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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Fabijan Purg on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Fabijan Purg on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Fabijan Purg on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Telo kot organ dotika]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fabijan.purg/telo-kot-organ-dotika-6b30c0e438cd?source=rss-8c65d1187c17------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6b30c0e438cd</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fabijan Purg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Feb 2018 22:50:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-28T17:27:27.636Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/594/1*qFBSyLUI8JmqlpcB3Uf8BA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Telo kot organ dotika</strong></p><p>Ljudje imamo pet čutov. To je tako očitno, da jih ni treba niti našteti. Dotik je eden izmed njih, a je naše razumevanje tega, kaj (vse) dotik (lahko) je, skrajno omejeno. Medtem ko imajo drugi čuti svoja čutila precej jasno locirana in primarno namenjene zaznavne funkcije, je dotiku zelo težko pripisati <em>eno</em> čutilo, ki bi bilo locirano <em>nekje </em>na telesu in ki bi bilo namenjeno izključno taktilni zaznavi.</p><p>Dotik tako, v razliki do drugih čutov, nima natančno določenega organa dotika. Učbeniško prepričanje je, da je organ dotika koža, pod katero se nahajajo različni in različno razporejeni nevronski končiči. Če se pri definiranju (organa) dotika omejimo na kožo in živce direktno pod njo, lahko povemo o fiziologiji dotika nekaj specifičnih stvari, recimo razdelimo živce v različne kvalitete, kot toplo, hladno, pritisk, vibriranje, bolečina … Potem lahko preučimo na katerih delih telesa se nahaja več končičev kot drugje in ali je kje večja zgostitev enih ali drugih vrst končičev ter preučimo poti po katerih potujejo do centralnega živčevja in nazaj. Tako ugotovimo, da imajo nekateri deli telesa precej večjo dotično pomembnost kot drugi. Najbolj izstopajo seveda roke.</p><p>Ponavadi ko govorimo o aktivnem dotikanju nečesa, govorimo o dotikanju z rokami. To nas privede do ideje, da organ dotika morda ni samo koža, ampak tudi konkretni deli telesa, ki šele privedejo kožo do stika z zunanjostjo. Pozabljeni pionir taktilne psihofiziologije, David Katz, je leta 1925 v svojem delu <em>Der Aufbau der Tastwelt </em>(v angleščino leta 1989 prevedeno v <em>The World of Touch) </em>predlagal odmik od paradigme kože kot organa dotika ter pozornost usmeril na premikajoče se telo, ter njegove bolj ali manj aktivne (pod)organe. Roke se premikajo še preden karkoli čutijo, lahko bi rekli da brezglavo iščejo oprijem, so v konstantni pripravljenosti na možnost dotika. Da se srečam z Rubikovo kocko, ki jo vidim na polici, se moram vstati, stegniti roko proti njej, razširiti dlan, jo v ravno pravem trenutku pokrčiti, potem spet malo razširiti, in tako dalje … Niso objekti v svetu tisti ki vdrejo v zaznavo, pač pa je naše telo v naprej pripravljeno na možnost takšnega ali drugačnega spoznanja. To idejo je, pod vplivom Edmunda Husserla (1982 in 1989) in že omenjenega Katza, prevzel francoski fenomenolog Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962 in 1963), katerega življenjski opus se je vrtel okoli konceptov zaznavanja in telesa.</p><p>Oba koncepta, zaznava in telo, sta, po Merleau-Pontyu, združena v dotiku. Dotikanje je toliko telesna oziroma vedenjska aktivnost, kolikor je zaznavna oziroma mentalna. Z drugimi besedami, pri dotiku ni meje med telesnim in duševnim, notranjim in zunanjim. Ko se dotaknemo nekega predmeta, načeloma izkusimo ta predmet sam, ne dotikajočega se telesa. Vendar pa telo ni samo medij taktilne zaznave, ampak je tudi objekt zaznave same. Kaj se zgodi, če sledim slavnemu primeru zgoraj omenjenih fenomenologov, ko sklenem roki in prekrižam prste? Katera je tista <em>ena </em>roka, ki je prijela <em>drugo</em>? Kdo se dotika česa? (Husserl 1989, Merleau-Ponty 1962, Ratcliffe 2013) Jasnega odgovora na tako prebrisano zastavljeno vprašanje seveda ne bomo dobili, vendar pa nam vprašanje samo ponuja iztočnico za razmislek o vlogi telesa pri premagovanju ločnic med zunanjim in notranjim.</p><p>Vloga telesa v zaznavi je tako dvojna in nobena od teh vlog ni izključno zunanja ali notranja. Na eni strani imamo telo kot medij (najbolj opazen v rutinskih aktivnostih, recimo tipkanju po tipkovnici, ko telo kar izgine iz doživljajskega vsakdana in gre svojo pot) ter telo kot objekt zaznave (ko telo ali kak njegov del postane osrednji objekt izkustva, recimo, ko čutim hitro utripajoče srce ali bolečino v kolenu). Vendar pa telo nikoli ni samo ali medij ali objekt zaznave, pač pa vsako telesno zaznavo zaznamuje ravno prepletenost teh dveh vlog. V vsakdanja taktilni zaznavi, recimo ko preverjamo, če smo zaklenili vrata ali ko pišemo s svinčnikom po papirju, telo deluje kot razmišljujoč medij in zaznan objekt v enem.</p><p>Za druge čute se zdi, da nam, z izjemo entoptičnih fenomenov (to so vizualna izkustva, katerih izvori se nahajajo v očesu samem, kot so bleščanje svetlobe pri gledanju sveče ali pa črvički na svetlem nebu) ali šumov v ušesu, posredujejo informacije o dogajanjih v zunanjem svetu. Ko vidimo ali slišimo drevo, izkušnja drevesa ni izražena na točki kontakta s s svetlobo ali zvokom, pač pa je locirana nekam tja v zunanji svet. Za taktilno izkušnjo se zdi, da nam posreduje direkten kontakt z zunanjim svetom oziroma čutnimi dražljaji. Zato se nam mogoče včasih zdi, da nam dotik daje resničnejši uvid v izkustveni svet kot drugi čuti. Ko gledam skodelico, vidim skodelico, pozabim pa da gledam. Ko jo primem v roko ali če si jo postavim na glavo, skodelica več ni nek predmet v, od mene neodvisnem, svetu. Lahko si v njo nalijem kavo, si jo ponesem k ustom, naredim požirek in svet izkusim v čisto novi podobi.</p><p><strong>Literatura</strong></p><p>Husserl, E. 1982 /1913. <em>Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology.</em> Prevedel: F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff</p><p>Husserl, E. 1989/1952.<em> Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book</em>. Prevedla: R. Rojcewicz in A. Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer</p><p>Katz, D. 1989/1925. The World of Touch. Prevedel: L. E. Krueger, London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.</p><p>Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962/1945. <em>Phenomenology of Perception</em>, Prevedel: C. Smith, London: Routledge.</p><p>Merleau-Ponty, M. 1963/1942. <em>The Structure of Behavior. </em>Prevedel: A.L. Fisher, Boston: Beacon Press</p><p>Ratcliffe, M. 2012. What is Touch. <em>Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90</em> (3): 413–432</p><p>Ratcliffe, M. 2013. Touch and the Sense of Reality. Poglavje v <em>The Hand, an Organ of the Mind: What the Manual tells the Mental</em>. Urednik: Radman, Z. MIT Press.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b30c0e438cd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Thinking in Movement]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fabijan.purg/thinking-in-movement-404336e356da?source=rss-8c65d1187c17------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/404336e356da</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[phenomenology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[merleau-ponty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[embodied-cognition]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy-of-mind]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[movement]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fabijan Purg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jan 2018 12:49:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-09T11:41:00.543Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/882/0*_uL1oyg6AEv84KdT." /></figure><p>I suppose we can all agree that we share certain ability to think, that is available to us at almost any moment. However, if we would have to agree on certain definition of what thinking is, we would probably not come far. Is thinking an ability to actively engage with the world, natural to any living organism, or is it the ability to distance ourselves from the world, ability that distinguishes higher primates from other organisms.</p><p>In following writing I will try to defend the position of the former and try to explain thinking as most general phenomenon that can ascribe behaviour of any living organism. In order to do this, I will follow<a href="https://philosophy.uoregon.edu/profile/msj/"> Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s</a> (2009) thinking in movement meditation. If thinking in movement is as original and primal to any form of animate life, as the author suggests, then we have good reason to identify its experiential markers in various practices of everyday life.</p><blockquote>Thinking in movement may be our primary way of making sense of the world.</blockquote><p>My goal is two-fold. First, to explain thinking as basic process of interacting with the world, rather than process of symbolic manipulation, and second, to ground this conception of thinking in one of most fundamental characteristics of living being, that is movement. To do this, I offer some examples that show that some form of thinking can be described only by its relation to movement. I wrap up the paper with a short discussion on thinking in movement and its relation to the other, more stereotypical types of thinking, such as linguistic, logical or mathematical types. I conclude that thinking in movement should be understood as fundamental, and not borderline, example of thinking.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FyTZxqSWPY7JaU%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2FyTZxqSWPY7JaU&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FyTZxqSWPY7JaU%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="326" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/273616df33e3ebe67ffdc1f2b1de3531/href">https://medium.com/media/273616df33e3ebe67ffdc1f2b1de3531/href</a></iframe><h3><strong>Thinking</strong></h3><p>Thinking is also often understood as a holistic, all-embracing phenomenon, an umbrella term for many other cognitive phenomena, such as decision making, problem solving … Thinking in general is understood as an abstract, purely mental, activity. This paper challenges the latter assumption in light of examples proposed by Sheets-Johnstone (2009), to whom I will often refer to as “the author”.</p><p>The author is concerned with the assumption that thinking, language and rationality are somehow connected to each other, and therefore it looks like anything that is connected to thinking, must also be somehow connected to rationality and possibly even language, etc. She challenges the claim that thinking is equal to symbol manipulation, regardless of whether it is a linguistic, mathematical or logical kind of manipulation. In this manner she opens a space for forms of thinking that have little to do with language and rationality per se, but nonetheless still can be properly described as forms of thinking.</p><p>Her main claim is therefore that thinking is in fact a far broader phenomenon and thinking in movement is an example of thinking that it is not about or of something. Therefore she offers an example of thinking that has nothing, or very little, to do with symbol manipulation. She is suggesting that infants and “lower” organisms share a common pre-conceptual, movement based mode of thinking, that later in life does not disappear, but gets somehow diminished and often substituted with more “rational” modes of thinking.</p><p>Another important assumption the author criticizes is that thought is separate from its expression, or even, that it must exist prior to its expression. If we paraphrase Ludwig Wittgenstein, thinking in language, is not accompanied with additional meanings of these thoughts (Sheets-Johnstone 2009). Even when talking aloud, there are usually no thoughts of these words existing prior to expressed words. Words just somehow happen to come out of our mouths. Therefore, the mind is not always one step ahead of its body. Sure, there are situations when the phase of thinking is causally followed by the phase of doing, but I believe that there are many more situations where thinking and doing cannot be separated from each other. If the latter is the case, then thinking must be defined in concert with doing, just as sensing must be defined in concert with moving. One cannot be described as a cause of the other, since we can observe only their complementarity.</p><h3><strong>Movement</strong></h3><p>Sheets-Johnstone puts a large emphasis on movement in relation to thought. She argues that movement is neither a medium through which thoughts emerge, nor a kinetic system for mediating thoughts, but it is rather the constitution of the thoughts themselves (Sheets-Johnstone 2009). When a musician performs an improvised solo part, movement of his hands does not follow any particular thought, independent from movement he performs. Movements and sounds he performs are thoughts themselves evolving through time of performing.</p><p>The author’s inspiration for corporeality of the thought lies in Merleau-Ponty, who argued that “<em>movement </em>must somehow cease to be a way of designating things or thoughts, and become the presence of that thought in the phenomenal world, and moreover, not its clothing but its token or its body.” (Merleau-Ponty in Sheets-Johnstone 2009, 37) Thinking is therefore not a static process in a dynamic body, but is just as dynamic as the body itself is.</p><p>Moreover, movement is proposed not just as fundamental to thinking, but also as a fundamental mode of being. What gives movement its primary and universal status is that movement is a discrete sign of change, a sign of something rather than nothing. Infants, for example, express and perceive movement as a change. As noted in Sheets-Johnstone (2009), that adapted the “theory of objects” from Husserl and von Helmholtz, we learn about the external world by moving in relation to objects and perceiving the change of their appearance in accordance with our movement. Even if some things appear as static, they appear like that with our dynamic movement towards them.</p><p>A similar idea, concretely ascribed to the sense of touch, is stating that the movement of one’s body is what lightning is to vision, appears in Katz (1925) and gets reexamined in Merleau-Ponty (1945). Knowing that some sort of touch is already present in single-cell organisms and primitive multicellular animals that lacked any neurons, and that animals such as jellyfish that posses very simple nervous systems, can exhibit coordinated patterns of motor response to sensory stimuli and many have a rich capacity to respond to touch (Prescott &amp; Dürr 2015) suggest that touch, i.e. sense of movement, is fundamental to any animate being. It is also proposed that phylogenetic emergence of the nervous system is correlated with an organism’s tendency to move. For that reason one might guess that movement must be a necessary precursor for any kind of thinking.</p><h3><strong>Thinking in movement, actually</strong></h3><p>Throughout the paper, Sheets-Johnstone emphasizes importance of thinking in movement on many different levels, namely experiential, developmental and phylogenetic. She argues that thinking in movement is our primary way of making sense of the world and that it is fundamental to being a body (Sheets-Johnstone 2009) and therefore could serve as an original form of thinking.</p><p>Moreover, thinking in movement might also serve as an explanation of animal’s behaviour, many of which are often described as a direct reaction to environment, namely reflex. Along the line with Merleau-Ponty (1945) she criticizes that kind of conception of reflexes or instincts, stating that even most automatic behaviour has certain holistic motivations. She argues that instinct behaviours does not necessarily signify the absence of thought and that instincts are adaptable, i.e. their realization depends on the past experience. Evolution of instinctive behaviours is a matter of movement: “When circumstances change, ways of living change, and those changes in the most basic sense are a matter of movement possibilities.” (Sheets-Johnstone 2009, 55)</p><blockquote>Even most automatic behaviour has certain holistic motivations.</blockquote><p>Instincts therefore do not have their origins in the habit, but rather in movement, in primal animation, as instincts start kinetically and can be treated as forms of thinking in movement. Instincts, human or nonhuman, cannot be easily separated from learned behaviour, since the realization of both depend on past experience.</p><p>Furthermore, the author describes instincts as example of an intelligence in action. “An intelligence in action is a build-in of animate life. Thinking in movement is the natural expression of this elemental biological character of life.” (ibid.)</p><h3><strong>Paradigms of thinking in movement</strong></h3><p>Deriving from the author’s paradigmatic example of thinking in movement, i.e. “the experience of moving in an improvisational dance” (Sheets-Johnstone 2009, 28) and proposed similarity of improvisational dance to improvisational jazz music (ibid., 29) I consider the experience of moving while actively performing improvised music to be another possible example of thinking in movement. In addition to that, I propose some other possible candidates for paradigms for thinking in movement, i.e. active and passive music listening, experience of the earworm and verbal expression.</p><p><strong>Improvisational music</strong></p><p>Improvisation is generally considered to be the idea of spontaneous performing without any pre-prepared or already remembered sheet music or chord or rhythm structure. While absolute improvisation from beginning to an end is in music rare, it’s essence remains present in various fields contemporary music. My goal is not to describe what improvisation in music is or isn’t, but rather to use experience of improvising as an example which might help us identify certain features of thinking in movement.</p><p>When a musician or a group of musicians is improvising, they actively explore the world in (and not just through) movement. World in movement is experienced as an ever-changing kinetic world of possibilities present in certain moment. When a musician moves and produces sounds, this is not a linear process of executing moves in order to follow the idea, but it is act of moving <em>in vivo</em>.</p><p>For example, in traditional jazz vocal improvisation, there is no explicit thinking present that could be separated from doing. Sounds that are produced at certain moment can continue in one or another way. It is not like the singer would first perceive what she or he is doing and then add something that goes along with what was already performed and then again perceive the outcome. What the singer is performing is perceived and acted at the same time. Similar</p><p><strong>Listening to music</strong></p><p>Another example that might correspond to formation of thinking in movement is music listening, may it be passive or active. Many people move parts of their body along with the beat or melody of the music, even though they do not actively listen to that piece of music per se. Could this be explained in terms of thinking in movement? Well, if so, it could help explain possible positive or negative effects of background music many use while working, studying, relaxing …</p><p>Active music listening could be another paradigmatic example of thinking in movement, in a way quite similar to the author’s example of improvisational dance and our example of improvisational music. When one moves along with heard music, this does not simply add another (kinetic) component to auditory perception, but affects the perception of music as a whole. Likewise, when one is (for any kind of reason) not able or allowed to move, this will clearly affect one’s auditory perception. Furthermore, when one listens actively, his movement is fundamental to the act of listening itself. One might turn his head to the expected source of sound or just move his head around to locate the source of sound more precisely.</p><p><strong>Earworms</strong></p><p>When there is a song or a melody stuck in our head, the typically unpleasant experience known as earworm, it is actually not in our head or mind where the song is stuck, but rather in the whole body that is moving and our mouth that is singing along. If there is no tension to move or sing the earworm, then the earworm may not be present at all. Its main features are located in the physical bodily movement. Earworm is not a thought that is transcribed into a movement but rather a kinetic thought that emerges only when it is performed.</p><p><strong>Verbal expression</strong></p><p>Yet another situation where thinking in movement might be present can be identified. As it was already proposed in the beginning, when we express verbally, there are often no thoughts existing prior to the spoken words. When we speak, the act of speaking itself motivates words to come out of our mouth. We do not mentally process every word and then send it to speech organs to execute it, but we just speak, using very complex and yet smooth system of speech organs. In addition to the fact that speaking is movement of speech organs, there is also another movement present, i.e. gestures. When we speak, it is not just speech organs that are active, but rather the whole body executing various expressions that somehow bound up with words being said. The movements of our face, hands and body are clearly not linguistic forms of thinking or expressing and yet they do not just add some extra-meaning to thing being said, but they rather co-create the meaning as a whole.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FGppbdd99pxXAQ%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2Fsinger-opera-mri-Gppbdd99pxXAQ&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FGppbdd99pxXAQ%2Fgiphy-downsized-large.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="326" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/47428d1911e02ee7c90906727bede4a5/href">https://medium.com/media/47428d1911e02ee7c90906727bede4a5/href</a></iframe><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>In this essay I examined a quite speculative and yet highly plausible proposition that approaches the phenomenon of thinking, and moreover cognition in general, from a very vital perspective, that is focused around a shared feature of all animate beings, that is, as the word suggest, animation or movement.</p><p>The author evidently suggests that thinking in movement is the original and foundational form of thinking of all animate beings, but is, at least from human perspective, often not present in our experiential horizon.</p><p>My goal was to identify certain experiential or behavioral situations where thinking in movement might be found. The examples given demonstrate the diversity of possibilities in thinking in movement and suggest that there is a myriad of situations where (glimpses of) thinking in movement can be found.</p><p>I believe thinking can be understood as a specific kind of behaviour, and by that I do not mean (just) the behaviour of mental processes in nervous system, but (also) behaviour of whole organism. … thinking not just internal process… no inner outer…</p><p>However, it remains unclear how the relation between thinking in movement and other well known forms of thinking are established. On the one hand it is proposed that thinking in movement is fundamental and therefore all other forms of thinking were developed as extensions of thinking in movement. For example, pointing to a snake is a form of thinking in movement, that could be extended to other more profound ways of thinking, like saying: “Watch out, there is a snake on your garden!”. In this manner, thinking in language could be understood as a mere extension of thinking in movement and can be, therefore, reduced to features of thinking in movement. On the other hand, the author argues, that our capacity to think in movement gets lost when we acquire other forms of pragmatically useful thinking. In this manner, thinking in movement might be understood as primitive, a merely universal mode of thinking, that is not compatible with other, more sophisticated modes of thinking.</p><p>Thinking remains a poorly defined phenomenon, but the notion of thinking in movement might help us to approach thinking in a more creative way. If thinking is something innate to any living organism, then we have good reasons to consider the idea that humans are far from being only species with the ability to think or reason.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Katz, D. 1925 (1989). The World of Touch, trans. L. E. Krueger, London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.</p><p>Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945 (2012). Phenomenology of perception. Trans. D.A. Landes. Oxon: Routledge.</p><p>Prescott, T. and Dürr, V. (2015). The World of Touch. In Scholarpedia, 10(4):32688 <a href="http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/The_World_of_Touch">www.scholarpedia.org/article/The_World_of_Touch</a></p><p>Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2009). The corporeal turn: an interdisciplinary reader. Exeter: Imprint Academic.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=404336e356da" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Questioning Bodily Certainty through the Experience of Stuttering]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fabijan.purg/questioning-bodily-certainty-through-the-experience-of-stuttering-1e58c6ae6491?source=rss-8c65d1187c17------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1e58c6ae6491</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[speech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[body]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phenomenology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stuttering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[existentialism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fabijan Purg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jan 2018 09:39:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-13T06:00:34.356Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6yHKBH_MJ1t_MraJ.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Questioning Bodily Certainty through the Experience of Stuttering</strong></p><p>In this essay I follow <a href="http://www.bristol.ac.uk/school-of-arts/people/havi-h-carel/index.html">Havi Carel</a>’s examination of bodily doubt or bodily uncertainty, that arises when an otherwise tacit feeling of bodily certainty becomes interrupted, as in the example of illness. I argue that serious, health-threatening illnesses may not be the only way of experiencing bodily doubt, as in the case of stuttering (or similar motor speech disorder), certain aspects of bodily doubt can also be found. If this is the case, then this may serve as another way to study implicit aspects of the bodily sense or existential feeling (Carel 2013, Ratcliffe 2008). In the first part of the paper I introduce bodily certainty and bodily doubt as important aspects of the existential background that shapes our reality. In second part I turn to the study of a particular pathology, stuttering, and show that it may resemble certain features of bodily doubt.</p><p><strong>Bodily (un)certainty</strong></p><p>Carel, to whom I will refer as “the author” argues that we possess a kind of certainty about the world and our bodies, that normally becomes visible only when it is disturbed. In other words, bodily certainty can be recognized only through its lack or absence. We normally don’t question if our legs will support us while walking, if our eyes will perceive light when seeing or if our mouth would speak when talking. But as soon as any of these actions becomes incongruent with our expectations, a certain feeling of doubt in/about our body becomes more prominent and can radically modify our experience (Carel 2013).</p><blockquote>Bodily certainty can be recognized only through its absence.</blockquote><p>We are engaged in various degrees and kinds of bodily certainty and uncertainty (Carel 2013). Bodily certainty is defined in terms of subtle feeling of ‘I can’ (cf. Husserl 1931), feeling of possibility rooted in our ‘habitual body’ (Merleau-Ponty 1945), a body that enables us to engage in conscious actions through accumulating various habits and routines (Carel 2013). That kind of (feeling of) certainty is usually tacit, taken for granted and is not experienced or expressed as an entity (in a way that maybe feeling of hunger is). When I reach for a glass of water, I do not think of the direction in which I have to move or about a type of grip I have to use in order to reach the glass, since I know that I can reach it without thinking. There is a wide range of routine actions we perform (e.g. walking, talking, eating … ) that are rarely consciously reflected upon, but somehow form a stable and transparent background, a sense of pre-reflective certainty, about our bodies and the world, that is ‘just there’. It is the basic mode of action that takes agency for granted and is most effective when it remains unnoticed (Carel 2013, e.g. 182–183). “[A] lack of a need to attend to our bodies, is core to our being.” (Carel 2013,183) When I walk I normally do not question my walking, I do not plan it, nor do I not reflect it, I just walk. However, if at a certain point something interrupts this routine action, certainty about it decreases. Individual steps become become reflected, legs feel heavier and the experience of incapability of forming a rhythmic flow of walk emerges.</p><blockquote>When I walk, I normally do not question my walking, I do not plan it or reflect it, I just walk.</blockquote><p>Many of our assumptions and expectations are based on the tacit feeling of bodily certainty, one may call them intuitions, as they are usually inexpressible in clear propositions and therefore not available for direct examination. As already proposed, one way to approach bodily certainty is to study the cases of its breakdown, that appears in different somatic or mental illnesses or other examples of interruption or dysfunction of our routine actions. When something that was individually or culturally taken for granted, has to become a matter of reflection, its certainty and familiarity becomes obsolete. When that happens, it is not just a feeling of bodily certainty alone that gets interrupted, but also our future intuitions about and behaviours towards the world, as they all stem from the bodily (un)certainty. If I injure my leg, this does not only affect how my leg is perceived or used, but also many other concepts indirectly connected to the sense of body or walking, such as concepts of distance, direction, time, health etc.</p><blockquote>When something that was previously taken for granted, has to become a matter of reflection, its certainty and familiarity becomes obsolete.</blockquote><p>One of the important features of bodily doubt is its unpredictability, i.e. it may come upon a person with complete surprise (Carel 2013, e.g. 185) and can therefore make the person feel incapable (Carel 2013, e.g. 186) to engage with the world. People experiencing the loss of hearing will likely try to avoid situations where their hearing situation would be an issue. That perspective suggests that there may be two kinds of conceptions of bodily doubt. First, bodily doubt as an instant feeling experienced in a moment when continuity breaks. Second, bodily doubt as a possibility of uncertainty, incapability or a break of continuity, that affects our tacit certainty in general. Carel writes that: “[b]odily certainty can be regained in many cases, but the expectation that the doubt may return substantively changes the kind of experience involved in each case” (Carel 2013, 184)</p><p>The author furthermore argues that while there is a certain similarity between bodily doubt and psychological stress, the former is not just a psychological or a mental state and cannot be reduced to propositional attitude, but is, first, and most importantly, bodily feeling, a physical sensation of doubt and hesitation. Bodily doubt in mental disorders, such as depression, is no exception, i.e. it is still a bodily feeling. One might even argue that any mental disorder has a bodily phenomenology (Carel 2012, e.g. 187–188)</p><p>As the author states, bodily doubt does not change only content of a particular experience, but it also changes the underlying structure of experience in general. She presents three possible changes in our experience that may yield the experience of bodily doubt: “loss of continuity, loss of transparency, and loss of faith in one’s embodied existence.” (Carel 2013, 179)</p><p>In bodily doubt, the continuity of the experience is interrupted. Our ‘habitual body’, the normal flow of an action leading to the goals is disturbed. Even if there is no uncertainty about the situation present at the moment, the mere possibility that feeling of doubt can occur affects our otherwise tacitly continuous experience (Carel 2013, e.g.188)</p><p>The line between the lived and the material body that is normally invisible, becomes salient in bodily doubt. The lived body becomes suspended from the world, the material body becomes the direct object of perception. Despite the brute fact of a body and reality that is constructs, the body as basic medium for having a world (Merleau-Ponty 1945) is often experienced as absent and generally not involved in our engagement with the world. In any skillful action (from seeing green to playing a violin) the body often disappears or becomes indistinguishable from the world. However, there are, temporary or permanent, situations where the exchange between the body and the world does not proceed so smoothly. When pre-reflective action present in a casual small talk with a neighbour has to be substituted with conscious planning and effort, a conversation is suddenly not as casual anymore. When something goes wrong, when we experience pain, uncertainty or doubt, our body becomes experienced not as something through which we perceive, but rather it becomes the object of perception, what may result in certain detachment from the world. When we are in pain, the world around us becomes less entertaining and can also completely disappear, while our body, normally absent, becomes more present than ever.</p><p>Bodily certainty could be described as a set of of unuttered beliefs we hold about our bodies and the world (Carel 2013, e.g. 191). We normally believe that our spine is supporting our posture, even though we never questioned its existence. We believe that our legs will walk and our mouth will talk without actually enacting the belief about this actions. Generally, we believe that our body will function fine and continue to perform as it has performed so far before believing anything else. However, one with an illness or some kind of bodily dysfunction might lose this general belief, certainty in own body. Instead, one will perceive doubt, feeling of incapability and a hesitation to participate with the world.</p><p><strong>Case study: Stuttering</strong></p><p>Stuttering is a speech disorder that causes problems with producing a spontaneous flow of speech. It is characterised by involuntary repetitions or prolongations of sounds or syllables. While the case of stutter may not be a paradigmatic example of an illness as it is proposed in Carel (2013), it shows certain signs of a broken bond between the lived and the material body, that becomes more conspicuous when talking, to be more concrete, when one experiences unpredictable interruption in the, usually smooth and possibly unnoticeable flow of talk. Words usually just somehow come out of our mouth, without particular attention turned to their morphology, but when the body (otherwise crucial for speech production) is interrupting their production, a certain doubt about it appears. The body sometimes fails to execute its function as it was ‘originally thought’. When sound cannot be produced or a word cannot be finished, more attention has to be turned to the particular aspect of motor action, that would otherwise happen pre-reflectively. Hesitations before starting or repetitions of certain sounds or syllables occur. Also, long pauses, particular facial expressions and breathing problems may appear. One may experience problem with expressing a certain sound (“r” for example) and will rather try to find a synonym word that does not contain problematic sound than annoy her- of himself with feeling of incapability.</p><blockquote>When one is talking, one does normally not explicitly perceive the flow of the act, but there is a tacit feeling of its presence, that we usually become aware of only when it is lost.</blockquote><p>In the first part of this paper we recognized two kinds of bodily doubt, let’s now call them instant and potential bodily doubt. They can both also be found at the case of stutter. When one is talking, one does normally not explicitly perceive the flow or motion of the act of talking, nor continuity of experience, but there is a tacit feeling of their presence, that we usually become aware of only when it is lost. When words cannot be expressed, as our body betrays us, a feeling of broken continuity arises, a feeling of doubt. This is the so called instant bodily doubt. When one experiences a multitude of instant doubts, that may lead to potential bodily doubt, a fear of bodily doubt will come. As stuttering is a completely involuntary action, that kind of fear is possible.</p><p>When I sit alone in my room and deliberately start to speak aloud the words that I am writing right now, I cannot get myself to express any of my stuttering symptoms. When I am talking on the phone, at the conference or I am having a casual conversation, the likelihood of possible stutters increases. But still, the moment when I may start to stutter is highly unpredictable, hence the uncertainty is present even when everything runs without problems. As one may not want to experience that kind of doubt again, that may influence his future actions and experiences. One may start to avoid public speaking or any kind of a communication situation. One may feel excluded from the society, just because bigger effort has to be put in doing something so basic, like talking. If one is forced to to talk very slowly in order to avoid interruptions the feeling of a detachment from own words, and consequently the body, may appear.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>In this essay I examined notions of bodily certainty and uncertainty. I introduced Carel’s and Ratcliffe’s proposals of studying pathologies that reveal certain kinds of bodily uncertainty to get closer to what is tacit feeling of bodily certainty. As an occasional stutterer, I used a first person approach to help myself understand what bodily doubt could be. I found out that a lot of things said about somatic or mental illness and their connection to experience of bodily doubt may also apply to other kind of disorders, such as stuttering. The loss of continuity and loss of faith in one’s body are some of them. There are various kinds of bodily doubt, that are differing in intensity, duration and specificity (Carel 2013, e.g.184). The kind of bodily doubt associated with stuttering may sure differ from one associated with paralysis or schizophrenia, but there are enough common ground to suggest that they are all different degrees of the same umbrella concept of bodily doubt. What these examples show is that our bodily certainty is much more vulnerable that one might suppose and cannot be disturbed only with serious illnesses, but also with a broader range of dysfunctions. The effect of different degrees of bodily doubt remains open to discussion.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><ul><li>Carel, H. 2013. Bodily doubt.<em> Journal of Consciousness Studies 20</em> (7–8) 178–97.</li><li>Husserl, E. 1931 (1950/1999). <em>Cartesian Meditations</em>. Dordrecht: Kluwer.</li><li>Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945 (2012). <em>Phenomenology of perception</em>. Trans. D.A. Landes. Oxon: Routledge.</li><li>Ratcliffe, M. 2008. <em>Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e58c6ae6491" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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