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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Expel on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Expel on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Expel on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@expel_io?source=rss-ebaf28d052e3------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[A common sense approach for assessing third-party risk]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@expel_io/a-common-sense-approach-for-assessing-third-party-risk-8bc0acb5474f?source=rss-ebaf28d052e3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8bc0acb5474f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[third-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[assessment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Expel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Dec 2020 15:43:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-16T15:43:30.611Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IlC3DpEG4Qlka0DYwbfiSQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>A common sense approach for assessing third-party risk</figcaption></figure><p>“How secure is your supply chain?” It’s a question that can strike terror into the heart of a CISO — even one who’s in charge of a mature security organization.</p><p>With the move (sprint?) to cloud-based infrastructure, and business departments subscribing to SaaS apps left and right (“Oops! was I supposed to tell IT?”), every day we rely more and more on other peoples’ services to serve our customers.</p><p>Here at Expel, we’re a “cloud first” organization. Our entire enterprise’s physical infrastructure fits easily on one desk. But we use the capability of nearly 250 vendors to bring our services to our customers. That’s a lot of infrastructure that’s not ours.</p><p>And we’re a relatively small company. Large companies may depend on hundreds of outside services. Understanding how all those services keep their customers (meaning … you) secure is no trivial matter. But it’s super important.</p><p>CISOs manage cyber risk in their own infrastructure every day. But once you leave your own infrastructure, it gets harder. And there aren’t a lot of playbooks for how to manage the risk of someone else’s infrastructure.</p><p>Third parties are out of your control. You give them money, they provide a good or service in return. Sometimes, there’s even contractual language that says “we’ll do our best to secure your data.” But, in practice, those words don’t really mean much. What matters is the practices, procedures, and policies your vendors follow.</p><p>At Expel, like many companies, we’ve created a third-party assessment program for our vendors to try to manage our supply chain risk. We’ve used other companies’ third-party assessment programs as input, consulted our vendors and done a lot of research. It works well for us, and so we’re sharing it with you, along with the <a href="https://info.expel.io/third-party-assessment?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=third%20party%20assessment">third-party risk assessment questionnaire</a> we’ve developed.</p><h4>Watch the video overview … or keep scrolling to read on</h4><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffast.wistia.net%2Fembed%2Fiframe%2Fra86deg3n5&amp;display_name=Wistia%2C+Inc.&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fexpel.wistia.com%2Fmedias%2Fra86deg3n5&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fembed-ssl.wistia.com%2Fdeliveries%2F45abd5a9aad69b9398f3541edf8d7c6a6f1e8851.jpg%3Fimage_crop_resized%3D960x540&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=wistia" width="960" height="540" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/4ed93c3836bb23244660f340d443f0ff/href">https://medium.com/media/4ed93c3836bb23244660f340d443f0ff/href</a></iframe><h3>First … be realistic about who chooses your suppliers</h3><p>Unfortunately (at least for CISOs), security doesn’t control who the organization does business with. Business owners do. And the questions they have on their mind are very different than what most CISOs are wondering. As you roll your program out, it’s important to understand the business owner’s mindset so you can figure out when, where and how to insert your own process into theirs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*W55jCwZyUClsuJPVUNdoig.png" /><figcaption>Where CISOs should be involved</figcaption></figure><p>When a business owner has a problem, they probably want to fix it fast. They want to know if the product or service they’ve got their eye on will do the trick. If the answer is “yes” (and they’ve got the budget) they’ll move forward, negotiating contracts, agreeing on cost and ultimately making the purchase. Meanwhile, the CISO is thinking, “Does this vendor create an acceptable level of risk?” Getting answers means acting fast — while the business owners are chasing down answers to their own questions. If a potential vendor doesn’t address security in a way you’re comfortable with, the sooner you know that the better. It’s much easier to guide the business away from potentially toxic companies early in the process than to stop a contract that’s gone through all the redlining and negotiation and is one inch from the finish line.</p><h3>Next … set realistic expectations (aka understand the constraints)</h3><p>Setting realistic expectations for your third-party assessment program requires understanding two important equations that’ll govern how much time you and your vendors are willing to put in.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rxtc2M1TZTsNHb5UVwodJA.png" /><figcaption>Set realistic expectations for your third-party assessment program</figcaption></figure><p>They seem simple. But it’s easy to get so caught up in the weeds perfecting your process that you lose sight of them. Violate equation number one and vendors will start stretching the truth to get through all of your questions or bury the bad stuff to try and get your business. Violate the second equation and you’ll find yourself giving away a free risk assessment or pen test to every potential vendor (more on that later).</p><p>Remember, SaaS providers are getting bombarded left and right with third-party assessments. Short, easy questionnaires will get their attention before long complex ones. Likewise, you don’t have a lot of time to dedicate to this either. The more complex the questions, the longer you’ll have to spend vetting the results.</p><p>Short, simple and to the point is far more likely to get to a result that’s useful — both for you and your vendors — than some crazy, multi-page questionnaire. Keeping things simple has multiple benefits.</p><h3>When in doubt, use the “50 at 50” rule</h3><p>Striking the balance between thorough yet brief, reminds me of a saying from when I used to crew for a friend that raced cars out in West Virginia. The sanctioning body for the races required that cars be painted in a professional manner. Anyone that’s been around amateur racing knows that very little about it qualifies as “professional.” The rule of thumb the officials used was “50 at 50”… that is, when you looked at a car traveling 50 miles per hour from 50 feet away, did the car look like it was painted? If the answer was “yes,” you were good to race.</p><p>That’s sort of how I view third-party assessments. If your process gives you the same level of assurance about your vendors’ security processes as “50 at 50” gives racing officials, you’re doing things right. Sure, there are some situations that require far more diligence than that (stay tuned!), but in most cases, you’re just trying to get a general feel for things. Ultimately, even organizations with great practices and procedures will screw up sometimes. Nothing you do in your third-party assessment program will change that.</p><h3>The common sense process for third-party assessments</h3><p>There are three big chunks to any third-party assessment program: creating the questionnaire, designing the process and running it (told you it would be “common sense”). Of course, not every situation will fit neatly into your process. We’ll cover the outliers too. But, to get started, you need to create your questionnaire.</p><h4>1. Creating your questionnaire</h4><p>The questions you ask your vendors will be taken seriously by them … or at least they’ll look at them seriously and try to figure out what you mean. It’s important to write crisp, clear questions that vendors can easily understand and have a clear way to answer.</p><p>The meat of your questionnaire is the questions themselves. We’re providing our <a href="https://info.expel.io/third-party-assessment?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=third%20party%20assessment">third-party risk assessment questionnaire</a> as a starting point for you. Hopefully this’ll let you speed through this step. We like these questions because they cover a wide swath of cybersecurity without being too detailed. They’re also aimed at making it easy for vendors to re-use work they’ve already done. Asking about existing certifications and the results of previous testing reduces friction in the process. Really, we want to ask questions we think will get answered truthfully and quickly. Focusing on reuse is one strategy for that.</p><p>We’ve also designed our questionnaire to sleuth out how much thought and care a vendor has put into security in general. For example, when we ask “Do you have a formally appointed information security officer?” we get a different vibe when the answer is “Yes, here’s our CISO’s contact info,” versus “Not really. Our lead developer cares a lot about security though.” Simple questions like this give you a great window into how a potential vendor thinks about security.</p><h4>2. Building the process</h4><p>Developing the questions is only one piece of the prep work that you’ll need to do. How you’re actually going to manage the process is equally important. The process we’ve designed breaks down into the following six steps.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*29JUq5uVoRUlk3seJwriBw.png" /><figcaption>Third-party assessment process</figcaption></figure><p>Your exact process will, no doubt, have to be tailored a bit to the way your organization buys products and services. We’re not suggesting that you can do a direct cut-and-paste of our process. But hopefully it can be an advanced starting point for you. Here’s a quick overview of how we thought about each step as we created our own third-party assessment process.</p><p><strong>Step 1: Kicking off the process</strong></p><p>We created a set of criteria to determine which external vendors need to go through the process. Vendors that make the cut include:</p><ul><li>Services that will impact production systems</li><li>Services that contain customer or other sensitive data</li><li>Systems which aggregate data from multiple data sources.</li></ul><p>If someone is trying to use a new service that fits one of these situations, they send a request for review via a vendor intake form containing what the service is, how we’re going to use it and provide points of contacts at the vendor.</p><p><strong>Step 2: Send an introduction</strong></p><p>It’s a bit awkward to send an email to a potential vendor demanding a bunch of information without first introducing yourself, the process and what they should expect. At Expel, the first thing we send to the vendor is a cordial email describing our process, the relatively casual and light touch nature of it and an invitation to ask questions or engage if they have concerns. We also let them know our desired timeliness (usually we ask for a response within about two weeks).</p><p><strong>Step 3: Send the real email</strong></p><p>Next, we send the real email. We use our secure file sharing system to send this email so that all communications are encrypted and their response is protected on its way back to us. You don’t have to do this, but it’s advisable, especially if you’re asking for copies of sensitive documents such as their SOC2 and pen test executive reports.</p><p><strong>Step 4: Send a reminder</strong></p><p>After a week and a half has gone by, we’ll send a gentle reminder if we haven’t heard anything. That’s usually enough prodding to get us answers right under our two week request.</p><p><strong>Step 5: Receive and analyze the results</strong></p><p>Hopefully, when you get the vendor’s answers back they make sense, are reasonably complete and if you’re lucky they’re even comprehensible. Sometimes we’ve had to go back to ask vendors for clarification on an answer or two, and that’s OK. Keeping in mind the “50 at 50” mentality, once you have the answers, balance them against the business request and determine if you’re willing to move forward with the vendor or if there are concerns that need to be addressed.</p><p><strong>Step 6: Brief the business owner(s)</strong></p><p>Once we’ve got our heads around all of the vendor’s answers, we give the business owner our opinion. When the results are positive, the conversations are easy. When we have concerns, that’s when things get more difficult. It’s a good idea in those cases to involve more people on the business side than just the requester (team leads, managers, etc.). You’re going to get into a risk-oriented decision about how important this specific vendor is to the company and what the security risks are. The results of that meeting can vary wildly, but usually will fall into one of four buckets:</p><ol><li>Yep. Cool. Go for it.</li><li>We can put in compensating controls to make up for lack of assurance in the vendor.</li><li>We need a deeper dive to better understand the risks.</li><li>No. Nope. Negative. Not going to use them.</li></ol><p>It’s very important not to treat these decisions as binary. The reason you’re doing a third-party assessment in the first place is to manage risk. Risk is a continuum, as it were, and you should treat your third-party vendor assessment process the same way.</p><h4>3. Running the process</h4><p>Once you’ve got your questionnaire and process figured out, test it on a few vendors. Be very up-front with them; let them know this is your first time trying out your third-party vendor assessment questionnaire and you’d love feedback on both the material itself and the overall process. You’ll find some vendors are well prepared for these kinds of requests and will have a team dedicated to answering them. Other vendors will respond with “huh, this is the first time anyone’s asked us about security.” Be prepared for that and everything in between. Take any feedback you get and stir it in appropriately with the work you’ve already done and your objectives for your third-party assessment program.</p><p>After you’ve tested the process on a few vendors (or later … run the process for a year or two), iterate. Feel free to change it up. As you grow, your risk appetite changes. As the state of the art of your vendors improves, you might want to modify your process to suit your needs. You don’t need a forever “apples to apples” comparison over the years. Rather, you need each response to provide you the information you need <em>right now</em> to make the decision that’s in front of you. That information will change over time, and your process should too.</p><h3>Keeping track of the results</h3><p>You’ll likely get lots of confidential documents back from your vendors when they reply to your questionnaire. You’ll want to make sure you protect them according to the terms of any non-disclosure agreements you signed with them. Be sure to follow whatever your internal procedures are with respect to protecting that information. Also, we’ve found that it’s helpful to create one place to track all of the assessments — upcoming requests, active ones, and assessments we’ve completed. We store all the responses, supporting documents and our notes in one place. We’ve chosen Confluence for that since we use the Atlassian suite for a lot of our engineering and security workflow already. You should choose whatever makes sense in your organization. But be aware, you’ll build up quite a pile of information quickly, so being organized early will pay off as your program grows.</p><h3>Hooking the process into the way your organization buys stuff</h3><p>Having a process is all well and good. But, unless you socialize it and have a clear way to plug it into the way your organization buys stuff, your third-party assessment program can quickly turn into shelfware.</p><p>It’s important to set the hook early in the process to get the best results. That hook can take many shapes:</p><ul><li><strong>The procurement process:</strong> When a business unit requests a new PO, your purchasing department can simply ask, “What does Security think of this?” Knowing a PO won’t be cut unless there’s a clear answer to that question will force business owners to engage your process early so you’re not playing catch up.</li><li><strong>Contract review:</strong> A slightly different take, but the same basic idea. When a contract is put in front of legal to review, they can ask, “What does Security think of this?” as well. Again, if business owners know they can’t get through legal without clearing security, they’re going to engage you early.</li><li><strong>That’s just the way it is: </strong>Rather than have a specific gate, you can communicate with leaders and purchasers that new products and services are subject to a third-party assessment as part of doing business. If it’s discovered that someone bought something without an assessment, There Will Be Consequences™. Just like there are when people buy product outside of purchasing, right? Right?</li></ul><p>Whatever you decide, be sure to communicate it widely and often. New processes that affect how you buy services tend to take a while for everyone to understand and accept, so putting together a good PR campaign can’t hurt your cause.</p><p>Also, be sure the “how to submit” part of your process is clear. At Expel we use Jira’s Service Desk as the portal where users can submit third-party assessment requests and track progress. We already use Service Desk for IT and other ticket tracking so it was an easy solution. <a href="https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/ymmv">YMMV</a> and all that… be sure to choose a method of engagement that works for you and your company.</p><h3>Vendors that are bigger than your breadbox</h3><p>There may be times when the product or service you’re evaluating is too big, too important or represents too much risk to apply the “50 at 50” rule. In these cases, you’ll likely end up doing a more formal risk assessment to understand the risks they present in more depth so you can compensate for any issues you can’t get the vendor to fix.</p><p>Risk assessments are complicated (I addressed them in an <a href="https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/operationalizing-security-risk">O’Reilly Security talk here</a> if you’re interested). They can be done either by your own staff or a third party. Either way, I have two points of caution:</p><h4>Don’t give out a free pen test</h4><p>If you engage a third party to assess your vendor’s product it’s easy for your vendor to ultimately get a free pen test that you unwittingly pay for. So, if you hire a third party, make sure they’re working on your behalf and use <em>your</em> business needs as the backstop for their work. That’ll make sure the final product is geared towards you and your business, not the vendor and their product.</p><h4>Make sure you don’t accidentally do a pen test or risk assessment</h4><p>The other common mistake when you dive deeper is you don’t realize that you’re diving deeper. You get the questionnaire back and you have questions … so you ask the vendor a few more questions. Things are clearer, but still not clear. So, you ask “Hey, can we take it for a test drive?” You get their product, configure it, start testing it and suddenly realize you’re doing a product assessment and you’re already 40 hours into the process and probably have 80 more hours to go before you’re done.</p><p>As you start peeling back the onion be aware that you’re doing it overtly and for a reason. Don’t spend more time and effort on a third-party assessment than you need to.</p><h3>Oh … and make sure to avoid these common pitfalls</h3><p>Finally, there are a couple of other pitfalls you’ll want to make sure you avoid as you launch (or refine) your third-party vendor assessment program.</p><h4>Adding to the questionnaire</h4><p>Be wary of asking too many questions or diving too deep. You’ll quickly reach a point where vendors don’t want to answer and it takes you too long to assess the results. It’s not worth it. If you decide to do a full-fledged risk assessment, then by all means, dive in the deep end. But if you’ve got a question you feel you <em>must</em> add to your questionnaire, find one (or two?) that aren’t giving you any value and swap them out. Again, the simpler and shorter your questionnaire is, the more likely you’ll get accurate and timely responses.</p><h4>Believing all the answers</h4><p>It’s human nature to not want to fail tests. That applies to vendors responding to third-party assessment requests. They want to be as compliant as possible, so you can expect they’ll take a few liberties in their answers. While it’s unusual to find a vendor that flat out lies (saying they’re SOC2 Type 2 compliant when they’re not, for example), you may find vendors occasionally stretch the truth enough to “pass.” So, when you’re answering the question “Am I OK using this vendor,” assume their answers are eighty percent correct.</p><h3>That’s it</h3><p>There you go. That’s Expel’s third-party vendor assessment program in a nutshell. There are many like it, but this one is ours. Hopefully it gives you a jump start on building your own program. Please, <a href="https://info.expel.io/third-party-assessment?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=third%20party%20assessment">take a look at our questionnaire</a>, and feel free to use, modify, and comment on it as you see fit. I’d also suggest taking a look at our <a href="http://info.expel.io/nist?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=third%20party%20assessment">NIST cybersecurity framework self-scoring tool</a> that I created. It allows you to create charts that show your current and future security posture based on the NIST CSF and it includes a section on supply chain risk. If you do have comments and you’d like to share on this process, the questionnaire or the NIST tool, please reach out to us and let us know. We’re always trying to improve and would love for you to help us with that.</p><p><em>Likes: transparency, puns, cool infosec stuff<br>Dislikes: industry buzzwords, finger pistols, black boxes<br>Connect with us on </em><a href="https://bit.ly/3mxbY3J"><em>LinkedIn</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8bc0acb5474f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[MFA is not a silver bullet to secure your cloud email]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@expel_io/mfa-is-not-a-silver-bullet-to-secure-your-cloud-email-596aae242166?source=rss-ebaf28d052e3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/596aae242166</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[email-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mfa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Expel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Dec 2020 14:58:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-02T14:58:57.809Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TJh5yFHlVpcqC_-xnU2Syw.jpeg" /><figcaption>MFA is not a silver bullet to secure your cloud email</figcaption></figure><p>Remember the good ol’ days when you used to run your own email servers? Well, maybe they weren’t <em>good</em> days (I’m looking at you, Exchange) …</p><p>More and more orgs are transitioning from using traditional on-premise email solutions to cloud-based solutions like Microsoft’s Office 365 and Google’s G Suite. And it’s easy to see why: you no longer have to support all of the required infrastructure or employ a team of individuals to service complicated Exchange deployments. The data is now hosted by a third party who is responsible for encrypting the data at rest, system availability, global delivery and developing and maintaining state of the art security protocols and services.</p><p>While cloud-based email comes with some security benefits like hosted unified audit logging and modern authentication protocols — they’re still pretty new and heavily targeted by attackers. Cloud-based email systems are an easy way for the bad guys (or gals) to gain initial access into new environments or conduct other criminal activities.</p><p>You’ve probably heard that if you just enable a multi-factor authentication (MFA) solution, then everything will be sunshine and rainbows. And while MFA is a good step toward securing cloud-based email systems, it’s not a silver bullet. The reality is that MFA can be defeated by an attacker given the right resources and persistence. MFA should only be considered as one of the several security measures an organization should employ rather than the end-all be-all.</p><p>Regardless of whether you have MFA enabled or not, it is important to layer your security controls to strengthen your overall security posture. Even if your organization doesn’t have the means to enable MFA, we highly recommend reading further to understand some additional risks to your cloud email environment and ways to reduce that risk.</p><h3>Disable legacy email protocols</h3><p>There are a bunch of email protocols and services in use today: Exchange Web Services (EWS), Messaging Application Programming Interface (MAPI), Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) … <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online">the list goes on.</a> While most of these common email services and applications support MFA, some of the legacy email protocols don’t.</p><p>For example, the Internet message access protocol (IMAP) and post office protocol (POP) email protocols are the two you should disable immediately. These protocols don’t support MFA by default and will fully circumvent MFA with single-factor authentication. That means if an attacker phished the credentials of one of your users, then he or she can easily access that user’s entire inbox if authenticating via an IMAP or POP client (and trust us, this will probably be the first thing they try).</p><p>Another big concern with IMAP and POP is that they expose too much data to the client application. Different clients have different <a href="https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/imap-synchronization#w_configuring-synchronization-and-disk-space-usage">sync settings by default</a> and this determines how much of the mailbox is actually downloaded after a session is created. Attackers can obtain an entire copy of a user’s mailbox in order to search and parse offline for sensitive data. Another shortcoming with these protocols is that there’s usually no logging available to determine exposure once you find an account compromise via IMAP or POP. In many circumstances, your security leaders would consider the entire mailbox exposed.</p><p>G Suite usually has these protocols disabled by default. However, if somewhere along the road your admins enabled it for any of your users, <a href="https://support.google.com/a/answer/105694?hl=en">it’s fairly simple to disable.</a></p><p>Microsoft O365 is another story, though. IMAP and POP are enabled by default and must be <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients/pop3-and-imap4/configure-mailbox-access?view=exchserver-2019">manually disabled across the tenant.</a> If your user base is using IMAP or POP clients, particularly mobile clients, this could impact their ability to access email and may require them to authenticate with a new email client that supports MFA. As a helpful reminder, if you have multiple tenants, you will need to apply these actions to all of your tenants.</p><p>If you determine that it’s catastrophic to the end-user experience to get rid of these protocols on your tenant, then consider using global and conditional access policies to prevent employees from using these protocols under certain circumstances. (More on conditional access in a bit.)</p><h3>Disable basic authentication for all email protocols</h3><p>Is your org’s IAM team getting woken up in the wee hours of the night thanks to a ton of Azure Active Directory, G Suite or cloud IAM (Okta/Duo) account lockouts from unauthorized access attempts?</p><p>Here’s the primary culprit. (You’re welcome — and cheers to now getting a full night’s sleep.)</p><p>Microsoft O365 currently has two implementations of authentication: basic authentication and modern authentication (Microsoft’s OAuth2). Because basic authentication is enabled by default, this allows older email clients that do not support modern authentication to bypass MFA as well. The protocols that allow for basic authentication in Microsoft O365 are ActiveSync, Autodiscover, EWS, IMAP4, POP3 and authenticated SMTP. Now, even if you’ve disabled the IMAP and POP protocol as described in the previous section, the attacker can still attempt to authenticate (via credential stuffing, password spraying or brute force), which in turn will create an abundance of account lockouts! Microsoft has released some good news though. As of October 2020, they <a href="https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Exchange-Team-Blog/Upcoming-changes-to-Exchange-Web-Services-EWS-API-for-Office-365/ba-p/608055">no longer support </a>basic authentication in Microsoft O365. Remember that this could have a major impact on your end user experience, and may require using a different email client. On October 1, 2019, Microsoft released <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/whats-new#plan-for-change-deprecation-of-the-power-bi-content-packs?platform=hootsuite">conditional access policies in audit-only mode</a>, which can help measure this impact to users.</p><p>If you’re interested in the current use of IMAP/POP and other basic authentication sessions in Microsoft O365, we’ve found that the <a href="https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4487380/useragent-property-value-in-the-unified-audit-log">user-agent string <strong>CBAInPROD</strong></a><strong> </strong>is a pretty good indication of this activity. Check your Azure AD logs for signs of this if you’re uncertain of your current Exchange configurations. It can be found in the <strong>ExtendedProperties</strong> of <strong>UserLoggedIn</strong> operations logs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WhlhJWnMF0p5AMR3LjgUVQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Example ExtendedProperties </em>from UserLoggedIn operation log</figcaption></figure><p>G Suite also provides support for less secure apps (email clients). This too is disabled by default, but if you find it is enabled for users in your G Suite account, you can <a href="https://support.google.com/a/answer/6260879?hl=en">disallow sign-in</a> from these apps.</p><h3>Enable conditional access policies</h3><p>Conditional Access enables administrators to apply policies (or multiple policies) to control who and what has access to apps in your environment. Conditional Access policies are enforced after the first-factor authentication has been completed but before the user is granted access to the environment. Therefore Conditional Access can evaluate multiple “signals” against your policies to determine success against certain pass/fail conditions. These “signals” include:</p><ul><li>user and/or group membership</li><li>IP location information or ranges</li><li>users device type, state or use patterns</li><li>attempted access to applications</li><li>real-time and calculated risk detection as well as other features unique to each service provider</li></ul><p>If your org only services customers in one region of the U.S. and all of your employees reside and operate within the U.S., do you need to allow authentications from China, Russia and the Netherlands? Figuratively speaking, of course — <em>cough, cough</em>.</p><p><a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/overview#conditional-access-policies">Conditional access policies in Microsoft O365</a> are another security measure which is relatively easy to enable and go a long way in supporting the effectiveness of MFA. Policies can be configured within an administrative session on the “Azure Conditional Access” tab.</p><p>For G Suite, conditional access policies are most often configured via a third party SSO agent or MFA client such as <a href="https://help.okta.com/en/prod/Content/Topics/Security/App_Based_Signon.htm">Okta</a> and <a href="https://duo.com/docs/policy">Duo</a> respectively.</p><p>Much like enabling MFA, whenever you make policy changes to authentication protocols, consider any adverse reactions to critical production systems and processes. We recommend making any of these changes in a phased roll out so that you can closely monitor changes for several days before implementing the next set of changes.</p><p>Any one of these security measures will strengthen your security posture — but combined they complement each other to make your organization far more resilient against <a href="https://expel.io/blog/what-you-need-to-know-business-email-compromise/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=MFA">business email compromise (BEC)</a> and unauthorized access.</p><p><em>Creating space for our customers to do what they love about security … Expel’s SOC-as-a-service capability offers 24x7 security monitoring and response for cloud, hybrid and on-prem environments. Learn more about </em><a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=Footer%205"><em>what we do</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/why-we-are-different/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=Footer%205"><em>why we do it</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=596aae242166" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Seven ways to spot a business email compromise in Office 365]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@expel_io/seven-ways-to-spot-a-business-email-compromise-in-office-365-efb5392d561b?source=rss-ebaf28d052e3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/efb5392d561b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[email]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-email-compromise]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cbse]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[office-365]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Expel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2020 16:41:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-18T16:41:22.131Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="https://hencinski.medium.com/">Jon Hencinski</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Oh7qU-An1kgOFVsY3GlAmA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Seven ways to spot a business email compromise in Office 365</figcaption></figure><p>Remember the old days when all of those Nigerian princes were emailing you to offer giant sums of money? All you’d need to do, of course, was click that suspicious-looking link, share your bank account information and you’d be living large. (Finally, a good reason to stop buying all those Powerball tickets.)</p><p>That scam is the old school version of a type of attack called a business email compromise (BEC). While those generous Nigerian princes have long since vanished, BEC has gotten far more sophisticated over the years, turning even the savviest internet users into unwitting victims.</p><p>As attackers behind BEC attacks find even more clever tactics to use, it’s getting trickier for businesses to protect themselves. But there are some telltale signs you can look for that are tip-offs that something’s amiss.</p><h3>What is business email compromise (BEC)?</h3><p>First things first, though. You’ve got to know what you’re looking for. BEC is a sophisticated, email-based scam targeting organizations and individuals just about everywhere. Many people think that BEC is only associated with wire transfer fraud, but the reality is that BEC is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ues_oRsTBNc&amp;feature=youtu.be">much more than that</a>. It’s really an umbrella term that includes things like <a href="https://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/w-2-fraud/">W2 scams</a>, <a href="https://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/russian-dating-scams/">romance scams</a>, <a href="https://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/home-loan-earnest-money-scam/">real estate scams</a> and <a href="https://www.pennlive.com/nation-world/2018/06/nigerian_scammers_targeted_in.html">lottery scams</a>.</p><p>You’re probably sitting there thinking, “Do people <em>really</em> fall for these tricks?”</p><p>They sure do. And it happens more often than you think.</p><p>In fact, <a href="https://www.ic3.gov/media/2018/180712.aspx">between October 2013 and May 2018</a>, there were 78,617 domestic and international BEC incidents, with victims from over 150 countries and all 50 U.S. states. And between <a href="https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2020/PSA200406">January 2014 and October 2019</a>, a total loss of $2.1 billion was reported from BEC scams using cloud-based email services.</p><p>BEC fraud has become so widespread that it’s now the target of major international law enforcement efforts coordinated domestically and abroad by organizations like the FBI and U.S. Department of Justice. In 2018, a BEC takedown effort named <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/international-bec-takedown-061118">Operation WireWire</a> resulted in 74 arrests globally, including 42 in the U.S. They nabbed nearly $2.4 million and recovered approximately $14 million in fraudulent wire transfers.</p><p>Now for the good news: There are ways that you can spot BEC attacks and stop them before they compromise unsuspecting employees.</p><h3>How to spot (and alert on) BEC activity</h3><p>Through the Expel SOC’s investigative work responding to many BEC activities in Office 365 (O365), we’ve observed threat actors reusing certain techniques to gain and maintain access to victims’ mailboxes. Take a look at this example of an investigation where a threat actor used BEC to access a victim’s mailbox and then set up mailbox inbox rules to redirect any emails that contained the words “statement,” “outstanding,” “pastdue,” “payment,” “invoice” or “wire” to a Gmail account.</p><p>Here are some common hallmarks of crafty BEC attacks, that our own SOC analysts here at Expel have detected by using the Expel Workbench.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iZtRL4bAznO8lSA49egghA.png" /><figcaption><em>Expel Workbench alert example</em></figcaption></figure><p>We’re going to share some of the techniques that we see attackers using again and again so you can take steps to protect your own org. As a bonus, we’ll even share log samples and example SIEM queries (we’re using <a href="https://www.sumologic.com/">Sumo Logic</a>) if you want to query your own tools for related activity. Plus we’re sharing our perspective on how likely you are to get false positives from these rules.</p><p>You’ll probably notice that there’s a theme to these often-used attacker techniques: the creation of new mail inbox rules. Why are we focusing so much on inbox rules? Because the attackers running these scams generally create inbox rules to hide evidence from their victims that the victim’s mailbox is being used to perpetuate those clever BEC activities.</p><p>The good news is that since attackers use this tactic so often, it creates a great detection opportunity, because there are only so many rules an attacker can create to cover his or her tracks.</p><p>As you look for evidence of BEC attempts, you should be alerting on:</p><h4>1. Inbox rules to automatically forward emails to any of the following folders: RSS subscriptions, junk email or notes</h4><p>During one of our investigations, we detected a threat actor creating an inbox rule to automatically forward emails containing “WeTransfer” in the email subject or body to the “RSS subscriptions” folder of the victim’s mailbox.</p><p><a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rule-actions"><strong>Log</strong></a><strong> example:</strong></p><p><em>“Operation”:”New-InboxRule”, “RecordType”:1, “ResultStatus”:”True”, “UserType”:2, “Version”:1, “Workload”:”Exchange”, “ { “Name”:”AlwaysDeleteOutlookRulesBlob”, “Value”:”False” },{ “Name”:”Force”, “Value”:”False” },{ “Name”:”MoveToFolder”, “Value”:”RSS Subscriptions” },{ “Name”:”Name”, “Value”:”..” },{ “Name”:”SubjectOrBodyContainsWords”, “Value”:”WeTransfer” },{ “Name”:”MarkAsRead”, “Value”:”True” },{ “Name”:”StopProcessingRules”, “Value”:”True” }],</em></p><p><strong>Sumo Logic query example:</strong></p><p><em>(“\”New-InboxRule\”” OR “\”Set-InboxRule\””) AND “Name\”:\”MoveToFolder\”, \”Value\”:\”RSS Subscriptions\””</em></p><p><strong>Expected false positive rate:</strong> Low (In our world, “low” means that you can enter this into an alert management workflow with minimal tuning work required.)</p><h4>2. Inbox rules to automatically delete messages</h4><p>Similar to folder redirection, we’ve detected threat actors creating new inbox rules to silently drop any emails that contained words like “virus,” “hacked,” “hack,” “spam” or “request” in the email subject or body. You can start by creating an alert for the creation of inbox rules to automatically delete messages with keywords, but we recommend alerting on any new inbox rule that’s designed to automatically delete messages.</p><p><strong>Log example:</strong></p><p><em>“Operation”:”New-InboxRule”, “Parameters”:[{ “Name”:”AlwaysDeleteOutlookRulesBlob”, “Value”:”False” },{ “Name”:”Force”, “Value”:”False” },{ “Name”:”SubjectOrBodyContainsWords”, “Value”:”virus;hacked;hack;spam;request” },{ “Name”:”DeleteMessage”, “Value”:”True” },{ “Name”:”MarkAsRead”, “Value”:”True” },{ “Name”:”StopProcessingRules”, “Value”:”True” }]</em></p><p><strong>Sumo Logic query example:</strong></p><p><em>(“\”New-InboxRule\”” OR “\”Set-InboxRule\””) AND “Name\”:\”DeleteMessage\”, \”Value\”:\”True\””</em></p><p><strong>False positive rate:</strong> Low</p><h4>3. Inbox rules to redirect messages to an external email address</h4><p>Using this technique, the message isn’t delivered to the original recipients and no notification is sent to the sender or the original recipients. We’ve detected threat actors creating inbox rules to redirect emails that contained words like “statement,” “outstanding,” “past due,” “payment,” “invoice” or “wire” to email accounts outside of the organization’s domain (for example, a Gmail account).</p><p><strong>Log example:</strong></p><p><em>“Operation”: “New-InboxRule”, “Parameters”: “[\r\n {\r\n \”Name\”: \”AlwaysDeleteOutlookRulesBlob\”,\r\n \”Value\”: \”False\”\r\n },\r\n {\r\n \”Name\”: \”Force\”,\r\n \”Value\”: \”False\”\r\n },\r\n {\r\n \”Name\”: \”RedirectTo\”,\r\n \”Value\”: \”&lt;redacted&gt;@gmail.com\”\r\n },\r\n “Name\”: \”SubjectOrBodyContainsWords\”,\r\n \”Value\”: \”statement;outstanding;past due;payment;invoice;wire\”\r\n },\r\n {\r\n \”Name\”: \”StopProcessingRules\”,\r\n \”Value\”: \”True\”\r\n }\r\n]”,</em></p><p><strong>Sumo Logic query example:</strong></p><p><em>(“\”New-InboxRule\”” OR “\”Set-InboxRule\””) AND “Name\”:\”RedirectTo\””</em></p><p><strong>False positive rate:</strong> This alert is susceptible to false positives since it’s not uncommon for users to forward work-related emails to a personal webmail account. If you’ve integrated O365 with your SIEM, modify the query or rule set to alert and filter out known false positives.</p><h4>4. Inbox rules that contain BEC keywords</h4><p>You’re probably starting to see a theme emerge in these first three examples: using keywords to redirect emails. We’ve detected threat actors by alerting anytime we see any inbox rule created using a value in our BEC keyword list. Here’s a snippet of our own BEC keyword list to get you started:</p><ul><li>Virus</li><li>Dropbox</li><li>Password</li><li>Fraud</li><li>W2</li><li>Invoice</li><li>Docusign</li><li>Deposit</li><li>Wire</li><li>Tax</li><li>Postmaster</li><li>Utilpro</li><li>Payroll</li></ul><p>Sumo Logic query example:</p><p><em>(“\”New-InboxRule\”” OR “\”Set-InboxRule\””) AND (“wetransfer” OR “document” OR “invoice” OR “postmaster”)</em></p><p><strong>False positive rate:</strong> Low</p><h4>5. New mailbox forwarding to an external address</h4><p>This technique doesn’t involve inbox rules. Instead, it watches for wiley attackers who are <a href="https://support.office.com/en-us/article/forward-email-from-office-365-to-another-email-account-1ed4ee1e-74f8-4f53-a174-86b748ff6a0e">configuring an external email address</a> in the victim’s account settings menu. While the setup is a bit different, the intent is the same: the attacker is trying to hide evidence from the victim that his or her mailbox is being used to perpetuate BEC fraud.</p><p><strong>Log example:</strong></p><p><em>“Operation”:”Set-Mailbox”,{“Name”:”ForwardingSmtpAddress”,”Value”:”smtp:&lt;redacted&gt;”},{“Name”:”DeliverToMailboxAndForward”,”Value”:”True”}],”application-action”:”Set-Mailbox”,”triggered-by”:{“app-username”:”,&lt;redacted&gt;”,”privileges”:[{“level”:”admin”}],”new-values”:{“additional-properties”:{“DeliverToMailboxAndForward”:”True”},”forward-to-address”:”smtp:&lt;redacted&gt;”</em></p><p><strong>Sumo Logic query example:</strong></p><p><em>(“\”New-InboxRule\”” OR “\”Set-InboxRule\”” OR “\”Set-Mailbox\””) AND “Name\”:\”DeliverToMailboxAndForward\””</em></p><p><strong>False positive rate: </strong>This alert is also susceptible to false positives since it’s not uncommon for users to forward work-related emails to a personal webmail account. If you’ve integrated O365 with your SIEM, modify the query or rule set to alert and filter out known false positives.</p><h4>6. New mailbox delegates</h4><p>This rule looks for threat actors that are gaining access to a victim’s account through mailbox delegate access rights. Take a look at this example of a potential BEC threat we detected for one of our customers that involved suspicious mailbox permissions:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JSFXM8doehIhw9j5VxrPQw.png" /><figcaption><em>Expel Workbench alert example</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Log example:</strong></p><p><em>{“Name”:”AccessRights”,”Value”:”FullAccess”},{“Name”:”InheritanceType”,”Value”:”All”}]”application-action”:”Add-MailboxPermission”,”status”:{“code”:”Success”}</em></p><p><strong>Sumo Logic query example:</strong></p><p><em>(“Add-MailboxPermission”) AND “Name\”:\”AccessRights\”” AND “Value\”:\”FullAccess\””</em></p><p><strong>False positive rate:</strong> This alert is also susceptible to false positives as it’s not uncommon for organizations to enable access to the mailbox and calendar of high ranking employees to schedule meetings and travel. You’ll need to tune this to your environment a bit.</p><h4>7. Successful mailbox logins within minutes of denied logins due to conditional access policies</h4><p>Through O365 and Azure AD, you can implement <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/overview">conditional access policies</a> to deny logins based on conditions like <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/location-condition">source country, source IP address</a> or a <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/conditions#sign-in-risk">sign-in risk</a> score calculated on the backend by Microsoft. One very important detail: conditional access policies are enforced after the first-factor of authentication. Here’s what it looks like in Expel Workbench:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3FRhJjLMoYR-BLMqabjfYQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Expel Workbench alert example</em></figcaption></figure><p>In the example above, O365 recorded a failed login from a foreign country due to a conditional access policy. Unfortunately, this can be bypassed using a virtual private network (VPN) service provider.</p><p>Take a look at this example from an investigation where a threat actor circumvented conditional access policies by simply turning on their VPN. At 22:17:40 UTC, O365 logs recorded a login failure due to a conditional access policy set to deny authentications from a list of foreign countries. Minutes later at 22:22:40, O365 logs recorded a successful login to the same account from a popular virtual private network service provider.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JkPeFFtdsgj9ler3HVdVGw.png" /><figcaption><em>O365 logs example</em></figcaption></figure><p>If you’re sending O365 logs to your SIEM or have a way to implement time-based detections, fire an alert when O365 records a successful login within minutes of a failed login due to conditional access policies for the same account. Another option is to fire an alert when O365 records a successful login originating from a virtual private network service provider within minutes of a failed login due to conditional access policies for the same account.</p><p>If you don’t have an easy way to do this, start by reviewing alerts for failed logins due to any existing conditional access policies to get a better understanding of what’s going on in your environment.</p><h3>You found a lead. Now what?</h3><p>If you identify something that doesn’t look quite right, here are some investigative tips to help you chase down a potential lead into BEC activity:</p><p><strong>Identify the source of the activity</strong></p><p>Whether you’re chasing down a suspicious mailbox inbox rule or a usual email delegate, identify the source IP address associated with the successful authentication into the account when the activity in question occurred. Next, look up the additional information about the IP address, such as categorical and location information. This will allow you to understand if the IP address in question associated with an internet service provider (ISP) in your organization’s geographic area or if the IP address in question is part of a VPN service provider range or located in another country based on GeoIP records.</p><p><strong>Review login activity for the user</strong></p><p>Next, review 30 days’ worth of login activity for the user in question. This research will help you determine if the user typically logs in to O365 from the IP address in question. Also, review user-agent activity to understand typical operating system and browser combinations. If you’re chasing something down that doesn’t pass the smell test, do you suddenly see a login from an odd IP address using a version of Google Chrome running on Windows when the user normally logs in from a fixed ISP line using a version of Chrome on macOS? Establish a sense of what “normal” looks like and watch out for deviations.</p><p>We follow this same approach when pursuing leads into suspicious O365 activity in Expel Workbench where we can take advantage of automation to speed things up a bit. Take a look at this example where, with the help of some automation, we’re able to quickly review 30 days of login activity based on IP address and user-agent combinations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rN-rb6yWOSSs85FyPhPoYA.png" /><figcaption><em>Expel Workbench activity log examples</em></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2kuHPsdEKZDj6c9PG_m9OQ.png" /><figcaption>Expel Workbench activity log examples</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Review mailbox activity for the user</strong></p><p>This is a really good step if your initial lead into possible BEC activity was something like a suspicious login to an account that originated from a VPN service provider. If you already have <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/enable-mailbox-auditing">O365 mailbox auditing enabled</a>, review mailbox activity for the user and be on the lookout for the threat actor techniques we mentioned above. Don’t be afraid to review 30 days worth of mailbox activity. Does the user account in question typically delegate mailbox permissions or create inbox rules to help manage their email? Context matters.</p><p><strong>Review login activity for the IP address</strong></p><p>The next step is to review 30 days’ worth of login activity for the IP address in question. Do you see successful authentications into multiple accounts from the IP address? Or do you only see activity into the user account in question? By reviewing login activity from the IP address in question, you’re gaining greater context. This is also a valuable scoping action if the threat actor is accessing multiple accounts from the same IP address.</p><p><strong>Scope and pivot!</strong></p><p>Finally, through the investigative process you might establish new leads into BEC activity like a new external IP address used to authenticate into victim mailboxes or an inbox rule configured to silently drop any emails containing the word “document.” Make sure to pursue them to properly scope the activity.</p><p>Let’s say that through scoping you observed a BEC threat actor authenticate into a victim’s mailbox from a popular VPN service provider. With this knowledge in hand, set out to answer how many other accounts the threat actor accessed from the VPN service provider. Here’s another example: if you know the threat actor is creating inbox rules to silently drop messages, figure out if O365 logs recorded similar activity for any other account. And if you find new leads through that? Pursue them!</p><h3>How do I get started?</h3><p>To take advantage of the alerting opportunities based on the different scenarios we described above, here are a couple #protips to get started:</p><ul><li><strong>Enable mailbox auditing in O365.</strong> Microsoft is in the process of enabling mailbox auditing by default across all its business users, but it doesn’t hurt to double check that mailbox auditing within your organization is enabled. You’ll gain visibility into mailbox login activity and actions typically performed in BEC attacks. Not sure how to enable mailbox auditing? <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/enable-mailbox-auditing">Just follow these easy instructions.</a></li><li><strong>Integrate O365 with your SIEM.</strong> This step allows your team to centralize alerts coming from O365, integrating them into the same workflow you’re already using. <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/integrate-your-siem-server-with-office-365-cas">Here are step-by-step instructions</a> on integrating O365 with your SIEM.</li><li><a href="https://expel.io/cloud/microsoft-o365/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=business%20email%20compromise"><strong>Or we could totally just do all of this for you</strong> if you’re looking for an “easy” button.</a></li></ul><p>Have more questions about BEC? You can always <a href="https://expel.io/about/contact-us/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=business%20email%20compromise">drop us a note</a> — we’d love to chat.</p><p><em>Creating space for our customers to do what they love about security … Expel’s SOC-as-a-service capability offers 24x7 security monitoring and response for cloud, hybrid and on-prem environments. Learn more about </em><a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=Footer%205"><em>what we do</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/why-we-are-different/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=Footer%205"><em>why we do it</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=efb5392d561b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is (cyber) threat hunting and where do you start?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@expel_io/what-is-cyber-threat-hunting-and-where-do-you-start-989db788d25d?source=rss-ebaf28d052e3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/989db788d25d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Expel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2020 19:00:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-04T19:00:20.482Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ix6Jh-y6O3pSsI7QL0A-Mw.jpeg" /><figcaption>What is (cyber) threat hunting and where do you start?</figcaption></figure><p>Sometimes the security landscape seems like a big game of telephone. A buzzword pops up. It may even be a good one. But then it enters the vendor echo chamber. Everyone starts repeating it to each other. The vendor’s CEO says, “We’ve got to put that on our website.” The sales VP says, “We’ve got to put that on our tradeshow booth.” And before long everyone in infosec is sayin’ it but nobody really knows what it means. Usually it’s defined as whatever the definer is doing. It’s kinda funny. But it’s really not. Because if you’re charged with making your organization more secure you’re left wondering what’s real(ly important) and whether you should care.</p><p>The term “hunting” is a good example. It has been kicking around for almost nine years since it <a href="https://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2017/03/the-origin-of-threat-hunting.html">was first introduced in 2011</a>. The fact that it’s had more time to marinate than some of the newer buzzwords may be why it’s so confusing. Whatever the reason, at Expel we want to demystify what hunting is and what it’s not. So here goes nothin’.</p><h3>What is hunting?</h3><p>In short, hunting is a proactive effort that applies a hypothesis to discover suspicious activity that may have slipped by your security devices.</p><p>Now, that doesn’t mean you can’t use your security tools to go hunting (we’ll get to that in a bit). But looking at alerts coming from your endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool isn’t hunting. It’s alert management. And pretty much anything on <a href="https://twitter.com/anton_chuvakin/status/972266644641689600">this list</a> also isn’t hunting.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JRsUSxDjvje153p08PIvVQ.png" /><figcaption>Comparison of hunting vs. alert management</figcaption></figure><p>Here’s another way to think about it. With hunting you’re assuming that something has already failed and you’ve been compromised. The attacker has gotten past the perimeter (aka inside the network) and you’re looking for them. Since you don’t know where the attacker is hiding or who they’re trying to impersonate you’ll need to start with a theory based on common tactics attackers use. Then, once you know how you plan to seek out the attacker you’ll need to look to take a closer look to identify activity that looks a little off. Things that don’t look normal become investigative leads for an analyst to further review.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ec_2AqLVQb14tOEX_Ohcbg.png" /><figcaption>Hunting process overview</figcaption></figure><blockquote>Example: Finding stolen user credentials (aka “You can’t travel that fast!”)</blockquote><p>Attackers use lots of different methods to steal user credentials so they can blend in with normal activity and avoid suspicion. But when attackers use those stolen credentials to access a system their location is usually drastically different from the user’s real location. For example, an attacker in New York could log in with stolen credentials and … 30 minutes later the real user could log in in Los Angeles. Planes just don’t fly that fast (not to mention TSA). By reviewing the location of successful user logins, you can identify login activity that is too geographically disparate to represent legitimate user travel.</p><p>Here’s what that would look like if we applied the process we outlined above.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gsF4Pa7UnBCtefmDYZIggg.png" /><figcaption>Hunting technique example: finding compromised accounts using login geo-infeasibility</figcaption></figure><h4>What do you need to start hunting (the basics)</h4><p>Now that we’ve talked about what hunting is, let’s identify the basic tools you’ll need to hunt. Here’s your shopping list starting from the hardest to find, to the easiest.</p><p>1. Someone (or some people) to do the hunting: That’s right. Hunting requires humans. Or at least human judgment to evaluate the data you collect. If you’re lucky, you may already have someone to perform this task. But if you’re smaller, or your security program is still maturing you’ll have to go hunting (heh) for someone. And that can <a href="https://expel.io/blog/five-ways-keep-security-nerds-happy/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=threat%20hunting">be tough</a>. Good threat hunters have typically done a stint on an incident response team, they’re itching to do some forensics and they’ve probably reversed at least one piece of malware just for fun. To translate, they’re not cheap, or easy to find. And once you find them you need to keep them (which can be <a href="https://expel.io/blog/learning-is-fundamental/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=threat%20hunting">easier said than done</a>). Of course, if you decide you don’t want to or can’t find your own hunters, there’s a line of security vendors and <a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=threat%20hunting">managed detection and response</a> (MDR) providers that would love to help you.</p><p>2. Security device to collect data: Once you’ve sorted out the pesky people problem, your next task will be to feed them some data. For that, you’ll need security devices. <a href="https://expel.io/blog/whats-endpoint-detection-and-response-edr/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=threat%20hunting">Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools</a> are a good place to start, but they’re not the be-all-end-all. Endpoints are a source of the truth, but your firewalls, SIEM or network forensics tool also collect data with crucial details for identifying malicious activity and filling out the story. The more data you can collect, the more you can hunt for. But don’t get hung up on the tools. At a minimum, if you’ve got either an endpoint or a network tool you’ve got what you need to get started.</p><p>3. A list of things to hunt for: Finally, you’ll need to decide what you want to hunt for. Knowing the tactic you want to sleuth out will guide the data you’ll need to collect and what outliers to look for.</p><p>The <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Main_Page">MITRE ATT&amp;CK framework</a> is a good starting point. In fact, it’s what we use here at Expel. It outlines the tactics and techniques attackers commonly use at each stage of the attack lifecycle. As you consider what you want to hunt for you’ll have to make sure that you have tools that can feed you the specific type of data you need. And be realistic about how much time you have.</p><p>If you choose to outsource your hunting capability, make sure you ask your service provider to explain how they’ll be hunting and how their techniques align with the security tools you’ve got. If their answers are squishy, it’s time to move on.</p><h3>Is hunting right for your organization?</h3><p>Now that we’ve (hopefully) taken some of the mystery out of hunting you may be wondering if it’s something that should even be on your radar. While it does provide an extra level of security, it’s not practical for every organization to implement a hunting program.</p><p>We recommend evaluating your risks and resources to determine if you should develop a hunting program. If you operate in a high-risk (and highly targeted) environment — think banks, defense contractors and companies that store large amounts of personal and financial information — then hunting probably makes sense because there are lots of adversaries trying to infiltrate your network.</p><p>But if your organization’s risk profile is medium-to low-risk, you’re likely the target of commodity malware and should evaluate where your resources are most needed. In that case, hunting can take up a lot of time and distract you from things that should probably be much higher on the priority list like effective anti-phishing controls, asset management, third-party assessments and a myriad of other things that make up an effective cyber risk program. Doing security right is difficult, and focusing on hunting when you should be focusing on building a more secure foundation can actually make you less secure.</p><p>Either way, you should make a conscious decision about whether you’re hunting or not. Don’t accidentally start hunting because your staff started chasing shiny things and found themselves looking at suspicious activity all over your network.</p><p>That said, if you decide a formal hunting program makes sense here are two good places to start.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QBHGhl9dpaA7dY7RrB0ong.png" /><figcaption>MITRE tactic descriptions and execution</figcaption></figure><p><em>1 “Credential access”. MITRE tactic description, </em><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Credential_Access"><em>https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Credential_Access</em></a></p><p><em>2 “Lateral movement”. MITRE tactic description, </em><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Lateral_Movement"><em>https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Lateral_Movement</em></a></p><p><em>3 “Execution”. MITRE tactic description, </em><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Execution"><em>https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Execution</em></a></p><p>Creating space for our customers to do what they love about security … Expel’s SOC-as-a-service capability offers 24x7 security monitoring and response for cloud, hybrid and on-prem environments. Learn more about <a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=Footer%205">what we do</a> and <a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/why-we-are-different/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=Footer%205">why we do it</a>. <em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://expel.io/blog/what-is-cyber-threat-hunting-and-where-do-you-start/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=threat%20hunting"><em>https://expel.io</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=989db788d25d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Finding evil in AWS: A key pair to remember]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@expel_io/finding-evil-in-aws-a-key-pair-to-remember-9fc26771fda6?source=rss-ebaf28d052e3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9fc26771fda6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[detection-and-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[amazon-web-services]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aws]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Expel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2020 14:25:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-21T14:25:16.184Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2aD03BGifwijkeufD18gtA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Finding evil in AWS: A key pair to remember</figcaption></figure><p>Detection and response in cloud infrastructure is a relatively new frontier. On top of that, there aren’t many compromise details publicly available to help shape the detection strategy for anyone running workloads in the cloud.</p><p>That’s why our team here at Expel is attempting to bridge the gap between theory and practice.</p><p>Over the years, we’ve detected and responded to countless Amazon Web Services (AWS) incidents, ranging from public S3 bucket exposures to compromised EC2 instance credentials and <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/rds/">RDS</a> ransomware attacks. Recently, we identified an incident involving the use of compromised AWS access keys.</p><p>In this post we’ll walk you through how we caught the problem, what we observed in our response, how we kicked the bad guy out and the lessons we learned along the way.</p><h3>Compromised AWS access keys: How we caught ‘em</h3><p>We first determined there was something amiss thanks to an Expel detection using CloudTrail logs. Here at Expel, we encourage many of our customers who run on AWS to use Amazon GuardDuty. But we’ve also taken it upon ourselves to <a href="https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=AWS">develop detection use cases against CloudTrail logs</a>. GuardDuty does a great job of identifying common attacks, and we’ve also found CloudTrail logs to be a great source of signal for additional alerting that’s more specific to an AWS service or an environment.</p><p>It all started with the alert below, telling us that EC2 SSH access keys were being generated (<a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_CreateKeyPair.html">CreateKeyPair</a>/<a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_ImportKeyPair.html">ImportKeyPair</a>) from a suspicious source IP address.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*iiKoSCmJgfs6ggMY.jpg" /><figcaption><em>Initial lead Expel alert</em></figcaption></figure><p>How’d we know it was suspicious?</p><p>We’ve created an orchestration framework that allows us to launch actions when certain things happen. In this case, when an alert fired an Expel robot picked it up and added additional information. This robot uses a third-party enrichment service for IPs (in this case, our friends at <a href="https://ipinfo.io/">ipinfo.io</a>). More on our robots here shortly.</p><p>Keep in mind that these are not logins to AWS per se. These are authenticated API calls with valid IAM user access keys. API access can be restricted at the IP layer, but it <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/iam-restrict-calls-ip-addresses/">can be a little burdensome to manage</a> in the IAM Policy. As you can see in the alert shown above, there was no MFA enforced for this API call. Again, this was not a login, but you can also <a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa_configure-api-require.html">enforce MFA for specific API calls through the IAM Policy</a>. We’ve observed only a few AWS customers using either of these controls.</p><p>Another interesting detail from this alert was the use of the <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/cli/">AWS Command Line Interface (CLI)</a>. This isn’t completely out of the norm, but it heightened our suspicion a bit because it’s less common than console (UI) or AWS SDK access. Additionally, we found this user hadn’t used the AWS CLI in recent history, potentially indicating a new person was using these credentials. The manual creation of an access key was also an atypical action versus leveraging infrastructure as code to manage keys (i.e. CloudFormation or Terraform).</p><p>Taking all of these factors into consideration, we knew we had an event worthy of additional investigation.</p><h3>Cue the robots, answer some questions</h3><p>Our orchestration workflows are critically important — they tackle highly repetitive tasks, that is answer questions an analyst would ask about an alert, on our behalf as soon as the alert fires. We call these workflows our robots.</p><p>When we get an AWS alert from a customer’s environment, we have three consistent questions we like to answer to help our analysts determine if it’s worthy of additional investigation (decision support):</p><ul><li>Did this IAM principal (user, role, etc.) assume any other roles?</li><li>What AWS services does this principal normally interact with?</li><li>What interesting API calls has this principal made?</li></ul><p>So, when the initial lead alert for the SSH key generation came in, we quickly understood that role assumption was not in play for this compromise. If the user had assumed roles, it would have been key to identity and include them in the investigation. Instead, we saw the image below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*7Sn5lxByRToAZFnE.jpg" /><figcaption><em>Expel AWS AssumeRole Robot</em></figcaption></figure><p>Once we knew access was limited to this IAM user, we wanted to know what AWS services this principal generally interacts with. Understanding this helps us spot outlier activity that’s considered unusual for that principal. Seeing the very limited API calls to other services further indicated that something nefarious might be going on.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*83MVWEil2jvzn-ts.jpg" /><figcaption><em>Expel AWS Service Interaction Robot</em></figcaption></figure><p>Finally, we wanted to see what interesting API calls the principal made. From a detection perspective, we define interesting API calls in this context to be mostly anything that isn’t Get*, List*, Describe* and Head*. This enrichment returned 344 calls to the AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress API from the AWS CLI user-agent. This is really the tipping point for considering this a security incident.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cs98sCIptWz1igXQ.jpg" /><figcaption><em>Expel AWS Interesting API Robot</em></figcaption></figure><h3>How we responded</h3><p>After we spotted the attack, we needed to scope this incident and provide the measures for containment. We framed our response by asking the primary investigative questions. Our initial response was going to be limited to determining what happened in the AWS control plane (API). CloudTrail was our huckleberry for answering most of our questions.</p><ul><li>What credentials did the attacker have access to?</li><li>How long has the attacker had access?</li><li>What did the attacker do with the access?</li><li>How did the attacker get access?</li></ul><h3>What credentials did the attacker have access to?</h3><p>By querying historical CloudTrail events for signs of this attacker, Expel was able to identify that they had access to a total of eight different IAM user access keys, and was active from two different IPs. If we recall from earlier, we were able to use our robot to determine that no successful AssumeRole calls were made, limiting our response to these IAM users.</p><h3>How long has the attacker had access?</h3><p>CloudTrail indicated that most of the access keys had not been used by anyone else in the past 30 days thus we can infer that the attacker likely discovered the keys recently.</p><h3>What did the attacker do with the access?</h3><p>Based on observed API activity, the attacker had a keen interest in S3, EC2 and RDS services as we observed ListBuckets, DescribeInstances and DescribeDBInstances calls for each access key, indicating an attempt to see which of these resources was available to the compromised IAM user.</p><p>As soon as the attacker identified a key with considerable permissions, DescribeSecurityGroups was called to determine the level of application tier access (firewall access) into the victim’s AWS environment. Once these groups were enumerated, the attacker “backdoored” all of the security groups with a utility similar to <a href="https://github.com/dagrz/aws_pwn/blob/master/persistence/backdoor_all_security_groups.py">aws_pwn’s backdoor_all_security_group script</a>. This allowed for any TCP/IP access into the victim’s environment.</p><p>Additional AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress calls were made for specific ingress rules for port 5432 (postgresql) and port 1253, amounting to hundreds of unique Security Group rules created. These enabled the attacker to gain network access to the environment and created additional risks by exposing many AWS service instances (EC2, RDS, etc.) to the internet.</p><p>A subsequent DescribeInstances call identified available EC2 instances to the IAM user. The attacker then created a SSH key pair (our initial lead alert for CreateKeyPair) for an existing EC2 instance. This instance was not running at the time so the attacker turned it on via a RunInstances call. Ultimately, this series of actions resulted in command line access to the targeted EC2 instance, at which point visibility can be a challenge without additional OS logging or security products to investigate instance activity.</p><h3>How did the attacker get credentials?</h3><p>While frustrating, it’s not always feasible to identify the root cause of an incident for a variety of reasons. For example, sometimes the technology simply doesn’t produce the data necessary to determine the root cause. In this case, using the tech we had available to us, we weren’t able to determine how the attacker gained credentials, but we have the following suspicions:</p><ul><li>Given multiple credentials were compromised, it’s likely they were found in a public repository such as git, an exposed database or somewhere similar.</li><li>It’s also possible credentials were lifted from developer machines directly, for example the AWS credentials file.</li></ul><p>We attempted to confirm these, but couldn’t get to an answer in this case. Though unfortunate, it offers an opportunity to work with the victim to improve visibility.</p><p>For reference, below are the Mitre ATT&amp;CK Cloud Tactics observed during Expel’s response.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jlXwIJe1cletZ3fSM0VzKA.png" /><figcaption>Mitre ATT&amp;CK Cloud Tactics</figcaption></figure><h3>Containment</h3><p>By thoroughly scoping the attacker’s activities, we were able to deliver clear remediation steps. This included:</p><ul><li>Deleting the compromised access keys for the eight involved IAM user accounts;</li><li>Snapshotting (additional forensic evidence) and rebuilding the compromised EC2 instance;</li><li>Deleting the SSH keys generated by the attacker;</li><li>And deleting the hundreds of Security Group ingress rules created by the attacker.</li></ul><h3>Resilience: Helping our customer improve their security posture</h3><p>When we say incident response isn’t complete without fixing the root of the problem — <a href="https://expel.io/security-operations/managed-detection-and-response/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=AWS">we mean it</a>.</p><p>One of the many things that makes us different at Expel is that we don’t just throw alerts over the fence. That would only be sort of helpful to our customers and puts us in a position where we’d have to tackle the same issue on another day … and likely on many more days after that.</p><p>We’re all about <a href="https://expel.io/blog/7-habits-highly-effective-socs/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=AWS">efficiency</a> here. That’s why we provide clear recommendations for how to solve issues and what actions a customer can take to prevent these kinds of attacks in the future. Everybody wins (except for the bad guys).</p><p>While we weren’t certain how the access keys were compromised in the first place, below are the resilience recommendations we gave our customer once the issue was resolved.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_fEoFWd8ZeS-C1zY.jpg" /><figcaption><em>Expel AWS Resilience (1)</em></figcaption></figure><ul><li>If the IAM user is unused, then it probably doesn’t need to remain active in your account. We made this recommendation because these access keys hadn’t been in use by anyone other than the attacker in the previous 30 days.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*P_z_MGnznVigbv-n.jpg" /><figcaption><em>Expel AWS Resilience (2)</em></figcaption></figure><ul><li>Since the access keys for this IAM principal were at least 30 days old given that no activity occurred from a legitimate user, it was time to do some tidying up, so to speak. If you need that user, rotate the access keys on a regular basis.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TpV-M7kDdKbC2AmD.jpg" /><figcaption><em>Expel AWS Resilience (3)</em></figcaption></figure><ul><li>We noticed that this IAM user had far too many EC2 permissions and thought this resilience measure was in order. We also shared that it would be far safer to delegate those EC2 permissions with an IAM role.</li></ul><h3>Lessons learned</h3><p>Fortunately, we were able to disrupt this attack before there was any serious damage, but it highlighted the very real fact that cloud infrastructure — whether you’re running workloads on AWS or somewhere else — is a prime target for attackers. As with every incident, we took some time to talk through what we discovered through this investigation and are sharing our key lessons here.</p><ul><li>AWS customers must architect better security “in” the cloud. That is, create greater visibility into the EC2 and other infrastructure identified in the shared responsibility model.</li><li>You can’t find evil if the analysts don’t know what to look for — train, train some more, and then when you’re done training, train again. Special thanks to Scott Piper (<a href="https://twitter.com/0xdabbad00">@0xdabbad00</a>) and Rhino Security Labs (<a href="https://twitter.com/RhinoSecurity">@RhinoSecurity</a>) for their contributions to AWS security research.</li><li>While security in the cloud is still relatively in its infancy, the same can be said for the attacker behaviors — much of what we observed here and in the past were elementary attack patterns.</li><li>There are additional automated enrichment opportunities. We’ve started working on a new AWS robotic workflow to summarize historical API usage data for the IAM principal and will compare it to the access parameters of the alert.</li></ul><p>Check out our other <a href="https://expel.io/blog?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=AWS">blogs</a> to learn more about how we leverage AWS cloud security for our customers, along with tips and tricks for ramping up your own org’s security when it comes to cloud.</p><p>We create space for you to do what you love about security (even if that’s not thinking about it). Learn more about <a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=Footer%201">what we do</a> and <a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/why-we-are-different/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=Footer%201">why we do it</a>. <em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=AWS"><em>https://expel.io</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9fc26771fda6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How much does it cost to build a 24x7 SOC?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@expel_io/how-much-does-it-cost-to-build-a-24x7-soc-a5aacc11af08?source=rss-ebaf28d052e3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a5aacc11af08</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-as-a-service]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Expel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2020 13:48:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-07T13:48:53.076Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XI960krb2O8auncTVuGqog.jpeg" /><figcaption>How much does it cost to build a 24x7 SOC?</figcaption></figure><p>The phone rings. It’s your boss.</p><p>“How much is it going to cost us to take our SOC to 24x7?!”</p><p>It sounds urgent. Turns out he’s calling because he just saw someone tweet about a data breach at one of your competitors. You’re tempted to throw out “a million dollars” as an estimate. It seems as good a place to start as anywhere. But is it? After all, the costs of building and operating a 24x7 security operations function can vary greatly.</p><p>One of the biggest factors impacting cost is how “good” you want to be. Do you need an excellent security operations center (SOC)? Or just one that’s good enough? Or maybe something in-between? Turns out there’s a “floor” cost that you’re unlikely to go under if you’re shooting for “competent.” Beyond that, the sky’s the limit. Let’s take a look at how we get to a right-sized answer that fits your particular situation.</p><h3>Night of the roundtable: adjectives matter when you build a SOC</h3><p>It’s tempting to whip out the calculator and start adding up the dollars … but not all SOCs are built alike. Are you building something basic? Advanced? What do these adjectives even mean?</p><p>A few years ago, our CEO was hosting a roundtable dinner with a room full of fellow CEOs. The topic was cybersecurity operations and the CEOs felt strongly that they needed to up their game. What they were doing just wasn’t good enough. It was time to push the pendulum to “state of the art.” What exactly does <em>that</em> look like, and what’s the price tag? Let’s look at the spectrum of what a SOC might do.</p><h3>Security Operations Center (SOC) Capabilities</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ws7L2b_I0Q0zEoUHolPw_w.png" /><figcaption>SOC capabilities</figcaption></figure><p>Whew. That’s quite a lot of capability — and it begins to represent what a state-of-the-art SOC entails. Add all of that up and depending on how big your organization is, this could cost anywhere from a few million dollars to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/01/30/why-j-p-morgan-chase-co-is-spending-a-half-billion-dollars-on-cybersecurity/#3b6f22fc2599">half a billion</a> (or heck … even <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/01/27/bank-of-americas-unlimited-cybersecurity-budget-sums-up-spending-plans-in-a-war-against-hackers/#feeedce264cd">unlimited</a>).</p><p>And as most of us are seeing as we begin our planning cycles, 2021 is not going to be like 2020 when it comes to <a href="https://www.darkreading.com/perimeter/zero-trust-efforts-rise-with-the-tide-of-remote-working/d/d-id/1338343">planning</a> and <a href="https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2020/09/18/justifying-your-2021-cybersecurity-budget/">budgeting</a>.</p><p>Now, back to that CEO roundtable. After the whole state-of-the-art discussion, one of the CEOs in the back of the room raised her hand, “Considering we’re not a big bank … what’s good enough and how much does that cost?”</p><p>Frankly, the foundational investments for “good enough” aren’t any different than “state-of-the-art.” You’ll need people. While there are <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shift_plan">seemingly endless shift schedules</a> to choose from, our experience building 24x7 security teams tells us that the minimum number of people you’ll want operating in a SOC is 12. You could probably get by with eight, but vacations and illness will result in individuals being stranded alone on shift. Considering even entry-level security analysts command more than $76,000/year in salary alone, your cost to operate a SOC starts at roughly a million dollars.</p><p>Beyond people, the next largest impact on your SOC’s efficacy will be your technology and how easy you can make it for your people to use. Any SOC that doesn’t have the right technology to provide visibility, detection and investigative capabilities will end up being pretty useless, regardless of how many people you throw at it. While the technology bill at smaller organizations will only be a fraction of the staffing costs, as an organization grows, those tech costs can really skyrocket.</p><p>Now that we have a sense of our base costs, let’s imagine four possible security operations centers. These examples map relatively well to examples we’ve seen in the field — both at customers and at service providers.</p><h4>1. The basic SOC</h4><p>This SOC focuses primarily on detection (but not so much on investigation). They’ve invested sparingly in technology and have an odd assortment of visibility, partially due to investments the last CISO made and partially due to limited current budget. Analysts work primarily in a SIEM that was deployed several years ago and it just hasn’t been kept up to date. Overall, these technologies offer decent detection capability but there’s not much flexibility to tune how they work with additional intelligence or use them for more advanced investigative use cases. Spending time doing investigations or engaging in “hunting” isn’t really in the cards at all.</p><p>There hasn’t been a major incident, but the current CISO worries: if there were, would his SOC find it?</p><h4>2. The intermediate SOC</h4><p>At this level, the SOC has mastered detection and the technology investments provide reasonably good visibility into the organization’s nooks and crannies. Beyond the basic detection capability of a SIEM fed by event logs, the SOC has deployed a combination of EDR and network forensics technologies that provide advanced threat detection. Security analysts operate at multiple tiers — some of the more senior practitioners frequently leave the SIEM to take advantage of unique capabilities their advanced tech offers. The team really wants to spend more time being proactive, but “operational reality” makes that difficult.</p><p>SOC management oscillates on a day-by-day basis: some days they’re confident about the capabilities of their SOC and other days they feel blind and they worry there’s stuff on the network they don’t know about.</p><h4>3. The advanced SOC</h4><p>SOCs that get to this level have made a tremendous investment in tooling to free up their analysts’ time. Tier one and two analysts are working primarily in a SIEM. But that’s only because they’ve taken the time (along with a good dose of help from outsiders) to tune their correlation rules and plug some of their more specialized products into the SIEM. They can even pull data from their network and endpoint security products without leaving the SIEM. This improves the quality (and speed) of their investigations. When they escalate incidents, tier three analysts pick them up and pivot directly to more sophisticated analysis tools and consoles.</p><p>While good things come in threes, advanced SOCs often add a fourth cadre of analysts called the “hunt” team. They’re not part of the 24x7 rotation. They focus exclusively on finding things their tech missed. While they do a little work in the SIEM, they spend most of their time building and running custom scripts to find threats their security products aren’t alerting on.</p><p>Lastly, there are a couple of groups helping to make all of the underlying tech run. Intelligence analysts make sure that the intel feeding the technology is up to date, ensure it’s not burying shift analysts in useless alerts and — when serious threats arise — add color and context so that management understands the risks they’re facing. Finally, you’ll see engineers whose job is to build software that makes their security products talk to each other. This helps streamline their processes and automate data gathering as best as they can. For lack of a better term at this organization, they call themselves SOC plumbers.</p><p>The CISO in the advanced SOC is comfortable with her security operation and periodically brings in third parties to run red team exercises to ensure the SOC is performing as she’d expect.</p><h4>4. The learning SOC</h4><p>Like the advanced SOC, this organization has invested an enormous amount of time and money in automation and analytics. They’re focused on ensuring that humans are doing the security work that only humans can do. Everything else is handled by software.</p><p>To that end, they’ve tied their security technologies together with an orchestration framework and pulled in resources from IT to help automate investigation and remediation. As a <a href="https://expel.io/blog/performance-metrics-measuring-soc-efficiency/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=SOC%20cost">metrics-driven organization</a>, they watch closely what the ratios are between false positives and true positives, how long it takes to triage and investigate and how much value they’re getting out of their security investments based on usage. These metrics drive a constant stream of change back into the infrastructure because the tuning is never done. A <a href="https://expel.io/blog/mistakes-avoid-measuring-soc-performance/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=SOC%20cost">note of caution</a> here: just because you have metrics doesn’t mean you’re operating at this level. They’re a necessary but not sufficient condition.</p><p>Every time the CISO brings in a red team (he rotates between three vendors) he reviews the metrics to ensure time-to-detect, time-to-respond and the overall accuracy that’s coming out of his SOC is improving. There’s still no guarantee his organization’s “secure,” but he feels prepared to respond should anyone get in.</p><h3>Picking the flavor that’s right for you</h3><p>What SOC is right for you? Perhaps it’s one of the examples above. Or, maybe it’s something in between. Only you can determine what’s right for your organization … but maybe we can help. We’ve found that the best way to figure out how much “security” you need to put in place is by looking at things through the lens of risk. And specifically, through a framework. It probably doesn’t matter which one, but starting with the end in mind is better than <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hooKVstzbz0">going YOLO</a>.</p><p>I know. It sounds kinda boring. It would be a lot more fun to go buy and implement a bunch of whizz-bang security tech. We see this a lot. But we also see these organizations paying a price in the end. A few years down the road their whizz-bang security tools are gathering dust and their people are overwhelmed with useless alerts.</p><p>If you’re willing to take this more step-by-step approach, we recommend NIST’s <a href="https://expel.io/blog/how-to-get-started-with-nist-privacy-framework/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=SOC%20cost">Cybersecurity Framework</a>. It’s certainly not the only one you can use, but it breaks down security practices into five simple functions: identify, protect, detect, respond and recover. It also encompasses a whole lot more than what goes into a SOC, which makes it even more useful. That said, if you’re focused on SOC operations, you’ll find your best guidance within <strong>detect</strong> and <strong>respond</strong> with a few relevant nuggets in <strong>identify</strong>.</p><p>We’ve provided <a href="https://expel.io/blog/how-to-get-started-with-nist-privacy-framework/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=SOC%20cost">a lot more guidance about this framework</a> on the EXE blog, but for now, the important thing to know is that your level of “rigor and sophistication” doesn’t need to be at level 4 across the board. It’s more like building out your D&amp;D character. You’re essentially allocating a limited set of points across charisma, agility, and strength.</p><h3>Adding it all up</h3><p>After you’ve determined the kind of risks you want to manage and mitigate, you’ll have a better notion of the kind of SOC you need to build. Below, we’ve outlined rough estimates for purchasing technology and staffing the team. Because technology* costs can vary significantly based on the size of the organization, we’re imagining an organization with about 5,000 employees. Bear in mind that at larger organizations, the costs of technology can increase dramatically.</p><h4>Sample costs for SOC-related tools, staffing and implementation</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*H68VT2o9jouuzggU8Vf1Tw.png" /><figcaption><em>Based on an organization of 5,000 employees</em></figcaption></figure><p><em>* We’re focusing on SOC-specific tools, not bread-and-butter security investments organizations make for things like basic firewalls, identity &amp; access management, patch management, vulnerability management, and the like.</em></p><h3>That’s a wrap</h3><p>Understanding the true costs of building and operating a SOC has more to do with the <a href="https://expel.io/blog/managed-detection-and-response-mdr-symptom-or-solution/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=SOC%20cost">capability you’d like to field</a> than the <a href="https://expel.io/blog/five-ways-keep-security-nerds-happy/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=SOC%20cost">people you need to hire</a> to run 24x7. Hopefully, this post has helped you estimate a little better what kind of SOC you’d like to build and how much that might cost. And look, if you’re sitting here thinking “oh man, this isn’t the kind of money I want to be spending … security’s not a core part of my business, and there’s no way we’re going to become experts at it,” well, a great many people end up at that same conclusion. In that case, it might be worth considering <a href="https://expel.io/security-operations/soc-as-a-service/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=SOC%20cost">an as-a-service model</a> for security operations.</p><p>I’ll leave you with a parting thought. If you do decide that building your own SOC capability is a bridge too far … consider when you’re outsourcing what exactly your provider is bringing to the table. Is it a basic SOC? An advanced one? Just the hunting use case? There are infinite ways in which these capabilities can be carved up, and the better you understand what capabilities you need, the better equipped you’ll be to build them or buy them.</p><p>On a <a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=Footer%202">journey</a> to change the current model of what most people think of when they hear the term “managed security.” Come say hi to us on <a href="https://bit.ly/3myGmdV">Twitter</a>. <em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://expel.io/blog/how-much-does-it-cost-to-build-a-24x7-soc/"><em>https://expel.io</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a5aacc11af08" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[7 habits of highly effective SOCs — Expel]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@expel_io/7-habits-of-highly-effective-socs-expel-941aa6b0b1fb?source=rss-ebaf28d052e3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/941aa6b0b1fb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[siem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Expel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Nov 2019 14:35:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-23T14:22:19.809Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>7 habits of highly effective SOCs</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IH0UQ4GT87CRvxcMHuBahQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>7 habits of highly effective SOCs</figcaption></figure><p>Before I talk about effective SOCs that run like well-oiled machines, let’s get one thing straight.</p><p>SOC<em> isn’t</em> a dirty word.</p><p>But I totally understand the negative connotation and that’s exactly why I’m writing this post. <a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/security-operations-alert-fatigue/">Alert fatigue is real</a>, repetition leads to exhaustion and those two things in tandem create an environment ripe for <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/AskNetsec/comments/ac5nya/coping_with_soc_burnout/">analyst burnout</a>. I get it.</p><p>Here’s the thing: When built right, a job working in a SOC can be so much fun, not to mention you get the learning and experience you thought you signed up for. Since launching our 24x7 service in 2017 we’ve experimented a ton, learned a bunch, and through a lot of iteration landed on some habits — seven, in fact — that we believe help us “SOC” the right way at Expel.</p><p>If you’re working in or managing a SOC with a ton of turnover — or just want tips on how to shape an effective and more productive team — here are seven habits to adopt right now.</p><h3>1. Have a clear mission and guiding principles</h3><p>Get explicit about the mission and your culture. At Expel, the SOC’s mission is to protect our customers and help them improve. The mission is centered around problem solving and being a strategic partner for our customers. Notice that there are zero mentions of looking at as many security blinky lights as possible. That’s intentional.</p><p>Take it a step further and create some guiding principles. Guiding principles define what you as a team believe in and how you operate together. Here are some (but not all) of the guiding principles in the Expel SOC:</p><ul><li>Teamwork makes the dream work.</li><li>Service with passion is our competitive advantage.</li><li>We embrace positive change.</li></ul><p>Articulating guiding principles is the first step in creating a SOC culture that you can turn into your competitive advantage. Security tech and process are easily replicated but culture is hard to copy.</p><h3>2. Prioritize learning</h3><p>Our analysts love to learn new things; it’s even one of the <a href="https://twitter.com/jhencinski/status/1153827186031284227?s=20">traits</a> we hire for. One thing that we’ve learned in building out our program is that the best way to foster improvement is to combine this love of learning with a collaborative — not adversarial — approach.</p><p>The best example of this is how we use <a href="https://expel.io/blog/why-we-love-threat-emulation-exercises/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=7%20habits">attack simulations</a> to help our team learn new techniques. During these, we have to celebrate progress and opportunities to learn — it doesn’t take much to make someone feel foolish and have that metastasize into a reluctance to try a new thing or stretch a new skill.</p><p>If you don’t run attack simulations regularly, start building them into your schedule. But don’t overthink it. You can run one right now in eight simple steps:</p><ol><li>Talk to the team and given them background so they don’t feel ambushed.</li><li>Open a PowerShell console.</li><li>Run <em>wmic /node:localhost process call create “cmd.exe /c notepad”</em> from your PowerShell console to simulate remote process creation using WMI.</li><li>Run <em>winrs:localhost</em> “cmd.exe /c calc” from your PowerShell console to simulate remote process creation using WinRm.</li><li>Finally run <em>schtasks /create /tn legit /sc daily /tr c:\users\ &lt;user&gt;\appdata\legit.exe</em> to simulate the creation of a malicious Windows scheduled task.</li><li>Interrogate your SIEM and EDR.</li><li>Talk about it as a team.</li><li>Find ways to improve.</li></ol><p>Want to run more sophisticated simulations? Here’s our <a href="https://expel.io/blog/why-we-love-threat-emulation-exercises/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=7%20habits">threat emulation framework</a> along with an example of how to <a href="https://expel.io/blog/how-to-build-useful-threat-emulation-exercise-aws/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=7%20habits">simulate an incident in AWS</a>.</p><h3>3. Empower the team</h3><p>Analysts want to spend time finding new things, pursuing quality leads and working with people to solve complex problems — not chasing the same false positive over and over again. Trust the team to filter out the noise and then enable them to do so.</p><p>How did we build this capability at Expel?</p><p>We took the DevOps processes used by our engineering teams and adapted them to detection deployment. Here’s a high-level overview of what this looks like:</p><ul><li>We manage our detection rules using <a href="https://github.com/">GitHub</a>.</li><li>We have unit tests for every detection (just like you would expect of code).</li><li>We use <a href="https://circleci.com/">CircleCi</a> to build our detection packages.</li><li>During the CircleCi build process, we apply linting and perform additional error checking.</li><li>If a CircleCi build fails we’ll automatically fail the PR so an analyst knows some additional tweaks are required.</li><li>We create error codes that are easy to understand.</li><li>We use <a href="https://www.ansible.com/">Ansible</a> to deploy new detection packages.</li><li>Now an analyst can deploy a new detection package at any time as long as the content passes automated tests and has been peer-reviewed.</li></ul><p>Here’s how this plays out in practice.</p><p>Matt Nelson AKA <a href="https://twitter.com/enigma0x3">@enigma0x3</a> once tweeted about a new remote process execution technique</p><ol><li>An analyst creates the rule in GitHub and submits a new PR.</li><li>That PR is picked up by CircleCi, linted and checked for errors.</li><li>Assuming all goes well, the PR is marked as “all checks passed.”</li><li>The analyst requests peer review.</li><li>The detection package is deployed using Ansible.</li><li>Everyone’s happy.</li></ol><p>Empower the team to tackle false positives and write rules to find new things. Give them control of the end-to-end system and back them up with good error checking. In doing so, your team members will feel more connected to their work and the mission.</p><h3>4. Automate</h3><p>SOC work can be repetitive. Automation FTW!</p><p>But what should you automate?</p><p>Decision support is a great place to start. What’s decision support? In our context, decision support is all of the automation, contextual enrichment and user interface attributes that make our analysts more effective in answering the following question: “Is this a thing?”</p><p>How does this play out at Expel?</p><p>As part of our integration with <a href="https://expel.io/cloud/microsoft-o365/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=7%20habits">Office 365</a> we collect signal and generate alerts when accounts are <a href="https://expel.io/blog/seven-ways-to-spot-business-email-compromise-office-365/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=7%20habits">compromised</a> or user activity doesn’t seem quite right. Investigating patterns of user authentication behavior can be a tedious task when done manually … but the good news is that it’s a series of repeated steps that can be automated.</p><p>Take a look at this example where, with the help of some automation, we’re able to quickly review 30 days of login activity based on IP address and user-agent combinations:</p><figure><img alt="Activity view within Expel’s Workbench" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rN-rb6yWOSSs85FyPhPoYA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="Activity view within Expel’s Workbench" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2kuHPsdEKZDj6c9PG_m9OQ.png" /><figcaption>Activity view within Expel’s Workbench</figcaption></figure><p>Automate the repetitive tasks so the team can focus their efforts on making important decisions versus clicking buttons.</p><h3>5. Use a capacity model</h3><p>Understand your available capacity (AKA analyst hours) and utilization. Are you consistently exceeding your available capacity? Is there always <em>way</em> more work to do than your people can handle?</p><p>If so, cue the burnout.</p><p>If capacity modeling is new to you, that’s okay. There are plenty of <a href="https://expel.io/blog/what-i-love-lucy-teaches-us-about-soc-performance/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=7%20habits">resources</a> available to help get you started.</p><p>Bottom line: Know your capacity utilization. If you discover that your team is oversubscribed, you’ll need to act fast.</p><h3>6. Perform time series analysis</h3><p>I agree with <a href="https://twitter.com/reefhack?lang=en">Yanek’s</a> philosophy here. Effective managers are able to look out into the future and, with reasonable certainty, predict what needs to change <em>today</em>.</p><figure><img alt="Tweet from Expel COO Yanek Korff" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xw7tWpt4U3KhSG3xzW9n8A.png" /><figcaption>Tweet from <a href="https://expel.io/company/leadership/yanek-korff/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=7%20habits">Yanek Korff</a>, Expel’s COO</figcaption></figure><p>I think effective management is centered around asking the right questions and using data to answer them.</p><p>You already know that alert fatigue leads to burnout. As a manager, I ask a ton of questions about the alert management process:</p><ol><li>How many alerts did we send to the team last month?</li><li>How many alerts will we send to the team next month?</li><li>What day of the week is the busiest?</li><li>Do we get more alerts during the day or at night?</li><li>How many alerts will we send to the team next year?</li></ol><p>All of these questions are centered around <strong>time</strong>. <a href="https://medium.com/greyatom/introduction-to-time-series-analysis-431beb02adc4">Time series analysis</a> allows you to analyze data in order to learn what happened in the past, and to inform you on what things will likely look like in the future. By performing time series analysis you can forecast how things will change and react before it’s too late. We perform time series analysis on the historical volume of alerts sent to our team for triage. From this data, we pull out different components including <a href="https://www.oraylis.de/blog/trend-in-times-series-analysis">trend</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seasonality">seasonality</a> and the noise AKA “ <a href="https://otexts.com/fpp2/residuals.html">the residual</a>,” so that we can use patterns from historical behavior to help us predict future behavior. This allows us to not only more deeply analyze what’s already happened, but it’s also a way to look into the future so you can start to react now before it’s too late.</p><h3>7. Measure quality</h3><p>I love this tweet.</p><figure><img alt="Tweet from Eric Weller" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6rSMDRR2pQbyTqlixDSj7g.png" /><figcaption>Tweet from <a href="https://twitter.com/milo924">Eric Weller</a></figcaption></figure><p>Quality control doesn’t get in the way. It pushes you forward.</p><p>At Expel, we use a quality control (QC) standard, <a href="https://qualityinspection.org/what-is-the-aql/">Acceptable Quality Limits</a> (AQL), to tell us how many alerts and incidents we should review each day. We then randomly select a number (based on AQL) of alerts, investigations and incidents and review them using a <a href="https://www.sixsigmadaily.com/check-sheets-five-basic-types/">check sheet</a>.</p><p>QC allows us to spot problems, understand them and then fix them. And fast.</p><h3>Parting words</h3><p>I’ll be candid. At one point I thought about rebranding our SOC as a Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) to distance ourselves from all the general negativity associated with a SOC.</p><p>But a SOC <em>can</em> be a great place to work if you solve problems the right way and empower your teams.</p><p>As an industry, let’s “SOC” the right way and reshape everyone’s thinking about SOCs.</p><p>We create space for you to do what you love about security (even if that’s not thinking about it). Learn more about <a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=Footer%201">what we do</a> and <a href="https://expel.io/managed-security/why-we-are-different/?utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=medium&amp;utm_campaign=Footer%201">why we do it</a>. <em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://expel.io/blog/7-habits-highly-effective-socs/"><em>https://expel.io</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=941aa6b0b1fb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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