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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Emperor Dotman on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Emperor Dotman on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Emperor Dotman on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[FFK might be a nutcase but he is speaking the language the South Africans understand]]></title>
            <link>https://emperordotman.medium.com/ffk-might-be-a-nutcase-but-he-is-speaking-the-language-the-south-africans-understand-348a65c0764c?source=rss-934acb6dbfd0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/348a65c0764c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Emperor Dotman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 17:31:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-15T17:31:03.075Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/678/1*EUpk5VZR0XddYHTV3Hw8Hw.jpeg" /><figcaption>FFK and President Cyril Ramaphosa, while he presented his letter of credence to him.</figcaption></figure><p>There is something quite interesting about Chief Femi Fani-Kayode’s emergence as Nigeria’s ambassador to South Africa. If you had told me a few years ago that I would be making an argument in defence of FFK’s approach to a diplomatic disagreement, I probably would have laughed and maybe even cried. This is, after all, a man whose public conduct, political history, and numerous controversies have given Nigerians, including myself, more than enough reasons to question his temperament.</p><p>But here we are.</p><p>Since his arrival in South Africa, FFK has made it clear that he is not particularly interested in playing the usual &quot;diplomatic game&quot; of pretending everything is fine while Nigerians are being subjected to harassment, intimidation and, in some cases, violence.</p><p>His latest confrontation with the South African Presidency over the omission of his address from the live broadcast of the diplomatic credentials ceremony has generated another round of arguments in Nigeria and South Africa about his temperament and whether his approach is appropriate for someone occupying such a sensitive office.</p><p>I understand the argument about &quot;<em>diplomatic decorum.&quot;</em> Yes, an ambassador is not a social media influencer, and there are established channels through which disagreements between governments should ordinarily be resolved, but I think Nigerians are sometimes too quick to focus on the manner in which someone makes an argument while ignoring the <strong>substance of the argument itself</strong>.</p><p>For years, South Africa has had a rather complicated relationship with other African countries, particularly those whose citizens have made South Africa their home. The recurring xenophobic attacks, the targeting of African-owned businesses, the harassment of foreign nationals, and the periodic campaigns by groups have become an <strong>unfortunate feature</strong> of South Africa’s domestic politics.</p><p>And Nigerians have been among the most visible targets in these unfortunate and, particularly, wicked events. What makes the situation particularly disturbing is that it is not always undocumented immigrants who bear the brunt of these attacks. Nigerians with legitimate residency papers, established businesses and families have also found themselves subjected to intimidation and violence by South Africans . In the latest wave of attacks by South Africans, the Nigerian government said it had recorded 98 deaths of Nigerians in mob and hate-related incidents since 2022, while approximately 1,500 Nigerians were eventually evacuated from South Africa during this year’s xenophobic attacks on Nigerians and other Africans.</p><p>At some point, we have to ask ourselves what exactly Nigeria is expected to do differently. Nigeria has historically maintained a cordial relationship with South Africa, and this relationship did not begin with the emergence of the ANC or Ramaphosa’s government. Evem during the apartheid era (during the dark days of Black South Africans), Nigeria was one of the African countries that made considerable sacrifices towards the liberation struggle of black South Africans. We provided financial support, diplomatic backing, and other forms of assistance to the anti-apartheid movement.</p><p>There is also an economic dimension to this relationship that I think Nigerians sometimes overlook. South African businesses have enjoyed considerable opportunities in Nigeria. MTN, MultiChoice, Shoprite, and other South African-linked businesses have established significant commercial interests in the Nigerian economy. They operate in a country where their investments are not routinely subjected to the kind of hostility that Nigerians have repeatedly experienced in South Africa.</p><p>Of course, Nigeria should not respond to xenophobia by attacking South African businesses or their employees as that would be counter productive, make us less qualified as civilized humans and it would amount to punishing people who have nothing to do with the actions of violent and uncivilised South African mobs. But, the fact that Nigeria has continued to provide an environment in which South African businesses can operate should also remind South Africans that the relationship should be reciprocal.</p><p>You can not continuously benefit from the goodwill and economic opportunities provided by another African country while treating the citizens of that country as if their dignity as Africans or humans is negotiable. And maybe this is where I think FFK’s approach becomes interesting.</p><p>And to be fair to FFK, Nigeria’s problem has never really been a shortage of diplomatic statements. We have issued condemnations, summoned South African diplomats, held bilateral meetings, and appealed to the historical relationship between both countries. Even during the latest crisis, the Nigerian government made several representations to Pretoria, and the two countries reached agreements on prosecutions, compensation claims, and additional safeguards for Nigerians. Yet, the recurring nature of these unfortunate incidents suggests that something more than another round of diplomatic assurances is required.</p><p>I am not suggesting that FFK should turn the Nigerian High Commission into a theatre of social media confrontations. There is a difference between being firm and being unnecessarily combative. The latter can undermine the very interests a foreign ambassador is supposed to protect. But there is also a difference between diplomacy and an almost <strong>compulsive need</strong> to avoid offending the other party, even when your own citizens are the ones paying the price.</p><p>Sometimes, the problem with African diplomacy is that we place too much emphasis on maintaining the <strong>appearance of brotherhood</strong> while refusing to confront the things that undermine that brotherhood. South Africa cannot continue to invoke <strong>African solidarity</strong> when it suits its interests and then become dismissive of the same solidarity when Nigerians and other African nationals demand basic protection in South Africa. The African continent cannot be serious about <strong>integration</strong> when the movement of people, businesses and capital is welcomed in principle but treated with suspicion and hostility in practice by a certain indigenous people of a country that calls themselves South <strong>Africans.</strong></p><p>And by the way, this is not just a Nigerian problem. Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Malawians, Ghanaians and other African nationals have also been caught up in South Africa’s recurring anti-immigrant hostility to citizens of their “African brothers”. This is a continental problem that also requires a continental conversation.</p><p>I also think the Nigerian government needs to understand that protecting its citizens abroad is not simply about evacuating them after things have gone wrong. It is about ensuring that those who remain can live, work and conduct legitimate businesses without constantly worrying about when and whether the next xenophobic mobilisation by South Africans will turn them into targets.</p><p>FFK may not be everybody’s idea of a <em>conventional diplomat</em>, and his public record certainly gives room for criticism. But perhaps the more important thing to note is whether Nigeria is finally prepared to move away from a foreign policy that prioritizes being seen as a &quot;<em>good neighbour</em>&quot; over insisting on being treated as an equal partner and ally.</p><p>South Africa is an important African country, just as Nigeria is. Both have interests, both have responsibilities, and neither should expect the other to subordinate its national dignity in the name of <em>continental brotherhood</em>. If Fani-Kayode&#39;s appointment achieves anything, it should be to remind Pretoria that Nigeria&#39;s relationship with South Africa is built on mutual respect, not a permanent obligation to tolerate disrespect.</p><p><strong>African solidarity cannot be a one-way street.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=348a65c0764c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[OYO 2027: WHAT IS SENATOR SHARAFADEEN ALLI PROMISING, AND HOW DIFFERENT IS HIS PLAN?]]></title>
            <link>https://emperordotman.medium.com/oyo-2027-what-is-senator-sharafadeen-alli-promising-and-how-different-is-his-plan-4280574be45d?source=rss-934acb6dbfd0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4280574be45d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oyo-state]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Emperor Dotman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 18:09:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-06T18:09:33.629Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A policy audit of Senator Sharafadeen Alli’s “Oyo AHEAD” manifesto</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/739/1*3EnHmYoEDpV2EboSC8Te6Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>The 2027 Oyo governorship race is beginning to take shape, and Senator Sharafadeen Abiodun Alli, former Secretary to the Oyo State Government and incumbent senator representing Oyo South, unveiled his manifesto, titled Oyo AHEAD, on November 3, 2026.</p><p>The manifesto is built around 7 pillars covering local government administration, infrastructure, healthcare, education, the economy, agriculture and security. It also contains his commitments on governance, public accountability and workers’ welfare.<br>While some of Sen. Sharafadeen Alli’s proposals address genuine shortcomings in Oyo state, others overlap with programmes already underway under the Seyi Makinde administration.</p><p>However, the bigger question is whether Sen. Sharafadeen Alli has presented a sufficiently convincing strategy for achieving these objectives. A manifesto should not simply identify what needs to change; it should explain how the proposed changes will be financed, which institutions will deliver them, what existing arrangements will be retained or replaced, and how residents will measure progress.</p><h3>LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A VALID CRITICISM, BUT WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE MONEY ARRIVES?</h3><p>Alli’s proposal to ensure that all 33 local governments receive their federal allocations directly, alongside an additional 10 per cent of state revenue, is valid. It is also reasonable to demand more effective local government administration. Local governments are supposed to be the most accessible level of government to citizens, but their effectiveness and independence have continued to attract criticism in Oyo State and Nigeria at large.</p><p>However, the practical question is how an Oyo State government under Alli would guarantee that LGs use their funds responsibly. Alli needs to explain how he will monitor council spending, publish expenditure records, audit projects and prevent mismanagement. His commitment to publish monthly allocations is a starting point, but residents also need to know what the money was spent on. Will local government chairmen also be required to publish their monthly expenditure and project records?</p><p>There is also a financial question surrounding his promise to allocate 10 per cent of state revenue to local governments. Sen. Sharafadeen Alli needs to clarify whether this means 10 per cent of Oyo state IGR alone or 10 per cent of the state’s total revenue, including federal allocation.</p><p>The distribution formula also needs to be explained. Will every local government in Oyo state receive an equal amount, or will population, landmass, infrastructure deficits, IGR generation obtained from the local government or other factors determine the allocation?</p><p>Local government autonomy should mean more than transferring money from one account to another. It should translate into functioning primary healthcare centres, better rural roads, better waste management, improved local markets and other social services that directly affect residents.</p><h3>INFRASTRUCTURE: WHAT IS NEW, AND WHAT WILL BE COMPLETED?</h3><p>Sen. Sharafadeen Alli pledges to build affordable housing, restore piped water to 100 communities in Oyo state, connect at least 100 rural communities to electricity, complete abandoned roads, upgrade rural roads, establish a state-owned electricity distribution company and improve drainage across the state.</p><p>These are important promises, but the Makinde administration has already made significant investments in infrastructure, including road construction, water infrastructure, drainage and electricity sector reforms. Projects such as the 110 Km Circular Road, the Iseyin-Fapote-Ogbomoso road and interventions at the Asejire and Eleyele waterworks form part of the state’s existing infrastructure programme.</p><p>Oyo has also established its electricity regulatory framework and begun opening its electricity market to private investment. Therefore, Alli’s proposal to establish a state-owned distribution company deserves further explanation.</p><p>Why does he prefer state ownership, and what will it cost to establish and operate the company? How will it acquire or develop distribution infrastructure, and what will its relationship with IBEDC look like?<br>His housing proposal also needs a clearer structure. Will his government provide direct housing subsidies, develop public housing estates or partner with private developers? What will make the houses affordable to ordinary working families in Oyo state?</p><p>Most importantly, Alli should identify the abandoned projects he intends to complete, the locations of the new projects he intends to undertake, their estimated costs and proposed completion timelines.</p><h3>HEALTHCARE: MORE HOSPITALS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN BETTER HEALTHCARE</h3><p>Alli proposes free healthcare for children under 10 and adults above 70, reducing maternal deaths by at least 30 per cent, upgrading primary healthcare centres, expanding health insurance coverage and establishing diagnostic and emergency centres.</p><p>He also promises to build general hospitals in the six local government areas he identifies as lacking them, recruit more medical personnel and address hospitals operating without doctors.</p><p>These are significant commitments, but any new administration would have to build on Oyo’s existing healthcare system rather than approach healthcare reform as though nothing has been done.</p><p>And, like I always say, more hospitals do not automatically mean better healthcare. A hospital without enough doctors, nurses, medicines, functioning equipment, electricity and emergency referral services is just a building. The availability of treatment, staffing levels, the condition of medical equipment and the effectiveness of care given to patients are better indicators of healthcare quality.</p><p>His proposed free healthcare scheme also requires a clearer definition from Sen. Sharafadeen Alli. Who qualifies for the scheme, and what services will be covered? Will the free care include medicines, laboratory tests, and emergency procedures? How much will the programme cost annually, and can it be financed through OYSHIA or will it require a separate budgetary arrangement?</p><p>There is also the question of sustainability. A government should not announce free healthcare without explaining how hospitals and healthcare providers will be reimbursed.</p><h3>EDUCATION: ENROLMENT IS ONLY PART OF THE PROBLEM</h3><p>Alli claims that approximately 674,000 children in Oyo State between the ages of three and 17 are not attending school, and he pledges to reduce that figure by 50 per cent.</p><p>He also proposes expanding technical education, creating STEM and vocational hubs, recruiting more teachers, reducing class sizes to 30 pupils and launching a Scholar2Job initiative to connect graduates with employment opportunities. These are important objectives, but the education problem requires a more comprehensive assessment.</p><p>However, finding out how many children have never enrolled, how many children have dropped out, why they are out of school and where they are concentrated is crucial. The interventions required in rural communities may be different from those required in urban areas.<br><br>More importantly, the discussion of education needs to go beyond enrolment and school buildings. What are pupils actually learning? What are the literacy and numeracy levels across public schools? How many pupil complete primary education and proceed to secondary school? How many complete secondary education? Are technical graduates acquiring skills that employers actually require?</p><p>Alli’s proposal to reduce classroom sizes to 30 pupils is also ambitious, particularly if some primary school classrooms currently accommodate about 100 pupils. Achieving this would require additional classrooms, more teachers, improved school facilities and a sustainable recruitment and training programme. How many teachers will be recruited, and what will be the annual financial implication?</p><p>His Scholar2Job proposal is interesting, but he needs to explain how it will connect training to actual employment rather than simply produce another batch of graduates with certificates. Technical and vocational education should be linked to the state’s industrial, agricultural and commercial development plans</p><h3>ECONOMY AND JOBS: THE ₦150 BILLION IGR TARGET NEEDS AN ECONOMIC STRATEGY</h3><p>Alli wants to establish a ₦10 billion youth fund, increase Oyo’s IGR from approximately ₦103 billion to ₦150 billion annually and provide additional support for SMEs, traders and artisans.</p><p>He also proposes industrial parks, the revitalisation of the Oluyole Free Trade Zone, a guarantee fund to help businesses access loans and digital hubs across the state’s five geopolitical zones.</p><p>These are among the more interesting proposals in his manifesto because they touch on the foundations of economic development rather than simply promising financial assistance to individuals.</p><p>However, the ₦150 billion IGR target needs a more detailed explanation. According to the 2025 IGR figures, Oyo generated approximately ₦103.25 billion, compared with ₦65.29 billion in 2024. This represents growth of about 58 per cent in one year. Alli’s proposed ₦150 billion target therefore represents an increase of approximately 45 per cent over the 2025 figure. Assuming a 4-year administration, this would require average annual growth of roughly 9.8 per cent. The bigger question is also how he intends to achieve it.<br><br>It takes more than increasing tax collection to grow IGR sustainably as it requires an expanding economy, stronger agricultural value chains, increased commercial activity, more productive businesses, industrial growth and employment creation.</p><p>Alli’s proposal to revitalise the Oluyole Free Trade Zone is interesting but the Makinde administration has already identified the zone as part of its industrial and economic development priorities. What exactly will Alli do differently? What infrastructure will be provided, which investors does he intend to attract, and what incentives will encourage businesses to establish operations there?</p><p>His proposal to establish industrial parks also needs further clarification. Where will they be located, which industries will they target, and how will they be connected to electricity, transportation, water and other essential infrastructure?</p><p>The proposed digital hubs across the five geopolitical zones could help expand opportunities for young people, but what services will they provide? Will they focus on digital skills, business incubation, technology infrastructure or access to employment? Who will operate and maintain them?</p><p>Alli’s proposal of a ₦10 billion youth fund also requires a clear structure. Will it provide loans, grants or equity investments? Who qualifies as a beneficiary, how will beneficiaries be selected, and what safeguards will prevent political distribution of public funds?</p><p>MSME and graduate-support initiatives are already in place under the Makinde administration,so, Alli needs to explain what his proposed funds will accomplish beyond existing arrangements.</p><p>His ambition to make Oyo one of Nigeria’s top three state economies also requires a clear definition. Does he mean the size of the state’s GDP, industrial output, IGR or another economic indicator? These are not interchangeable measures.</p><h3><strong>Workers’ welfare and pensions</strong></h3><p>Alli’s pledge to implement a 13th-month salary and pay salaries on the 25th must be weighed against the performance of the current administration. Makinde’s government has continued these policies, including the 13th-month salary. Therefore, the more useful question is what additional workers’ welfare measures Alli intends to introduce instead.<br><br>Makinde’s administration has also commenced a contributory pension arrangement effective July 2026 for employees recruited from January 1, 2025, with an employer contribution of 12 per cent and an employee contribution of 8 per cent. Alli must address both categories of workers. What will happen to employees already in service before January 2025? How will he handle existing pension liabilities and retirees’ entitlements? Will he retain the contributory pension scheme, ensure timely remittances into retirement savings accounts and expand its coverage where appropriate?</p><h3>AGRICULTURE: PRODUCTION IS NOT ENOUGH WITHOUT PROCESSING AND LOGISTICS</h3><p>Alli proposes expanding irrigation, creating agro-processing hubs, insuring 10,000 farmers, revitalising nine former farm settlements and raising agriculture’s share of the state budget from 2.24 per cent towards 10 per cent. He also proposes improved seedlings, subsidised agricultural inputs, equipment rental pools, grain silos, cold-chain infrastructure and the establishment of an Oyo Produce Board. These are important interventions, particularly for a state with significant agricultural potential.</p><p>However, his farm-settlement proposal requires further explanation. Alongside initiatives at Eruwa and Ijaiye, the Makinde administration has pursued the development of existing agricultural settlements, including Fashola, as centres of agribusiness. Where will Alli expand the programme to, and which nine settlements does he intend to revitalise? What investments will be made in each settlement, and what will be the role of private investors and farmers’ cooperatives?</p><h3>Post-harvest management and logistics</h3><p>Numerous towns and communities in Oyo, particularly outside the state capital, rely heavily on agriculture for their economies. Farmers can increase production and still lose money when produce cannot reach markets and other states, particularly Lagos, quickly enough or when adequate storage facilities are unavailable. What is Alli’s strategy for connecting farming communities with major markets through cold storage, warehouses, rural roads, aggregation centres and refrigerated transportation?</p><p>His proposed Oyo Produce Board could be an interesting institutional intervention, but what exactly will it do? Will it facilitate produce aggregation, quality control, market access, export certification, price information or price stabilisation? How will it work with existing agricultural institutions and private commodity buyers?</p><p>Details are also needed for the proposed agro-processing hubs. Which industries does he intend to establish or attract? Will Oyo develop additional processing capacity for cassava, maize, yam, fruits and other agricultural products? Who will finance these facilities, where will they be located, and how will farmers access them?</p><h3>SECURITY: INTELLIGENCE IS IMPORTANT, BUT WHAT IS THE OPERATIONAL PLAN?</h3><p>Alli proposes reducing kidnappings by 50 per cent through Smart Amotekun; drones, CCTV, improved communication systems and community-based reporting mechanisms. His manifesto also mentions strengthening the police, Amotekun and Forest Guards, establishing rapid-response infrastructure, improving inter-agency coordination and creating farmer-herder mediation corridors.</p><p>These are relevant interventions. Intelligence and technology can improve security, but they are not substitutes for an effective security structure.</p><p>The manifesto cites 85 kidnapping victims in Oyo State in the year to June 2026 and promises to halve that figure. However, the source and methodology behind this statistic should be disclosed. Does it represent the number of victims, reported incidents or verified cases? How does it compare with previous years?<br>The target itself is measurable, but he must also explain further how it intends to achieve it. For instance, how does Alli plan to reorganise Amotekun? Will there be additional recruitment, better training, improved equipment and a more effective intelligence-gathering structure? How will the outfit work with the Nigeria Police Force, particularly with the planned implementation of state police?</p><p>There are additional security concerns that need to be addressed.What is his plan for illegal mining, particularly in vulnerable rural areas? How will he secure the Old Oyo National Park and other large forest reserves in the state? What safeguards will be put in place to protect residents travelling between towns, particularly along vulnerable rural routes?<br>He also needs a border-security strategy.</p><p>Criminal networks do not necessarily operate within the boundaries of one state or local government. Oyo shares borders with several states, and effective security requires coordination beyond its territory. How will Amotekun coordinate with neighbouring state security outfits, state police where established and federal security agencies since Amotekun itself was born out of the need for border policing.</p><h3>GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: BEYOND PUBLISHING REPORT CARDS</h3><p>Alli pledges to increase women’s representation in his government appointments, publish quarterly public report cards, disclose state contracts and their costs, and visit all 33 local governments. He also makes a personal commitment not to seek a second term if Oyo State is not better under his administration.</p><p>These are interesting commitments, but they need to be translated into measurable standards. Oyo already publishes budget performance and citizens’ accountability reports. Alli’s proposed quarterly reporting is therefore useful, but he needs to explain how his proposed system will improve existing reporting arrangements.</p><p>His commitment to increasing women’s representation also needs a numerical target. How many women will he appoint to senior government positions (percentage wise), and will the commitment extend to boards, agencies and local government administration?</p><p>Similarly, visiting all 33 local governments is useful for engagement, but what happens after the visits? Will the administration publish the concerns raised by residents and explain which ones have been addressed?</p><h3><strong>CONCLUSION: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROMISES AND A DELIVERY PLAN</strong></h3><p>Sen. Sharafdeen Alli’s “Oyo AHEAD” manifesto highlights several issues that deserve attention, including local government accountability, job creation, education, rural security, agricultural investment, healthcare and infrastructure.<br>Some proposals address genuine shortcomings in the state, while others overlap with existing programmes under the Makinde administration.</p><p>There are also new ideas, particularly the proposed industrial parks, SME guarantee fund, digital hubs, Oyo Produce Board and Smart Amotekun, that could make a difference if properly designed and implemented.</p><p>However, a manifesto should do more than list problems and announce targets. It should outline the institutions, financial arrangements, implementation schedules and measurable outcomes that will make those commitments achievable rather than vague implementation plan.</p><p>Alli needs to explain what will happen to existing programmes, which ones he intends to retain, which ones he intends to expand and which ones he intends to replace. He also needs to demonstrate how his proposals will deliver additional value rather than simply repackage existing government initiatives.</p><p>Ultimately, the question voters should ask is not simply what Senator Sharafadeen Alli intends to do if elected governor, but why his proposed approach should deliver better results than what is already being done. That is the standard by which any governorship manifesto in Oyo state should be evaluated.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4280574be45d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[THE LAGOS PROMISE: HAMZAT WANTS FOUR MORE YEARS OF THE APC DEVELOPMENT MODEL, BUT WHAT EXACTLY WILL…]]></title>
            <link>https://emperordotman.medium.com/the-lagos-promise-hamzat-wants-four-more-years-of-the-apc-development-model-but-what-exactly-will-4d8d40b638c7?source=rss-934acb6dbfd0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4d8d40b638c7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lagos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Emperor Dotman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 19:26:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-31T19:51:11.937Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>THE LAGOS PROMISE: HAMZAT WANTS FOUR MORE YEARS OF THE APC DEVELOPMENT MODEL, BUT WHAT EXACTLY WILL CHANGE?</h3><h3>A policy audit of Dr. Kadri Obafemi Hamzat’s Lagos 2027–2031 manifesto</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/654/1*cIE2wzlN_nKKK4UQbrz-Cg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Before we delve deeply into this policy audit of this manifesto, one particularly crucial point must be made. Dr. Obafemi Hamzat is neither an opposition candidate nor a “outsider” who has been watching the Lagos state government from a distance and feels he has discovered answers that both this administration and its predecessors have missed. For twenty years, he has been a member of Lagos’ political and administrative establishment. He held various commissioner positions during his tenure in prior administrations, and since 2019, he has served as deputy governor, playing a crucial role in institutional decision-making.</p><p>This is the standard by which the Lagos deputy governor would be evaluated, as I stated in <a href="https://medium.com/@emperordotman/lagos-2027-what-the-governorship-candidates-promised-and-what-the-reality-looks-like-f47239e775a3?source=user_profile_page---------3-------------934acb6dbfd0------------------------">my policy audit of the platform town hall meeting of the Lagos state gubernatorial candidates</a>. In contrast, when an opposition candidate pledges to enhance public transportation, healthcare, education, or housing, the immediate question is whether the proposed intervention is feasible and whether the candidate is aware of the institutional and financial challenges involved. Another difficulty arises when an incumbent deputy governor makes the same pledges: what transpired while he was already a member of the government? It’s interesting to note that Dr. Obafemi Hamzat’s manifesto appears to reflect the current situation of the Lagos state government as well as the promises he would make.</p><p>Before we examine some of the key areas that were suggested in Dr. Obafemi Hamzat’s manifesto, let’s examine the burden of continuity and what the current administration can legitimately claim.</p><h4>THE PROBLEM WITH CONTINUITY: WHAT EXACTLY ARE WE CONTINUING?</h4><p>Since 1999, Lagos State has been governed by the ruling APC party, which Hamzat will represent in the upcoming elections. This is a significant amount of time to establish administrative systems, construct infrastructure, build institutions, and gain experience in managing a “complex metropolitan economy.” Saying that the ruling party hasn’t done some of this would be intellectually dishonest given that Lagos has upgraded its revenue administration, built significant road networks, increased its transit infrastructure, and made investments in public institutions.</p><p>The Blue Line and Red Line rail projects are also significant additions to the state’s transportation infrastructure. The expansion of the state’s internally generated revenue is also worth acknowledging. According to figures disclosed by the Lagos Commissioner for Finance in May 2026, the state generated approximately ₦2.6 trillion in total revenue in 2025, including ₦1.87 trillion in internally generated revenue, compared with ₦1.58 trillion in 2024. But there is a difference between building infrastructure and ensuring that the infrastructure adequately addresses the needs of a growing population, and there is also a difference between increasing government revenue and translating that revenue into improved living standards.</p><p>Therefore, it is not logical for Hamzat to claim that continuity is a “automatic achievement.” He has to explain what his party has done, what hasn’t worked, why some issues have remained, and what he plans to change. The next crucial question should be how his model will be modified if the current model has produced significant infrastructure but has not adequately addressed housing affordability, public water access, garbage collection, flooding, and the cost of living.</p><p>HEALTHCARE: AGAIN, MORE HOSPITALS ARE NOT THE SAME AS BETTER HEALTHCARE.<br>Hamzat acknowledges that Lagos has an established healthcare system comprising public hospitals, primary healthcare facilities, health insurance arrangements, ambulance services, and specialized medical institutions. His manifesto also recognizes that the population of Lagos state is projected to exceed 40 million. This projection has an important implication for the healthcare planning of Lagos State.<br>Therefore, his commitments presented are increasing the maternal and child health centers in the states from 10 to 15, upgrading 100 PHCs to flagship standard, and expanding the Ilera-Eko insurance scheme towards coverage of one in every three Lagos residents. He has also spoken of completing the 150-bed Massey Children’s Hospital, the 280-bed general hospital and the 150-bed Shomolu hospital, alongside two proposed general hospitals at Ogombo and Ibeju-Lekki.<br>These are significant proposals But as I have said in the townhall audit the test of healthcare is not simply the number of buildings opened or beds commissioned. Response rate and access are more important metrics than this. The Ilera-Eko initiative also requires clarity. An ambition to cover a third of the population should be accompanied by the present enrolment figure, the number of active enrollees, the services covered, the number of accredited facilities and the proportion of claims paid promptly and also,registration is not the same as effective access. A resident who holds an insurance card but cannot obtain medicines or find a nearby accredited provider is not adequately covered.<br>Hamzat should also have publised a baseline for maternal mortality, infant mortality, immunisation, , waiting times, drug availability and staffing at PHCs. Hamzat should then state the annual improvement expected between 2027 and 2031. Without those measures, the manifesto risks presenting additional infrastructure as a substitute for measurable health outcomes.</p><h4>EDUCATION: ACCESS MUST TRANSLATE INTO LEARNING</h4><p>Hamzat’s manifesto identifies several existing interventions, including EKO-EXCEL, the EKO-LEARNERS initiative, and the state’s technical and vocational education programs. It proposes deepening EKO-EXCEL across public primary schools and extending its reach into secondary education and promises to align technical and vocational training with labor market demand and scale the AI Workforce Transformation Programme. His proposals include: Strengthening the Lagos state universities and the research system around the state, Improving the capacity of teachers, trainers, and lecturers, Expanding technical education, Establishing additional technical colleges, Improving educational equity across the state’s divisions, Reducing the number of children excluded from education.</p><p>One particularly important commitment I like is the proposal to ensure that every child under 18 is either in school or learning a trade. This is an important objective, but its implementation requires more than establishing an agency or conducting enforcement exercises.<br>There are children in Lagos that are outside school for different reasons: poverty, disability, family circumstances, displacement, inadequate school infrastructure, and the inability of parents to meet the indirect costs of education (which I discussed in my audit of the townhall meeting and the audit of <a href="https://medium.com/@emperordotman/funso-dohertys-manifesto-has-the-right-ambition-where-is-the-delivery-plan-8810a8cf3ca7?source=user_profile_page---------2-------------934acb6dbfd0------------------------">Funsho Doherty’s manifesto</a>). A child who is not attending school because the family cannot afford transportation will not necessarily benefit from an intervention that merely requires registration.</p><p>The relevant measures should also include attendance, completion, literacy and numeracy, transition to secondary school, teacher training/vacancies/recruitment practices, and learning outcomes by local government area. If the deputy governor cannot show where the gaps are today, it will be difficult to determine whether his 2031 target has been met.</p><p>The manifesto also speaks about aligning technical education with the labor market, but this is where he must be more specific. What skills are employers currently demanding? How many graduates from existing technical colleges obtain employment within six months? How many establish viable businesses? How many institutions have functioning workshops and modern equipment?</p><h4>TRANSPORT: THE NUMBERS ARE AMBITIOUS, BUT THE OPERATING MODEL MATTERS.</h4><p>Transportation is central to Lagos’s economic productivity, education, and even housing policies. Hamzat proposes expanding the Lagos BRT bus fleet from about 1,000 to 4,000, with a target of serving one million Lagosians daily. He also outlined extensions of the Lagos rail lines, improvements to LAG ferry services, and integrating ticketing and additional water transport infrastructure to the OMIEKO.</p><p>These are tangible infrastructure developments and promises, but they also expose an important distinction between constructing transportation infrastructure and creating an integrated mass-transit model. A railway can be operational without adequately serving the wider population, as its usefulness depends on the number of passengers it carries daily, the frequency of the bus service, the affordability of fares, the availability of feeder buses, the accessibility of stations, and its connection with other transportation modes.</p><p>Increasing the number of BRT busses from about 1,000 to 4,000 shouldn’t be viewed as only a procurement process. Hamzat must describe how many buses will run during peak hours, how often they will run, which routes they will service, how maintenance will be paid for, and whether the operators and personnel can sustain his proposed growth. It is especially significant since he promised integrated ticketing. However, he ought to have made public the planned revenue-sharing plan, service standards, and pricing structure.</p><h4>HOUSING: MORTGAGE FINANCING DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MAKE HOMES AFFORDABLE</h4><p>The housing sector is one of the most difficult challenges Lagosians face. Hamzat’s manifesto recognizes the need to expand affordable homeownership through mortgage financing and partnerships with private developers. Hamzat proposes a 10 percent initial deposit, single-digit interest rates, and longer repayment periods. He also promises to complete ongoing housing projects, including developments at Sangotedo, Ibeshe, Ipaja, and Amuwo-Odofin.</p><p>A 10 per cent deposit may appear affordable, but affordability is determined by the entire cost of the property and the borrower’s ability to meet the monthly repayment obligations. Consider a hypothetical ₦50 million property, a 10 per cent deposit means ₦5 million upfront, leaving ₦45 million to be financed. Even with a single-digit interest rate, the monthly repayment may remain beyond the reach of many teachers, nurses, civil servants, traders and young professionals. So the problem is therefore not simply access to mortgages ,it is the relationship between property prices, household income, interest rates and the availability of long-term financing.</p><p>There is another issue: housing and transportation policies must be planned together. A cheaper house in a distant part of Lagos can become expensive when the resident has to spend several hours and a substantial proportion of their income travelling to work. Housing affordability must therefore include the cost of transportation, access to employment, healthcare, education and other essential services.</p><h4>WASTE MANAGEMENT: PROCUREMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE WON’T BE EFFECTIVE IF THE MODEL DOES NOT CHANGE</h4><p>The waste management section of Hamzat’s manifesto is particularly interesting because it exposes a problem that the current administration itself has publicly acknowledged. In September 2026, Governor Babajide Sanwo-Olu declared what he described as “a small state of emergency” over waste management. The intervention followed mounting complaints about the failing waste collection and disposal in Lagos state.</p><p>The government later declared plans for waste-to-energy infrastructure, the purchase of 160 compactor waste vehicles, more disposal capacity, and the renovation of transfer-loading stations at Olusosun and Solous 3. According to Hamzat’s manifesto, community-based collection systems should be strengthened; transfer-loading stations should be completed; material-recovery and waste-to-energy facilities should be developed; and 95% coverage should be achieved by optimizing Private Sector Participation operators. Additionally, he suggests incorporating about 30,000 individuals who gather and sort rubbish informally into the official waste management system.</p><p>These are intriguing ideas, but they don’t deal with the fundamental issue of Lagos’ waste management failure, as I have already mentioned: the state must decentralize waste management and transfer authority to local governments and LCDAs. Each LG/LCDA is impacted by waste management decisions that are not unique to one another. The roles of LAWMA, PSP operators, local governments, and LCDAs must be clearly defined by Hamzat. Who is responsible when a particular community goes several days without waste collection? Who monitors the performance of operators? What penalties apply to contractors who fail to meet service standards?</p><h4>ELECTRICITY: LAGOS NOW HAS MORE REGULATORY POWER. WHAT WILL IT DO WITH IT?</h4><p>Hamzat recognises that Lagos cannot continue to depend on generators as its principal solution to unreliable electricity supply so his manifesto proposes a combination of electricity-market reforms, private-sector investment, renewable energy and improved power infrastructure. It also recognises the economic importance of providing reliable electricity to homes, businesses and essential public institutions.</p><p>Lagos State became a state power market regulator in June 2025 after the ElectricityAct 2023 allowed Nigerian governments to create their own electricity markets. Although this is a significant institutional advancement, regulation by itself cannot produce electricity or ensure dependable distribution. Lagos still requires funding for gas supply, distribution, metering, storage, and upkeep. Additionally, the state must safeguard customers against “opaque” billing and make sure that the market reform does not only shift costs to small enterprises and homes.</p><p>So, therefore, Hamzat should have set out the expected megawatts to be added in the next four years, locations and timelines for new capacity, the role of private investors, expected tariff implications and the mechanism for resolving disputes. He must demonstrate how the electricity market will be financed, regulated and expanded.</p><h4>FLOODING, DRAINAGE AND COASTAL RESILIENCE</h4><p>Lagos state faces a combination of environmental challenges arising from its coastal geography, rapid urbanisation, drainage infrastructure, land-use patterns and changing climatic conditions. Hamzat proposes stronger drainage infrastructure, flood management, disaster preparedness, coastal protection and emergency response.</p><p>The environmental commitments include the need to maintain drainage channels, improve waste management and strengthen the state’s ability to respond to disasters.</p><p>However, land-use enforcement must also be addressed in a real resilience strategy. When urbanization continues to encroach on wetlands and natural drainage pathways, it is challenging to lower the danger of flooding. Plans for preventing wetland and drainage corridor encroachment must be demonstrated, and the state must cease its reactionary enforcement. Environmental assessments need to be taken carefully because of this. Additionally, he must to make public his emergency response plans, which should include the resources available to deal with flooding, the typical response time, and the plans for helping individuals who have been displaced.</p><h4>THE STATE WEALTH FUND PROPOSAL</h4><p>This is arguably one of the most consequential institutional proposals in Hamzat’s manifesto. Hamzat wants Lagos to improve how it plans, saves and finances its development beyond individual political administrations. His proposed State Wealth Fund is intended to create a mechanism through which the state can preserve resources and invest for future generations.</p><p>Lagos has a sizable source of income. As I previously stated, its entire revenue in 2025 was about ₦2.6 trillion, of which ₦1.87 trillion came from internal sources. The Lagos State House of Assembly approved a budget for 2026 that was roughly ₦4.44 trillion, of which more than half was set aside for capital expenditures. These figures show the size of the state’s public finances at the moment, but this does not imply that Lagos State has limitless financial resources.</p><p>The 2026 budget includes recurrent spending, capital expenditure, personnel costs, debt obligations and other commitments and there is also the issue of debt servicing. This is important because any proposed wealth fund must be designed around the state’s existing financial obligations. <br>The following questions must be answered by Dr Obafemi Hamzat: <br>1. What percentage of the state annual revenue will be transferred into the fund?<br>2. Which revenue sources will finance it?<br>3. Will it receive proceeds from asset sales, investment returns or specific government revenues?<br>4. Who will manage the fund?<br>5. What investment instruments will be permitted?<br>6. What safeguards will prevent political interference?<br>7. Will the fund’s financial statements be independently audited and published?<br>8. Under what circumstances can the government withdraw money from this fund?</p><h4>SECURITY</h4><p>Hamzat also addresses neighbourhood safety, public lighting, surveillance and the welfare of security personnel. These proposals matter because security is not only about major criminal incidents. It is also about whether residents can move safely through their neighbourhoods, whether markets and transport corridors are secure and whether vulnerable people can access public services without intimidation.</p><p>The proposed expansion of the Lagos Neighbourhood Safety Agency across the 20 local government areas and 37 local council development areas should come with a clear account and plan of its relationship with the Lagos RRS and other security agencies. He must define the agency’s legal powers, training standards, complaint procedures and current limits on the use of force as the agency is currently unarmed.</p><h4>WHAT A DELIVERY COMPACT SHOULD ACTUALLY LOOK LIKE</h4><p>The strongest part of Dr Obafemi Hamzat manifesto’s public presentation is the idea that each commitment he is making should be translated into a compact specifying what will be done, where it will happen, what it will cost and who will be responsible.<br>However, every major pledge should rather have six elements: a baseline, a measurable target, a deadline, a named responsible institution, a published budget and an independent means of verification. The government should also be able to report the progress quarterly and explain delays if a pledge is not fulfilled. Where a target is missed, it should say why and what corrective action will follow.</p><p>Like I have previously said in Funsho Doherty’s manifesto audit, the baseline is particularly important. If the government promises to increase water access, it must state how many households currently receive reliable piped water. If it promises 1 million daily BRT bus passengers, it must publish the present daily passenger count and distinguish scheduled capacity from actual journeys. If it promises to expand health insurance, it must disclose active enrolment and service use, not just registration.<br>A review of his compact should assess both outputs and outcomes and they are not interchangeable. Outputs include roads completed, buses procured, hospitals built and schools renovated while Outcomes include shorter commute times, lower maternal deaths, improved learning, more reliable water supply and reduced exposure to flooding.</p><p>A rather more important delivery should actually look like this;</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ko2_WHORWD_StlhHULNlXA.png" /></figure><h4>THE QUESTION HAMZAT MUST ANSWER</h4><p>Hamzat’s manifesto is broad and, in several areas, ambitious as it contains proposals that could improve public services if properly financed and implemented. It also builds on projects and institutions established during the administration in which he has served.</p><p>Continuity can preserve useful investments and prevent policy disruption but continuity is not, by itself, a development strategy. The APC gubernatorial candidate must therefore explain why problems that have persisted under the current administration will be resolved during the next one. If the water network has not reached most households, what will change in the financing and management of water delivery? If waste collection still breaks down, what will change in the contract structure, enforcement, waste collection model and disposal chain? If congestion remains severe after major transport investments, what will change in route planning, land use and public transport integration?</p><h4>CONCLUSION: CONTINUITY MUST COME WITH CORRECTION</h4><p>Dr Obafemi Hamzat’s manifesto presents a case for extending the “APC’s masterplan”. It points to infrastructure already delivered, projects underway and investments in health, education, transport, housing, water, waste, power, security and economic opportunity.</p><p>And yes, Hamzat has an advantage that opposition candidates do not: he knows the “machinery of government” and has been part of the public service for 22 years. That experience should allow him to present a more detailed and realistic plan but it also means he cannot avoid responsibility for explaining the gap between the current adminstation promise and the everyday experience of residents.</p><p>Most of the problem Lagos state faces have been discussed for years and Some are already the subject of ongoing government programmes. Others have become more pressing despite substantial public expenditure. The more important question is what Hamzat intends to do differently.</p><p>Hamzat has a particular responsibility in this regard because he is not approaching government as a new entrant. He has been part of the political and administrative system he now seeks to lead. His experience is relevant, but so is the record of the administration in which he has served.</p><p>The APC cannot reasonably make continuity its principal argument while treating the unresolved problems of the same administration as if they were inherited from an entirely different government.</p><p>Continuity may preserve useful institutions and ongoing projects but continuity must also allow for institutional correction, policy innovation and a willingness to abandon approaches that have not delivered the expected results</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4d8d40b638c7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[WHO IS PAYING AND HOW? THE QUESTION MISSING FROM NIGERIA'S SUBSIDY DEBATE]]></title>
            <link>https://emperordotman.medium.com/who-is-paying-and-how-the-question-missing-from-nigerias-subsidy-debate-97dea1775179?source=rss-934acb6dbfd0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/97dea1775179</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Emperor Dotman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 18:57:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-28T19:01:00.367Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>WHO IS PAYING AND HOW? THE QUESTION MISSING FROM NIGERIA’S SUBSIDY DEBATE</h3><h3>Yes, our politicians are thieves but this is not an economic plan</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/679/1*hpaL0n-_Jy9Hz2ugSLxG-A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Open Nigerian Twitter on any day, and you will find the same argument from a different perspective. Nigerians deserve free healthcare, affordable petrol, free university education, decent pensions, and trains that run on time. But when someone asks where the money for all of this will come from, it is simply: the politicians have stolen it.</p><p>I have probably made that argument myself too, usually with more adjectives, and I still believe corruption is one of Nigeria’s biggest problems. I find it bothersome, though, that we have grown so accustomed to that response that we hardly ever ask the next question. Would it be sufficient to cover all of our demands of the government, even if we were to recover every stolen naira?</p><p>IMO, Nigeria’s problem goes way beyond corruption. In actuality, it is an oversimplified perspective of our present situation. We depend too heavily on oil, collect too little tax from the wider economy, spend badly, and devote a substantial share of our income to servicing debt. Corruption makes all these problems worse, but it has never been the whole story.</p><h3>FIRST, THE MONEY NIGERIAN POLITICIANS STEAL</h3><p>According to the Chatham House, approximately $400 billion was taken from Nigeria&#39;s public accounts between the country&#39;s independence and 1999, and an additional $182 billion was lost as a result of illegal financial transactions between 2005 and 2014.</p><p>At N1,400 to the dollar, $17.8 billion is roughly N25 trillion. Nigeria’s 2026 federal budget allocates ₦2.48 trillion to health and ₦3.52 trillion to education. It is then simple to conclude that recovering stolen funds would resolve our issues if we choose to add those numbers together. However, money taken from government accounts is not the only source of illicit financial flows. The government is also deprived of money it should have collected through tax evasion, under-invoicing at ports, and profits hidden abroad. Additionally, theft occurs after funds have been distributed. Money intended for public services vanishes before the public benefits, contracts are inflated, and projects are shelved after payment.</p><p>Hospitals, universities, and public transportation would not be automatically funded indefinitely, even if all leaks were fixed and some of these funds were recovered. Every year, these services need money, so we need a stable revenue stream in addition to successfully recovering funds that have been stolen.</p><h3>CORRUPTION IS NOT CONFINED TO POLITICIANS</h3><p>Corruption has become so familiar in almost every part of Nigerian society that its citizens sometimes treat it as normal. The civil servant who demands money before doing his job, the contractor who inflates a quotation because he expects to share the proceeds, and the business owner who evades tax all contribute to the corrupt cycle in Nigeria. It even gets worse when antigraft agencies, who are supposed to fight corruption, are caught in corruption schemes.</p><p>And this does not excuse politicians who steal public money. Those entrusted with public resources and funds should face particularly serious scrutiny. However, if the same behaviour is accepted practically every place in society, changing the people at the top won’t put an end to corruption. We can not condemn corruption in government while celebrating it when it benefits us personally. Perhaps the Chatham report that also claimed corruption is a social issue is correct after all.</p><h3>RUSSIA AND CHINA AS CASE STUDY</h3><p>China is often cited as a popular example of a country that punishes corrupt officials severely because of the capital punishment that is given to offenders. For instance, Lai Xiaomin, the former chairman of China Huarong Asset Management, was put to death in January 2021 after being found guilty of corruption.</p><p>However, corruption is still a problem in China. China received a score of 43 out of 100 in Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, while Russia received a score of 22 (even lower than Nigeria’s score of 26). In fact, England and London, in particular, used to be a haven for Russian oligarchs to take public funds to.</p><p>This index does not teach us that fighting corruption is not important. Instead, it tells us a productive economy and an efficient government cannot be established by the death penalty alone. China, in particular, has developed a vast manufacturing and export base. Its economic strength comes from much more than how it punishes corrupt officials. Infrastructure, investments, and productive industries are all important. Nigeria should take the same broader view. While combating corruption is crucial, it cannot take the place of effective public administration and economic growth.</p><h3>WE LIVE OFF OIL AND TAX TOO LITTLE OF THE WIDER ECONOMY</h3><p>This is the aspect of the debate that we hardly ever discuss or that people purposefully avoid discussing.</p><p>Despite making up only 5% of Nigeria&#39;s real GDP, crude oil accounts for nearly 90% of the country&#39;s export earnings and roughly 40% of government revenue. There is a significant imbalance there. The government is under pressure to borrow money, postpone projects, or reduce spending when oil production declines or prices fall short.</p><p>Meanwhile, we struggle to collect sufficient tax from the wider economy. A large informal sector makes tax administration difficult, while tax evasion, weak enforcement and corporate tax incentives has also further limit collections. And yes, the answer is not to harass petty traders who are barely surviving. It is to build a fairer system that captures taxable economic activity, which reviews unnecessary exemptions and ensures that profitable businesses pay what they owe.</p><p>For instance, according to the OECD, Nigeria&#39;s tax-to-GDP ratio in 2023 was 8.2%, while the average for 38 other African nations was 16.1%. Comparable numbers for Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa were 15.8%, 15.4%, and 26.5%, respectively. Because they employ different definitions and coverage, various institutions occasionally publish higher Nigerian estimates. However, the main issue still persists: Nigeria&#39;s tax revenue is low given the size of its economy.</p><p>There is also a political cost to depending heavily on a centralized economy; oil. There may be less direct pressure on a government that depends less on citizen taxes to justify the use of public funds. Although taxes don’t always result in accountability, people who pay taxes have a right to expect outcomes.</p><h3>THE BUDGET ALSO TELLS ITS OWN STORY</h3><p>Nigeria&#39;s federal budget for 2026 is ₦58.18 trillion, with a projected revenue of ₦34.33 trillion and a ₦23.85 trillion deficit. It is estimated that debt servicing will cost ₦15.52 trillion, while health and education will cost ₦2.48 trillion and ₦3.52 trillion, respectively. The problem has not never been simply how much Nigeria owes. It is whether the government generates enough income to meet its obligations without squeezing the money available for public services. Due to low government revenue, a debt-to-GDP ratio may appear manageable, but debt servicing is still challenging. That is why increasing revenue matters as much as controlling expenditure.</p><p>The effects of this are demonstrated by Nigerian healthcare. When divided by a population of more than 230 million, the health allocation is just under ₦11,000 per Nigerian. This explains why a lot of families still have to pay a large amount of money out of pocket for medical care. Nigerians have every right to call for improved medical facilities and academic institutions. But we should also ask how the government intends to finance these services year after year.</p><h3>THE QUESTION OF SUBSIDY</h3><p>Fuel subsidies revealed the same issue in a different way. Nigeria receives foreign exchange from the sale of crude oil, but it uses a large portion of these profits to support, subsidize, and regulate the price of gasoline, including fuel that is smuggled into neighboring countries.</p><p>But eliminating the subsidy did not immediately generate enough funds to address our issues with public service. The August 2026 scorecard from the Federal Ministry of Finance estimates that the federation saved ₦15.8 trillion in subsidies between June 2023 and December 2025. Only about ₦5.43 trillion was the Federal Government’s share, with the remainder going to states and local governments.</p><p>To be precise, households have suffered greatly as a result of the removal of subsidies due to increased transportation and inflation, but reinstating them would also be expensive. If someone makes a commitment to restore it, they should also describe how it would be funded and what expenses would be cut to make room for it.</p><h3>What we would request instead</h3><p>I’m not saying that corruption should be overlooked. I contend that corruption cannot be the sole cause of our economic issues. We lose money through theft. We fail to collect revenue that should come from legitimate economic activity. We spend poorly, rely too much on oil, and spend too much of our disposable income on debt repayment.</p><p>Stopping corruption is necessary, but it is not enough. Additionally, we require a government that is able to collect enough money, spend it wisely, and provide services that are worth the funds.</p><p>I would begin by calling for the services that Nigerians are entitled to. No one should have to borrow money or sell their property in order to cover their medical expenses. Children should not be denied decent education because their parents cannot afford private schools. However, each commitment should include a description of how it will be financed. This was the starting point for my audit of Funsho Doherty’s manifesto and the Lagos gubernatorial candidates at THE PLATFORM TOWNHALL. It is simple to make promises, but it is challenging to demonstrate how to turn them into reality.</p><p>Candidates who promise free healthcare should be questioned about the costs and sources of funding, how they plan to raise taxes without unfairly burdening those who are already struggling, and how they plan to decentralize the economy without using performative jargon.</p><p>The “thief theory” is reassuring because it identifies a clear villain and suggests a simple solution. However, if we only shout about the money that politicians embezzle, we might continue to win online debates while losing the much more important debate about how to create a functional nation.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=97dea1775179" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[FUNSO DOHERTY’S MANIFESTO HAS THE RIGHT AMBITION. WHERE IS THE DELIVERY PLAN?]]></title>
            <link>https://emperordotman.medium.com/funso-dohertys-manifesto-has-the-right-ambition-where-is-the-delivery-plan-8810a8cf3ca7?source=rss-934acb6dbfd0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8810a8cf3ca7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lagos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Emperor Dotman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 16:53:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-13T18:36:19.006Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A policy audit of ÒNÀ TUNTUN, testing its 34 commitments against Lagos’ existing programmes, public finances and the practical business of governing a megacity.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/399/0*-nTxWSrTNORih3Ei" /></figure><p>Funso Doherty has unveiled his manifesto for the 2027 Lagos governorship election. 34 pledges in the fields of health, education, housing, transportation, the environment, employment, small business, and government accountability make up <strong>“ONA TUNTUN: The New Way for Lagos.”</strong></p><p>The proposals are bold. In four years, he wants to build 150,000 housing units, help create 500,000 jobs, establish at least 40 technical and vocational schools, offer free healthcare for mothers and children, and increase the combined budgetary allocation to health and education to 28%.</p><p>He also wants a single-fare public transport system, better drainage, wider access to water, better waste management, and a more accountable government. These are issues that affect the everyday life of Lagosians. The goals of many of these proposals have plenty of justifications.</p><p>But I do not wish to assess this manifesto according to that standard.</p><p>In my previous piece, <a href="https://emperordotman.medium.com/lagos-2027-what-the-governorship-candidates-promised-and-what-the-reality-looks-like-f47239e775a3">Lagos 2027: What the Governorship Candidates Promised and What the Reality Looks Like</a>, I compared the promises made at The Platform town hall to current initiatives, available data, financial realities, and governmental obligations.</p><p>The same principles should apply here.</p><p>A candidate can correctly identify a problem but propose an unnecessarily expensive solution. Even if a promise is not adequately funded, it can still be appealing. Although a program may be technically feasible, the governor cannot simply disregard institutions, contracts, or regulatory arrangements.</p><p>Furthermore, a manifesto might pledge to carry out an existing policy without describing how the new government intends to make it better.</p><p>We can look at Funsho Doherty’s manifesto in addition to his campaign speeches. Several commitments have specific numbers attached to them. That is useful.</p><p>Finding the practical meaning of those numbers is the next challenge.</p><h4>THE FIRST PROBLEM IS MONEY. NOT WHETHER LAGOS HAS IT, BUT HOW IT WILL BE SPENT</h4><p>According to Doherty, Lagos has the means to offer its citizens better public services. That position is supported by a compelling argument.</p><p>Lagos produced the most internally generated revenue of any state in the nation in 2025, with about ₦1.77 trillion, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. That is a sizable source of income.</p><p>But having a sizable revenue base does not guaranty that the government can fund all appealing proposals at once.</p><p>How much each commitment will cost, what will be directly funded by the state, how much private investment is anticipated, and which current expenditures will have to make way are all crucial questions.</p><p>Take into consideration the manifesto’s pledge to raise budgetary allotments to health and education to 28%, which is roughly twice the current percentage.</p><p>According to Lagos’ published 2026 budget proposal, the combined budget for health and education would be approximately ₦587.6 billion, out of a total budget of ₦4.237 trillion. That is approximately 13.9 per cent of the proposed budget.</p><p>Allocating 28% of the budget to the two sectors would equate to about ₦1.186 trillion. The proposed 28% target and the published allocations differ by about ₦599 billion.</p><p>That is not pocket change.</p><p>It does not imply that the goal is unachievable. Increasing revenue, rerouting spending, improving collection, cutting wasteful spending, or combining these strategies are all options available to a new administration. Over time, its budget would also fluctuate.</p><p>However, the manifesto must outline how this change will take place.</p><p>Will cutting back on other capital projects provide the extra funding? Will more money be necessary for the government? Will new financing arrangements be introduced? How much of the increase will be used for new infrastructure and how much for salaries, medications, and school operations?</p><p>Increasing a budgetary allocation does not always result in better service delivery, so these questions are important. The funds must be allocated to the appropriate organizations, used appropriately, and yield quantifiable outcomes.</p><p>A compelling spending goal is presented in the manifesto. It does not yet offer a sufficiently thorough financial plan to accomplish it.</p><h4>HOUSING: 150,000 UNITS IS A SERIOUS TARGET. THE FUNDING MODEL IS THE REAL TEST.</h4><p>Housing is one of the promises in this manifesto that most urgently needs a thorough implementation strategy.</p><p>Within four years, Doherty hopes to provide at least 150,000 low- and middle-class housing units.</p><p>That amounts to 37,500 units per year.</p><p>To put things in perspective, Lagos has been constructing public housing estates for many years, but the amount delivered is still far less than what would be needed to fulfilll this commitment. In my earlier town hall audit, I noted the gap between the current administration’s housing delivery and the scale of its candidate’s promise.</p><p>By talking about the money, Doherty has at least taken things a step further.</p><p>He calculated at the time of the manifesto launch that it might take about ₦600 billion to deliver 30,000 units in the first year. Although he acknowledged that the exact numbers were still being worked out, he stated that the funds would come from both government and private sector investment, backed by the necessary government guaranties.</p><p>This information is helpful, but it also shows how big the problem is.</p><p>The projected ₦600 billion represents roughly 34% of Lagos’s internal revenue of ₦1.77 trillion in 2025. Additionally, it is nearly five times the ₦123.76 billion allotted to the housing sector in the state’s proposed budget for 2026.</p><p>To be clear, this does not imply that the government must use its own annual budget to cover the full cost of housing. Private investment can reduce the immediate burden on public finances.</p><p>However, private funds are also not free.</p><p>If government provides guarantees, acquires land, installs infrastructure or commits to purchasing completed units, it assumes financial obligations that must be disclosed and properly assessed.</p><p>Therefore, the manifesto must specify the number of units that will be directly funded by the government, the number that will come from private developers, the guaranties that will be provided, and the potential costs to taxpayers of those guaranties.</p><p>Affordability is another issue.</p><p>Without increasing housing accessibility for regular workers, a housing program can produce thousands of new apartments. A young graduate, a teacher, a trader, and a civil servant may not all be able to make mortgage payments.</p><p>For the proposed homes, what income level will be eligible? What are the monthly payments and purchase prices going to be? Will those without access to traditional mortgages be able to rent-to-own properties? How will the government make sure that those who already own property don’t eventually use the units as investments?</p><p>These specifics shouldn’t wait until the houses are constructed.</p><p><strong>Even more investigation is needed into the Lekki Free Trade Zone proposal.</strong></p><p>Additionally, Doherty suggests allocating about 3,000 hectares of the Lekki Free Trade Zone to affordable housing.</p><p>The idea is to make land available for lower-cost accommodation while improving transport and infrastructure in areas such as Ikorodu, Ibeju-Lekki, Epe and Badagry.</p><p>The possible advantage Is obvious. Lagos’s housing crisis cannot be resolved by concentrating all new construction in pricey areas of the city.</p><p>However, the Lekki Economic Zone is not simply an empty expanse of government land. Its development is centered on commercial, industrial, logistics, and other economic activities and spans about 16,500 hectares. <strong>The zone functions within the framework of a special economic zone created by Nigeria’s free-zone laws.</strong></p><p>It’s a big decision to reallocate about one-fifth of that land area for housing.</p><p>An independent land-use assessment, a review of current contractual obligations, communication with the appropriate free-zone authorities, and a detailed explanation of how the change would impact employment and planned investments are all necessary.</p><p>It also requires more than drawing new boundaries on a map.</p><p>Where will the locals obtain their water? What kind of infrastructure will be used for drainage? How will they travel to work? Will residents find themselves living in reasonably priced homes while incurring significant daily transportation costs, or will public transportation be available prior to the homes being occupied?</p><p>I have always maintained that housing and transportation need to be taken into account jointly. A house is not truly affordable simply because its purchase price is lower. The housing bill includes the daily cost of transportation to work.</p><p>The manifesto needs to offer a much clearer delivery and funding model, but Doherty has identified the appropriate geographic areas to look at.</p><p><strong>EDUCATION: THE QUESTION IS WHAT BECOMES FREE THAT IS NOT ALREADY FREE</strong></p><p>Doherty promises free public education through senior secondary school or technical college, including textbooks and examination fees. Additionally, he suggests providing free school transportation for students who require it and one wholesome meal for every public school student each school day.</p><p>This has a lot of positive aspects.</p><p>Parents are aware that education costs more than just tuition. Even when tuition is officially free, public education can be costly due to transportation costs, books, uniforms, exam fees, and meals.</p><p>However, Lagos does not have to start from scratch with its education policy.</p><p>There is already a free and mandatory education system in place for public primary and junior secondary education. The state also has existing arrangements for examination fees for eligible pupils, alongside textbook provision and other educational support programmes. My earlier town hall audit examined these programmes and the need to distinguish existing services from genuinely new commitments.</p><p>Under the Adopt-a-School initiative, Lagos and the Federal Government also started a school breakfast program in July 2026. That program is meant to supplement current feeding arrangements, but a partnership that relies on school sponsorship is not the same as a state guaranty that every student will have a meal every school day.</p><p>Therefore, Doherty’s proposal should be evaluated based on how much extra help it will offer and how consistently it will reach students.</p><p>For school meals, how many children will be covered? How much will be spent every day on each child? What safeguards will be in place to prevent inflated contracts and subpar meals, and who will provide the food?</p><p>How will the government determine which students require transportation assistance? Will it use a different plan, subsidize current public transportation, or provide special school busses?</p><p>Most importantly, as the government increases these benefits, what happens to the quality of education?</p><p>A child does not fully benefit from public education if they receive free meals and textbooks but are confined to a crammed classroom with insufficient teaching resources.</p><p>The manifesto should provide a costed plan showing how these commitments will work together.</p><p>40 technical and vocational schools: why start with that number?</p><p>Doherty suggests establishing at least forty cutting-edge technical and vocational schools throughout Lagos.</p><p>The fundamental issue is genuine. Lagos requires skilled workers who can support the state’s economy, such as electricians, technicians, mechanics, plumbers, welders, industrial operators, and construction workers.</p><p>Nonetheless, there are already technical and vocational education facilities in the state. According to the baseline covered in my earlier audit, it operates 19 skills-acquisition centers and has plans to expand the technical-college network to ten institutions.</p><p>The number of new schools that can be announced is not the only pertinent question.</p><p>Are the current institutions equipped appropriately? Are their workshops operational? Do their courses meet the needs of employers? After completing their training, can graduates start their own businesses or find employment?</p><h4>HEALTHCARE: FREE CARE IS A GOOD PROMISE, BUT WHAT WILL PATIENTS ACTUALLY RECEIVE?</h4><p>The manifesto promises free maternal and child healthcare for pregnant women and children up to 16 years old, including drugs, tests and medical consumables.</p><p>One of its more significant social obligations is this.</p><p>A pregnant woman should not have to abandon treatment because she cannot afford prescribed medicines. Parents shouldn’t have to choose between covering other household expenses and paying for a child’s medical care.</p><p>Nevertheless, current programs need to be taken into account.</p><p>Through initiatives involving Ilera-Eko and the Basic Health Care Provision Fund, Lagos already runs healthcare support programs that include free delivery services for expectant mothers and subsidized treatment for other qualified patients. The state has also admitted that low awareness and insufficient mobilization prevent eligible residents from receiving the benefits that are available to them.</p><p>Because of this, implementation is particularly crucial.</p><p>Doherty’s proposal appears to go further by explicitly including medicines, tests and consumables for a wider group of beneficiaries. If the program is adequately funded and available, that could be a significant improvement.</p><p>However, the manifesto must outline the range of services that are included. Will participating private hospitals be included in the commitment, or will it only be applicable at public facilities? When a patient requires specialized care, what happens? How are hospitals going to get paid? When patients arrive, what system will ensure that medications are available?</p><p>The programme also requires reliable procurement, adequate staffing, functioning equipment and a referral system for complications.</p><p>On its first day in office, a government may declare healthcare to be free. Providing dependable care to millions of people is a more complicated undertaking.</p><p>The true test should be whether maternal and child health outcomes improve over time and whether eligible patients can receive treatment without being sent away to purchase basic medications and supplies.</p><p>Those actions must be documented in the manifesto.</p><h4>TRANSPORT: A DEFINITION IS NEEDED FOR THE ONE-FARE PROMISE</h4><p>Doherty suggests a more comprehensive public transportation system that includes ferries, busses, and trains. Additionally, he wants a transport academy, better rail connections to priority housing zones, road maintenance bases in each local government area, and the deployment of large, high-capacity busses on major routes.</p><p>The direction Is sensible.</p><p>Lagos has made significant investments in transportation infrastructure, but locals are still burdened by high fares, lengthy travel times, and the challenge of switching between different modes of transportation.</p><p>Although the Red and Blue rail lines are currently in operation, additional funding, land acquisition, and engineering work are needed for further expansion. As I mentioned in my previous audit, the financing and delivery arrangements are just as important as the projected completion dates when evaluating rail projects.</p><p>Particular consideration should be given to the one-fare promise.</p><p>Does it refer to a single ticket that enables travelers to switch between trains, busses, and ferries? Does this imply a set fare for all distances? Or does it refer to a standard payment method with a cap on the total amount paid for a trip?</p><p>These policies have distinct financial ramifications.</p><p>The use of public transportation could be greatly facilitated by a common ticketing system. On the other hand, a clear plan for revenue sharing and operating expenses would be necessary for a flat fare across all modes.</p><p>When the fare collected is less than the service charge, who bears the difference? How will operators who take part get paid? Are transfers going to be free, discounted, or time-limited?</p><p>These questions must be addressed in the manifesto.</p><p>What happens to current transportation workers and bus operators?</p><p>Replacing minibuses on major routes is not just a vehicle procurement exercise.</p><p>Owners of vehicles, drivers, conductors, informal transport workers, and other individuals rely on the current system for their livelihoods.</p><p>Doherty recognizes the necessity of transitioning impacted employees, which is a crucial component. However, the manifesto ought to outline the procedure.</p><p>Will new bus companies invite operators? Will vehicle owners be compensated or offered opportunities to invest? What kind of funding and training will be offered? How will the government keep the new system from turning into another one where a few companies control the majority of the revenue and the routes?</p><p>Although training by itself won’t solve the issue, the proposed LAMATA Transport Academy might be helpful. It must directly relate to job opportunities brought about by the transportation reforms.</p><p>Measurable goals are also required for the road-maintenance proposal. It is one thing to establish a base in each local government. Another is making sure potholes are fixed promptly.</p><p>Lagosians should be able to see how long it takes the government to address a road defect, how many kilometers of roads are maintained annually, and how much money is allocated to preventive maintenance as opposed to emergency repairs.</p><p>That is how we know whether decentralising operations has made a difference.</p><h4>ECOLOGY: THE MANIFESTO HAS TO GO BEYOND PURCHASING EQUIPMENT</h4><p>The three main areas of concern in the environment section are waste management, flood prevention, and water access.</p><p>Lagosians deal with these issues on a daily basis, and the suggestions merit careful consideration.</p><p><strong>Water for every home</strong></p><p>Doherty pledges to guaranty that all households have access to water, either via shared access points or direct connections.</p><p>The difference is important.</p><p>Not every home will have a private piped connection just because everyone has access to water. In communities where individual connections are not immediately possible, communal points can offer a helpful temporary solution.</p><p>However, the manifesto must specify what universal access will actually entail.</p><p>How many homes have consistent access to clean water right now? For household connections, what is the goal? Where will the common areas be situated? Who will maintain the systems after construction and how will water quality be monitored?</p><p>A financing plan for the production, treatment, distribution, and upkeep of water is also necessary for the promise.</p><p>Without those specifics, the government runs the risk of declaring the building of water facilities a success even though locals might still have trouble getting water on a regular basis.</p><p><strong>Flooding and drainage</strong></p><p>An excellent place to start is with the proposal to audit Lagos’ drainage infrastructure.</p><p>Critical flood points, damaged infrastructure, and blocked channels could all be found with the aid of a thorough assessment. Additionally, the manifesto calls for immediate action to resolve significant drainage bottlenecks.</p><p>But flood prevention is not the same as an audit.</p><p>What proportion of the drainage system will be examined? In the first year, how many priority bottlenecks will be fixed? Which places will be attended to right away? How frequently will drainage channels be examined and cleaned?</p><p>Lagos must also safeguard its coastal regions and wetlands. An institutional focus for that task could be provided by the proposed independent Wetlands and Coastal Protection Commission.</p><p>However, the state already has ministries and agencies in charge of drainage and environmental management. As a result, the new commission should have well-defined authority, duties, and financial resources. If not, Lagos might establish a new agency without addressing the overlaps that frequently impair enforcement.</p><p>Instead of just creating a new institution, the goal should be to lessen flooding, safeguard communities, and stop preventable damage to homes and businesses.</p><p><strong>Waste management: equipment is not the whole solution</strong></p><p>This is the environmental commitment that I think is most crucial.</p><p>Doherty suggests making significant investments in infrastructure and equipment for waste collection, transfer, processing, and disposal. Additionally, he wants more waste-to-energy, recycling, and material recovery initiatives.</p><p>Instead of treating waste management as a collection of unconnected tasks, the proposal appropriately views it as a chain.</p><p>However, we already have a convincing example of why this problem requires more than just more equipment.</p><p>Governor Babajide Sanwo-Olu proclaimed a “small state of emergency” in September 2026 due to waste management. The government revealed plans to build transfer-loading and material-recovery facilities, increase the capacity of existing dumpsites to receive waste, and deploy 160 new compactor trucks. The intervention came in response to growing pressure on Lagos’s waste disposal and collection systems.</p><p>This experience should serve as a lesson for the next administration.</p><p>Purchasing trucks can boost the capacity for collection. The amount of time trucks must wait to release waste can be decreased by transfer stations. Recycling can minimize the amount of trash dumped in landfills and recover valuable materials.</p><p>These interventions are all worthwhile.</p><p>They won’t, however, automatically address issues like missed collections, inadequate route coverage, lax enforcement, or the challenges faced by locals in areas with inconsistent collection services.</p><p>The manifesto outlines its investment priorities, but it is unclear how accountability for the system as a whole will be distributed.</p><p>Who is going to be in charge of household collection? What roles will local governments, LCDAs, private sector operators, and LAWMA all play? How will subpar service be penalized and performance evaluated? What percentage of waste will be recycled, and what goals will direct waste-to-energy initiatives?</p><p>I’ve previously stated that Lagos should move waste collection closer to LCD and local governments.While LAWMA concentrates more on regulation, standards, and support, they are more familiar with their own streets, markets, and communities. In my opinion, the need to hold local services accountable should not be confused with central coordination.</p><p>That question is not resolved by Doherty’s manifesto.</p><p>It should.</p><p>Markets and neighborhoods produce waste. Missed collections and indiscriminate dumping are experienced at street level. The government must decide who is responsible for solving these problems and give that institution the resources and authority to do so.</p><p>Without a clear division of responsibility, Lagos could spend more money on waste management and still struggle with the same failures.</p><h4>500,000 JOBS: WHO WILL COUNT THEM?</h4><p>Doherty has set an ambitious goal of facilitating the creation of 500,000 jobs. Construction, transportation, education, healthcare, manufacturing, commerce, agriculture-related activities, and waste processing are among the suggested sectors.</p><p>It Is significant that the word<strong> “enable”</strong> is used in the manifesto.</p><p>It does not imply that 500,000 people will be directly employed by the state. Instead, the government anticipates that its investments and policies will promote employment growth throughout the economy.</p><p>The final delivery plan should take that distinction into account.</p><p>Over the course of a four-year term, the government would need to develop a clear plan for sustaining an average of 125,000 jobs annually.</p><p>How many jobs are anticipated as a result of the housing program? How many come from investments in transportation? In technical and vocational education, how many? To reach the goal, how much private investment will be needed?</p><p>What constitutes a job is another issue.</p><p>Are jobs that would have been created without government intervention, short-term training placements, informal trading, and temporary construction employment included in the target?</p><p>The government must make a distinction between short-term and long-term employment. Additionally, it should monitor salaries, length of employment, and the number of Individuals who continue to work after completing a program.</p><p>If not, an administration might declare 500,000 jobs without providing Lagosians with a trustworthy means of confirming whether the goal has been met.</p><p>Beyond a list of authorized fees, small businesses require protection.</p><p>The manifesto proposes a single, transparent schedule of business fees, stronger action against unauthorised levies, a Small Business Ombudsman’s office, tax relief for low-income workers and employment tax credits for small-business employers.</p><p>These are helpful suggestions, especially for small businesses and traders who have to deal with a lot of charges and inspections.</p><p>But there are practical issues to resolve.</p><p>A single schedule of fees will only work if agencies and local governments apply it consistently. An ombudsman’s office must have the authority to investigate complaints, demand information and secure corrective action. Additionally, companies must be free to report illegal charges without worrying about reprisals.</p><p>Similar caution is needed with the tax proposals.</p><p>Who will be eligible for employment credits and rebates? How much will the government pay for them? Will the incentives primarily help companies that already have the documentation and resources required to claim them, or will they also reach small businesses that operate outside of the official payroll system?</p><p>The manifesto should also specify how the government will assess these incentives’ efficacy. For instance, the government should be able to determine whether a company that receives an employment tax credit actually created more jobs rather than getting public funding for jobs it would have created anyhow.</p><h4>GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY: THE MOST IMPORTANT PROMISE MAY BE THE ONE THAT COSTS THE LEAST TO ANNOUNCE</h4><p>Stronger enforcement of the public-officer code of conduct, a review of public-private partnerships and major contracts, a review of public-sector compensation, a cap of two official vehicles permanently assigned to each public officer in office, and an independent assessment of benefits granted to former governors and other political appointees are all suggested in the manifesto.</p><p>These suggestions address an issue that extends beyond Lagos: people are frequently asked to acknowledge that the government requires additional funding, but they are frequently unable to assess the efficiency with which current funds are being utilized.</p><p>Therefore, Doherty’s pledge to examine significant contracts and public-private partnerships is crucial.</p><p>However, the exercise needs to be done correctly.</p><p>Contracts signed by a previous administration should not be canceled due to a review. Current agreements may have financial ramifications, compensation requirements, and legal obligations.</p><p>The government would require independent technical and financial evaluations, precise criteria for choosing contracts for review, and published results outlining the investigations and subsequent actions.</p><p>The government should provide an explanation of the evidence and the available legal remedies in cases where contracts have been poorly negotiated, violated, or found to be against the public interest.</p><p>The same strategy ought to be used when enforcing the behavior of public servants. If investigations are biased or if sanctions are based on political affiliation, the manifesto’s commitment will be meaningless.</p><p>Reducing the privileges associated with public office might be effectively communicated by limiting the use of official vehicles that are permanently assigned. The bigger question, however, is how much the government spends on its fleet of vehicles, maintenance, fuel, and associated costs, and whether or not those expenditures benefit the general public.</p><p>Attention should also be paid to the review of former governors’ benefits, especially if it results in clear information and affordable public-service expenses.</p><p>However, the government ought to do more.</p><p>It should pledge to make procurement data, audit reports, project expenses, and implementation progress available in easily comprehensible formats. Campaign statements shouldn’t be the only way for a resident to learn whether a project is on track or how much it has cost.</p><p>The manifesto makes a number of helpful promises regarding accountability. Their real value will depend on whether the administration is willing to subject itself to scrutiny.</p><h4>WHAT IS MISSING FROM THE MANIFESTO?</h4><p>A policy audit must examine omissions as well as the promises that are already in the document.</p><p>One noticeable gap is the absence of a substantial, standalone electricity programme.</p><p>Households, manufacturers, retailers, service providers, and nearly every small business in Lagos are impacted by energy costs. There are now chances for state-level intervention because the state operates in a different electricity regulatory environment. My earlier town hall audit examined why this is an area where candidates should be expected to explain what their administrations would regulate, finance or facilitate.</p><p>While Doherty’s manifesto offers suggestions for infrastructure, jobs, and business assistance, it does not outline a comparable electricity program with precise goals for supply, affordability, or dependability.</p><p>That is a significant omission from an economic agenda.</p><p>Coordination is another more general problem.</p><p>The housing program is reliant on drainage, water, and transportation. The requirements of businesses determine technical education. The livelihoods of current employees, private operators, and fare policy all play a role in public transportation reform. Who is in charge of collection, disposal, and enforcement determines how waste is managed.</p><p>These are not distinct issues.</p><p>The manifesto contains proposals that touch many of these areas, but the links between them need to be clearer. A government cannot construct a lot of homes and then deny the locals access to reasonably priced transportation. Without determining what skills the labor market requires, technical education cannot be expanded. It cannot implement business tax credits without proving that they will create new jobs.</p><p>The final Implementation plan should demonstrate the interdependence of the programs and how the commitments fit together.</p><h4>THE VERDICT: GOOD DIAGNOSIS, BUT THE NUMBERS STILL NEED TO WORK</h4><p>The manifesto of Funsho Doherty merits careful consideration.</p><p>It acknowledges a number of issues that make life challenging for Lagosians and suggests solutions that could enhance access to basic services, housing, healthcare, education, and transportation. It’s also good that government accountability is emphasized.</p><p>Although the housing target is ambitious, its size alone does not justify its dismissal. Examining whether the financing, land, and infrastructure arrangements can support the promised delivery is the appropriate task.</p><p>This also holds true for free school lunches, healthcare, and education. These are commendable goals, but the manifesto needs to make a distinction between the services that are currently provided and the extra assistance that its administration plans to ensure.</p><p>Although there are some good ideas in its transportation and waste management proposals, the institutional details are still unclear. A transparent method of measuring success is also necessary for the 500,000 jobs program.</p><p>Above all, it is impossible to ignore the financial consequences.</p><p>It is reasonable to expect a state with Lagos’ revenue base to do more for its citizens. The availability of funds does not, however, imply that all proposals can be funded at once or that the most costly proposal is always the best one.</p><p>The decisions made by the government will be just as important as its expenditures.</p><p>I would not reject this manifesto because it is ambitious. Lagos needs an administration prepared to make substantial improvements in the lives of its residents.</p><p>However, I also wouldn’t accept it as a final delivery plan.</p><p>A comprehensive, costed program outlining the first year’s events, the subsequent years’ plans, the financing of each commitment, and the institutions that will be held accountable should be the next step.</p><p>By 2027, Lagosians shouldn’t be forced to choose candidates solely on the basis of their most alluring promises.</p><p>They ought to be able to look at what each candidate wants to accomplish, whether the figures make sense, whether the institutions can carry it out, and how the public will be able to tell if it has succeeded.</p><p>I conducted the town hall audit using that standard. It should also be the standard for the manifesto.</p><p>A manifesto should tell us what a candidate wants to do. Additionally, a legitimate governing plan should specify how, with what funds, by whom, and when.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8810a8cf3ca7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[LAGOS 2027: WHAT THE GOVERNORSHIP CANDIDATES PROMISED AND WHAT THE REALITY LOOKS LIKE]]></title>
            <link>https://emperordotman.medium.com/lagos-2027-what-the-governorship-candidates-promised-and-what-the-reality-looks-like-f47239e775a3?source=rss-934acb6dbfd0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f47239e775a3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lagos]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Emperor Dotman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 20:28:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-03T20:34:55.306Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A policy audit of the Lagos 2027 governorship town hall, testing the candidates’ claims and promises against facts, existing programmes and fiscal realities.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/399/1*9szq13XIQMk89ygBg3aizw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Platform town hall offered something most gubernatorial elections in Nigeria rarely provide; several competing discussions in the same room, on similar subjects, and before the same audience. But campaign promises are not simply policy because they sound ambitious.</p><p>On October 1st, 2026, four major Lagos gubernatorial candidates; Adedeji Doherty (PDP), Gbadebo Rhodes-Vivour (ADC), Funso Doherty (NDC) and the deputy governor, Obafemi Hamzat (APC) appeared at this town hall.</p><p>This event produced plenty of numbers and promises, and this matters, but so do the omissions. A candidate can successfully identify a problem but still propose the wrong instrumentation to solve it. A promise can be desirable but fiscally implausible. A solution could be technically feasible, but the framework around it could be dependent on institutions outside the state government&#39;s jurisdiction and direct control. And even sometimes, the campaign promise could even propose to &quot;fix&quot; something the state has already implemented.</p><p>This is not a ranking of the four major candidates but a policy audit of the arguments they presented; is the problem correctly identified? Can Lagos seriously and realistically fund these ambitions? More importantly, does this proffered solution improve what already exists?</p><p>Another major factor in this piece is that the judgemental lens for the deputy governor could be different as he is not arguing outside the current system, so therefore the continuity argument must be judged alongside the record of the administration he has been part of.</p><h3>HOUSING: The candidates correctly identified the supply problem, but don’t the numbers need a reality check?</h3><p>Housing was probably the clearest example of a shared diagnosis that produced a very different level of details.</p><p>Adedeji Doherty rejected simple rent control and argued that Lagos should increase supply through public housing, high-rise development, acquisition and redevelopment of existing buildings, and cheaper housing in areas such as Epe, Ojo and Badagry.</p><p>And this is a sound economic idea.</p><p>A government cannot regulate and control the price of the entire private housing rental market merely by decree while supply is constrained. Increasing housing supply and expanding mortgage access are structurally relevant to affordability.</p><p>His proposal to place lower-cost housing outside high-brow communities in Lagos is wonderful logic but can only work if transport costs/travel time do not convert cheaper housing rents into expensive commuting. This is why I have always advocated for housing policy and transport policy to be designed together.</p><p>Funso Doherty proposed approximately 150,000 homes in four years while Rhodes-Vivour proposed 100,000 in four years and a monthly payment system that would be towards ownership.</p><p>The deputy governor&#39;s intervention was more about financing as he argued for long-term mortgaging.</p><p>The financing argument is important as raised by the candidates as the Lagos housing problem is a supply-and-finance problem.</p><p>Just to put it that the current state government has built nearly 10,000 in 7 years and would have about 14,022 units by 2026 but still below the estimated housing needed. Delivering 150,000 units in four years would mean building 37,500 units a year, and just to be fair, it is not &quot;mathematically&quot; impossible, but the campaigns failed to explain the financing structure, land pipeline, and the expected contributions from private developers.</p><p>This is also a conceptual problem as the state cannot simply build its way out of a housing deficit this large entirely on annual government appropriations.</p><p>The real question shouldn&#39;t be about who promised most housing units.</p><p>It is who has a financing and land-delivery model capable of producing those housing units at scale without simply creating another catalogue of estates that are still too expensive for the people who need them.</p><h3>TRANSPORT: Shortening the commute is the right metric, but rail can not be announced into existence</h3><p>All four candidates recognised that transport is one of Lagos&#39; defining problems.</p><p>Adedeji Doherty criticised the current BRT system, calling for investigation of operational problems and proposed gas conversions.</p><p>Funso Doherty argued that a genuinely functional mass-transit system should be one that people across income groups are willing to use while connecting systems around this sector.</p><p>Gbadebo Rhodes-Vivour proposed a multi-modal network and argued he would complete all the rail lines in two years by opening procurement to private investors.</p><p>Dr. Obafemi Hamzat reduced the argument to a much simpler outcome. &quot;Residents of places like Agege, Ajegunle, Ajah and Igando should spend less time travelling than they do today&quot; while proposing conversion to CNG buses</p><p>Lagos needs rail lines because a large number of people need to move efficiently but the proposal for a two-year rail promise requires a more serious interrogation and the state&#39;s existing rail programme demonstrates why.</p><p>Both the Red Rail and Blue Line are operational but they need expansion and expansion is expensive.</p><p>The proposed Green Line for example is a roughly 70KM corridor and is estimated to cost about $3 billion. As of 2 months ago, the project was still undergoing an African Development Bank appraisal process for financing even despite Federal Government&#39;s willingness on counterpart funding.</p><p>Lagos state has previously relied heavily on borrowing to finance its rail projects even with CBN intervention funding which makes the private-sector procurement an interesting idea.</p><p>But this skips the hardest parts of the problem; Who assumes the risk, who is willing to take this financial risk, especially given the short duration, how are land acquisitions and compensations for the rail tracks handled?</p><h3>EDUCATION: The &quot;free education&quot; promise partly solves a problem Lagos has already solved</h3><p>This is one of the most important corrections to the campaign conversation.</p><p>Funso Doherty promised to make education &quot;entirely free&quot; within his first 100 days, including books and examination fees, alongside school meals and free school transport for children who need it.</p><p>The problem with this is that the basic public education in Lagos is already free.</p><p>The Lagos State Compulsory Free Universal Basic Education Law provides for free and compulsory education in public and junior secondary schools. LASUBEB explicitly states that services in public primary and junior secondary schools are to be provided free of charge.</p><p>The state also has a broader education policy that has spanned for 25 years that includes payment of WAEC examination fees for eligible students so &quot;free education&quot; is not, by itself, a new policy.</p><p>But Funso Doherty&#39;s proposal contains more meaningful insight as books, transport, and feeding are actual costs, too, and these expenses could often prevent &quot;nominally free education&quot; from being genuinely accessible.</p><p>At that, the Lagos state government still has already started a free textbooks programme in 2025 and even expanded this programme this year. The state government and the federal government are also in partnership and launched a school breakfast programme in July 2026.</p><p>So that means the serious policy question should not be whether Lagos should have &quot;free education.&quot;</p><p>It already does.</p><p>The question should be whether the next government will guarantee the full participation in public education; adequate nutrition, learning materials, and transport aids while also ensuring it can do so universally without allowing quality to deteriorate.</p><p>Adedeji Doherty emphasised teacher welfare, vocational education, and technology transfer.</p><p>Rhodes-Vivour focused on teaching pay, training, technology, and reducing rote learning.</p><p>Hamzat focused on ensuring every under-18 is either in school or learning a trade and his plan to prioritise child welfare while also talking about the quality of education currently in the state.</p><h3>TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION: The problem is real, but is 40 new schools the first answer?</h3><p>Funso Doherty proposed around 40 technical and vocational schools.</p><p>Rhodes-Vivour also proposed a similar number and tied skills acquisition to construction and government projects.</p><p>The underlying diagnosis is difficult to dispute, but again, the baseline matters.</p><p>In 2025, the Lagos State Government announced that they were establishing 5 additional technical colleges; which would take the number to 10 across the state&#39;s five divisions (IBILE - Ikeja, Badagry, Ikorodu, Lagos Island and Epe). Lagos has 19 skills-acquisition centres that have reportedly trained about 30,000 citizens in the last five years.</p><p>This then changes the question.</p><p>The issue is not the absence of vocational institutions.</p><p>It is whether the existing institutions are sufficiently equipped, connected to the labour market, accessible and also aligned with actual labour demand.</p><p>A serious TVET policy should, therefore, begin with labour market demand and alignment.</p><h3><strong>HEALTHCARE: Lagos has real strengths, so the debate should move from &quot;build healthcare&quot; to &quot;fix access, financing and emergency response&quot;</strong></h3><p>Lagos&#39; healthcare system is neither a success story without a problem nor a system starting from zero.</p><p>This distinction is crucial.</p><p>Lagos state currently has an active Primary Health Care Board, and a 2026 report ranks the state 3rd nationally on the PHC leadership challenge assessment.</p><p>So, any report that describes that Lagos simply lacks primary healthcare institutions would be misleading, but at the same time, the existence of facilities does not mean universal access.</p><p>Adedeji Doherty focused on doctors&#39; welfare and charges.</p><p>Funso Doherty proposed genuinely free maternal and child healthcare, which includes drugs within the first 100 days.</p><p>Rhodes-Vivour proposed emergency stabilisation centres at ward level with the aim of getting initial emergency support to patients.</p><p>Hamzat&#39;s ambulance claim needs much more careful scrutiny.</p><p>He cited a rise from around zero public ambulances in 1999 to around 200 ambulances today. This historical expansion is real but not supported by operational data.</p><p>For example, LASAMBUS in 2025 reportedly had 36 ambulances operating in 4 operational bases, but an earlier peer-reviewed study found 25 ambulances in operation. The same service also reported a 97.5 per cent response rate to emergency calls between 2021 and 2025. This should have been a much more useful performance indicator than raw fleet number.</p><p>In other words, the deputy governor might have conflated the broader expansion of emergency-response infrastructure with the number of operational ambulances.</p><p>A state government can &quot;own&quot; 200 ambulances on paper but have fewer available for dispatch at a particular time.</p><p>The important numbers or metrics for healthcare should rather be waiting time, coverage, drug availability, maternal mortality, emergency response time, insurance coverage, and staffing.</p><h3>POWER: This is one of the areas where the legal environment has changed</h3><p>Adedeji Doherty&#39;s insistence that reliable electricity is foundational to Lagos&#39;s economy is sound, but his more dramatic claim that regular electricity could create 200 millionaires out of 1,000 people in six months is not an empirically established projection. This is a political assertion.</p><p>The more interesting part is his proposal to use state investment and partnerships to improve electricity and affordability, which is no longer legally remote as it would have been.</p><p>Nigeria&#39;s 2023 electricity reforms already opened the door for states to legislate and regulate electricity markets within their territories. Lagos subsequently established its own electricity market and regulatory commission.</p><p>Lagos&#39;s Electricity Law also establishes a framework for generation, distribution, supply, and tariff regulation. This makes state intervention in electricity more feasible than before.</p><p>But there is still a large difference between having regulatory powers and making electricity cheap and reliable.</p><p>Investment in distribution infrastructure requires huge capital, and gas supply still remains a constraint.</p><p>Electricity tariffs need to support investment while protecting consumers, and where the state takes equity positions or offers subsidy, the opportunity cost must be examined.</p><p>Therefore, the sensible version of the promise is not &quot;government will make electricity cheap.&quot;</p><p>It is what specific generation, distribution, metering, and industrial-energy projects will the government finance, regulate or facilitate, and what measurable increase in electricity supply will result?</p><p>This is the level at which an election promise becomes a policy.</p><h3>WASTE: Candidates talked about a problem that demonstrably exists</h3><p>This is one area where the town hall criticism should not be dismissed as campaign rhetoric.</p><p>In September 2026, the Lagos state government itself declared what Governor Sanwo-Olu called a &quot;small state of emergency&quot; over waste management after pressure on the collection and disposal system produced widespread complaints about indiscriminate dumping.</p><p>The deputy governor, Obafemi Hamzat, explained that the state has purchased 160 new compactor trucks, additional disposal locations, and two 2400-tonne transfer-loading stations at Olusosun and Solous 3 while also talking about the waste-to-energy plans at Agbowa as part of the government’s emerging response.</p><p>That matters because it establishes the factual baseline before any candidate&#39;s criticism.</p><p>Funso Doherty&#39;s argument that waste management must be treated as a complete chain from collection to transfer, processing, and final disposal. This position is economically coherent.</p><p>Rhodes-Vivour&#39;s argument for decentralisation, recycling, and waste-to-wealth addresses a genuine systems issue.</p><p>The problem with Lagos&#39; waste problem is institutional and systematic.</p><p>Lagos operates a heavily centralised waste-management architecture through LAWMA in partnership with licensed PSP operators. The current waste crisis illustrates the vulnerability of a system in which failure at disposal points and collection can ripple backwards into household collection.</p><p>So, the most consequential reform may not be simply another fleet of trucks. It is simply a redesign of &quot;who is responsible for what.&quot;</p><p>Collection, transfer, treatment, recycling, and disposal need different operational incentives, and the more decentralised the system becomes, the more important the standards and enforcement become.</p><h3>&quot;AGBEROS&quot; AND INFORMAL TRANSPORT COLLECTIONS: No candidate has fully answered the problem</h3><p>The candidates were broadly united that Lagos&#39;s informal transport collection system has become incompatible with a modern metropolitan transport network.</p><p>Funso Doherty described a hierarchy through which money moves upwards and proposed replacing the informal ecosystem with modern mass transportation and technical training.</p><p>Rhodes-Vivour offered skills and productive alternatives for people involved in street-level thuggery and transport collections.</p><p>Hamzat emphasised differentiating between vulnerable people, criminal actors, and people whose livelihoods are tied to informal systems. He also proposed a reduction of unnecessary levies and uniform systems across the states with local governments involved.</p><p>The challenge should not simply be to &quot;remove agberos&quot; as these are different components of what should really be one policy, and there are thousands of people who earn income from transport-related activities.</p><p>There are also financial relationships between route control, ticketing, political networks, and financial employment.</p><p>A serious reform, therefore, needs three things:<br>1. Modern payment systems<br>2. Consistent enforcement<br>3. Transport-collection framework</p><p>Otherwise, the system will simply mutate.</p><p>Digital payment collection, for example, can reduce cash leakage and make route-level revenue traceable, but only if the state government can enforce the operators to use the regulated system.</p><p>The technological solution exists, but political implementation is the difficult part.</p><h3>FLOODING AND WETLANDS: Rhodes-Vivour’s environmental diagnosis is supported by research, but the problem is broader than sand filling</h3><p>Rhodes-Vivour argued that Lagos must treat wetlands as flood infrastructure and stop developments that destroy them.</p><p>This is a serious proposition.</p><p>Research on Lagos state has found major wetland loss associated with urban expansion and development. A study estimated that 59 per cent of the wetland area in its study region has been lost over the last 30 years, largely due to building development. A 2024 systematic review similarly identified rapid urbanisation, drainage problems, land-use changes, waste blockage, and climate pressures as interconnected drivers of flood risk.</p><p>This supports the basic principle behind Rhodes-Vivour&#39;s proposal of wetlands protection.</p><p>But flood control cannot be reduced to &quot;stop sand filling.&quot;</p><p>State drainage maintenance matters, which he also discussed. Other environmental factors such as rainfall intensity matter, sea-level rise matters, and most importantly Lagos&#39;s coastal geometry matters.</p><p>Hamzat&#39;s approach to coastal erosion was groynes, dredging, and shoreline protection. This addresses a different but equally real physical threat.</p><p>The Great Wall of Lagos was designed specifically to reduce coastal erosion, while studies of Eko Atlantic intervention also show that coastal protection can shift erosion pressures downstream.</p><p>That means Lagos needs 2 separate environmental strategies:<br>1. Urban flood management inland<br>2. Coastal risk management along the Atlantic</p><p>Neither can substitute for the other.</p><h3>The first 100-day promises expose the difference between a reform agenda and a campaign wishlist</h3><p>The 100-day proposals actually deserve special scrutiny because the time frame is so short.</p><p>Adedeji Doherty&#39;s commitment to doctor&#39;s conditions, medical charges, and teacher-related relief are relatively concrete.</p><p>Funso Doherty&#39;s programme is far broader; free books and examinations, school meals, school transport, free maternal and child healthcare while starting a new housing programme within the same period.</p><p>Hamzat proposed institutional reforms, including the establishment of a child welfare administration agency and a state wealth fund.</p><p>The problem with a 100-day promise is not that 100 days is too short for the government to have a positive impact, but it is that budgeting, procurement, legislation, and institutional reforms have different clocks.</p><h3>ACCOUNTABILITY MAY MATTER MORE THAN ANOTHER MANIFESTO</h3><p>There was one particularly useful idea in the town hall: the movement toward measurable pledges.</p><p>Hamzat proposed a &quot;Hamzat Compact&quot; containing 100 measurable commitments.</p><p>Funso Doherty presented 34 first-term actions.</p><p>Rhodes-Vivour emphasised transparent private-sector procurement.</p><p>Adedeji Doherty presented a 10-point agenda.</p><p>The difference between these formats is less important than what actually happens after the election.</p><p>Every major promise should be converted into five factors:<br>1. Baseline<br>2. Target<br>3. Deadline<br>4. Cost<br>5. Responsible institution</p><p>For example, take transport.</p><p>&quot;Shorter commutes&quot; is definitely not enough.</p><p>The baseline should say average travel time on defined corridors. The target should say how much reduction is expected/projected. The deadline should be specified. The MDA responsible for this should be identified, and financing should be disclosed.</p><p>Let&#39;s also use housing as another example.</p><p>&quot;100000/150000&quot; is not enough.</p><p>The policy should disclose how many will be directly funded by public funding, how many will be funded through PPP, the income groups served, the mortgage terms, the land source, and the projected completion schedule.</p><p>Lastly, let&#39;s take education.</p><p>&quot;Free education&quot; is definitely not enough.</p><p>Lagos already has free public basic education. The new promise should specify which existing costs such as transportation will disappear and which new quality indicators will improve.</p><p>This is what makes a manifesto auditable.</p><h3>What the Hamzat argument gets right and what the incumbent status makes unavoidable</h3><p>Dr Obafemi Hamzat is the current deputy governor and has served in several capacities as commissioner under Gov. Bola Tinubu and Babatunde Raji Fashola administration.</p><p>During his earlier tenure as commissioner for science and technology, the state expanded its enterprise system, which includes the introduction of the 11 modules of Oracle ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) which was the first to be deployed by an African government body which improved Lagos state&#39;s administrative, financial and GIS operations. He also spearheaded digital tracking to eliminate ghost workers on the state payroll.</p><p>During his later stint as commissioner of works under Babatunde Fashola, he spearheaded the delivery of Nigeria&#39;s first cable bridge, the Lekki-Ikoyi Link Bridge amongst other major road projects. Most importantly, he carried the largest infrastructure intervention of inner roads in 2012 in Nigeria when the state carried out 156 inner road projects, which earned him the Lagos Man of the Year award a year later.</p><p>Hamzat&#39;s strongest political argument is continuity.</p><p>In his response to why citizens should trust his party after over 25 years in government, he argued that he can point to projects and systems created across successive AD/AC(N) and now APC administrations.</p><p>There is, therefore, a legitimate policy question about whether Lagos benefits more from &quot;continuity&quot; rather than repeatedly replacing these administrations.</p><p>But incumbency changes the burden of proof.</p><p>Hamzat has been deputy governor since 2019 and was previously commissioner for 10 years. He is, therefore, not merely defending the past 25 years as an abstract historical period.</p><p>That means &quot;continuity&quot; cannot simply mean:</p><p>&quot;We have built a lot.&quot;</p><p>It also has to answer:</p><p>&quot;Why are the remaining problems still here?&quot;</p><h3>CONCLUSION</h3><p>The central lesson is simple.</p><p>Lagos state does not need another election in which every candidate might discover the same problems.</p><p>It needs one in which promises are converted into numbers, numbers into budget, budget into institutions, and the outcomes can be independently measured.</p><p>A bigger housing target does not automatically mean it is a better housing policy, and neither does a large ambulance fleet automatically equal better emergency care. Free education is not a new education policy, and neither does continuity automatically guarantee failure or success.</p><p>By 2027, the useful question for Lagosians should be much narrower and much harder:</p><p>Which candidate promises a defensible baseline, a credible financing model, a clear institutional route, and a measurable outcome, and which ones are still just numbers and words said on the stage?</p><p>That is the standard by which a modern megacity should judge its next government.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f47239e775a3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[5 MONTHS LATER, LAGOS STILL HASN'T FIXED ITS WASTE COLLECTION PROBLEM]]></title>
            <link>https://emperordotman.medium.com/5-months-later-lagos-still-hasnt-fixed-its-waste-collection-problem-e1152cfe2c2b?source=rss-934acb6dbfd0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e1152cfe2c2b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[waste-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lagos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[environment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Emperor Dotman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 20:01:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-26T10:54:15.697Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rzG3SL9_dq0mORiD5nV3cA.jpeg" /></figure><p>5 months ago, I <a href="https://emperordotman.medium.com/why-lagos-must-fully-hand-over-waste-management-to-local-governments-and-lcdas-d75c2817ae93">wrote that the Lagos State Government should fully hand over its waste management, particularly waste collection, to its local governments and LCDAs.</a></p><p>Just to point out, it wasn&#39;t an argument against LAWMA, as some perceived, but an argument against the current structure that had become too centralised and problematic for a &quot;megacity&quot; it was supposed to serve.</p><p>If we must note, waste is generated at street (local) level, illegal and indiscriminate disposal of it also happens at street level, yet the responsibility for making the system work has been concentrated far above the people experiencing this failure.</p><p>And by the way, I had thought this argument of mine would have generated a &quot;serious debate,&quot; but instead, I got something more useful.</p><p>Evidence.</p><p>5 months later, the state government claims it has spent money and repaired infrastructure. They also announced &quot;reforms&quot; in a bid to relieve pressure on the failing system.</p><p>And yet the problem still remains.</p><p>Refuse is still spilling into the drainage channels, Lagos markets are still surrounded by waste they generated, and the road medians in Lagos have turned into &quot;unofficial dump sites.&quot; And while we might want to argue about civic responsibility for some of these residents, it could also be a resident who has paid for collection and is still looking at the same refuse bags weeks later.</p><p>And this has not been happening quietly in the last few weeks.</p><h3>LAGOS HAS A COLLECTION PROBLEM. WE SHOULD STOP PRETENDING IT IS ONLY A DISPOSAL PROBLEM</h3><p>This distinction is very important.</p><p>The conversation by citizens and the Lagos State Government on the waste crisis has increasingly revolved around Olusosun landfill capacity, transfer stations, trucks, and disposal infrastructure.</p><p>While those things matter, they do not explain everything.</p><p>- In January, TheCable Newspaper reported that waste had accumulated along major roads after many PSP collectors allegedly abandoned their duties.</p><p>- By March, BusinessDay reported that broken trucks and filled dumpsites had stalled waste collection for more than a month, leaving streets dirty and drainage channels clogged.</p><p>- The Lagos State Government itself, in June, directed LAWMA to summon PSP operators following complaints about irregular waste collection. The Commissioner for Environment, Tokunbo Wahab, also publicly acknowledged these complaints.</p><p>Once the state government itself convened emergency meetings because PSPs weren&#39;t showing up, the problem cannot simply be:</p><p>&quot;Lagosians generate too much waste.&quot;</p><p>It should be:</p><p>&quot;The waste collection system is failing to collect it.&quot;</p><h3>AND 5 MONTHS AFTER MY ARTICLE, THE STATE STILL HASN&#39;T ANSWERED THE CENTRAL QUESTION</h3><p>&quot;Who is responsible for waste collection?&quot;</p><p>Waste collection can be part of the waste management process, but it is definitely different from waste disposal, landfill management, and recycling.</p><p>And there are lots of further questions:</p><p>1. Who is responsible for making sure that the waste outside a particular house is collected?<br>2. Who is responsible when it isn&#39;t?<br>3. Who receives the complaints when it is not collected?<br>4. Who has the authority to replace the PSP operator who is failing in its duty?<br>5. Who monitors the operations of these PSP operators?</p><p>The answers to these are complicated. While LAWMA manages the system, PSP handles collection, and the state government also serves as a regulator, when the system fails, everybody has an explanation.</p><p>Some of these explanations could even be true simultaneously, but that is exactly the problem.</p><p>A system in which everyone has a reason for failure can also become a system in which nobody owns the failure.</p><h3>OLUSOSUN EXPOSED THE WEAKNESSES</h3><p>Olusosun landfill isn&#39;t just another dumpsite but one of the critical points through which Lagos State&#39;s waste stream moves.</p><p>When the access roads are bad or when they become congested and waste trucks queue, the effects do not remain at Ojota. They travel backwards and create a backlog. This backlog eventually leads to overflowing bins and illegal dumpsites.</p><p>Earlier this year, long queues of waste trucks were witnessed at Olusosun, with difficulty to evacuate waste, and weeks later, LAWMA itself acknowledged that heavy rainfall had damaged access roads within the facility.</p><p>The government response to this was to rehabilitate &quot;Road E&quot; and work on the evacuation, but notice what happened here: the solution again became largely &quot;centralised.&quot; Fix Olusosun.</p><p>But why should the failure of one central disposal point be capable of disrupting collection across such a huge metropolis like Lagos State?</p><h3>SEPTEMBER</h3><p>On September 9, Gov. Babajide Sanwo-Olu inspected Olusosun and declared what he called &quot;a small state of emergency&quot; over the waste collection. He also announced 160 new compactor trucks and plans to increase Olusosun&#39;s tipping capacity.</p><p>But what does that admission mean?</p><p>Lagos did not suddenly start producing waste. Lagos has always produced waste. The problem started the moment the system could not consistently move the waste.</p><p>This is the difference between a &quot;waste-generation crisis&quot; and a &quot;waste-management crisis.&quot;</p><p>Lagos has both, but the second one is the state government&#39;s responsibility.</p><h3>MORE TRUCKS ARE NOT THE SAME THING AS MORE COLLECTION</h3><p>This is where I disagree with the instinctive response to the waste crisis.</p><p>A truck is only useful if the system around it is working and effective.</p><p>Trucks do not generate funding themselves, they do not decide which street gets serviced first, do not monitor PSP operators, and do not know which community is inaccessible after rainfall.</p><p>The problem is not a simplistic one that the presence of new trucks would solve. It is the absence of a sufficient local system.</p><h3>THIS IS WHY I KEEP COMING BACK TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS</h3><p>The argument has never been that local governments or LCDAs are magically more competent than LAWMA. That would be an unserious argument because the local governments can fail, too.</p><p>However, there is one thing a centralised system struggles to reproduce: PROXIMITY. This applies to the argument for the creation of state police.</p><p>Local governments and LCDAs are physically closer to the markets, residents, illegal dumpsites, inaccessible streets, and communities that failed to pay for the service. This proximity matters.</p><h3>CAN LGs AFFORD WASTE MANAGEMENT?</h3><p>This question assumes that the only alternative is asking local councils to finance everything independently, and this is not what my proposal is. Lagos needs a structured funding model.</p><p>The Lagos State Government can support infrastructure, the local governments/LCDAs can also fund the collection while waste-service charges supplement the system.</p><p>Commercial waste generators can pay according to the amount and type of waste produced, while the state government can also create an &quot;equalisation mechanism&quot; whose revenue base cannot support the same level of waste service as in high-brow communities.</p><p>And public accountability plus a performance target has to be important.</p><h3>LAGOS STATE ALREADY ADMITTED THAT THE PSP SYSTEM HAS A PERFORMANCE PROBLEM</h3><p>LAWMA&#39;s Managing Director, Muyiwa Gbadegeshin PhD, in August, said that the agency audits PSP operators on a monthly basis, checking if their trucks are working, if these operators are working according to schedule, while also reviewing customer feedback and the landfill activity at Olusosun.</p><p>He also claimed that the agency withdrew the licenses of 27 operators last year and another number roughly close to that this year, and has been working with local government/LCDA chairmen to provide backup where the gaps exist.</p><p>But that statement should make us pause.</p><p>If these PSP operators are repeatedly failing badly enough to make them lose licenses and the LG chairmen are then asked to provide backup, why shouldn&#39;t those local governments simply be given the formal responsibility to organise collection in the first place?</p><p>This is not because LAWMA cannot monitor, but monitoring from Ijora is not the same thing as managing waste locally.</p><h3>AND PERHAPS THE PSP SYSTEM ITSELF NEEDS TO BECOME LOCAL</h3><p>There is nothing inherently wrong with the Private-Sector Participation model.</p><p>Like I said 5 months ago, the Lagos PSP model traces back to the late 90s and became an active system across the state around 2004.</p><p>But imagine instead that the local governments contract the operators? The LG/LCDAs themselves monitor performance and impose penalties? And LAWMA instead establishes the statewide standards and serves as a regulator for this decentralised system while also providing infrastructure?</p><p>LAWMA has said some LGs like Ibeju-Lekki, Lagos Island and Badagry have been licensed to operate collection systems, including smaller vehicles with a pay-as-you-go arrangement, so maybe this idea is not radical anymore. But the interesting question is why it remains an experiment. Why not build the system around this?</p><h3>FUNDING PROBLEM AND ACCOUNTABILITY</h3><p>While we can&#39;t shy away from the funding problems or citizens not paying for waste services, we must also not shy away from the accountability part.</p><p>If the council receives money, it must also publish how it spent it on this service. The contracts to these PSPs shouldn&#39;t be a kickback scheme. If the citizen fails to pay for services, there should be a transparent mechanism for enforcement, and also, if the local council fails, the state government should be able to intervene.</p><h3>5 MONTHS LATER, MY ORIGINAL ARGUMENT LOOKS DIFFERENT</h3><p>When I wrote the initial article, my argument was: &quot;Give the local governments the bigger role because waste is local.&quot;</p><p>Today, I would put it more bluntly: &quot;Lagos State&#39;s centralised collection system has not delivered the consistency that residents are entitled to expect.&quot;</p><p>And my argument was never for LAWMA to disappear or the state government to abandon waste management. It simply means the division of labour in waste collection has to change.</p><p>LAWMA should regulate, set standards, manage infrastructure, coordinate disposal and recovery, and even step in when some local council fails.</p><p>Local governments/LCDAs should be responsible for the waste collection service within their territories. The waste is generated locally, the waste collection happens locally, and the system has to be local.</p><p>5 months ago, I argued that the Lagos State Government should hand over the far greater responsibility for waste collection to the local governments and LCDAs, and 5 months later, the evidence of the waste piles across the state has not made this argument less relevant.</p><p>In fact, it has even made it harder to ignore.</p><p>The state can keep buying trucks, clearing piles when it is being called out, but these waste piles will keep coming back.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e1152cfe2c2b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[So, Who Is Watching What We Eat?]]></title>
            <link>https://emperordotman.medium.com/so-who-is-watching-what-we-eat-55fb9023b744?source=rss-934acb6dbfd0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/55fb9023b744</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[food-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[food]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[agriculture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Emperor Dotman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 14:54:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-14T16:46:49.327Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/588/1*9fidLmlxGt9EvHAMnK0QSA.jpeg" /></figure><p>NAFDAC says unpackaged staple foods are outside its direct regulatory oversight. That may be legally understandable. But for the average Nigerian consumer, there is a much bigger question: <strong>if NAFDAC isn&#39;t watching, who is?</strong></p><p>Every morning, somewhere in Lagos, a woman walks into a market with a shopping bag and a list in her head.</p><p>Palm oil.</p><p>Garri.</p><p>Pepper.</p><p>Tomatoes.</p><p>Maybe some meat too.</p><p>She doesn&#39;t ask for laboratory certificates.</p><p>She doesn&#39;t ask the vendor for a certificate of conformity.</p><p>She simply looks.</p><p>The palm oil is bright red.</p><p>The garri looks clean.</p><p>The meat looks fresh.</p><p>The seller has been there for years, so she trusts him.</p><p>She pays and goes home.</p><p>And that is where the problem begins.</p><p>Not because the food is necessarily contaminated.</p><p><strong>But because she has almost no way of knowing whether it is.</strong></p><p>That question became more interesting after the Director-General of the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control, NAFDAC, Prof. Mojisola Adeyeye clarified the agency’s position on unbranded and unpackaged food.</p><p>The statement, stripped of the bureaucratic language, raises a rather uncomfortable question:</p><p><em>If NAFDAC is not directly responsible for the food sold loose in our markets, who exactly is?</em></p><p>And more importantly:</p><p><em>Does the average Nigerian know?</em></p><h3>The NAFDAC Question</h3><p>NAFDAC is probably the first organisation that comes to the mind of most Nigerians when the subject is unsafe food or drugs.</p><p>Fake drugs?</p><p>NAFDAC.</p><p>Bad drinks?</p><p>NAFDAC.</p><p>Counterfeit cosmetics?</p><p>NAFDAC.</p><p>Expired products?</p><p>NAFDAC.</p><p>So when someone buys palm oil from an open market and suspects that something has been added to it, it is understandable that the first instinct would be to ask:</p><p>&quot;<em>Where is NAFDAC?&quot;</em></p><p>But the answer is more complicated.</p><p>NAFDAC’s mandate is broad. Its establishing law gives the agency responsibility for regulating products, including food, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, chemicals, and packaged water.</p><p>However, the regulation in practice is not as simple as saying:</p><p><strong>NAFDAC regulates food.</strong></p><p>There is a distinction between the food sitting inside a registered factory, sealed in a labelled container, and the food being scooped from a large plastic container at a market stall.</p><p>This is where the confusion begins.</p><p>NAFDAC has built much of its food-safety enforcement around manufactured, processed and pre-packaged products.</p><p>That makes sense.</p><p>A factory producing bottled juice can be inspected.</p><p>Its ingredients can be examined.</p><p>Its production process can be audited.</p><p>Its labels can be checked.</p><p>Its registration can be verified.</p><p>But what happens when the product is not a bottle?</p><p>What happens when it is a jerrycan?</p><p>A sack?</p><p>A basin?</p><p>A bucket?</p><p>A tray?</p><p>Or simply a bowl sitting in the middle of a market?</p><p>That is where Nigeria&#39;s food-safety system becomes less clear to the ordinary consumer.</p><p><strong>Welcome to the Food-Safety Grey Area</strong></p><p>Walk through a Nigerian market and you will quickly realise how much of our food economy exists outside the neat world of factories and supermarkets.</p><p>Palm oil is poured from large containers.</p><p>Garri is measured from sacks.</p><p>Beans are scooped from bowls.</p><p>Fish is displayed in open trays.</p><p>Meat is cut and wrapped on demand.</p><p>Bread is produced by small bakeries and sold individually.</p><p>Local drinks are prepared and sold in bottles that may not carry any meaningful information about their contents.</p><p>These products are not necessarily unsafe.</p><p>That distinction matters.</p><p><strong>Unpackaged does not automatically mean contaminated.</strong></p><p>But the absence of packaging can make traceability and regulatory oversight much more difficult.</p><p>If a sealed product makes someone sick, investigators can potentially trace the manufacturer, batch number, production date and distribution chain.</p><p>If five litres of palm oil are poured from a large container in an open market, the trail can be much harder to follow.</p><p>Who produced it?</p><p>Where?</p><p>When?</p><p>What was added?</p><p>Was it transported under appropriate conditions?</p><p>Was the container previously used for something else?</p><p>Was it diluted?</p><p>Was it adulterated?</p><p>And who has the authority to walk into that market, take a sample and demand answers?</p><p><strong>That is the question Nigerians rarely ask.</strong></p><h3>The Redder the Palm Oil, the Better?</h3><p>Consider palm oil.</p><p>For generations, Nigerians have bought it without thinking of any laboratory analysis.</p><p>We judge it by colour, smell, texture and most atimes even the reputation of the seller.</p><p>But adulteration is not a completely imaginary concern.</p><p>There have been warnings and reports around the adulteration of edible oils with prohibited colouring substances, including azo dyes such as Sudan dyes.</p><p>The irony is almost cruel.</p><p>Consumers often associate a deep red colour with good palm oil.</p><p>An unscrupulous seller can therefore have an incentive to make the oil look better than it actually is.</p><p>And this is where food safety stops being an “abstract” regulatory issue.</p><p>It becomes personal.</p><p>Because the person eating the food is not a laboratory.</p><p>The consumer buying the oil cannot see a chemical contaminant.</p><p>We have created a food economy where consumers are frequently expected to detect dangers that sometimes require laboratory testing to identify.</p><p>That is not really consumer protection.</p><p>That is consumer guesswork.</p><h3>So Who Is Supposed to Be Watching?</h3><p>This is where the story gets complicated.</p><p>NAFDAC is not the only institution involved in Nigeria&#39;s food-safety architecture.</p><p>The Standards Organisation of Nigeria (SON) has responsibilities relating to national standards and conformity assessment.</p><p>State governments have public-health and environmental-health structures.</p><p>Local governments have roles in environmental health and market sanitation.</p><p>The Nigeria Agricultural Quarantine Service has responsibilities concerning agricultural products, particularly at points of entry and in relation to quarantine.</p><p>The Nigeria Customs Service intercepts prohibited and illicit imports.</p><p>The police can also assist with criminal enforcement.</p><p>The NDLEA deals with illicit narcotics and controlled substances.</p><p>Different institutions therefore have different pieces of the puzzle.</p><p>The problem is that the consumer doesn&#39;t experience food safety in pieces.</p><p>If I buy contaminated palm oil, I don&#39;t care whether the legal responsibility belongs to federal, state or local government.</p><p>I only know that I bought food.</p><p>I ate it.</p><p>And something went wrong.</p><h3>Meanwhile, Fake Drugs Are Everywhere</h3><p>If the food situation sounds worrying, the pharmaceutical side is even more disturbing.</p><p>Nigeria has spent years fighting counterfeit, fake, expired and unregistered medicines.</p><p>And NAFDAC has conducted some enormous enforcement operations.</p><p>In February 2025, the agency&#39;s crackdown on major open-drug markets reportedly resulted in thousands of shops being sealed and huge quantities of suspected illicit pharmaceuticals being removed from circulation.</p><p>The scale was staggering.</p><p>Thousands of shops.</p><p>Truckloads of medicines.</p><p>A reported value running into the trillions of naira.</p><p>It tells us something important.</p><p>This is not a handful of people selling one fake packet of tablets somewhere behind a bus stop.</p><p>There is an entire ecosystem.</p><p>Manufacturers.</p><p>Importers.</p><p>Distributors.</p><p>Wholesalers.</p><p>Retailers.</p><p>Middlemen.</p><p>Markets.</p><p>Consumers.</p><p>And sometimes, unfortunately, officials who may look the other way.</p><p>The same country that can destroy billions of naira worth of fake or expired products can also find the same markets returning after an enforcement operation ends.</p><p>And that raises another uncomfortable question.</p><p><em>Are we fighting counterfeiters, or are we simply interrupting their business?</em></p><h3>The Raid-Repeat Cycle</h3><p>There is something almost predictable when it comes to Nigeria’s enforcement cycle.</p><p>Authorities discover illegal products.</p><p>A raid is conducted.</p><p>Products are seized.</p><p>Some shops are sealed.</p><p>There are photographs.</p><p>There are press releases.</p><p>There are headlines.</p><p>The public applauds.</p><p>Then the story disappears.</p><p>Eventually, the market returns.</p><p>Sometimes, the same people return.</p><p>Sometimes, new people occupy the same spaces.</p><p>The products return.</p><p>And the cycle begins again.</p><p>This is not to say seizures are useless.</p><p>They are necessary.</p><p>Removing dangerous products from circulation can prevent harm.</p><p>But seizures alone cannot solve a market problem.</p><p>If the <strong>economic incentives</strong> remain intact, somebody will eventually replace what was seized.</p><p>That is basic economics.</p><p>If counterfeit drugs generate enormous profits while the probability of serious punishment remains relatively low, the business will continue to attract people.</p><h3>The Numbers Should Worry Us</h3><p>The enforcement figures tell their own story.</p><p>NAFDAC has reported destroying billions of naira worth of unsafe products.</p><p>Yet the number of prosecutions has historically been tiny compared with the scale of the seizures.</p><p>That is the part of the story that deserves more attention.</p><p>Because destroying a counterfeit drug does not destroy the person who manufactured it.</p><p>Seizing fake drinks does not automatically dismantle the network that produced them.</p><p>Closing a shop does not necessarily eliminate the wholesaler supplying ten other shops.</p><p>And confiscating adulterated food does not prevent the next batch from entering another market.</p><p>The product is destroyed. The business model survives.</p><p>That is the enforcement gap.</p><h3>Make Counterfeiting a Crime That Destroys the Business</h3><p>Perhaps Nigeria also needs to be much more ruthless with the economics of food and drug adulteration.</p><p>Right now, one of the biggest problems is that some offenders can treat enforcement as nothing more than a temporary interruption.</p><p>They lose a shipment.</p><p>They reopen.</p><p>They lose a shop.</p><p>Another one appears.</p><p>They get arrested.</p><p>The case drags through the courts.</p><p>Eventually, the story disappears.</p><p>That is not enough.</p><p>Government needs to make the consequences so severe that counterfeiting and deliberate food adulteration stop looking like profitable businesses.</p><p>And I don&#39;t mean simply announcing another increase in fines.</p><p>For large-scale offenders, the law should target the entire operation.</p><p>Seize the illegal products.</p><p>Shut down the illegal factory.</p><p>Trace the money.</p><p>Freeze the proceeds where legally justified.</p><p>Prosecute the owners and principal actors.</p><p>And where the evidence establishes deliberate, serious harm, impose penalties that reflect the potential damage caused to the public.</p><p>A person who deliberately manufactures fake medicine is not committing an ordinary commercial offence. They are putting human lives at risk.</p><p>The same applies to someone who knowingly adulterates food with dangerous substances for profit.</p><p>If a businessman can make ₦100 million from adulterating products but faces only a relatively small fine when caught, the punishment becomes part of the cost of doing business.</p><p>That is a terrible incentive.</p><p>The penalty should not be cheaper than the crime.</p><p>Government should also introduce stronger consequences for repeat offenders. Someone caught once may have made a mistake. Someone caught repeatedly operating illegal factories, warehouses or distribution networks is demonstrating a business model.</p><p>Treat it accordingly.</p><p>There should also be greater accountability for companies and individuals that knowingly distribute products after receiving warnings or enforcement notices.</p><p>But strong sanctions must come with due process.</p><p>The goal should not be to create a system where inspectors can arbitrarily destroy someone&#39;s livelihood.</p><p>The goal is to create a system where deliberate, proven and dangerous adulteration carries consequences serious enough to deter it.</p><p>Nigeria does not necessarily need more dramatic raids.</p><p>Sometimes, it needs a better ending to the raid.</p><p>Arrest. Investigate. Prosecute. Convict where the evidence supports it. Recover criminal proceeds where the law permits. And make the offender understand that the business is no longer worth the risk.</p><p>Because until the economics change, the counterfeit economy will keep adapting.</p><p>You can destroy 100 trucks of fake products today.</p><p>If the people behind those trucks remain profitable tomorrow, another 100 trucks will eventually appear.</p><p>That is why enforcement must move from <strong>seizure</strong> to <strong>deterrence</strong>.</p><p>Destroy the product, yes.</p><p>But dismantle the business behind it.</p><h3>The Sachet-Gin Problem</h3><p>The same contradiction can be seen in the battle against illicit alcoholic drinks.</p><p>Nigeria has attempted to restrict certain small-format alcoholic beverages, particularly sachet products, because of concerns including accessibility to young people and public-health risks.</p><p>Yet illegal production has continued.</p><p>This is not simply a regulatory problem.</p><p>It is a market problem.</p><p><strong>If there is demand, somebody will supply it.</strong></p><p>If a small sachet of gin is cheap enough for someone with little money to buy, banning the packaging does not automatically eliminate the demand for alcohol.</p><p>It can simply push production underground.</p><p>And once production goes underground, quality control becomes even harder.</p><p>This is where regulation needs to move beyond raids.</p><p>You need intelligence.</p><p>You need traceability.</p><p>You need prosecution.</p><p>You need market surveillance.</p><p>You need cooperation between agencies.</p><p>And, perhaps most importantly, you need to attack the economics that make illegal production attractive.</p><p>The Problem With Having Ten Watchmen</p><p>Nigeria doesn&#39;t necessarily suffer from a complete absence of regulatory institutions.</p><p>Sometimes, it suffers from the opposite.</p><p>There are many institutions.</p><p>Many laws.</p><p>Many mandates.</p><p>Many committees.</p><p>Many task forces.</p><p>Many press conferences.</p><p>But when responsibility is divided between too many institutions, a strange thing can happen.</p><p>Everybody has a role.</p><p>Yet nobody appears completely responsible.</p><p>NAFDAC says one thing is outside its direct mandate.</p><p>SON has another responsibility.</p><p>State authorities have another.</p><p>Local government has another.</p><p>Customs deals with imports.</p><p>NDLEA deals with controlled drugs.</p><p>Police deal with criminal matters.</p><p>And somewhere in between all of them is the Nigerian consumer.</p><p>Still buying food.</p><p>Still buying medicine.</p><p>Still hoping that the person selling it knows what they are doing.</p><h3>Perhaps the Real Problem Is Not NAFDAC</h3><p>This is where I think the conversation needs to change.</p><p>The question shouldn&#39;t simply be:</p><p>&quot;<em>Why isn&#39;t NAFDAC regulating this?&quot;</em></p><p>A better question is:</p><p>&quot;<em>Why does Nigeria not have an effective system that guarantees that every food product reaching a consumer is reasonably safe?</em>&quot;</p><p>Those are two very different questions.</p><p>NAFDAC cannot physically stand beside every food seller in Lagos.</p><p>Neither can SON.</p><p>Neither can the Ministry of Health.</p><p>Neither can a local government.</p><p>That would be impossible.</p><p>What Nigeria needs is a functioning food-safety ecosystem.</p><p>One where responsibilities are clear.</p><p>Where local authorities have the equipment to test suspicious products.</p><p>Where state environmental-health officers can actually enforce standards.</p><p>Where laboratories are accessible.</p><p>Where information moves quickly between agencies.</p><p>Where serious offenders are prosecuted.</p><p>And where consumers know exactly where to report suspicious products.</p><h3>Give Local Regulators Teeth</h3><p>If unpackaged food is largely going to be handled at state and local levels, then those levels of government need more than titles and an avenue for collecting bribes.</p><p><strong>They need capacity.</strong></p><p>A local health inspector should not have to look at a suspicious food product and simply say:</p><p>&quot;It looks strange.&quot;</p><p>Give them rapid testing tools.</p><p>Give them functioning laboratories.</p><p>Give them proper training.</p><p>Give them legal authority.</p><p>Give them a clear reporting channel to federal regulators.</p><p>And give them enough independence to act.</p><p>Imagine a market inspector being able to take a sample of suspicious palm oil, test it quickly for prohibited substances and immediately trigger enforcement if it fails.</p><p>That would be much more useful than discovering the problem months later after hundreds of people have consumed it.</p><h3>And Then There Is the Consumer</h3><p>Regulation cannot succeed if consumers are completely excluded from the system.</p><p>People should know how to verify medicines.</p><p>They should know how to report suspicious products.</p><p>They should understand why some products should not be purchased simply because they are cheaper.</p><p>But we also need to be careful with the burden we place on consumers.</p><p>Food safety should not become:</p><p>&quot;If you get poisoned, you should have checked better.&quot;</p><p>The average Nigerian is already dealing with inflation, transportation costs, electricity problems, rent and food prices.</p><p>We cannot realistically expect someone buying palm oil to conduct a chemical analysis before paying for it.</p><p>Consumer education is important.</p><p>But consumer education should complement regulation, not replace it.</p><h3>We Need to Stop Measuring Success by Seizures</h3><p>Perhaps this is the most important point.</p><p>A regulator should not be judged only by how many trucks it seizes.</p><p>Or how many shops it closes.</p><p>Or how many tonnes of products it destroys.</p><p>Those figures make great headlines.</p><p>But they don&#39;t necessarily tell us whether the system is working.</p><p>The better questions are:</p><p><em>How many repeat offenders were convicted?</em></p><p><em>How many illegal factories were permanently shut down?</em></p><p><em>How many supply chains were dismantled?</em></p><p><em>How quickly are consumer complaints investigated?</em></p><p><em>How many market samples are tested every month?</em></p><p><em>How many states have functional food-safety laboratories?</em></p><p><em>How many cases actually make it through the courts?</em></p><p><strong>So, Who Is Watching Our Food?</strong></p><p>Perhaps the answer is everybody.</p><p>And perhaps that is precisely the problem.</p><p>Because when everybody is responsible, it can become very easy for responsibility to become diluted.</p><p>NAFDAC has an enormous mandate.</p><p>SON has standards responsibilities.</p><p>State and local authorities have public-health responsibilities.</p><p>Customs controls the borders.</p><p>NAQS deals with agricultural quarantine.</p><p>NDLEA deals with illicit drugs.</p><p>The police enforce criminal laws.</p><p>The courts are supposed to deliver justice.</p><p>But somewhere at the end of this complicated chain is a Nigerian standing in a market with ₦10,000 in their hand, trying to feed a family.</p><p>They don&#39;t know which agency has jurisdiction.</p><p>They shouldn&#39;t have to.</p><p>They shouldn&#39;t need to understand the NAFDAC Act before buying palm oil.</p><p>They shouldn&#39;t need to know the difference between a federal regulator and a state environmental-health officer before purchasing medicine.</p><p>They should simply be able to trust that the food and medicine available for sale are safe.</p><p>That is the real promise of regulation.</p><p>Not the number of raids.</p><p>Not the number of press releases.</p><p>Not the number of destroyed products.</p><p><strong>Trust.</strong></p><p><strong>And right now, Nigeria&#39;s food-safety system has a trust problem.</strong></p><p>So perhaps the debate sparked by NAFDAC&#39;s clarification should not end with:</p><p>&quot;<strong>Is NAFDAC responsible for unpackaged food</strong>?&quot;</p><p>Perhaps we should ask something much harder:</p><p><strong>If NAFDAC isn&#39;t directly watching that market stall, who is?</strong></p><p>And when the answer is finally given, the next question should be even harder:</p><p><strong>Do they actually have the power, money, laboratories, manpower and political independence to do the job?</strong></p><p>Because the Nigerian consumer is already doing their part.</p><p>They are buying the food.</p><p>They are taking it home.</p><p>They are feeding their children.</p><p>The least the system can do is make sure that what is inside that food isn&#39;t a gamble.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=55fb9023b744" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[FAVOURITISM, NOT TALENT: WHY THE 2026 WORLD CUP EXPOSED FOOTBALL’S BEST CLUB MANAGERS]]></title>
            <link>https://emperordotman.medium.com/favouritism-not-talent-why-the-2026-world-cup-exposed-footballs-best-club-managers-84b7711fc17d?source=rss-934acb6dbfd0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/84b7711fc17d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[world-cup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fifa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fifa-world-cup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Emperor Dotman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 12:54:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-19T12:54:10.401Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Squad profiling, team balance, and the coaches who never learned the difference</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/588/1*VJUtA7stf5t6-GsEHM6rdg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Club football and national team football are not the same sport wearing different jerseys. A club manager gets a training ground every day, a transfer window to fix his gaps, and total control over recruitment if his sporting director is any good. A national team manager gets a week here, a week there, a squad he inherited rather than built, and zero market to fix what isn&#39;t working. That difference is the whole story of this World Cup.</p><p>Every top manager walks into a tournament with a profile of player he trusts. Pep Guardiola wants technicians who let him strangle a game through ball control. Klopp and Pochettino want runners who can turn a match into chaos and win it there. Then you have the duel-hunters and masters of dark arts; the Simeones and the Dyches and now Arteta, who will happily win ugly if it means winning at all. At club level, a smart sporting director builds the squad around the manager’s profile. At international level, nobody builds you anything. You inherit whoever came through the pipeline, and your job is to find the balance, not just pick your favourites.</p><blockquote>The managers who struggled at this World Cup didn&#39;t struggle because they lacked quality. They struggled because they kept picking their guy instead of the right profiles for the XI.</blockquote><p>This world cup was, by reputation, one of the strongest set of head coaches assembled for a World Cup since the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. Several of them still went home without delivering what their names and appointment had promised, and the pattern behind most of those exits was the same: too much favouritism dressed up as loyalty, and a refusal to treat squad balance as seriously as individual quality.</p><h3>Brazil: Ancelotti&#39;s Midfield Problem Was Never a Secret</h3><p>Carlo Ancelotti is the most decorated Champions League coach, but his first real audit in international football management landed badly. Brazil opened with a 1-1 draw against Morocco in which the Atlas Lions dominated the first half (with 18 years old teenager, Bouaddi dominating the Brazil veterans) and deservedly led through Ismael Saibari before Vinicius Junior salvaged a point, and Ancelotti himself admitted afterwards that nerves had gotten to his players. Brazil recovered to win their remaining group games, but the shape of the problem was already visible; a midfield that could not control matches against sides with genuine press and legs.</p><p>That problem was not an accident. It was built into the squad list from the moment Ancelotti announced it. He leaned on Casemiro, 34 by tournament time and in his farewell season at Manchester United, alongside a Bruno Guimaraes forced to do both the creating and the running because there was no one else to share the load with him. Behind them, the fullback options carried the same fingerprints of a coach picking comfort over competition: Danilo and Alex Sandro, both well into their thirties and both drawing heavy criticism for their inclusion. Andrey Santos, arguably the country&#39;s best pure young midfield talent, did not make the trip.</p><p>Brazil eventually paid for it in the round of 16, not against Morocco as the group stage script might have suggested, but against Norway. Erling Haaland scored the goals that ended Brazil&#39;s tournament in a disappointing defeat, and in his press conference afterwards Ancelotti stopped defending the group and admitted the obvious: Brazil have a structural problem in the central midfield position, and it needs young, high-level players who simply were not part of this squad Don Carlo called up.</p><p>There is a wider point buried in that admission. Brazil&#39;s talent pool at the very top end, the Neymar-Ronaldinho-Ronaldo tier, has thinned out, and that is a separate crisis to the one Ancelotti created himself. But even accounting for that, a coach with his pedigree building a World Cup squad around an ageing double pivot and two fullbacks past their best, while leaving younger alternatives at home, is exactly the favouritism trap this piece is describing. Quality alone does not win you the midfield battle. The right profiling and midfield balance does.</p><h3>England: Tuchel Got the Big Calls Right, Even If the Semifinal Got Away?</h3><p>It would be unfair to lump Tuchel into the same failure category as Ancelotti because England’s tournament was, by any honest measure, a success. Third place finish in the world cup, a genuine World Cup semifinal, and then England’s best men’s finish since 1966 after an outrageous 6-4 win over France in the bronze medal match, Bukayo Saka scoring a hat-trick after England somehow surrendered a four-goal half-time lead. Tuchel’s England were duel monsters exactly as advertised, built around athleticism and physical control in midfield, and the approach delivered results all tournament until they met the defending champions.</p><p>Where the argument about profiling still applies is the semifinal itself. England led Argentina through Anthony Gordon before Messi, at 39, produced the two assists that killed the game late, first teeing up Enzo Fernandez and then Lautaro Martinez in stoppage time. Sky Sports and others pointed to Tuchel&#39;s passive substitutions in that closing period as the moment England lost control of a match they were winning, a defence he had chopped and changed all tournament finally running out of answers against the one player: an alien and the greatest player of all who was capable of deciding a game from nothing. It is a smaller version of the same disease: a coach trusting his structure to hold rather than making the profile change the moment demanded it which he did not have when he decided to leave elite passers like Alexander Arnold, Levi Colwill, Adam Wharton and Cole Palmer at home while the likes of Noni Madueke, Jordan Henderson, Dan Burn and Jarell Quansah got call ups.</p><h3>Belgium: The Golden Generation&#39;s Final Word Was Almost a Statement</h3><p>Belgium do not belong in the failure column the way this piece originally assumed. Rudi Garcia, not a marquee manager name but a manager who talked Thibaut Courtois back into the fold after two years of estrangement, took a squad still carrying the last embers of the golden generation to the quarterfinal, where they lost 2-1 to eventual finalists Spain. The match turned on a Rodri handball inside the Spanish box that PGMOL very own referee Michael Oliver and VAR both waved away, and on a goalkeeping error from Senne Lammens that Garcia pointedly declined to defend afterwards.</p><p>The criticism of Belgium through the group stage, that this squad was ageing and overly reliant on De Bruyne, Lukaku and Courtois to paper over a thinning pipeline, was real and Garcia said as much himself when he called the criticism of his younger players &#39;ugly&#39; after a 5-1 win over New Zealand settled any nerves.</p><p>That would not however excuse Garcia’s squad selections with priority to washed midfielders bar Youri Tielemans or his choice of terribly mid back 4 or lack of balance in his forwards selection which he later rectified in the knock out stages.</p><h3>Deschamps and Rabiot: An Old Habit That Finally Cost Him</h3><p>Didier Deschamps is not new to this conversation. His winning midfield of Kante, Pogba, and Matuidi was as close to a perfectly profiled trio as international football has produced; runners, a controller, and a destroyer all in one XI. Since then, Deschamps has developed a habit of finding a way to fit Adrien Rabiot (who by the way isn’t a bad player but his profile doesn’t do the justice) into that same midfield regardless of whether the matchup calls for him, and it finally cost France against exactly the opponent it was always going to cost him against.</p><p>France walked into the semifinal against Spain as favourites after winning every match to that point, and were beaten 2-0, Mikel Oyarzabal converting an early penalty and Pedro Porro doubling it in the second half, while Spain&#39;s defence restricted elite forwards Mbappe, Olise, Dembele and Doue to next to nothing. Rabiot picked up an early yellow card and was hauled off at half-time for Manu Kone, a substitution Deschamps later explained by saying Rabiot himself had asked to come off rather than risk a second booking. L&#39;Equipe&#39;s dressing-room reporting suggested the decision, and the choice of Aurelien Tchaouameni ahead of Kone in the original XI, had left plenty of the squad frustrated.</p><p>Spain’s whole identity is control through technical ability on the ball, quick combinations in tight spaces and lastly, patience in possession. Rabiot is not that profile and has never pretended to be. Deschamps knew this and picked him anyway, the same way he has periodically done since 2018, and against the one opponent in the draw built entirely to punish exactly that kind of midfield mismatch, it finally became the difference.</p><p>Zinedine Zidane takes over the France job after this tournament, and fixing that recurring blind spot (midfield balance) in central midfield will be one of his first real tests.</p><h3>Age Is a Number, Not a Selection Policy</h3><p>Experience is the mask every struggling coach reaches for. It sounds responsible. It photographs well in a press conference. It is also, more often than not, a way of avoiding an uncomfortable selection call. Messi produced two match-winning assists in a World Cup semifinal at 39. That should end the conversation about age as a blanket disqualifier because it proves what should already have been obvious; players should be judged on their current quality profile, not on a birth certificate.</p><p>There will always be outliers on both ends, a 33-year-old who has nothing left and a 39-year-old who still decides finals or the likes of Bouaddi, Mazambi, G. Mora and co.</p><p>Squad selection built around comfort with veterans, rather than a genuine audit of who is still performing at the level a World Cup demands, is another favouritism act wearing a respectable coat.</p><h3>The Tournament&#39;s Real Controversy Wasn&#39;t Tactical</h3><p>Away from team sheets, this World Cup carried a genuine political storm that had nothing to do with formations. Folarin Balogun was sent off for the United States in the group stage and handed a one-match ban, ruling him out of the round of 16 tie against Belgium. President Donald Trump publicly called FIFA president Gianni Infantino to ask for the suspension to be reviewed, and within days FIFA’s disciplinary committee suspended the ban, freeing Balogun to play. He did, and the US lost 4-1 anyway.</p><p>The reversal triggered exactly the reaction anyone outside FIFA’s press office would expect. The Royal Belgian Football Association formally challenged the eligibility decision. The human rights group FairSquare filed a complaint with the International Olympic Committee alleging Infantino had repeatedly breached rules on political neutrality, citing his effusive public support for Trump, FIFA’s decision to award Trump its inaugural Peace Prize at the World Cup draw, and his attendance at Trump’s inauguration. More than fifty members of the European Parliament signed a letter backing an investigation. Infantino’s own defence, that FIFA’s disciplinary bodies operate independently and he simply informed Trump of that fact on the call, has not stopped the story from following the tournament all the way to the final, where Trump is scheduled to jointly present the trophy alongside Infantino on Sunday. For a sport that markets itself as neutral in matters of politics and religion, it was as loud a breach of that principle as the game has seen at a World Cup. And this was a separate incidence to the Somali referee.</p><h3>Where the Final Leaves the Argument</h3><p>Spain arrive at MetLife Stadium having conceded a single goal in seven matches, the clearest evidence in the entire tournament that discipline, technical quality, team balance and profile-fit beat individual star power when a coach commits to it properly. Luis de la Fuente’s side is built on control, positional discipline, and a level of technical uniformity across the XI that neither Brazil, Belgium, nor France could match in their biggest games.</p><p>Argentina, by contrast, have needed extra time or a late fightback in every knockout match this tournament and have leaned on the G.O.A.T, Messi (when he moves to a wide position in the latter stages of the game) to manufacture the difference more than once, most dramatically against England. Both approaches have got their teams to the same match. Only one of them looks sustainable beyond one magical run.</p><p>However, the lesson from this World Cup is not that big names fail at international football. It is that international football punishes the exact instinct that makes a lot of these coaches great at club level, the confidence to build a team entirely around what you personally love watching. Club football lets you buy your way out of that. International football makes you live with the squad you have, and the coaches who understood that this summer went further than the ones who didn’t.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=84b7711fc17d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The NPFL and NNL: What Brazil Got Right That Nigeria Still Gets Wrong]]></title>
            <link>https://emperordotman.medium.com/the-npfl-and-nnl-what-brazil-got-right-that-nigeria-still-gets-wrong-fd9695b4e419?source=rss-934acb6dbfd0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fd9695b4e419</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Emperor Dotman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 12:30:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-07T13:02:50.013Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mvQhDD-O2Vxts4OxF5Wm_A.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Nigerian football stands at a critical juncture.</p><p>For decades, the Nigeria Professional Football League (NPFL) and the Nigeria National League (NNL) have relied heavily on state governments for survival. This model has now become a structural barrier to the growth of the leagues.</p><p>Inconsistent funding, political interference, and a lack of commercial drive have left our domestic game underdeveloped, despite the country’s talent pool. Privatization, executed thoughtfully with strong regulatory oversight, represents the most logical and transformative solution.</p><p>The evidence appears in both domestic success stories and proven international models. It is time to confront the failures directly and implement change.</p><h3><strong>The Failures of Government Ownership</strong></h3><p>State-owned clubs dominate the top tiers of Nigerian club football, but their success (at least if that is the best word to sugarcoat the mediocrity) swings dramatically with political cycles.</p><p>A new governor often brings fresh priorities. Football funding, viewed as secondary to infrastructure, education, or political patronage, can dry up overnight. Projects stall, salaries go unpaid for months, and leadership changes disrupt continuity.</p><p>Club administrators, frequently political appointees, chase short-term results to impress their principals instead of building sustainable structures. This volatility breeds mediocrity. Academies (which most professional clubs in Nigeria don’t have, by the way) suffer from neglect, infrastructure decays, and matchday experiences remain unappealing, keeping fans away. Sponsors shy away from entities tied to unpredictable public budgets with limited accountability.</p><p>The outcome is a league plagued by low attendance, modest broadcasting value, and clubs that operate more like the usual government MDAs than competitive businesses.</p><p>Private clubs have demonstrated greater stability on an uneven field. Remo Stars, under Kunle Soname’s ownership, stands as a prime example. Their Beyond Limits academy has exported numerous talents, including players to Inter Milan (Ebenezer Akinsanmiro who was on loan to Italian Serie A outfit, Pisa) and Flamengo (Shola Ogundana, who now plays for Dyanmo Kyiv), with structured sales generating significant revenue. The club has even secured the NPFL title as a privately run entity, proving that professional management and a focus on youth development yield results. Player trading has provided financial stability without endless fund injections.</p><h3>Youth Development: From Glory Days to Recent Decline</h3><p>Nigeria’s trajectory at the youth level since the 2015 FIFA U-17 World Cup victory in Chile underscores the damage of weak structures.</p><p>That Golden Eaglets squad, boasting talents like Victor Osimhen and Samuel Chukwueze, secured Nigeria’s fifth title through organised preparation and depth. Subsequent U-17 world cups have brought inconsistent qualifications, early exits, and diminished global impact.</p><p>The talent remains abundant, but the domestic platform that should refine it has faltered.</p><p>Privatised clubs with robust academies would reverse this decline. Owners motivated by long-term financial returns would invest seriously in scouting, coaching, and facilities.</p><p>Youth players become valuable assets through proper development and smart sales. Scaled league-wide, this approach would restore Nigeria’s dominance at U-17 and U-20 levels, feeding the Super Eagles side later on.</p><h3>Real-World Talent Stories: Zadok Yohanna and the Next Wave</h3><p>Recent examples highlight both potential and lost opportunities.</p><p>Zadok Abu Yohanna, the exciting right winger born in Bauchi State, emerged from Ikon Allah Football Academy in Kaduna state, Nigeria. He moved directly to Swedish side AIK in 2025 without significant NPFL exposure, impressed rapidly, and secured a high-value transfer (€28.5m) to Premier League club Brighton &amp; Hove Albion yesterday.</p><p>His journey shows Nigerian raw talent can shine internationally, but it also reveals how our league often fails to provide the platform, visibility, and financial rewards that retain or properly value such prospects at home.</p><p>FYI, AIK has reportedly eyed another Nigerian teenager, Angelo Agbejoye (who plays for the flying Eagles and Grass Runners FC in Sagamu, Ogun state), as a potential replacement for Yohanna.</p><p>This pattern of rapid exports without deep domestic seasoning repeats too often. A thriving privatised league would nurture these talents longer, increase their value through competitive exposure, and allow clubs to benefit from structured sell-ons.</p><h3>Global Exposure Gap: Why Intermediary Leagues Turn to Africa</h3><p>South American leagues, particularly in Brazil and Argentina, enjoy far greater global visibility and direct pathways to Europe’s top clubs. In recent years, young stars from Palmerias like Endrick (Palmeiras to Real Madrid), Estêvão (Palmeiras to Chelsea), and Vitor Reis (Palmeiras to Manchester City) have commanded massive fees with minimal intermediary steps. Tier 1 european league sides now employ scouts who monitor these leagues closely, and strong broadcasting deals plus competitive environments inflate player valuations.</p><p>This dynamic means many mid-tier European and other intermediary leagues like the Czech, Swedish, Danish and Norwegian cannot compete financially for Brazilian or Argentine talents. They increasingly turn to Africa for cost-effective, high-potential options instead</p><p>A professionalised NPFL would have elevated our players’ exposure, help command better transfer fees, and position Nigerian clubs as key players in the global talent market rather than mere suppliers of raw material.</p><h3>The Economics of Player Trading and Retention</h3><p>Smart player development and trading can fully fund club operations and generate surplus.</p><p>Remo Stars’ model already demonstrates how academy products, backed by strong sell-on clauses, can cover wages, infrastructure, and reinvestment.</p><p>One major transfer windfall, like those seen with Ecuador’s Independiente del Valle and Moisés Caicedo- Independiente Del Valle got close to 29 million euros through transfer fees and structured sell on clauses from Caicedo’s move in 2023 from Brighton to Chelsea (add William Pacho and Piero Hincapie who also left the club in 2020 and got high profile moves to PSG and Arsenal respectively) can sustain a club for years and open doors for the club to be in a better position of negotiation (as seen in Kendry Paez, Joel Ordonez and Dennier Ordonez)</p><p>Beyond economics, better remuneration would aid national team building. Many Nigerian players currently ply their trade in South Africa’s PSL or other African leagues. With competitive salaries in a privatised NPFL, these tier B and C homegrown talents would likely stay or return home.</p><p>A stronger domestic league would field more experienced, settled players ready for CAF competitions.The result? Improved performances in the CAF Champions League and Confederation Cup. Nigerian clubs could move beyond occasional quarter-final appearances to consistent semi-final and final contention, raising the league’s profile and attracting further investment.</p><h3>Learning from Brazil: Academies, Private Models, and Revenue Streams</h3><p>Interestingly, Brazil provides an instructive blueprint. Clubs like Flamengo, Palmeiras, and Santos have built renowned developmental academies that systematically produce and monetise talent. While the federation supports national teams, league operations and club funding lean heavily on private or corporate structures.</p><p>The <strong>Sociedade Anônima do Futebol (SAF)</strong> model has encouraged investment and better governance.</p><p><strong>Approximate Revenue Breakdown for Top Brazilian Clubs :</strong></p><ul><li>Player transfers: Major driver, often exceeding US$500 million league-wide in strong years.</li><li>Broadcasting and commercial: Hundreds of millions more.</li><li>Matchday and other: Supplementary but growing with professional management.</li></ul><p>These revenue streams fund academies effectively. Nigerian clubs could replicate this success through privatisation, turning youth development into a core revenue engine while building competitive first teams.</p><p><strong>A Structured, Practical Path to Privatisation Reform must be deliberate and phased:</strong></p><ul><li>Gradual Divestment: Strengthen and enforce rules requiring state clubs to sell majority equity, with clear timelines and incentives. Begin with public-private partnerships where needed.</li><li>Ownership Standards: License owners based on financial capacity, credible business plans focused on academies, and transparent governance. Limit political influence in operations.</li><li>Academy Mandates: Require certified youth setups (U-15 to U-19) with minimum standards for facilities, coaching, and scouting. Link compliance to league participation.</li><li>Commercial and Revenue Framework: Improve collective broadcasting negotiations while granting clubs freedom for sponsorships, merchandising, and digital content. Offer incentives for academy-derived transfer income.</li><li>Player Welfare and Retention: Mandate competitive salary structures and welfare standards to attract and keep Nigerian talents who might otherwise seek opportunities abroad or in other African leagues.</li><li>Regulatory Safeguards: The NFF and the LMC maintain oversight to enforce development clauses, prevent asset-stripping, and protect fan interests through possible community share options.</li></ul><p>This framework adapts successful elements from Brazil and other markets to Nigerian realities.</p><h3>Time for Bold Action</h3><p>Imagine a Nigerian league filled with clubs like Remo Stars (Beyond Limits) having professional academies producing talents such as Zadok Yohanna and Ebenezer Akinsanmiro for sustained domestic growth before high-value exports; packed stadiums; competitive continental campaigns; and a reliable pipeline bolstering the Super Eagles.</p><p>Government transitions would no longer destabilize teams. Public resources could support grassroots initiatives instead of subsidising inefficiency. The raw talent, passion, and potential have always existed in abundance. What has been missing is an ownership model that rewards vision, professionalism, and sustainability.</p><p>Nigerian football can transcend its current role as a political appendage. It can evolve into a self-sustaining industry that develops starlets, creates economic value, inspires communities, and delivers consistent glory on the continental and global stage. The moment for courageous reform is now. Let us build the league our talents deserve before the next Zadok Yohanna slips through underdeveloped and undervalued or even unnoticed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd9695b4e419" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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