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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by chrisGoad on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by chrisGoad on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by chrisGoad on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Lacanian Analysis of “The Graduate”]]></title>
            <link>https://eutelic.medium.com/a-lacanian-analysis-of-the-graduate-8b01ce140273?source=rss-9eb6cdfd0ade------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[lacan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[the-graduate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[chrisGoad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 14:45:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-27T06:57:27.472Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>-<a href="https://medium.com/@eutelic">Chris Goad</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/225/1*L2oI_lwyh76rbd1BePsBbg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Borromean Knot symbolizing the three registers</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Lacan">Jacques Lacan</a> (1901–1981) was an influential French psychoanalyst.</p><p>In this note, I’ll briefly describe some of Lacan’s ideas, and as an example, show how they apply to the goings on in the old movie <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Graduate">“The Graduate”</a>. If you haven’t seen the movie, or your memory of it is hazy, you might want to see it again (it streams from Amazon).</p><p>According to Lacan, human experience is built from three components, which he called “registers”. They are as follows:</p><p>1. The imaginary. This is the realm of direct perception and imagination. One way of putting it is that it is the realm of the signified, leaving aside the signifiers.</p><p>2. The symbolic. This is the realm of signifiers, linguistic and otherwise. It is a realm formed by culture, of laws, social conventions, science, and the like.</p><p>3. The real. This is not reality, but the realm that cannot be symbolized. As <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Lacan">Wikipedia</a> puts it: “The Real is that which is outside language and which resists symbolization absolutely. It is this resistance to symbolization that lends the Real its traumatic quality. The Real is the object of anxiety, insofar as it lacks any possible mediation and is ‘the essential object which is not an object any longer, but this something faced with which all words cease and all categories fail, the object of anxiety par excellence.’”</p><p>According to Lacan, human experiences always mix the three registers, but one may dominate.</p><p>Additional Lacanian concepts are the Other, and the Mirror Stage.</p><p>The Other comes in two flavors, big and little. Quoting Wikipedia again (not an exact quote):</p><p>“The little Other is the Other who is not really other, but a reflection and projection of the ego, for example one’s own body as experienced by oneself. The little Other is entirely inscribed in the imaginary register.”</p><p>“The big Other designates radical alterity, an other-ness which transcends the illusory otherness of the imaginary because it cannot be assimilated through identification. Lacan equates this radical alterity with language and the law, and hence the big Other is inscribed in the register of the symbolic.”</p><p>Now to the mirror stage and alienation.</p><p>The mirror stage designates the time in an infant’s development when recognition by the infant of his/her body in a mirror first occurs. This normally happens between 6 and 18 months of age. According to Lacan, this recognition leads to an identification of the self with the body. The ego is thereby inaugurated. But this identification is imperfect. The infant’s ability to control the body is still partial, so there is still a degree of otherness to the body. The gap constitutes the infant’s original alienation.</p><p>Another early alienation comes with the acquisition of language. Language comes from outside the self. It is the big Other. When a child begins to speak, the possibility, even the certainty, of “getting it wrong” arises. Hence another gap between self and presentation, another alienation, arises. This is an alienation that persists thoughout life.</p><p>Now to the movie.</p><p>It begins with Ben in a state of alienation from the entire symbolic realm. He has just come home from college where he gathered many symbolic rewards. He reacts to praise about this success in a silent and sullen manner, showing his alienation.</p><p>In his early scenes Ben’s words are nearly always those that are expected of him (ie words originating from the big Other) and rarely express his own thoughts. This illustrates Lacan’s maxim “the Other must first of all be considered a locus in which speech is constituted”</p><p>The incompetence of Ben’s interpretations of the big Other’s directives provides the movie with much of its comedy.</p><p>The the early scuba scene seems impossible and jarring, two signal characteristics of Lacan’s real register.</p><p>Ben’s sullen, silent alienation only deepens during his affair with Mrs Robinson. She exudes the misery of inhabiting only the symbolic realm.</p><p>Daughter Elaine is what Lacan would call a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objet_petit_a">“Objet Petite a”</a>. Quoting Wikipedia again: “An Objet Petite a stands for the unattainable object of desire, a projection or reflection of the ego made to symbolise otherness.” There was no actual love between Ben and Elaine — they had very little contact. Instead Elaine was a projection of Ben’s, giving him an imaginary escape from her mother and his alienated existence</p><p>In the scene at the drive-in restaurant that Ben and Elaine visit after leaving the strip club, Ben lucidly describes the big Other and the effect that it has had on him in recent times.</p><p>In one of the scenes towards the end of the movie, Ben bars the doors of Elaine’s wedding church with a crucifix. What movie scene has been drenched more thoroughly in symbolism, or occupied a place more central to the symbolic register?</p><p>The movie ends with Ben and Elaine’s escape by bus. At first they seem elated, but gradually sink into anxiety. The anxiety of the Real.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8b01ce140273" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Hard Problem of Sensation]]></title>
            <link>https://eutelic.medium.com/the-hard-problem-of-sensation-2f0bfd9f3227?source=rss-9eb6cdfd0ade------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[consciousness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematical-realism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[chrisGoad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Mar 2024 15:24:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-03T16:09:59.180Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/987/1*3mehuOM1Mw5E9QelKRR7Fg.jpeg" /></figure><h4><strong>1. Awareness via mathematical realism</strong></h4><p><a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/">Mathematical realism</a> (also called Platonism) provides a framework for understanding how consciousness can arise in physical beings, but the realm of sensation presents further puzzles. So from this standpoint, <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/">the hard problem</a> adheres to sensation rather than to consciousness itself.</p><p>Let me explain. Mathematical realism is the doctrine that the structures studied in mathematics, the numbers, geometries, the endless varieties of sets (manifolds, topologies, Hilbert spaces,…) have an existence independent of our minds. When we do mathematics, we are discovering things about these real mathematical objects, not inventing them. Realism is perhaps a minority position in the philosophy of mathematics, but is the common attitude from which mathematicians practice their trade. At the end of this section, I briefly describe a less extensive form of realism that supports the same conclusions</p><p>Structures that can be modeled by mathematical objects are found throughout our world. Such structures include not only space, fields (such as gravitation and the electro-magnetic field) and counts of things (numbers), but any structure whose workings can be described precisely, such as the game of chess, or a computer program in any language.</p><p>Now, when I am aware of space, it feels from within that I am aware of something with three orthogonal directions, in which objects can be moved along paths, and rotated, and in which objects have extension. Call this phenomenal space. Mathematicians have discovered the structure <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-dimensional_space">R³</a> exhibiting these properties. There are differences. Most notably, phenomenal space and its contents are (presumably ) finite structures at any given moment. Positions in R³, on the other hand, are given with infinite precision. Also, positions in phenomenal space are usually given relative to the host of the space in question rather than a fixed coordinate system.</p><p>But still, phenomenal space can be viewed as a mathematical structure. Like R³, it is a container for shapes, which can be described by other mathematical structures such as those used in 3D CGI (computer-generated-imagery), structures which in turn have their own phenomenal counterparts. The exact forms of phenomenal space and its phenomenal contents have not been worked out, although phenomenologists, notably <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/">Husserl</a> and <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/merleau-ponty/">Merleau-Ponty</a>, have made a start. Husserl has a nice treatment of the finiteness of the contents of each moment of spatial perception within an infinite manifold, via his idea of “<a href="https://philpapers.org/browse/husserl-horizonality">horizons</a>”. Each perception of an object comes with a horizon of possible extensions, which consist of possible new views, perhaps closer views, of the object. Thereby, objects are presented to awareness as endless in content (infinite), even though finitely presented at each moment.</p><p>In any case, I find it plausible that our awareness of space<em> is </em>a mathematical structure, a structure whose existence in our minds follows from mathematical realism.</p><p>How is this awareness constructed? By emergence.</p><p>By emergence of a mathematical structure B from structure A, I mean that B’s primitives and relationships can be defined directly, or alternatively in the terms provided by A. An example is provided by the way that Euclidean geometry (B) emerges from the real numbers (A) via <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartesian_coordinate_system">cartesian coordinates</a>. Instead of positing points and lines as primitives, and writing down, as Euclid did, the laws that govern them, a point can be defined as a pair or triple of real numbers, and a line by a point and direction.</p><p>Note that I have defined emergence in a simple way. The term has been applied <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence">to a wide variety of things</a>.</p><p>This sort of thing happens often among mathematical systems which describe the physical world. For example, classical thermodynamics emerges from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_mechanics">statistical mechanics</a>. An example of a tower of emergence: chemistry emerges from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_field_theory">quantum field theory</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_and_theoretical_biology">biology</a> from chemistry, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_neuroscience">neurology</a> from biology. Each has its own level of description via its own set of mathematical objects.</p><p>Another tower starts with quantum field theory, but follows with the physics of semiconductors, theory of circuits, programming at the machine level, then at the level of the various high level programming languages. A software application might have its own mathematics, such as CGI where shapes and motions are modeled.</p><p>Now, according to mathematical realism, each level of emergence <em>exists </em>. A circuit level description of the operation of a computer is just as real as its quantum field description. And the geometric description of shapes modeled in a CGI application are as real as the circuit level description of the computer in which the CGI is running. Similarly, the modeling of space and shapes of objects in our brains, regarded geometrically, is just as real as any description at the neurological level. The differences between brain and computer are extensive — for one thing we know exactly what goes on in a computer, but only have foggy ideas about how space is modeled by neurons. Perhaps computer vision systems based on deep learning will provide a clue. In these systems spatial descriptions are encoded by s<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synaptic_weight">ynaptic weights</a>. This can only be a clue, not an explanation, since natural neurons are far more complex than their artificial counterparts.</p><p>Emergence in both of the towers mentioned above comes in layers. Each layer is a causal system which can be described independently of the layers below it, if the range of states of the lower layers are appropriately constrained. This at least is true of the computational tower, where we have full understanding of what is going on. The situation is murkier on the biological side, since many details are unknown.</p><p>My speculation is that consciousness constitutes one of the layers in the biological tower, and that phenomenal space is a mathematical structure within that layer.</p><p>This is a sketch of how our awareness of space and its contents might arise in our brains: a mathematical description of space and its contents might really exist there, at a level of emergence well above neurons, where it constitutes our spatial awareness. Space is present <em>to </em>us because it is present <em>within </em>us.</p><p>What applies to space, applies to other mathematical structures with phenomenal variants: the game of chess and computer programs, for example. Also, phenomena such as planning, self-knowledge, and memory can and have been cast in mathematical terms. The speculation is that these structures live along with phenomenal space in the same layer of emergence.</p><p><strong>My conclusion<em>: there is no hard problem of consciousness in the general case. That is, consciousness of some things, such as space, does not present a hard problem in </em></strong><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers"><strong><em>Chalmer’</em></strong></a><strong><em>s sense.</em></strong></p><p>A weaker, and perhaps more plausible, form of mathematical realism yields existence of the kinds of structures that I have been discussing. Namely, we need not say that <em>every </em>mathematical structure exists, but only those causal emergent structures whose chain of emergence is grounded in mathematical physics.</p><p><strong>2. Sensation</strong></p><p>However, this stance does not apply to other realms of consciousness. In these realms, the hard problem persists with full force. The case that I’ll discuss is that of an atomic sensation. Such sensations are known as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia">qualia </a>in the philosophy of mind, and examples include colors, smells, and pains. Husserl called them <a href="https://profesorvargasguillen.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/husserl_s-hyletic-data-and-phenomenal-consciousness-2013.pdf">hýle.</a></p><p>Here, it is adequate to consider the example of colors.</p><p>This is how the matter seems to me. Each color has its own essential nature, and that nature is disclosed to me in its exactness at the moment that I see it. Of course I am referring to the experience of a color, not some external thing such as a wavelength. I cannot recover the exactness of a color experience in memory, only the general category (linked to its name). But when a color is before me I cannot but think that I “know” exactly what I am seeing. Of course, colors are almost always encountered as properties of objects, but I have no problem in mentally isolating the color experience.</p><p>So colors are definite essences that appear within experience. Different colors are different essences.</p><p>These convictions are not based on deduction, but arise from direct experience. Unlike the <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/">eliminativists</a>, I cannot manage to doubt them.</p><p>My brain is built to believe these things, it seems. I cannot do otherwise, nor can I specify scientific meanings for the beliefs.</p><p>How can we account the fact that colors arise in the form that they do from a neural substrate? Why should 700 nanometer radiation, when processed by cones in the retina, and neurons of the occipital lobe, generate the sensation (red) that it does, and not blue instead? Why should it generate any sensation at all?</p><p>This seems an entirely intractable problem, which by its nature falls beyond scientific and mathematical thought. It is not even possible to formulate in scientific language what a color phenomenon <em>is</em>. Philosophers have not provided, as far as I can tell, any hints of an answer either. Most agree about its current intractability.</p><p>The image at the top of this note illustrates my points. It displays a moderately complex spatial structure, rendered in cyan. We see mathematical properties in the structure — symmetries and the like. The color cyan, however, does not appear to us as a structure at all, certainly not a mathematical one. It is an essence whose nature is a central mystery of our world.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2f0bfd9f3227" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Realm of the Determinate]]></title>
            <link>https://eutelic.medium.com/the-realm-of-the-determinate-23948576d40c?source=rss-9eb6cdfd0ade------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/23948576d40c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[chrisGoad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Oct 2023 03:37:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-08T12:54:48.650Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1017/1*pvCxTZa62g6gA4HVSv14NA.jpeg" /></figure><p>By a determinate, I mean a property of the world whose value is not dependent on chance or on human choice. I will start with determinacies of a mathematical nature, because of their stark nature, and then move on to physical determinacies.</p><p>Most people will agree that the result of multiplying two particular numbers is determinate, as is the set of factors of one particular number. More generally, programmers will agree that the output of any well defined algorithm, applied to particular inputs, and without calls to a random number generator, is determinate if the algorithm terminates. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alan_Turing">Alan Turing</a> was able to formulate this assertion with mathematical precision. His <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine">machines</a> have very simple and precise rules of operation. Yet no exception is known to the proposition that every algorithm can be implemented by a Turing machine; the many notions of computable function miraculously coincide. This conclusion is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis">Church-Turing thesis</a>.</p><p>For each formal mathematical theory, such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms">Peano arithmetic</a>, or <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_theory">ZFC set theory</a>, there is a Turing machine which, given a proposition, will search for its formal proof. If there is such a proof, it will find it, though it might take many times the age of the universe at a gigahertz step rate to do so. If there is no such proof, the Turing machine will never halt. So if a proposition can be proved in a formal mathematical theory, this fact is determinate. Truth is another matter (as Gödel <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems">showed</a>). For <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/">Platonists</a>, mathematical truth is generally seen as determinate too, but this is not germane to this discussion.</p><p>The physical world has many properties that qualify as determinate, but the situation is complicated. Such properties are theory dependent, and theories change. We can assert that the atomic number and weight of a given element are determinate, but only after we have developed atomic theory. One interesting case is that of a physical system which is either built to implement mathematical determinacies (like a computer) or which has been observed to obey such determinacies (like the solar system). Such a system can be said to have determinacies that are derived from mathematics. There is always the caveat that physical theories (both formal and informal) are subject to possible conflict with future observations, and physical machines can break down. Full exclusion of randomness is impossible in most cases. Still, some conclusions can be drawn that, while fallible in principle, do not involve human choice or chance.</p><p>What is the status of the realm of the determinate? For example, does every million digit number, and its set of factors, exist in some sense? Does every billion long sequence of states of every run of a Turing machine exist? Is the number of stars with planets in a particular galaxy a billion light-years away determinate? Maybe not in all cases, but the realm of the determinate might as well exist, given the relationship that humans have to the realm. An element of the realm comes into ordinary existence for the people who happen look at the element (and who with rare exceptions come to the same conclusions about the element when working separately, as one would expect). One would have to say that the realm of the determinate<em> takes a definite form in the world</em>, but its elements are only visible under certain conditions.</p><p>Our epistemic relationship to the realm of the mathematically determinate is the same as it is to determinacies in the physical world: neither will ever be completely known, but both are always available for further exploration. Before there were lunar probes, it was believed that the locations and sizes of craters on the dark side of the moon were determinate at any moment in time. We believed that probes sent by different nations would all see the same thing, or nearly so given that new craters can appear at any time (and do so, but gradually; it takes 80,000 years to <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/538177a">completely transfigure</a> the moonscape ). This belief in crater determinacy has not been contradicted, or we would have heard about it. The dark side of the moon, and the digits of <strong><em>π </em></strong>from the 100,000th through the 200,000th, had the same status, epistemically, in 1950: unknown. Both have been explored <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronology_of_computation_of_%CF%80">since</a>.</p><p>Mathematics and physical theory both evolve, and our idea of their determinacies with them. Mathematics evolves much more slowly than the physical theory. Euclid’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euclid%27s_Elements">“Elements”</a> (300 BC) still makes sense to us today, and does not contradict modern mathematics (although Euclid’s geometry is now embedded in a wider notion of the geometric). Set theory has stood firm for a century. On the whole, the mathematical sense of the determinate has greatly enlarged over the centuries, but seldom retreated.</p><p>All of the notions discussed here have arisen from human minds. Might alien minds have other notions of mathematics and of the determinate? How can we know until we encounter them?</p><p>However things may turn out with alien minds, the presence in the world of determinacy of the algorithmic kind — which includes mathematical provability- is not subject to doubt. Our phenomenal world does indeed contain the determinate and we too are parts of the wide world, therefore the wide world contains the determinate. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edmund_Husserl">Husserl</a> formulates our membership in the wide world well: “Consciousness and things in general are thereby a combined whole, combined into individual psychophysical entities that we call ‘animalia’ and ultimately in the <em>real unity of the entire world</em>.” (Ideas 1, section 39)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=23948576d40c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Consciousness Is an Axiom, Not a Theorem]]></title>
            <link>https://eutelic.medium.com/consciousness-is-an-axiom-not-a-theorem-39b4d9bd7b9b?source=rss-9eb6cdfd0ade------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/39b4d9bd7b9b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[consciousness]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[chrisGoad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jun 2023 21:46:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-21T21:46:05.753Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This brief article is in reply to <a href="https://medium.com/@wilstrup?source=post_page-----4e567a5aedc5--------------------------------">Casper Skern Wilstrup</a>’s piece: <a href="https://medium.com/machine-cognition/we-know-exactly-what-consciousness-is-dont-let-anyone-tell-you-otherwise-4e567a5aedc5">We Know Exactly What Consciousness Is — Don’t Let Anyone Tell You Otherwise</a>. In that article it is argued that an understanding of consciousness cannot be rooted in the ideas that science presents to us about an external world, via neurology ,quantum fields, mathematics and so forth. Wilstrup bases his argument on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism">idealism </a>(he expounds his idealism more directly <a href="https://medium.com/machine-cognition/objective-reality-doesnt-exist-it-is-time-to-accept-it-and-move-on-7524b494d6af">here</a>), which turns any attempt to ground consciousness in science into a vicious circle, because in its estimation science is an emanation of consciousness only, outside of which there is nothing. You can’t ground consciousness in something whose only ground is itself consciousness. (I hope that I have stated Wilstrup’s argument correctly). The argument is valid if you are willing to grant idealism. I am not. It seems to me an arrogant position: that the only thing that exists is our own consciousness. This ushers us back into that comfortable world from which Copernicus (and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristarchus_of_Samos">Aristarchus </a>before him ) exiled us-namely the world of which we are the center. Here’s a much simpler argument for Wilstrup’s conclusion, in which idealism plays no role.</p><p>We find it self-evident that we have consciousness, in that that it <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_It_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F">is like something</a> to be us at each moment. There is, as it were, someone home. We also find it self-evident that our experience is a structure in which primitives (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia">qualia</a>) often appear. Let us take the canonical example of a quale: color. A color is a quale because it has no internal structure for us, no parts. Initially (we all start as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism">naïve realists</a>) we take color to be a property of the objects around us. Later most of come to think that color in our minds is not a direct copy of or access to something in the physical world, but some sort of representation of it. Even after escaping naïve realism, we still believe that when we see a particular color, that color is an element of experience with its own essential nature.</p><p>The above paragraph contains two statements of belief, the first that we have consciousness, and the second that our experience includes primitive elements, each with its own essence. Both are of an introspective nature, that is, they are statements that emerge from our s<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self_model">elf-model</a>.</p><p>What do we mean by these statements, and why do we believe them? It seems that both statements are primitive, in the sense that they cannot be explained in other terms. I cannot (nor it seems can anyone else) imagine what an argument establishing their truth would look like, or even what notion of truth would apply (except “obvious without argument”). They have no hope of being formulated as scientific statements (you can posit all the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism">conscious electrons</a> or <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-consciousness/">quantum mind-stuff</a> or <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory"><strong>Φ</strong>s</a> that you like — it won’t help a bit). I conclude that we believe these things because we can’t help it; they are built into our minds as are axioms into a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_(mathematical_logic)">mathematical theory</a>. This conclusion is a species of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_mysterianism">mysterianism</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=39b4d9bd7b9b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Phenomenology of Visual Pattern]]></title>
            <link>https://eutelic.medium.com/a-phenomenology-of-visual-pattern-643cf577ad6c?source=rss-9eb6cdfd0ade------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/643cf577ad6c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[phenomenology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[chrisGoad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 02 Oct 2022 11:58:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-02T11:58:57.093Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1017/1*enwcZU7KKEfDsh7pdiaRDg.jpeg" /></figure><p>In this note, I wish to convince you of three things, using a few examples. First, your perception of a patterned image, such as the one above, is not a copy of the image, but a hybrid of a general description, and transient bindings of that description to foveal copies. Second, the description is often mathematical in nature. Finally , I wish to show that the patterns that you see lie within your percepts. They might exist in the external world in some sense, but play no causal role in it except via these percepts.</p><p>All of this applies to natural as well as artificially generated images, in so far as the natural world includes patterns too.</p><h3><strong>1. Terminology</strong></h3><p>When you gaze at an image, such as the one above, there are two things going on. First there is the image itself as a physical object (in this case an array of pixels on your screen). Another is the seeing of the image, the image as it appears to you. The former is a physical thing, and the latter a mental thing. (Perhaps the mental thing emerges from the physical thing that is your brain, but it is still of a different character and structure than the image itself.) The mental thing is called a phenomenon (plural phenomena), in the jargon of the school of philosophy known as <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/">phenomenology</a>, founded in its modern form by <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/">Edmund Husserl</a> early in the twentieth century. I will employ this jargon in what follows.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hkxTZB6YkAJDPOY0l4hW5Q.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>Images 1 and 2</strong></figcaption></figure><h3>2. Phenomena arising from images are not copies or maps, but rely on general descriptions</h3><p>Are the left and right images just above different? They are, but this requires study. The <em>phenomena </em>that arise immediately from the two images are identical-they look just the same. Considered as arrays of pixels, or grids of short lines, there are plenty of diffences: 69 differences in the angles of lines. This is not apparent because the common phenomenon to which the two images give rise does not contain the orientations of the individual line segments. Instead, the phenomenon is captured by the description “a square grid of randomly oriented white line segments on a field of black”. By randomly is meant: “with no pattern that I can detect”. This shows clearly that what is in the mind, the phenomenon, includes something in nature of a general description, and does not contain a copy, in any sense, of the image. By “general” I mean that it does not specify the image exactly, but only partially; many images fit the description. Also, I am not saying that the phenomenon <em>is </em>a description in the literal sense of a sequence of words, but that it yields such a description when our verbal powers are set to work, and hence includes within it something equivalent to the content of that description, a descriptive structure, we might call it.</p><p>A surprising aspect of this situation is that you feel so strongly that the angles of the line segments are present to you , even though they are missing from the phenomenon. The feeling of presence, and actual presence in phenomena, are two different things. Daniel Dennett calls the former “the representation of presence” and the latter, “the presence of representation”. See this <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transsaccadic_memory#Dennett">paragraph</a> for a concise formulation of Dennett’s views.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_AgSjxmySuQVQ7aona0Zeg.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>Image 3</strong></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>3. Phenomena arising from images are mathematical in nature (at least sometimes)</strong></h3><p>The image above exhibits a pattern of an abstract kind. With a glance, you know all about it. If I asked you to describe it, you would likely come up with something like: “It is a grid with short red horizontal lines at the centers of cells. White lines consisting of the left and top boundaries of grid cells zigzag up and to the right across the grid, but there is also a horizontal band half way down where all four boundaries appear as lines, and a vertical band half way across with the same property. ” All of these aspects are available in your experience of the image within a second or so of seeing it. This is very close to an exact mathematical description of the image, in that it could easily be rendered in mathematical terms by someone with knowledge of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_geometry">analytic geometry</a> and in fully formal terms by someone who is also familiar with axiomatic methods (eg <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_theory">ZF set theory</a>). That is, the phenomenon that the image induces in your mind includes content that gives rise to a precise description, which description can be formalized mathematically, and the phenomenon with its descriptive content is built immediately upon attending to the image. If this were not the case, no description like the one above would be possible for you. Its presence does not depend on your knowledge of mathematics; only its formalization would depend on this knowledge. This is a remarkable fact — that a phenomenon containing this mathematical precision should arise in a few instants (though articulating it takes longer). Note that the phenomenon arising from images 1 and 2 yields a precise mathematical description as well: “a square grid of randomly oriented white line segments on a field of black”.</p><p>Note that I am practicing phenomenology, not psychology, here. The primary technique of phenomenological investigation is to carefully attend to one’s own phenomena exactly as they present themselves. The technique also involves “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bracketing_(phenomenology)">bracketing</a>”. Bracketing consists of placing aside any consideration of the external objects which give rise to phenomena, and even of whether there are such external objects. It is not those externals that are the topic of investigation, but the phenomena, just as they are. In considering the phenomenon associated with image 3, I was able to detect the mathematical nature of its descriptive content. To do this required some training in mathematics on my part, but the phenomenon in itself includes this nature independent of the mathematical training of the individual in which it occurs. The phenomenon must include this mathematical nature for everyone, because everyone can come up with the sort of description that I alluded to, but only those with some mathematical background will detect the description’s mathematical nature.</p><p>A visual phenomenon is not exhausted by its descriptive content. The description is also <em>bound </em>to the foveal image on each <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saccade">saccade </a>(shift of gaze): each primitive feature in the foveal image (e.g. line or circle), is, as it were, labeled by its category and role within the description. The structure, when revealed in this form, appears in concrete rather than symbolic guise. That is, one feels that one is aware of the pattern itself, rather than a description of it. Let us call this “pattern-awareness” in distinction to “description-awareness”. The latter is present only when one is consciously constructing a verbal account of the pattern. In pattern-awareness the descriptive content, though not a <em>topic </em>of current awareness, must be present within the phenomenon as a mechanism for supporting the pattern-awareness; what we are aware of in this case is the binding — the incarnation of the pattern in the sensory input of the moment. Peripheral vision plays a role too: binding of the much lower resolution peripheral imagery takes place too.</p><p>A rebinding (and perhaps modification) of the description takes place with every saccade, since each saccade modifies the set of visible features. <strong><em>This </em></strong>is what constitutes visual presence: a combination of a descriptive structure together with the sequence of bindings to the detailed images that arise from saccades. A central aspect of the feeling of presence is the experience that wherever one redirects one’s gaze, and that redirection lies within the scope of the current description, then it can be rebound with only minor changes, changes that are small enough to be consistent with expected continuities. This is how the sense of a stable world arises from images that are always jumping around. There is evidence that memory of detailed imagery persists only for a fraction of a second (in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iconic_memory"><em>iconic memory</em></a>) over saccades; only the pattern description persists (in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_short-term_memory"><em>visual short-term memory</em></a><em>). </em>Thus visual perception is in part a matter of continual forgetting.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jst1gmH2cH2Our1eG2P7Jg.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>Images 4 and 5</strong></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>4. Patterns play no role in the world except via our awareness of them.</strong></h3><p>Images 4 and 5 are <em>identical</em> to images 1 and 2, except for the red highlighting . From this we see that patterns of a simple kind were present in the <em>images</em> 1 and 2, but not present in the <em>phenomena</em> arising from these images. This is a simple example of patterns existing in an image, but not in our awareness of it. In this sort of case, the patterns may <em>exist </em>in the external world in some sense, but play no <em>role</em> in that world — they have no causal efficacy (in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality#Counterfactual_theories">counterfactual</a> sense). Such a pattern is like <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/If_a_tree_falls_in_a_forest">Berkeley’s unobserved tree</a>, only more so. The pixels that make up the image jostle local photons, but there is no need to mention patterns in an account of this jostling. If a pattern makes it into someone’s awareness it can have plenty of effects (such as triggering a verbal description), but if it does not, there are none. One might say, paraphrasing <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Luke%2017%3A21&amp;version=NKJV">Luke 17:21</a>, that the kingdom of pattern is within you.</p><p>These observations apply, with a modification, to auditory patterns. A time window around the current moment plays a role similar to the foveal image. In vision, an image is captured and its description assembled via saccades, whereas the auditory window proceeds continuously with time across the patterned sound. But in both cases patterns which are present in the world may or may not be detected by the viewer or listener, and undetected patterns are similarly impotent in the world. Patterns are within you either way.</p><h3><strong>5. Examples</strong></h3><p>Numerous examples of images built from mathematical patterns can be found by <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=generative+art&amp;source=lnms&amp;tbm=isch">search</a>, on this <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/generative/">subreddit</a>, and on <a href="https://kingdomofpattern.com/index.html">my own site</a> devoted to the topic.</p><p>The central arguments of this note are complete. The last matter I wish to discuss is on the technical side, so I include it in an appendix.</p><h3><strong>Appendix: Do all phenomena arising from visual patterns have mathematical structure?</strong></h3><p>So far, the examples have been simple. But what about images such as this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*nNp565DtSQelKW0_.jpeg" /></figure><p>At first glance, this looks like 3 copies of the same image. In other words, the initial phenomena for the three images are the same. But inspection of local detail will show that most rectangular blocks differ in shade from image to image. At the pixel level, the images are entirely different. I doubt that you noticed that there are 9 vertical bands in the central image, but 8 on the side images. (Because 8 is above your <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subitizing">subtizing</a> threshold).</p><p>The common phenomenon arising from the three images includes a common description. In earlier examples I was able to articulate the descriptions in English and discern their mathematical nature. Here, I cannot. Clearly the descriptions for visual phenomena are immensely complex. One of many aspects: it seems that a dictionary of elements which recur (such as the vertical bands) is assembled, and then the nature of their recurence is formulated. This is a recursive process. At each stage of the creation of a description, details are replaced by summaries.</p><p>Be that as it may, it is my sense that the underlying structure of a description is of the same general kind as for the simpler examples. If we ever know what’s going on (e.g. by discerning the nature of the neural activity involved, and assuming that supervenience of the mental on the neural is still taken seriously), then I expect we will find mathematical structure. But this is only an intuition. So the answer to the question “Do all phenomena arising from visual patterns have mathematical structure?” must remain a maybe. Another question: what other sort of structure might be involved? When the term “structure” is used, is mathematics ever far behind?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=643cf577ad6c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[At the Boundary of the Physical]]></title>
            <link>https://eutelic.medium.com/at-the-boundary-of-the-physical-ecaa456f2e69?source=rss-9eb6cdfd0ade------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ecaa456f2e69</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[emergence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[chrisGoad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Jan 2022 14:05:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-23T12:31:49.936Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LNJ-9oWtfAvNweGi1Ih0Ng.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Newton” by William Blake</figcaption></figure><p>In order to consider the boundary of the physical, I first need to say what I mean by the physical. This explanation will in turn require visiting the topic of what the philosopher Wilfred Sellars called the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilfrid_Sellars#%22Philosophy_and_the_Scientific_Image_of_Man%22">scientific and manifest images of the world</a>”, and then, briefly, the question: “what is mathematics?”</p><p><strong>The Scientific Image</strong></p><p>The world as known to science can be seen as a kernel of fundamental physics, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrative_level">wrapped</a> like the layers of an onion by mathematical structures, each with its own vocabulary and laws. For humans, prominent layers are 1) fundamental physics 2) chemistry 3) biology 4) neurology 4) the mental. For computers, corresponding layers are 1) fundamental physics 2) circuitry 3) software 4) application. I am setting aside other wrappings, such as the mechanics of macroscopic bodies and cosmology, for the purposes of this note.</p><p>Why do I designate these as <em>mathematical </em>layers? The key phrase is “the world as known to science”. Modern science has only to do with structure, not substance — it can only say what regularities are present, not what they are regularities <em>of</em>. Since the topic is always structure, and mathematics is the discipline that studies all possible structures, science is primarily a matter of finding mathematical structure in what we observe.</p><p>The above is a variant of what Wilfred Sellars calls “the scientific image” of existence, where <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_field_theory">quantum fields</a> are fundamental, and the other layers are derived. In constrast, according to the older “manifest image”, the things that we directly experience, such as chairs and rocks, are basic. Bringing these two images together into one consistent view has proved difficult or impossible. It is one of the many formulations of the <a href="http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Hard_problem_of_consciousness">hard problem of consciousness</a>: how does experience arise in the world considered scientifically?</p><p><strong>What is Mathematics?</strong></p><p>Let me quickly explain the various attitudes that have been held about the status of mathematics. First let’s make a distinction between mathematical <em>language</em>, and mathematical <em>structures </em>(also called mathematical objects). Mathematical language consists of strings of symbols that make statements about mathematical objects. The objects are things like numbers, geometric shapes, and fancier things like groups and manifolds. Now, <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/">mathematical platonists</a>, also called mathematical realists, grant mathematical structures a reality independent of the human mind. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-mathematics/">Nominalists </a>deny the existence of mathematical objects, and view mathematics as only a matter of language — of symbol manipulation. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism/">Intuitionists</a> regard mathematical objects as mental constructions; no mathematical structure exists until it has been constructed by a human mind.</p><p><strong>Mathematics and the Onion</strong></p><p>The onion model requires at least partial platonism, it seems to me. The layers cannot just be mental constructions or imaginary constructs associated with a game of symbols, if they are to constitute aspects of the world which nearly all scientists would call real and external to humans. This does not commit us to full platonism (we might still be suspicious of the status of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Large_cardinal">large cardinals</a>, for example).</p><p>I am not saying, as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothesis#Description">Max Tegmark</a> does, that the physical world is <em>constituted </em>by<em> </em>mathematics, but I <em>am </em>saying that the scientific image of it, built over centuries, asserts that certain mathematical structures are <em>present </em>within the physical world that we observe. Of course,the mathematical structures and layers as defined by science change from time to time. But at each point in time it is posited that some such structures exist, and this idea is what requires a degree of platonism. And indeed, at each stage, observations of the world at that stage have shown consistency with scientific models at the stage, so the world at each stage does indeed have structures within it that produce such consistency. For example, astronomical observations, suitably restricted, still cohere with Newtonian physics. In this sense the structures of Newtonian physics persist in the world, even if they are now seen as less fundamental.</p><p>From the onion viewpoint, then, a question is: what is special about the human and computational layers that gives them the status of “physically real”, if they are just one set of mathmatical structures among many, most of which we would not think of as physical (like the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set_theory">class of all sets</a> or the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monster_group">monster group</a>)? A possible answer: the layers have two special properties that set them apart: 1) the vocabulary and laws of each layer <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence"><em>emerge</em></a><em> </em>from the layer below, at least in theory, and 2) each is temporal, in that time passes at the layer, and is internally causal in that there are regularaties, explanations, and predictive laws that apply <em>within </em>the layer. In other words, each of the layers has internal causal properties in the broad sense that things can be known about the layer’s future from knowledge about its past (both expressed in the vocabulary of the the layer). Note that time needs a relativistic definition at the fundamental layer but relativistic considerations are irrelevant for most situations encountered in other layers.</p><p>The first property grounds the layers, recursively, in the kernel of fundamental physics, and the second is what grants them the status of mathematical systems of scientific interest. Now, I have finally gotten to the point of defining the physical: it consists of <em>the</em> <em>causal realms rooted in physics</em>.</p><p>In Sellar’s manifest image, the fundamental elements of the physical are different :they are chairs, tables, persons, rocks, and so forth. So, we inhabit a world several layers of the onion out from what is fundamental from the standpoint of the scientific image. Presumably though, the manifest image nests within the structures that I have called physical, rather than floating in some other mathematical space. But I will leave the manifest image and its mysteries behind for the duration of this note, and concentrate on the scientific one.</p><p><strong>The Boundary</strong></p><p>By a boundary structure in this context I mean a structure within the physical, which exhibits a causal influence from outside the physical. My concern in this note is to undertake, via two examples, a brief exploration of this boundary.</p><p>A first and obvious point on the boundary is the mind of the mathematician, which contemplates structures on the far side of the physical/mathematical boundary, but is (presumably) implemented via a brain in the physical world. There is a sense in which the nature of the mathematical structures under contemplation, which are often outside the physical, <em>cause </em>the thoughts and writings of the mathematician about them, thereby forming a bridge between the physical and otherwise non-physical realms of the mathematical world. This view of things depends on the platonic attitude towards the mathematical structures involved. To take a simple case, consider the statement “Joan (or her phone) says that 53 times 14 is 742 <em>because </em>53 times 14 <em>is</em> 742, and because Joan knows arithmetic (resp. the phone is correctly programmed for arithmetic)”. This is a correct statement, from the platonist’s point of view: The numbers 14, 53, and 742, possess their nature and properties in the human-indepenent world of mathematical objects. Therefore the statement “53 times 14 is 742” can serve as a fact in a chain of causation in this example, without circularity. It would also be correct to say, speaking in the vocabulary of another layer, “Joan (or her phone) says that 53 times 14 is 742 <em>because </em>this particular series of neural events occured in Joan’s brain (resp. electronic events in the phone’s circuitry).” There is no contradiction in having multiple correct causal explanations at different layers.</p><p>But there is a second, less obvious, point of contact. Consider the following image:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gtvow1jc69FFaW2plf0enA.jpeg" /></figure><p>This image exhibits a pattern of an abstract kind. With a glance, you know all about it. If I asked you to describe it, you would likely come up with something like: “It is a grid with short red horizontal lines at the centers of cells. White lines consisting of the left and top boundaries of grid cells zigzag up and to the right across the grid, but there is also a horizontal band half way down where all four boundaries appear as lines, and a vertical band half way across with the same property. ” All of these aspects are available in your experience of the image within a second or so of seeing it. This is very close to an exact mathematical description of the image, in that it could easily be rendered in mathematical terms by someone with knowledge of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_geometry">analytic geometry</a> and in fully formal terms by someone who is also familiar with axiomatic (eg <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_theory">ZF</a>) set theory. That is, the experience that the image induces in your mind exhibits mathematical structure, whether or not you know how to express it in formal terms, and that structure is built immediately upon attending to the image. If this were not the case, no such description would be possible.</p><p>Now, my claim is that the pattern itself, as it exists externally to you, should not be classed as something physical, but only as having the kind of mathematical existence granted by the platonist to any mathematical structure. Thus, the recognition of the pattern by an observer constitutes another structure on the boundary of the physical.</p><p>The reason is this: the fact that a particular mathematical pattern is exhibited by the pixels of the above image has no causal effect, except when that pattern is recognized by an observer (human or computational). The <em>pixels </em>have their usual sort of causal effect, causing light to scatter in a given way, but without an observer there is no point at which the pattern plays a role. That is, if the set of mathematical patterns exhibited by pixels is regarded as a layer above the physical, then this layer of patterns, although emergent, has no internal causation associated with it, and therefore fails the test for the physical given earlier in this note. Thus, the observer of a pattern serves as a bridge between the physical and non-physical, just as does the mathematician. Specifically, the pattern causes mental and linguistic events in the observer, and thus the observer plays the role of a bridge from the non-physical.</p><p>Patterns of sound as well as sight, such as the patterns found in music, are non-physical as well.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ecaa456f2e69" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mathematical Phenomenology]]></title>
            <link>https://eutelic.medium.com/mathematical-phenomenology-1adca52e9d20?source=rss-9eb6cdfd0ade------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1adca52e9d20</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phenomenology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[chrisGoad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 21 Mar 2021 15:09:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-04T14:54:46.146Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/1*v7uu1H9I60cUJP4vXsNYeQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.rafael-araujo.com/">Rafael Araujo</a></figcaption></figure><p>Phenomenology is the study of appearances. Let’s consider an example of the simplest kind: the situation of a person gazing attentively at some physical object, such as a coffee cup. There are two parts of the situation. One is the cup itself. Another is the seeing of the cup, the cup as it appears to the viewer. The former is a physical thing, and the latter a mental thing. (Perhaps the mental thing emerges from the physical thing that is a brain, but it is still of a different character and structure than the cup itself.) The mental thing is called a phenomenon (plural phenomena), in the jargon of the school of philosophy known as <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/">phenomenology</a>, founded in its modern form by <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/">Edmund Husserl</a> early in the twentieth century.</p><p>If the phenomenon arises from an object seen in the world, as in this example, then the phenomenon can be said to have spatial content: it includes an estimate of the object’s shape, a perceived hierarchical structure of parts, each with its own shape estimate and placement. The object is also placed in space relative to other objects, including the viewer’s own body. The space I refer to is phenomenal space — space as we experience it within our minds. Finally, if the object can be identified — say as a tree, cup, or shoe, then that identification is present within the phenomenon.</p><p>Is phenomenal space the same as “real” space as Euclid, Descartes, Newton, and Einstein have given us to understand it? Of course not! For one thing, the curvature discovered by Einstein does not come into the matter. But the differences go beyond that. All things in phenomenal space are finite in nature — they are approximations if that is the right word. No position has infinite precision, very far from it. In addition, perceived space is centered on the body of the perceiver, and contains only those things visible from that position and direction of gaze. Perceived space is only one kind of phenomenal space. There are also spatial memories, anticipations, and imaginings. But each of these is modeled on perceptual space, with a degradation in detail. Their structure is the same.</p><p>Phenomenal space is occupied by phenomenal objects, that is, by the phenomena that arise from perception of physical objects. Most of these are assigned categories (shoes, trees, cups, etc.). This partition of what is seen into individual phenomena with their categories is something imposed by the mind. A physicist’s space is occupied only by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_field_theory">quantum fields</a>.</p><p>Finally, phenomena contain patterns — regular repetitions, grids, textures, musical patterns, and so forth. As we will see shortly, those patterns cannot be identified with structure that occurs in the objects that give rise to the phenomena; the patterns live <em>within </em>the phenomena.</p><p>Despite this, phenomenal space retains some of the structure of outward space. It is still three dimensional — there is still up and down, side to side, and near and far. Rigid objects transform in the same way, via translations and rotations. Distance makes sense in both realms. Etcetera.</p><p>The important thing is to realize that phenomenal space is something real of its own kind, and distinct from Newtonian space. However, phenomenal space shares some mathematical structure with external space. The concepts that help us to understand the latter apply to the former.</p><p>Furthermore, We can investigate these properties without becoming entangled with <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia"><em>qualia</em></a>. Here is an explanation of the latter concept:</p><p>Phenomenal objects have color. Color is not a substance from physics, although there is a complex connection between color as experienced and the physics of light and its interaction with surfaces. Red, for example, is a name for a phenomenal property. It has its own specific nature, and is directly present to our minds when viewing a red object. It seems a primitive substance of our experience. It is ineffable in the sense that it could never be explained to a blind person. Communication about it among sighted people relies on identifying commonalities in experience. Colors are defined by pointing rather than describing. In the philosophy of mind red is called a “quale” (plural “qualia”). What is this mysterious substance, and how can it arise from neurons firing within the darkness of our skulls? This stands in for the general question: “how can experience arise from the physical world?”. This ancient problem has been known in recent times as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness">hard problem of consciousness</a>.</p><p>My point is that we can investigate the structure of phenomena, such as spatial phenomena, without becoming entangled with qualia. We can start from this position: Yes, experience exists. Yes it possesses mathematical structure. Yes, we can investigate that structure. No, the problem of qualia is not thereby addressed. So, there is no claim that mathematical structure will ever give a complete account of phenomena — it seems evident from qualia that this is not possible. And perhaps there are other aspects than qualia which lie outside the grasp of mathematical thinking. Still, mathematical structure <em>is </em>present in phenomena, and can be investigated for its own sake. This kind of investigation is what I am calling mathematical phenomenology. The problem of phenomena is thereby partitioned into <em>structure </em>(mathematical)<em> </em>and <em>substance </em>(qualia), and the latter is left for another time.</p><p>Aside: there is also the project of investigating the phenomena involved in mathematical thought — that is, the phenomenology of mathematics. That is not the enterprise under consideration here. I am concerned, rather, with the use of mathematics in investigating phenomena of whatever kind.</p><p>As you’ll see later in this note, mathematical phenomenology, in combination with mathematical realism, can shed some light on the hard problem, even if qualia are not touched.</p><p>There is another aspect of mathematical structure of phenomena beyond 3D geometry: pattern. We are as adept at introducing this aspect into our phenomena as is the case for three dimensional geometry or categorization of objects. This pattern-imposition is present for perception of two-dimensional images, a simpler context within which to investigate the process than the natural 3D world. Consider the following image.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_AgSjxmySuQVQ7aona0Zeg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image 1</figcaption></figure><p>This image exhibits a pattern of an abstract kind. With a glance, you know all about it. If I asked you to describe it, you would likely come up with something like: “It is a grid with short red horizontal lines at the centers of cells. White lines consisting of the left and top boundaries of grid cells zigzag up and to the right across the grid, but there is also a horizontal band half way down where all four boundaries appear as lines, and a vertical band half way across with the same property. ” All of these aspects are available in your experience of the image within a second or so of seeing it. This is very close to an exact mathematical description of the image, in that it could easily be rendered in mathematical terms by someone with knowledge of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_geometry">analytic geometry</a> and in fully formal terms by someone who is also familiar with axiomatic (eg <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_theory">ZF</a>) set theory. That is, the phenomenon that the image induces in your mind has a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_structure">mathematical structure</a>, and that structure is built immediately upon attending to the image. If this were not the case, no such description would be possible.</p><p>Note that I am practicing phenomenology, not psychology, here. The primary technique of phenomenological investigation is to carefully attend to one’s own phenomena exactly as they present themselves. The technique also involves “bracketing”. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bracketing_(phenomenology)">Bracketing </a>consists of placing aside any consideration of the external objects which give rise to phenomena, and even of whether there are such external objects. It is not those externals that are the topic of investigation, but the phenomena, just as they are. In considering the phenomenon associated with image 1, I was able to detect its mathematical nature. To do this required some training in mathematics on my part, but the phenomenon in itself has this nature independent of the mathematical training of the individual in which it occurs. The phenomenon must have a mathematical nature for everyone, because everyone can come up with the sort of description that I alluded to, but only those with some mathematical background will detect the description’s mathematical nature.</p><p>Husserl calls the standpoint that we take in every day life when we are not philsophising “the natural attitude”. In this state of mind, it feels as if you see objects and images “as they are”; there is no thought of a phenomenon separate from what is seen. But, philsophising once more, we can see that the phenomenon and image have very different content, as the following example will show.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hkxTZB6YkAJDPOY0l4hW5Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Images 2 and 3</figcaption></figure><p>Are the left and right images different? They are, but this requires study. The phenomena that arise immediately from the two images are identical. In fact there are 69 differences in the angles of lines. This is not apparent because the common phenomenon to which the two images give rise does not contain the orientations of the individual line segments. Instead, the phenomenon is captured by the description “a square grid of randomly oriented white line segments on a field of black”. By randomly is meant: “with no pattern that I can detect”. Again this is close to a complete mathematical description. What is missing is the exact length and width of lines as a fraction of grid cell size, and the dimension of the grid by cell count. These details are present in the phenomenon as rough estimates, not exact quantities. I can say this because the phenomenon is present to me, so I can gauge its basic properties.</p><p>Another thing that I have left out: at any moment I am aware of the orientations of a few line segments at foveal position, but only if I attend to this, and only until I move my eyes (via a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saccade">saccade </a>). The important thing to realize is that the phenomenon is a <em>description </em>of the image, not a copy. The nature of the the description, is, again, mathematical.</p><p>Despite the missing angles in the phenomenon, it does seem, in the natural attitude, that all of those lines are <em>present </em>to me, even if I do not know anything about them except the “randomly oriented” property. This shows that the feeling of presence, and actual presence in the phenomena, are two different things. Daniel Dennett calls the former “the representation of presence” and the latter, “the presence of representation”. To repeat: present in the phenomenon are 1) the description, and 2) a detailed capture of the part of the image which is projected on the fovea. The detail is overwritten on each shift of gaze. However, the description persists for longer, since it is held in <a href="http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Visual_short_term_memory">short term visual memory</a>. The representation of presence is the illusory feeling that images are present to us in full detail. See this <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transsaccadic_memory#Dennett">paragraph </a>for a concise formulation of Dennett’s views.</p><p>There is something else missing from the phenomenon: the patterns highlighted in red below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jst1gmH2cH2Our1eG2P7Jg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Images 4 and 5</figcaption></figure><p>The images 4 and 5 are <em>identical </em>to images 2 and 3, except for the red highlighting . From this we see that patterns of a simple kind were present in the <em>images </em>2 and 3, but not present in the initial <em>phenomena</em>. This makes the simple but important point that the patterns that we see reside within our minds. The presence of a pattern in the outer world, however simple, is no guarantee of its arrival in phenomena. It goes the other way too: patterns can appear in our phenomena that have no counterpart in the external world. This is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apophenia">apophenia</a>. To paraphrase Luke <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Luke%2017%3A21&amp;version=NKJV">17:21</a>, the kingdom of pattern is within you.</p><p><strong>Neuroscience, Emergence, and Mathematical Realism</strong></p><p>Now, I’ll switch gears entirely. Instead of taking the phenomenological view, in which phenomena are investigated from the inside as they appear to us, I will move to the exterior view — the view of the scientist who studies the brain as a physical system. But I will not forget the results of my phenomenological investigations. Even viewed from the outside, we need to make sense of why biological systems (we humans) <em>report </em>phenomena, and the forms that those reports take.</p><p>Consider again the various mathematical structures associated with images 1–5. One speculation is that these structures are encoded in the activity of my brain when I attend to the images. An equivalent formulation is that the structures are emergent entities of the brain’s activity.</p><p>What might be the nature of this emergence/encoding? It is premature to make any concrete claims. Only very simple kinds of encodings of mental content by neural activity are currently understood.</p><p>I don’t claim that the brain is like a computer in any way except that the ideas of encoding and emergence apply. But to explain what I mean by emergence, it is helpful to consider an analogy from computing. Consider a computer running CGI (computer generated imagery) software, and displaying a textured sphere. The activity of this system can be described at a number of levels:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*JmcwAEp4y4wsTg9ZQKuQEw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Each of these levels is independent of those above and below it in that the laws that govern each level, and make its activity comprehensible to us, can be formulated without mentioning the other levels. The user of the CGI system need not know programming, the person who writes the source code needn’t know machine code, nor circuit design, nor the relevant physics, etc. These differing descriptions apply to the same object.</p><p>These levels of description exist objectively independent of any observer. One objective measure of emergence is Eric Hoel’s <a href="https://medium.com/@erikphoel/a-primer-on-causal-emergence-87e6e6944ebc">effective information</a> (EI), which, roughly, characterizes the levels of a system by the degree to which they preserve information through time. If one system H is defined in terms of a lower level system L — as circuits(H) are defined in terms of physics(L) — the former may possess more effective information than the latter, even if the latter level incorporates much more detail. EI provides a measure of the degree to which a proposed level of description has its own coherence, independent of its basis in lower levels. The above example from computer graphics provides extreme examples. The middle levels are <em>perfectly </em>causal : the past <em>determines </em>the future via the laws of operation that pertain to the circuit, machine, and source code levels. The existence of these causal levels is an objective mathematical fact about the system, no observer needed. (By the way, high EI does not require determinism).</p><p>The brain might admit this sort of layered description. Indeed, it is already known to. Some neuroscientists study the brain at the level of biochemistry, others at the level of firing of individual neurons, others at the level of circuits involving many neurons. These levels are not as strictly separable as in the our computer graphics case, but a causal analysis at varying levels is still possible. Many such levels remain to be discovered, very likely.</p><p>To complete this investigation of phenomena from the outside, I require one more ingredient: mathematical realism.</p><p><a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/">Mathematical realism</a> (also called mathematical platonism) is the view that mathematical structures exist independent of the mind. Other positions view mathematics and its objects as, in one sense or another, human creations or interpretations. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-mathematics/">Nominalists </a>deny the existence of mathematical objects, and provide reformulations of mathematical statements in other terms. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism/">Intuitionists</a> regard mathematical objects as mental constructions. Mathematical realism is not monolithic. For example, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finitism">finitists </a>take a realistic view of finite mathematical objects such as trillion digit numbers or the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monster_group">monster group</a>, but not of completed infinities. Note that even the realism of finitists is wild in a way, in that it posits the existence of unbounded numbers of mathematical structures that are bigger and more complex than the physical universe.</p><p>Although I am a mathematical realist myself, I will not argue the case here, but discuss a consequence of realism : it provides a way of thinking about the substance of which phenomena consist.</p><p>A mathematical realist can visualize a sort of cloud of mathematics around physical things. This cloud consists of the mathematical objects that exhibit systematic correlations to the things in question. This supports the following way of talking about the mathematical structure of physical reality. One interprets “physical thing X exhibits mathematical structure Y”, as meaning “there exists the mathematical structure Y that exhibits such and such correlation to the physical object X”. This way of putting matters takes the realistic view towards the mathematical object: it is an existent in its own right which correlates to the physical. For example, for each elementary particle there is the corresponding <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_physics_and_representation_theory">Lie group</a>. Actually, physicists almost always use the formulations of mathematical realism. This may seem like a distinction without a difference, but please read on.</p><p>Now consider a structure which exhibits levels of description, as in the computer graphics example above. The levels are mathematical structures clothing the physical system. From the mathematical realist’s point of view, these structures <em>exist </em>— and this is as true for the higher levels, as for the lower. Furthermore, they are, in the case of our CGI example, causal structures, whose behavior is determined through time by laws which operate <em>at their own level</em>.</p><p><strong>The Hard Problem Reformulated</strong></p><p>Now for the hypothesis: suppose that the brain admits multiple levels of description, and that the mathematical structures which we apprehend in phenomena actually <em>exist </em>in the mathematical realist’s sense, at some level. Might not these structures actually <em>be</em> the phenomena, at least in part? Such a hypothesis does not solve the hard problem of consciousness. It says nothing about qualia. But it is relevant to the problem, in that the question “<strong>why is it <em>like something</em> to<em> </em>be a biological system?</strong>” is replaced by <strong>“why is it<em> like something</em> to be<em> </em>the system of mathematical structures that emerge from brain/body activity?”</strong>. The latter question narrows the gap, in the sense that more similarity can be recognized between the entities on either side of the gap than is the case for the former question. In particular, the <em>structures</em> of the phenomena that we detect from the inside are already present in views from outside, with this reformulation of the hard problem. So the reformulation gets closer to an answer, perhaps (but only for us mathematical realists).</p><p><strong>Phenomena Are Causal</strong></p><p>If phenomena are partly constituted by mathematical structures, they are structures with causal force. Phenomena are accessible by a wide range of mental processes, such as <a href="http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Attention">attention</a>, evaluation, <a href="http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Memory">memory</a>, decision making, action selection and verbal report. Their properties can be queried by these processes. Phenomena resemble computing’s data structures in this respect — but I do not mean to imply any other similarity whatever.</p><p>Consciousness must exist at a single level, since its contents are unified, as described above. The <a href="http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness#Global_workspace_models">global workspace </a>model of consciousness, proposed by Bernard Baars in 1988, is relevant, because of its formlation of this unity. Stephen Dehaene and others have since proposed neuronal implementations of the global workspace architecture.</p><p><strong>Do All Phenomena Have Mathematical Structure?</strong></p><p>So far, the examples have been simple. But what about images such as these:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*03NbAnKyaxvYtbqzunPDlQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>At first glance, this looks like 3 copies of the same image. In other words, the initial phenomena for the three images are the same. But inspection of local detail will show that most rectangular blocks differ in color from image to image. At the pixel level, the images are entirely different. I doubt that you noticed that there are 9 vertical bands in the central image, but 8 on the side images. (Because 8 is above your <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subitizing">subtizing</a> threshold).</p><p>The phenomena, again,are not copies of the images, but descriptions. In earlier examples I was able to articulate descriptions in English, and discern their mathematical nature. Here, I cannot do that. Clearly the systems of description for visual phenomena are immensely complex. One of many aspects: it seems that a dictionary of elements which recur (such as the vertical bands)is assembled, and then the pattern of their recurence is formulated. This is a recursive process. At each stage of the creation of a description, details are replaced by summaries.</p><p>To repeat the question, do all phenomena have mathematical structure? There are two ways this might be so. First, it might be that mathematical structure is the <em>only form </em>that structure<em> </em>(as opposed to substance) takes. Are there known exceptions? Second, brains might rely on such structure for their role in existence — to preserve the life of their hosts. They might need to populate their higher level descriptions with mathematical structures (models) which allow them to minimize surprise, as <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/22/5/516/htm">Karl Friston</a> would have it. This is an evolutionary account.</p><p>That said, it would be radically premature to conclude that all phenomena have a structure that can be captured mathematically. But some do!</p><p><strong>Two Varieties of Causal Structures and Their Models</strong></p><p>As remarked above, phenomena are causal structures in that we can act and report on them. Our examples have involved geometric and logical descriptions. The descriptions do not specify exact structures, but summarize them.</p><p>There is another kind of structure involved than descriptions. Phenomena of the spatial world (which arise from the auditory, kinesthetic, and tactile senses, in addition to vision) are embedded within a general theory of space and spatial action. This theory tells us that at all times we can shift our gaze and body to look at things more closely, and, more generally, navigate through a spatial context. Just as shapes and patterns are <em>present</em> to us via their descriptions, we are aware of the partial nature of our view of any object. We always know that there is more to the object than we can see (or touch) at any moment, and that by use of our body, if only by shifting our gaze, we can access a different part of the object.</p><p>The mode by which this theory operates is not yet understood, nor the form that it takes in the mind. However, it is clear that it is entangled with the mathematical theory of space, just as descriptions of individual objects are. I theorize that this aspect of mind exists within the same mathematical level as do descriptions of individual objects — the level of consciousness.</p><p>From the standpoint of mathematical realism, there are two aspects of the situation. The causal mathematical structures point to mathematical objects outside of the causal realm. For example, the description “a grid of short white line segments randomly oriented” is a description which applies to a set of mathematical objects: the infinite set of actual dispositions of line segments, with their exact orientations, to which the description applies. Similarly, the general theory of space refers (among other things) to what mathematicians think of when they think of space — an infinitely divisible continuum with three dimensions. In the jargon of mathematical logic these non-causal mathematical objects to which descriptions and theories refer are called their “<a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/">models</a>”. The causal structures are (presumably) finite, but their models are not.</p><p>Here is the point: in the natural attitude, a phenomenon <em>feels </em>present to us not as a description or theory, but as an object to which the description or theory refers . This a variety of Dennett’s “representation of presence”. Our awareness contains the apprehension that we are in the presence of objects in their endless detail, even if that detail never arrives in our minds.</p><p>That is, the felt presence of something amounts to our minds containing a description or theory of it. It feels as if the something is entirely there for us, though it never is. We feel that all those lines and their orientations are present to us in image 2, though these orientations are not to be found anywhere within our minds. Also we feel that space and in its unbounded divisibility is present to us, though what we possess in our minds is only a theory of space, not the structure itself in its infinite nature.</p><p>Let me close this note with a statement of the obvious: The structure of phenomena has been studied, under various rubrics, for more than a hundred years, by the phenomenologists themselves (such as Husserl), Gestalt psychologists, cognitive scientists , neuroscientists, and computer scientists. In many cases, the structures that have been illucidated by these studies is mathematical in nature.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1adca52e9d20" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Phenomenological Lessons from a Simple Image]]></title>
            <link>https://eutelic.medium.com/phenomenological-lessons-from-a-simple-image-8bb814f3a5c1?source=rss-9eb6cdfd0ade------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8bb814f3a5c1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[animation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vision]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phenomenology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[chrisGoad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2020 15:07:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-14T15:07:52.026Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dVVGOs81JRfzNh4PasF6nw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image 1</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*X1fDRFbUYR0KGInBwwxkQw.gif" /></figure><p>Consider this image. Not much to see. Just a grid of randomly oriented line segments, yes?</p><p>However, scroll down, and an animation will disclose a simple pattern that is hiding in plain sight.</p><p>Now you see that the image contains a diamond shape whose sides consist of sequences of parallel segments. As the pattern starts to move, it comes into awareness, and seems to disappear as soon the pattern returns to its rest position.</p><p>There are two things involved here. There is the image itself — an array of pixels. Then there is your perception of it. Of course these are things of different kinds — one is out there in the world and one is in your mind. The latter is called a “phenomenon” by philosophers, and the discipline of studying phenomena, “<a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/">phenomenology</a>”. The objective here is to investigate the nature of the phenomenon of image 1.</p><p>The investigation is carried out by asking ourselves: what is present to us in the phenomenon, and what is not? What questions can we answer about it? Evidently the phenomenon of this particular image is not a mental copy of the external image. It does not contain a list of which pixels are white, and which black, nor even a list of orientations of line segments. Even while looking at the image, let alone recalling it, we don’t know those orientations. We can focus attention on a few individual segments and discover their orientation for a moment, but only a few, and these are immediately forgotten if our attention shifts. And, via such changes of focus, the phenomenon changes. It seems clear that the phenomenon as it is formed from our first look at the image is summed up by this formulation: “a square grid of short white line segments of uniform length, randomly oriented, on a field of black”. Never mind about the image, this is what the phenomenon contains. Would you not agree?</p><p>This is a minor instance of what <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edmund_Husserl">Husserl</a>, the founder of modern phenomenology, called “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bracketing_(phenomenology)">bracketing</a>”. Bracketing is a matter of focusing on what is present in a phenomenon, without consideration of the external object that produced it, nor even the assumption that such an object exists. The bracketed phenomenon could be any mental object — a coffee cup within view, a memory of a waterfall, something encountered in a dream. The thesis is that one can derive certain (<a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/apodictic">apodictic</a>) knowledge about phenomena from this disciplined variety of introspection. Husserl’s slogan was “back to the things themselves” (meaning the phenomena). When I ask myself what the phenomenon of the image contains, no doubt arises about the answer — I see a grid of line segments, and I discern no pattern in their orientations (that is what I mean by “random” in this context). No error is possible, because the question is about what is present directly to my awareness, not about anything external.</p><p>I’ll offer another demonstration that the orientations of individual segments are missing from their phenomena:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Bi-r-RDdrLCaKIOYZFslQA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Can you spot the differences between left (which is identical to image 1), and right? There are two dozen differences. At the bottom of this note, there appears an identical image pair, except that the segments which differ are displayed in magenta.</p><p>Since a list of orientations of segments is missing from the phenomenon, simple patterns by which the orientations are correlated are sometimes missed too, as is the case for the diamond. Consider this variant:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dfoKHNjApvJ894y0RiYCRA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image 2</figcaption></figure><p>The variant is identical to the first image except that the segments in the pattern have been rotated by 90 degrees, so that the segments making up each of the four lines of the diamond are co-linear. With this change, the pattern becomes visible — it enters into the phenomenon.</p><p>I can easily come up with a description of the content of the new phenomenon. The description runs: “ it is a square grid of short white line segments of uniform length on a field of black, randomly oriented, except those which make up a diamond with tips at the sides of the grid, which segments are co-linear along the diamond’s sides”. Again this description fully captures the content of the phenomenon (well, a few details are missing, notably the length and width of the segments compared to the grid cells, and the number of rows and columns in the grid). How the phenomenon itself, a mental object, is constituted, and how it is embedded in the physical world (if it is) via patterns of neural activity, is a separate, and unanswered, question.</p><p>This is not to say that the phenomenon <em>is </em>the description, only that the description formulates its content. The process by which we are able to produce the description is not available to introspection, only the apodictic knowledge that the description is correct and complete</p><p>Note that descriptions are characterized by their level of abstraction and lack of detail compared to the image itself. For any given description, countless images match it. We can say that the phenomenon has <em>the nature of a description</em>, in that it too is abstract (built of higher level concepts than pixels), and lacks nearly all detail. In mathematical terminology it is a predicate on images, not a copy of any particular image. Indeed, the descriptions that we have encountered could be precisely and easily formulated using geometry and a little mathematical logic, by anyone familiar with those fields.</p><p>The phenomenon does not <em>feel </em>like a description, however. It feels as if we see the image “as it is”. It seems that every little segment and its orientation is present to us. This, it seems, is an illusion built into visual awareness. How can we feel that we have direct perceptual contact with the external image, when its phenomenon is so distant in form and content from the image?</p><p>Note that the presence of a pattern in an image, such as the diamond, does not imply that it is present to awareness. We are aware of a pattern only if it shows up in the phenomenon, and thereby, in the description. We should think of patterns as we experience them as structures internal to ourselves. This is another sense in which the phenomenon fails to contact the image.</p><p>When do the descriptions arise ? In these simple cases, I place the task before me: “describe the image”, and the description flows easily, and captures the content of the phenomenon without remainder. But, in normal activity, there is only occasionally a call for a description of the things we see. Without such a call, no description is present to the mind: instead the illusion of seeing the image as it is takes the reins of awareness. A phenomenon <em>is </em>my seeing of the image, and the description occurs within the phenomenon, in an unknown coding (if that is the right phrase). So it is fair to say that the description normally lies within my seeing, rather than being something that I see.</p><p>As images get more complex, the possibility of writing down language which fully captures their phenomena withdraws. Consider the following image:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qKb2U6qIYclPHQ5ntmsK0A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Clearly , it is not enough to characterize this as “randomly oriented green and yellow short segments placed randomly within a square”, although this description is accurate as far as it goes. The segments form swirls — nearby segments are similarly oriented, and their orientation varies smoothly across the image. Exact characterization the phenomenon is out of the reach of introspection. However, we can still say something about what is present in the phenomenon. A comparison of two images helps.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jdJFOjv-XyT6fovIQPld-w.jpeg" /></figure><p>What differences do you see between the two at first sight? This is what I pick up: the images appear to be identical, except that the swirls in the lower right are a bit different. It took a moment to notice the latter fact, as my eyes swept over that part of the image. On close inspection, when you turn your attention to individual pairs of segments at corresponding positions, one on the left and one on the right, you will note that they are often of different colors and lengths, though their orientations are identical (except in the lower right). So, we see that, as in our earlier example (image 1), the individual segments are not present in the phenomenon prior to consciously directed close inspection. Thus we can already see that the gulf between image and phenomenon is wide.</p><p>The study of what visual phenomena (a.k.a. “percepts”) contain, and how they are built up, has been studied intensively for more than a hundred years, first by the Gestalt psychologists, then by cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and computer scientists. Of particular relevance here is the work of Bela <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B%C3%A9la_Julesz">Julesz</a> on texture discrimination. He showed that any texture (an image or portion thereof built of a large number of elements placed according statistical principles), can be ascribed a mathematical characterization (based on “<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/290091a0">textons</a>”) such that, that characterization is the same for two images, or two portions of an image, if and only if the textures are indistinguishable by human vision (except by conscious investigation, not immediate impression). That is, textons capture the same information about a patch of texture as does human vision. A texton map of a textured image constitutes a variety of description, although it is formulated mathematically rather than with ordinary language. Thus, we see that even though a description of a visual phenomenon may not be available to introspection, nor even amenable to formulation in ordinary language, such a description can sometimes be uncovered and validated by scientific work.</p><p>Again, I would not say that phenomena <em>are </em>their descriptions, only that content of phenomena are characterized by their descriptions, and that the descriptions are sometimes accessible from the phenomena via conscious processes. They can also probed by experiment in more complex cases. The descriptions do not <em>appear </em>within the original phenomenon, rather they are a part of the mechanism from which appearance emerges.</p><p>Here is a variant of the image pair above, with differences in magenta.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bkREnLxPRbitDpPIerFwzA.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8bb814f3a5c1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Visual Experience as Theory]]></title>
            <link>https://eutelic.medium.com/visual-experience-as-theory-1602c4914bb6?source=rss-9eb6cdfd0ade------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1602c4914bb6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vision]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phenomenology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[chrisGoad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 16 Aug 2020 15:20:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-07T12:01:21.095Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*T-m7g6BMfgUzoxRtdd1WWg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image A</figcaption></figure><p>Consider the image above. With a glance, you know many things about it. If I asked you to describe it, you would likely come up with something like: “It is a grid with short red horizontal lines at the centers of cells. White lines consisting of the left and top boundaries of grid cells zigzag up and to the right across the grid, but there is also a horizontal band half way down where all four boundaries appear as lines, and a vertical band half way across with the same property. ” All of these aspects are available in your experience of the image within a second or so of seeing it. It feels as if you see the image “as it is”, including these structural aspects. But this is not the right account, as the following examples will show.</p><p>Have a look at this pair of images.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qfI1zgP_lzt0cILM0k57LA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Images B and C</figcaption></figure><p>Can you spot differences between left and right? Maybe, but you would have to spend time at it. There are two dozen differences between the two. A version in which the differences are displayed in black appears at the end of this note. The fact that no difference enters awareness on seeing the images means that your visual awareness does not contain representations of all the individual segments that appear in the image. What does happen is this. As you move your eyes across the image (via <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saccade">saccades</a>), the few segments that are in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foveal">foveal </a>range and are granted attention — those few can be said to be present in visual awareness at that moment. But only that moment. They are forgotten almost immediately when the eye moves on.</p><p>Your visual mind contains theories of images, not copies thereof. For example, your theory of the image at the top of this note was something like the zigzag theory given above. Similarly, your theories of the next two images ran something like “a grid of short white lines randomly oriented on a red field”. You could not see any difference between the images, because the same theory applies to both.</p><p>At this point, I’ll note that the zigzag theory is slightly wrong. If you look at the middle of the top of the lower left quadrant, you’ll see that there is a missing zig two lines down. Also, in the lower right quadrant, if you look along the diagonal, about two-thirds of the distance from upper left to lower right you’ll see a vertical rather than horizontal red line. So, your theory will need elaboration. This shows that your awareness of<strong> image A</strong> is limited by the fovea as well.</p><p>This is how vision works: At any given time, you have a theory of what is present in your visual field. As you redirect your gaze via saccades, you check the new foveal images against your theory of what they should contain. Usually, the match is good (because <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/eye2015220">a billion years of evolution</a> has tuned you well), and no theory revision is required. (Karl Friston’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_energy_principle">free energy principle</a> provides an account of how and why our theories, for the most part, predict incoming sensory data so well).</p><p>But what, more precisely, is contained in our awareness of an image? In the jargon of philosophy, such an awareness — such an appearance within the mind — is called a <em>phenomenon,</em> and the study thereof<em> </em><a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/"><em>phenomenology</em></a>. So we distinguish between the image itself (an array of pixels), and our awareness of it (a phenomenon). The phenomenon associated with an image includes what I have called a “theory”, such detail as is available from the fovea, and the vague shapes transmitted by peripheral vision. In addition, a phenomenon associated with an image can be characterized as a hierarchical structure. Points of color (pixels), are at the bottom of the hierarchy, then, in the case of the phenomenon arising from <strong>image A</strong>, we ascend to short line segments, followed by the aggregates: zigzags, and linear assemblies of segments. Other images have other hierarchies, often quite deep. What I have called the theory assigns certain properties and relations to the elements at each level, such as parallelism and repetition-with-variation. The structure, in the case of <strong>image A</strong>, would contain propositions such as “white lines consisting of the left and top boundaries of grid cells zigzag up and to the right across the grid”. Some aspects of the structures are accessible to introspection (as in the zigzag case), but most are not. There is evidence about the latter from a number of sources, for example, from studies of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0042698904001762">texture perception</a>.</p><p>This sort of structure can be represented mathematically, using the tools of geometry and mathematical logic. Possibly, a detailed correlation will be found between such a structure and brain states, in some distant future. (Such correlations have been <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_correlates_of_consciousness#The_neuronal_basis_of_perception">found already</a>, but only at a very coarse level). So we have three topics to think about: <strong>image A</strong>, <strong>phenomenon A</strong>, and <strong>mathematical structure A.</strong></p><p>This standpoint might work for the kinds of simple, grid-based, abstract images that we have been considering, but what about the realm of all images encountered by humans? Of course, the images we see in every day life are almost always two-dimensional projections of a three-dimensional world, either directly, or via photographs and paintings. It seems likely that what we perceive in those images — their phenomena — have the same nature as the phenomena that arise from the simple images. We see details in the foveal field, and also theorize patterns of various sorts — repetitions, theories of illumination, theories of what familiar objects appear in the image and where, and so forth, but formulated in three dimensions.</p><p>I don’t mean that the mathematical structure which corresponds to a phenomenon presents itself to us as equations and logical formulae. Rather the structure supports the operations that our mind applies to it, such as noting patterns of repetition in the image, recognizing familiar structure such as zigzags, and predicting outcomes of visual input as the the eye moves through saccades. In the three-dimensional case, the operations involve noting where things are in space, and, for example, predicting their appearance as we approach them. The way in which the structure and its operations are coded (if that is the right word) is unknown, but they are partly visible to the inner eye of the phenomenologist (which is the same as any other eye, but apprehends its targets as phenomena rather than things in the external world).</p><p>The account that I have just given differs from what we <em>feel </em>is happening.We feel, in gazing at the images <strong>A</strong>, <strong>B</strong> and <strong>C</strong> , that what is present to us is the <em>entire image as it actually is</em>. On the contrary, the fact is that detail is missing except in the foveal area, and it is an illusion to feel that our awareness includes detail elsewhere. What dominates is what I have called our theory of the image. The illusion of complete awareness is probably buttressed by the possibility of shifting our gaze to any part of an image at any time. However, when the shift takes place, the preceding bit of foveal detail is immediately and completely forgotten, so there is no time at which the whole image is present to our awareness, except at the level of theory.</p><p><strong>Invisible Patterns</strong></p><p>Just because a pattern, however simple, is present in an image, does not mean that it will show up in the associated phenomenon. The phenomenon contains only those patterns which our visual minds are able to recognize and describe. These explicit descriptions are needed for awareness of the patterns. All that we see is built out of them. This is another sense in which it is incorrect to think that we see images as they are — it is better to say, with <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/7190.Ana_s_Nin">Anaïs Nin</a>, that we see them as we are.</p><p>Here is a demonstration of this point. Do you see a pattern in this image?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oqvpY2sBdv6j6LOQUVBfOQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image D</figcaption></figure><p>There is one, and it is very simple. See the end of this note for a version of the image in which the pattern elements are displayed in black.</p><p><strong>Mathematical Realism</strong></p><p>Whether or not correlations are discovered between the mathematical structures which formulate phenomena, and brain states, remains to be seen. But, in any case, the mathematical structures, if found, would not be the <em>same </em>as brain states. They reside in the universe of mathematics. This is where mathematical realism comes in.</p><p>Mathematical realism is the philosophical position that mathematical objects exist in their own right, independent of human thought . A mathematical realist can visualize a sort of cloud of mathematics around physical things. This cloud consists of the mathematical objects that exhibit systematic correlations to the things in question. This supports the following way of talking about the mathematical structure of physical reality. One interprets “physical thing X exhibits mathematical structure Y”, as meaning “there exists the mathematical structure Y that exhibits such and such correlation to the physical object X”. This way of putting matters takes the realistic view towards the mathematical object: it is an existent in its own right which correlates to the physical.</p><p>So, if one is a mathematical realist (such as me), then<strong> structure A</strong> simply resides in the mathematical universe. A question then arises. Is<strong> phenomenon A</strong> <em>the same, identical thing</em> as <strong>structure A</strong>? Maybe that’s how the world works: our awareness is constituted by mathematical structures (the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory#Central_identity">Integrated Information Theorists </a>think so). That is, the structures are not the <em>subject matter</em> of our perceptions, but <em>are</em><strong><em> </em></strong>those perceptions. (A more detailed treatment of this topic can be found <a href="https://medium.com/@eutelic/consciousness-and-mathematical-realism-298a61f981bc">here</a>).</p><p>But this cannot be the whole story, for a basic reason: <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/">qualia</a>. “Qualia” is the philosophical name for the basic “feels” that arise in experience, such as color or pain. Qualia cannot be explained by mathematics. But maybe <strong>phenomenon A</strong> consists of <strong>structure A</strong> painted, as it were, by qualia.</p><p>This line of inquiry might be mistaken. But phenomena are <em>something </em>and made of something — and that something is not brain tissue. That they are partly made of mathematical structure is made plausible by the fact that their structural features can be captured mathematically.</p><p><strong>Postscript</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rtPTV0sV52ST35ITj_g8kA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Differences Between Images B and C in Black</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N_sVHrlQq-uOtKNRdRSXZg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pattern Elements of Image D Displayed in Black</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1602c4914bb6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Phenomenology of Abstract Images]]></title>
            <link>https://eutelic.medium.com/the-phenomenology-of-abstract-images-a09517b2bd02?source=rss-9eb6cdfd0ade------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a09517b2bd02</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[phenomenology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[consciousness]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[chrisGoad]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jan 2020 12:16:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-12T14:26:05.399Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By “phenomenology” I mean the philosophical discipline, founded in its modern form by <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/">Edmund Husserl</a>, which studies appearances.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/721/1*HI-GxNPyJOTK1Mli3joiqg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Consider an image, and the situation of a person (say Albert) attending to it. The image itself, as a physical object, might be a photograph, or pixels on a screen. The appearance of the image within Albert’s mind (that is, the phenomenon to which the image gives rise) is not itself an image, but a mental object. This note concerns the ways in which the structures of image and phenomenon differ.</p><p>There are two perspectives from which the phenomenon can be considered. The first is Albert’s own. The second is that of an outside observer — for example, a philosopher or neuroscientist trying to make sense of the situation.</p><p>When I am considering the matter from the outside, I favor<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergentism"> emergentism</a>, a form of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind#Non-reductive_physicalism">non-reductive physicalism</a> which holds that phenomena are structures built out of the activity of neurons, but are not reducible to that activity (see this <a href="https://medium.com/@eutelic/consciousness-and-mathematical-realism-298a61f981bc">earlier note</a> for details). But, for the most part, the observations in this note are made from the internal, phenomenological standpoint, and as such do not depend on any particular theory of about what phenomena might be as viewed from the outside.</p><p>You yourself know the internal perspective as well as anyone, since you are a human looking at the image too. You see crossing diagonals against an otherwise random field, don’t you?</p><p>The pattern of the crossing diagonals is an aspect of Albert’s phenomenon of the image. Consider the following alternative image:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yvUWtEr5opeszECmtZKBWg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image 2</figcaption></figure><p>This image would seem to be the same as the first one, with the difference that it is missing the crossing diagonals, and consists entirely of a random field. However, if you look closely, you will see that the little lines on the diagonals in image 2 are not random at all. Instead of running along the direction of the diagonals as they did in the first image, they are at right angles to them. The following image was constructed in the same way, but with the diagonal elements colored red.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PozyImJxx3q38dFfQA_QfA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Let us call the phenomenon of the first crossing-diagonals image P1, and of the second image P2. P1 contains a pattern and P2 does not. We know this because we can ask Albert (or ourselves) what we see — are aware of — when we encounter the images (that is, before the pattern in P2 is explained to us). However, the two <em>images </em>contain patterns to an equal degree.</p><p>We can deduce that whatever P1 and P2 are, they are surely not just internal copies of their images. It seems reasonable to say that P1 <em>contains </em>the first image in a certain way, at least when Albert is actually looking at the image, rather than remembering it. It is hard to doubt that those little lines are present to Albert’s awareness in this case. But awareness of the little lines is not enough to ensure awareness of a pattern in them, as is shown by P2. Rather, P1 seems to contain annotations which assign to the lines on the diagonals additional explicit notes that they are aligned along the diagonals to form the crossing-diagonal pattern. These explicit notes are necessary for the awareness of the pattern. No such notes are present in P2 for the equally systematic orientations of the lines on the diagonals.</p><p>This at least is my simple phenomenological analysis of this situation — my analysis of what<em> appears to me</em> in the first image. Namely, I am aware of several things: first of a collection of short lines arrayed in a particular way across the image, second of the presence of a particular pattern, which in this case, I can describe easily with the phrase “crossing diagonals”, and finally an assignment of the little lines either to the pattern, or the random field.</p><p>This is the view of the situation from the inside. What about the external view — the view, say of the neuroscientist? A long history of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feature_detection_(nervous_system)">work in neuroscience</a> correlates with this picture, in that the coding of simple patterns via the activity of neurons has been uncovered in many contexts. Phenomena, viewed from the outside, might be information structures coded, at some level of abstraction, in neuronal activity (though phenomena in their entirety cannot be accounted for in this way, due to the problem of <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/">qualia</a>). The explicit notes, in some situations, might find a particularly simple encoding: the firings of individual neurons. However, such neurological correlations are known only for the simplest of situations. The relationship between phenomena and brain activity remains, as a general matter, mysterious (the study of this falls under the heading “<a href="http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Neural_correlates_of_consciousness#The_Neuronal_Basis_of_Conscious_Perception">Neural Correlates of Consciousness</a>”). Note that, other than this paragraph, observations made here do not depend on neuroscience.</p><p>Presence in awareness of a pattern brings with it causal power — it allows Albert to answer out loud when asked about the content of the image: “I see crossing diagonals”. One could train a dog to press a lever only when the pattern is present, as well. Awareness is <em>constituted </em>by this sort of causal power, according to one theory. Namely, according to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_workspace_theory">global workspace theory</a> of consciousness, bringing something into awareness amounts to cataloging it in a workspace to which the various <a href="https://medium.com/@eutelic/a-diagram-of-the-mind-4b81adaae88d">mechanisms of the mind</a> have common access. The contents of the workspace are all those things that can be brought to attention, and which can thereby play a role in conscious thought and behavior.</p><p>The conclusion is that patterns within an image sometimes show up in phenomena, and sometimes not. Note that such patterns, in the absence of their observation, have absolutely no macroscopic causal power (that is they might affect some photons, but never have any effect at the macroscopic scale). Patterns are macroscopically impotent unless they are observed. They are like George Berkeley’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/If_a_tree_falls_in_a_forest#History">tree</a>, only more so. At least a tree has interactions with the other trees in the forest, even if there is no observer to behold it. An unobserved pattern in an image, however, is a completely isolated thing in the universe, with no macroscopic effect on anything whatever. It has the lowest possible grade of existence. Note that unheard music has the same low grade of existence as an unobserved visual pattern.</p><p>We now know how to build machines which behave as observers in the above sense. Does consciousness of some sort arise in this situation too? I have no idea. How could one <em>know </em>that an entity is conscious without <em>being </em>that entity?</p><p>Consider this image in which the patterning is more ornate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XdthN0iXs4WZgjpXe6bhug.jpeg" /></figure><p>The complexity and nature of the annotations which accompany your phenomenon of this image can only be guessed at. What is the extent of the formal language of patterns (if that is the right way of thinking of it) in which annotations are expressed? It would include, for example, ways of formulating the repetition of visual elements in geometries such as lines, arcs, and grids. Such visual elements would include primitives such as line segments, but also patterns at a lower level, rendering the formulations recursive. But this is only the beginning.</p><p>In any case, it is the structure of the annotations that constitute your seeing of the image above, much more so than the pixels. It is inevitable that there are many patterns in the image of which you are unaware. In this sense, you cannot see anything of this complexity in its entirety.</p><p>Note that any image of a tree or sidewalk includes patterns of even higher intricacy, only some of which find their way into phenomena. You will never see a tree “as it is”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-ES1xOVZbWf87Z-3pW0vzQ.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a09517b2bd02" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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