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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Eric Arsenault on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Eric Arsenault on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Eric Arsenault on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@eric-arsenault?source=rss-944b87f3e7ef------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Awarding NFT Apps 41K $RARI (~$1M) Weekly via Protocol App Mining Program]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rarible-dao/awarding-nft-apps-34k-rari-750k-weekly-via-protocol-app-mining-program-df3af4856331?source=rss-944b87f3e7ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/df3af4856331</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Arsenault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Aug 2021 14:51:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-08-19T15:35:11.632Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>$RARI token distribution for NFT app projects</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nlC5wuUaXvX_0tlsc164Zg.png" /></figure><p>Today, the <a href="https://rarible.org/">Rarible Protocol</a> is introducing App Mining: a new program designed to distribute ownership of the protocol to NFT application builders and users via the distribution of the DAO’s native governance token, $RARI.</p><p>The Rarible Protocol, which <a href="https://rarible.medium.com/introducing-the-rarible-protocol-an-open-source-cross-chain-tool-for-nft-innovation-318f7c7fb4f0">launched last week</a>, provides developers and teams with a robust set of interoperable tools to monetize and grow quickly in the NFT space.</p><p>The Rarible Protocol DAO is dedicated to supporting projects that are building on top of the protocol and contributing to the ecosystem. The DAO has already started offering funding opportunities of up to $100,000 in grants to projects. Today’s announcement highlighting $RARI token distribution to applications reinforces our efforts to make the protocol community owned and governed.</p><h3>Welcome App Mining</h3><p>Over the past year, $RARI tokens have been distributed on a weekly basis to active buyers and sellers across Rarible.com. Moving forward, applications built on the Rarible Protocol have the opportunity to decide where $RARI tokens get distributed, based on their weekly sales volume. Tokens allocated in this way be scaled <a href="https://www.radicalxchange.org/concepts/quadratic-funding/#:~:text=Quadratic%20Funding%20(QF)%20is%20a,accessible%20to%20the%20general%20public.&amp;text=QF%20optimizes%20matching%20funds%20by,number%20of%20people%20who%20contributed.">quadratically</a>.</p><p>Applications may choose to distribute tokens in a variety of ways, including</p><ul><li>distributing tokens to their users,</li><li>distributing their tokens to their DAO</li><li>keeping the $RARI tokens, among other possibilities.</li></ul><p><a href="https://rarible.com/">Rarible.com</a>, which has completed its migration to the Rarible Protocol, will remain one of the applications benefiting from the App Mining program and will continue to distribute its share of $RARI tokens to Rarible.com buyers and sellers in a 50/50 split.</p><p>The goal of the Rarible Protocol App Mining program is to boost NFT project economics by rewarding application builders and their users. <strong>Approximately 41,000 $RARI tokens, currently valued at ~$1MUSD, are distributed every week to applications on the protocol. </strong>An additional~34K $RARI tokens are sent to Rarible DAO on a weekly basis to fund operational and growth efforts.</p><p><strong><em>Visit </em></strong><a href="https://rarible.org/"><strong><em>rarible.org</em></strong></a><strong><em> to learn more about how you can build an NFT project on the Rarible Protocol and participate in the new App Mining program. If you are interested in being a participant, start building, ask questions in our </em></strong><a href="https://discord.gg/zqsZsEWBbN"><strong><em>Discord</em></strong></a><strong><em>, and reach out!</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df3af4856331" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rarible-dao/awarding-nft-apps-34k-rari-750k-weekly-via-protocol-app-mining-program-df3af4856331">Awarding NFT Apps 41K $RARI (~$1M) Weekly via Protocol App Mining Program</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rarible-dao">Rarible Protocol</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Introducing The Rarible Protocol: An Open-Source, Cross-Chain Tool For NFT Innovation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rarible-dao/introducing-the-rarible-protocol-an-open-source-cross-chain-tool-for-nft-innovation-b463c46c09bd?source=rss-944b87f3e7ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b463c46c09bd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nft]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Arsenault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Aug 2021 15:17:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-08-19T16:57:59.678Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nxYL23KR9aNuSAt8ngqAKA.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>This article is authored by </em><a href="https://twitter.com/eric_rsno?lang=en"><em>Eric Arsenault</em></a><em>, core contributor at Rarible DAO, </em><a href="https://twitter.com/insider0x?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor"><em>Alex Salnikov</em></a><em>, co-founder of Rarible.com, and additional contributors within the Rarible DAO community.</em></p><p>Today, we are proud to announce a set of open source tools (dubbed the “<a href="https://rarible.org/">Rarible Protocol</a>”) to drastically simplify the go-to-market process for NFT projects and ideas.</p><p>Creating an NFT project from the ground up is no easy feat — the Rarible.com team knows this firsthand. Getting to where we are today involved countless iterations and setbacks, as well as perseverance through two-sided marketplace challenges like bootstrapping supply and demand.</p><p>Long gone are the days where a project needed to build an entire NFT storefront or marketplace from scratch. With the protocol, developers and teams can focus on what they are good at, while also tapping into an interoperable ecosystem of projects to drive innovation as the market evolves.</p><h3>Meet the Rarible Protocol</h3><p>The Rarible Protocol is a set of smart contracts that can be deployed to various blockchains, as well as an open source indexer. Projects can use these tools to build consumer facing applications, while smart contract developers can build features in the protocol that benefit an entire ecosystem of projects.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dsCxRWhuOQZT1T4E.png" /><figcaption>The Rarible Protocol stack</figcaption></figure><h3>Key Features</h3><ol><li>Decentralized Exchange with Fee Splitting Capability<br>At the core of the Rarible Protocol is a decentralized exchange. One of the protocol’s most powerful features is its ability to split fees during the exchange process, which allows for interesting use cases like the co-creation of NFTs, and the monetization of applications built on top of the protocol, or even the splitting of fees to features used within an application.</li><li>Shared Order Book and Liquidity<br>Applications built on the Rarible Protocol have a shared order book. The practical implications of this are that when an NFT is listed for sale, it is listed for sale across all applications built on the protocol (same goes for when bids are placed). The effect of this is powerful: every project benefits as more teams build on the protocol.</li><li>Lazy Minting of Single (ERC721) or Edition (ERC1155) NFTs<br>This feature enables anyone, regardless of their crypto knowledge, to easily mint an NFT without paying a transaction fee. Instead, the gas costs associated with minting are paid off to the buyer when the NFT is sold — opening up NFT minting to mainstream audiences (for eixample: the minting of a Twitch stream, a Tweet, a TikTok video, all with zero crypto onboarding).</li><li>Royalties Standard<br>The Rarible Protocol implements a royalty standard for protocol-minted NFTs, as well as for externally minted NFTs. This enables NFTs sold on protocol applications to adhere to creator and platform royalties regardless of their provenance (currently, if an NFT is minted on SuperRare, and sold on OpenSea, royalties are not passed along back to the original creator which is a huge barrier to creating an interoperable NFT ecosystem).</li><li>Open Source Indexer<br>The Rarible Protocol indexer is a completely open-source store of data for developers. It enables them to index NFTs and have access to information including metadata, orders, activity and ranking or sorting for leaderboard purposes. Notably, the Rarible Protocol is the first open-sourced indexer protocol available to developers.</li></ol><p>Upcoming Features on the Protocol Roadmap<br>The protocol is currently deployed on Ethereum and will soon be available on Flow and Polygon. Looking forward, we are looking to prioritize with input from our ecosystem, including:</p><ul><li>Improve documentation</li><li>Complete an SDK</li><li>Integrate with fiat payment solutions</li><li>Offer a search API</li><li>Move to an on-chain orderbook</li></ul><h3>Building on the Rarible Protocol</h3><p>Currently, 20 diverse projects are building applications on the protocol, including <a href="https://rarible.com/">Rarible.com</a>, <a href="https://reactions.eth.link/">Reaction$</a>, <a href="https://coconft.com/">CocoNFT</a>, <a href="https://daohaus.club/">DAOhaus</a>, <a href="https://www.mintgate.app/">MintGate</a>, <a href="https://ownerfy.com/">Ownerfy</a>, <a href="https://oncyber.io/">Cyber</a>, <a href="https://footium.club/">Footium</a>, <a href="http://nfp.studio/">NFP</a>, <a href="http://vertex.xyz/">Vertex</a>, <a href="https://mintdrop.co/">Mintdrop</a>, <a href="https://blog.zerion.io/nfts-are-live-on-zerion-with-a-surprise-d7b09330c3ae">Zerion</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/genie_xyz">Genies</a>, <a href="https://snapshot.org/#/rarible.eth/proposal/QmT5HNVtGhSVvHUaiTVgCeJdmrbByp26skwcjwwexpB5gd">Decentraland</a>, <a href="https://rarepress.org/">Rarepress</a>, and <a href="https://www.blockex.com/">BlockEx</a>. Developers can build many other applications including:</p><ol><li>Customizable NFT Storefronts<br>From large-scale projects like Rarible.com, to small-scale options for creators, the protocol makes the development and customization of NFT storefronts simple.</li><li>NFT Minting Apps<br>Because of the shared orderbook, applications on the protocol can also choose to Mint NFTs and let other applications deal with the sale and distribution of those NFTs. This eliminates some of the challenges associated with bootstrapping demand and should drastically reduce time to market for ideas.</li><li>Browsing / Discovery / Management<br>There are various applications that might want to use the protocol for browsing / discovery and management of NFTs, including Wallets or DAO frameworks or Multisigs for example.</li><li>Features Monetization<br>With the Rarible Protocol, developers can create innovative features and integrate applications on the protocol to test, validate, and monetize via fee splitting.</li><li>Data Analytics Tools<br>Easily create analytical solutions for NFT prices, trades and scarcity.</li></ol><h3>Building, Incubating, and Governing Together</h3><p>As of today, the Rarible.com marketplace has successfully completed its migration to the Rarible Protocol.</p><p>While Rarible.com and the Rarible Protocol remain two separate entities, both share a core mission to build a community-driven and decentralized network to govern the parameters of the protocol. This will be achieved through the Rarible DAO composed of valuable members within the community, from developers to thought leaders, who hold ownership and decision-making rights.</p><p>There are two main ways the Rarible DAO offers support to projects building on our protocol:</p><ol><li>Distribution of ~40,000 $RARI tokens per week (currently valued at ~$500K USD) at the discretion of apps built on the protocol, with allocations proportional to their app-generated sales volume for the week, scaled quadratically.</li><li>Funding for new NFT projects, ideas and features of up to $100,000 for developers building on the protocol. This funding is distributed via the approval of proposals submitted to Rarible DAO, as well as through DAO sponsored hackathons.</li></ol><p>For more information on the Rarible Protocol, visit <a href="https://rarible.org/">rarible.org</a> and join the official Rarible DAO <a href="https://discord.gg/G83j9uCjtP">Discord</a> and signal your interest in the #grant-applications or #looking-to-contribute channels.</p><p><em>***NOTE: Rarible.com built and leverages the Rarible Protocol, but in no way does building on the Rarible Protocol result in any fees or value accruing to Rarible.com. The protocol is open source and currently zero-fee (a parameter which is set by Rarible DAO).</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b463c46c09bd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rarible-dao/introducing-the-rarible-protocol-an-open-source-cross-chain-tool-for-nft-innovation-b463c46c09bd">Introducing The Rarible Protocol: An Open-Source, Cross-Chain Tool For NFT Innovation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rarible-dao">Rarible Protocol</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[From rarible.com to Rarible Ecosystem]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rarible-dao/from-rarible-com-to-rarible-ecosystem-dc5c145520f9?source=rss-944b87f3e7ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dc5c145520f9</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Arsenault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Jun 2021 17:17:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-08-12T15:18:42.062Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Rarible is in the process of a transformation.</h3><p>In July 2020, Rarible introduced the <a href="https://rarible.medium.com/introducing-rari-the-first-governance-token-in-the-nft-space-5dbcc55b6c43">$RARI governance token</a>, and in September 2020, we began our transition towards decentralized governance with the first proposals submitted for vote.</p><p>Up until recently, 75,000 $RARI tokens were distributed weekly to active artists and collectors on the platform (currently, 25% of that is directly to the Rarible DAO). Through this process, our hope is to create a true <em>ownership model</em> by distributing ownership of our network to the most valuable contributors in our ecosystem.</p><p>Over the last several months, the team has been hard at work building the <a href="https://rarible.org/">Rarible Protocol</a>, and just this week, <a href="http://rarible.com/">rarible.com</a> has transitioned to almost fully to using it. <strong>This milestone marks the next phase of our journey.</strong></p><p>Over the coming months, Rarible will begin transitioning from being a single project (<a href="http://rarible.com/">rarible.com</a>), to a more complex <em>ecosystem of projects</em> building on a protocol, and governed by a DAO. What this means is not entirely clear yet, and will depend on the wishes of $RARI token holders, as well as key contributors to Rarible DAO who are in the weeds designing this future.</p><p>The journey ahead is incredibly exciting. The metaverse is being built before our eyes, and our community is among those leading the pack. For those interested in contributing, join our <a href="https://discord.gg/mka6w6dA">Discord</a>, and say hi. There’s work to be done!</p><p>Expect more on this topic soon :)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dc5c145520f9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rarible-dao/from-rarible-com-to-rarible-ecosystem-dc5c145520f9">From rarible.com to Rarible Ecosystem</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rarible-dao">Rarible Protocol</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[DAOstack in 2021]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/daostack/daostack-in-2021-2f0ba049e064?source=rss-944b87f3e7ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2f0ba049e064</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Arsenault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Jan 2021 22:50:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-25T22:50:13.388Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2018, DAOstack launched an ICO with the promise of creating a modular and unopinionated DAO framework. Back then, DAOs were for the most part, just a concept. Today the DAO landscape looks very different and DAOs have become one of the hottest trends in the crypto space.</p><p>Below is a look back at 2020, and some of the opportunities we are excited about as we start the new year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mlGsnIXrNK5F0TPM4BdeYw.png" /></figure><h3>A look back at 2020</h3><p><strong>Wrapping up Genesis DAO</strong></p><p>Shortly after DAOstack raised funds in their ICO, Genesis DAO was launched. It survived a hack, grew to nearly 300 members, and had hundreds of proposals submitted and were funded by the DAO — from creating interactive video experiences to funding other DAOs. Genesis played a key role in helping guide our product development, and fostered a global community of contributors and thinkers curious and passionate about the decentralized future.</p><p>In March 2020, the Genesis DAO experiment was halted to allow us to shift our focus on building a new app, <a href="http://www.common.io/">Common</a>. Genesis DAO was an extremely valuable experiment in the early stages of the company that helped forge a number of relationships and helped guide our thinking on DAOs. As a bonus, a number of Genesis DAO members have continued contributing significantly to the DAO space post-Genesis DAO, which is something we are deeply proud of :)</p><p><strong>A shifting market, and reevaluating our value proposition</strong></p><p>2020 saw an absolute explosion of DAOs. Hundreds of projects launched with decentralization and governance front of mind. Many of these new projects began adopting relatively new governance tools, like Compound or Snapshot + Gnosis Safe, which focused on simplicity and usability.</p><p>Although DAOstack saw our fair share of wins in 2020 (including the successful fundraising efforts by DXdao and Prime DAO, as well as the continued success of NecDAO), behind the scenes, we were forced to get back to basics. We doubled down on understanding our target market, and spend much time re-evaluating our previously held assumptions as well as refining the vision for our product.</p><h3>The opportunities ahead</h3><p>M<strong>ore focused targets</strong></p><p>When DAOstack launched, there wasn’t yet a clear picture of what DAOs would look like, or what the main use cases would be. Over the last year however, we’ve seen certain DAO use cases emerge and gain more traction than others.</p><p>One important group of DAO use cases that emerged was a category of grassroot funded not-for-profit DAOs we call Social Collaboratives (spearheaded in a large part by Moloch DAOs). In early 2020, we began developing a mobile app called Common, targeting this use case. Common was recently approved by the App Store and over the coming year we plan to incubate a number of local and global projects. This use case has a large market, from funding and organizing global grassroots movements to funding local clean-up efforts: think “decentralized Facebook groups on steroids”.</p><p>Alchemy, on the other hand, is our second product vertical, one that we’ve been making steady progress on. Moving into 2021, we are doubling down on a specific market, around which all of our product efforts will revolve. Stay tuned. 🎯</p><p><strong>Decentralizing via Genesis DAO 2.0</strong></p><p>DAOstack’s vision has always been to decentralize. In early 2021, we will be launching an updated version of Genesis DAO to progressively decentralize our stack and give GEN holders governance over aspects of our products. Genesis DAO will play a critical role in a growing and aligned ecosystem of DAOs and DAO members. Posts about Genesis DAO should start appearing on our <a href="https://daotalk.org/">forum</a> in the next couple weeks.</p><p><strong>Changes to our business model</strong></p><p>Since the launch of DAOstack, the GEN token has only played one role: the utility token in our Holographic Consensus-based voting protocol. But requiring GEN has negatively impacting the experience of users and projects, and in 2021, we will be announcing an updated model for the GEN token. 🤫</p><h3>Final thoughts</h3><p>With a more focused target market, and two product verticals seeing no signs of slowing, as 2021 kicks off, we’re incredibly excited for what’s in store. The future of collaboration is taking shape before our eyes!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*ilRz8dUPSGcZStbtS_u25Q.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2f0ba049e064" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/daostack/daostack-in-2021-2f0ba049e064">DAOstack in 2021</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/daostack">DAOstack</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Alchemy Evolution: Part 1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/daostack/the-alchemy-evolution-part-1-4c30563440c8?source=rss-944b87f3e7ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4c30563440c8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Arsenault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 Jan 2021 19:52:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-18T19:56:26.064Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Over the last few months, we’ve been working hard to make <a href="https://alchemy.daostack.io/">Alchemy</a> even more amazing. We have a number of exciting changes in the pipeline, and this series of short posts outlines the highlights for you.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ujadAzecuGvMjuyKTiBXYA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Multicall</h3><p>In November, we finished rolling out our “Multicall” plugin. This plugin allows a DAO to submit a single proposal that includes any series of smart contract calls. Using this plugin allows projects and communities to easily interact with external contracts, and do things like place a trade on Uniswap, or earn yield on DAO tokens using Aave.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4dK0w0WiQZXNrImkmW6Nmw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d29lGpTQ5dk&amp;ab_channel=DAOstack">Watch demo</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Updates to our proposals pages</h3><p>Previously, DAOs on Alchemy had various plugins, and each plugin had its own set of proposals. We simplified this by creating a single “Proposals” page that shows all of the proposals, from every plugin. This greatly simplifies the proposal discovery process, by giving users only a single list to look at :)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zBrIrgp2jdyDIt7XonBFRw.png" /></figure><h3>Easier DAO navigation</h3><p>We simplified the process of switching between DAOs you have voting power in. Now you just need to click on a dropdown, at at any time, you can get information on another DAO you are part of.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/588/1*OYvybA9iAtcTGZhsc1i-UQ.png" /></figure><h3>Easier switching between networks</h3><p>Alchemy now allows you to navigate between DAOs on different networks seamlessly within the same interface. In fact, the list of DAOs in the dropdown above include DAOs on different networks. We’ve seen a few instances of DAOs having both Mainnet and Layer 2 DAOs, which are used for different purposes. We believe this trend will continue, and we plan on continue taking steps to create a seamless interaction for DAO members.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/375/1*Kjx2Y-eDQ7uE4_3lGh20sg.png" /><figcaption>Mainnet</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*6UblyF5bh2qtlqPkIn5HXQ.png" /><figcaption>xdai</figcaption></figure><h3>Up Next</h3><p>Our next set of updates includes giving new DAOs the ability to give voting power to an existing ERC-20 token, expanding the list of layer 2s we support, overhauling our front-end designs, and integrating Snapshot 😎</p><p>Stay tuned for Part 2 of this series.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4c30563440c8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/daostack/the-alchemy-evolution-part-1-4c30563440c8">The Alchemy Evolution: Part 1</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/daostack">DAOstack</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Voting Options in DAOs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/daostack/voting-options-in-daos-b86e5c69a3e3?source=rss-944b87f3e7ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b86e5c69a3e3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Arsenault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Dec 2020 19:24:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-15T19:46:44.946Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This article explores the different voting mechanisms used by DAOs through Q&amp;As with DAO founders and builders. *Special thanks* to Michael from Curve, <a href="https://twitter.com/clesaege">Clement</a> from Kleros, <a href="https://twitter.com/anonymous">anonymous</a> from Compound, <a href="https://twitter.com/sminert">Sky</a> from DXdao, <a href="https://twitter.com/LuukDAO">Luuk</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/papa_raw">Pat</a> from PrimeDAO, <a href="https://twitter.com/thekerp">Adam</a> from lexDAO, <a href="https://twitter.com/DekanBro">Dekan</a> from Raid Guild, <a href="https://twitter.com/lkngtn">Luke</a> from 1Hive, <a href="https://twitter.com/Cooopahtroopa">Cooper</a> from Audius, <a href="https://twitter.com/auryn_macmillan">Auryn</a> from Gnosis, and <a href="https://twitter.com/M0zrat">Ezra</a> from DAOstack for providing input!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*VVmG17VW-ZSbMaWv" /><figcaption>We’ve come a long way…</figcaption></figure><h3>Token based quorum voting</h3><p>Quorum voting requires a certain threshold of voters in order for a proposal to pass (for example: 60% quorum, which means 60% of voting power needs to vote). Once this threshold has been met, whichever decision has more votes wins. Without reaching the quorum threshold, proposals fail.</p><p>The threshold has typically been based on the total number of votes, although some protocols (like Compound governance) have a quorum threshold only for the votes in favor of a proposal passing instead (20% quorum in this case would mean 20% of voting power voting positively for a proposal in order for a proposal to be considered for passing).</p><p>Projects that have used this include Compound, Curve, and Kleros (among many others).</p><p>This governance mechanism is battle tested, and has a long history in our political system. It also has a simple UX for users.</p><p>On the flipside, pure token-based voting has some issues. Plutocracies aren’t great. Selecting the “right” quorum requirement is hard. A low quorum makes proposals very easy to pass and the system easy to attack. A high quorum makes it very difficult to pass proposals. This challenge is even greater when large whales are added to the mix. Token-based voting is sensitive to certain kinds of attacks (like the flash governance attack<a href="https://www.coindesk.com/maker-dao-vote-on-safeguard-against-flash-loan"> we saw</a> in Maker). Quorum-based voting also requires a high amount of participation from members to pass proposals, which is expensive and time consuming.</p><h4><strong>Q&amp;A with Michael from Curve:</strong></h4><p><strong>How do you like quorum-based voting being used in your DAO?</strong></p><p>Quorum-based voting makes sense for us. Usually turnout is very small, though. We have not had many challenges passing proposals (only 1 didn’t reach quorum out of ~30). Voting does turn into a game of chasing whales though, which is annoying. Some of them you know, some of them you don’t know, which makes things challenging. The amount of gas is a barrier to a certain degree, but we are looking to subsidize gas with meta transactions in the future.</p><p><strong>Are you concerned about some of the risks associated with quorum-based voting? </strong><em>(NOTE: Curve does not use direct token voting. They require token holders to lock tokens, and the voting power given is proportional to the amount of tokens locked as well as the time they are locked for. This mechanism decreases attack vectors.).</em></p><p>Not really since voting power is given to token lockers, based on the amount of time they have the tokens locked for. Not really concerned about other risks, like not being able to reach quorum.</p><p><strong>Would you switch the voting mechanism for this DAO if you could easily do so?</strong></p><p>What I really want to have is liquid democracy, where votes are delegated.</p><h4><strong>Q&amp;A with Clement from Kleros:</strong></h4><p><strong>How do you like quorum-based voting being used in your DAO?</strong></p><p>I hate it. The only quorum % I would advise projects use would be 0 (ie, no quorum).</p><p><strong>What are some of the things you most dislike about quorum-based voting?</strong></p><p>It leads to tactical voting. There are various reasons why tactical voting is not ideal, and doesn’t lead to the best decisions being taken. <em>(Tactical voting means that you may be incentivized to lie about your preference to get the best outcome you can. Many people often do this in the US elections for example, by voting Democratic or Republican even if they support an independent party since their “vote won’t count”)</em>. In quorum-based voting, people against a proposal often abstain since they are more likely to prevent a proposal from passing this way than to vote no.</p><p>Quorum-based voting also leads to governance locks when the quorum can’t be reached. It also leads to forced conservatism as only extremely popular proposals can be passed but simple ones have trouble getting people to vote.</p><p><strong>Are you concerned about some of the risks associated with quorum-based voting?</strong></p><p>Yes, I am concerned. The risks of governance locks are significant and can result in projects stopping their development or not being able to answer in a timely fashion to new environment conditions.</p><p><strong>Would you switch the voting mechanism for this DAO if you could easily do so?</strong></p><p>Conviction voting is interesting, Moloch permissioned-style can fit some DAOs. I’m also generally a fan of<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method#:~:text=A%20Condorcet%20method%20%28English%3A%20%2F,whenever%20there%20is%20such%20a"> Condorcet method</a> voting systems.</p><h4><strong>Q&amp;A with {anonymous} from Compound:</strong></h4><p><strong>How do you like quorum-based voting being used in your DAO?</strong></p><p>At least in Compound, it seems to be working, and upgrades are being made by the community. It has not been a problem meeting quorum, possibly because there are active whales.</p><p><strong>What are some of the things you most dislike about quorum-based voting?</strong></p><p>Tokens as a voting mechanism have a market price, which is mostly based around speculation. Separating out the voting power from the financial aspect would be a good thing.</p><p>The challenges around Compound governance seem to be more related to social and incentive problems. For example: Many people participate in the community because they care, not because they have a long term stake. It would be good to get more people aligned with the long term direction of protocol. Getting more people to care in general is a challenge. In addition, even though Compound is decentralized, many still just reach out to the team instead of working within the community. Part of this problem is likely due to a lack of infrastructure around proposals and voting as well as perceived centralization.</p><p><strong>Would you switch the voting mechanism for this DAO if you could easily do so?</strong></p><p>Quadratic voting line of thought seems to be interesting. Possibly requiring the locking up of tokens to accrue voting power. Possibly also issuing vesting COMP to farmers to align long term incentives.</p><p>Other things that come to mind is voting power tied to the length of time tokens are staked.</p><h3>Holographic Consensus</h3><p>Holographic Consensus (HC) was a concept spearheaded by DAOstack. This voting mechanism associates a prediction market with each proposal. Predictors can stake funds for or against a proposal they believe will pass or fail. If they predict correctly, they benefit financially. Proposals that are predicted to pass are “boosted” and voting switches from 50% quorum to relative majority (where you only look at For vs. Against votes, and no quorum is needed), making the barrier to pass proposals much lower than proposals that don’t have funds staked on them.</p><p>Projects that have used this voting mechanism include DXdao, NecDAO and Prime DAO.</p><p>This voting mechanism naturally protects projects from nefarious proposals, since you need to pay in order to attack (via staking funds on proposals). It works great for projects that have many proposals since members only really need to pay attention to proposals with a stake on them. It also allows a DAO to pass proposals quickly.</p><p>On the flipside, the UX is more confusing and it introduces a new token mechanism (staking on proposals) which isn’t always desired.</p><h4><strong>Q&amp;A with Sky from DXdao:</strong></h4><p><strong>How do you like HC based voting being used in your DAO?</strong></p><p>Holographic consensus-based voting that is being used by DXdao has been working well. It’s been interesting to participate in a system which uses non-transferrable REP for voting and a GEN-staking token for predicting on proposals, as this is unique from most other single token governance systems.</p><p>My understanding is that the design of holographic consensus is meant to be a system that can scale to tens or hundreds of thousands of members. Obviously, we have not seen this large scale experience in action yet and so DXdao is practicing what we might call a much lighter version of what it was designed for. It is not often that there are so many proposals in the queue that the staking mechanism becomes an important aspect of the filtering.</p><p>Overall, it has been working well. DXdao has not had many contentious votes. Part of the reason for this is likely that people making proposals often feel out and gain social consensus through forum posts/chats and community discussions around a topic prior to making the proposal. This almost adds a third layer into the governance mix.</p><p><strong>What are some of the things you most dislike about HC type voting?</strong></p><p>Holographic Consensus adds more complexity to the governance process. The biggest drawback is probably that it is hard to understand the exact details of how the system works, especially if one is new to the DAO and system.</p><p>Because of this, it takes time and energy for people to become familiar with the governance process and how to most effectively govern with it.</p><p>Also, I would say that an active Holographic Consensus governance system with all the moving pieces and lots of people being active becomes quite expensive especially with higher gas prices on Ethereum.</p><p><strong>Would you switch the voting mechanism for this DAO if you could easily do so?</strong></p><p>For me, the most interesting addition to the current governance system would be some way to incorporate conviction voting into the governance process to be used for specific types of proposals on top of the current system. Seeing Commons Stack’s Panvala Conviction Voting system in action during Gitcoin grants was pretty cool. I think this fluid type of voting makes a ton of sense in certain situations.</p><p>I also really like the simplicity of Moloch DAOs — they are quite easy for new people to understand right away, and they are efficient and secure (assuming you have the necessary community watching over them).</p><p>At this point, I don’t think it would make sense to switch fully to any other voting mechanism as HC has been working well for DXdao’s needs, but we are always experimenting!</p><h4><strong>Q&amp;A with Luuk from Prime DAO:</strong></h4><p><strong>How do you like HC based voting being used in your DAO?</strong></p><p>I believe HC can work well for filtering proposals for a DAO. I’m not really sure it works well for making the best decisions for a DAO though, since people with specific knowledge about something aren’t necessarily the same people who have voting power. The initial idea that Colony had (i.e. where people had reputation in a specific domain) seemed interesting. In fact, in another DAO I was working on (CuraDAO), some people even found it unethical for them to be able to vote on certain proposals they didn’t have knowledge on! I don’t necessarily believe in the vision of these mega DAOs.</p><p>Although not really related to the voting mechanism, I do really love the proposal information and flow in the DAOstack DAOs.</p><p><strong>What are some of the things you most dislike about HC type voting?</strong></p><p>A big challenge is the need to use GEN.</p><p><strong>Would you switch the voting mechanism for this DAO if you could easily do so?</strong></p><p>Would switch to having multiple voting mechanisms for different decisions. HC for base layer decisions, then Conviction Voting for budgetary decisions. 1 Token 1 Vote for other things. To me, it makes the most sense to use the right tool for the right thing. HC makes sense for high level, but not necessarily low level.</p><h3>Permissioned relative majority (Moloch DAOs)</h3><p>Relative majority (ie, where you just compare total number of for and against votes) isn’t a viable governance option for DAOs due to the ease with which they can be attacked (1 person can easily drain the DAO’s funds while others aren’t looking!). However, Moloch DAOs have a nice little feature to prevent this: proposals need to be sponsored by DAO members in order to be voted on, which adds a nice security buffer.</p><p>Projects that have used this include MetaCartel Ventures, Raid Guild and DAOhaus.</p><p>Some of the benefits of this voting mechanism include a simple UX, and less actions required by members, meaning a lower attention requirement and gas cost. On the other hand, proposals are easy to pass and can pose a risk if nobody is watching. It is slower by design.</p><h4><strong>Q&amp;A with Adam from LexDAO:</strong></h4><p><strong>How do you like “permissioned relative majority” voting being used in your DAO?</strong></p><p>LexDAO previously used quorum-based voting, and it was a nightmare. Had to whip every vote to get enough people in. The complaining about gas was endless, even when it was $.50 to vote. Votes were rare, but still people were bugged by the gas. Moloch on the other hand tends to effectively align incentives to foster community. It flips the burden from “get enough people to say yes” as the threshold for anything getting done, to “it’s your job to say ‘no’ if you care.”</p><p><strong>Do you dislike anything about this sort of voting mechanism?</strong></p><p>It’s definitely slower. A lot of the protections built in are around the timing of the proposal process.</p><p><strong>Would you move to another voting system, or change anything about it?</strong></p><p>Delegation might be something nice to add.</p><h4><strong>Q&amp;A with Dekan from Raid Guild</strong></h4><p><em>(Note: Dekan is building DAOhaus, a platform to deploy Moloch DAOs):</em></p><p><strong>How do you like “permissioned relative majority” voting being used in your DAO?</strong></p><p>I like the simple majority rules and no quorum on Moloch voting. Only a single vote is required to pass a proposal which saves gas but it also requires members to be vigilant on watching proposals. It requires an engaged community.</p><p><strong>Do you dislike anything about this sort of voting mechanism?</strong></p><p>Although “majority rules” has its positives, it is also a negative in a sense. A lot can ride on one vote so a proposal can sneak through if the community is not engaged. If a proposal does sneak through, members can still ragequit, but that could be missed too. So there is a high level of responsibility to be aware of the votes happening in your DAO.</p><p><strong>Would you move to another voting system, or change anything about it?</strong></p><p>I would like to have an early voting mechanic, so a special proposal could pass instantly on some quorum being met.</p><h3>Conviction voting</h3><p>High level:<a href="https://medium.com/giveth/conviction-voting-a-novel-continuous-decision-making-alternative-to-governance-aa746cfb9475"> Conviction voting</a> is a voting mechanism in which people stake their voting power on proposals, and over time, those proposals accumulate enough votes to pass. Aragon recently<a href="https://aragon.org/blog/introducing-the-conviction-funding-pilot"> began a pilot</a> for this new type of voting mechanism, which is still very experimental.</p><p>Projects that are using this include 1Hive, Panvala, and Commons Stack.</p><p>This voting mechanism in theory prevents people with large stakes and strong opinions from suppressing minority voters. The majority doesn’t need to achieve consensus on every proposal, instead, token holders can simply focus on the proposals they support.</p><p>On the other hand, this voting mechanism is not yet battle tested, it has a more confusing UX, and likely needs to be used along with other voting mechanisms that are better for yes/no or time sensitive decisions.</p><h4><strong>Q&amp;A with Luke Duncan from 1Hive</strong></h4><p><em>Note: Luke is a member of 1Hive and Aragon, which have funded the building of conviction voting systems:</em></p><p><strong>How do you like your experience with Conviction Voting so far?</strong></p><p>Conviction voting is really interesting, it’s still early, but I consider it to be a game changer from a decentralized governance perspective. It’s hard to compare it to other voting mechanisms, because it works so differently. At least in the context we use it, it is more about budgeting and resource allocation than about reaching a specific consensus/decision.</p><p><strong>Do you think it could be used effectively for specific consensus / decisions? Or are there reasons why it’s not that good for it?</strong></p><p>It’s not really the right tool for that, though in some contexts it could be applied. For example, we use it for funding, and the amount of support required depends on the amount of funds requested by a proposal out of the available funds in a treasury/pool. Another use case is updating a linear parameter (e.g. an inflation rate), which can be done by averaging the signals periodically to move parameter values. But it wouldn’t make a ton of sense to make arbitrary decisions like “upgrade this smart contract”.</p><h3>The Multisig</h3><p>Many projects and communities have opted to go the Multisig route (usually with Snapshot for off-chain signaling). In this voting mechanism, token holders signal on proposals, which are then executed by a more centralized committee who usually control a Gnosis Safe. A more thorough analysis of this option along with Q&amp;A will be published at a later date.</p><h3>Colony’s “Lazy Consensus” voting mechanism (section 3.4 of Colony’s<a href="https://colony.io/whitepaper.pdf"> whitepaper</a>)</h3><p>In this system in development by Colony, , anyone in the community can make a motion for something to happen. If no one objects within a certain amount of time, it happens. If someone objects, then a reputation-weighted vote decides whether or not it should happen. This voting mechanism is still under development, so unfortunately we don’t have firsthand accounts or example projects yet.</p><h3>Final Thoughts</h3><p>Currently, the vast majority of projects are using quorum-based voting, in part because it is the most battle-tested and simplest to integrate for existing projects. But we are still in the super early stages of product / protocol governance! The voting mechanism used by your project influences everything from member participation to security and community culture. The *right* voting mechanism could play a critical role in the long term success of projects, by allowing groups to make the best decisions, at the right pace, with minimal risks.</p><p>Until a clear winner emerges, projects should try and minimize locking themselves into a specific protocol or voting mechanism, and be open to experimenting as the space keeps evolving.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b86e5c69a3e3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/daostack/voting-options-in-daos-b86e5c69a3e3">Voting Options in DAOs</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/daostack">DAOstack</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ownership in Web3]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/daostack/ownership-in-web3-4992864fd49f?source=rss-944b87f3e7ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4992864fd49f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Arsenault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2020 17:32:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-24T19:25:18.874Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Deciding who should own your project is a critically important step in the <a href="https://medium.com/venture-dao/8-steps-to-decentralization-1822806e2d54">path to decentralization</a>. This article outlines some considerations to ensure the long term alignment and success of your network. Protocol wars have only just begun!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*Nj2Z6rGcuHT_l2-Z.jpg" /></figure><h3>What is Ownership</h3><p>Before getting to “who” should own your decentralized project, maybe we should answer the more basic question of what ownership means in the context of crypto.</p><p>On one end of the spectrum, ownership literally means “you own every aspect of this project” (all current smart contracts, assets, as well as any future value accrual mechanisms that might arise from them). There are very few decentralized projects in this category, one of the lone exceptions might be DXdao, which has even decentralized their community managed <a href="https://dxdao.eth.link/#/">website</a>.</p><p>For the majority of projects at this stage, “ownership” just means having <em>some</em> level of control over some aspect of a project / protocol. There is a huge deal of possibilities here, including even <em>just the promise</em> of future ownership / control (ie, not even giving anything away but a worthless token). Stakeholders for these kinds of projects are relying heavily on trust and good faith in the founding team / members as there is rarely any ownership in the legal sense of the word.</p><p>What further complicates this topic is the fact that token ownership does not always equal voting power ownership. In many cases, there is a complete overlap (such as COMP), but in other cases, they are not (such as DXdao, which uses non-transferable voting power in the form of reputation for contributors, along with the DXD token which was given to funders).</p><p>There are many different factors that may affect the initial and ongoing ownership structure of a project, including:</p><ul><li>Does the project need to achieve sufficient decentralization for legal reasons? Is the project anonymous?</li><li>Who are the project stakeholders, and what are their investment timelines and preferences? Do they require fixed supply tokens which seems to be in style at the moment?</li><li>How strong is the project’s moat?</li><li>How reliant is the project on the community / external contributors? How reliant <em>should</em> it be?</li><li>Who is building the project? How sustainable is it? Does the project have a source of funds to pay people and to grow a community?</li><li>Do you want to use something that is “out of the box”?</li><li>Can the project give ownership of its assets to token holders? In some cases (like Rarible), this isn’t yet possible.</li></ul><p>With this in mind, let’s take a look at four very different projects and see where they stand.</p><h3>YFI</h3><p><em>Where they stand: </em>YFI issued 30,000 standard ERC-20 tokens in total. These were initially issued out to yield farmers. Since then, tokens have either remained in the hands of early yield farmers, or gone to speculators. Token holders have technically no control of the protocol (yet), but they do signal using Snapshot, which is executed using a Gnosis Safe.</p><p>Contributors to the project include a small group of full time builders active in the community forums. Many of these individuals get paid full salaries in stablecoins (based on the Gnosis Safe transactions). It’s unknown to what extent contributors overlap with YFI token holders.</p><p><em>Thoughts and concerns. </em>Until it’s addressed, there seems to be a poor incentive alignment between YFI holders and contributors. Contributors could potentially fork and reward themselves more handsomely (although this would likely cause irreparable damage to the brand and reputation of stakeholders, so there is likely only a small risk of this). Voting power also doesn’t really seem to be in the right hands. If voting was ever put entirely on chain, there would be a serious risk to the project since there are a number of whales out there who would have outsize influence.</p><h3>UNI</h3><p><em>Where they stand.</em> Uniswap tokens were issued to four key groups (investors, team, community, advisors), distributed over 4 years. After 4 years, the project plans to have a yearly inflation of 2%. Token holders control the Uniswap protocol parameters. The DAO has not been used to take any actions yet, mainly because meeting quorum hasn’t been achievable. Contributors (at this stage) seem to be limited to the Uniswap team.</p><p><em>Thoughts and concerns.</em> The decision of Uniswap to have inflation rewards past the 4 year vesting period, as well as a large number of UNI tokens available to the community, is a great direction. This should help build a community with a pool of funds for contributors. However, there is a real threat from projects like SUSHI, which don’t need to deal with the baggage associated with founder / investor tokens and higher rewards. It’s hard to predict what the effect of this will be over 4 years…</p><p>Technology is generally not a very good moat, while communities and ecosystems are. Though Uniswap hasn’t always prioritized community building in the past, it remains to be seen if this will change moving forward.</p><h3>DXdao</h3><p><em>Where they stand.</em> DXdao has a two-token DAO, with both DXD holders (which invested in a bonding curve) and Reputation holders (with non-transferable voting power). DXD holders (so far) don’t have any voting power and thus ~no control. Reputation holders control all of the DXdao products and are for the most part limited to contributors to the project.</p><p>Reputation can be minted by the DAO in perpetuity. DXD tokens can only be obtained by purchasing tokens from the bonding curve, or by buying them on the secondary market.</p><p><em>Thoughts and concerns.</em> Voting power in DXdao is held only by Reputation holders. DXD holders are currently unrepresented in the DAO, a problem that has been highlighted and is being addressed.</p><p>There is no way for DXdao to mint DXD tokens, which means they depend on funds raised or from revenue sources to pay members, which limits the flexibility of incentives. This design decision might not have been ideal, but time will tell.</p><h3>MakerDAO</h3><p><em>Where they stand. </em>Token holders include team members, investors, and speculators. MKR token holders can vote on proposals submitted by the Maker team. Initially 1M MKR tokens were created, which were sold and distributed to the public, team and investors. MKR tokens are burned over time with protocol fees.</p><p><em>Thoughts and concerns. </em>Maker has been successful in building network effects around DAI. With no inflation, DAO treasury, or ability for the public to submit proposals, Maker might have a hard time fostering a community of dedicated builders around their project to be sustainable longer term. On the other hand, maybe Maker won’t have a major need for builders in order to continue being useful… ¯\_(ツ)_/¯</p><h3>Closing thoughts</h3><p>Projects face tough choices when trying to structure their governance since there are often very high risks. New projects should consider some of the factors above, and get familiar with some of the <a href="https://medium.com/daostack/the-governance-lemon-awards-134c773f1ce7">learning points</a> from other projects. As long as you don’t screw up too badly, it’s always possible to shift strategy over time (which I expect we will see more of as the space matures).</p><p>In future articles, I will explore which directions I believe projects should be heading and why. Feel free to reach out any time at @eric_rsno on Telegram or Twitter if you have any thoughts, comments, or are looking to DAOify!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4992864fd49f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/daostack/ownership-in-web3-4992864fd49f">Ownership in Web3</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/daostack">DAOstack</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Governance Lemon Awards ]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/daostack/the-governance-lemon-awards-134c773f1ce7?source=rss-944b87f3e7ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/134c773f1ce7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Arsenault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2020 17:21:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-08T17:21:36.800Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Overview</h3><p>Decentralized governance is all the rage these days. On the surface, almost every new emoji token has ambitious decentralized governance plans. But we are still early! Many lessons have been learned the hard way, and many more are around the corner. The Governance Lemon Awards were created to celebrate our learnings, and to share knowledge gained and commiserate in our growth pains.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pTg3QzXjOk6QtoGXAVUFFQ.png" /></figure><p>Hopefully these learnings can help new projects make better decisions as we keep experimenting and driving the space forward. If your project has some horror stories to share, send me an email at <a href="/service/mailto:eric@daostack.io">eric@daostack.io</a>, and we will include you in our follow up article.</p><h3>🍋🥇 $MTA, $FEW, $SUSHI, $SWERVE</h3><p>All of these projects unfortunately suffered from a similar community backlash due to early insiders potentially profiting at the expense of others. Whether or not there was any truth to these claims is another topic altogether, but valuable lessons can still be learned.</p><ul><li>mStable had an IDO on July 18th, using the Mesa platform. The tokens were listed at $3.5. Unfortunately, only three days before, the team sold $3.1M MTA to investors, at a price of $0.15.</li><li>The $FEW debacle took place over Sept 22. If you aren’t in the loop, <a href="https://rekt.ghost.io/few-gets-rekt/">here’s</a> a summary for you.</li><li>$SUSHI, on the other hand, was subject to Chef Nomi’s token sell-off, just over a week after launch.</li><li>$SWERVE, a Curve fork, speculatively <a href="https://rekt.ghost.io/the-crooked-swerve/">faked</a> a “fair launch”.</li></ul><p>Takeaways:</p><ul><li>Vesting periods are important since they help align incentives and ensure individuals are vested in the long term success of a project. Projects should also consider funding mechanisms like a <a href="https://ethresear.ch/t/explanation-of-daicos/465">DAICO</a> instead to further build community trust.</li><li>Fair launches &gt; unfair launches…and YOU CAN’T FAKE IT! Actually, that’s not true, you can definitely fake it, for a while.</li><li>For investors in these projects, this risk needs to be priced in. Be careful, and assume people will do what they can to maximize their gains, no matter how committed they seem.</li></ul><h3>🍋🥇 $CRV</h3><p>Curve had some early governance <a href="https://cryptobriefing.com/curves-troubled-governance-is-warning-other-daos-defi/">drama</a>, but reCRV token distribution (voting power in the DAO) has since gotten much better. New projects using quorum-based voting should ensure they don’t get in a situation where very few members can dictate complete control over the project.</p><p>Takeaways:</p><ul><li>The voting power distribution in your economy is important! As Jake Brukhman has <a href="https://blog.coinfund.io/efficient-computation-of-the-banzhaf-voting-power-index-b011ef4be55f">previously alluded to</a>, a poor token distribution will likely end up being priced into governance tokens. If you do go with a skewed token distribution, you might want to use some other voting mechanism such as quadratic voting to ensure voting power is more distributed.</li></ul><h3>🍋🥇 $DXD</h3><p>The launch of the DAO was successful in distributing governance to a wide variety of folks. Shortly after, products like the DutchX and Mesa (both Gnosis products) were handed over to the DAO. The DAO recently raised funds via a continuous bonding curve, which issued $DXD token.</p><p>Takeaways:</p><ul><li>Despite the DXdao being given both OWL tokens as well as GEN tokens, there is still no long term alignment of the DAO and either DAOstack and Gnosis. Vesting of tokens might have helped with that, to a certain extent.</li><li>The $DXD tokenholders were not given voting power in the DAO, which also leads to another misalignment of incentives. The DAO is currently looking into ways of giving voting power to tokenholders, to give them better representation.</li></ul><h3>🍋🥇 $UNI</h3><p>Uniswap launched their token on September 16th 2020. The airdrop was a nice little present, but governance hit some snags. Most importantly was the super high $UNI threshold required to make proposals to Uniswap. As it currently stands, only Binance (🤭) has enough voting power <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/glassnode-uniswap-team-may-have-misled-community-over-team-token-vesting">to submit proposals</a>. This has resulted in groups creating <a href="https://yuni.finance/">$UNI pools</a> to make it possible for others to submit proposals.</p><p>Is such a high threshold “good” governance design? In one way, it behaves almost as elected political representatives, which seems to be a more effective way to govern… so maybe this is actually a good direction. Time will tell.</p><p>Also very bizarre is the fact that <a href="https://twitter.com/dkryptd/status/1306490067662249984?s=20">tokens were issued</a> at launch, instead of being issued according to the vesting schedule they outlined in their intro <a href="https://uniswap.org/blog/uni/">doc</a>, below. A great article on the topic is linked <a href="https://insights.glassnode.com/uni-token-is-uniswap-really-decentralized/#:~:text=Token%20Distribution&amp;text=In%20total%2C%2060%25%20of%20the,the%20protocol%20and%20UNI%20markets.">here</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qP8BGBD9oZ0g5bFq" /></figure><p>Finally, the following claim is quite surprising:</p><p><em>“…team members will not participate directly in governance for the foreseeable future, although they may delegate votes to protocol delegates without seeking to influence their voting decisions.”</em></p><p>Why shouldn’t they participate in the governance of their protocol? Very bizarre, and likely not true if push came to shove.</p><p>Takeaways:</p><ul><li>Although there hasn’t really been much backlash from the lack of vesting tokens, it would be great to have transparent communication by the team.</li><li>Decentralization theatre shouldn’t be used, particularly if your stakeholders are savvy crypto nerds.</li></ul><h3>🍋🥇 $RARI</h3><p>Rarible launched their $RARI token earlier this year, and has seen <a href="https://twitter.com/MessariCrypto/status/1306271089329348608?s=20">impressive growth</a> because of it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ziLq7sHAxj7INKIZ" /></figure><p>The ability to <a href="https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Snapshot.sol">snapshot</a> the token wasn’t included in the ERC-20 contract, which will likely mean that token holders will need to lock tokens in order to obtain voting power in their future DAO.</p><p>For many projects, this isn’t a problem. In the case of Rarible however, it would have been preferable*. Including snapshot would have allowed the team to have a much smoother UX for tokenholders when governance time rolls around.</p><p><em>*This information was obtained through discussions with the Rarible team, which were kind enough to include this learning point in this article*</em></p><p>Takeaways:</p><ul><li>Ensure the right functionality is in your ERC-20 before launching! Snapshot is likely at the top of the list.</li></ul><h3>🍋🥇 $Genesis DAO</h3><p>Genesis DAO was a DAO launched by DAOstack in 2018. The hope was that this DAO would eventually inherit the DAOstack protocol, as well as a substantial GEN treasury. In early 2020, the experiment ended early.</p><p>The main issues with the experiment included: 1) The DAO members with voting power had very little overlap with GEN holders (DAOstack’s native token), so there was a misalignment of interests from an early stage. 2) There was very poor accountability within the DAO. A number of projects were funded and did not deliver. 3) Because there was no fundamental alignment of interests and few clearly stated DAO goals, the DAO ended up funding all kinds of projects, many of which had nothing to do with DAOstack’s product direction.</p><p>Takeaways:</p><ul><li>Having the right stakeholders is critical to have a successful decentralized community. Without the right stakeholders and a clear vision, you may end up going in circles.</li><li>Decentralizing progressively is a good strategy, as you can “go back” once you are decentralized.</li><li>Having effective accountability measures is important (a problem that is still present in many communities today).</li></ul><h3>🍋🥇 $DORG</h3><p>dOrg is a dev cooperative that launched on the DAOstack platform in 2019. In 2020, some changes were made to the DAO parameters, which made it impossible to upgrade the DAO moving forward. Thankfully, the team only had to launch a new DAO, transfer funds, and periodically check their clients weren’t making payments to the old DAO address.</p><p>Takeaways:</p><ul><li>Changing DAO parameters are particularly risky. DAO protocols like DAOstack have added security measures for these types of proposals (longer voting time, higher proposal staking requirement), but there are still risks! Be careful.</li></ul><h3>🍋🥇 $YAM</h3><p>$YAM was the catalyst that kickstarted a huge token farming rush in Aug-Sept 2020. $YAM allowed people to farm tokens by providing liquidity to certain Uniswap pairs. The resulting farmed $YAMS have an elastic token supply mechanic identical to Ampleforth, but with a % of positive rebases being directed to a community governed DAO.</p><p>Unfortunately, shortly after the start of rebasing, a bug was found which made it impossible for any proposal to pass in the DAO, thus <a href="https://twitter.com/YamFinance/status/1293660938906869760?s=20">locking the community governed funds</a> in the DAO forever. Although this sort of governance bug is pretty specific, it does highlight one of the issues with pure quorum based token voting.</p><p>Takeaways:</p><ul><li>If you do end up using quorum based voting, make sure your parameters are chosen properly.</li><li>Possibly consider another governance mechanism! There are many being experimented with, such as conviction voting, holographic consensus, quadratic voting, among others.</li></ul><h3>Conclusions</h3><p>Decentralized governance is a complicated beast, and many projects will stumble along the way. Let’s not be afraid to share our learnings, and help drive the space forward for everyone. If you have any learnings from your governance experiments, please share them in the comments below.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=134c773f1ce7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/daostack/the-governance-lemon-awards-134c773f1ce7">The Governance Lemon Awards 🍋🥇</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/daostack">DAOstack</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[8 Steps to Decentralization]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/venture-dao/8-steps-to-decentralization-1822806e2d54?source=rss-944b87f3e7ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1822806e2d54</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Arsenault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2020 16:08:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-31T16:10:35.246Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The decentralization movement is upon us. A core part of the equation is a clear path for projects and teams to become decentralized. This document aims to clarify this process for projects.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*H6lPR4di3cNP-LPym22T7w.jpeg" /><figcaption>The path to decentralization is now clear</figcaption></figure><p>Reasons to decentralize include:</p><ol><li>Giving early stakeholders an easy way to exit</li><li>Leveraging new forms of network effects, allowing projects <em>without moats to have one</em></li><li>Performing regulated activities (raising funds, allowing the trading of securities, issuing dividends, etc.) by <a href="https://www.theslowhunch.net/2018/a-visual-guide-to-the-howey-test/">removing </a>“efforts from a 3rd party” from the equation.</li></ol><p>Inspiration for this article was drawn from the number of projects in the space pushing the boundaries, as well as the concepts of <a href="https://variant.fund/the-ownership-economy-crypto-and-consumer-software/">Ownership Economy</a> by Jesse Walden. At the end of this document, an example is given demonstrating how to apply this process to your project.</p><blockquote>Proudly written in collaboration with <strong>MetaCartel Ventures</strong>, which is seeking to fund projects following this model , as well as <strong>DAOstack</strong>, a governance project building a product specifically targeting this market. Reach out for governance support! Thanks also to <a href="https://medium.com/@lex_node">Gabriel Shapiro</a> for his input.</blockquote><h3>Step 1: Initial Stakeholders</h3><p>Most projects will already have a defined group of stakeholders. Usually this includes the founding team, investors, and it may also include token-holders if a token already exists. In the case of a legal entity, you would want to offer investors rights to future governance tokens (via a <a href="https://medium.com/ideo-colab/meet-the-safg-defis-emergent-framework-for-participatory-investing-and-protocol-development-62286a576fb5">SAFG</a>).</p><p>In all situations, stakeholders get governance tokens.</p><h3>Step 2: Incentives &amp; Ideal Stakeholders</h3><p>Projects looking to decentralize need to think about who they want to govern their future protocol, in addition to initial stakeholders. Careful consideration should be given to ensure the right incentives are in place, as you could end up in a situation where your protocol gets hijacked if you don’t get this right.</p><p>For many projects, the ideal stakeholders will be acquired via some form of “activity mining”, while other projects may choose strategies such as:</p><ul><li>Airdropping governance to a certain group of people</li><li>Giving governance away to an existing decentralized network, like an existing DAO</li><li>Selling memberships (This has the advantage of also raising funds while also becoming decentralized)</li></ul><p>Some projects may also choose to direct a certain amount of governance tokens to the project’s future DAO treasury. This has the benefit of allowing the community to have working capital as the community forms, particularly important in cases where the project does not yet have cash flow.</p><p>Step 2 is really about defining who you want to distribute governance tokens to, and what activities (if any) you want to incentivize on your protocol. You might choose not to define all incentives from the onset, and they may change over time.</p><p>The rest of this document is primarily focused on “activity mining” as a form of governance distribution as it seems most effective. Slight variations would be required for the other distribution models.</p><h3>Step 3: Defining your Timeline</h3><p>In general, the concepts of Ownership Economy can apply to every project. Giving users more ownership via some form of ‘activity mining’ will most definitely increase engagement.</p><p>The real question is: “how long should we keep these incentives in place?”. The answer depends on many factors, such as the project vision, investor / team timeline, defensibility, among other things.</p><p>It’s my belief that the projects that will last longest will choose to go with a continuous incentive model (i.e. no token cap), as this allows projects to continuously adapt and provide incentives to new users of the platform. It’s quite ironic that many in the Ethereum community make fun of BTC’s supply cap, while simultaneously creating protocols with token supply caps.</p><p>A shorter incentive period may be fine for projects with a shorter timeline, or a strong moat (such as YFI).</p><p>Step 3 is about understanding your timeline and your defensibility which help define the emissions schedule of tokens.</p><h3>Step 4: Modelling the Token Economy</h3><p>Questions that need to be answered before you start issuing ownership include:</p><ul><li>How much ownership should the founding stakeholders have after X months?</li><li>Is there some sort of token burn model to decrease supply?</li><li>Should initial stakeholder tokens vest alongside the activity mining activities, or should they have another vesting schedule?</li><li>Are a portion of tokens going to be directed to a DAO and is there a vesting schedule on these tokens as well?</li></ul><p>Once you are done with Steps 1–4, you’re almost there! You have your initial and future set of stakeholders along with their emission schedule, now you just need to execute.</p><h3>Step 5: Issuing tokens</h3><p>At this stage, you can start giving away tokens according to your incentives and your schedule. Note that tokens do nothing at this stage.</p><h3>Step 6: Launching a DAO (optional)</h3><p>If part of the distribution of tokens goes to a DAO, you will need to launch your DAO along with Step 5, above. If a DAO is not part of the token distribution schedule, the team can launch a DAO at any time. In either case, voting power is given to tokenholders either directly or indirectly.</p><p>Note that launching a DAO may require more community building effort, and support, but on the other hand, it can empower your community, and increase engagement.</p><p>At this stage, the DAO will only be signalling, since it isn’t yet the owner of your protocol.</p><h3>Step 7: Reaching “Sufficient Decentralization”</h3><p>The next milestone before handing off control of your protocol is becoming sufficiently decentralized.</p><p>This is the fuzziest area, and the one with the least guidance for projects. If you don’t sufficiently decentralize, you might end up in jail, so it is likely best to kick this can down the road. See <a href="https://medium.com/@lex_node/defining-decentralization-for-law-58ca54e18b2a">this article</a> by Gabriel Shapiro for a bit more information so you can stay safe. Below is an attempt to define decentralization in the context of DAOs, based on this article:</p><ul><li>The lower the amount of tokens held by affiliated groups, the better. In Gabriel’s article, he uses a 20% threshold.</li><li>If users of the platform can fork somewhat easily, there is a stronger case that the network is decentralized.</li><li>Ownership by the initial team is also an important factor, the amount held may be at that 20% upper limit, but for more conservative groups, 10% is even better.</li></ul><p>Voter turnout and community participation is another variable to consider. Low participation may hinder your ability to claim decentralization, so tread carefully!</p><h3>Step 8: Gifting the Protocol to the DAO</h3><p>Once you have achieved sufficient decentralization with a network aligned with your project, you can decentralize ownership of your protocol. If you haven’t yet launched the DAO in Step 6, now would be the time to do it.</p><p>Ownership of your protocol can then be transferred over to the DAO, and you are good to go! Your project can now reap the benefits of being a decentralized network. From now on, your team will need to ask for funding from the DAO to keep operating, good luck :)</p><h3>EXAMPLE: From Startup to Decentralized</h3><p>Below is an example of what the process might look like for a project:</p><ul><li>Alice has a great idea for a startup, a P2P photo-sharing app, and she would like it to eventually owned by the stakeholders and users of the platform</li><li>She would like the platform to have a lasting impact, and decides to have no token supply cap.</li><li>She targets year 5 as the year all initial stakeholder tokens will vest. At that point, 40% of the network will be controlled by initial stakeholders, 30% will be controlled by users of the platform, and 30% of the network will be owned by an ecosystem DAO.</li><li>She wants users who share photos or buy photos to receive tokens for doing so</li><li>The initial stakeholders will include her founding team and investors. She decides there will be an initial allocation of 1M tokens to these initial stakeholders, and 20% of these tokens will be for investors.</li><li>Alice wants the project to raise a bit of funds, then decentralize as soon as possible. She hopes that once the project is decentralized, the network will raise additional funds, and hopefully the network will continue to pay her team to develop the project.</li></ul><p>Alice forms a company, and raises $1M from investors as a SAFG (which is a promise for 200,000 governance tokens once live). Once these funds are raised, the team executes and is able to build their platform.</p><p>1 year later, they are ready to start decentralizing the platform and giving away governance to its users.</p><ul><li>The team implements the incentives via smart contracts (users who share photos or buy photos receive governance tokens)</li><li>The team also creates a vesting program for the initial investors such that their tokens vest over a 5 year period. At the end of the five years, the initial investors and team members will have 40% of all tokens, with the other 60% going to the protocol DAO and users of the platform. This means that at year 5:</li><li>160,000 tokens will be owned by investors (20% of 40%)</li><li>640,000 tokens will be owned by the initial team members (80% of 40%)</li><li>600,000 tokens will be owned by the DAO (30%)</li><li>600,000 tokens will be owned by users of the platform (30%)</li><li>This is approximately 1100 tokens per day minted: with 666 tokens going to users and the DAO.</li><li>After this initial vesting period, tokens for users and the DAO keep being minted at the same rate of 666 tokens per day, and can be changed by the DAO at any point.</li></ul><p>After 6 months of activity mining, the project reaches sufficient decentralization, and the protocol is given to the DAO. 6 months later, Alice and company start asking the DAO for funds to continue building the product. Soon after, a handful of other companies start working for the DAO and contributing to the project.</p><p>Congratulations Alice, you created a decentralized network.</p><p>Join our journey at <a href="https://twitter.com/VENTURE_DAO">https://twitter.com/VENTURE_DAO</a></p><p>Follow me personally at <a href="https://twitter.com/eric_rsno">https://twitter.com/eric_rsno</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1822806e2d54" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/venture-dao/8-steps-to-decentralization-1822806e2d54">8 Steps to Decentralization</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/venture-dao">MetaCartel Ventures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Building 1UP]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/1up-world/building-1up-2fb15055a828?source=rss-944b87f3e7ef------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2fb15055a828</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Arsenault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2020 22:27:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-02T22:27:21.286Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/728/0*nDkVwOd3NC0KfG9-.jpg" /></figure><p>1UP officially launched last week, with much excitement. Various communities added our telegram bot (@oneupworld_bot) to their chat, and started playing with it (see overview article here).</p><p>In the first week of use, there were a number of requests that came up:</p><ul><li>Can we add this bot to our Discord channel?</li><li>Can we use 1UP for our own DAO?</li><li>How can we reduce the amount of spam from 1UP in our chat?</li><li>What can we do with 1UP tokens?</li><li>+ many many more great ideas</li></ul><p>This article aims to outline what our plans are with 1UP, and how you can help make this happen :)</p><p><strong>Effort 1: Expanding 1UP Functionality</strong></p><p>Our priorities are to turn 1UP into a valuable tool for the entire Ethereum DAO ecosystem. Work on the next version of 1UP has already gotten started, and our priorities are as follows:</p><ol><li>Make the existing 1UP experience smoother, less spammy for communities</li><li>Allow any DAO to launch their own version of 1UP, for DAOstack, Aragon and Moloch DAOs, moving towards a white label solution</li><li>Expand 1UP to Discord, and other web2 communication tools</li></ol><p><strong>Effort 2: Building Rewards into 1UP</strong></p><p>Why should people care about receiving 1UPs? That’s an important question, and without a good answer… well, people simply won’t care.</p><p>Once we allow for any community to run their own version of 1UP, it will be up to each community to decide what rewards look like. Our intention is to make it very easy to create rewards, and to display those rewards within the 1UP interface, for each commuity. Without closing this rewards loop, 1UPs are pretty meaningless, other than potentially bragging rights from sitting on top of the leaderboard.</p><p>More on this coming soon!</p><p><strong>Effort 3: Building the “1UP Game”</strong></p><p>The intention with 1UP was always to create a really simple game. The creation of this game has already started, an article outlining this will be released soon. If you are a designer or developer interested in contributing, please contact me or join our Telegram channel.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*yl5MWLpeIQkPmdhQ.gif" /><figcaption>A 1UP game item created by the community member <strong>Kinchasa.eth</strong></figcaption></figure><p>Stay tuned!</p><p>-Eric</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2fb15055a828" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/1up-world/building-1up-2fb15055a828">Building 1UP</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/1up-world">1UP WORLD</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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