non-machine politics. Ethereum’s machine culture may be among the first of its kind to seek status as a protected group.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>A permissionless system only works by creating boundaries, defining its membership and banishing that which attempts to corrupt the chain’s ongoing production of what is mathematician Silvio Micali calls “common knowledge” (Micali in Fridman, 2021). The processes of knowledge formation are therefore at the heart of permissionless systems and these processes require agreement among a group of machines called validators. Attesting to the validity of the ledger and agreeing on the state of the virtual machine occurs as part of a continuous, collective, relational effort.</p><p>These processes are typically explained through the language of mechanism design, which suggests that the crypto-economic blueprint of the protocol designers is simply powered up into production mode (not unlike transmission theories in cultural studies). Yet as many competing blockchain developers have discovered, a good mechanism can fail to produce a sustainable chain. Focusing on how group-formation and cooperation occurs in a permissionless virtual machine context is a necessary step to understanding new economies and politics in the making. Ethereum is an exemplar of a permissionless yet groupish system, where entry is open but ongoing participation requires adherence to collectively upheld agreement processes. Machine culture among nodes creates boundaries that protect the blockchain from malicious actors while fostering growth, including a global, polycentric system of cultural, economic, and political practices. However, as Ethereum expands its functionalities it risks becoming entangled in external geopolitical events. Ethereum’s unique machine culture, formed through the coordination of its nodes and validators, is an intrinsic aspect that supports its survival and evolution. It may one day warrant protection from the external forces — human politics — that could destabilize it.</p><h4>Acknowledgements</h4><p>Ellie Rennie acknowledges the support of the Australian Research Council Future Fellow scheme, project FT190100372. Thanks to Jason Potts for feedback.</p><h4>References</h4><p>Alston, E., Law, W., Murtazashvili, I., &amp; Weiss, M. (2022). Blockchain networks as constitutional and competitive polycentric orders. <em>Journal of Institutional Economics</em>, <em>18</em>(5), 707–723. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S174413742100093X">https://doi.org/10.1017/S174413742100093X</a></p><p>Brinkmann, L., Baumann, F., Bonnefon, J.-F., Derex, M., Müller, T. F., Nussberger, A.-M., Czaplicka, A., Acerbi, A., Griffiths, T. L., Henrich, J., Leibo, J. Z., McElreath, R., Oudeyer, P.-Y., Stray, J., &amp; Rahwan, I. (2023). Machine culture. <em>Nature Human Behaviour</em>, <em>7</em>(11), 1855–1868. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01742-2">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01742-2</a></p><p>Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An Economic Theory of Clubs. <em>Economica</em>, <em>32</em>(125), 1–14. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2552442">https://doi.org/10.2307/2552442</a></p><p>Buterin, V. (2023, September). Should Ethereum be okay with enshrining more things in the protocol? <em>Vitalik Buterin’s Website</em>. <a href="https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2023/09/30/enshrinement.html">https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2023/09/30/enshrinement.html</a></p><p>De Filippi, P., Mannan, M., &amp; Reijers, W. (2020). Blockchain as a confidence machine: The problem of trust &amp; challenges of governance. <em>Technology in Society</em>, <em>62</em>, 101284. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2020.101284">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2020.101284</a></p><p>Edgington, B. (2023). 2.8.6 Inactivity leak. In <em>Upgrading Ethereum: A technical handbook on Ethereum’s move to proof of stake and beyond</em> (Edition 0.3: Capella [WIP]). <a href="https://eth2book.info/capella/part2/incentives/inactivity/">https://eth2book.info/capella/part2/incentives/inactivity/</a></p><p>EF Protocol Support Team. (2022, January 16). <em>Announcing the KZG Ceremony</em>. Ethereum Foundation Blog. <a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2023/01/16/announcing-kzg-ceremony">https://blog.ethereum.org/2023/01/16/announcing-kzg-ceremony</a></p><p>Ethereum Foundation. (n.d.). <em>Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)</em>. Ethereum.Org. Retrieved April 8, 2024, from <a href="https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/evm/">https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/evm/</a></p><p>Fishbein, E., &amp; Hein, B. (2022, September 19). For Myanmar’s revolutionaries, adopting digital currency can mean life or death. <em>Rest of World</em>. <a href="https://restofworld.org/2022/myanmars-rebels-crypto-adoption/">https://restofworld.org/2022/myanmars-rebels-crypto-adoption/</a></p><p>Fridman, L. (2021). Silvio Micali: Cryptocurrency, Blockchain, Algorand, Bitcoin &amp; Ethereum. <em>Lex Fridman Podcast</em> (168). <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zNdhgOk4-fE">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zNdhgOk4-fE</a></p><p>Hartley, J. (2020). <em>How We Use Stories and Why That Matters: Cultural science in action</em>. Bloomsbury Academic.</p><p>Hartley, J., &amp; Potts, J. (2014). <em>Cultural Science: A natural history of stories, demes, knowledge and innovation</em>. Bloomsbury Academic.</p><p>Kealey, T., &amp; Ricketts, M. (2014). Modelling science as a contribution good. <em>Research Policy</em>, <em>43</em>(6), 1014–1024. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.01.009">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.01.009</a></p><p>Offchain Labs, (2023). Post-Mortem Report: Ethereum Mainnet Finality (05/11/2023). <em>Offchain Labs</em>. <a href="https://medium.com/offchainlabs/post-mortem-report-ethereum-mainnet-finality-05-11-2023-95e271dfd8b2">https://medium.com/offchainlabs/post-mortem-report-ethereum-mainnet-finality-05-11-2023-95e271dfd8b2</a></p><p>Nuzzi, L., Waters, K., &amp; Andrade, M. (2024). <em>Breaking BFT: Quantifying the Cost to Attack Bitcoin and Ethereum</em> (SSRN Scholarly Paper 4727999). <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4727999">https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4727999</a></p><p>Rennie, E., &amp; Potts, J. (2024). <em>Contribution Systems: A New Theory of Value</em> (SSRN Scholarly Paper 4754267). <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4754267">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4754267</a></p><p>Schär, F. (2020). <em>Bitcoin, Blockchain, and Cryptoassets: A comprehensive introduction</em>. MIT Press.</p><p>Schneider, N. (2019). Decentralization: An incomplete ambition. <em>Journal of Cultural Economy</em>, <em>12</em>(4), 265–285.</p><p>Werbach, K. (2018). Trust, but verify: Why blockchains need the law. <em>Berkeley Technology Law Journal</em>, <em>33</em>, 487–550. <a href="https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38H41JM9N">https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38H41JM9N</a></p><h4>Authors information</h4><p>Ellie Rennie is a Professor at RMIT University and an Australian Research Council-funded Future Fellow working on the project “Cooperation Through Code”. She has at times run an Ethereum validator as part of her ethnographic practice, being rewarded and penalised for her contribution to the blockchain.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Brinkman et al use the example of Alpha Go Zero generating Go strategies without referencing human gameplay, which people in turn developed on.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> For the Ceremony to succeed, only one participant out of the eventual 141,416 needed to be honest and not publish their part of a shared secret for the final output to be secure.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> If some refuse to upgrade during a fork, two versions of the blockchain are produced (as occurred with miners in 2016 following The Dao exploit, which resulted in Ethereum and Ethereum Classic).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Using distributed validator technology, such as Obol.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> The story is not so outlandish given that National Unity Government, Myanmar’s anti-coup administration in exile, has already created what it referred to as a central bank digital currency on the Stellar blockchain, asserting the illegitimacy of the military administration (Fishbein &amp; Hein, 2022). The difference between this and Buterin’s fictitious example is that the NUG’s DMMK was not using the validator set as an oracle to peg it to the kyat.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9e73da656a97" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On Governators]]></title>
            <link>https://ellierennie.medium.com/on-governators-92ec2697829d?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/92ec2697829d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ellie Rennie]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Sep 2023 00:55:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-15T01:11:25.978Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The following is a brain-dump ahead of a Metagov Govbase call (7am 29 Sep 2023 AEST) in which we will discuss the concept of governators.</p><p><em>A</em><strong> validator</strong> <em>is a machine contributor with a human minder. The contributions a validator makes include proposing and attesting blocks. When a validator fails to perform — either through downtime or malicious behaviour — rewards are paused and penalties may be imposed. These boundaries are prescribed by the protocol rules</em>.</p><p><em>A</em><strong> governator</strong> <em>is a human contributor with a machine minder. The contribution the governator makes is ensuring that risks are mitigated and roadmaps are met. A governator operates within the </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0tMP8hqlu4"><em>governance surface</em></a><em> of the protocol, which may include changes to the protocol rules from time-to-time (which becomes a dual governance system as validators take part by enacting software upgrades). Rewards and penalties are issued in accordance with the outcomes of the governator’s contributions.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/666/1*9uZgu7gqQjsbZoWV2trtKw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The above definitions are my own, derived from my ethnographic research into validators and governance processes in Proof of Stake (PoS) blockchains.</p><p>My definition of a <strong>validator</strong> is fairly standard, except perhaps the <strong>contributor</strong><em> </em>component. As an ethnographer, I look at experiences and actions rather than mechanisms, which has led me to see validator rewards less as incentives to encourage deposits and more as payment for performing tasks, including producing blocks and securing the network. The tasks are repetitive and automated but the attention of the human minder is an essential component.</p><p>My definition of a <strong>governator</strong> requires a bit more explanation. PoS blockchains have so far neglected to reward outcomes within the governance surface — at least at the protocol level [1]. Smart contracts exist that can make some administrative tasks easier, and there are some tools that assist DAO members to record their contributions, including activities that are intended to produce outcomes. The term governator specifically applies to the human-machine configuration that contributes to governance and receives rewards in PoS blockchains that have been designed with onchain governance.</p><p>I am still tracing the genealogy of the term ‘governator’. Josh Lee (Keplr and Osmosis) used it in the context of validator governance at the 2023 Blockchain Infrastructure Forum, suggesting that validators need to be able to delegate votes to governance experts, who should receive a portion of validator rewards in return. Josh sent the group a link to a <a href="https://forum.osmosis.zone/t/the-governator-manifesto/65">Governator Manifesto</a> post and thread initiated by Jacob Gadikian (Notional DAO), which credits Jim Yang and other Osmosis figures for developing the idea. Zaki Manian had floated similar ideas to me after a Validator Commons forum in 2022. It also comes up on various forum posts, although not always using the ‘governator’ terminology.</p><p>In these conceptions, a governator, like a validator, is paid in protocol rewards. This is in contrast to dominant governance models in which Foundation teams pay protocol DAO delegates (such as in Maker) or DAOs that make protocol decisions (such as C1 on Juno). When the idea was discussed in Vienna it was meant as a way to for validators to defer governance responsibilities to individuals or entities. It is therefore an evolution of on-chain governance in that it seeks to release those <a href="https://metagov.github.io/validator/validator_governance_report_2023_09.pdf">validators who do not vote (typically due to liability concerns or lack of capacity)</a> to delegate their voting power.</p><h4>Potential problems</h4><p>A governator that is a delegate of validator votes could maintain plutocratic governance dynamics. If validators who have a large portion of stake are able to select a representative then it means that those who are receiving those delegations can be captured by the capital interests of the validator and/or their investors.</p><p>Such a model also encourages the worst of the politics-media nexus, favouring PR strategies and possibly election cycles. The result is that diversity of ideas/worldviews, experience and careful behind-the-scenes work goes unseen while the loud, confrontational or popular attain power.</p><p>One way to deal with this is for governance rewards to be sent to a pool, with rewards then allocated based on contributions (a version of this occurs with Polkadot’s <a href="https://support.polkadot.network/support/solutions/articles/65000184772-polkadot-opengov-how-does-it-work-">OpenGov</a>). Validators who wish to participate in governance can do so alongside others who are not running validators. It’s likely that many validators would continue to participate in governance as validators have an interest in the longevity of chains whereas the token holders who delegate to them are more likely to be in it for short term gains.</p><h4>The opportunity</h4><p>The opportunity of blockchain institutions is to reward contributions that are recognised and valued, as opposed to rewarding for publicity or showing up (other systems these older formats already exist, such as labour contracts and advertising revenue). Various groups have built and experimented with contribution tools, including SourceCred, Govrn, and Coordinape (see my ethnography of SourceCred <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4570035">here</a>, which explores the dynamics of contribution-based governance). Existing DAO tools do not provide an out-of-the-box solution for governators, but they do demonstrate ways of doing that lean towards recognising contributions as an organisation function of permissionless systems.</p><p>Another frontier is experiments with LLMs in organisational contexts (such as <a href="https://medium.com/block-science/towards-knowledge-networks-3232b82eca4a">BlockScience’s</a>), which may evolve into the machine helpers that are able to see if a governator’s processing of ideas, anticipating risks and offering expertise result in stability, fairness, resilience or partnerships (or other indicators typically used by boards and committees to monitor and evaluate). This is an area that Metagov is beginning to explore.</p><p>For governators to work they need to achieve corporate governance objectives such as dealing with agency problems (minimising the power of insiders). A significant problem with validator governance power is that validators have been known to vote against decisions on one chain that go against their financial interests in another chain — a problem that will get worse if/as app chain ecosystems grow. The smart contracts that assist governators could automatically excise them from decisions where there is a conflict of interest and issue penalties for failing to declare or deal with such conflicts. The extent to which a governator’s actions are public is an important question to consider. Reputational tokens could allow governators to prove their experience or attributes and possibly do so in a privacy-preserving way if desired (including credentials such as legal expertise, geographic and gender diversity). <a href="https://youtu.be/eduq9fQNY0o?si=BUuEy3OqW9gU01qq">Puja Ohlhavar’s</a> work is a good starting point for considering privacy, reputation and collusion-resistance.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>When designing governators we need to consider:</p><ul><li>A tool (the machine helper) that is able to see someone’s contributions and tie these to achieved outcomes for the protocol.</li><li>An automated means to prevent conflict of interest.</li><li>Demonstrate credentials and experience.</li><li>Minimise the influence of political public relations and media.</li><li>Possibly enable teams to take on governator duties whilst ensuring these do not become a backdoor for collusion.</li></ul><p>From a theory perspective, if governators do eventuate, they provide a chance to observe a system that departs from both representative democracy and corporate governance. The former achieves consent for one group to rule over others, while the latter can help deal with agency problems but can also create its own fiefdoms within protocols. The purpose of governators should be to enable coordination in permissionless systems via the governance surface. If governators are conceived and designed as contributors rather than token holders or citizens then the emphasis shifts from choice (politics) to action (contributions). Governance then becomes a matter of value creation rather than preferences.</p><p>[1] Optimism has a version of this already in that they provide retroactive funding for governance activities, using network revenue (from sequencing) for rewards. Kleomedes is a DAO validator that is building tools for governance rewards using validator income.</p><p><em>I am a Professor at RMIT University in Melbourne, working across the </em><a href="https://rmitblockchain.io/"><em>RMIT Blockchain Innovation Hub</em></a><em> and the </em><a href="https://digital-ethnography.com/about/"><em>Digital Ethnography Research Centre</em></a><em>. I am also an Associate Investigator (AI 🤖) of the </em><a href="https://www.admscentre.org.au/"><em>ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society</em></a><em> and a Research Director in </em><a href="http://metagov.org/"><em>Metagov</em></a><em>. I acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council, FT19010372. I use this Medium blog for work-in-progress ideas and reflections.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=92ec2697829d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An ethnography of SourceCred’s CredSperiment]]></title>
            <link>https://ellierennie.medium.com/an-ethnography-of-sourcecreds-credsperiment-396a81efe355?source=rss-30be288d760------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/396a81efe355</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sourcecred]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web3]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ellie Rennie]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 Sep 2023 05:07:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-17T06:24:13.824Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>My full ethnography of SourceCred’s CredSperiment is now on </em><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4570035"><em>SSRN</em></a><em>. Here’s a short summary of what I learnt from observing this astounding attempt to live in a radically different world</em>👇</p><p>During the CredSperiment, people were paid according to their contributions within a permissionless organisation, meaning an organisation where there is no boss and people can enter and exit at their will. In return for building and maintaining the SourceCred product, contributors to SourceCred accepted payment for their contributions based on sophisticated calculations called “Cred scores”, created from the SourceCred software.</p><p>The SourceCred software ‘saw’ actions and people, but Cred scores were derived from dependencies and appreciation, such as whether a contribution was taken up or liked by others. Rewards were allocated according to Cred scores via a secondary token called Grain. Anyone could join, offer what they felt was needed, and even be rewarded for their contribution long after they had left (if it was picked up by others). The CredSperiment ended in 2022. The learnings are important for web3 generally.</p><figure><img alt="An image of an ancient hydraulic water system in Shushtar, Iran. The picture shows stone constructions with water flowing into a central dam." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*w2qfJfClJTDd5MiA4ILX2A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Evan Miyazono of Protocol Labs likened the SourceCred software to a <a href="https://research.protocol.ai/blog/2020/sourcecred-an-introduction-to-calculating-cred-and-grain/">hydraulic water system</a>. This is the Shushtar historical hydraulic water system (Iran). Image: Hassam Saeb. CC4.0</figcaption></figure><h4>A very short summary of events</h4><p>For GitHub contributions, SourceCred’s system was relatively unproblematic. However, when they created and implemented plugins for Discourse and Discord in order to reward other forms of contributions, things started to go awry.</p><p>In particular, the #props and #didathing Discord channels required people to signal their activities so the algorithm could see emoji reactions to those posts, and this changed people’s relationship to the algorithm and each other.</p><p>Attempting to reward non-code contributions was an important and necessary development. However, without adequate systems in place for managing weights and collectively steering the algorithm, rewards didn’t necessarily go where they were needed to keep the mission on track.</p><p>Community-building was amplified (not a bad thing in certain contexts!). Some people were concerned that others were taking on ‘side quests’ — community-oriented tasks that were more easily communicated to non-technical people than work on the code (hence receiving high rewards). Many of these tasks were important for needs such as onboarding, record keeping etc, while others were important for community wellbeing.</p><p>However, this took resources away from work on the product, creating tensions around ‘extractive behaviour’. This went against the original vision that SourceCred would automate rewards in the background so that “people feel free to just contribute for the joy of it, without worrying if a particular transaction gets me x$” (Dandelion).</p><p>SourceCred intended to build components that could have mitigated these tendencies, but they were not completed in time for the CredSperiment to experience the outcomes. These various solutions involved making it easier for non-technical people to use SourceCred.</p><p>Most importantly, they would have added legibility to processes such as collectively weighting what was rewarded. Contribution systems only work when people can see, understand and adjust the systems that determine value. When this happens, it’s a form of planning and governance in itself. One unresolved area is how to provide people with agency over membership boundaries.</p><h4>Why it matters</h4><p>For me, the CredSperiment changed how I think of web3 generally. Some kernels of that thinking are in the essay, including:</p><ol><li>Systems for adding more localised information into value-formation processes are important for the problems that society faces, and SourceCred was a sophisticated attempt to do that (even if it failed). Prices as computed by markets are a poor measure of value. Web3 gives us the tools for better computation. SourceCred tried to construct a coordination mechanism that could ‘outcompete capitalism’ (Dandelion’s words). Undertaking this ethnography of SourceCred helped me to better understand regenerative economies.</li><li>Web3 cares about public goods, but ‘contribution goods’ is a more useful framework for how these systems can and should evolve. With contribution goods, those who put more in get more out (either resources or reputation), and the benefits to contributors rise as more high-quality contributors join. There can be a public good produced as a byproduct (such as a public blockchain), but we need ways to see and reward contributors, and which help people to coordinate in a permissionless manner. Achieving this might counteract the speculative nature of the web3 economy and token-weighted governance. In some cases, contributions will be performed by machines with human minders (validators are an example of this in my experience).</li><li>SourceCred dismantled the notion of the worker in what I consider to be a productive way. A contribution is not a role or a job (or necessarily performed by a human). The system removed workplace strcutures and expectations with positive outcomes for people’s relationships[1].</li><li>SourceCred also gave shape to some ephemeral aspects of participation. With systems like this we become less reliant on an ideal notion of the unburdened, virtuous citizen who has infinite time and attention. We don’t need to think of participation as programs that get people ‘to participate’. Participation is more about what needs doing and the value that it generates for the group.</li><li>Governance changes as a result. The governance that SourceCred pioneered is what I call ‘terraforming’. It’s a bit like the concept of ‘environmentality’ (a milieux-based governance where action is taken over the rules of the game rather than directly on the players), but where modulation of the system is done by the local community.</li></ol><p>The truly transformative possibility SourceCred was to replace capitalism’s version of value-formation and its vampiric tendencies with a more sophisticated, information-abundant, locally responsive cybernetic system. I am now working with @profjasonpotts on a theory arising from this case study and others. Stay tuned.</p><h4>Acknowledgements</h4><p>I am grateful to the SourceCred community for letting me observe part of the journey and providing their consent for the release of the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4570035">full article</a> [2]. They also helped me pilot the Telescope bot (see <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10778004221097056">this article</a> for full background on the Telescope digital ethnography tool). Ethnography is deliberately subjective whilst also synthesising collectively-attained knowledge. Therefore, while many people contributed to the ethnography (see article for full list), they will also have their own views about what occurred.</p><p>[1] There were also negative outcomes for people including interpersonal problems. These may have been mitigated if the system had the means to be more actively steered by the contributors — or not. It’s impossible to say from this particular case study.</p><p>[2] I haven’t decided if/how I will publish this piece. Consider it an unwieldy director’s cut for now (typos and all).</p><p><em>I am a Professor at RMIT University in Melbourne, working across the </em><a href="https://rmitblockchain.io/"><em>RMIT Blockchain Innovation Hub</em></a><em> and the </em><a href="https://digital-ethnography.com/about/"><em>Digital Ethnography Research Centre</em></a><em>. I am also an Associate Investigator (AI 🤖) of the </em><a href="https://www.admscentre.org.au/"><em>ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society</em></a><em> and a Research Director in </em><a href="http://metagov.org/"><em>Metagov</em></a><em>, which is how I came to observe the CredSperiment and trial the Telescope. I acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council, FT19010372. I use this Medium blog for work-in-progress ideas and reflections.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=396a81efe355" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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