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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Eric Ver Ploeg on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Eric Ver Ploeg on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Eric Ver Ploeg on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[2023 Series A Venture Deal Pace]]></title>
            <link>https://everploeg.medium.com/2023-series-a-venture-deal-pace-d192295abfdb?source=rss-560eaf036eaf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d192295abfdb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[series-a]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[seed-investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Ver Ploeg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Mar 2023 23:51:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-09T00:10:56.898Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’ve heard lots of recent discussion about Series A deal pace here in the early months of 2023. As you can see in the data below, deal pace and round sizing has indeed declined, but it’s nowhere near as a cataclysmic as some folks have made it sound.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5-xbo3jPOk8SzuIfIWjpXA.png" /><figcaption>Series A deal count by month for US-based tech (non-healthcare) companies. All data from Crunchbase.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ezKeEbPDogZwOn_meXqlMA.png" /><figcaption>Series A median round size by month for US-based tech companies. All data from Crunchbase.</figcaption></figure><h4>Observations</h4><p>On a number of deals per month basis, the pace has indeed recently fallen to about two-thirds what we saw in 2020. The deal pace of 2021 and early 2022 were the exceptions, not the norm. We see that median round size stays fairly constant over time, since it is most strongly correlated with the size of the venture funds writing checks, which doesn’t change much on a year to year basis.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d192295abfdb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Do San Francisco Bay Area Startups Still Outperform?]]></title>
            <link>https://everploeg.medium.com/do-san-francisco-bay-area-startups-still-outperform-53adff23d188?source=rss-560eaf036eaf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/53adff23d188</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[seed-funding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Ver Ploeg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 31 Oct 2022 16:12:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-22T21:04:59.708Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://everploeg.medium.com/are-founders-still-starting-companies-in-san-francisco-bay-area-3cc0d45fa682">We’ve seen</a> that the fraction of startups formed in the San Francisco Bay Area, relative to the rest of the United States, was essentially unchanged through the onset of the pandemic. Despite the work-from-anywhere reality forced upon us by the pandemic, per capita startup formation in the San Francisco Bay Area remains at roughly 10x the rate of the rest of the USA. But is it still the best place in the world to start a startup? Now that it has been two and a half years since the onset of the pandemic, we have useful data to respond to this question.</p><h4>What is “Best”?</h4><p>As a seed stage venture investor, my definition of “best place to start a startup” is tied to financial outcomes. A prospective startup founder might have a very different, and completely rational, basis for what is “best,” around lifestyle factors. But here I will only look at investment returns considerations. One way to do the financial outcomes analysis is to wait until cash-on-cash results are available, but average time to liquidity for seed stage investments is running about eight years (with the very best outcomes often taking longer), so that approach requires waiting a long time for the data and unhelpfully tells you about the seed stage world eight years ago. Those are very material drawbacks.</p><p>A useful proxy for success is the binary test of whether or not a Series A financing was announced within a set period of time after the Seed financing (throughout this post, I use the same definitions as <a href="https://everploeg.medium.com/are-founders-still-starting-companies-in-san-francisco-bay-area-3cc0d45fa682">here</a>). Since a Series A round is nearly a prerequisite for an eventual large successful outcome, and it generally happens within 18 months of the Seed financing, it is an effective interim measure of success. We can create a related binary success metric by observing that the top tier Series A venture firms have markedly better financial outcomes than the rest of the venture industry. We could have a robust debate on the directionality of the causal link between top tier venture firms and superior financial results, but we only need to rely on the existence of a correlation, which I’ve never seen refuted by data. So, a Series A financing led by a top tier venture firm is another interesting interim success metric to evaluate through the pandemic transition.</p><p>The table below summarizes the data on startups for four populations: two geographies and two time periods. The two geographies are for companies headquartered in the San Francisco Bay Area and Rest of the United States; the two time periods are for companies that raised Seed funding in the four quarters before the onset of the COVID pandemic (defined as end of Q1 2020) and the four quarters after the pandemic onset. For the four populations, we have the initial Seed funded startup counts, the subset of those Seed funded companies that raised Series A within 18 months, and the subset of those Seed funded companies that raised Series A from a top tier venture firm within 18 months.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/983/1*mSvlQipN92ZWLoUW9Zfgkw.png" /><figcaption>Seed to Series A success rates before and after the onset of the COVID pandemic for the San Francisco Bay Area and the Rest of the United States (all of US except for SF Bay Area). Four quarters after Pandemic onset are defined to be Q2 2020 through Q1 2021; corresponding subsequent Series A period defined to be Q2 2020 through Q3 2022. All data from Crunchbase.</figcaption></figure><h4>Observations</h4><p>The table below combines data from the table above and illustrates the following observations.</p><p>(1) The startup financing boom after the onset of the pandemic is clearly evident. Total US (combination of both geographies considered here) Seed to Series A success rate climbed from 16% to 22%, and the Seed to top tier Series A success rate climbed from 2.2% to 4.2%. This will likely roll off as the current venture slow down works its way through this data.</p><p>(2) The San Francisco Bay Area demonstrates a significant advantage over the entire time period considered here. For the Seed to Series A success metric, the SF Bay Area had a 1.60x advantage, and for the Seed to top tier Series A success metrics, a 1.52x advantage.</p><p>(3) Addressing the main question posed in this post, the regional advantage — as measured by both of the success metrics we consider here — of the San Francisco Bay Area <strong>increased</strong> after the onset of the pandemic. The SF Bay Area’s Seed to Series A advantage increased by a factor of 1.19x and the Seed to top tier Series A advantage increased by a factor of 1.13x.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A0FB4dz1LWfmpJNyNvy86g.png" /><figcaption>Startups formed in the San Francisco Bay Area had a material success rate advantage versus the Rest of USA, for both of the success metrics considered here, before onset of the COVID pandemic. That San Francisco Bay Area advantage <strong>increased</strong> after the onset of the pandemic. All data in this table comes from the table above.</figcaption></figure><h4>Data Trumps Opinions</h4><p>Despite the anti-SF Bay Area punditry, the data shows that it became a better place to found a startup through the onset of the pandemic. There are of course many caveats to this sort of analysis. Statistical correlation is not destiny. Great companies can be formed anywhere, and there are some sectors that have particular geographic areas of excellence. And the underlying causal factors may be more banal than some pro-SF Bay Area pundits would like to admit: the average SF Bay Area Seed funding tends to be noticeably larger than elsewhere, making it easier to reach Series A; a large fraction of the top tier venture firms are based in the SF Bay Area, and some have a bias toward local investments.</p><p>The typical startup has become markedly more “virtual” through the pandemic. But, in the cursory checks I did, the reported headquarters location does seem to line up with the main founder’s geographic location. And, from the data above, startup headquarters location matters more than ever, despite companies being more virtual.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=53adff23d188" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Are Founders Still Starting Companies in San Francisco Bay Area?]]></title>
            <link>https://everploeg.medium.com/are-founders-still-starting-companies-in-san-francisco-bay-area-3cc0d45fa682?source=rss-560eaf036eaf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3cc0d45fa682</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[seed-investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[work-from-home]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[san-francisco]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Ver Ploeg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Jul 2022 19:08:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-07-11T19:08:36.922Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For at least two decades, the high cost of living in the San Francisco Bay Area, and other quality of life issues, have led many observers to predict the end of the San Francisco Bay Area being the most attractive place to start a venture back-able company. With the pandemic forced acceptance of work-from-anywhere, perhaps now will see the long-anticipated end of the dominance of the San Francisco Bay Area as the place to launch a startup. It’s been long enough since the onset of the pandemic that we now have meaningful amounts of data to look at to see if founder choices on location are showing up empirically.</p><p>It is difficult to pin down the “Founding Date” for a startup, since they often start as vaguely defined projects that can follow chaotic paths on their way to being a company. For this reason, I’ve used “first financing of $100K or more” as the definition of startup formation date. This hurdle also eliminates the very large number of companies that get entered in the Crunchbase dataset, but never actually raise any money. Lowering this hurdle to $50k wouldn’t change the analysis much; but, raising it to $1m would eliminate a large number of companies that raise six figures but fail before a next round of funding, and would introduce more of a time lag in the analysis.</p><p>The graphs below present the counts for companies headquartered in the San Francisco Bay Area and the Rest of the USA (ie, all of the US except the San Francisco Bay Area) for first reported Seed financings of $100K or more. It has been reported elsewhere that the fraction of remote workers has climbed markedly since the pandemic, so perhaps “headquarters” doesn’t mean quite as much as it used to. Also, I have not made an attempt confirm the categorization of the modest number of purely virtual startups. The handful of virtual startups I checked resolved to specific cities known for startups. And, some companies skip straight to raising a Series A, or raise non-equity capital (eg, grants, debt), but there doesn’t seem to be any reason to expect the ratio to change over the range of dates of this study, nor to be different in the geographies considered, so ignoring these cases seems reasonable.</p><p>I attempted to evaluate other startup hubs (New York, Austin, Miami, Seattle, etc.) but the startup formation rates were markedly smaller in each of them, relative to the San Francisco Bay Area, and therefore yielded much noisier data that bounced around from quarter to quarter.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vua7sGIQoVQWdisC8R0X3Q.png" /><figcaption>New Startup formation rate doesn’t appear to be much affected by the pandemic — starting at about the fifth bar. All data from Crunchbase.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ikbc6pzDC1zc2yd-nNttXw.png" /><figcaption>Ratio is directly derived from data presented in graph above. Ratio = Green Portion / Blue Portion of the bars above. Orange bars are the four quarters before the pandemic; blue bars are the eight quarters after the onset of the pandemic. Pandemic has had no impact on ratio of startups being formed in the San Francisco Bay Area.</figcaption></figure><p>For the four quarters before the pandemic, the ratio of San Francisco Bay Area to Rest of USA initial startup formation was 23.5%; for the eight quarters (any seasonality effects should be the same in the two groups) was also 23.5%. Empirically, the pandemic has had no observable impact on the relative rate of startup formation in the San Francisco Bay Area versus the Rest of the United States. At least from the perspective of where startup founders elect to start their companies, the pandemic doesn’t seem to have affected the relative attractiveness of the San Francisco Bay Area.</p><p>Taking a similar ratio based on total populations yields 2.4% — so, per capita startup formation rate is about 10x higher in the San Francisco Bay Area than in the Rest of the United States, both before and after the onset of the pandemic.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3cc0d45fa682" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[There is No Series A “No Man’s Land”]]></title>
            <link>https://everploeg.medium.com/there-is-no-series-a-no-mans-land-1af5658b0e97?source=rss-560eaf036eaf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1af5658b0e97</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup-lessons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Ver Ploeg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Jan 2017 20:43:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-10T21:07:28.142Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yFgQqY-6CQQN01nulo344A.png" /><figcaption>Number of Financings decreases with a Power Law dependence on round size. Data set: Crunchbase, equity rounds for US-based companies in 2015 and 2016.</figcaption></figure><p>I was talking with a startup CEO about sizing their upcoming Series A fundraise. We had a discussion about the perceived dearth of venture capital financings between the “large Series Seed” and the “small Series A”, and whether or not it then made sense to target raising more or less than the otherwise ideal amount, so as to avoid that “no man’s land” in the middle. To inform the discussion with something a bit better than anecdotal evidence, I pulled some data from Crunchbase. As we can see from the plot above, the number of financings falls off sharply as the size of the round increases. The data points are reasonably well fit by a power law curve (solid black line). Exceptions are deal counts at the “round number” financings of $5M, $10M, $15M, and $20M. I suspect these larger “round number” deal counts are a combination of the self-reported nature of the Crunchbase numbers and the natural inclination of investors and executives to reach round numbers.</p><p>As one would expect, the data confirms the dramatic reduction in the number of rounds that happen as round size grows. But, it does not show region of reduced deal counts that might be consistent with a “no man’s land” between a large Series Seed and a small Series A.</p><p>It is also relevant to look at the total amount of money raised in each of the $1M wide bins. Each point in the plot below is equal to the count from the corresponding point in the plot above multiplied by the average round size in that bin. The “round number” financings represent noticeably larger amounts of total investment than the adjacent bins.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uA48HBakkc5uzhYBwJZs3w.png" /><figcaption>Total Amount of Financings is relatively flat as a funding of round size. Exceptions are the “round number” financings at $5M, $10M, $15M &amp; $20M. Each point represents the total amount of the fundings that happened in 2015 &amp; 2016 at this size.</figcaption></figure><p>And, if we take the data in the plot above and plot in a cumulative manner, we can see in the plot below, the total amount of capital raised decreases only slightly with increasing round sizes. These plots do not suggest any specific region of lack of rounds getting done.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9W0mOaLz42I7nTY9UW4fHA.png" /><figcaption>Cumulative Total Amount of Financings shows a fairly linear dependence on round size.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Most important take aways:</strong></p><ol><li>There really isn’t a material gap in any part of the fundraising round size for the range that is relevant to a Series A financing. So, you should target the amount of money your startup actually needs, not what some well meaning advisor tells you need to raise.</li><li>Of course there are fewer financings as you look at larger round sizes. This is another reason not to talk yourself into raising a larger round of funding than you actually need.</li></ol><p><strong>The details:</strong></p><ul><li>All data is from Crunchbase, for rounds announced in calendar years 2015 and 2016. Much older than that starts to be of questionable current relevance.</li><li>Only financings for US based startups were included. Round types that aren’t equity-like (grants, non-convertible debt, etc.) were excluded.</li><li>When multiple rounds were announced within a 3 month period, I combined them as a single “round” for this study. This had minor impact on the smallest bins, and immaterial impact on the larger bins.</li><li>Within the $0 to $1M bin, 1106 of the 5136 deals were below $100K, and these accounted for only $43M of the $1.8B total. These very small rounds may be systemically missing from Crunchbase, but the total missing rounds are unlikely to be material to this analysis.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1af5658b0e97" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Numerai: Another Nail in the Efficient Market Hypothesis Coffin]]></title>
            <link>https://everploeg.medium.com/numerai-another-nail-in-the-efficient-market-hypothesis-coffin-533cc5e4a561?source=rss-560eaf036eaf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/533cc5e4a561</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[machine-learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Ver Ploeg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:21:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-22T20:42:37.741Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/318/1*hqli5z7r6tei27PGQ2t7MQ.png" /></figure><h3>Shiller First to Say “Emperor Has No Clothes”</h3><p>In his 1984 paper, “Stock Prices and Social Dynamics,” Professor Robert Shiller pointed out a startlingly obvious error in the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Simplifying greatly, the EMH says “stock prices always reflect their actual intrinsic worth,” but all the studies that purported to test the EMH instead tested the question “are stock prices hard to predict?” Professor Shiller earned the Nobel Prize in Economics largely for saying “hold on, those are two fundamentally different things.” Professor Shiller didn’t pull any punches in his attack on the EMH:</p><blockquote>…claims that because real returns are nearly unforecastable, the real price of stocks is close to the intrinsic value... This argument for the efficient markets hypothesis represents one of the most remarkable errors in the history of economic thought. It is remarkable in the immediacy of its logical error and in the sweep and implications of its conclusion.</blockquote><p>Just because stock prices are hard for humans to predict, doesn’t mean they are correct!</p><h3>Recurring Mispricings</h3><p>Once Professor Shiller pointed out this obvious error at the core of the EMH dogma, even the “hard to predict” part came under attack. Many studies have gone on to show there are recurring instances of stock price movements being predictable on a statistically significant basis. Of course, stock markets are adaptive systems, with significant incentives in place to drive out the largest and most reliably predictable price movements. So, once a recurring predictability is uncovered, it tends to go away.</p><p>It seems to me there are a few big observations/trends about these predictable price movements:</p><ol><li>With some work, it is possible to find statistically significant mispricings that recur when some set of circumstances prevail. A problem with this is that a model that makes a good prediction say 60% of the time, but can only be used on one month out of ten is very difficult to allocate capital to, unless one has access to a large collection of independent models, at least some of which work during different time periods.</li><li>The advances in AI/machine learning data analysis tools are making it dramatically easier to uncover many classes of statistically significant mispricings, if you can get access to the relevant data quickly and cheaply.</li><li>If you uncover a recurring pricing error, you don’t want to let anyone know what it is! You don’t want to upload your model to any third party site. You may not even want anyone to know who you are.</li></ol><h3>Enter Numerai</h3><p>I had those opinions in my mind the first time I met Richard Craib, the CEO of <a href="https://numer.ai/about">Numerai</a>. What I saw in the incredibly powerful Numerai business model was a way to anonymously empower a large number of data scientists to create a large number of independently identified stock mispricings that capitalized on the increasing power and ease of use of AI/machine learning tools. This large number of independently generated predictions could be tested for predictive power, combined in such a way as to reduce variance, and have capital allocated to them accordingly.</p><p>I participated in Numerai stock prediction tournament in February of 2016. The whole process only took me 90 minutes to download the training data, build a very simple model, and upload the prediction data set. I didn’t have to share any personally identifying information, nor did I have to share any of the details of <strong>how</strong> my model made the predictions it made. I actually uploaded two separate prediction data sets:</p><ol><li>A random set of predictions. I literally used a random number generator for this prediction set. I was happy to see that 92% of the existing submissions beat my random submission. This told me that most of the predictions had at least some predictive power.</li><li>A prediction set based on my very simple model. This model was beaten by 87% of the existing tournament submissions. This told me the overwhelming majority of the submissions were the result of thoughtful predictive models. I had to fight the urge to implement the long list of potential model improvements that would have allowed me to climb up the tournament ranking list.</li></ol><p>Based on this demonstrated fit with a huge latent need, the strength of the founding team, and the natural attractiveness of the Numerai business model, I asked Richard if I could participate as an investor in Numerai itself, which he thankfully agreed to despite it being an oversubscribed round.</p><p>As of today, thousands of data scientists have made over 20 billion stock market predictions through their participation in Numerai tournaments. Some of the best performers have indeed chosen to remain anonymous, and take their payments in Bitcoin. Also, Numerai has shifted tournament scoring to the degree to which their submissions uniquely improve the Numerai meta model, to reward the creation of additional predictive power at the aggregate level.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=533cc5e4a561" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Your Startup’s Future Isn’t as Binary as You Probably Think]]></title>
            <link>https://everploeg.medium.com/your-startups-future-isn-t-as-binary-as-you-probably-think-2b856b62ad28?source=rss-560eaf036eaf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b856b62ad28</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Ver Ploeg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Jul 2016 02:52:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-26T03:00:50.566Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3iTRWW-_74DLpMCDFjliLA.png" /><figcaption>In the real world, it is more likely that things will be going neither “great” nor “terrible” when it comes time for raising your next round of funding. It is that more likely gray area in the middle that requires you to plan ahead for that future financing campaign!</figcaption></figure><p>When talking with startups about their future financing plans, a recurring theme I run into is an essentially binary view of their future. They believe that either things will be “going well” with their startup, in which case fundraising will be a breeze, or things will be “going poorly”, and they’ll just stop working on the company. In the real world, when it is time for the next round of funding, things are more likely to turn out being some shade of gray in the middle than this simplistic white/black view.</p><p>Yes, some of the time, things really are objectively great. But, this is more like 10% or 20% of the time, not 50% of the time. Some of the things that lead to this outcome are in your control, like delivering a great product, and engaging well with your audience/customers. And, some of the things that lead to this outcome are completely out of your control, like the stock market going on a bull run, or a huge acquisition happening in your sector. But, whatever the cause, if things are going great, your fundraising is going to go reasonably well whether you do a good job planning that effort or not.</p><p>And yes, sometimes they do turn out so bad that it is obvious to everyone that it is time to quit. But, this is also something like 10% or 20% of the time, not 50%. Again, some of the causes are endogenous, and some exogenous. And, in this bad case, your fundraising is not going to be successful, no matter how well you planned in advance.</p><p>But, what you’re left with — most of the time — is a future scenario is some shade of gray between terrible and great. It is this majority part of the future probability space that requires planning if you are going to have a successful future financing campaign! For this most likely outcome, you can have a dramatic impact on your likelihood of fundraising success with just a bit of advanced planning. Sadly, I see many promising companies that are in their financing process and it is clear they have done no planning whatsoever.</p><p>Perhaps a root cause for the binary view many startups have is explained by the following... Most founders don’t have much experience with fundraising, and don’t have a lot of extra time to spend on learning how to do it better. Avoiding cognitive dissonance requires a worldview where it is somehow rational to ignore doing this thing you don’t know how to do: planning ahead for your next round. Conveniently, a binary view of your startup’s future is indeed consistent with not having to do this thing you don’t know how to do. But, common sense tells you that this cannot be the case.</p><p>Whatever the cause of this binary view held by so many entrepreneurs, it is both objectively incorrect and harmful to a company’s prospects for success!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b856b62ad28" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Venture Capital’s Leading Indicator]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/vcdium/venture-capitals-leading-indicator-751a3a50bb94?source=rss-560eaf036eaf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/751a3a50bb94</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Ver Ploeg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Apr 2016 21:23:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-28T04:20:32.819Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RI0lVl4YQEmPYo9Xsd9wMA.png" /><figcaption>Quarterly Capital Flows into (VC Fundraising) and from (VC Investing) Venture Funds</figcaption></figure><p>A surprisingly large amount of ink and conversation in the startup world is devoted to updates on the current availability of venture capital for investment, market clearing prices at which it can be had, and predictions and analyses of why it is getting harder/easier to raise money for your startup. Let me just start with what I believe is the most important, and rarely made, observation:</p><p><strong>The pricing of equity — public or private — is primarily driven by public sentiment. That sentiment is reflected first in the public markets, and is inherently difficult to predict.</strong></p><p>I see/hear otherwise bright people getting lost in their arguments and analyses, and becoming confused about the underlying causality. I would argue that the opinions of venture capitalists, investors into venture funds, and those who write about the venture industry, are at best a lagging indicator. The place where public sentiment is reflected first is in the prices of public equities. Indeed, there are convincing arguments that the public markets create the means by which public sentiment is discovered.</p><p>My personal favorite single barometer of public sentiment is the <a href="http://www.multpl.com/shiller-pe/">Shiller Price to Earnings Ratio</a> (based on the S&amp;P 500). The Shiller PE is graphed below for the same quarters as in the chart above.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GGUeYJ05EreUuIKXAFrGJA.png" /><figcaption>Shiller PE Ratio, for same quarters as graph above.</figcaption></figure><p>As we compare the quarterly capital flows into, and from, venture firms, with the value of of the Shiller PE, there are a few things worth noting:</p><ol><li>Wow, those plots are striking in the degree to which they line up! More on the actual correlations below.</li><li>Capital flows in the venture ecosystem reflect a sub-optimal “buy high, sell low” procyclicality that is true across most asset classes. I examine this in more detail in a <a href="https://medium.com/@everploeg/how-does-venture-money-change-with-the-market-1599ab1bc3ad#.vrl67ea2h">previous post</a>.</li><li>Each data point in the first graph reflects information not knowable until the end of a quarter. While each data point in the second graph is a snapshot of a value that is knowable in real-time (during market hours). Put another way, if the S&amp;P 500 shoots up 20% on the first few days of the quarter, it’s a good bet that venture capital flows will go up markedly before the end of the quarter.</li><li>The best predictor of where public market prices will be in the future (after correcting for inflation and GDP growth) is where they are today. Anyone who actually has a better prediction capability — if for example, surveying the opinions of venture capitalists could predict the public markets — would be a billionaire trading their own account. They certainly wouldn’t be wasting their time sharing their predictions with you or me.</li></ol><p>We could easily get absorbed in looking for a better proxy than the Shiller PE Ratio. There are indices that are more tech-centric; there are indices that are more small-cap centric; there are indices that are higher-growth centric. Yes, yes, and yes. But, let’s not lose sight of the key fact that the public indices are real-time indicators of market sentiment, and all venture capital opinion pieces and compendiums of private prices reflect averages that are weeks or months old. Indeed, when we check correlations between quarterly changes in the Shiller PE Ratio and quarterly VC Investing and quarterly VC Fundraising, we find a few very interesting things.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/515/1*Wr6FqgP8jUudh2x4YOjW0w.png" /><figcaption>Correlation between quarterly changes in Shiller PE Ratio and in-quarter and next-quarter changes in VC Investing (VC Funds investing into startups) and VC Fundraising (LPs investing into VC Funds). Same quarters as graphs above.</figcaption></figure><ol><li>Consistent with a visual comparison between the first and second graphs above, we see noticeable positive correlation between Shiller PE change and change in in-quarter capital flows for both VC Investing and VC Fundraising. Correlations of this size across such a large number of quarters are strong and statistically significant results.</li><li>When we look at the correlation between Shiller PE changes and changes in next-quarter capital flows for VC Investing, we see that the correlation remains strong, suggesting that venture capitalists may take a few months to respond to changes in market sentiment.</li><li>But, the story is very different when we look at the correlation between Shiller PE change and changes in next-quarter capital flows for VC Fundraising. Here we see the correlation essentially goes away, suggesting the LPs who invest in venture firms react fairly quickly to changes in the public market.</li></ol><h4>Bottom Line</h4><p>Of course, current venture round pricing information is sometimes useful. If you are a startup founder raising a round of financing, it is certainly worth collecting up some data to have a quantified view. But, please bear in mind that you’re collecting up old data, and that the best way to adjust it to current time is by looking at the changes in the public markets. And, changes to the value of your startup are a magnified version of the changes to the public markets. Not only does your startup’s equity have higher beta in the standard financial sense (as we might partially address by picking a high-tech, high-growth, small-cap index), but changes in the value of your startup are also magnified to a greater extent than can be observed in the public markets due to:</p><ol><li>Capital formation ability. If the public markets go down, it’s going to be harder for all startups to raise additional money, and vice versa if the market goes up.</li><li>Willingness to buy from the little guy. The same positive sentiment that buoys the public markets gives people the confidence to buy from a little startup. But, when the markets fall, there is generally a flight to quality, and people don’t want to take a risk on buying from a startup.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=751a3a50bb94" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/vcdium/venture-capitals-leading-indicator-751a3a50bb94">Venture Capital’s Leading Indicator</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/vcdium">GVCdium</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The ONE THING that Helps Most in Raising a Series A Round]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hackernoon/the-one-thing-that-helps-most-in-raising-a-series-a-round-d5de2c5550c0?source=rss-560eaf036eaf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d5de2c5550c0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[series-a]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Ver Ploeg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2016 01:19:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-30T05:13:09.927Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/847/1*jpQxAG_j1qeSmhlUMBHvyA.png" /><figcaption>Raising a larger amount of Seed money is the strongest predictor of Series A fundraising success. Error bars are +/- One Standard Error. Data from CrunchBase.</figcaption></figure><p>My last post (<a href="https://medium.com/@everploeg/accelerators-vs-angels-a79ba5154acc#.6aqf72v8o">Accelerators vs Angels</a>) showed that raising money from Angel investors was a significantly more <a href="https://hackernoon.com/tagged/important">important</a> predictor of a startup’s ability <a href="https://hackernoon.com/tagged/raise">raise</a> a Series A round than was graduating from an Accelerator. But, it seems likely that there would be a big difference between raising small and large amounts of Seed money. This post looks more closely at this issue.</p><p>There are a large number of statistically significant attributes that are correlated with success in raising a Series A financing. But, one thing stands out if you want to maximize your startup’s chances of successfully raising a Series A round:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Raise a lot of Seed money.</em></strong></blockquote><p>The graph above shows this very clearly. Of course, the underlying causality is a separate issue, and is nearly impossible to identify with certainty. And the causality probably varies from company to company. But the likely key causes are (in approximate order of likelihood):</p><ol><li>Having more money from the Seed stage allows the company to get further along in generating the sort of traction metrics that will allow it to raise a Series A round.</li><li>The company has been getting really great customer/user traction since its early days. That same traction that drew lots of Seed money to the company makes it highly likely it will be able to raise a Series A round.</li><li>The founders are just really skilled at fundraising, both at Seed stage and Series A stage.</li><li>The founders are rockstars (eg, $1B exit already) making it easy to raise money at almost any stage.</li></ol><p>Using the CrunchBase dataset, and following the methodology used in the post mentioned above, we can construct the data table below for companies that raised Seed money in the period 2010 through 2013. This is the data plotted in the chart above.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/834/1*4mu_1ynBVEvGzGsxBb_m4w.png" /><figcaption>Data used to produce the graph above, with addition of company counts in each range. CrunchBase dataset.</figcaption></figure><p>These results are really striking. Historically, a company raising a $150K Seed round has about one chance in 25 of raising a Series A round, while a company raising $750K has about one chance in four of raising a Series A.</p><p><a href="http://tomtunguz.com/seed-followon-rates/">Tom Tunguz recently posted an excellent analysis on a very similar topic</a>. His results are similar to mine despite significant differences in the population definitions. So, I guess my post can be viewed as semi-independent (we used the same CrunchBase dataset, so it’s not truly independent) confirmation of his conclusions.</p><figure><a href="http://bit.ly/HackernoonFB"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0hqOaABQ7XGPT-OYNgiUBg.png" /></a></figure><figure><a href="https://goo.gl/k7XYbx"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Vgw1jkA6hgnvwzTsfMlnpg.png" /></a></figure><figure><a href="https://goo.gl/4ofytp"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gKBpq1ruUi0FVK2UM_I4tQ.png" /></a></figure><blockquote><a href="http://bit.ly/Hackernoon">Hacker Noon</a> is how hackers start their afternoons. We’re a part of the <a href="http://bit.ly/atAMIatAMI">@AMI</a> family. We are now <a href="http://bit.ly/hackernoonsubmission">accepting submissions</a> and happy to <a href="/service/mailto:partners@amipublications.com">discuss advertising &amp; sponsorship</a> opportunities.</blockquote><blockquote>If you enjoyed this story, we recommend reading our <a href="http://bit.ly/hackernoonlatestt">latest tech stories</a> and <a href="https://hackernoon.com/trending">trending tech stories</a>. Until next time, don’t take the realities of the world for granted!</blockquote><figure><a href="https://goo.gl/Ahtev1"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*35tCjoPcvq6LbB3I6Wegqw.jpeg" /></a></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fdde502%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fhackernoon%2F&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3c851dac986ab6dbb2d1aaa91205a8eb/href">https://medium.com/media/3c851dac986ab6dbb2d1aaa91205a8eb/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d5de2c5550c0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon/the-one-thing-that-helps-most-in-raising-a-series-a-round-d5de2c5550c0">The ONE THING that Helps Most in Raising a Series A Round</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon">HackerNoon.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Accelerators vs Angels]]></title>
            <link>https://everploeg.medium.com/accelerators-vs-angels-a79ba5154acc?source=rss-560eaf036eaf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a79ba5154acc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[accelerator]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angel-investors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Ver Ploeg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Dec 2015 19:04:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-12-21T19:14:10.778Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PV_MMJhk68Ar2OoDErYrJw.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/gmacorig/2312721547/in/photolist-4wnixr-z4jg9C-bxyRXi-8NA5cS-5pfu1-ejgezZ-dx5brU-5KiuWZ-kjeHvU-qF8BXr-8c5jJx-nFyNEM-qeQ5WC-7eizs3-ixe8KV-qtoc1s-AT9EfL-24R2b-6jqkTH-6jrEWx-5wz5p1-7aAWz6-bf37Qc-kiRieR-aeP64V-6hxFDq-neKYg8-n1spdi-dGkjcn-3XcxwZ-8PRo2-bt2SH8-9Tb6fv-p4Lohn-ehb7XX-7ejUoH-7aB1FM-cXDBWQ-81mjck-y5fuQu-ejrjUv-5HS4td-8mGyz9-hxEt2P-qGq2oE-x1gEXb-2VcL7e-9oQNnC-b25j5D-9FSwg4">Photo Credit</a></figcaption></figure><p>An entrepreneur friend asked me if he should apply to an Accelerator or go raise Angel money. Generally speaking this isn’t an either/or sort of question, and what is best for each company is a function of its particular needs and situation. But, we can bring some useful historical data analysis to see how these paths correlate with good near-term outcomes.</p><p>A good early indicator of “success” is whether or not a subsequent Series A financing happens for the company. This older post of mine — <a href="https://medium.com/@everploeg/do-angel-investors-in-4b2df43709c0#.u3ay6d7wv">Do Angel Investors in California Outperform the Rest of the World?</a> — examines the rationale and motivation for using this success metric. While a subsequent Series A is not any sort of guarantee of success, it is essentially a necessary condition for major success, and only happens for a modest fraction of all companies that graduate from Accelerators or receive Angel money.</p><p>Fortunately, all the data we need to analyze the correlation between graduating from an Accelerator or receiving Angel money and raising a subsequent Series A financing is available from the fantastic <a href="https://www.crunchbase.com/">CrunchBase Dataset</a>. The CrunchBase Dataset includes 96 Accelerators and Incubators and 3,462 individual Angels that made at least one investment in the years 2010 through 2013. The 2013 end was chosen to allow enough time for subsequent Series A investments to have had a chance to happen. Those 96 Accelerators and Incubators graduated 2,012 startups across those four years, with the largest half dozen programs producing about half of the graduates. Over the same period of time, the 3,462 Angels invested in 1,923 companies. There is likely some sample bias among the Angel investments, with the companies that ultimately fail never making their way into the Crunchbase Dataset. The year 2010 start of the consideration universe was chosen in part because that was about the time when CrunchBase was enough of a known information source that startup companies had an incentive to have as much of their funding information published as possible, which reduces the sample selection bias associated with Angels adding information after the fact, and potentially mostly for their winners.</p><p>The table below summarizes the results. We see that about 13% of the Accelerator and Incubator grads went on to raise a Series A financing, and about 23% of the companies that received Angel money went on to raise a Series A financing. The Standard Error on these success ratios are small enough that we can assume that potential sample bias issues outweigh any random noise.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/526/1*sLH1ph9OU0L2arRHlJTyow.png" /><figcaption>A relatively modest fraction of Accelerator/Incubator Grads ever go on to raise a Series A financing. Success rates are better for those that raise Angel money, but the odds are still long. Consideration Universe Subset defined below.</figcaption></figure><p>It turns out that there were 484 companies in this combined population that both graduated from an Accelerator or Incubator and received Angel money. These 484 companies were more likely to receive a subsequent Series A financing than the 1,412 companies that received Angel money without graduating from an Accelerator or Incubator. The table below compares these two populations. The primary root cause of this difference appears to be the subset of companies in the second group who raise a very small amount of Angel money and quickly fade away.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/526/1*t_cRKFTH2xJdOoL4sr1tdA.png" /><figcaption>Those companies that both graduate from an Accelerator/Incubator and raise Angel money have a bit higher success rate. This appears to be driven by the startups who raise small amounts of Angel money and never make much progress. Consideration Universe Subset defined below.</figcaption></figure><p>Looking more closely at the 2,012 Accelerator or Incubator graduates, we see three separate paths:</p><ol><li>About 9% of the graduates go straight to raising a Series A financing.</li><li>About 24% raise Angel money. Usually, this happens at the time of graduation from the Accelerator or Incubator, or soon after. Of the 2,012 total graduates, about 7% reach a Series A financing via this path.</li><li>About 84% of the graduates have not raised a Series A financing. These companies have failed, been acquired (generally, for small dollar amounts), or are continuing to operate on a shoestring budget.</li></ol><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>Every startup is different. For some, the Accelerator/Incubator path brings something they really need. For others, it is the only alternative other than giving up. But, it is only a step in a process, and that process is one is a long and difficult one. As I hope the data above illustrates, going through an Accelerator/Incubator program is not some sort of golden ticket to the promised land. Most startups fail, and the earlier the stage, the truer this is.</p><h4>Methodology</h4><p>I’m including this section for the small subset of folks who love to drill into the details. If you’re not interested in those sort of details, you won’t miss anything by skipping this…</p><p>The 3,451 companies in the consideration universe are the subset of companies in the CrunchBase Dataset that meet the following criteria:</p><ul><li>Primary location is USA. This represents the overwhelming fraction of the companies, and for this subset of the companies, the rest of the associated data has better coverage.</li><li>Total financing size less than $2M. Financings larger than $2M don’t seem to me to be in the spirit of what most people would consider to be a Seed financing — at least, not for the 2010 through 2013 years.</li><li>Round type = “angel”, “seed”, or “convertible note”. This removed a fair number of small “Series A” financings that would have otherwise met the initial selection criteria. The financing provided by the Accelerators and Incubators is generally categorized as “seed”.</li><li>Investor was an individual Angel or Accelerator/Incubator. Explicitly removed were financings from Micro VC’s, traditional venture firms (many had seed programs in those years), government entities, and non-profits.</li><li>This initial financing happened in the years 2010 through 2013.</li><li>Have not already raised a Series A financing. A fair number of Angel rounds are bridges, extensions, follow-on financings, or small pieces added on to another round of financing. These may be great investments, but they are not in the spirit of the analysis I am trying to do here.</li></ul><p>For a subsequent Series A financing to have been deemed to have happened, it had to meet the following criteria:</p><ul><li>Round Type = “venture”</li><li>Round Code = “A”</li><li>Total financing size greater than $2M</li><li>Date has to be after (and not same date as) the initial date above, and was in the CrunchBase data set as of the September 30, 2015 quarterly update date. There are certainly a few companies that entered the consideration universe above that will someday reach a Series A financing, but haven’t done so yet. I would be surprised if this was even one percent of the universe, though.</li></ul><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_error">This Wikipedia article on Standard Error</a>, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernoulli_distribution">this one on Bernoulli Distributions</a> are a good refresh on the underlying statistics.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a79ba5154acc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What the Heck AngelList Really is — Three Marketplace Functions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/startups-venture-capital/what-the-heck-angellist-really-is-three-marketplace-functions-3f4235a29c5d?source=rss-560eaf036eaf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3f4235a29c5d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angellist]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Ver Ploeg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2015 20:59:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-28T19:47:17.053Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pzHjoBg8gBEtH9zQigqNaw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VVpu8gfOmKbgPLo5jG_zvg.jpeg" /></figure><p>AngelList is impressive in its current reach into the early-stage venture ecosystem, and its plans for the future. By my back of envelope estimates, they represent about three-quarters of the entire US equity crowdfunding market. But, AngelList fills a number of functions, and is in an ongoing state of evolution, so it is a difficult business to describe succinctly. When I mention AngelList to friends in the venture/startup world, some are very familiar with it, and others say “can you please tell me what the heck AngelList really is?” The answer to that question depends on who you are and what you want to get done. The following is a grossly simplified version of what AngelList is.</p><p>As the graphic above depicts, the essence of AngelList is three separate marketplace functions:</p><ol><li><strong>AngelList Jobs.</strong> Marketplace connecting people looking to join a startup and startup companies looking to hire people. AngelList does not currently charge for this service.</li><li><strong>AngelList Companies.</strong> A facilitator role in financings between startup companies and active investors. AngelList sees to the creation of the per-deal SPV and reporting for the lifetime of the investment. This is done at cost — passed through to a separate company.</li><li><strong>AngelList Syndicates &amp; Funds</strong>. Marketplace connecting individuals or funds who source investment opportunities (“Syndicate Leads” or “Funds”) and investors who back those investment opportunities (“Investors”). AngelList charges carry for making these connections. AngelList enables a Lead to offer a continuum of commitment levels to prospective Investors, from allowing complete discretion over each investment to committing to a blind pool.</li></ol><p>Moving from left to right in the graphic above, <strong>if you are</strong>:</p><ul><li><strong>An individual looking for a job with a startup.</strong> You use angel.co/jobs as a way to connect with startups that have job postings there.</li><li><strong>A startup looking to hire people.</strong> You use angel.co/jobs to post jobs.</li><li><strong>A startup looking to raise capital.</strong> There are essentially two things you can be doing: (i) put up a profile on AngelList and hope that a Syndicate Lead or Fund approaches you — this might happen, but you are almost certainly better off thinking of your AngelList profile in terms of how it supports your proactive efforts; (ii) proactively pursue Syndicate Leads or Funds on AngelList similar to the way you would pursue any other potential source of funding.</li><li><strong>An active investor (you source your own investment opportunities) looking for investment opportunities.</strong> Many startups create AngelList profiles with enough information to enable some initial screening. I’m trying to stay purely factual in this post, but I feel the need to interject a warning here: if you are new to angel investing, please do not blow your brains out by investing in startups directly from the list of AngelList companies.</li><li><strong>An active investor (you are an individual or fund who sources your own investment opportunities — a “Syndicate Lead” or “Fund”) looking to get paid for investing others’ money. </strong>AngelList gives you an easy way to pool money from a number of other investors. For those that you bring to the table directly, AngelList doesn’t take any extra fee beyond the SPV creation/reporting pass through cost (currently $8K per deal). For those that come via AngelList and/or your general branding/marketing efforts, AngelList takes a carry (currently 5%) on that money.</li><li><strong>An investor looking to invest in startups without sourcing your own investment opportunities (“Syndicate Investor” in AngelList parlance).</strong> You can pick from a number of Lead investors (individuals and funds) that source investment opportunities. You pay the Lead for this service in the form of the carry level they select.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3f4235a29c5d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/startups-venture-capital/what-the-heck-angellist-really-is-three-marketplace-functions-3f4235a29c5d">What the Heck AngelList Really is — Three Marketplace Functions</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/startups-venture-capital">Startups &amp; Venture Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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