<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by EternalBeats on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by EternalBeats on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@eternalbeats?source=rss-96b7cd8c88a6------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 01:34:33 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@eternalbeats/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Shedding Light on Indonesia’s User Privacy in Android Applications]]></title>
            <link>https://eternalbeats.medium.com/shedding-light-on-indonesias-user-privacy-in-android-applications-ae8878112056?source=rss-96b7cd8c88a6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ae8878112056</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[clevertap]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[appsflyer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tracking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[EternalBeats]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Jul 2021 12:36:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-05T12:36:10.458Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Sugiarta Wijaya and <a href="https://bmleebigby.medium.com/"><strong>Bryan Mitchell Lee</strong></a> ( Interns @ ITSECAsia )</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*XECrr09sFMqX3xyb.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.thea-blast.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Screen-Shot-2018-04-10-at-8.34.19-AM-900x478.png">https://www.thea-blast.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Screen-Shot-2018-04-10-at-8.34.19-AM-900x478.png</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Background</h3><p>Not too long ago, we made an article on Indonesia’s Biggest Data Leak which you can find <a href="https://bmleebigby.medium.com/deeper-insight-towards-indonesias-biggest-data-leak-9e0c596383b0">here</a>, which then leads us to a discussion about today’s reality on protecting self’s digital privacy when almost everyone carries with them at all time, a compact location tracker and behavioral logger tool we now love and depend on called “smart phones”.</p><p>We both use smartphones and are in no way being hypocrites, but as individuals striving to know more and be better in the information security world, we decided to check and see for ourselves and hopefully uncover some truth as part of our learning process.</p><p>The reason why we analyzed Gojek’s android application is because during conducting daily penetration testing on client’s application, our Senior Penetration Tester found out huge amount of traffic sent to AppsFlyer endpoint repeatedly in a close interval which has the parameter “app_id=com.gojek.app”. This makes it an interesting topic to research into and find out what actually gets send to these analytical endpoints.</p><p>Disclaimer : This article is only for research purposes and is aimed to increase viewer’s awareness on user background data collection and analytics. Viewers should read and comprehend this article as it is.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qY3L1a7CfRx2Mh-LGHNWOw.png" /></figure><p>Gojek has stated in the privacy policy that they have the right to collect, store, process user data and send it to their third party partners, these agreements and policies are agreed by us when we register and log in to Gojek’s application.</p><h3>Analyzing Trackers</h3><p>As our first approach on analyzing the Application, we used MobSF’s feature to list out existing trackers. The scan result showed us 8 trackers inside including AppsFlyer, CleverTap, Facebook Analytics, Google Analytics, and Instabug.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/862/1*nQNY2J2JAWxKh5Y_3h8SoA.png" /></figure><p>However we can’t always rely on automated scanner so we decided to check the traffic for ourself using Burpsuite proxy (in order to replicate this you will first need to bypass the SSL pinning)</p><p>We found some interesting third-party endpoints that are requesting “analytical” data, these third-party endpoints in addition to Gojek’s API endpoint itself and the data they log will be discussed in detail below.</p><h3><strong>AppsFlyer</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/659/0*nvMALhEC6c7Uo1X-.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.appsflyer.com/">https://www.appsflyer.com/</a></p><pre>Accurate data, an unbiased customer-centric approach, and privacy by design make AppsFlyer the attribution platform of choice for the world’s leading brands</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/354/1*nfPYSkqYdtaQSFAoMJFXng.png" /><figcaption>AppsFlyer inside Gojek’s APK</figcaption></figure><p>On inspecting the traffic through Burpsuite, we found out that we are not able to read the request body, since at first we thought that it was compressed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/1*nClHjN73kqiJ-AiVrPvr4A.png" /><figcaption>AppsFlyer Encrypted Request Body</figcaption></figure><p>We did an entropy check to see if it is compressed or encrypted.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A57pRWl2SKp7mUQuqKSjTw.png" /></figure><p>It has an entropy of &gt;7.9 which implies that it might be encrypted. Searching around on AppFlyer’s website we can then confirm that the request body is encrypted before it is sent to AppsFlyer’s endpoint for Gojek Application.</p><p><a href="https://www.appsflyer.com/glossary/spoofed-traffic/">Spoofed Traffic | AppsFlyer</a></p><pre>AppsFlyer’s encrypted SDK, unlike open source SDKs, uses encrypted server messages, postbacks are much more difficult to fake and manipulate.</pre><p>This made us all the more excited in uncovering what’s really being sent to AppsFlyer’s endpoint.</p><p>By using Frida, we were able to trace it back to a class where the data is being operated on before it is sent to the endpoint.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/528/1*JSa_OVhf_dXFafBpGY3XeQ.png" /></figure><p>We made a Frida script to intercept the return value in “AFEvent.params” and transform it from an Object datatype to strings in order to get the unencrypted data before it’s passed to an encryption method and sent to the endpoint.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*WXQuUAEYUysECbGBYJZTdA.png" /></figure><p>Unencrypted AppsFlyer’s Request Body</p><pre>{<br>    &quot;device&quot;: &quot;sailfish&quot;,<br>    &quot;firstLaunchDate&quot;: &quot;2021-06-24_095255+0000&quot;,<br>    &quot;sdk&quot;: &quot;25&quot;,<br>    &quot;carrier&quot;: &quot;3&quot;,<br>    &quot;cksm_v1&quot;: &quot;4ca01c43001ccd507ffa9b038fcc1f52f5&quot;,<br>    &quot;advertiserIdEnabled&quot;: &quot;true&quot;,<br>    &quot;iaecounter&quot;: &quot;928&quot;,<br>    &quot;advertiserId&quot;: &quot;86d77577-9459-48d0-a968-2f060d057ae4&quot;,<br>    &quot;appUserId&quot;: &quot;717336557&quot;,<br>    &quot;deviceData&quot;: {<br>        &quot;dim&quot;: {<br>            &quot;x_px&quot;: &quot;1080&quot;,<br>            &quot;y_px&quot;: &quot;1782&quot;,<br>            &quot;size&quot;: &quot;2&quot;,<br>            &quot;xdp&quot;: &quot;442.451&quot;,<br>            &quot;d_dpi&quot;: &quot;460&quot;,<br>            &quot;ydp&quot;: &quot;443.345&quot;<br>        },<br>        &quot;build_display_id&quot;: &quot;NDE63H&quot;,<br>        &quot;arch&quot;: &quot;&quot;,<br>        &quot;cpu_abi&quot;: &quot;arm64-v8a&quot;,<br>        &quot;cpu_abi2&quot;: &quot;&quot;<br>    },<br>    &quot;eventValue&quot;: &quot;{\&quot;CurrentCountry\&quot;:\&quot;ID\&quot;,\&quot;ChatVersion\&quot;:\&quot;v4\&quot;,\&quot;S2ID_15\&quot;:\&quot;3344475085107888128\&quot;,\&quot;UserLongitude\&quot;:106.7897978,\&quot;S2ID_13\&quot;:\&quot;3344475073296728064\&quot;,\&quot;EpochTime\&quot;:1625017613,\&quot;S2ID_12\&quot;:\&quot;3344475021757120512\&quot;,\&quot;S2ID_10\&quot;:\&quot;3344475777671364608\&quot;,\&quot;SignedUpCountry\&quot;:\&quot;ID\&quot;,\&quot;S2ID_14\&quot;:\&quot;3344475086181629952\&quot;,\&quot;S2ID_18\&quot;:\&quot;3344475085124665344\&quot;,\&quot;UserLatitude\&quot;:-6.1739604,\&quot;DeviceModel\&quot;:\&quot;Pixel\&quot;,\&quot;S2ID_17\&quot;:\&quot;3344475085174996992\&quot;,\&quot;S2ID_11\&quot;:\&quot;3344474953037643776\&quot;,\&quot;SessionID\&quot;:\&quot;1df7f3f6-9116-4e8c-b55d-e4cc9ff97836\&quot;,\&quot;operating_system\&quot;:\&quot;android\&quot;,\&quot;S2ID_16\&quot;:\&quot;3344475085376323584\&quot;,\&quot;DeviceMake\&quot;:\&quot;Google\&quot;}&quot;,<br>    &quot;af_events_api&quot;: &quot;1&quot;,<br>    &quot;disk&quot;: &quot;18539/24900&quot;,<br>    &quot;network&quot;: &quot;WIFI&quot;,<br>    &quot;af_timestamp&quot;: &quot;1625017614645&quot;,<br>    &quot;product&quot;: &quot;sailfish&quot;,<br>    &quot;counter&quot;: &quot;54&quot;,<br>    &quot;installDate&quot;: &quot;2021-06-24_094727+0000&quot;,<br>    &quot;date1&quot;: &quot;2021-06-24_164727+0700&quot;,<br>    &quot;tokenRefreshConfigured&quot;: false,<br>    &quot;af_preinstalled&quot;: &quot;false&quot;,<br>    &quot;lang_code&quot;: &quot;en&quot;,<br>    &quot;appsflyerKey&quot;: &quot;nn3gEyFppeARRaPRuyKx8R&quot;,<br>    &quot;sc_o&quot;: &quot;p&quot;,<br>    &quot;installer_package&quot;: &quot;com.android.vending&quot;,<br>    &quot;registeredUninstall&quot;: false,<br>    &quot;ivc&quot;: false,<br>    &quot;last_boot_time&quot;: 1624955593792,<br>    &quot;lang&quot;: &quot;English&quot;,<br>    &quot;app_version_name&quot;: &quot;4.22.1&quot;,<br>    &quot;eventName&quot;: &quot;Chat Tab Display&quot;,<br>    &quot;sig&quot;: &quot;CF436094469CA08FCB5C950597E90351400AC733ECBA4071F194DCCEBAAE4CA8&quot;,<br>    &quot;isGaidWithGps&quot;: &quot;true&quot;,<br>    &quot;user_emails&quot;: &quot;{\&quot;plain_el_arr\&quot;:[\&quot;<a href="/service/mailto:onlyfordummytesting@gmail.com">onlyfordummytesting@gmail.com</a>\&quot;]}&quot;,<br>    &quot;deviceType&quot;: &quot;user&quot;,<br>    &quot;sensors&quot;: {<br>        &quot;mm&quot;: {<br>            &quot;v&quot;: [<br>                [<br>                    -107.5,<br>                    -55<br>                ],<br>                [<br>                    -0.3,<br>                    -0.3<br>                ]<br>            ],<br>            &quot;n&quot;: &quot;AK09915 magnetometer&quot;<br>        },<br>        &quot;am&quot;: {<br>            &quot;v&quot;: [<br>                [<br>                    0.8,<br>                    -0.4,<br>                    9.6<br>                ],<br>                [<br>                    0,<br>                    0,<br>                    0<br>                ]<br>            ],<br>            &quot;n&quot;: &quot;BMI160 accelerometer&quot;<br>        },<br>        &quot;gs&quot;: {<br>            &quot;v&quot;: [<br>                [<br>                    0,<br>                    0,<br>                    0<br>                ],<br>                [<br>                    0,<br>                    0,<br>                    0<br>                ]<br>            ],<br>            &quot;n&quot;: &quot;BMI160 gyroscope&quot;<br>        }<br>    },<br>    &quot;af_v2&quot;: &quot;1564afddadd825d6551926076f4f06f6d140e77f&quot;,<br>    &quot;app_version_code&quot;: &quot;4221&quot;,<br>    &quot;af_v&quot;: &quot;c15cc1c29c40ec912c8797f7a3b3463398dd2183&quot;,<br>    &quot;platformextension&quot;: &quot;android_native&quot;,<br>    &quot;operator&quot;: &quot;3&quot;,<br>    &quot;country&quot;: &quot;EN&quot;,<br>    &quot;brand&quot;: &quot;google&quot;,<br>    &quot;date2&quot;: &quot;2021-06-24_164727+0700&quot;,<br>    &quot;prev_event&quot;: &quot;{\&quot;prev_event_timestamp\&quot;:\&quot;1625017614665\&quot;,\&quot;prev_event_value\&quot;:\&quot;{\\\&quot;CurrentCountry\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;ID\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;S2ID_15\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;3344475085107888128\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;UserLongitude\\\&quot;:106.7897978,\\\&quot;S2ID_13\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;3344475073296728064\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;Action\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;Foreground\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;EpochTime\\\&quot;:1625017612,\\\&quot;Id\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;d3fc5f8b-c624-45c3-b9ab-844d583ec85b\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;S2ID_12\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;3344475021757120512\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;S2ID_10\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;3344475777671364608\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;SignedUpCountry\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;ID\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;S2ID_14\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;3344475086181629952\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;S2ID_18\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;3344475085124665344\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;UserLatitude\\\&quot;:-6.1739604,\\\&quot;DeviceModel\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;Pixel\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;S2ID_17\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;3344475085174996992\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;S2ID_11\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;3344474953037643776\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;SessionID\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;1df7f3f6-9116-4e8c-b55d-e4cc9ff97836\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;operating_system\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;android\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;S2ID_16\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;3344475085376323584\\\&quot;,\\\&quot;DeviceMake\\\&quot;:\\\&quot;Google\\\&quot;}\&quot;,\&quot;prev_event_name\&quot;:\&quot;App Active Time Tracker\&quot;}&quot;,<br>    &quot;uid&quot;: &quot;1624528374877-1096504963802631415&quot;,<br>    &quot;isFirstCall&quot;: &quot;false&quot;,<br>    &quot;cell&quot;: {<br>        &quot;mnc&quot;: 89,<br>        &quot;mcc&quot;: 510<br>    },<br>    &quot;model&quot;: &quot;Pixel&quot;<br>}</pre><p>After seeing the unencrypted data with our own eyes, we begin to wonder if it is really just purely for “Analytical / Attribution” purposes.</p><p>The data is continuously sent to the endpoint on almost every button press, whenever you interact with the application even after closing the Gojek application. These fields include but not limited to :</p><ul><li>Smartphone’s hardware specification (CPU architecture, performance, operating system, screen display, preferences, and many more)</li><li>Application user’s EXACT location (Country, UserLongitude, UserLatitude, and <strong>S2ID</strong>)</li><li>User’s button presses (AppsFlyer will make a request on each event of button press, this request then will have its own id and is logged sequentially, which means AppsFlyer will have an abundance of data to calculate user behavior and/or personality)</li></ul><h4>S2 Geometry</h4><p>Most of us have probably heard of Longitude and Latitude, but what is S2?</p><p><a href="https://s2geometry.io/">S2 Geometry</a></p><pre>S2 is a library for spherical geometry that aims to have the same robustness, flexibility, and performance as the very best planar geometry libraries.</pre><p>Basically it’s a curved map covered in squares called cells. These cells vary in sizes from around 7842 km in size down to 6 mm in size. It all depend on the ‘level’ they wanted to use from 0–30 (Think of it as accuracy).</p><p>But what can S2 even do in correlation to user tracking?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eJ228oELlj9T-4_QDqnvBQ.png" /><figcaption>S2 Tracking System</figcaption></figure><p>Using the S2 system we can create an accurate mapping from the cells from real-time location. This data when used effectively enables whoever has access to the aforementioned data to predict where the user might go before he/she even thinks about going there. This ability to predict human behavior is more than slightly concerns us both, the data can be so easily misused for other unethical intentions.</p><p><a href="https://www.gojek.io/blog/appreciating-the-geo-s2-library">Appreciating the geo/S2 library - 3 min read</a></p><p>As confirmed by this article, Gojek is able to use the s2cells data to know how many users are currently in the area to locate “hotspots”. However since we dont know exactly how the user data is processed in the backend, we can’t fully predict what the data is used for.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/677/1*YVIG16GRaueenn5b_W4pOg.png" /><figcaption>S2Geometry Implementation for Gojek</figcaption></figure><p>However from an analytical view as mentioned before, the data can be used to predict where the user will go, the range or reach of that particular person’s travel, and the user’s connection based on location. For example when spending a lot of time in a particular location especially at night, any other users in close vicinity could be considered as roommates or family members.</p><h4>MNC, MCC, LAC, CellID</h4><p>Other than the previously mention S2Geometry data, there are also some interesting fields that are crucial in information gathering and location tracking such as MNC (Mobile Network Code), MCC (Mobile Country Code), LAC (Local Area Code) and CallID/ CID which we can use to track a person’s location. Here’s an example</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*8N0SQDkL-bQxiSyX.png" /><figcaption>Example from cellidfinder.com</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://cellidfinder.com/articles/how-to-find-cellid-location-with-mcc-mnc-lac-i-cellid-cid">How to find the Cell Id location with MCC, MNC, LAC and CellID (CID).</a></p><p>This method is more commonly used by telecommunication companies to know if a particular area is covered by their cell towers or not. This way, telecommunication companies are able to decide where to expand their reach next more efficiently.</p><h3>CleverTap</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/684/1*7_6Ucg9p6dsBFG8NJ-EZ0A.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://clevertap.com/">https://clevertap.com/</a></p><pre>CleverTap is the most complete and capable platform for mobile growth teams. By combining real-time analytics, a powerful segmentation engine, and a suite of engagement tools, your team has everything they’ll need to build an amazing mobile experience.</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/456/1*2lr5UyHJmDqsahFdDyt8Gw.png" /><figcaption>CleverTap inside Gojek’s APK</figcaption></figure><p>CleverTap uses the endpoint wzrkt.com</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/606/1*5hNJBbH7Q9e5jNyp6W96Vw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Request to wzrkt.com (CleverTap)</figcaption></figure><p>Unlike AppsFlyer, the request body is not encrypted and less detailed. However the data sent to the endpoint seems to be tracking the user’s EXACT location as well. The request is triggered whenever we interact with the Gojek APK, sending continuous stream of data containing our coordinates and S2 value.</p><p>The following images are from 3 different requests body sent to wzrkt.com, pay attention to the field and value pointed by red arrows.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/997/1*whBjJkD1ARGpQcno6eqZxA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QgQEw5LfRXjXXhgvWFFw1A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/947/1*iW1xMM8klu_HrvlZ95wKdA.png" /></figure><p>Have you noticed something? CleverTap monitors our movement and events happening in the application (button presses etc.) and records it, however the requests body also contains all over sensitive data that is unrelated to application events logging. For example, changing to promo page from home page, triggers the requests that send your location as well, which is really weird as to what the location data is supposed to serve in every subsequent requests.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/556/1*Oc23RaidO4KQIdRvLphuRw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r1_gqNotoLVpTzMui9bkOg.png" /><figcaption>VirusTotal Community Scoring</figcaption></figure><p>The suspicious domain name and data collection then causes it to have bad community score in VirusTotal and even detected as a malware by 1 security vendor.</p><p>CleverTap’s endpoint “wzrkt.com” was even covered in local media and was accused of stealing data from users.</p><p><a href="https://republika.co.id/berita/trendtek/internet/18/03/26/p66w7o359-setelah-facebook-aplikasi-india-ketahuan-curi-data-pengguna">Setelah Facebook, Aplikasi India Ketahuan Curi Data Pengguna |Republika Online</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/584/1*MGL7Mz5hFt2OVCByRYnBHw.png" /><figcaption>Twitter Post on wzrkt’s Subdomain</figcaption></figure><h3>Facebook Analytics</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NTF_ZwyfPIUMZwjb.png" /></figure><p>It is not even surprising anymore that Facebook has an analytical platform since social media in itself profits from the user’s data. A wise man once said, when you use something for free, then you are the product. However Facebook does not stop at only users in its own domain, Facebook also has partners all around including Gojek to create a huge network of analytics and user behavior monitoring so that they can create a profile for each person on the internet.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Hy6gtQkWtPLC8Ze3iJsYtQ.png" /><figcaption>HTTP Traffic to graph.facebook.com</figcaption></figure><p>The data is URL encoded, once decoded the data is actually in a JSON format, and after using a beautifier on it we can see it clearer</p><pre>format=json<br>sdk=android<br>custom_events=[<br>    {<br>        &quot;_eventName&quot;: &quot;Chat Error Tracking&quot;,<br>        &quot;_eventName_md5&quot;: &quot;9e32a0629bbfe0445e6df256cdeb8612&quot;,<br>        &quot;_logTime&quot;: 1624943015,<br>        &quot;_ui&quot;: &quot;unknown&quot;,<br>        &quot;_session_id&quot;: &quot;0b2c6a30-b00e-4291-a3be-3f178a5f9d49&quot;,<br>        &quot;CurrentCountry&quot;: &quot;ID&quot;,<br>        &quot;ErrorMessage&quot;: &quot;java.security.cert.CertPathValidatorException: Trust anchor for certification path not found.&quot;,<br>        &quot;UserLongitude&quot;: &quot;106.7897978&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_15&quot;: &quot;3344475085107888128&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_13&quot;: &quot;3344475073296728064&quot;,<br>        &quot;EpochTime&quot;: &quot;1624943015&quot;,<br>        &quot;ErrorContext&quot;: &quot;Babble Connect&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_12&quot;: &quot;3344475021757120512&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_10&quot;: &quot;3344475777671364608&quot;,<br>        &quot;SignedUpCountry&quot;: &quot;ID&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_14&quot;: &quot;3344475086181629952&quot;,<br>        &quot;ChatIdentifier&quot;: &quot;&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_18&quot;: &quot;3344475085124665344&quot;,<br>        &quot;UserLatitude&quot;: &quot;-6.1739604&quot;,<br>        &quot;DeviceModel&quot;: &quot;Pixel&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_17&quot;: &quot;3344475085174996992&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_11&quot;: &quot;3344474953037643776&quot;,<br>        &quot;operating_system&quot;: &quot;android&quot;,<br>        &quot;SessionID&quot;: &quot;b33bd71b-f23f-416e-bff8-ace44c813dc8&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_16&quot;: &quot;3344475085376323584&quot;,<br>        &quot;DeviceMake&quot;: &quot;Google&quot;<br>    },<br>    .<br>    . (Snipped)<br>    .,<br>    {<br>        &quot;_eventName&quot;: &quot;GoClub Entry Point Shown&quot;,<br>        &quot;_eventName_md5&quot;: &quot;4feec4020b15614440271c49fa8d41cb&quot;,<br>        &quot;_logTime&quot;: 1624943060,<br>        &quot;_ui&quot;: &quot;unknown&quot;,<br>        &quot;_session_id&quot;: &quot;0b2c6a30-b00e-4291-a3be-3f178a5f9d49&quot;,<br>        &quot;IsMember&quot;: &quot;false&quot;,<br>        &quot;CurrentCountry&quot;: &quot;ID&quot;,<br>        &quot;UserLongitude&quot;: &quot;106.7897978&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_15&quot;: &quot;3344475085107888128&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_13&quot;: &quot;3344475073296728064&quot;,<br>        &quot;Source&quot;: &quot;Home&quot;,<br>        &quot;BackgroundImage&quot;: &quot;<a href="https://i.gojekapi.com/darkroom/customer-platform/v2/images/41925011-7dc1-4c0d-a0d8-ccab3b9e63c7_Pro">https://i.gojekapi.com/darkroom/customer-platform/v2/images/41925011-7dc1-4c0d-a0d8-ccab3b9e63c7_Pro</a>&quot;,<br>        &quot;EpochTime&quot;: &quot;1624943060&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_12&quot;: &quot;3344475021757120512&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_10&quot;: &quot;3344475777671364608&quot;,<br>        &quot;SignedUpCountry&quot;: &quot;ID&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_14&quot;: &quot;3344475086181629952&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_18&quot;: &quot;3344475085124665344&quot;,<br>        &quot;UserLatitude&quot;: &quot;-6.1739604&quot;,<br>        &quot;DeviceModel&quot;: &quot;Pixel&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_17&quot;: &quot;3344475085174996992&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_11&quot;: &quot;3344474953037643776&quot;,<br>        &quot;operating_system&quot;: &quot;android&quot;,<br>        &quot;SessionID&quot;: &quot;b33bd71b-f23f-416e-bff8-ace44c813dc8&quot;,<br>        &quot;S2ID_16&quot;: &quot;3344475085376323584&quot;,<br>        &quot;DeviceMake&quot;: &quot;Google&quot;<br>    }<br>]<br>event=CUSTOM_APP_EVENTS<br>anon_id=XZ16146d83-5ef5-4578-9524-dea8381e9595<br>application_tracking_enabled=true<br>advertiser_id_collection_enabled=true<br>advertiser_id=86d77577-9459-48d0-a968-2f060d057ae4<br>advertiser_tracking_enabled=true<br>installer_package=com.android.vending<br>extinfo=[&quot;a2&quot;,&quot;com.gojek.app&quot;,4221,&quot;4.22.1&quot;,&quot;7.1&quot;,&quot;Pixel&quot;,&quot;en_US&quot;,&quot;&quot;,&quot;NoCarrier&quot;,1080,1782,&quot;2.88&quot;,4,-1,-1,&quot;Asia\/Jakarta&quot;]<br>application_package_name=com.gojek.app</pre><p>These data fields are what we get when we intercepted a Facebook analytics traffic to graph.facebook.com . We realized that the data sent to the endpoint is more detailed compared to what CleverTap sent to its own endpoint.</p><p>The “event data” enables Facebook Analytic to know</p><ul><li>What are we doing in the application</li><li>How are we doing the action, what we did before that, and what page are we doing it in</li><li>Where are we currently when doing the particular action (using coordinates and S2cell, with two tracking method means they have improved accuracy on where we are in real life)</li><li>If we are registered or have an account in Facebook</li><li>What device and its specifications are we using to access the application</li></ul><p>Its amazing how much data a third party analytics is designed to take from Gojek’s users and makes us wonder why there are so many different trackers and “analytics” from multiple third parties, sending the same extremely detailed data. Another interesting point is that Facebook Analytics keep on sending these data even though we don’t own a Facebook account, meaning they have an alternative way to keep profiling internet users without us even having to register to the Facebook social media.</p><h3>Gojek API</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1oBRBipr3NJTEmIs.png" /></figure><p>Gojek will of course need our location to function in most of its features. However the interesting point is that why does the app still requires our precise location even though we’re only accessing unrelated pages that does not need our location to function properly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FxZUvmS333vv3OPD002ILA.png" /></figure><p>This detailed request is sent in this format and fields with no exceptions to Gojek’s API endpoint. Another worthy mention is the X-M1 header that can be seen in most Gojek API requests, this header has been covered by @mame82 or Marcus Mengs in his twitter post where he covers how the Gojek android applicaton bypasses the Android permission system, to extract (trackable) persistent hardware identifiers and collect it as “analytical” through the API endpoint.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/593/1*GdzJYoLHbCxgvIxRUpaA4A.png" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//mobile.twitter.com/mame82/status/1316655939857063937&amp;image=https%3A//i.embed.ly/1/image%3Furl%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fabs.twimg.com%252Ferrors%252Flogo46x38.png%26key%3Da19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/4e1a4e095286cbdd5b158b2851a7a5b2/href">https://medium.com/media/4e1a4e095286cbdd5b158b2851a7a5b2/href</a></iframe><p>“Gojek simply uses the ‘java.lang.NetworkInterface’ class to enumerate interfaces and extract the hardware address of “wlan0” (of course by accident, as shown by the linter expression to suppress “HardwareIds” access warnings).” — Marcus Mengs</p><h3>Gojek “Hidden” Background Process</h3><p>This it the most interesting point of the whole article and will act as the main proving point of how an android application has the ability to easily invade a user’s privacy.</p><p>During our analysis on the application we found out that Gojek’s android application when closed from the multitask, will create another hidden process running in the background that will still send analytical data to all 4 endpoints even though we are not interacting with it at all and the only way to shut the process down is if you have shell access to your android device or by restarting your phone and not opening the Gojek application at all.</p><p>Here’s a video where we try to demonstrate the behavior so viewers can understand it better.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FkMUXYKzpKZk%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DkMUXYKzpKZk&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FkMUXYKzpKZk%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/267c1afa6a60e8c65e740da4622a6e40/href">https://medium.com/media/267c1afa6a60e8c65e740da4622a6e40/href</a></iframe><p>When closed, Gojek application will spawn another process with different PID after a few seconds that will still transmit data to all analytics and Gojek API endpoint itself. Which makes us wonder if this behavior is included in the privacy policy that users initially agreed on.</p><h3>Summary</h3><p>In the modern society where almost everyone owns a smartphone and is inseparable to technology, people will have to start being more aware of what they agree to. Any application that may help in daily endeavors, even though made with good intentions, does not always comes with no risk to the user’s privacy. In our opinion, all companies and developers should improve their socialization on privacy policies, terms of service etc. to their users. The customers has the right to know what and who is their data sent to also for what purpose, we believe that these agreement between users and developers should be made more clear to people who are less informed to modern technological advances.</p><p>This should apply to all companies and developers who are collecting data from their users. We are hoping for a change in the future where in the future, privacy policies does not come in form of long paragraphs that looks like it was copied from a lorem ipsum or the bible. Instead these agreements should be made more interactive and more easily understood for customers. Lastly we also hope that in the future, analytics or attributions or whatever name they come up with should improve their data collection methodology and only collect data that is necessary, not transmitting the user’s real time location with multiple tracking method when the user presses the home button will be a good start.</p><p>Hopefully this article can benefit many, and increase awareness about the reality of privacy and data collection in all platforms’ applications.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ae8878112056" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>