<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Luis Vega-Verástegui on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Luis Vega-Verástegui on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@entrevacios?source=rss-9b3c2c6d1b92------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:44:42 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@entrevacios/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Schemas of Kant avec Sade]]></title>
            <link>https://entrevacios.medium.com/the-schemas-of-kant-avec-sade-7769bc97cbc6?source=rss-9b3c2c6d1b92------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7769bc97cbc6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[masochism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sadism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lacan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sade]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kant]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Luis Vega-Verástegui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Jun 2025 15:49:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-17T11:49:27.814Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mZRn6ztTFlNgk_-ce4lJGQ.png" /><figcaption>Image generated by the almighty ChatGPT</figcaption></figure><p>Anyone who has read “Kant avec Sade” has likely encountered Lacan’s obscure schemas — diagrams that, at first glance, seem to follow no coherent logic. Lacan limits himself to describing the symptoms experienced by each position within the sadistic and masochistic fantasies, but says little about why the schemas are structured as they are. When I first read the text, these diagrams struck me as utterly arbitrary. Lacan introduces them without offering any real justification, as if their form needed no explanation. It wasn’t until I came across Christian Fierens’s <em>The Jouissance Principle</em> that their structure began to make sense. What was the key? Fierens reads the schemas in “Kant avec Sade” as a variation of Schema L — Lacan’s first topological graph.</p><p>I must admit that I have never been fond of Schema L. It always struck me as ambiguous and incompatible with Lacan’s later conceptual developments; something he was aware of, given the fact that he modified it in subsequent seminars. But perhaps I shouldn’t be this harsh. After all, when Lacan introduced it in Seminar II, he acknowledged its limitations: <strong>“This schema would not be a schema if it yielded a solution. It isn’t even a model. It’s just a way of fixing our ideas, called for by an infirmity in our discursive capacity.”</strong><a href="#_ftn1"><strong>[1]</strong></a><strong> </strong>From this vantage point, I approach Schema L and the sadists and masochist schemas, not as definitive theoretical constructs, but as heuristic tools. My aim, then, is not to explain everything in them— because there is no unified theory behind their forms— but rather to clarify what is at play in the sadistic and masochistic schemas through the imaginary and symbolic axes that can also be interpreted as the axes of statement and enunciation.</p><h3>Schema L</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/990/1*a1_rDDqJl4SbNFNnYDkUVQ.png" /><figcaption>Image 1: Schema L from Seminar II</figcaption></figure><p>Let us begin by clarifying the function of each symbol in the schema. In the upper left corner, we find “(Es) S,” which designates the subject, not yet the split subject of the signifier, but rather the unconscious<strong> </strong>subject, corresponding to Freud’s<strong> </strong>Id (Es). Opposite it, in the upper right corner, is a′, the other as semblant — the specular image or external counterpart with whom the subject identifies. In the lower left corner is the ego (a), which emerges as the imaginary construct formed through identification with the specular other. Finally, in the lower right corner, we encounter A, the Big Other — the locus of language, law, and symbolic order, the place from which the subject is constituted and spoken (we should remark that this is not yet conceptualized as the barred Other).</p><p>This schema is particularly valuable because it allows us to “picture” the complex interplay between the conscious and unconscious relationship between the subject and the other, something that cannot be fully captured by signifiers alone. If I were to explain this dynamic through language alone, I would likely run out of words before achieving the clarity this picture provides. This is precisely what the imaginary register contributes: it produces a coherent totality, a structured image, where no such totality objectively exists.</p><p>Similarly, the imaginary ego arises from this same imaginary mechanism. When the subject identifies with the image of the other — perceived as a complete and unified form — it constructs, by analogy, a fictional image of itself, one that mirrors the other’s perceived wholeness. In this way, the ego is not an expression of interior truth but a misrecognition (<em>méconnaissance</em>), forged through a specular illusion of unity.</p><p>After understanding how the ego is the product of the identification with the imaginary other, it makes sense why the line in the diagram goes from the imaginary other to the ego (a’ → a) and not otherwise. The ego doesn’t affect the imaginary other, but this other does affect the ego. Therefore, this axis represents the imaginary relation one has with the other, or others. Lacan calls the imaginary relationship the ego has with others the <strong>wall of language</strong>. While there is a symbolic aspect to this wall of language, it is dominated by the imagination in the way it identifies all things as objects in the world. <strong>“The imaginary gains its false reality, which nonetheless is a verified reality, starting off from the order defined by the wall of language. The ego such as we understand it, the other, the fellow being, all these imaginary things are objects.”</strong><a href="#_ftn2"><strong>[2]</strong></a></p><p>This imaginary relationship between objects functions as a <strong>wall</strong> — an obstacle that prevents a direct or “true” relationship between subjects. The subjects, properly speaking, lie on the other side of this wall. As Lacan puts it: <strong>“The subject is separated from the Others, the true ones, by the wall of language.”</strong><a href="#_ftn3"><strong>[3]</strong></a> But if there is a wall, it implies that something is trying but failing to cross it: <strong>the speech of the Other</strong>. It is given to speech that a relation to the Other exists. <strong>“If speech is founded in the existence of the Other; the true one, language is so made as to return us to the objectified other, to the other whom we can make what we want of, including thinking that he is an object, that is to say that he doesn’t know what he’s saying.”</strong><a href="#_ftn4"><strong>[4]</strong></a></p><p>As depicted in Schema L, the Big Other (A) is the only position not conditioned by another — the origin point of speech. Without speech, not only would the subject lack any relation to the true Other, but there would be no objects, no ego, and ultimately, no subjectivity as we know it. The speech of the Other functions as the unconditional cause that initiates the symbolic chain. Yet, once the imaginary wall is erected through ego formation and specular identification, there is no longer a direct line from the Other to the subject (A → S). The symbolic must now detour through the imaginary, rerouting itself in a mediated and distorted form. Thus, the axis connecting A to S is symbolic (and real, even though the notion of the Real is in its early development in this graph) — it reflects the indirect, structured, and unconscious nature of the Other’s speech.</p><h3>The 90 Degree Turn</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/598/1*w51GJxFEWHrX_4HWA0736Q.png" /><figcaption>Image 2: From The Jouissance Principle</figcaption></figure><p>I can continue explaining Schema L, but I would like to stop here and determine with clarity what matters for the sadist and masochist schemas of “Kant avec Sade.” As we have seen, the axis from the imaginary other to the ego (a’ → a) is the imaginary wall of language that connects the ego with the other as objects in the world. On the other hand, the incomplete axis between the Other and the subject (A → S) is the unconscious relationship that the Other has with the subject in speech. Now, given the fact that the imaginary axis is grounded on the “ordinary language” that objectifies intersubjectivity, this axis can be understood as what is enunciated, or as the statement. On the other hand, the symbolic axis can be interpreted as the axis of enunciation, based on being grounded in the speech of the Other. This is how Fierens opens the space to understand the schemas of “Kant avec Sade.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/598/1*mxlMBh-By4BWwWpBHIwMfg.png" /><figcaption>Image 3: From The Jouissance Principle</figcaption></figure><p>With Schema L in mind and the role of these two axes, we can understand how a 90-degree move to the right gives us the first schema, the sadist schema. If you compare Image 2 with Image 3, you can see how Schema L has rotated while keeping all its pieces. In Image 3, you can see how the imaginary axis of the statement still connects the ego with the other. You might ask, What does this change represent? The main alteration in Image 3 is the mix between the places of the subject and the other. While in Schema L, the subject and its ego are on the left side, and the Other and its other are on the right side, in Image 3, the Other is on the side of the ego, and the subject is on the side of the other. Why does this matter? It matters because the speech of the Other emerges from within the subject towards an external subject. This is why turning the Schema L 90 degrees to the right produces the Sadean schema, in which the Other torments its victim with its implacable voice.</p><h3>The Sadist Schema</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1022/1*tIokx-rpIJarLVz3DQuAXQ.png" /><figcaption>Image 4: The sadist schema from Écrits</figcaption></figure><p>The schema above is the first diagram Lacan presents in “Kant avec Sade,” representing the relationship between tormentor and victim. While it closely resembles the earlier Schema L, it features several notable terminological and conceptual shifts that reflect Lacan’s evolving theory of the drives. Let us begin with the Other (A). In this schema, A is transformed into the voice of the superego (a). This marks a crucial turning point in Lacan’s thought, as he begins to articulate a theory of the drive rooted in the voice as the object cause of desire. Despite this reconfiguration, the function of the Other as the locus of enunciation remains intact, thereby maintaining continuity with the logic of Schema L.</p><p>The ego, on the other hand, is now replaced by V, which stands for the Kantian will (<em>volonté</em> in French). This shift signifies that the ego is no longer a passive imaginary construct but the active agent of practical reason — that is, it occupies the place of ethical decision-making within Kantian ethics.</p><p>One of the most striking changes is the replacement of the other (a) with the divided subject ($). One might be tempted to say that the “other” in this schema is now the subject, insofar as it occupies the position of the split subject of the unconscious. However, it is the sadist’s will that dominates, subjects, and forces the other to choose between life and death.</p><p>Lastly, the position labeled S, which remains unchanged from Schema L, now takes on a different meaning. In this recontextualized framework, S stands for the pathological subject governed by the pleasure principle. This reinterpretation does not contradict its earlier alignment with Freud’s Id, as both operate outside the jurisdiction of moral law and are driven by unconscious desires.</p><p>The most important change is the direction of the arrows. Now there is only one curvy line that follows one direction from the voice to the pathological subject. As we can see in Image 4, this curvy line follows a causal chain: a →V →$ →S. I read this chain to follow Kant’s category of causality, in which the understanding synthesizes appearances in accordance with the principle of cause and effect.</p><p>In practical reason, Kant needs to presuppose an unconditional causation outside the causations of the world: freedom. Hence, if we presuppose that the subject’s will is free and autonomous, then the subject can be responsible for enunciating and following the categorical imperative, the free will (V). In that sense, for Kant, the chain of causation is reduced to a free will that commands to follow the law for law’s sake, even if the pathological subject has to suffer in the process (V →S).</p><p>In contrast to Kant’s causality of practical reason, we can see how the Sadean schema introduces the unconscious causation of an “impure” practical reason. The main challenge for Kant is the preceding causation of the Will, the voice of the tormentor that Sade introduces in his novels (a →V). This voice differs from the Will precisely because it carries an unconscious desire that Lacan codifies as the “d” next to the voice (d →a). In other words, the voice is the material ground of a desire absent in the statement of the categorical imperative, which mirrors the same problem the Other faces against the <strong>wall of language</strong> in Schema L, which can only communicate unconsciously. Here, given the fact that these roles are externalized, the voice is present in the world, conditioning the will with its hidden desire when spoken to an external other. This externalization of the categorical imperative towards someone else denotes the subtle difference between the enunciated statement and the material voice whose ferocity exceeds all symbolizations. This is why Lacan claims that with Sade, the division between <strong>the subject of enunciation</strong> (the subject that speaks — the voice) and <strong>the subject of the statement</strong> (the grammatical subject of the categorical imperative — the will) is revealed.</p><p>Now, what the will does to the other is what constitutes the sadist fantasy. The will of the sadist subjugates the other by forcing it to choose between life and death. It is this forced choice that divides the other and maintains it divided through repetition. The sadist’s act in this case is not to push the victim to cross the line of death, but to keep the victim between life and death. As Lacan claims, <strong>“We will see that there is a statics of the fantasy, whereby the point of aphanisis, assumed to lie in $, must in one’s imagination be indefinitely pushed back. This explains the hardly believable survival that Sade grants to the victims of the abuse and tribulations he inflicts in his fable.”</strong><a href="#_ftn5"><strong>[5]</strong></a></p><p>The forced choice to live is sustained by the pain the pathological subject bears. This pain is ultimately what the sadist wants to generate in the other. Everything at the end is grounded on the pain the other’s body experiences because it is through pain that the pleasure of <em>jouissance</em> can be stretched, a pleasure in pain. Hence, the pain felt in the pathological subject is the goal of this chain of causations, starting from the voice of the Other. However, the pain given to the other is not a gift for a masochist who seeks pain. The sadist is not concerned about generating pain for pain’s sake. In the imaginary relationship between the sadist and the victim, this pain is the only connection the sadist has with the Other after rejecting its existence. As Fierens states, <strong>“If the subject is presented as being on the verge of passing out (the barred subject), it is in order to be well present for the sadist as his Other, from who the sadist himself receives his message of jouissance in an inverted form (where it is seen that Sade’s characters only take a provisional place in the fourfold schema of the question of the subject).”</strong><a href="#_ftn6"><strong>[6]</strong></a><strong> </strong>This is why the sadist seeks pain. It is not to destroy the other, but on the contrary, to get closer to the Other beyond the objectifying wall of language.</p><p>After covering the cause and the effect of this whole chain, the sadist fantasy becomes clear. As visible in Image 4, Lacan codifies the sadist fantasy at the bottom of the schema (a&lt;&gt;$). This fantasy is the product of inverting the neurotic fantasy ($&lt;&gt;a) that Lacan introduced between seminars V and VI, in which the subject desires the object. This inversion represents how the voice determines the subject by dictating his desire (a&lt;&gt;$). Starting from the voice that enunciates the categorical imperative, this fantasy is directed towards the other who bears the Sadean cross by infinitely feeling pain in their flesh without passing away. In contrast to the pleasure principle that rejects displeasure to maintain a pleasurable stream of sensations, the principle of <em>jouissance</em> is grounded on the repetition of displeasure to expand pleasure indefinitely. It is in accordance with this fantasy that we can understand Lacan’s Sadean maxim that is enunciated from the locus of the Other:</p><blockquote>“I have the right to enjoy your body,” anyone can say to me, “and I will exercise this right without any limit to the capriciousness of the exactions I may wish to satiate with your body.” <a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></blockquote><h3>The Masochist Schema</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mXBL02oc63zY-O-y_sO-ZQ.png" /><figcaption>Image 5: The masochist schema from Écrits</figcaption></figure><p>If we rotate the sadist schema 90 degrees to the right, we arrive at the masochist schema. We can see how Lacan’s use of such rotations anticipates the method he later employs in constructing the four discourses, where similar turns produce new structural configurations. In the case of the masochist schema, what comes into focus is not the fantasy scenario depicted in Sade’s novels, but rather the lived structure of Sade’s own subjective position. The masochist schema reflects the real-life fantasy of the Marquis de Sade himself. It reveals how Sade, as a subject, occupied a masochistic position with respect to his mother-in-law by becoming the object of her will to <em>jouissance</em>.</p><p>Although Lacan doesn’t define this graph as a masochist graph, we can deduce this conclusion because (1) before presenting it, he mentions how masochism is not just the reversal of sadism and then continues claiming that the right to <em>jouissance</em> given to the other cannot be understood as a symmetrical reversal but as a 90-degree rotation. Moreover, (2) claiming that this graph only explains his life is an arbitrary use of the rotation of the sadist schema.</p><p>The pivotal moment comes when Lacan notes that, in the sadist’s compulsive repetition of punishment, the sadist ends up negating the existence of the Other only to become, paradoxically, what he sought to destroy: the eternal object. In Sade’s case, this objectification marks his capture by the very structure he attempts to dominate. He becomes the perpetual voice of the will of the Other — a will embodied, in his personal life, by his mother-in-law, who relentlessly pursued legal action against him. In this way, Sade’s transgressive maxims, rather than expressing pure autonomy, enact the desire of the Other (<em>a → V</em>), a will oriented toward <em>jouissance</em>.</p><p>At the universal level (the upper register of the schema), the masochist becomes the object of the Other’s will, and it is through this submission that Sade, as a particular subject, is constituted. As Lacan defines it, <strong>“For Sade, $ (barred S), we finally see that, as a subject, it is through his disappearance that he makes his mark, things having come to their term.”</strong><a href="#_ftn8"><strong>[8]</strong></a> That is, Sade takes on the position of subject only through being subjected (<em>V → $</em>) to the will of the Other. This will is not merely one of punishment, but of unbounded enjoyment — a demand for <em>jouissance</em>. As Lacan suggests, this desire of the Other is what ultimately animates Sade’s own wish to vanish, to erase himself from the scene and not to be born at all. For Fierens:</p><blockquote>In the second schema, Sade’s voice ( <em>a</em>), and $ can only be articulated by the enactment of a will to jouissance (V), a will represented by Madame de Montreuil, Sade’s mother-in-law, an uncastratable mother who pulls the strings of Sade’s destiny: his incarceration in the fortress of Vincennes, then in the Bastille and at Charenton asylum (1778–1790), his imprisonment under the young First Consul Bonaparte in 1801, and his transferral once again to Charenton, where he died in 1814.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></blockquote><p>However, how can we understand the endpoint of this schema, which still culminates in the pathological subject (S)? If the masochist internalizes the pain and suffering, why does the pathological subject appear on the side of the other? For Lacan, the pathological subject here represents what he calls <strong>“the brute subject incarnating the heroism characteristic of the pathological in the form of faithfulness to Sade manifested by those who at first tolerated his excesses.”</strong><a href="#_ftn10"><strong>[10]</strong></a> In other words, the pathological subject is not merely the one who suffers, but the particular subject who remained faithful to him despite bearing the burden of his actions. This detail reveals the essential inversion at work in the masochist schema. The masochist does not aim to inflict pain, nor simply to receive it, but rather to provoke the other’s fidelity, to become the object of their desire. In this light, the product the masochist seeks is not suffering itself, but the symbolic confirmation that he has become indispensable to the Other’s <em>jouissance</em> — that he is the unique object of the Other’s desire, which produces faithful others. In that sense, we can understand the axis of enunciation from the universal voice that needs to cross <strong>the wall of language </strong>(V → $) to communicate its message to the particular pathological subjects that enjoy the mark he left in the world and his works (a → S). This is my interpretation and not what Lacan claims in “Kant avec Sade.”</p><p>I must admit, Lacan’s final schema falls somewhat short. Perhaps this is because Sade was not, in fact, a masochist, making it difficult to capture the full complexity of masochism through his example. Sade ultimately embodies the sadistic fantasy he so methodically stages in his writings. And while it is true that beneath every sadism there lies a hidden masochistic structure, this is precisely what Sade resisted with his transgressions against the Law he didn’t know he was submitted to — the law of <em>jouissance</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Jacques Lacan, <em>The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 2: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis</em>, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Sylvana Tomasellli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 243.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Lacan, 244.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <em>Ibid.</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <em>Ibid.</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton &amp; Company, 2006), 654.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Christian Fierens, <em>The Jouissance Principle</em>, trans. Kieran O’Meara (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2022), 143.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Lacan, <em>Écrits</em>, 648.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Lacan, <em>Écrits</em>, 657.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Fierens, 146.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Lacan, <em>Écrits</em>, 657.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7769bc97cbc6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[It Feels Good to Do Evil: An Introduction to Kant avec Sade]]></title>
            <link>https://entrevacios.medium.com/it-feels-good-to-do-evil-an-introduction-to-kant-avec-sade-5ec87a5fde11?source=rss-9b3c2c6d1b92------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5ec87a5fde11</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kant]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sade]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lacanian-psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Luis Vega-Verástegui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Jun 2025 19:25:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-09T00:21:53.950Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*luO656v83NEh9xt_KVu09w.jpeg" /></figure><p>Anyone who has ventured into Lacan’s <em>Écrits</em> has likely struggled to decipher “Kant avec Sade.” Often regarded as one of Lacan’s most challenging texts, due to its dense prose and theoretical complexity, “Kant avec Sade” remains a source of fascination and frustration for Lacanian readers. While numerous interpretations attempt to explain why Lacan believed that Sade’s <em>Philosophy in the Bedroom</em> not only completes Kant’s <em>Critique of Practical Reason</em> but also unveils its hidden truth, my goal with this article is on getting to the threshold where this truth can be found without really exhibiting it as a trophy to be admired. To that end, I will focus exclusively on the first three pages of “Kant avec Sade,” where the core ethical tension Lacan addresses in Kantian thought begins to surface.</p><p>In <em>The Law of Desire </em>(2017), Dany Nobus, with the journalistic finesse of a writer who knows how to tell a story without overlooking a detail, reveals the drama behind the publication of “Kant avec Sade,” an essay Lacan wrote intending to be part of the preface of Sade’s <em>La Philosophie dans le Boudoir </em>but was not published for obscure reasons in its first attempt<em>. </em>After years of gossip that placed the blame on multiple editors and publishers, in a letter to Élizabeth Roudinesco<em>, </em>the editor of<em> Cercle du livre précieux, </em>Claude Tchou, assumed full responsibility for rejecting Lacan’s essay. The reason? Tchou claimed he rejected it because he was unworthy of the text. As Nobus queries, supposing that Tchow knew Lacan’s texts were complex writing pieces, why did he even commission Lacan to write an essay for the preface of <em>Philosophy in the Bedroom</em>? Jean Allouch, speculating over the erroneous hypothesis that a different publisher refused Lacan’s text, had the idea that Lacan didn’t comply with the editor and publisher’s demands for a psycho-biographical interpretation of the style of Freud’s works on Leonardo da Vinci, Moses, and others. Instead of following the editorial line and compromising his desire, Lacan defied those demands and did his own thing. Inspired by the unrestrained desire to write only what desire demands, his text clashed with the “No” of the editor. “If, as Lacan argued in ‘Kant with Sade’, it is futile to conceive of a lawless desire, and fruitless to hope for a desire that will circumvent or undo the law, then this may be what he himself experienced first hand when he submitted his paper to the Cercle du livre précieux.”<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>Allouch’s hypothesis is not far-fetched if we take into consideration the fact that Lacan starts “Kant avec Sade” by reproaching the “specialists” who only see in Sade’s contribution to psychoanalysis a “catalogue of perversions.” Is this confrontational start a general reproach to “the specialists,” or is Lacan lambasting the editorial line for its crude demands? We could speculate all day, but what is clear is that for Lacan, Sade’s bedroom is not just a chamber of perversions. As he declares next, “I, on the contrary, maintain that the Sadean bedroom is of the same stature as those places from which the schools of ancient philosophy borrowed their names: Academy, Lyceum, and Stoa. Here as there, one paves the way for science by rectifying one’s ethical position.”<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a></p><p>Such a statement probably raised some eyebrows among editors as it does among readers who place Sade on the fringes of society. This leads us to the following question: Why does Lacan elevate the Sadean bedroom to the level of an educational institution that reforms students’ moral character? To properly answer this question, we should ask what ethical position it rectifies. In the chapter “Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen, If You Will Become Republicans” of <em>Philosophy in the Bedroom,</em> Sade attacks the religious education that constrains sexuality with a metaphysical doctrine that scorns bodily pleasures. As he decrees:</p><blockquote>Rather than fatigue your children’s young organs with deific stupidities, replace them with excellent social principles; instead of teaching them futile prayers which, by the time they are sixteen, they will glory in having forgotten, let them be instructed in their duties toward society; train them to cherish the virtues you scarcely ever mentioned in former times and which, without your religious fables, are sufficient for their individual happiness; make them sense that this happiness consists in rendering others as fortunate as we desire to be ourselves.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a></blockquote><p>As we can see in this quote, Sade’s rejection of Christian sexual oppression is not done merely to reject morality but to rectify it with former virtues that don’t despise the pleasures of the body — virtues grounded in nature rather than divine command. Sade is unclear about the exact natural value system he is referring to. We only know that they are pagan values he assigns to the Romans. Through his works, we can see that these values praise the unrestrained desire of nature, which is indifferent to human dignity. Without a God determining what is good and evil, there are no limits for what the Sadean subject can do. Murder, rape, incest, torture, everything that pleases nature is allowed in Sade’s republic. And to attain this state of freedom, Sade calls on the French to make one more effort to continue the revolutionary desire for liberation. Paradoxically, Sade’s demand for one more effort towards the liberation of the body makes the bedroom into a rigorous institution where the body is forced to be free from Christian tyranny.</p><p>Although there is no proof that Nietzsche studied Sade, we can observe in Nietzsche’s concept of Master morality an alternative perspective on Sade’s “natural virtues.” Whether influenced or not, this attraction to pagan ethics embodies the 19th century’s obsession with the idea of “delight in evil” (<em>bonheur dans le mal</em>). This allure of amoral pleasures ennobled Sade’s bedroom as a space where sexuality and pleasure could exist free from any constraining dogma. The potential for pleasure, unbound from the concept of the “Good,” facilitated the Sadean bedroom to lay the groundwork for Freud’s pleasure principle, as distinct from the conventional view that bonds pleasure with an established notion of normative behavior.</p><p>With Sade, there is a pleasure that is not grounded in morality. The pleasure that Sade reveals is, on the contrary, the product of doing “evil.” However, while Sade’s <em>boudoir</em> epitomizes the “delight in evil” (<em>bonheur dans le mal</em>), Kant was the first to untangle the traditional union of pleasure with the Good. As Lacan states:</p><blockquote>One might say that the shift involved in the notion that it feels good to do evil [<em>qu on soit bien dans le mal</em>] — or, if you will, that the eternal feminine does not elevate us — was made on the basis of a philological remark: namely, that the idea that had been accepted up until then, which is that it feels good to do good [<em>quon est bien dans le bien</em>], is based on a homonymy not found in German: <em>Man fühlt sich wohl im Guten</em>. This is how Kant introduces us to his <em>Critique of Practical Reason</em>.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></blockquote><p>Although Kant’s arguments are not centered on this philological remark that Lacan points out, it is a shortcut to the essence of Kantian ethics and its connection with psychoanalysis. Lacan thinks that Kantian ethics is grounded on the rejection of the pleasure principle, which in its most primary form is defined by the discharge of excessive stimulus to maintain a state of homeostasis where the body’s wellbeing is conserved. From this basic point of view, Kantian ethics needs to reject the pleasure principle because a moral act is not conditioned by pleasure. As such, we could see how Kant opened the stage for Sade’s bedroom as a side effect. If the rejection of pleasure means embracing displeasure, then Sade is formally a moralist. In contrast to Epicurus, Sade’s hedonism is not bound to the rejection of displeasure but, on the contrary, Sade seeks pain as a gateway to enjoyment.</p><p>However, for Lacan, Kant’s rejection of any law of feeling good (<em>bien</em>) and wellbeing (<em>bien-être</em>) is not just grounded on the rejection of pleasure but on the fact that “No phenomenon can lay claim to a constant relationship to pleasure. No law of feeling good can thus be enunciated that would define the subject who puts it into practice as ‘will.’”<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> In other words, the pleasure principle cannot be a universal law that would grant constant pleasure to the subject that submits to it. There must be another principle, and it is precisely for this reason that Lacan thinks that “[Kant’s] quest to feel good would thus be a dead end were it not reborn in the form of <em>das Gute</em>, the good that is the object of the moral law.”<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>Although Kant rejects the Greek notion of the highest good in his <em>Critique of Practical Reason, </em>Kant reforms the highest good, with the only condition that it is impossible in this world. In that sense, the subject would never achieve the highest good in this world but can only hope for it in the afterlife. Classically, the highest good is the union of virtue with happiness. For Kant, the highest good represents the unconditioned totality of a virtuous disposition that produces happiness of the same proportion. The main difference from the classical understanding is that happiness can never be achieved in this world; instead, the subject should always find itself guilty of not being holy. Although Kant reformulates the notion of the highest good in the resolution of the antinomies of practical reason, it is done in a way that the highest good becomes the object of desire but not the cause of such a desire, given that only virtue can ground morality.</p><p>However, the problem with Kant’s resolution is that the highest good is not a proper object of desire. The highest good is a fantasy in this most basic form, given to the fact that it is not an object of the senses. If the highest good is not a proper object of desire, then how could it impose such weight on the subject? To answer this question, Lacan presents us a paradox, “Let us consider the paradox that it is at the very moment at which the subject no longer has any object before him that he encounters a law that has no other phenomenon than something that is already signifying; the latter is obtained from a voice in conscience, which, articulating in the form of a maxim in conscience, proposes the order of a purely practical reason or will there.”<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> As we can see, the object is not the highest good, but the voice in conscience that psychoanalysis understands as the superego.</p><p>Although this inner voice needs to be rejected by Kant precisely because it would undermine the freedom of the autonomous subject of practical reason, Kant mentions the “voice of reason” once in the whole book claiming that if someone were to make their happiness their determining ground of the will, then that, “would ruin morality altogether were not the voice of reason in reference to the will so distinct, so irrepressible, and so audible even to the most common human beings; thus it can maintain itself only in the perplexing speculations of the schools, which are brazen enough to shut their ears to that heavenly voice in order to support a theory they need not break their heads over.”<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a></p><p>Here we can see why Lacan finds Sade so important. In contrast to Kant, Sade externalizes the voice of the superego in the relationship the sadist has with the victim. In such a way, the sadist finds ethical consistency not in the pursuit of pleasure per se, but in the unflinching adherence to a principle that exalts the will’s domination over both the self and the other — an inversion that reveals the hidden superegoic underside of Kantian ethics. Thus, where Kant upholds duty in the face of desire, Sade elevates a kind of perverse duty in which the subject remains faithful to the law of their own jouissance, even when it produces suffering. Without any moral or metaphysical law governing pleasure, Sade becomes radically unbound, uninhibited in his pursuit of acts that defy all traditional constraints. What, after all, can repress his desire? Who is left to declare that sodomy is not a legitimate path to pleasure when the idea of God, the one who would judge such acts, is no longer needed for Sade? If happiness is no longer fastened to moral duty, then nothing compels Sade to obey any transcendent law other than the voice of nature.</p><p>It is in this way that Sade reveals the truth of the second Critique; not particularly because Kantian ethics hides a sadistic core, but because Sade reveals the superegoic voice that demands unconditional loyalty, even if to follow it one would have to transgress one’s wellbeing. In this light, Sade does not merely stand as the antithesis of Kant, but rather as his obscene double — an echo of the same structural commitment to law, stripped of its moral veneer. Both figures stage a drama in which the subject is commanded by an inhuman voice that demands going beyond the pleasure principle, but only one can claim that it feels good to do evil.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Dany Nobus, <em>The Law of Desire: On Lacan’s “Kant with Sade”</em> (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), XIX.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton &amp; Company, 2006), 645.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Marquis de Sade, <em>The Marquis de Sade: Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom and Other Writings</em>, trans. Richard Seaver and Austryn Wainhouse (New York: Grove Press, 1965), 303.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Jacques Lacan, <em>Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English</em>, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton &amp; Company, 2006), 646.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> <em>Ibid.</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <em>Ibid.</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <em>Ibid., </em>647.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Immanuel Kant, <em>Critique of Practical Reason</em>, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 32 (5:35).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5ec87a5fde11" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[What Can Jazz Improvisation Teach Us in This Pandemic?]]></title>
            <link>https://entrevacios.medium.com/what-can-jazz-improvisation-teach-us-in-this-pandemic-8ea5c519e2ac?source=rss-9b3c2c6d1b92------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8ea5c519e2ac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[jazz]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[improvisation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pandemic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nietzsche]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Luis Vega-Verástegui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2020 21:53:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-15T02:20:52.271Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_vuC3G30Bpg2vlXXHtl17Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Jazz, without a doubt, is one of the most exotic and original musical genres that a person can listen to in his short life. Originally from New Orleans, jazz music is the product of a mixture of Afro-Caribbean rhythms and Caucasian melodies that surpassed all expectations when it became a universal language used by various musical traditions around the world. This universality is better comprehended when compared with its progenitor, the blues. In contrast to the blues, jazz music does not want to keep narrating the contingent martyrdom of being black in a white society. Jazz music takes another direction against this discomfort in culture. Somehow, jazz found the way to replace the melancholy of an enslaving past with an ironic search of a joy that can only be found in the endless becoming of musical improvisation. A different approach in its singular sounds, yet universal in the way it overcomes its contingent facticity.</p><p>To enhance our understanding of this change in perspective, let us take a rapid detour into the mind of the German philosopher, Fredrich Nietzsche. Although jazz did not exist in his time, in his magnum opus Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche proposes a provocative idea for the Christian imagination: “I would only believe in a God that knows how to dance.” This quote should not be read just as a way of lambasting Christianity. With this idea, Nietzsche was also questioning all doctrines that deny the joys and discomforts of this earthly existence. For Nietzsche, living in this world entails an agony that must be accepted to finally be capable of dancing in the eternity of the present.</p><p>Back to jazz music, is not this the way how jazz improvisation arose to affirm the world that the blues could only see with melancholy? This might be the reason why many jazz musicians have claimed that jazz is more than a musical style or technique. If we see jazz music as Nietzsche saw life, we will see how this picture takes form. We will observe how the spirit of jazz improvisation is its way of affirming the present with no desire for correcting the chances of the universe — just acceptance, pure acceptance. Indeed, improvisations are creations that cannot be changed. They require the full attention of the improviser to focus on the present — into the passage of each played note. Hence, it is because the improviser cannot change what has just happened why the improviser must accept his/her present existence with a certain mythological rhythm that feels the world in each of its slight movements. This is a beautiful way of gallantly surpass all the tragedies that often occur unexpectedly in the course of life — the present is what it is, now the point is what to do next. Is not this a vision that we should implement in this pandemic?</p><p>Unquestionably, this global epidemic is an unprecedented tragedy that has frustrated all our lives. To face this disaster, many of us find it suitable to resign all willpower to stall in the comforting memories of a world that no longer is present. This might be a viable option, but it is not the best decision to take if we want to get out of this pandemonium. Maybe, just as a psychologist advises his patients to accept their existential tragedies as the first step towards a cure, we should self-recommend reconciling with the ubiquitous fact that the past is the past and that the virus is here to stay until further notice. Only if we first accept the gravity of this reality, we can then act appropriately against the unknown.</p><p>Is there an adequate way to react against this global catastrophe? I am not an epidemiologist, but even though the experts can design plans to contain the virus, the coronavirus acts in a way still unknown to experts. Unfortunately, there is no ‘correct’ procedure that can counteract the spread of this virus in every corner of the world. Aside from that fact, there are diverse variables such as the social, economic, or political context of a nation that diminishes the epidemiologists’ control and planning capacities. No one would have imagined that the unfitting decisions (to ‘save’ the economy) by ‘leaders’ like Trump and Bolsonaro would be a hindrance to epidemiologists. However, all experienced professional should know that their work is full of uncertainties that make it impossible to choose the right decision. But it is no just a matter of an indefinable amount of uncertainties the sole cause of this hindrance. To err is intrinsic to mere fact of acting. At the moment of acting, of making a decision, there are no ‘right’ answers from a pre-written script. When making a choice, there are only adequate answers, improvised answers — improvisation that jazz musicians are adept at performing.</p><p>To better exemplify this issue, let’s make another stop to see improvisation in action.</p><p>The song <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=30FTr6G53VU">Giant Steps</a> from the album Giant Steps by John Coltrane is one of the most iconic songs in the world of jazz. For this song, Coltrane used a sophisticated chord progression that, wishing it or not, made Giant Steps one of the most <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62tIvfP9A2w">challenging songs to improvise</a>. If we listen to the recording from 1960, we can notice the difference in the ability for improvisating between John Coltrane on his saxophone and Tommy Flanagan on his piano. Throughout the song, we can listen to how Coltrane skillfully improvises without leaving any vacillation. However, when Coltrane stops playing, we can realize how Flanagan cannot maintain the same musical vitality when improvising with his piano. It sounds as if the present was flowing faster than usual at that moment, leaving spaces of involuntary reticence in its way. We can observe in these two improvisations how, although no answer is correct when improvising, some decisions are more fitting than others.</p><p>The contrast that exists between the improvisations of Coltrane and Flanagan can help us understand how some resolutions are more appropriate than others when improvising a composition in the present moment — since the precise instant when the first note is played. This sudden creation (and somehow forced by time) is how our response to the coronavirus occurs day by day in the face of an uncertain queer tomorrow. Perhaps it is not the most comfortable creation, but that should not deter us from continuing with the strenuous duty of composing our lives. Sure, there are no correct answers against the coronavirus, but at least we can still improvise in our daily lives. However, for the hardest decisions to improvise, we should let experts (like Coltrane) adroitly make adequate decisions that will put an end to this apocalyptic cataclysm.</p><p>As we have come to notice, there are no right decisions in this dire pandemic. On the contrary, there are multiple manners of improvising — many ways we can adjust to this new mode of existence and keep creating our little worlds. However, if we want to keep composing the course of our lives, some choices are better than others. This is an essential idea to understand, at this moment when many people dispute the guidance and expertise of the government and other institutions. We should remember that there are experts that have anxiously waited for this moment to use their improvisational capabilities at facing a pandemic like many great jazz musicians afront a still unwritten composition. I don’t know… but maybe it is a promising idea following the tempo of their tunes to overcome one of the most challenging misadventures in human existence.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ea5c519e2ac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Can We Live in a World Without Love?]]></title>
            <link>https://entrevacios.medium.com/can-we-live-in-a-world-without-love-ec3297c370c?source=rss-9b3c2c6d1b92------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ec3297c370c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pandemic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[existentialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[love]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[heidegger]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Luis Vega-Verástegui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2020 21:56:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-04T16:04:23.989Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Cc2KZsmoxSfHkAIpsiL8jw.jpeg" /></figure><p>It is tough to face a pandemic as catastrophic as this one with rationality. The most elemental instincts of our being incite us to commit irrational acts when death roams around the world. At times like these, many people are willing to risk everything to keep the presence of their loved ones alive. Isolation, bankruptcy, or losing one’s job are some of the decisions that many people have made to preserve the health of their families and friends. All these people have made these daring choices without thinking twice because it is almost an innate instinct to watch over our loved ones. Nietzsche would most likely tell us that this is a <em>human, all too human</em>, instinct. But what would life look like without this vital drive?</p><p>Unfortunately, many people — consumed by their indifference — believe the economy is worth more than life itself. With a cold utilitarian approach, these individuals think that it is more reasonable to benefit the economy since an indefinite closure of businesses will affect the pockets of many more people in the near future. However, no one knows for sure how opening the market will benefit the majority. All there is are just ludicrous speculations based on the belief that everything will unfold in a rational and orderly way as if the market could only follow the divine laws of an untarnished order. We should remind these people that no economist predicted the pandemic. It should be clear that the future is full of uncertainties now more than ever when the coronavirus is indifferent to any social order.</p><p>Without a doubt, all the ethical decisions made on a large scale in this pandemic lack foundations — neither the utilitarians nor the moralist can give us a clear roadmap to follow. Despite this fact, the lack of ethical foundations is inherent to our existence since it grants us the freedom to give an authentic meaning to our lives. It is because of this lack that life is like a canvas that waits for the painter that will mark its vacuous linen with eternal significance. However, not all paintings share the same value, likewise, not all lives share the same level of freedom at deciding what kind of life is worth living. For that reason, to live a life worth living, according to Heidegger, we have to designate an authentic meaning to our existence trough the confrontation of our death — by accepting the fact that today might be our last day. In this dreadful pandemic — when the possibility of dying at any moment lingers in the present — we must accept this atrocious fate without vacillations and ask ourselves: in what world would we want to live? Is it worth living in a world without love toward our loved ones?</p><p>There are no clear answers to these questions. We can only answer them individually by reflecting on the singular paths we have chosen. In my opinion, even though we might have different perspectives, and especially because we respect the opinion of others, no one will like to live in a culture filled with indifference toward others. Therefore, a world that values ​​the economy at the expend of life does not deserve to exist. Neither does a world that only sees humans as animals that can simply be replaced. What is at stake in this challenging pandemic is defending life, but not the animal life whose only meaning is reproducing, but rather the life that feels in its being how the most precious thing in its existence suddenly disappears forever. In scenarios like these, are we willing to risk everything to protect the most valuable in this world?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ec3297c370c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Virtual Politics of a Post-Pandemic World]]></title>
            <link>https://entrevacios.medium.com/the-virtual-politics-of-a-post-pandemic-world-64958c08651b?source=rss-9b3c2c6d1b92------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/64958c08651b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[byung-chul-han]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[big-data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[agamben]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Luis Vega-Verástegui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2020 18:14:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-31T08:50:59.353Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Virtual Politics of a Post-Pandemic World: Agamben, Byung-Chul Han, and the Big Data</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qo2B5pMS5FadQch9dP3ekA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Seeing people leave confinement all around the world has made me reflect on the elements that could have aggravated this lockdown. I wish this idea will never happen, but I wonder what could have happened if, instead, we had had to abstain from a tool so essential for our postmodern existence — the internet.</p><p>This virtual network that unites the whole world has become so indispensable to our lives that our generation will not survive a second without it. Honestly, I don’t know how we could have defied the first stages of this pandemic if the internet were to be an invention of a future we have not yet reached. If online applications like Zoom and Skype did not exist, many students could not have continued their education. And many would not have graduated on time. Simultaneously, without the possibility of having online communication and virtual databases, many professionals could not have relocated their offices into their homes. Indeed, if the coronavirus could have ambushed us before the emergence of the digital era, by this time, probably the global economy will be shattered, and many people would have fallen into severe states of loneliness. Fortunately, the invisible virtual web that connects us through our devices has and will help us elude all the social distance measures that keep us separated.</p><p>Envisioning how will we get back to ‘normal’ life is a task no one can accurately predict. Nevertheless, I believe that we all agree that in our post-COVID future, every stranger (or any person that we perceived as a stranger) that we might encounter on the street will become a virtual carrier of the virus. It is not an overstatement to claim that we might no longer be able to blithely get close to a person that has not gone through the confinement with us. The ‘other’ will become an imminent threat to our lives, to such extent that our public behavior will be self-monitored to inhibit any undesired infection by the ‘other.’ In such circumstances, the lifesaving tool that has helped us resist the initial stages of the pandemic will be crucial to counter the horror of the other’s body in a world that seeks to overcome the effects of the virus. If life on the outside will not be fulfilling nor safe, would the web be that safe haven where we will reunite with safety and freedom?</p><p>In one way or another, the illusion of this marvelous safe heaven breaks apart when we are aware that the internet does not necessarily entail the safety and freedom that we need as humans. Cyberspace is not as benevolent as we will like to believe. The nascent virtual network that connects the whole globe floats through international waters where justice doesn’t exist and the law of the strong prevails.</p><p>Since the beginning of the pandemic, Agamben has written multiple commentaries to warn us about imminent authoritarianism in the near future. For him, the pandemic is giving the state the perfect excuse to fill every aspect of our lives with <em>apparatuses</em> that will manage all our activities. However, there are theoretical reasons to claim that his view on digital technologies is outdated. In contrast to Agamben’s views, Byung-Chul Han doesn’t believe cyberspace, nor digital technologies are a threat; instead, he believes that what is really threatening to our well-being is the amassment of all the information entangled to our use of digital <em>apparatuses </em>that aim at defining who we are — Big Data.</p><p>At the dawn of the pandemic, Agamben claimed in a short text, <em>L’invenzione di un’epidemia</em>, that so far, no enough evidence can differentiate the coronavirus from common influenza. All the information provided by the Italian National Research Council (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche) determined that only 4 percent of the infected will require intensive care. If that information was right, then the Italian state did not possess sufficient reasons to apply exceptional measures. For Agamben, only two factors can explain the panic that this pandemic has created. First, the Italian government’s reactions demonstrate a growing worldwide tendency to use the state of exception as the new normal. In other words, it is in the advantage of the state to proliferate sufficient panic to suspend the law and establish an estate of emergency. The other factor is the eagerness of our modern culture to reproduce and accrete fear, which desires for safety makes everyone accept all the limits imposed by the government.<a href="#_edn1">[i]</a></p><p>Since Agamben published that commentary, many people have condemned his premature interpretation of the pandemic by revealing how wrong was he about the effects of the coronavirus. As a response to his detractors, in a new comment named <em>Chiarimenti</em>, Agamben asserted that his central goal is to reveal the governments’ propensity to treat each of us as generic vessels of infections, and how we are facing the pandemic like animals that fear for their lives. In the eyes of Agamben, the fear and panic that this pandemic has brought to our lives reflect society’s incapability for seeking a life that goes beyond survival — beyond <em>bare life</em>. This fear will keep us separated, at a distance, where friendship and real connection cannot be accomplished.<a href="#_edn2">[ii]</a></p><p>Although Agamben clarified his previews statement with this response, there is an idea that has gone unnoticed at the end of <em>Chiarimenti</em>. In the last paragraph, Agamben expresses his preoccupation with regards to the technologies utilized to confront the pandemic, and how will they shape our near future. Agamben believes the state will finally digitalize every aspect of our lives, so we will no longer need to reunite as friends to discuss politics and other social matters. The significance of this quandary is the focus of his next commentary, <em>Requiem per gli studendi</em>, where Agamben analyzes how the lives of many students are affected by the introduction of online classes in universities. He foretells a world where students will no longer need to go live on campus to forge friendships outside classrooms. For that reason, Agamben condemns all professors who complaisantly submit to this virtual dictatorship of acting like the professors who aligned with the fascist regimes of the second world war.<a href="#_edn3">[iii]</a></p><p>This alarm is warranted only if digital technologies are the revolutionary novelty of an analog world. But, are digital technologies new to how our experience of the world is mediated? Many people could argue that digital technologies have been dominating our lives for decades. The validity of this previously stated scenario does not abate Agamben’s warnings. The fact that digital technologies have long been part of our world only adds a layer of complexity to a serpentine conundrum.</p><p>As a matter of fact, Agamben is pretty aware that digital technologies have changed our world. In his essay, <em>What is an Apparatus?</em>, he analyzes Foucault’s <em>apparatus </em>(<em>dispositif</em> in French), as everything through which an active governability is effectuated without any foundations of being. Agamben comes to this conclusion by directly linking Foucault’s <em>dispositif</em> with Hyppolite’s understanding of the Hegelian notion of positivity religion, which is the set of rules, rituals, and activities that a subject must obediently follow.<a href="#_edn4">[iv]</a></p><p>To expand the understanding of this mechanism, Agamben goes back to analyze the Greek concept, <em>oikonomia </em>(economy)<em>, </em>which represented the management of the house and the family. Agamben notices how this term was used by Christian theologians to forge the foundations for the holy trinity, in which God granted Jesus the governing of humanity (the holy spirit). It was only later in the history of Christianity when theologians started to differentiate the logos of theology from its governance. Hence, the term <em>oikonomia </em>became the <em>apparatus</em> for the divine providential governance of the Christian faith, which pure praxis — without a foundation of being — produces the subject by edifying a <em>dis-position</em> towards the world.</p><p>It is not fair to continue this analysis without noticing that Agamben’s <em>apparatus</em> is no longer the Foucauldian apparatus of normalization. As Pasquinelli draws in his essay, <em>What an Apparatus is Not,</em> Agamben’s providential <em>apparatus</em> is closely linked to Christianity, something Foucault does not include in his conceptualization of an <em>apparatus. </em>In fact, Hyppolite has no direct influence on the Foucauldian <em>apparatus</em>. Pasquinelli claims that Foucault explicitly expressed that he was influenced by Canguilhem and Goldstein’s works on normalization.<a href="#_edn5">[v]</a></p><p>Nevertheless, aware of his idiosyncrasy or not, Agamben proposes in the second half of <em>What is an Apparatus?</em> a general dichotomy between beings: living beings and <em>apparatuses — </em>with the subject in the middle, as the product of these interactions. In this trinity, apparatuses are essential beings for humanity. Without them, humanity would not exist. As a matter of fact, for Agamben, even language (one of the most fundamental tools that all humans share) is an <em>apparatus</em>. Therefore, if all humans use this apparatus, called language, to express and make sense of their reality, then there is no human that has not gone through this process of subjectification.</p><p>Against our presuppositions, subjectification is not a problem for Agamben because with every process of subjectification there is the possibility of negation — desubjectification. However, Agamben sees in late capitalism’s tremendous accumulation and multiplication of <em>apparatuses </em>a disavowal of any possibility for overcoming subjectification, by crowding the world with apparatuses that negate our human identity without creating a new subject along this process of negation. “Contemporary societies therefore present themselves as inert bodies going though massive processes of desubjectification without acknowledging any real subjectification.”<a href="#_edn6">[vi]</a></p><p>After laying out Agamben’s theoretical justifications for his suspicion of digital technologies we can better understand how the capitalist state’s solution will exponentially increase the proliferation of apparatuses in our lives. However, the problem with Agamben’s criticism cannot go unnoticed. His critique only works if the internet and other digital technologies do not create a new subject. This is true for generations to whom these new technologies can only negate their ways of life because only in this manner digital technologies can negate a previously subjectivized subject. However, for younger generations, who have lived in a world filled with digital technologies, these apparatuses are their lives — digital technologies fully define their subjectivities. It is therefore not an overstatement claiming that Agamben’s perspective dwells in a world that no longer exists.</p><p>The obdurate will of Agamben’s perspective lingers in a paradigm where apparatuses, like the television, hypnotize every subject with its entertaining power. However, we live in different times, where a new subject has emerged to surf the virtual universe. For all the people that have grown up using the internet, their reality is this <em>apparatus</em>. The more it is used, the more powerful it becomes; the more subjects it includes, the more it expands its power. Unfortunately, Agamben’s biopolitics cannot comprehend how this new subject is governed, because the internet does not govern by exclusion, but by including everyone into the system. As Byung-Chul Han states with regards to Agamben’s biopolitical analysis, “The <em>homines sacri</em> of today have not been shut out of the system — they have been <em>shut into the system</em>.”<a href="#_edn7">[vii]</a></p><p>In his book, <em>Psychopolitics</em>, Byung-Chul Han explains why biopolitics cannot decode the ongoing social control of neoliberalism. The ideology that runs our world has discovered a more effective tactic to control the individual that does not involve the <em>corpus</em>. Controlling our psychic disposition to labor under the rules of the market is a better way of dominating the working force. In a world where the production of immaterial objects determines the course of capitalism, dominating the body will not invigorate productivity. Quite the contrary, management that tries to discipline refractory desires will eventually lead to a decrease in productivity in contrast to management that ‘motivates’ their autonomous will for self-exploitation. It is clear that we have moved from disciplining the working force to motivating each worker’s desire for self-exploitation because the subject of our cotemporary times is both a master and a slave. “Under neoliberalism, the technology of power takes on a subtle form…it ensures that individuals act on themselves so that power relations are interiorized — and then interpreted as freedom. Self-optimization and submission, freedom and exploitation, fall into one.”<a href="#_edn8">[viii]</a></p><p>Within this panorama, Agamben is unable to give us an incisive critique of our use of digital technologies because he does not take into account the virtual subjects of the digital era that use multiple gadgets to self-manage their lives and increase their productivity. In contrast, for Agamben, a new subject cannot be created through the use of digital technologies because, for him, these <em>apparatuses</em> can only subjectivize through desubjectification. Within this framework, digital technologies can control our life only if discipline is the only way of subjectivizing our docile bodies. Yet, if these gadgets become a tool for individual economical liberation, the subject is no longer a passive receptor of information but rather the creator of such information.</p><p>In that case, if our contemporary subject is both master and slave, then this subject cannot be controlled by the discipline of the body; thus it will be an error trying to resist a discipline that does not exist. While in biopolitics resistance can emerge through the self-actualization and creative endeavors of an aesthetic life, Han believes these forms of resistance are futile in neoliberalism because they are the mirror image of <em>psychopolitics’</em> strategy to infuse into each ‘autonomous’ individual the idea that ‘they’ are their most important entrepreneurial asset of investment. This strategy should not be a surprise because in late capitalism every creative production contributes to the reproduction of capital, to such an extent that we have become the most important creation to be commodified. In this new way of life, we as workers and consumers have become just bundles of information that are studied to shape our habit and predisposition on the web to increase our productivity and consumption.</p><p>Within this panorama, the question at stake is, how did we reach this level of total governability? It is an easy way out to blame the technological advancements that have shaped our digital world, however, we should not easily inculpate the internet and other digital gadgets for these social consequences. On the contrary, we should exculpate the internet because, in its larval stage, the internet began with an openness towards infinite possibilities, where both our life and cyberspace were under construction; it didn’t provide us with a positive path of being, it rather asked us what we would like to be. Indeed, the internet needs our contribution to become co-creators of this virtual reality. As such, this <em>apparatus</em> was (and to a certain extent is) uncertain by nature. I am trying not to be nostalgic, but it is inevitable not to remember how cyberspace used to be a place where we could forget about our fixed identities — where we could be anything we like. Unfortunately, the times when a person could use the internet free from the reification of the world are over. It is now the rule on the vast majority of websites to demand every user the creation of a profile — an account that will report in the utmost detail every virtual behavior.</p><p>The predicament of using the internet in these times entails reducing our beings to a bundle of information made out of the binary combination of zeros and ones. With this fundamental rule, cyberspace has become the ideal space for total governmentality, where surveilling our “being-in-the-internet” — when we are mere disembodied intellect — is a much efficient managerial strategy.</p><p>Nonetheless, the internet is not the <em>apparatus</em> that govern us (neither are the gadgets that we use) because its essence does not aim at normalizing our behavior (maybe we should think of the internet as the <em>anti-apparatus</em>). The absolute <em>apparatus</em> of surveillance and normalization is the “Big Data” — the totality of our interactions with other digital <em>apparatuses</em>. It is ironic realizing that the best tool of governmentality is not the one we are in constant interaction, but rather the one that analyzes our interactions with <em>apparatuses</em> to reveal the unconscious patterns of our psyche.</p><p>For Han, the Big Data is the virtual panopticon that gathers all the necessary information to create social profiles and modes of organization. Bentham’s idea of the panopticon falls short in comparison to the digital panopticon. Big Data can surveil an individual without being limited by the blind spots of a physical panopticon’s perspective. The digital optics of the Big Data produces an absolute perspective from where to observe a user from all its angles. Every interaction, every expression, every contact, every like, everything at all can be recollected and analyzed to create profiles to predict, manage, and normalize a whole society. As Han states, “In contrast to Big Brother, who could be quite forgetful, Big Data never forgets anything at all. For this reason alone, the digital panopticon is much more efficient than Bentham’s.”<a href="#_edn9">[ix]</a> With Big Data, whole elections can by predicted by scanning the profiles of all possible voters. All this should not be a surprise for anyone that has been following the Cambridge Analytica case, where millions of Facebook profiles were analyzed to help Trump win the 2016 election. The most shocking fact, nonetheless, was knowing that many of the targeted profiles did not even know that they could be potential Trump supporters. It is therefore not hyperbolic claiming that an algorithm that can predict such proclivities foretells the end of freedom “as we know it.”</p><p>Big Data can know us better than we know our selves, that is a fact. This is the reason why, amid the Covid-19 pandemic, virtual surveillance has demonstrated to be the most effective way of controlling the behaviors of millions of people in Eastern nations. In an article, <em>La emergencia viral y el mundo de mañana</em> for the Spanish newspaper El País, Byung-Chul Han explains the reasons why countries like South Korea, Japan, and China controlled the pandemic better than Europe. Han explains that the main reason for such organized success comes to the fact that Eastern societies are culturally more gregarious and law-abiding than Western societies. This is the reason why no oppositions were held against the demands of the state in Easter nations. People unanimously approved the use of digital surveillance to deter the spread of the virus.<a href="#_edn10">[x]</a></p><p>We should pay close attention to what Eastern nations have done, because granting the state unlimited powers is the governmentality pattern of authoritarian nations like China. Therefore, we should ask a fundamental question: is granting to the state these powers necessary?</p><p>In his essay, <em>Monitor and Punish? Yes, Please!, </em>the Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Zizek, criticized Agamben’s view in which all state interventions to control the pandemic are stratagems for social control. For Zizek, the real test of this pandemic is for the western nations to do with transparency what China has done to reduce their rate of infection (meaning that a whole network of information that tracks the movements of individuals will be used with transparency).<a href="#_edn11">[xi]</a> This solution seems plausible— the state must do something to solve this pandemic— however, are the solutions of the Chinese state the best? Is the use of Big Data justifiable in a state of exception?</p><p>Zizek believes that the only way to survive this pandemic is by reinventing communism — as a new form of global institutional solidarity. For Zizek, we only have two solutions, either we build a new international or we fall into barbarism. Han has not much hope for the former. He foresees a darker future, where China will export its digital governmentality formula to Western nations. If that is our future, then Agamben’s state of exception will become a normal practice — where monitoring all activities at all times is performed without hesitation.</p><p>To resist the Big Data, Han advises us (following Deleuze and Nietzsche) to act like the ‘idiot’ whose subjectivity resists all forms of psychologization and standardization. As much as I am personally biddable to follow this form of resistance, the problem with this solution is its incapacity to overcome the liberal ideology about which all solutions to the system must begin with the individual (and end with the individual). If we want to transcend the individual, then it seems that Zizek is right. Only a new international can save us from future economic and political totalitarianism. However, how can we be sure that this new government will not utilize Big Data to satisfy the private interests of some individuals? Simply banning Big Data does not solve this imbroglio. Big Data is here to stay, now the problem is what to do with it.</p><p>In, <em>What is an Apparatus?</em>, Agamben claims that the best strategy to fight against the seizing power of an <em>apparatus </em>is by desecrating it — by profaning its providential power. For Agamben, profanation is how we bring an object back to common use. “Profanation is the counter-apparatus that restores to common use what sacrifice had separated and divided.”<a href="#_edn12">[xii]</a> Even though this approach seems to contradict his negative view of digital technologies, there is much to learn from this solution.</p><p>From an Agambenian point of view, there are two ways of approaching our dilemma with Big Data. On the right hand, no human should be able to possess such amount of data (sacralization) — “only God can know the absolute.” This option will maintain the sacredness of the <em>apparatus </em>apart from the human genus or at least apart from those to whom the law imposes its will (where the sovereign is an exception)<em>. </em>On the left hand, these data should proliferate among the commons (profanation). This option will make the Big Data accessible to the common man, and as such it will negate and desecrate this<em> apparatus</em>. If we opt for the latter, then ‘we’ are the only ones who can decide what to do with it. Would ‘we’ sacrifice our privacy just to intrude into the life of others and know their truth? Or, would ‘we’ sacrifice the digital ‘phallus’ to achieve true self-consciousness? This is a decision that only a free community will be able to determine. However, are we a community, free from <em>biopolitical</em> and/or <em>psychopolitical</em> control, that runs under a different social contract?</p><p>To become a free community, we need deep economic and cultural changes. As history can attest, changes of this magnitude only emerge when free individuals (standing as the ‘exception’ to the current order) influence others to create this new social body. As such, it is apparently necessary to give this new ‘sovereign(s)’(sacralized) power only if they can influence others to construct a society that will grant to the commons more and more powers (profanation). It will be an error to see this solution as a synthesis of our previous solutions — as if both sacralization and profanation could amalgamate. On the contrary, this solution proves the impossibility of a virtually correct answer to descend into reductionistic partisanship. Maybe, in this uncertain stage of a pandemic that sees no clear future, it is time to rethink politics if we want to go beyond the barbarism of Capitalism’s virtual totalitarianism.</p><p><a href="#_ednref1">[i]</a> Agamben, Giorgio. “L’invenzione Di Un’epidemia.” Quodlibet, February 26, 2020. <a href="https://www.quodlibet.it/giorgio-agamben-l-invenzione-di-un-epidemia">https://www.quodlibet.it/giorgio-agamben-l-invenzione-di-un-epidemia</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref2">[ii]</a> Agamben, Giorgio. “Chiarimenti.” Quodlibet, March 17, 2020. <a href="https://www.quodlibet.it/giorgio-agamben-chiarimenti">https://www.quodlibet.it/giorgio-agamben-chiarimenti</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref3">[iii]</a> Agamben, Giorgio. “Requiem per gli student.” Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofic, May 23, 2020. <a href="https://www.iisf.it/index.php/attivita/pubblicazioni-e-archivi/diario-della-crisi/giorgio-agamben-requiem-per-gli-studenti.html">https://www.iisf.it/index.php/attivita/pubblicazioni-e-archivi/diario-della-crisi/giorgio-agamben-requiem-per-gli-studenti.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref4">[iv]</a> Agamben, Giorgio. <em>What Is an Apparatus? and Other Essays</em>. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009).</p><p><a href="#_ednref5">[v]</a> Pasquinelli, Matteo. “What an Apparatus Is Not: On the Archeology of the Norm in Foucault, Canguilhem, and Goldstein.” <em>Parrhesia</em>, 22 (2015), 79–89.</p><p><a href="#_ednref6">[vi]</a> Agamben. <em>What Is an Apparatus? and Other Essays</em>, 22.</p><p><a href="#_ednref7">[vii]</a> Han, Byung-Chul. <em>Psychopolitics.</em> (Brooklyn, New York: Verso Books, 2017), ch. 5, Kindle.</p><p><a href="#_ednref8">[viii]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ednref9">[ix]</a> Ibid., ch 11.</p><p><a href="#_ednref10">[x]</a> Han, Byung-Chul, “<em>La emergencia viral y el mundo de mañana. Byung-Chul Han, el filósofo surcoreano que piensa desde Berlín</em>,” El País, March 22, 2020. <a href="https://elpais.com/ideas/2020-03-21/la-emergencia-viral-y-el-mundo-de-manana-byung-chul-han-el-filosofo-surcoreano-que-piensa-desde-berlin.html">https://elpais.com/ideas/2020-03-21/la-emergencia-viral-y-el-mundo-de-manana-byung-chul-han-el-filosofo-surcoreano-que-piensa-desde-berlin.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref11">[xi]</a> Zizek, Slavoj,<em> “Monitor and Punish? Yes, Please!,” </em>The Philosophical Salon, March 16, 2020. <a href="https://thephilosophicalsalon.com/monitor-and-punish-yes-please/">https://thephilosophicalsalon.com/monitor-and-punish-yes-please/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref12">[xii]</a> Agamben. <em>What Is an Apparatus?. </em>19.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=64958c08651b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Is the Ending of ‘Dark’ the End? The Eternal Return and the Death Drive]]></title>
            <link>https://entrevacios.medium.com/is-the-ending-of-dark-the-end-the-eternal-return-and-the-death-drive-d21a96e9c85d?source=rss-9b3c2c6d1b92------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d21a96e9c85d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[death-drive]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nietzsche]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eternal-return]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dark]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Luis Vega-Verástegui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2020 21:26:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-19T23:49:49.476Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CWVOoLBuFw79EpytMOKyEg.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>— Spoiler Alert — This comment contains information that could spoil your experience at the moment of watching this show.</em></p><p>Some days ago a friend recommended me to start watching ‘Dark’ before Netflix released the third and final season. I doubted it at the beginning, but I gave it a chance. It didn’t take long for the mysterious aura of this series to captivate me. Every aspect of this show kept me watching with the illusion of understanding the deep and obscure meaning behind this drama.</p><p>The melancholic undertone of a town that has lived too much but has said very little is the perfect atmosphere to unravel one of the most complex dramas ever written. With interconnected characters and bizarre murder cases, this story is a maze that all viewers must solve if they want to enjoy it until the end. Yet, as much as we could think to have left the darkness of this maze, there is always a new element that twists this story. This surprise factor creates in ‘Dark’ a unique enchantment that transcends our temporality — as if past, present, and future could all exist in this NOW.</p><p>Nevertheless, as much as I liked the first two seasons, I started to feel that the ending season betrays the created alluringness of a sophisticated plot. As we know from previous chapters, there is a network in time where multiple characters are connected by the same event. Therefore, Jonas, among others, tries to stop the ‘origin’ that will eventually cause the apocalypse. However, in the third season, we can notice that every move they are doing is actually creating the origin of this eternal loop of suffering and perpetuating the end of the world. For that reason, Adan (the older version of Jonas) came to the conclusion that the only way to solve this eternal loop is by destroying the ‘origin’ which will, at the same time, annihilate his existence and the entire world. What this creates is a world without Jonas (Adan), where unfortunately an apocalypse will also occur. Therefore, to counter Adan’s plan, Eva (the older version of Martha) is trying everything she can to maintain the loop and their world alive (a world without Jonas). Here is where the problem emerges. For my taste, the introduction of Eva and her parallel world into the series was not only a repetition of the same but also the destruction of a deep hermetic plot behind this drama.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*SHvY6C464qjmrI2kBEJt4g.jpeg" /></figure><p>By the end of the second season I was sure that ‘Dark’ was based on Nietzsche’s eternal return. Not only does the show directly refers to him, but the whole concept of an infinitely repeating world is an idea that cannot be disconnected from Nietzsche’s oeuvre. Nietzsche proposed the eternal return as a hypothetical cosmological view of the world, where everything repeats; all the happiness and suffering of our life, every wrong decision and tragedy repeats ad infinitum. With this possible scenario, Nietzsche inquired into the morality of a person aware that his/her past will repeat forever. Would that person negate or accept his/her destiny? For Nietzsche, if a person learns to accept his/her past and the chances of the universe, this person will become the Ubermensch (the Superman) and will learn to love the world.</p><p>With this in mind, I was disappointed because ‘Dark’ didn’t follow the ethical consequences inherent to Nietzsche’s eternal return. In the third season, we can see how Jonas never accepts his past, he instead chooses to dwell on what has already occurred to change a future that is nothing but the consequences of his eagerness to fix all the past sufferings of his world.</p><p>However, there is another way of interpreting the show. If we see this drama with Freudian spectacles, we could argue that Martha/Eva represents the forces of Eros (life), while Jonas/Adan the forces of Thanatos (death). With this view, we can think of Jonas&#39; and Martha’s voyage to the third world (the ‘real’ world), to end with the ‘origin’ of the loop, as representing the victory of Thanatos over Eros — the absolute annihilating power of the “death drive.”</p><p>For Freud, the death drive’s goal is to go back to inorganic matter, to become part of the undivided-world once again — like the desire to go back to the mother’s womb, or the wish to never be born. The problem with this view is that this undivided world is only a phantasy retroactively created to avoid accepting our fractured world — a world doomed to be incomplete. Ironically, for Lacan, the french psychoanalyst, the death drive never reaches its goal — it obtains pleasure by always failing to attain it.</p><blockquote><a href="https://nosubject.com/Drive">“Thus the real purpose of the drive is not some mythical goal of full satisfaction, but to return to its circular path, and the real source of enjoyment is the repetitive movement of this closed circuit.”</a></blockquote><p>From this psychoanalytic view, absolute annihilation is not possible because the ‘death drive’ always fails to reach its destiny. A cosmological perspective will show us something similar. It will tell us that nothing can be ‘absolutely nothing’ because it will be ‘something’ rather than nothing. In any case, we can see this failure of an absolute when trying to reach the ‘paradise’ that Noah, among others, aim at. This ‘absolute something’, of absolute satisfaction, is nothing than an ‘absolute nothingness’ where nothing else is needed. This connection between extremes does not mean that they both coexist, but that all absolutes are destined to fail. As such, this paradox shows us how there cannot be an ‘absolute’ end to this eternal loop. “The end is the beginning and the beginning is the end.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yR74xzqT-7DDWbFJJQDmEA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Is there an end to the loop, as the end of ‘Dark’ portrays? There are many ways of interpreting this ending. Maybe the writers of ‘Dark’ see the world like Schopenhauer, as a painful world that we escape by negating the will — a sufficient reason to think that an end to the eternal loop between the two worlds is possible. But then why would they use Nietzsche’s eternal return to fundament their ideas of time? It is probable that they simply got everything wrong. It will not be the first time that a tv show or a movie creates such high expectations to then ruin it with a bad ending. But maybe, there is a way of interpreting this ending. What if, by saving the clockmaker’s son, they set the ‘origin’ back to its place? Meaning that saving and/or not saving the clockmaker’s son is the original cause. In that case, there will be two ‘meta-worlds’: one where the clockmaker’s son dies and one where he does not. This means that the ending moment when Jonas and Martha disappear is actually the beginning of a new cycle that will endlessly repeat by endlessly saving the clockmaker’s son — as the ultimate meaning of their world.</p><p>I would have preferred something simpler but tragic at the same time. What if the travel of Jonas and Martha to the ‘real world’ caused the death of the clockmaker’s son? An ending where Jonas and Martha appear in front of the car of the clockmaker’s son, causing the vehicle to slide and crash — leaving no one alive — is a more tragic ending that affirms the idea that we cannot just reject our fate. This ending would have been in accordance with Nietzsche’s eternal return. This alternative ending would have represented the tragic consequence of not accepting our past and the random chances of the universe.</p><p>Ironically, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonah">Jonas</a> is the prophet of the old testament that avoids the fate that God had given him; being this the cause of God’s anger upon him and reason why he was eventually swallowed by a whale. This leads us to the next question. Is it morally acceptable to do something evil because you know a higher power or cause demands it? Will this mean that Adan’s fate was to perform all the atrocities that he did?</p><p>I cannot still understand why all these children and many other characters had to die. The show does not tell us why all the people had to be killed, the only thing that we know is that their deaths were necessary to complete the cycle. Yet, these killings were not the act of affirming life but of acting as the agents of a ‘prophecy.’ Here, maybe, the moral of the story is that free will relays on the ignorance of the consequences of our actions. The moment we know our future, the only free act is to negate the transcendental and act differently, within the immanence of our life. Therefore, if instead of following the premonitions of other people, Jonas could have chosen to accept his past and affirm his life, nothing of this would have happened. If Jonas had affirmed the eternal return, another would be the story.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d21a96e9c85d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[¿Es el Final de ‘Dark’ el Final? El Eterno Retorno y la Pulsión de Muerte]]></title>
            <link>https://entrevacios.medium.com/es-el-final-de-dark-el-final-o-el-principio-8af2c15d0dd3?source=rss-9b3c2c6d1b92------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8af2c15d0dd3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dark]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eterno-retorno]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lacan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nietzsche]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freud]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Luis Vega-Verástegui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2020 04:59:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-19T20:51:29.543Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CWVOoLBuFw79EpytMOKyEg.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Alerta: este comentario contiene información que podría estropear tu experiencia al momento de ver esta serie.</em></p><p>Hace unos días, un amigo me recomendó que comenzara a ver ‘Dark’ antes que Netflix lanzara la tercera y última temporada. Dudé al principio, pero le di una oportunidad. No me llevó mucho tiempo cautivarme por la misteriosa aura de este programa de televisión. Cada aspecto de esta serie me mantuvo observando con la ilusión de comprender el profundo y oscuro significado detrás de esta drama.</p><p>El tono melancólico de una ciudad que ha vivido demasiado, pero ha dicho muy poco, es el ambiente perfecto para desentrañar una de las tramas más complejas jamás antes escritas. Con interconectados personajes en el tiempo y casos de asesinatos bizarros, esta historia es un laberinto que todos los espectadores deben resolver si quieren disfrutarla hasta el final. Sin embargo, por mucho que uno piense haber dejado la oscuridad de este laberinto, siempre hay un nuevo elemento complicando la trama. Este factor sorpresa da a ‘Dark’ un encanto único que trasciende nuestra temporalidad—como si pasado, presente y futuro pudieran existir en este AHORA.</p><p>Apesar que las dos primeras temporadas fueron de mi agrado, comencé a sentir que la temporada final traiciona el atractivo de un razonamiento sofisticado detrás de la trama. Como sabemos en capítulos anteriores, existe una red en el tiempo donde varios personajes están conectados por el mismo evento. Por lo tanto, Jonas, entre otros, tratan de detener el “origen” que eventualmente causará el apocalipsis. Sin embargo, en la tercera temporada, podemos notar que cada movimiento que ellos hacen crea el origen de este eterno ciclo de sufrimiento, y perpetua, de esta manera, el fin del mundo. Por esa razón, Adán (la versión vieja de Jonas) pensó que la única forma de resolver este eterno bucle es destruyendo el ‘origen’, el cual al mismo tiempo aniquilará su existencia y el mundo entero. Lo que esto crea es un mundo sin Jonas (Adán), donde desafortunadamente también ocurrirá un apocalipsis. Por lo tanto, para contrarrestar el plan de Adán, Eva (la versión vieja de Martha) está intentando todo lo posible para mantener vivo el bucle y su propio mundo (un mundo sin Jonas). Es aquí donde el problema emerge. A mi parecer, la introducción de Eva y su mundo paralelo en la serie no solo fue una repetición de lo mismo, sino también la destrucción de un posible hermético razonamiento detrás de esta drama.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*SHvY6C464qjmrI2kBEJt4g.jpeg" /></figure><p>Al final de la segunda temporada, estaba seguro de que ‘Dark’ estaba basado en el eterno retorno de Nietzsche. La serie no solo se refiere a este directamente, sino que todo el concepto de un mundo que se repite infinitamente es una idea que no se puede desconectar de la obra del filósofo alemán. Nietzsche propuso el eterno retorno como una hipotética visión cosmológica del mundo, donde todo se repite; toda la felicidad y el sufrimiento de nuestra vida, cada decisión equivocada y tragedia se repite infinitamente. Con este posible escenario, Nietzsche interrogó la moralidad de una persona consciente que su pasado se repetiría por siempre. ¿Esta persona negaría o aceptaría su destino? Para Nietzsche, si una persona aprende a aceptar su pasado y el azar del universo, esta persona se convertirá en el Ubermensch (el Superhombre) y aprenderá a amar el mundo.</p><p>Con esto en mente, me decepcionó que ‘Dark’ no siguiera las consecuencias éticas inherentes al eterno retorno de Nietzsche. En la tercera temporada, podemos ver cómo Jonas nunca acepta su pasado, sino que elige vivir mirando los errores de lo ya ocurrido para cambiar un futuro que no es más que las consecuencias de su afán por arreglar todos los sufrimientos ​​de su mundo.</p><p>Sin embargo, hay otra forma de interpretar este show. Si vemos a este espectáculo con gafas freudianas, podríamos argumentar que Martha / Eva representa las fuerzas de Eros (vida), mientras que Jonas / Adan las fuerzas de Thanatos (muerte). Con esta visión, podemos pensar que el viaje de Jonas y Martha al tercer mundo (el mundo “real”), para terminar con el “origen” del bucle, representa la victoria de Thanatos sobre Eros — el poder aniquilador absoluto de la pulsión de muerte. Para Freud, el objetivo de la pulsión de muerte es volver a la materia inorgánica, volver a formar parte de un mundo indiviso—como el deseo de nunca haber nacido. El problema con este punto de vista es que este mundo indiviso es solo una fantasía creada retroactivamente para evitar aceptar nuestro mundo dividido — un universo inherentemente fracturado. Irónicamente, para Lacan, la pulsión de muerte nunca alcanza su objetivo—obtiene placer al nunca lograrlo.</p><blockquote><a href="https://nosubject.com/Drive">“Por lo tanto, el propósito real de la pulsión no es un objetivo mítico de plena satisfacción, sino volver a su camino circular, y la verdadera fuente de disfrute es el movimiento repetitivo de este circuito cerrado”.</a></blockquote><p>Desde este punto de vista psicoanalítico, la aniquilación absoluta no es posible porque la “pulsión de muerte” siempre falla al tratar de obtener su objetivo. Desde una perspectiva cosmológica, nada puede ser ‘absolutamente nada’ porque seria ‘algo’ en vez de nada. También podemos ver este fracaso al tratar de alcanzar el “paraíso” al que Noah, al igual que otros, desea llegar. Este “algo absoluto”, de satisfacción absoluta, no es más que una “nada absoluta” donde nada es necesario. Esta conexión entre extremos no significa que ambos coexistan, sino que todos los absolutos están destinados a fracasar. Esta paradoja nos muestra cómo no puede haber un final “absoluto” para este ciclo eterno. “El final es el principio y el principio es el final.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yR74xzqT-7DDWbFJJQDmEA.jpeg" /></figure><p>¿Hay un final para el ciclo, como lo retrata el ultimo capitulo de ‘Dark’? Hay muchas formas de interpretar este final. Tal vez los escritores de ‘Dark’ ven el mundo como Schopenhauer — como un mundo doloroso que debemos escapar a través de la negación de la voluntad. Razón suficiente para pensar que un fin al eterno bucle entre los dos mundos es posible. Pero entonces, ¿por qué usarían el eterno retorno de Nietzsche para fundamentar sus ideas del tiempo? Es probable que simplemente hayan entendido todo mal. No será la primera vez que un programa de televisión o una película crea expectativas tan altas para arruinarlo todo al final. Pero tal vez, hay una manera de interpretar este final. ¿Qué pasa si, al salvar al hijo del relojero, en realidad están colocando el ‘origen’ del bucle en su lugar? Lo cual significaría que salvar y/o no salvar al hijo del relojero es la causa primordial. En ese caso, habrían dos ‘meta-mundos’: uno donde muere el hijo del relojero y otro donde no. Esto significa que el momento en que Jonas y Martha desaparecen demarca el comienzo de un nuevo ciclo—donde salvar al hijo del relojero se repetirá infinitamente.</p><p>Yo hubiera preferido algo más simple y trágico al mismo tiempo. ¿Qué pasa si el viaje de Jonas y Martha al ‘mundo real’ es la causa de la muerte del hijo del relojero? Un final donde Jonas y Martha aparecen frente al auto del hijo del relojero lo cual hace que el vehículo patine y estrelle — sin dejar a nadie vivo — es un trágico final que afirma la idea de que no podemos simplemente negar nuestro pasado. Este final habría estado de acuerdo con el eterno retorno de Nietzsche. Este final alternativo habría representado la trágica consecuencia de no aceptar nuestro pasado y el azar del universo.</p><p>Irónicamente, Jonas es el profeta del antiguo testamento que evita el destino que Dios le había dado, siendo esta la causa de la ira de Dios sobre él y la razón por la cual finalmente fue tragado por una ballena. Esta visión religiosa nos lleva a la siguiente pregunta. ¿Es moralmente aceptable hacer algo malo porque sabes que un poder o causa superior necesita que se haga? ¿Esta Adán absuelto de toda culpa ya que era su destino realizar todas estas atrocidades?</p><p>Todavía no puedo entender por qué todos estos niños y muchos otros personajes tuvieron que morir. La serie no nos dice por qué todas las personas tuvieron que ser asesinadas, lo único que sabemos es que sus muertes fueron necesarias para completar el ciclo. Sin embargo, este no fue el acto de afirmar la vida, sino de actuar como el agente de una ‘profecía’. Aquí, tal vez, la moraleja de la historia debería ser que el libre albedrío se basa en la ignorancia de las consecuencias de nuestras acciones. En el momento en que conocemos nuestro futuro, el único acto libre es negar lo trascendente y actuar de manera diferente dentro de lo inmanente de nuestra existencia. De esta manera, si en lugar de seguir las premoniciones de los demás, Jonas hubiera elegido aceptar su pasado y afirmado su existencia, nada de esto habría sucedido. Si Jonas hubiera afirmado el eterno retorno, otra fuera la historia.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8af2c15d0dd3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Our Toilet Paper Obsession in The Midst of a Global Crisis]]></title>
            <link>https://entrevacios.medium.com/our-toilet-paper-obsession-in-the-midst-of-a-global-crisis-b04797650117?source=rss-9b3c2c6d1b92------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b04797650117</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bruno-latour]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-distance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freud]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Luis Vega-Verástegui]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2020 15:41:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-18T00:34:35.992Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="Fotografiada por Daniel Marin" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zmu8f0P1lOTNXl_tl5ALJQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fotografías de Daniel Marin</figcaption></figure><p>I am currently in my hometown in Peru writing these reflections because I feel the need to share my perspective on the global pandemic. I don’t believe I have a unique view, but it is certainly the only one I have. After having lived in the United States for many years, my perspective of the world is no longer the same. It is claimed that the subjectivity of an expatriated no longer sees home in the same way he used to. That is definitely true. Having one foot on the north and the other on the south can certainly tear down all ethnocentrism and narrow worldviews — it can open the present to the vast possibilities of the future. Nevertheless, I would have never thought that a crisis of this magnitude could have happened. I would have never thought that all around the world people would start distancing from each other to be safe. Amid this crisis (when millions of people are suffering), I would like to think that things will go back to normal ­­– that we will hug and kiss again. But that present has passed — things will no longer be the same. I am not a time traveler that has gone to the future to bring some empirical proofs of a new world. I simply know that some unprecedented changes in our ‘modern’ way of life must take place if we want to overcome this global crisis.</p><p>It’s not easy to describe an event that has never happened before in the history of humanity; never before the whole world has shared the same bewildering experience of been taken away from their daily routines with such severity. Waking up with that habitual rush to get ready for work has been replaced with a lethargic awakening full of anxieties and trepidations that lead us nowhere during the day. We are not used to the confinement. Even the most introverted individual will find in a locked-down a restriction to his/her freedom. But, what else can we do against this novel enemy? The best solution we have at this moment is to stay away from the virus as much as possible– as if we were all carriers of such disease. However, this solution is not a viable possibility for many people that are forced to go out to work because either their work is essential for society or their economy does not grant them the luxury of staying home. Would the excluded people from our universal solution form part of that new class that could be treated like Foucault’s lepers?</p><p>All around the world, the novel coronavirus has forced countries to implement social distancing measures that variegate only in degree. In some places, social distancing is understood as a strict quarantine, in others, just as a suggestion. Regardless of these different approaches, everyone agrees these social measures have abruptly thwarted our daily lives — leaving us with no signs of early recovery. Some people are optimistic and think this pandemic will unite us against a common enemy, even if we are distant from each other. However, is everyone included in this unity? Are the more vulnerable to get infected and infect other people included in this unity? Are the “sanitary measures” exacerbating our social divisions? Are we thinking like a global community?</p><p>I can’t stop thinking about what will happen to the world — especially to my nation and the people that inhabit it. Like many other ‘developing’ countries, Peru has a very fragile social welfare system that would certainly be demolished without a rigorous quarantine– leaving many people in need insecure and closer to death. This single dreadful idea has triggered panic attacks on many Peruvians. Many people — the privileged ones — have started to hoard food and toilet paper to protect themselves and their families; consequently, making life difficult for the ones that live from day to day. Unfortunately, Peruvians are not the only ones manifesting these panic symptoms. All around the world — from the global north to the global south — the coronavirus has prompted a massive hysteria that shares the same banal preoccupations.</p><p>Many have wondered about the reason behind the massive purchase of toilet paper. A superficial inquiry will only see in these unreasonable actions the fear of scarcity. Nevertheless, toilet paper means a lot to many of us. Every day, with its delicate surface, we strip away our unwanted excesses to become the civilized citizens of these modern times. Indeed, how will the world look like without toilet paper? Probably, not very clean. I guess we will appear to ourselves as the dirty animals we avoid being. Maybe if we analyze our obsession with toilet paper, we will be able to understand how our ‘modern’ lives thwart us from acting responsibly as a global community.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*T5VJgCSWWdp2Vnwrl7_Tkw.jpeg" /></figure><p>A psychoanalyst would probably tell us that a person that appears to have an obsessive fixation with hoarding toilet paper has not resolved the conflicts of the anal stage. In the <em>Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality</em>, Freud defines the anal stage as the period when the child learns to go to the toilet under the authority of the parent. In this stage, the child internalizes one of the most fundamental rules of society — where and where not to defecate. Freud claimed that the adults that underwent a liberal toilet-training have an anal-expulsive personality: they are unorganized, extremely generous, and rebellious. On the other hand, for Freud, the adults that underwent a strict toilet-training have an anal-retentive personality: they are extremely organized, thrifty, and law-aboding. With this in mind, a psychoanalyst will easily place toilet paper hoarders under the category of anal-retentive, based on the evident conflict at the moment of giving up that ‘possession’ they so cherish.</p><p>Claiming that toilet paper hoarders are anal-retentive is not based on some people’s propensity for using more toilet paper than others. The factual utility of toilet paper is not of concern to us. If that were to be the case, hoarding toilet paper would be a perfectly rational decision, and no one would ever be surprised if someone leaves the supermarket with a cart filled with white paper rolls. The foundation of this argument relies upon the signification of these white sheets. The irrational desire to store toilet paper must be caused by our fascination with the phantasms within this soft object. In other words, toilet paper hoarders deter jettison this precious cargo because its value in this world is greater than we might imagine. However, the compulsive need to retain this value is more than a mere illusion that some fall into. The allure for retaining toilet paper’s value can only be situated in our modern societies because more than been a product if this epoch, it is the perfect representation of our modern subjectivity. Only a modern individual will ever find value in these paper rolls.</p><p>The French philosopher Bruno Latour describes modernity, in his book <em>We Have Never Been Modern,</em> as the product of two practices that must be perceived as mutually exclusive if we want to remain moderns: (1) the works of translation and (2) the works of purification. For Latour, the former creates a network of objects that can only be understood as hybrids of nature and culture (quasi-objects); like the new scientific studies in chemistry or the technological innovations in cybernetics. On the other hand, the latter defines the modern critical stance, in which there is an absolute division between human culture and non-human nature. For this critical position, the modern man is different from nature and all natural beings.</p><p>If toilet paper, as a quasi-object, stands for ideas like cleanliness and purification, then can we claim that toilet paper incorporates these two incompatible practices (translation and purification)? Toilet paper is a novelty of our modern times. Never before in history, a product, other than food and shelter, has aided a necessity so essential for our lives — our modern lives. This is possible because our need goes beyond the material qualities of toilet paper and its hygienic utility. Toilet paper is both a product of modernity and a symbol of modernity’s eagerness to set itself apart from nature through sanitary practices.</p><p>Melissa Mohr explains, in her book <em>Holy Sh*t: A Brief History of Swearing,</em> how defecation became taboo when the emerging middle-class families of the 18th century started to implement sanitary practices to differentiate themselves from the working-class. At the same time that modernity was moving away from the middle ages’ customs and hierarchies, there were many <em>bourgeois </em>and<em> petite bourgeois </em>families that had the need to not be identified as working class. To achieve that goal, each family had to have their private bathroom inside their house instead of sharing an outside bathroom like many working-class families use to do. All these sanitary practices are so common in our times that we will conceive them as self-evident human behaviors. Hence, are not these practices of purification and cleanliness deeply connected with modernization, and its segregation of the world?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*zS1hf2JYPF3RbTw9xvZ4pg.jpeg" /></figure><p>The moment we realize that the obsession for hoarding toilet paper is also an obsession for preserving our modern subjectivity, we realize that there is nothing truly modern about ourselves. We cannot longer be modern the moment we realize that the object of our desire represents the contradictions of our modern identity. For Latour, we are no longer moderns the moment we are aware that the works of translation and the works of purification have always been aiding each other throughout history. In other words, for Latour, we cannot claim to be modern when we are aware that our ‘modern’ social network is a hybrid of nature and culture. Evidently, we can no longer claim to be separated from nature when we realize that everything (including ourselves) is a quasi-object that is both natural and cultural. We cannot longer claim to be different from primitive cultures the moment we realized that our modern societies are based on the same networks. However, if this is true, then we have always known that the exceptionality of our modern society is a facade. The only problem is that we did not know that we knew. Therefore, the reason why, amid a crisis, hoarding toilet paper is just another way of disavowing this truth. Maybe, it is time to give away this ‘gift’ that we have retained for so long if we want to overcome this crisis.</p><p>Given the global crisis’ magnitude, it is no longer possible to think that the world will remain unchanged. Something unprecedented must happen if we want to survive this global crisis. There is a necessity in all of us to think and act globally. We have to act united as one community that suffers the same illness of being alive in these uncertain times. How would that community look like? I don’t know. I can only see a need that longs for a new global network. Unfortunately, our current global community still clings to a neo-liberal and neo-colonial perspective of the world that might be exacerbated with this “sanitary measures” — intensifying the gap between culture and nature, human and non-humans, rich and poor, civilized and uncivilized, etc.</p><p>This is the reason why I think it is crucial to reflect on how this biopolitical tool is not new. Our obsession with sanitation is a fundamental element of our identity as moderns. However, if we want to preserve the modern desire for achieving a more democratic way of life, we must forget about modernity. If we still believe in progress — in the betterment of societies — we must realize that the split between human culture and non-human nature occludes the development of a democratic global community in which all societies will be the sovereigns of their fate. In this global crisis, the creation of a new global network is not a utopia, but a necessity for our survival.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b04797650117" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>