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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Eric Jackson on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[When Intelligence Is Abundant, Governance Is Scarce]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ericjackson/when-intelligence-is-abundant-governance-is-scarce-a44e8f5f46ee?source=rss-786dd3eb3058------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-markets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stable-coin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2026 12:48:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-25T12:48:10.585Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Eric Jackson | February 26, 2026</p><p><strong>I.</strong></p><p>On Monday, a 7,000-word hypothetical crashed the Dow 800 points.</p><p>Citrini Research published a “Macro Memo from June 2028” — a thought exercise framed as a post-mortem written two years in the future — describing a world where AI collapses the premium on human intelligence. <em>ServiceNow reports 15% workforce reductions and 18% stock declines in a single quarter. Zendesk defaults on a $5 billion private credit facility. Apollo’s stock drops 22% in two sessions after Moody’s puts Athene on negative outlook. The S&amp;P falls 38% from its highs. Unemployment hits 10.2%.</em></p><p>It was fiction. Yet the market Monday traded it as fact.</p><p>IBM dropped 13% on the day. Its worst day since 2000. DataDog, CrowdStrike, Zscaler — each down 9% or more. American Express, KKR, Blackstone — all name-checked, all punished. DoorDash fell 6.6% after Citrini called it the “poster child” for companies whose moats are made of human laziness.</p><p>The market panicked because the market knows the report is directionally right.</p><p>For the entirety of modern economic history, human intelligence has been the scarce input. Every business model you can name — software, consulting, financial services, legal, medical, creative — prices its product based on the assumption that smart humans are expensive and hard to find. Their core sentence captures it perfectly: “Human intelligence derived its inherent premium from its scarcity.” They are correct. AI makes that input abundant. The premium unwinds.</p><p>When intelligence becomes abundant, every business model priced on intelligence scarcity gets repriced. That’s not speculation. That’s arithmetic. And the Dow’s 800-point drop is the market beginning to do that arithmetic.</p><p>But the report made a mistake that could cost its readers money.</p><p>They followed the disruption chain down — to unemployment, contagion, and collapse. They didn’t follow it forward — to what replaces the system they just dismantled.</p><p>Every technological revolution destroys the incumbents. Every technological revolution also creates the replacement layer. The report only wrote the first half.</p><p>This is the second half.</p><p>I’ve spent the last five years building my hedge fund and governance and regime detection systems for digital assets and equities. What follows is not a prediction. It’s an architecture.</p><p>— -</p><p><strong>II. The Structural Thesis Was Already in Motion</strong></p><p>Two days after Citrini crashed the markets, I published a tweet that over 170,000 people read. The thesis:</p><p><em>&gt; BTC didn’t fail as an asset. It succeeded as an ETF. And that’s the problem.</em></p><p><em>&gt; From $126K to $60K. Every time IGV sells off, BTC sells off with it. That’s not a store of value. That’s a high-beta tech position with a different logo.</em></p><p><em>&gt; IBIT changed who owns Bitcoin. In 2021, the marginal buyer was ideological. No allocation limits. No risk budget. No rebalancing. In 2026, the marginal buyer is institutional. Same desks that own IGV. Same desks that de-risk on the same day.</em></p><p>I wrote about the structural shift in who holds BTC and what that means for its price behavior. I wrote about how the institutional holders — the same hedge funds and allocators the report describes — are the ones dragging BTC down with their tech portfolios.</p><p>What that tweet didn’t have room for is what happens after those holders leave.</p><p>The report describes the mechanism that pushes them out. This piece describes what replaces them.</p><p>— -</p><p><strong>III. What the Report Actually Built</strong></p><p>Let me be precise about what that memo contains, because most of the commentary I’ve seen gets it wrong. They didn’t just say “AI is bearish.” They built a specific architecture of contagion. It’s worth understanding because parts of it are very good — and the parts that are wrong are wrong in a way that matters.</p><p><em>### Ghost GDP</em></p><p>The report’s most original concept. In their 2028 scenario, nominal GDP keeps printing mid-to-high single digit growth. Productivity soars. Real output per hour rises at rates not seen since the 1950s. Stocks rally. And none of it reaches the consumer economy.</p><p>Their line: “A single GPU cluster in North Dakota generating the output previously attributed to 10,000 white-collar workers in midtown Manhattan is more economic pandemic than economic panacea.”</p><p>The mechanism: AI produces output that shows up in national accounts but never circulates. The velocity of money flatlines because machines don’t spend discretionary income. GDP goes up. Consumer spending goes down. The divergence between “the economy” and “the economy people live in” becomes a chasm.</p><p>This is a real risk. I’ll come back to why it’s also an opportunity.</p><p><em>### The Intelligence Displacement Spiral</em></p><p>The report’s feedback loop: <em>AI capabilities improve → companies need fewer workers → layoffs increase → displaced workers spend less → margin pressure pushes firms to invest more in AI → AI capabilities improve.</em> “A negative feedback loop with no natural brake.”</p><p>They contrast this to every prior technological revolution by making an argument that deserves respect: “Every new job required a human to perform it.” The ATM created more bank branches. The spreadsheet created more financial analysts. But AI is different because it’s “a general intelligence that improves at the very tasks humans would redeploy to.”</p><p>This is the report’s strongest point. A displaced coder can’t simply become an “AI manager” because AI is already capable of management. The replacement jobs themselves get replaced.</p><p><em>### The Reflexivity Trap</em></p><p>This is where the report gets genuinely brilliant. Their ServiceNow example is the most elegant illustration of the mechanism:</p><p>ServiceNow sold per-seat licenses. When Fortune 500 clients cut 15% of their workforce using AI, they cancelled 15% of their ServiceNow seats. The AI-driven headcount reductions that were boosting margins at ServiceNow’s customers were mechanically destroying ServiceNow’s own revenue base.</p><p>Worse: ServiceNow’s response was to cut its own headcount and fund more AI development — accelerating the very technology disrupting it. “Each company’s individual response was rational. The collective result was catastrophic.”</p><p>This is not hypothetical. It’s the structure. Per-seat SaaS pricing is a bet that the number of humans doing knowledge work stays constant or grows. AI is a technology that exists to reduce the number of humans doing knowledge work. The bet and the technology are structurally opposed. Every dollar a company saves on headcount by deploying AI is a dollar that disappears from the revenue of every SaaS company that charged by the seat.</p><p><em>### The Zendesk Default</em></p><p>The most specific scenario in the report. Hellman &amp; Friedman took Zendesk private in 2022 for $10.2 billion. The $5 billion debt package was the largest ARR-backed facility in history, led by Blackstone with Apollo, Blue Owl, and HPS in the lending group. The loan was structured around the assumption that annual recurring revenue would remain recurring.</p><p>By mid-2027 in the scenario, AI agents handle customer service without generating a ticket. The category Zendesk defined — ticketing, routing, managing human support interactions — is replaced by systems that resolve issues without any human intermediary. The recurring revenue stops recurring. The largest ARR-backed loan in history becomes the largest private credit software default in history.</p><p>And then every credit desk asks the same question: “Who else has a secular headwind disguised as a cyclical one?”</p><p><em>### The Insurance Daisy Chain</em></p><p>This is the report’s most overlooked argument. Over the past decade, alternative asset managers acquired life insurance companies and turned them into funding vehicles. Apollo bought Athene. KKR took Global Atlantic. Brookfield bought American Equity. The managers invested annuity deposits into the private credit they originated — earning spread on the insurance side and management fees on the asset management side. A fee-on-fee perpetual motion machine.</p><p>The problem: the private credit has to be money good. When it isn’t, the losses hit balance sheets built to hold illiquid assets against the savings of American households — structured as annuities. The “permanent capital” that was supposed to make the system resilient isn’t some abstract pool of patient institutional money. It’s Main Street’s retirement savings.</p><p>The report adds a layer of opacity: the US insurer writes the annuity, then cedes the risk to an affiliated Bermuda or Cayman reinsurer it also owns. “The spider web of different firms linked to different balance sheets was stunning in its opacity.”</p><p><em>### The Mortgage Market</em></p><p>The heaviest punch in the report. The $13 trillion US mortgage market is underwritten on the assumption that borrowers will remain employed at roughly their current income level. Every prior mortgage crisis was driven by speculative excess (2008), rate shocks, or localized economic shocks.</p><p>Their scenario is different: “The borrowers in question are not subprime. They’re 780 FICO scores. They put 20% down. They have clean credit histories, stable employment records. In 2008, the loans were bad on day one. In 2028, the loans were good on day one. The world just… changed after the loans were written.”</p><p>White-collar workers whose earnings are structurally impaired stop spending. HELOC draws spike. 401(k) withdrawals spike. Credit card debt spikes. Mortgage payments stay current — until they don’t. Delinquencies emerge first in San Francisco, Seattle, Manhattan, and Austin.</p><p>If that scenario materializes, the report sees the S&amp;P at 3500. A GFC-scale drawdown.</p><p>— -</p><p><strong>IV. Where the Report Is Right</strong></p><p>I want to be clear about this because it matters.</p><p>The report is right that per-seat SaaS pricing is structurally impaired. Right that AI agents will route around credit card interchange. Right that private credit portfolios underwritten on human-intelligence-premium assumptions are exposed. Right that the reflexivity trap — where each company’s rational response to AI acceleration collectively destroys the ecosystem — is real and underappreciated. Right that Ghost GDP is possible: output that never reaches consumers.</p><p>They are right that this is not like prior technological revolutions where displaced workers simply moved to new sectors. AI improves at the replacement tasks. That’s different.</p><p>And they are right that the market hasn’t priced any of this.</p><p>But here’s what the data says right now — not in a 2028 scenario, but today.</p><p>Citadel Securities had research this week showing Indeed software engineering job postings are recovering. New business applications in the US are running at 500,000+ per month — near all-time highs. The labor market is resilient. GenAI adoption is the fastest technology adoption curve ever recorded — roughly 40% penetration in 2–3 years — but daily workplace usage is flat at 10–12%. People are experimenting. They haven’t been replaced.</p><p>The report’s unemployment spiral assumes a speed of displacement that the current data don’t support. AI is real. The disruption is real. But the timeline is measured in years, not quarters. And in those years, the replacement infrastructure gets built.</p><p>As of Tuesday’s close, IGV had only recovered half of Monday’s losses. The market isn’t shrugging this off. It’s digesting it. And that’s the right response — the structural repricing Citrini describes is real, but it plays out in years, not in a Monday selloff.</p><p>What the report gets wrong is the conclusion. They describe the destruction and sit down. They tell you what dies. They don’t tell you what replaces it.</p><p>— -</p><p><strong>V. Even the AI Infrastructure Is Fragile</strong></p><p>Before I tell you what replaces it, let me tell you something the report missed entirely: even the companies building the AI infrastructure are fragile.</p><p>The scenario assumes NVIDIA and the hyperscalers keep posting record revenues while the rest of the economy deteriorates. They explicitly note that infrastructure winners remain strong even as GDP contracts. This is too optimistic.</p><p>I’ve spent 5 years building crypto and governance models, and the last year building a system that analyzes management behavior across earnings calls — 31 calibrated company arcs, 445 transcripts, 20 scoring patterns applied in sequence. What that system tells me about the AI infrastructure buildout is: **the demand is real, but the financing structures are fragile, and even a modest slowdown in AI spending would cascade through a leveraged supply chain.**</p><p><em>### CoreWeave: $14 Billion of Debt on a Single Variable</em></p><p>CoreWeave is the largest independent AI cloud company. $55.6 billion in contracted backlog. $14 billion in debt. $311 million per quarter in interest expense.</p><p>The problem: three reinforcing loops — customer contracts drive debt financing which funds GPU purchases which generate revenue which drives more contracts — all depend on a single variable. AI compute demand persists and grows. If that single variable slows, even modestly, the leverage amplifies in reverse.</p><p>My system flagged CoreWeave’s CEO dismissing NVIDIA’s circular financing concerns as a “fly on the butt of the elephant” — a vivid metaphorical dismissal. In our library of 31 company arcs, vivid metaphorical dismissals of structural concerns have predicted 3–6 month confirmation of the dismissed concern with high reliability. Blue Owl’s management called liquidity concerns a “Mandela effect” 14 days before their redemption gate. CoreWeave’s rhetoric rhymes.</p><p>CoreWeave’s backlog-to-revenue ratio is 11x. For comparison, Oracle’s RPO-to-revenue ratio is 8.2x, and we flagged that as elevated. Microsoft’s is 2.5x. Amazon’s is 1.5x. CoreWeave’s is the highest in our library — and it sits on leased infrastructure (2.9GW leased from third parties), not owned infrastructure. When a single third-party provider failed in Q3 2025, CoreWeave cut CapEx guidance by 40%.</p><p>This is not a prediction that CoreWeave fails. It’s an observation that the AI infrastructure buildout is leveraged, interconnected, and dependent on demand growth continuing at extraordinary rates. If it slows — and the report’s own thesis about white-collar spending contraction would slow enterprise AI budgets — the infrastructure layer cracks too.</p><p><em>### NVIDIA: The Cycle Everyone Forgot</em></p><p>NVIDIA has corrected three times in the current era: -56% in 2018 (crypto crash), -69% in 2022 (gaming/macro), -38% in 2025 (DeepSeek). Each time the thesis was intact. Each time the stock recovered. But each correction happened when the market briefly questioned demand growth.</p><p>What my system shows is that NVIDIA is the first company in our library to simultaneously trigger bubble AND anti-bubble indicators at maximum intensity. The commercial structure is real — $57 billion per quarter in revenue, genuine supply constraints, demonstrated 10x ROI for customers. But the rhetoric is at peak euphoria levels: permanently elevated inevitability language, zero internal constraint language across three consecutive quarters, and full CFO alignment — which in every prior cycle has been the strongest timing signal for corrections.</p><p>NVIDIA will probably be fine in five years. But if the thesis is right about enterprise spending contraction, NVIDIA’s gross margins (currently 73.6%, already compressing from 78.9%) would compress further. And the AI infrastructure chain — CoreWeave, the neoclouds, the data center developers — would face a margin squeeze with leverage ratios that don’t tolerate slow quarters.</p><p>The point is not that AI is fake. The point is that the companies building AI infrastructure have priced in perpetual acceleration. Even a deceleration — from extraordinary growth to merely strong growth — would create a correction that cascades through leveraged balance sheets.</p><p>— -</p><p><em>## VI. The Railroad Lesson</em></p><p>The report has been compared to dot-com warnings. This is wrong. The dot-com comparison is a canard, and the authors themselves would reject it — their scenario is explicitly about real demand being destructive, not fictional demand being exposed.</p><p>The correct historical analogy is the 1860s railroad buildout.</p><p>The railroads transformed American commerce. The demand was real. The infrastructure was physical. The debt was enormous — railroad bonds were the largest asset class in America by the 1870s. The companies that built the transcontinental railroad opened markets that had never existed.</p><p>And most of them went bankrupt.</p><p>The Jay Cooke crisis of 1873 was triggered by overbuilding of railroads financed with debt structured on the assumption that traffic growth would continue at extraordinary rates. The traffic did grow — but not fast enough to service the debt that had been issued against optimistic projections. The panic of 1873 led to a six-year depression. 89 of the country’s 364 railroads went bankrupt. 18,000 businesses failed.</p><p>The survivors — Union Pacific, Southern Pacific, the companies that had real routes and manageable debt — became generational companies. The infrastructure they built served American commerce for a century.</p><p>The AI buildout is a railroad story, not a dot-com story. The demand is real. The infrastructure is physical — data centers, power plants, fiber optic cables. The debt is enormous. And the companies building it have priced in traffic growth that must continue at extraordinary rates to service the debt.</p><p>Some of them will become generational companies. Some of them will be Jay Cooke.</p><p>The question the report doesn’t ask — and should have — is: when the railroad overbuild corrects, what happens to the freight? The freight doesn’t disappear. The railroads go bankrupt and the freight keeps moving on rails that someone else acquires at 30 cents on the dollar. Just like the web bits and bytes kept flowing on Global Crossing fiber.</p><p>AI doesn’t stop because CoreWeave’s bonds trade at 58 cents. AI agents don’t stop transacting because some SaaS companies default on their private credit facilities. The intelligence displacement spiral is real — but its logical endpoint isn’t economic collapse. Its logical endpoint is a new infrastructure layer built for the agents, not the humans.</p><p>The report followed the chain down. Let me follow it forward.</p><p>— -</p><p><strong>VII. What AI Agents Actually Use</strong></p><p>Let me be specific. The report named names. So will I.</p><p><em>### Credit Cards Are Dead. Stablecoin Rails Replace Them.</em></p><p>The report crashed Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and Discover. The argument is precise: AI agents controlling transactions route around 2–3% interchange because the cost is irrational in machine-to-machine commerce. In their scenario, “most settled on using stablecoins via Solana or Ethereum L2s, where settlement was near-instant and the transaction cost was measured in fractions of a penny.”</p><p>The report is right about the mechanism. But it stops at the destruction of interchange revenue without asking what the replacement looks like at scale.</p><p>AI agents don’t just recommend against credit cards. They settle transactions themselves. And when an AI agent processes a payment on your behalf, it has exactly zero reason to route through a network that charges 2.5% interchange plus 30% APR on carried balances.</p><p>Stablecoin settlement costs fractions of a cent. It’s instant. It’s programmable. It works 24/7. It doesn’t require a bank, a payment processor, or a card network.</p><p>Right now today, Better Home &amp; Finance is deploying a $500 million DeFi warehouse facility through the Sky stablecoin ecosystem. Conforming mortgages originated through AI underwriting, funded by stablecoins, at 100 basis points cheaper than traditional warehouse lines. This isn’t hypothetical. This is live.</p><p>An AI agent is the purest rational economic actor ever created. It has no brand loyalty. It has no relationship inertia. When it processes a mortgage application, it routes to the lowest cost. Every time. A 100 basis point structural cost advantage isn’t a feature. It’s a moat — and it widens with every AI agent that enters the market.</p><p>The report worries about the $13 trillion mortgage market cracking because white-collar borrowers lose income. I worry about the same thing. But I also see what replaces the 1970s-era financing infrastructure: stablecoin warehouse facilities that underwrite using on-chain data rather than three-year-old tax returns.</p><p><em>**Prediction:** Visa and Mastercard lose 15–25% of digital transaction volume to stablecoin and AI-agent-routed settlement rails by 2028. The interchange business model — charging merchants 2.5% for the privilege of accepting payment — cannot survive when the alternative costs 0.01%.</em></p><p><em>### SaaS Is Dying. Infrastructure Survives.</em></p><p>The ServiceNow example is perfect. A Fortune 500 procurement manager told them his vendor expected a 5% annual price increase. The procurement manager told the vendor he’d been in conversations with OpenAI about having AI tools replace the vendor entirely. They renewed at a 30% discount. That was a good outcome. The long-tail SaaS companies — Monday.com, Zapier, Asana — had it worse.</p><p>I agree with all of this. Per-seat pricing is structurally impaired because the “seat” is being eliminated by the same technology the vendor sells. The reflexivity trap is real and underappreciated.</p><p>But here’s what the report missed: the infrastructure layer underneath SaaS doesn’t die. AWS, Azure, Cloudflare — the companies that provide compute, storage, and network infrastructure — see MORE demand, not less, because AI agents consume infrastructure at scale. The report even notes this in passing — NVIDIA and TSM “still posting record revenues” in their 2028 scenario. But they don’t follow the implication.</p><p>The losers are the companies that charge humans for access to dashboards. The winners are the companies that sell compute cycles to AI agents. And the biggest winner of all is the settlement infrastructure those agents use to transact.</p><p><em>**Prediction:** At least 3 of the top 10 SaaS companies by market cap will report negative year-over-year revenue growth within 18 months. Per-seat pricing is structurally impaired. The survivors will be the ones that pivot to consumption-based infrastructure pricing before their customers’ AI agents make the dashboards irrelevant.</em></p><p><em>### Private Credit Implodes. On-Chain Lending Replaces It.</em></p><p>The Zendesk scenario is specific enough to model: $10.2 billion LBO, $5 billion in direct lending structured around recurring revenue that stopped recurring. Every credit desk asking “who else has a secular headwind disguised as a cyclical one?”</p><p>What the report describes is the private credit version of the railroad overbuild. The loans were underwritten on the assumption that software margins would persist. AI compresses those margins. The loans go bad. And then the insurance daisy chain — Apollo/Athene, KKR/Global Atlantic, Brookfield/American Equity — transmits the losses to Main Street retirement savings structured as annuities.</p><p>My system has been tracking this. Blue Owl — one of the lenders in the Zendesk scenario — is in our library as a Type 12→4a arc (Architectural Compounder collapsing to Decline &amp; Recovery). We scored Blue Owl’s credit stress at 58.5/100 on our Credit Stress Index. Our system flagged Blue Owl’s management dismissing liquidity concerns as a “Mandela effect” — and the redemption gate followed 14 days later. The pattern the report projects into 2028 is already happening in 2026.</p><p><em>**Prediction:** Private credit defaults spike in 2027 as AI-disrupted companies fail to service debt underwritten on human-intelligence-premium assumptions. The firms most exposed are those with concentrated lending to technology services, software, and financial advisory companies.</em></p><p>But here’s the forward chain the report doesn’t write: on-chain lending replaces private credit for the same reason stablecoins replace credit cards. AI agents can assess creditworthiness through on-chain data — transaction history, collateral positions, smart contract obligations — faster and cheaper than any credit committee. DeFi lending protocols already do this at scale with algorithmic risk management.</p><p>The private credit industry isn’t dying because lending dies. It’s dying because the underwriting, due diligence, and monitoring — all human-intelligence-dependent activities — get automated. And automated lending doesn’t need a 100-person credit team. It needs a smart contract and collateral.</p><p><em>### Financial Advisory Gets Governed, Not Eliminated</em></p><p>Here’s where I diverge most sharply.</p><p>The report implies AI replaces financial advisors. I think AI replaces financial ADVICE but creates massive demand for financial GOVERNANCE.</p><p>The difference matters.</p><p>A financial advisor today does two things: (1) tells you what to do with your money, and (2) provides emotional discipline when markets get scary. AI agents can do #1 better, faster, and cheaper. They will never do #2, because #2 requires trust, judgment, and accountability that cannot be delegated to software.</p><p>The report notes that “we had overestimated the value of ‘human relationships.’ Turns out that a lot of what people called relationships was simply friction with a friendly face.” This is half right. The transactional relationships — insurance renewals, real estate brokers, travel booking — were friction. Those die. But the governance relationships — the fiduciary duty to stop you from panic-selling at the bottom — those don’t die. They become more valuable as AI makes everything else cheaper.</p><p>What emerges is a new category: governed autonomy. AI agents manage the portfolio. Human frameworks set the rules, the constraints, the risk limits, and the fail-safes. The human doesn’t pick stocks. The human picks the constraint architecture — and the system enforces it.</p><p>Let me define what I mean by governance, because I don’t mean compliance and I don’t mean regulation. I mean an explicit set of rules — written in advance, auditable after the fact — that determines when a system acts, when it stops, and when it does nothing. It’s the difference between a self-driving car that accelerates when it’s confused and one that pulls over. Fail-closed, not fail-open.</p><p><em>**Prediction:** At least one Fortune 500 company replaces its entire financial advisory relationship with an AI-native constraint system by 2027. Not a robo-advisor — those are just automated versions of the same advice. A platform with explicit rules, real-time sensor inputs, and fail-closed architecture that does nothing when the data quality is low.</em></p><p>— -</p><p><strong>VIII. The BTC and ETH Thesis the Report Accidentally Proved</strong></p><p>Now follow the full chain.</p><p><em>If AI agents bypass credit cards → they need programmable money.<br>If AI agents bypass financial advisors → they need programmable collateral.<br>If AI agents bypass SWIFT → they need a settlement layer.<br>If AI agents bypass private credit → they need on-chain lending.</em></p><p>Every link in this chain points to the same two assets.</p><p><em>### Bitcoin: Pristine Collateral for the Age of Autonomous Commerce</em></p><p>BTC is not digital gold. That analogy undersells what it is.</p><p>Gold is a store of value for human institutions. Central banks hold it. Sovereign wealth funds hold it. It works because humans trust 5,000 years of history.</p><p>BTC is pristine collateral for autonomous systems. AI agents hold it. Smart contracts hold it. Corporate treasuries hold it. It works because code verifies it in milliseconds, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, with no custodian, no settlement delay, and no counterparty risk.</p><p>When AI agents need collateral to back a stablecoin loan, they don’t call a gold dealer. They post BTC to a smart contract. When a corporate treasury needs programmable reserves that can be deployed algorithmically, they don’t buy gold bars. They hold BTC.</p><p>Fixed supply. 21 million coins. No inflation. No dilution. The scarcest programmable asset ever created.</p><p>Gold’s market cap is $30 trillion. Gold’s holder base is sovereign-heavy — central banks, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds. That holder base measures in decades, not quarters.</p><p>BTC’s holder base is upgrading. Right now. This is what my tweet was about, and what the report accelerates.</p><p>The institutional desks that the report says are getting disrupted — the same desks that own IGV and BTC and sell both when they de-risk — are the current marginal sellers of Bitcoin. They are the reason BTC correlates with tech stocks. They are the reason BTC dropped 52% in 5 months.</p><p>The Intelligence Displacement Spiral doesn’t just disrupt the white-collar workforce. It disrupts the institutional desks that employ them. The hedge fund analysts, the asset allocators, the portfolio managers — the scenario implies their jobs get displaced too. When those desks shrink, their forced selling of BTC ends. What replaces them is exactly the holder base BTC needs:</p><p><em>- AI agents that use BTC as programmable collateral<br>- Corporate treasuries that hold BTC as algorithmic reserves<br>- Sovereign wealth funds that accumulate BTC as a non-correlated store of value<br>- Pension capital that measures in decades, not quarters</em></p><p>Every prior cycle, the ceiling was set by who was buying. Retail gave you $20K. Funds gave you $69K. Institutions gave you $126K.</p><p>The next holder base doesn’t have ceilings. It has mandates.</p><p><em>**My target: BTC at $50 million by 2041.** Not because of halving math. Because the last class of sellers — the institutional desks the report just described disrupting — gets replaced by the first class of permanent holders. And permanent holders of a fixed-supply asset with AI-agent collateral demand create a price dynamic that has no historical precedent.</em></p><p><em>### Ethereum: The Transaction Layer for Autonomous Commerce</em></p><p>If BTC is the collateral, ETH is the plumbing.</p><p>Every AI agent transaction — every stablecoin settlement, every smart contract execution, every DeFi loan, every on-chain credit assessment — needs a transaction layer. The report describes AI agents settling on “Solana or Ethereum L2s, where settlement was near-instant and the transaction cost was measured in fractions of a penny.” They’re describing the replacement infrastructure without recognizing it as the investment thesis.</p><p>That layer needs to be:</p><p><em>- Programmable (smart contracts, not SWIFT messages)<br>- Composable (one transaction triggers another without human intervention)<br>- Cheap (gas fees measured in cents, not interchange percentages)<br>- Global (no borders, no banking hours, no correspondent bank chains)<br>- Deflationary (fee burns reduce supply, rewarding holders)</em></p><p>The scenario has the median American consuming 400,000 tokens per day by March 2027. Each of those token interactions generates economic activity. Some fraction of that activity settles on-chain. The transaction layer that processes it becomes the most important infrastructure in the new economy — more important than the card networks, more important than SWIFT, more important than the correspondent banking system.</p><p>Global payment volume exceeds $150 trillion per year. If ETH captures 10% of that as the settlement and smart contract layer for AI-agent commerce, and if ETH supply continues burning with each transaction, the math gets very large very fast.</p><p><em>**My target: ETH at $1.5 million by 2041.** Not because of speculation. Because the transaction layer for a $15-trillion-per-year autonomous commerce economy is a deflationary asset. Supply shrinks as demand grows. That’s not a trade. That’s arithmetic.</em></p><p>— -</p><p><strong>IX. The 52% Problem</strong></p><p>Here is the part nobody wants to talk about.</p><p>BTC went from $126,000 in October to $60,000 in February. A 52% drawdown in 5 months.</p><p>If you are a corporate treasury that believes BTC goes to $50 million, you still cannot hold an asset that drops 52% in 5 months. Your board won’t approve it. Your auditors won’t sign off. Your shareholders will revolt at the next earnings call.</p><p>If you are a sovereign wealth fund with a 30-year mandate, you can stomach it. But most institutional holders are not sovereign wealth funds. They are the same desks the report describes — the same desks that own IGV and rebalance quarterly and de-risk when their risk budget gets hit.</p><p>This is the paradox of the BTC thesis: the asset that is structurally going to $50 million is currently held by the wrong people. And the wrong people create the volatility that prevents the right people from buying.</p><p>The solution is not better prediction. The solution is governance.</p><p>A constraint layer that tells you when to hedge. That tells you when to reduce exposure. That tells you when to do nothing. That fails CLOSED — meaning when the data quality is low or the signals are ambiguous, the system does not act.</p><p>I’ve spent 5 years building crypto and risk infrastructure. My team has built a regime detection model that identifies when BTC is in a stress state — and when it’s not — with a 24.5 percentage point edge on 21-day forward returns. We validated it independently on Ethereum, where the edge is even larger: 27 percentage points. We’ve built a sensor array with 19 live inputs running hourly. We’ve built an earnings transcript analysis system with 31 calibrated company arcs — the same system that flagged Blue Owl’s credit stress months before the redemption gate.</p><p>All of it feeds a constraint kernel that doesn’t predict. It governs.</p><p>When the regime detector says STRESS, the system shifts from aggressive to defensive. When the sensors disagree, the system does nothing. When a trade proposal violates the constraint rules, the system blocks it — even if the model says it’s a great trade.</p><p>The result: a 37.5% CAGR in our work with a 30.7% max drawdown and a 0.949 Sharpe ratio. In the same period, BTC drew down 52%. MicroStrategy drew down 45–50%.</p><p>The difference isn’t the return. The difference is that our drawdown has a MECHANISM — an explicit, auditable, automated risk architecture that caps it. BTC’s drawdown has no mechanism. It’s just wherever the market happens to stop.</p><p>Corporate treasuries don’t need better predictions about BTC. They need a fail-closed system that lets them hold BTC through the volatility without blowing up their risk budget. That is the product the market doesn’t know it needs yet.</p><p>But it will. Because the future the report describes — the one where AI agents use BTC as collateral and ETH as the transaction layer — requires institutional holders who can actually hold these assets. And institutional holders require governance.</p><p>— -</p><p><strong>X. The Specific Map</strong></p><p>Let me give you what the report gave you: a list of specific conclusions you can act on.</p><p>**What dies (the report is right):**</p><p>1. Per-seat SaaS pricing. The ServiceNow reflexivity trap is real. 3 of the top 10 SaaS companies will have negative revenue growth within 18 months.</p><p>2. Credit card interchange. AI agents route through stablecoins. Visa and Mastercard lose 15–25% of digital volume by 2028.</p><p>3. Human-intelligence-premium consulting. McKinsey at $500/hour cannot compete with an AI agent at $0.05/query. The Big Four’s advisory revenue peaks in 2026.</p><p>4. Private credit to tech services companies. The Zendesk scenario plays out across dozens of LBOs. Defaults spike in 2027.</p><p>5. Traditional financial advisory. 1% AUM for portfolio construction that AI does better and cheaper. The fee compresses to 0.25% or less within 3 years.</p><p>6. Overleveraged AI infrastructure builders. The railroad overbuild corrects. CoreWeave-type balance sheets with 11x backlog-to-revenue ratios and single-variable dependency don’t survive a deceleration. Some neoclouds fail. The data centers get acquired at distressed prices and keep operating.</p><p>**What replaces it (the report didn’t write this part):**</p><p>7. Stablecoin settlement rails. USDC and USDT transaction volume doubles within 18 months as AI agents bypass legacy payment infrastructure.</p><p>8. BTC as programmable collateral. Corporate treasury adoption accelerates after the current institutional shakeout. BTC reclaims $100K within 12 months and $150K within 18 — not on retail, not on ETF rebalancing, but on longer-duration capital entering. Sovereign wealth funds, corporate treasuries, pension allocators. Money that doesn’t correlate to IGV.</p><p>9. ETH as the smart contract transaction layer. AI agent transaction volume on Ethereum and L2s grows 10x in 3 years. ETH becomes structurally deflationary as fee burns exceed issuance.</p><p>10. On-chain lending replaces private credit for AI-native borrowers. DeFi lending protocols capture market share from traditional credit providers because AI agents can assess and post collateral programmatically.</p><p>11. Constraint platforms emerge as the critical infrastructure layer. Not prediction engines. Not trading algorithms. Explicit, auditable rule systems that sit between AI agents and human decision-makers — telling the system when to act, when to stop, and when to do nothing.</p><p>12. IGV declines another 20% over time before stabilizing. The software business model is structurally impaired. What comes after is infrastructure and governance, not per-seat licenses.</p><p>13. India’s IT services sector ($200 billion annually) contracts 30% by 2028 — The report is right about this. But Indian developers who can build AI agent infrastructure, rather than doing the work AI replaces, migrate to the winning side.</p><p>14. Stablecoin-native mortgage platforms (and I expect Opendoor and Better to lead the way, competing with each other) take 10%+ origination market share by 2029 — not because they have better apps, but because AI agents route every borrower to the cheapest option, and stablecoin warehouse facilities are structurally 100bps cheaper. Traditional fintech (SoFi, Rocket) retains the human-facing market. The AI-agent-facing market goes to whoever has the lowest structural cost.</p><p>15. At least one Fortune 500 corporate treasury — not a crypto company, not another MicroStrategy — announces BTC holdings by end of 2027. The governance layer that dampens volatility is the missing piece that makes this possible. When it exists, the board approvals follow.</p><p>16. Stablecoin daily settlement volume exceeds Visa’s within 18 months. Visa processes roughly $42 billion per day. Stablecoins are already approaching that level. AI agents routing transactions through programmable money push it over. This is not a crypto prediction. It’s an infrastructure prediction.</p><p>17. A top-10 private credit default triggers an insurance company ratings downgrade by 2027. The Zendesk scenario isn’t fiction — it’s early. The daisy chain from private credit to insurance balance sheets to Main Street retirement savings is already wired. It just needs one catalyst.</p><p>18. The first AI agent autonomously executes a real financial transaction on-chain by end of 2026. Not a demo. Not a hackathon project. A real agent, moving real money, settling on a real blockchain. That is the moment this thesis stops being theoretical.</p><p>— -</p><p><strong>XI.</strong></p><p>The report ends with a warning: “The canary is still alive.”</p><p>Let me offer a different frame.</p><p>The canary IS still alive. But the mine it’s warning about is not the one they think.</p><p>The mine is not “AI destroys the economy.” The mine is “AI destroys the incumbent economy — and we haven’t built the replacement yet.”</p><p>The 1870s railroad crisis didn’t destroy American commerce. It destroyed the overleveraged railroad builders. The freight kept moving. The routes stayed open. The survivors — the companies with manageable debt, real routes, and operational discipline — became the backbone of the American economy for 100 years.</p><p>The intelligence premium is unwinding. The report is right about that. The companies priced on human scarcity will reprice. The daisy chain of private credit, insurance, and mortgage debt structured on those assumptions will crack. Ghost GDP is possible. The reflexivity trap is real.</p><p>But when human intelligence was the scarce input, the valuable thing was producing intelligence.</p><p>When intelligence becomes abundant, the valuable thing is governing intelligence.</p><p>Not producing the analysis — AI does that. Not generating the recommendation — AI does that. Governing which analysis to trust. Governing when to act and when to stop. Governing the boundary between what AI proposes and what humans approve.</p><p>The railroads needed governance too. After the 1873 panic, the Interstate Commerce Commission was established in 1887 — the first federal regulatory agency. It didn’t build railroads. It governed them. And the governed railroads created more value in the next 50 years than the ungoverned ones did in the first 20.</p><p>The assets that serve as the programmable infrastructure for autonomous commerce — BTC as collateral, ETH as the transaction layer — are the assets that will compound as AI agents scale from millions to billions of daily transactions.</p><p>The companies that build explicit, auditable, fail-closed governance for AI-driven systems — in finance, in healthcare, in law, in every industry where getting it wrong has consequences — are the companies that will define the next era.</p><p>And the investors who understand that a 52% drawdown is a governance problem, not an asset problem, are the ones who will hold through the volatility and come out the other side owning the most important asset class of the 21st century.</p><p>The report told you what dies.</p><p>I’m telling you what replaces it.</p><p>The canary is alive. Build the governance before the canary stops singing.</p><p>— -</p><p>*Eric Jackson is the founder of EMJX (<a href="https://emjx.ai/">https://emjx.ai</a>), a governance-first Gen2 treasury operating system and EMJ Capital Ltd., a tech-focused hedge fund. 150,000 people follow his daily video frameworks on X. He appears regularly on CNBC, Fox Business, and Bloomberg.*</p><p>*Disclosure: The author or EMJX or his fund holds positions in BTC, ETH, and crypto infrastructure companies including IREN, HUT, CIFR, OPEN and BETR. The author is building EMJX, which provides governance tools for digital asset management. Nothing in this post constitutes financial advice. Do your own research.*</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a44e8f5f46ee" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Zynga’s Peak Acquisition Means It Could Double In A Year]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ericjackson/zyngas-peak-acquisition-means-it-could-double-in-a-year-6b1eb243ee2?source=rss-786dd3eb3058------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6b1eb243ee2</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2020 20:32:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-09T20:32:37.633Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Zynga’s (ZNGA) stock is up 50% this year and it just announced its biggest acquisition ever in Peak Games for $1.8 billion.</p><p>In my view, it’s still very undervalued.</p><p>Here’s why.</p><p>Many still associate Zynga with games played on Facebook (FB) back when Zynga first IPO’ed in 2012. Its stock price briefly shot up to $14 before belly-flopping down to $2 by the end of that year. The stock is now back over $9 for the first time in 8 years. It takes time to make new associations for what has been a forgotten about stock. And, as the deal for Peak Games was just announced this morning, I believe the market still hasn’t digested how importantly this acquisition will change Zynga’s operational results into 2021.</p><p>Zynga had been on track to do $1.8 billion in revenues this year and $2 billion next year (they also upped their Q2 and full year guidance on the acquisition call this morning). Consensus is also that Zynga with have $364 million in EBITDA this year and $421 million next year.</p><p>In the press release about the Peak acquisition today, CEO Frank Gibeau suggested that Peak is doing about $600 million a year in revenue (as he suggested they’ll contribute $300 million in the second half of the year). He’s likely sand-bagging and they’ll do even better than that. We don’t know what Peak’s EBITDA will be. Zynga does and presumably they like it which is why they paid $1.8 billion for it. We do know that Zynga is going to try to apply the same live services playbook that they’ve used on their other successful and smaller acquisitions recently.</p><p>I am assuming that Zynga is going to get $220 million in EBITDA out of Peak in 2021. That would imply that Zynga will do combined 2021 revenues of $2.6 billion and EBITDA of $640 million.</p><p>How should you value that business? The average price-to-sales ratio of Glu Mobile (GLUU), Take Two (TTWO), and Activision (ATVI) is 5.7x implying that Zynga will be worth $15 billion next year or $15.75/share next year. The average enterprise value-to-EBITDA ratio of Glu, Take Two, and Activision is 27x, implying that Zynga will be worth $17.5 billion or $19.40/share next year.</p><p>I suspect that Zynga has a few tricks up its sleeve in terms of its own pipeline of games, as well as how to make the most out of Peak.</p><p>With half the value of the Peak buyout being paid in Zynga stock priced at $7.92/share, Peak’s team also has a big incentive to make this acquisition work and deliver upside surprises to help Zynga’s stock.</p><p>My guess is that Zynga’s stock ends 2021 above $21/share.</p><p><em>[Disclosure: Affiliates controlled by Eric Jackson hold a long position in ZNGA]</em></p><p><em>Commentary by Eric Jackson, sign up for Eric’s monthly </em><a href="http://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=5b7ea69431"><em>Tech &amp; Media Email</em></a><em> and his </em><a href="https://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/the-eric-jackson-podcast/id1009301965?mt=2"><em>Podcast</em></a><em>. You can follow Eric on Twitter</em> <a href="https://www.twitter.com/ericjackson"><em>@ericjackson</em> </a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b1eb243ee2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hit ‘Buy Now’ on eBay]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ericjackson/hit-buy-now-on-ebay-475bf066d61a?source=rss-786dd3eb3058------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/475bf066d61a</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2020 16:53:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-14T17:05:33.948Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/257/1*YCgnWHKx3A3uKnkquTqj-Q.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>eBay (EBAY) has been largely forgotten among the exciting buzzy unicorn stories that we constantly hear about on business television over the last few years.</strong></p><p>The Internet auction pioneer once held that kind of status during the dot com days of the 90s but that was 20 years ago. Since then, it’s cycled through a bunch of CEOs and seen its revenue growth grind to a snail’s pace. Many tech-focused investors would consider eBay almost dead at this point.</p><p>But Internet giants — even former ones like eBay — never truly die. Their traffic (which of course is linked to their CAC) just keeps coming like some kind of zombie apocalypse.</p><p>Many people in 2012 and 2013 liked to make fun of Yahoo! (YHOO) as a former Internet giant that now was essentially dead. If you accepted that kind of simplistic analysis, you wouldn’t have paid attention to their large ownership stake in Alibaba that would catapult the stock over the next few years.</p><p>eBay’s stock today reminds me of Yahoo’s in 2012 — on the cusp of a huge run that very few care about. Is Netflix or Apple or Amazon going to 3x over the next couple of years? Probably not. But eBay sure has a good shot to, which is why I own it.</p><p>Here’s what I like about the eBay story at this moment:</p><p>- It just appointed a new outside CEO yesterday — Jamie Iannone. I know nothing about him or his style but, being an outsider, he’s likely to want to put his mark on the company over the next 18 months which will help move its stock price up. He also has a couple of activist shareholders (including one on his board) who will be eager to help him do just that.<br>- They unloaded StubHub just before a global pandemic and upped their stock buyback to $4.5B a few weeks back. Let’s hope they were buying like crazy on the recent stock pullback down to the $20s. If they exhausted their entire buyback allocation, they would have retired 20% of their shares outstanding.<br>- They have already committed to selling off their Classifieds biz and Korean biz. If they do (and it will be this year), it will probably give them $15B (pretax). They could do more buybacks if they wanted (which the activists might lobby for), but that would probably be short-sighted. Long-term shareholders would probably do better if they instead targeted some EBITDA-generating private companies with great brands who need an exit at depressed valuations. If we learned anything from the 2009–2011 period, it’s that, just when tech companies should have been buying companies on the cheap, many were too busy cowering under their desks. There will be some good deals to be had out there in the next year.<br>- Assuming they spin off the Classifieds biz, eBay is currently priced around 6x EBITDA for 2020. Historically, their EBITDA multiple got as high as 26x in 2015. They are — despite being forgotten about by many — a free cash flow generating machine with flat top line growth. What if their new team is actually able to crank out a little growth in the next couple of years — or buy it through smart M&amp;A? If they go back to the upper range of that EBITDA multiple this year or next, eBay is a $90 stock (instead of $35). And that’s before shrinking the shares outstanding by a fifth. Given that factor, I expect this to help eBay touch $100/share sometime in 2021.<br>- In my last email, I highlighted Zoom and Slack, which I argued were set up to permanently benefit from the global pandemic. I said that long-term consumer and enterprise behaviors would be altered by going through this terrible tragedy. We’ve already seen Amazon (AMZN) go to all-time highs as of today, as people shift their behaviors in certain ways. If this new management team is smart, they will ensure that eBay benefits as a post-corona winner as well. Consumers will need deals on goods like never before. Small Medium Businesses will need consumers like never before. eBay can show the world that it’s not a dinosaur. It’s a must-have bridge between those groups at this moment and going forward.<br>- Expect some cost-cutting with the new management team as well.<br>- If the general economy goes south as the year rolls on and pulls down the stock market with it, I think eBay will be one of the best defensive names in the tech world. Mid-$20s is probably the floor.</p><p>The bottom line is that eBay is a great deal at current levels, especially if the economy holds in there. This is another Yahoo circa 2012 situation.</p><p>Hopefully, their new CEO capitalizes on the opportunity.</p><p>PS. <a href="https://twitter.com/JKosner">John Kosner</a> writes in response to this post: “I have found eBay to be a secret weapon to find a host of things (paper towels, toilet paper, other essentials) that are difficult to get on Amazon.”</p><p><em>[Disclosure: Affiliates controlled by Eric Jackson hold long positions in EBAY, ZM and WORK]</em></p><p><em>Commentary by Eric Jackson, sign up for Eric’s monthly </em><a href="http://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=5b7ea69431"><em>Tech &amp; Media Email</em></a><em> and his </em><a href="https://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/the-eric-jackson-podcast/id1009301965?mt=2"><em>Podcast</em></a><em>. You can follow Eric on Twitter</em> <a href="https://www.twitter.com/ericjackson"><em>@ericjackson</em> </a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=475bf066d61a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Changes From Coronavirus Will Be Long-Lasting — And Benefit Zoom and Slack]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ericjackson/changes-from-coronavirus-will-be-long-lasting-and-benefit-zoom-and-slack-6f87dd3a6a0c?source=rss-786dd3eb3058------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6f87dd3a6a0c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2020 16:52:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-14T16:55:48.102Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Changes From Coronavirus Will Be Long-Lasting — And Benefit Zoom and Slack</strong></h3><p>March 6, 2020</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/275/1*T9yeYkY4YBgSL9y0CWMvHA.jpeg" /></figure><p>It’s clear that few of us in North America paid much attention to the coronavirus when it was “over there” in China and other parts of Asia.</p><p>Yet, it’s clearly in all our minds after the last couple of weeks.</p><p>Many large employers in California and Washington are now requiring their employees to stay at home for work. That will likely expand to many other states in the coming weeks.</p><p>Hopefully, over the summer (when the virus subsides), there will be some vaccines which emerge to deal effectively with it.</p><p>Even if that occurs though, it’s my view that there will be some permanent effects of this outbreak. One is that a general tech theme of “increased remote work” will accelerate. It will not simply go back to its pre-outbreak growth level.</p><p>Among technology stocks, my favorite ways to express my view is through owning the stocks Zoom Communications (ZM) and Slack Technologies (WORK).</p><p>Both are necessary tools for any remote worker to “keep in touch” with the culture and sense of what’s happening back at the physical office — Zoom through virtual meetings and Slack through its messaging.</p><p>Their software was best in class before the crisis but it will be “must have” for many in the months to come. That’s why, I don’t think you can use backward-facing price-to-sales multiples to assess their valuations. You have to look forward to their addressable markets and how their stocks will react to an upward inflection in their growth rates.</p><p>Both stocks have increased over the past couple of months — Zoom much more than Slack. I think Slack will increasingly be seen by investors as a key beneficiary of the accelerating remote work trend, just as Zoom has already been.</p><p>There’s another reason I like both names. Pricing Power.</p><p>Last week, I was chatting with one tech CEO friend. Unprompted, he brought up their use of Slack. “I think they’re dramatically underpriced. We rely on their software. I was talking with my CFO a few weeks ago and asked if we’d keep paying Slack if they tripled their prices overnight. He paused, nodded and said we probably would.”</p><p>I suspect the same is true for Zoom — especially after they come to rely on both even more in the coming months. What happens to stocks when they increase prices — repeatedly over time?</p><p><em>[Disclosure: Affiliates controlled by Eric Jackson hold long positions in ZM and WORK]</em></p><p><em>Commentary by Eric Jackson, sign up for Eric’s monthly </em><a href="http://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=5b7ea69431"><em>Tech &amp; Media Email</em></a><em> and his </em><a href="https://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/the-eric-jackson-podcast/id1009301965?mt=2"><em>Podcast</em></a><em>. You can follow Eric on Twitter</em> <a href="https://www.twitter.com/ericjackson"><em>@ericjackson</em> </a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6f87dd3a6a0c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sinclair’s Depressed Stock Price Could Get a Jolt from a Dish Deal and 2020 Guidance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ericjackson/sinclairs-depressed-stock-price-could-get-a-jolt-from-a-dish-deal-and-2020-guidance-f4ad8c4700ac?source=rss-786dd3eb3058------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f4ad8c4700ac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rsn]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sinclair-broadcasting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stocks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sinclair]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Oct 2019 12:45:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-16T12:45:19.239Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/290/1*Lqm8QzRj_eA1lEEO9Nh-kA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Sinclair Broadcast Group (SBGI) is trading below its valuation prior to its blockbuster acquisition of the Fox Regional Sports Networks (RSNs) from Disney (DIS) in May.</p><p>The company’s stock — predominantly known for its local broadcast channels, the Tennis Channel, and Stadium — closed today at just over $41/share. It was trading around $43 prior to getting the RSNs.</p><p>That deal — now closed — brings Sinclair an EBITDA stream of about $1.8 billion (as of 2018, according to different reports). That’s double in EBITDA what Sinclair itself did in 2018 ($900M).</p><p>The initial news of the RSN deal took Sinclair shares up to $66/share. They dipped below $39 last week. The primary reason for the retracement is that Sinclair is currently in the midst of a dispute with Dish (DISH) over carriage of their RSNs and what Dish will pay going forward. The RSNs are currently blacked out to Dish customers.</p><p>I own Sinclair’s shares as I think the value of the equity has a chance to triple over the next 3 years, once the Dish dispute gets resolved and investors turn their attention back to the value of the new RSNs going forward.</p><p>Here’s my logic.</p><p>Despite the current carriage dispute with Dish, I believe the $1.8 billion in EBITDA will continue to be stable over the next few years and may actually<em> increase</em> under Sinclair. As Sinclair disclosed at the time of the acquisition, the individual RSNs have carriage agreements that run over the next 7 years. They’re not all up for renewal next year.</p><p>Although they will have to be negotiated at different points in time in the years ahead with different providers, I believe all will get re-upped at similar rates to the past — even if the terms might be a little shorter than past deals. Live local sports will continue to be a draw for most in a local area. Just as we see in the case of ESPN, it only takes a few “must watch” games a year to make the majority of viewers holler for why they aren’t seeing them on their base package.</p><p>With most cable systems trying to demonstrate their value to their customers and possible cord-cutters, it’s just not worth going to war over these live sports channels. Other channels with reruns of syndicated shows? Sure, but not live news, weather and sports.</p><p>If you agree and assume that Sinclair will still be doing $1.8 billion in EBITDA from their RSNs in 2022, you must then turn your attention to their old EBITDA stream of $900 million in 2018. This has also been steadily increasing over time — it’s up from $690 million in 2015. If it stays flat in the coming years, Sinclair will have a combined EBITDA stream of $2.7 billion in 2022.</p><p>Sinclair’s Enterprise Value to EBITDA ratio has varied between 6–10x in each of the past 4 years. I assume it will still receive a multiple of 8.5x in 2022, which would suggest its Enterprise Value would be around $23 billion then.</p><p>Sinclair had about $4 billion in debt prior to the RSN deal and took on another $9 billion to do that deal (at favorable terms). If we assume that Sinclair spends about $1 billion a year of its cash flow to pay down debt, it should have combined debt of just under $10 billion in 3 years from now.</p><p>That means Sinclair’s equity value should be just over $13 billion in 2022 — up from $3.7 billion today. Using the current debt levels, and an 8.5x multiple, Sinclair’s shares deserve to be trading today above $90/share instead of $41.</p><p>What has to happen to get them back towards those levels? I think there are two needed catalysts.</p><ol><li>Sinclair management has to come out with 2020 guidance that demonstrates that they too see a stable and large EBITDA stream from the RSNs. We will have to wait to hear more commentary from management on their next earnings call on November 6th.</li><li>There needs to be a resolution in the Dish talks. I have no insights into when this will happen. However, I think it’s in the best interests of both sides to have a deal in place prior to the start of the NBA season (which is one week away).</li></ol><p>If we get those outcomes, plus perhaps some new coverage from Wall Street (as Sinclair doesn’t get a lot today), the stock could move up rather quickly.</p><p><em>[Disclosure: Affiliates controlled by Eric Jackson hold long positions in Sinclair and Disney]</em></p><p><em>Commentary by Eric Jackson, sign up for Eric’s monthly </em><a href="http://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=5b7ea69431"><em>Tech &amp; Media Email</em></a><em> and his </em><a href="https://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/the-eric-jackson-podcast/id1009301965?mt=2"><em>Podcast</em></a><em>. You can follow Eric on Twitter</em> <a href="https://www.twitter.com/ericjackson"><em>@ericjackson</em> </a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f4ad8c4700ac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Force Awakens In Disney’s Stock Price]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ericjackson/the-force-awakens-in-disneys-stock-price-c4adfd29fab8?source=rss-786dd3eb3058------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c4adfd29fab8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[disney]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disney-channel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diş]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[television]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2019 15:52:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-15T15:52:50.254Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/307/1*XhKKKcEYVU6J0pk-dUBfgw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Last Thursday, I attended the Disney Investor Day in Burbank where the company revealed its long anticipated streaming service Disney+. In my view, the details revealed should propel the Disney stock — which has languished for 4 years — to a price of $282/share by the end of the year. I’ll explain why below.</p><p>First, here were the key takeaways from the event.</p><p>Disney+ is launching November 12th in the US and likely soon afterwards internationally. It’s going to be priced at $6.99/month to start (or $69.99/year) which was less than the consensus going in and telegraphs that the company is looking to amass a huge number of subs right off the bat. It expects the service to become profitable by 2024 — a year after ESPN+ and Hulu reach profitability. Disney expects 60–90 million subs to the service by 2024 and 2/3rds of these are expected to be international subs. Disney telegraphed that they would eventually bundle their three services together: Disney+, ESPN+ and Hulu.</p><p>Some of my thoughts on the event are as follows:</p><ul><li>The 3.5 hour event was impressive in the sheer breadth of quality content that Disney has amassed and which will be available from day one on the service: Star Wars (all films), Marvel, Pixar, Disney Classics, new hit Disney films, Disney Channel content, all Simpsons episodes ever, and new originals.</li><li>Disney was late in competing against Netflix but, you realized as you watched the presentation, this service has been decades in the making. It’s the entire history of Disney content, supplemented with the mega M&amp;A deals which Bob Iger (with help from Kevin Mayer) executed in the last 10 years before Netflix was big enough to nab them for themselves.</li><li>Low cost of customer acquisition. When WarnerMedia, Comcast, or Sony launch their “Netflix killer,” who in the general public is going to immediately understand what “WarnerMedia+” is and why they should care? Yet, when Disney+ launches, all families (and most young people who like Marvel and Star Wars) will immediately understand the value proposition of $6.99 a month for all Disney content. What’s more — as they pointed out effectively in the Thursday presentation — expect to be bombarded by Disney+ ads on ABC, ESPN, if you go to Disney Parks, or if you’re a subscriber to any Disney news of any kind. This low customer acquisition cost is why Disney+ can reach profitability by 2024.</li><li>The Disney+, ESPN+, and Hulu bundle should be a compelling offering when it’s available.</li><li>There was an audible gasp throughout the theater when Kevin Mayer mentioned that the price point was going to be $6.99. (<a href="https://medium.com/@ericjackson/disneys-stock-price-once-again-looks-attractive-ef4eddcb9ec7">Back in January when I wrote</a> about why I thought Disney’s stock was poised to break out in 2019, I guessed the new service would be priced at $10/month.) I think a woman two seats next to me grabbed the table when she heard $6.99. I think most expected Disney to price it higher to seek to maximize profits (based on what they did with DisneyLife in the UK a few years ago). Yet, by going low, Disney signalled it wanted to attract millions of subs right away to the service. This is exactly what they should be doing to get their legs under them. It sends a signal to everyone that they will be one of the dominant entertainment streaming services in the years to come. They may never catch Netflix in terms of subs but Disney+ will be at that type of global scale (unlike the WarnerMedia+-types which will try to launch in years to come).</li><li>You couldn’t help but wonder as you watched Disney show a clip from Toy Story 4, Avengers End Game, Frozen 2, Lion King, and the new Lucasfilm original Mandalorian: how could Apple’s original content keynote of a few weeks ago have been so bad? It really seems like Apple is completing content kindergarten while Disney is finishing off its content Ph.D.</li><li>Downloadable content. Disney revealed that any Disney+ subscriber could download as many Disney movies or shows as they want for as long as they remain a subscriber. Parents intuitively get the value of this with their kids vs. a capped number of shows such as what you receive from Netflix.</li><li>Both ESPN+ and Hulu are doing better than most expected a year ago. ESPN+ got out of the gates with 2 million subs in its first year and has really shown it can amass unique sports rights (e.g., UFC PPV events) and originals. Hulu gained 8 million subs in the last year to bring its total to 25 million subs. It seems likely in the next year that Disney will try to buy the rest of the 40% of Hulu it doesn’t already own.</li><li>Disney has had multiple box office blockbusters every year — but they never seem to impact the stock price. With the launch of Disney+ now though, I wonder if we’re on the verge of this changing. Avengers End Game will stream first on Disney+, so will Toy Story 4, so will Lion King, so will The Rise of Skywalker. Will Avengers get you to subscribe? Will the next one? Will the next one? Each new release should act as a spur to drive a whole new bunch of subs. And new subs are going to increasingly drive the Disney stock price (see below in my company valuation). (We’ve seen evidence of the importance of “events” on news subs with DAZN and ESPN+ already and the same will happen with Disney+.)</li></ul><p><strong><em>What is Disney’s stock worth?</em></strong></p><p>On the Friday after the Disney Investor Day, 6x the normal daily volume of Disney shares traded hands. The stock finished up nearly 12% on the session. The reason is the Disney’s estimated 2024 subscriber numbers were almost double what many on Wall Street expected.</p><p>And here’s the thing: Disney management is likely sandbagging those numbers. Disney+ might well be at 150 million subscribers in 5 years from now. (Netflix is already there today or when they announce their earnings on Tuesday — and don’t you think increasing numbers of people are going to adopt streaming services in the coming 5 years?)</p><p>With Friday’s gains, Disney’s stock broke through to a new all-time high after treading water for about 4 years. Disney got no credit for the work they were doing to launch Disney+, but their moment in the sun has finally arrived.</p><p>When I look at all the parts of Disney including the old business, the new Fox assets and the new streaming services (Disney+, ESPN+, Hulu and Hotstar), I come up with a year end valuation for the company of $282/share vs. the current $130/share. Here’s how:</p><ul><li>Old Disney (the part of Disney that existed prior to the Fox acquisition and the new streaming services) traded at an Enterprise Value to EBITDA multiple of 14.4x in 2015 just prior to the swirl of concerns about how cord-cutting would affect the company. Old Disney’s EBITDA was $15 billion in 2015 and it’s going to be $17.5 billion in 2019. The cord-cutting fears were overblown. Disney is still one of the most premier media companies in the world. It deserves that old multiple which means its old business is worth $252 billion.</li><li>Fox Assets. Disney now owns the Fox assets of the film studio, TV studio, Fox’s Hulu stake, and various Fox cable channels. Yet, up until Thursday, Disney’s stock was priced exactly the same from a year ago when it didn’t own the assets (i.e., Wall Street was saying these assets were now worthless under Disney control, which is clearly not the case). The non-RSN Fox assets that Disney received in the deal are going to do about $1.5 billion annually in EBITDA in my view. There’s likely going to be another $1.5 billion in cost synergies wrung out of the combination of the assets with Disney. If you put a 14.4x multiple on that, you get a set of assets worth an additional $43 billion to Disney’s enterprise value.</li><li>Disney streaming assets of Disney+, ESPN+, and Hulu. Disney says Disney+ will have up to 90 million subs by 2024. What if they’re sandbagging and they have that by 2021? What if ESPN+ has 5 million subs by 2021 and Hulu has 40 million subs by 2021? There will also probably be some kind of bundle of the 3 by then as well. If I put 20x multiples on all of those subscriber numbers multiplied by the revenues they will generate (consistent with fast-growing early days of Netflix), I get to additional enterprise value numbers of $126 billion for Disney+, $6 billion for ESPN+ and $80 billion for Hulu. (And by the way, when Disney critics yelp about lost Netflix licensing or lost Walmart DVD sales revenues, this is where Disney shareholders are being made whole and then some. Wall Street will increasingly value this steady subscriber revenue for these different services at a similar lofty valuation as other SaaS companies get because the revenue is highly sticky.)</li><li>Add all the components and you get a total Disney enterprise value of $507 billion vs. the $255 billion at which Disney closed at the end of the day on Friday.</li><li>At the current share count of nearly 1.8 billion shares, a $507 billion enterprise value would be worth a $282 stock price — significantly higher than the $130 that Disney closed at on Friday.</li></ul><p><strong><em>What will be the catalysts for driving the stock higher towards this $282/share target?</em></strong></p><ul><li>Friday’s powerful move to all-time highs will likely get investors and Wall Street analysts to pull out their notebooks and start reassessing Disney shares and how they should be valued. This stock is no longer in the penalty box.</li><li>Each new blockbuster used to deliver a lot of buzz but no jolt to the Disney stock price. Yet, with Disney+ firmly in investors’ minds now, each new blockbuster is about to translate into millions of additional subscribers to their service. Investors will likely think of this when Avengers open and when Toy Story 4 and Lion King open. What’s more, Disney’s “old” assets give them a low customer acquisition cost that other rivals can only dream of.</li><li>RSN sale. There will likely be some conclusion in the next few weeks to the RSN sale that has dragged on for months.</li><li>News about a potential acquisition of the WarnerMedia and/or Comcast stakes of Hulu.</li><li>Launch of the Disney+ service on November 12th.</li><li>Updates on initial subscriber numbers to Disney+. Big adoption could lead to big gains for the stock.</li><li>Updates on international roll-out of Disney+ and/or Hulu.</li></ul><p><em>[Disclosure: Affiliates controlled by Eric Jackson hold long positions in DIS]</em></p><p><em>Commentary by Eric Jackson, sign up for Eric’s monthly </em><a href="http://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=5b7ea69431"><em>Tech &amp; Media Email</em></a><em> and his </em><a href="https://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/the-eric-jackson-podcast/id1009301965?mt=2"><em>Podcast</em></a><em>. You can follow Eric on Twitter</em> <a href="https://www.twitter.com/ericjackson"><em>@ericjackson</em> </a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c4adfd29fab8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Even After Last Year’s Move, WWE’s Stock Still Lags Where It Should Be Trading]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ericjackson/even-after-last-years-move-wwe-s-stock-still-lags-where-it-should-be-trading-3524e454879d?source=rss-786dd3eb3058------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3524e454879d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[wwe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vince-mcmahon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wrestlemania]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wrestling]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2019 18:57:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-09T18:57:37.539Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*6u2y_fAvO5w1_oBRmYESzQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>WWE (WWE) held its 35th annual WrestleMania last weekend. It was the 3rd highest attended WrestleMania ever with attendance over 83,000 at MetLife Stadium just outside New York.</p><p>The stock was up 140% last year, taking it to all-time highs just shy of $100/share. It’s currently at just over $90/share.</p><p>In my view, it’s still criminally underpriced relative to its sports media public company peers.</p><p>Currently, WWE has an Enterprise Value to 2020 expected EBITDA multiple of 15.6x according to Bloomberg.</p><p>Compare that to the following companies:</p><p>1. Liberty Media — Braves (BATRK): 24.7x</p><p>2. Liberty Media — Formula One (FWONK): 27.6x</p><p>3. Madison Square Garden Co (MSG): 31.7x</p><p>That’s a blended average of 28x for those 3 companies.</p><p>If you assume that WWE does the analyst consensus of $445 million in 2020 EBITDA, that implies that WWE should be trading today at around $163/share instead of $90/share.</p><p>I’m not the first to point this out. A couple of weeks ago, Marci Ryvicker of Wolfe Research pointed out the disconnect between WWE’s valuation and other comparables when she put a Street high $157/share price target on the stock.</p><p>Is there a good reason why WWE should be trading at such a lower multiple than these other stocks?</p><p>It might be a stigma that the WWE is a traveling carnival troupe with an inferior corporate governance system because of its controlling shareholder in Vince McMahon. However, MSG also has a controlling shareholder and it has the highest multiple of any of the sports media companies mentioned at 32x.</p><p>It might be that the stock increased so much in 2018 that investors have yet to raise their 2020 EBITDA estimates.</p><p>The biggest reason why WWE jumped so much last year was that Fox Corp (FOX) paid a much larger amount than expected to start carrying WWE’s programming starting later this year.</p><p>Yet, other big rights renewal deals for WWE in India and the UK appear to be imminent as WWE management has indicated they should be announced by mid-year. These announcements could be the catalyst to help readjust the Street’s multiples for next year and see the stock move meaningfully higher again.</p><p>Several analysts have also wondered whether the WWE could announce an additional hour of programming a week to air on Fox which they currently film anyways and which Fox might be happy to pay for.</p><p>Something that could really help get the stock going would be to see its OTT Service called the WWE Network to start to accelerate its growth. The service is currently at 1.6 million paid subscribers but its growth rate has been modest in the last couple of years and the company has been working to get churn rates down.</p><p>One thing that was evident in WrestleMania is that WWE has some great characters now. And the women took center stage at the event with a 3 way match between Charlotte Flair, Ronda Rousey and Becky Lynch. If these and other strong female characters can attract a much bigger female demo to watch the matches around the world, the WWE could see its popularity — and its stock price — soar.</p><p><em>[Disclosure: Affiliates controlled by Eric Jackson hold long positions in WWE]</em></p><p><em>Commentary by Eric Jackson, sign up for Eric’s monthly </em><a href="http://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=5b7ea69431"><em>Tech &amp; Media Email</em></a><em> and his </em><a href="https://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/the-eric-jackson-podcast/id1009301965?mt=2"><em>Podcast</em></a><em>. You can follow Eric on Twitter</em> <a href="https://www.twitter.com/ericjackson"><em>@ericjackson</em> </a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3524e454879d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blue Skies Ahead For GreenSky]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ericjackson/blue-skies-ahead-for-greensky-2b2c6c04586f?source=rss-786dd3eb3058------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b2c6c04586f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2019 17:34:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-28T17:35:10.901Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/437/1*mtyIt5mprqKgSjJqB2fcug.png" /></figure><p>GreenSky (GSKY) is a Fintech IPO from last year that has stumbled out of the gate. As a result, it trades at about half its value from a year ago.</p><p>The company, based in Atlanta, offers a Point of Sale (POS) technology solution (in store, on the web or via an app) to merchants to offer 60 second loan decisions for consumers in the home improvement and elective surgery verticals. The loans, which cater to prime and super prime customers, if approved, are then passed on to one of GreenSky’s banking partners (which tend to be regional banks who don’t have the tech to offer this service to merchants themselves) to service. The POS loans are often much more attractive to consumers because of lower rates compared to credit cards, as well as much simpler than utilizing a home equity line of credit.</p><p>GreenSky makes money in two ways:<br> <br> (1) They get a take rate (typically 7%) off the transaction the consumer makes with the merchant when they’re approved for the loan and;</p><p>(2) They make a small fee (usually 1%) off the servicing value of the loans which get approved and then passed over to the banks.</p><p>GreenSky IPO’ed last year in June around $23/share with a $4 billion market cap. It currently trades at about half that.</p><p><em>What happened to cause the stock drop?</em></p><p>- Besides the fourth quarter sell-off that affected the whole market, on the November earnings call, GreenSky management announced that the steeper yield curve had caused them to have to push out further some of their profits from the quarter. It was seen by some analysts as a sign that merchants weren’t passing on the cost of higher interest rates to consumers and this caused concern that GreenSky’s take rate would drop if rates kept rising. GreenSky management disputed that on the call.</p><p>- GreenSky management also discussed how they had a solar business (with a much higher take rate) that had dropped significantly as a percentage of their business from 2017.</p><p>- The stock went from a high of $26 post-IPO to a low of $8 in December. It’s now at $12 and they had an earnings call in March that reassured the Street that management’s explanation in November was valid.</p><p>- Some still question whether GreenSky can make money in a rising rate environment or an end of cycle period when there is a risk of taking on lower-quality consumers who default.</p><p><em>What’s interesting to me about GreenSky is:</em></p><p>- Similar to Twilio (TWLO) a year ago, they’re seen a “failed IPO.” In my opinion, all the things which initially made investors about GreenSky are still valid. They have a bright management team who — in my view — will perform over time.</p><p>- They are going after a big total addressable market (TAM) now in home improvement and elective surgery with an easy opportunity to expand into other verticals with even bigger TAMs. Management has said they’re scratching less than 1% of the addressable market for home improvement and elective surgery today.</p><p>- They have been growing quickly in the last few years, with top line revenues increasing in the 30% range.</p><p>- Best-in-class profitability for Fintech due to low customer acquisition costs. Due to the nature of GreenSky’s POS tech being right at the point-of-sale once used by merchants — and getting recommended by their banking partners to merchants because of the win-win-win nature of their tech for all parties involved, GreenSky has very low customer acquisition costs compared to most in the Fintech space. As a result, their EBITDA margins are in the high 30%s making them a stand out.</p><p>- No balance sheet risk. They are referring loans to banking partners, not taking them on themselves (although they are incented to refer good customers due to their continuing to make money from the servicing of those loans).</p><p>- Going after prime and super prime customers. 71% of their customers have FICO scores above 700. This makes them highly attractive for GreenSky’s banking partners. Additionally, this helps mitigate the concern which some have raised about how GreenSky will perform at the end of a cycle. Their customers should continue to service their loans and GreenSky management has said they still have so much opportunity in front of them that they have no need or incentive to go after lower quality customers.</p><p>- Deeper moat than perceived. Its POS tech combined with providing merchants an omnichannel approach (POS, web and app approvals for customers in 60 seconds) is highly attractive to both merchants and the regional banking partners who likely can’t continue to make the Fintech investments like the larger banks can and which further attracts them to partnering with GreenSky.</p><p>- GreenSky’s cohort data to date shows recurring revenue nature of their relationships with merchants (with net dollar expansion rates steady around 100%) even though their business is primarily based on a take rate for customer introductions.</p><ul><li>Google Trends suggest steady growth of interest in GreenSky over the past year (although no doubt some of these searches come from the IPO of the stock).</li><li>17% of GreenSky’s float is held short, meaning another good quarter could spark a rapid covering of their shares — pushing the stock even higher in the short-term.</li></ul><p>- After last November, the company put in place a $150 million stock buyback. They’ve already spent about $50 million of that to date, so they are moving quickly. When complete, this buyback could shrink the float by up to 25%.</p><p>- Like the case of Twilio last year, the best time to buy a stock is when it’s a great company that’s had an explainable stumble and is under-valued relative to its likely growth path in the coming years. When they IPO’ed last year, sell-side analysts suggested that, due to their highly unique business model (which is nothing like LendingClub (LC) and is similar to Visa (V) or MasterCard (MC) except more profitable and at a much earlier-stage), GreenSky should be valued at 33x next year’s earnings. They’re currently being valued at less than half of that.</p><p>- When you combine the fact that — again my view — this is a very strong management team (with a big economic stake in the business) which has now been embarrassed by the stumble last Fall, they have a high incentive to make a big comeback this year and next year. I expect their guidance for this year is even more sand-bagged than would typically be the case.</p><p>- Management has announced a large pilot with American Express a couple of quarters ago which has already started and is expected to be rolled out further as this year progresses. The partnership is not built into their 2019 guidance at all, so it’s all upside.</p><p>- Although management’s explanation that rising or falling rates will not affect their take rate over time because these rates are passed on by merchants to consumers (who still get attractive rates on a relative basis), we saw on the November call that quickly rising rates mean that some current quarter profitability can get pushed out to be recognized later. In the current quarter, rates have dropped suddenly. Therefore, you would expect to see the reverse situation of some surprise profits being recognized sooner in this current quarter when they announce next in May.</p><p><em>Open Questions for Debate:</em></p><p>1. Of course, you can’t take management’s word for everything. We will have to see how they handle rising (or falling) rates over time and how this affects their take rate. Management has also said that consumers will still find their loans attractively priced (on a relative basis) even if rates rise. Some critics will want to see it before they believe it.</p><p>2. There will likely continue to be a debate on if GreenSky Is a tech company or is more like a smaller consumer lender with no real tech advantage. In my view, it’s unique and will deserve a premium multiple over time. Currently, sell side analysts are taking a skeptical view. Management will have to perform to be the final arbiter of this debate. Assuming they can perform, I expect investors will rush back in to the stock.</p><p>3. End of cycle worries. Skeptics think that, if there is an end of cycle to the current economic boom, this will cause consumers to pull back spending, increase defaults, and cause banks to pull back their available capital to GreenSky and its merchants. In the past few quarters, management has increased its available capital to now around $12 billion. They are focused on the prime and super prime customers, which the banks are also interested in lending to.</p><p><em>Where could the stock go if it works?</em></p><p>- There’s a risk and reward in every stock. What I like about GreenSky currently is that its valuation seems much closer to the low expectations end of the spectrum compared to starry-eyed growth continuing forever valuations.</p><p>- When GreenSky IPO’ed last year, several sell-side analysts said that it should be valued — due to its growth profile and high profitability — as 33x next year’s earnings or 22x next year’s EBITDA. Yet, due to the Fall sell-off, it’s currently valued at 14x next year’s earnings and 9x next year’s EBITDA.</p><p>- In my view, management will be able to win back this type of premium multiple as it executes in the coming quarters.</p><p>- If GreenSky simply performs to their sand-bagged guidance, the original IPO multiples should take it $30/share by the end of the year which would be more than a double. This also isn’t taking in to account the potentially much smaller float which will exist then. However, if there are some upside surprises which management can pull out of its hat, I could envision the stock trading up to $35–40/share</p><p>- Longer term, management has said that their current TAM is $600 billion and they’re only scratching the surface of it. They’ve also said that they expect their banking partners to pull them into other natural verticals which would add another $800 billion of TAM. If they can grow to a 10% market share of that addressable market over many years, with their take rates and EBITDA margin profile, it’s not inconceivable that GreenSky could be a $90 billion company one day.</p><p>- In the shorter term, GreenSky to me looks like a $100/share stock in 3 years and a possibly a $500/share stock in 5–7 years</p><p><em>[Disclosure: Affiliates controlled by Eric Jackson hold long positions in GreenSky and Twilio]</em></p><p><em>Commentary by Eric Jackson, sign up for Eric’s monthly </em><a href="http://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=5b7ea69431"><em>Tech &amp; Media Email</em></a><em> and his </em><a href="https://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/the-eric-jackson-podcast/id1009301965?mt=2"><em>Podcast</em></a><em>. You can follow Eric on Twitter</em> <a href="https://www.twitter.com/ericjackson"><em>@ericjackson</em> </a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b2c6c04586f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dropbox Is No Longer A Boring Consumer Company]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ericjackson/dropbox-is-no-longer-a-boring-consumer-company-69440226825b?source=rss-786dd3eb3058------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/69440226825b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dropbox-paper]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dbx]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dropbox]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[saas]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Feb 2019 16:22:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-04T14:03:08.285Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/275/1*SCzE0e1F5XUhe8GW70TVOA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Dropbox (DBX) IPO’ed last March. Since then, its stock performance has been underwhelming. After initially popping up from its $21/share IPO price to trade in the high $20s and low $30s, It traded down below $20 on Christmas Eve and opened this morning in the $23/share range.</p><p>Although the IPO got some initial press coverage, you don’t hear about it much these days on business television or in the press. A flat stock contributes to that. Former Google exec, Dennis Woodside, who was Dropbox’s COO, <a href="https://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/track/click?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=a5387a0de2&amp;e=778fb43f06">announced he was leaving the company</a> in August and that also likely didn’t help with optics to investors.</p><p>Many still think of Dropbox as the consumer file storage company that they signed up for 10 years ago for a free account and now never use. Where’s the business model in that?</p><p>Yet, Dropbox has seemingly recreated itself as a very large and growing enterprise subscription software service catering to team collaboration and project management. It surpassed $1 billion in annual revenues in 2017 and should do close to $1.4 billion for 2018 when they announce earnings in a few weeks from now. That makes them significantly larger than some of the more prominent enterprise SaaS companies that get a good deal of attention.</p><p>Here are some interesting facts about the “new” Dropbox which you might not know:</p><ul><li>Their sales have been growing in the mid- to high-20% range for the last few quarters</li><li>Virtually all its revenue is recurring. So it’s really a SaaS company</li><li>Its gross margins and operating margins have been expanding recently (to 75.9% and 12.8% respectively in the most recent quarter).</li><li>It’s FCF and EBITDA positive and has been for some time.</li><li>Dropbox paid users were up again last quarter to 12.3 million and its ARPU was also up sequentially (to +5.9% y/y).</li><li>It follows a similar virality/self service sales model to Twilio, SendGrid (recently merged with Twilio), and Atlassian. Dropbox only spends 24% of revenues on Sales and Marketing costs (vs. 50% for many of its peers). Instead, it relies on word of mouth and link-sharing. This partly explains the high gross margins but also points to the potential for Dropbox to actually see revenue acceleration in the coming quarters. This is of course something that Wall Street investors would get very excited about if it happened.</li><li>Dropbox did its biggest acquisition earlier this week for HelloSign (for $264 million) which allows for electronic signatures of documents in different verticals. This further signals they are going after high margin team/collaboration features to win more paying subscribers (and to complement their existing high-value features for project management and collaboration which their customers are already paying them for today).</li><li>Churn has been steady.</li><li>The company today says it has 50% of the Fortune 500 using Dropbox Business Teams. They still have a very large Total Addressable Market (TAM) to go after and their 10 year old consumer storage history gives them much more familiarity with potential customers than nascent start-ups.</li><li>Salesforce invested $100 million in the Dropbox IPO — meaning they essentially own 3.5% of the company. Salesforce also invited Dropbox to their Dreamforce conference in September. It seems like the 2 could become meaningful partners to each other as they don’t compete directly. (You could also call it a Salesforce put on the Dropbox shares.)</li><li>Dropbox is currently valued at a 7x P/S ratio for the TTM. This is on the low-end for SaaS companies currently. After a strong quarter earlier this week, ServiceNow sports a 15x P/S ratio.</li><li>If Dropbox actually started seeing its revenues accelerate this year and got a higher P/S multiple like most other growing SaaS companies, the stock could get repriced meaningfully higher from current levels.</li><li>If they only kept on increasing their sales at a decelerating rate, Dropbox is trading close to its 52 week lows and seems like a good candidate to go back to its initial post-IPO trading range of $30–42, if not into the $50s.</li></ul><p>Dropbox’s biggest risk is probably that Microsoft and Google come after them more aggressively with their own team collaboration apps. Yet, they’ve had such products in the market for a while and Dropbox continues to grow with its neutrality and ease of use story.</p><p>Another risk is that Dropbox continues to get ignored by investors as we’ve seen in the past 6 months, despite its good earnings and the stock keeps drifting down.</p><p>However, all things considered, I think the risk/reward is very attractive for Dropbox at these levels. Hopefully for investors, the company’s viral business model will continue to take hold in 2019.</p><p><em>[Disclosure: Affiliates controlled by Eric Jackson hold long positions in Dropbox, Atlassian, and Twilio]</em></p><p><em>Commentary by Eric Jackson, sign up for Eric’s monthly </em><a href="https://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/track/click?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=076c93e085&amp;e=778fb43f06"><em>Tech &amp; Media Email</em></a><em> and his </em><a href="https://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/track/click?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=c81d5470b1&amp;e=778fb43f06"><em>Podcast</em></a><em>. You can follow Eric on Twitter</em> <a href="https://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/track/click?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=c91d9c5ae1&amp;e=778fb43f06"><em>@ericjackson</em> </a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=69440226825b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Disney’s Stock Price Once Again Looks Attractive]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ericjackson/disneys-stock-price-once-again-looks-attractive-ef4eddcb9ec7?source=rss-786dd3eb3058------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ef4eddcb9ec7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[stocks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diş]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disney]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2019 18:29:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-23T20:31:30.678Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Disney’s stock price topped out at $121/share in August 2015. Since then, it’s treaded water between $120 at the top and $90 at the bottom of the range. August 2015 was when CEO Bob Iger first publicly admitted on an earnings call that its Media Networks division (housing ESPN) was seeing subscriber declines.</p><p>Of course, since the Disney top, the stock market has increased (the S&amp;P is up roughly 50%) while Disney’s shares have sagged (down about 10%).</p><p>When your stock has been a loser, people tend to think you’ll stay a loser. The same principle applies to winners. So it’s natural that there’s not that much buzz about Disney going into 2019.</p><p>However, I think this could finally be the year that Disney’s stock shows some meaningful gains. Here’s why:</p><ul><li>Since the start of October (when the market swooned), Disney has meaningfully outperformed the S&amp;P 500. The S&amp;P is down about 10% since then. Disney is down 5%.</li><li>April 11th Investor Day should be a catalyst. The company will demonstrate its new Disney+ streaming service and discuss it and the company’s strategy in general</li><li>Disney+ launches in calendar Q4 and there should be some excitement and newsflow relating to the service leading up to it.</li><li>Disney may unveil a “Disney as a Service” type offering that allows subscribers to get theme park, cruise, and consumer goods discounts in addition to access to their new streaming services like Disney+ and ESPN+. These are assets that Netflix or any other potential entertainment streaming service can’t offer and may lead to higher annual subscription fees for some.</li><li>The core Media Networks division seems to continue to be on a less bad news track.</li><li>The historical price-to-sales multiple for Disney just hit a multi-year trough level. In the last 4 years, its P/S ratio has gone between 2.6x and 4.1x (at the August 2015 high). It recently hit 2.6x again at the Christmas Eve lows and is currently around 2.8x. While I don’t think it’s going back to 4x this year, with a series of good news announcements and upgrades, I don’t think it’s impossible for it to go back up to 3.3x.</li><li>The Fox assets deal is expected to close this quarter. Once this happens, analysts will start to build the value of these assets into their projections for Disney this year and next. After that, the Street is likely to pay much more attention to the potential for all the assets together.</li><li>The divestiture of the Fox RSNs will likely happen in the next couple of months as well. There’s been a lot of speculation about who might or might not bid for these assets and whether or not the price they’ll pay will be higher than $20 billion. Regardless who buys them, or even if it’s lower than $20 billion, the market will likely take it as a positive once the deal is announced and certainty around the divestiture exists.</li><li>There’s also going to be regular Disney earnings as well. The next report is due in February.</li></ul><p>So those are the potential “catalysts” this year. What was also interesting was that last week Disney released an 8-K with financial information reorganized showing Consumer Products as part of Theme Parks (under Bob Chapek) and Direct To Consumer (DTC) together with International (under Kevin Mayer). The DTC division already showed $3.4 billion in revenue (although critics howl that the division is losing money — even though many of those same critics don’t seem to mind it a lick that Netflix is still losing money on DTC). It’s likely that Disney is doing this to encourage the Street to value it on a “sum-of-the-parts” basis. And why shouldn’t they?</p><p>Are you going to value Disney DTC on a traditional media company EV/EBITDA basis when Netflix has always been valued on a P/S basis? Netflix has seen its P/S ratio in the last 4 years range from 3x — 15x. It’s currently at 9x. What’s appropriate for the DTC and International division of Disney? 6x?</p><p>So, let’s play this out.</p><ul><li>DTC and International is doing $3.4 billion a year in revenues now. What kind of initial success will Disney+ have by next year? 10 million subs? At $10 a month? That’s $1.2 billion a year in subscription revenue. Put a 6x multiple on the old and new revenue for the division and you’re talking about $28 billion of value.</li><li>Old Disney is supposed to do $63 billion on revenue (based on Bloomberg consensus estimates) for the year ending September 2020. Let’s call it $60 billion and put a 3.3x multiple of that. That’s $198 billion in value.</li><li>Fox assets. According to the Disney merger proxy from last June, the Fox assets which Disney will acquire were doing about a $20 billion revenue run rate in 2017. Disney has said there’ll be $2 billion in synergies but maybe there’s also some revenue slippage, so let’s assume there will be $20 billion of revenue in 2020. With the same 3.3x multiple, that’s another $66 billion in value.</li><li>Altogether, that’s $292 billion of value. How many shares will Disney have by then? They have 1.49 billion today but will issue more to complete the Fox acquisition (as well as cash to those Fox sellers who prefer cash). Let’s assume they have 1.7 billion shares outstanding.</li><li>That suggests the fair price target for Disney stock after the closing of the Fox assets and assuming a reasonable start to Disney+ is something closer to <strong><em>$172 per share rather than the current $110 per share</em></strong>.</li></ul><p>Of course, we will have to see what the shares outstanding are after the Fox deal closes. We’ll also have to hear from Disney management on their projections at their Investor Day, and their plans for a “Disney as a Service” model. And we will have to see if any inter-segment Disney revenue declines once the Disney+ service launches.</p><p>However, at a high level, there are a number of reasons which make me optimistic about Disney’s stock price going into this year.</p><p><em>[Disclosure: Affiliates controlled by Eric Jackson hold long positions in Disney]</em></p><p><em>Commentary by Eric Jackson, sign up for Eric’s monthly </em><a href="http://twitter.us11.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=886b833e7ee9981fff7354cd9&amp;id=5b7ea69431"><em>Tech &amp; Media Email</em></a><em> and his </em><a href="https://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/the-eric-jackson-podcast/id1009301965?mt=2"><em>Podcast</em></a><em>. You can follow Eric on Twitter</em> <a href="https://www.twitter.com/ericjackson"><em>@ericjackson</em> </a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef4eddcb9ec7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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