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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Farid Kasi on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Farid Kasi on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@faridoonkasi?source=rss-892e5bc914c5------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Farid Kasi on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@faridoonkasi?source=rss-892e5bc914c5------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Highway of Fear]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@faridoonkasi/highway-of-fear-9a033a676651?source=rss-892e5bc914c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9a033a676651</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[smuggling]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[balochistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[highway]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[insurgency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gawadar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Farid Kasi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 05:06:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-13T05:06:48.625Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FW-FQC90DN1zUWToe43VWQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Highway of Fear</strong></p><p>The bus was ready to depart from Quetta as the call to prayer faded. Summer had fully arrived in the mountains, and the heat had seeped into everything — the seats, the windows, and the patience of those standing outside. The sky above the barren peaks remained dark, clinging to the night’s last coolness. By the time the last passengers had found their seats, the air inside was already close and stale, the vinyl seats warm and faintly tacky. A ceiling fan at the front turned slowly, without conviction, pushing the same hot air from one side of the bus to the other. Someone had hung a small air freshener from the overhead rack — pine-scented, melted almost to nothing — and it swayed as the engine shuddered to life, its fragrance long since surrendered to the heat.</p><p>Outside, Quetta remained half-asleep. A few shopkeepers began opening their shutters along Sariab Road, moving slowly in the summer heat. The mountains looked dark and imposing against a sky just beginning to lighten, embodying a grey morning that offered no warmth or optimism. Dust drifted through the bus terminal in shimmering sheets of gold as passengers rushed to catch their buses. Tea sellers shouted over the noise of engines. Porters carried sacks of wheat flour and plastic-wrapped boxes toward heavily loaded coaches bound for the south. A spotless white bus was ready for the twelve-hour trip to Gwadar.</p><p>The driver, Karim Baloch, stood beside the vehicle, smoking quietly. A man shaped by the road. In his late forties, with sunburned skin and deep lines around his eyes, he carried the tired calm of someone who had spent half his life behind the wheel. His thick mustache had begun to grey, and his hands were rough from years of gripping the wheel on dusty truck routes through Balochistan’s harsh terrain. He spoke little, preferring long silences broken only by the crackle of cigarettes and the hum of the engine. He had driven the Quetta-Gwadar route for nearly fifteen years and could easily sense danger in the road’s mood. Karim looked at his watch, crushed the cigarette under his shoe, and climbed into his seat. All was set to hit the highway of fear. Nothing looked unusual, and that somehow worried him even more. Karim knew the road well enough to know that no two nights were the same. On certain nights, the highway seemed vibrant — filled with trucks, buses, fuel tankers, zamyad convoys, and police escorts. On others, it looked deserted, as if the mountains were warning travelers to stay away.</p><p>Inside the bus, fifty-four passengers sat. All different yet bound by the apprehension and uncertainty they carried. Most would remain strangers to one another — faces briefly caught in the dim cabin light, names forgotten by journey’s end. But a few were harder to overlook. Their stories seemed to carry pieces of Balochistan. They had boarded the same bus for different reasons. Yet each, in his own way, carried something of the province’s present condition — its ambitions, anxieties, stubborn routines, and the uncertainty that had become part of life on the road.</p><p>Sameer was quiet and restless, the kind of university student who carried more ambition in his eyes than confidence in his voice as he returned to Gawadar after his exams. The widow traveling to Pasni to see her pregnant daughter, married to an Army Sepoy, spoke softly and prayed under her breath, clutching the edge of her shawl as though it connected her to the family she missed. The three laborers heading toward Gwadar Port were exhausted yet cheerful, masking their uncertainty with constant jokes and loud laughter. The schoolteacher, thin and absent-minded, guarded his broken laptop in a tattered carry bag with unusual care, treating it like a treasure gathered over a lifetime. Beside them sat the two traders, sharp-eyed and practical, quietly discussing prices and profits as if every kilometer of the highway carried the weight of gain or loss. Near the back, Hamza Ali, a journalist from Karachi, sat, observing every passenger with utmost curiosity.</p><p>Hamza had traveled to Balochistan to report on trade routes and economic connectivity, knowing that trade and economic activity could survive only where highways and connectivity corridors remained secure. But beneath the surface of his assignment, he was searching for the truth about why the province’s roads had become paths of fear.</p><p>As the bus pulled out of Quetta, the city shrank behind them until it was nothing but dust and distance. Ahead lay hundreds of kilometers of darkness, mountains, and uncertainty. For nearly an hour, nobody spoke much, as if someone were watching them. Passengers watched videos on their phones in silence, avoiding each other, or stared out the window. The atmosphere shifted only after the first checkpoint outside Mastung, where soldiers checked ID cards under the clear sky while armed personnel scanned the hills along the road.</p><p>“Where are you going?” a soldier asked Hamza.</p><p>“Gwadar.” “Journalist?” Hamza nodded. The soldier handed the card back. “Travel carefully,” he said quietly. The bus moved again.</p><p>Sameer laughed nervously.</p><p>“In Balochistan,” he said, “that’s the official farewell phrase.”</p><p>Travel carefully. Not goodbye. Not a safe journey. Travel carefully. Hamza opened his notebook.</p><p>“What scares people more?” he asked.</p><p>“The checkpoints, both by the militants and the state,” Sameer replied immediately. Then he paused. And the silence. Then, under his breath, he added, “I am not sure.” He looked out the window as if avoiding him.</p><p>Outside, the mountains rose like apocalyptic black walls along the highway. For years, insurgency and terrorism had transformed Balochistan’s roads into contested territory. Armed groups attacked security convoys, passenger buses, rail lines, and highways linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Entire routes were sometimes temporarily blocked by armed militants to show that, despite military deployments, the state still struggled to maintain uninterrupted control over remote regions. The attacks had consequences far beyond security statistics. Truckers refused to take certain routes after sunset. Passenger buses traveled in fear. Fuel and transport costs rose. Investors hesitated. Families worried whenever relatives set out on long road trips across the province. Even tribal leaders no longer traveled with confidence.</p><p>After nearly three hours on the road, we stopped at a small tea stall near Kalat around nine in the morning. The summer sun was already warming the highway. As we sipped our tea, two white pickup trucks pulled up beside the stall. Armed men stepped out first, rifles slung over their shoulders. Their eyes darted constantly — at the road, the hills, and the faces inside the stall. An old man stepped out of the vehicle.</p><p>He wore a dark brown shalwar kameez, with a light-colored waistcoat draped over his slender shoulders. His beard was silver. His face looked calm, but the guards around him moved with nervous discipline. One stayed near the vehicles, and another stood facing the highway. The old man sat in silence on the wooden bench.</p><p>Hamza saw his chance. He carried his tea over and greeted him politely. The old man introduced himself only as <em>Mir Baloch</em>. Nothing more.</p><p>Later, Karim leaned closer and whispered:</p><p>“Big tribal family from southern Balochistan.”</p><p>Hamza glanced toward the armed guards.</p><p>“You travel with robust security?” he asked cautiously.</p><p>A faint smile tugged at the old man’s face.</p><p>“Everyone travels with guards now.”</p><p>One of the gunmen adjusted the rifle on his shoulder and stared down the empty highway, as if expecting something to emerge from the mountains.</p><p>Mir Sahib stirred spoonful after spoonful of sugar into his tea.</p><p>“Ten years ago,” he said quietly, “a sardar could cross these roads on the strength of respect alone.”</p><p>He looked toward the silent hills.</p><p>“Now even tribal chiefs avoid driving after dark.”</p><p>A pause.</p><p>“Some no longer travel by road.”</p><p>That truth revealed a deeper crisis unfolding across Balochistan. Traditionally, tribal leaders and sardars embodied authority, influence, and stability in many rural areas. Even the fear of traveling on highways without armed protection showed how deeply insecurity had permeated daily life. Roads that once connected tribes and towns and served as trade routes had become psychological frontiers, and fear now governed every movement.</p><p>After Mir Sahab left, Karim sat next to Hamza, who was taking notes. In a whisper, Karim asked Hamza</p><p>“You’re writing about security?”</p><p>“Yes,” Hamza replied cautiously.</p><p>“Then write honestly,” Karim replied. “The government thinks roads are protected by checkpoints and unchecked scrutiny, but roads are protected when people trust the state and stop fearing insurgents.” He spat. “Trust cannot be imposed; it grows only when it is earned.” He walked towards the bus, climbed into the driver’s seat, and shouted, “Come on! “No time left. We are late.</p><p>While seated, Hamza realized everyone in Balochistan spoke about roads differently than people elsewhere in Pakistan. In Lahore or Karachi, roads meant convenience. In Balochistan, roads meant survival.</p><p>The bus eased past another convoy — three Zamyad pickups, heavy on their axles, their flatbeds stacked with blue plastic jerrycans lashed beneath torn tarpaulins that hid nothing. No one spoke of what they carried. The drivers kept their eyes ahead, and the men beside them kept their hands in their laps.</p><p>Sameer leaned closer to Hamza and lowered his voice.</p><p>“That’s petrol,” he murmured. “Smuggled petrol.”</p><p>Hamza glanced through the window as another pickup rumbled past them. “And they’re just driving it down the main road?”</p><p>Sameer gave a humorless smile. “That’s the strange part. They can travel these roads without anyone stopping them. Convoy after convoy.” He looked ahead, where the pickups were already disappearing into the dust. “But an ordinary man? He gets stopped at every checkpoint, questioned about where he’s going, where he’s coming from, and what’s in his bag.”</p><p>Hamza watched the last truck vanish around a bend.</p><p>“So, everyone knows?”</p><p>“Everyone knows,” Sameer said quietly. “That’s why no one asks.”</p><p>Behind them, at a distance neither close enough to escort nor far enough to be coincidental, a column of army Land Cruisers rolled south, their antennas whipping in the dry wind; the soldiers were invisible behind tinted glass. The road belonged to everyone and no one. The fear was not loud. It lived in the pauses — in the way passengers stopped mid-sentence when a helicopter crossed the ridgeline, its rotors beating a slow pulse before the mountains swallowed the sound.</p><p>A loud mobile ringtone broke the silence. Karim’s phone was ringing. He answered without slowing down, wedging the handset between his ear and shoulder, speaker on. He gave the call no restraint it deserved. His voice filled the bus — loud, unconcerned with who was listening.</p><p>“Hello? Where are you?” he asked in a rough Brahvi accent.</p><p>“I’m near Kalat,” Karim replied. “Listen, the Khuzdar road has been blocked for the last two hours.”</p><p>“What happened?” Karim asked confusingly</p><p>“The insurgents stopped three trucks on the road.”</p><p>“Three trucks?”</p><p>“Are you sure?”</p><p>“That’s what I’ve been told.” The other man replied.</p><p>He laughed at something the other person said, a short, hard laugh, and then the call ended. He tossed the phone onto the dashboard, where it slid against the cracked windshield before coming to rest.</p><p>After that, tension mounted inside the bus. A rumor passed quietly from seat to seat — that another route farther south had been blocked for several hours just a few hours earlier. Nobody knew whether it was true, but it carried a strange fear, as if our route were next. In Balochistan, rumors spread faster than facts, and facts were rarely better than rumors.</p><p>The widow traveling to Pasni tightened her grip on her beads and recited her prayers a little faster, her lips barely moving. Sameer pretended to sleep but kept checking his phone for a signal — one bar, then none, then one again — the screen casting a pale light across his face each time. The man in the seat ahead of him stared at the headrest in front of him as if reading something written there. Outside, the dust continued to rise and settle, indifferent to it all.</p><p>Hamza stared through the window and began to grasp the scale of Pakistan’s challenge. Balochistan had always been difficult to control. Long before the insurgency, the land itself resisted control. Mountains stretched in every direction, and deserts swallowed the highways between towns. Phone signals vanished without warning, and if something happened on the road, help was hours away — if it came at all. The militants knew the terrain better than anyone. They didn’t need cities. They didn’t need to hold territory. Fear was enough. A burned truck. A blocked road. An ambush of a convoy. By morning, it would be on every news channel in the country. The real target was never the vehicles. It was the roads. Highways meant trade, connectivity, and the state’s presence in places where authority already felt thin. Every attack carried the same message: <em>we are still here.</em></p><p>The government responded with checkpoints, troop deployments, and armed escorts. But Balochistan was too vast. Thousands of kilometers of empty terrain could not be monitored every hour of every night. That was why some highways fell silent after dark. Not because they were dangerous, but because even the state no longer fully trusted them.</p><p>Near Basima, the bus slowed without warning, and the passengers stiffened almost as one, their bodies registering the danger before their minds caught up. Through the dusty glass, two Frontier Corps vehicles had blocked part of the road, their engines idling in the heat as soldiers moved around a stranded truck with the slow, methodical patience of men who had done this many times. Armed personnel stood at the edges of the hardtop, scanning the hills. The light was flat and merciless, revealing nothing. No one spoke.</p><p>After several long minutes, they waved the convoy through. The bus groaned back up to speed, and only then did Karim lean toward Hamza. “You know what the real problem is?” he said quietly. “The roads connect the towns, but nothing connects the people.” Hamza didn’t respond. He just took out his notebook and wrote it down, because it was the kind of sentence that felt true the moment you heard it and truer still the longer you sat with it.</p><p>Balochistan today stands at the center of Pakistan’s regional connectivity ambitions. Gwadar Port, CPEC infrastructure, border trade with Iran, and potential transit routes linking South Asia to the Middle East and Central Asia all depend on secure highways. That importance could increase dramatically if tensions between Iran and the West ease further. Across policy circles in Islamabad, many officials quietly recognize that any long-term peace arrangement with Iran or regional normalization could fundamentally transform Balochistan’s strategic value. Expanding trade corridors linking Gwadar, Karachi, Taftan, Gabd, and Iranian border crossings could turn Balochistan into one of South Asia’s most important commercial gateways. Roads currently associated with insecurity could eventually become arteries for regional commerce, energy pipelines, and international transport. But none of that can happen without security. If Iran stabilizes economically and regional sanctions ease over time, trade volumes through Balochistan could rise dramatically. Energy corridors, cargo routes, and transit markets could link Pakistan not only to Iran but also, eventually, to Turkey, Central Asia, and Europe. Discussions about the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline have already underscored the importance of these routes to Pakistan’s economy and energy security. In such a future, insecure highways would be more than a provincial problem; they would be a national economic liability.</p><p>A retired bureaucrat in Quetta once put the issue bluntly:</p><p><em>“If the wider region stabilizes while Balochistan remains insecure, Pakistan risks missing the trade and economic opportunities that regional peace could bring.”</em></p><p>Securing Balochistan’s highways now is not solely a counterterrorism matter. It is about preparing for the future geography of trade. Balochistan’s highway security crisis requires more than additional checkpoints and personnel. But strategies drawn on maps and written in briefing rooms can make the road look deceptively simple. From above, a highway is a line — something to secure, patrol, monitor, and keep open. On the ground, it is something else entirely. It cuts through settlements where promises have accumulated faster than opportunities, past villages that watch convoys and cargo disappear toward distant destinations, and through communities for whom the language of corridors and connectivity can feel strangely remote. Somewhere between the security post and the next bend in the asphalt, the question shifts. It is no longer only who controls the road, but who believes they have a stake in it.</p><p>That question followed me into the night. At a tea stop somewhere after sunset — a roadside shack with a single bulb swinging in the wind and a boy too young to be awake pouring chai into cracked glasses — a schoolteacher who had been sitting near the front made his way over to Hamza and sat down. He had been teaching in the district for eleven years, he said. He knew the roads. “You’re a journalist?” he asked. “Yes.” He nodded slowly, as if that explained something. “Then go and ask those people what development actually reached them,” he said, gesturing toward a cluster of dark shapes on the hillside that might have been a village. “Ask how many jobs came from these highways. Ask whether the schools improved. Ask whether anything changed at all, or whether the road just made it easier for others to pass through.” He paused. “People protect roads when they believe the roads belong to them, too.”</p><p>It was not a new argument. Researchers, development economists, and local officials had been making similar points for decades. But sitting on a plastic stool at four in the morning, somewhere between Khuzdar and the coast, with the sound of an unseen highway checkpoint humming in the distance, it did not sound like an argument. It sounded like a fact that had simply never been acted on, because the data supported it. Where communities had stakes in infrastructure — through local employment, functional schools near the highway, and some visible return — incidents dropped. Where they did not, the road remained someone else’s project, passing through land that had never been asked for permission.</p><p>By the time the bus crested the final ridge, the last of the light had already left the water. The Arabian Sea lay dark and flat below, its surface catching nothing, giving nothing back — just an absence where the desert ended. The sea appeared as it always does in this part of the world, without warning or transition, as if the land had simply run out of reasons to continue.</p><p>Below, Gwadar had settled into its nighttime self. The construction cranes stood motionless against a sky still faintly bruised at the horizon, their arms reaching over half-finished towers whose exposed steel frames had lost the day’s warmth and now held only shadow. The port road was lit in intervals — pools of sodium light with long stretches of darkness between them — and along it, security patrols moved slowly, their headlights sweeping the verges in the unhurried way of men who expected nothing yet remained watchful anyway. It looked less like a city than like an ambition someone had left out in the heat too long.</p><p>Karim eased the bus to a stop near the terminal, cut the engine, and for a moment no one moved, as if the journey needed a few seconds of silence before it could officially end. Then Sameer exhaled and said, “We made it,” with the particular relief of a man who had not been entirely sure he would. Karim didn’t smile. He looked back through the cracked rear window at the highway dissolving into the darkening mountains behind them, the road already swallowing itself in shadow.</p><p>Hamza was the last to leave. He stood on the curb, his notebook under his arm, looking back the way they had come — that long, contested road through the mountains, past checkpoints and convoys, roadside shacks, and the silences that said more than anyone was willing to say. It carried everything at once: fear and ambition, insurgency and trade, memory and possibility, the weight of a state still trying to hold itself together across impossible distances. Somewhere back up that road, a truck driver was memorizing a dangerous stretch by heart. A widow was still traveling. A teacher was returning to a classroom the highway had never quite reached. And perhaps what happened next in Pakistan would depend on which of those things arrived at the destination first.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9a033a676651" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sardar and Sarkar: The Story of Balochistan]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@faridoonkasi/sardar-and-sarkar-the-story-of-balochistan-f0df650b40b4?source=rss-892e5bc914c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f0df650b40b4</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Farid Kasi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 16 Aug 2026 05:19:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-16T05:19:09.346Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_coRPsKvyQV_p_jqCBA1-A.png" /><figcaption>Sardar and Sarkar</figcaption></figure><p>Whenever Balochistan’s underdevelopment is discussed, the main explanation often points to the Sardars. It is claimed that tribal leaders oppose education, hinder progress, resist modern ideas, and keep their people impoverished to maintain their hereditary dominance. This criticism contains some truth — centralized political authority, whether tribal, feudal, or bureaucratic, can indeed impede democratic growth. However, attributing Balochistan’s complex political issues solely to tribal chiefs’ ambitions is both a historical oversimplification and a political convenience. A more challenging question warrants consideration. If Sardars have been the greatest obstacle to Balochistan’s development, why have successive governments repeatedly relied on them to govern the province?</p><p>The answer traces a historical continuity from British colonial rule to the present. The Sardari system predates British rule; tribal chiefs existed long before colonial influence, making it inaccurate to claim otherwise. However, colonialism significantly altered what it meant to be a Sardar. In the 1800s, British administrators faced a major strategic challenge. Balochistan was large, mountainous, sparsely populated, and costly to administer directly. Rather than creating representative institutions or a full bureaucratic system, they opted for a cost-effective approach: ruling through local intermediaries.</p><p>Under Sir Robert Sandeman’s indirect rule system, Sardars who cooperated were officially recognized, received financial support, and gained political influence in exchange for maintaining order and safeguarding imperial interests. Tribal authority was no longer based solely on internal tribal relationships; the colonial government’s resources and legitimacy now supported it. This transformation was significant. The British did not create the Sardar; they redefined his political authority.</p><p>Rather than fostering direct engagement between citizens and public institutions, colonial rule promoted a hierarchical system in which common tribespeople often accessed the state through hereditary intermediaries. The Sardar served as a conduit between the government and society. This arrangement greatly benefited imperial interests. Although the empire dissolved in 1947, much of this political structure persisted.</p><p>Pakistan inherited a province with weak representative institutions, limited administrative capacity, and influential tribal families who dominated the interface between the state and the people. The new government faced a dilemma: to gradually establish accountable institutions or to continue relying on established local elites. Time and again, political convenience led to the latter choice.</p><p>Although the Sardari system was officially abolished in 1976, dismantling its underlying political economy proved far more difficult. Laws can revoke formal recognition, but they cannot eliminate family ties, patronage networks, electoral machines, or privileged access to government. This creates one of Pakistan’s most persistent political contradictions.</p><p>Governments often criticize Sardars as symbols of backwardness, yet they also incorporate them into political parties, appoint them to ministerial positions, and rely on their support as influential electables. The continued prominence of tribal elites is also evident in the composition of provincial governments. For example, when Balochistan’s cabinet was expanded in 2013 under Chief Minister Dr Abdul Malik Baloch — himself widely presented as a middle-class alternative to traditional tribal politics — <em>Dawn</em> reported that 11 of the 14 cabinet members were tribal chieftains or feudal figures. This is a striking illustration of the structural nature of the problem. Even when the chief minister did not personally belong to the traditional Sardari establishment, coalition politics still produced a government heavily populated by established tribal elites. The issue, therefore, cannot be reduced to whether a particular chief minister supports or opposes Sardari politics. Rather, the political system itself rewards individuals capable of delivering constituencies.</p><p>Traditional authority has become closely linked to electoral democracy. Today, a hereditary chief can also serve as an MPA, senator, federal minister, or party leader. While the title remains traditional, the systems of power have modernized. Many debates about the Sardari system overlook the core issue: the enduring power of tribal elites is not solely due to tribal culture but is also sustained by state patronage.</p><p>Development funds, public contracts, government employment, administrative access, and political appointments become sources of influence when citizens view state access as dependent on personal connections rather than impartial institutions. A road built through transparent public planning boosts trust in government. Conversely, a road seen as the personal success of a powerful politician elevates that politician’s status. The same principle applies to schools, hospitals, jobs, and development programs. When institutions are weak and influential intermediaries control access, public resources become political capital.</p><p>This establishes a self-perpetuating cycle: local influence leads to electoral success, which grants access to state resources. Those resources then bolster local influence, perpetuating the cycle.</p><p>Ironically, democratic elections sometimes strengthen hereditary power when political parties prioritize influential “electables” over building grassroots organizations. Rather than nurturing new leaders, parties often bring in seasoned power brokers with already strong local influence. However, the state’s interactions with Sardars have never been consistently cooperative.</p><p>Some of Pakistan’s most intense conflicts have centered on tribal leaders. Prominent Sardars have defied the state, participated in nationalist movements, and led armed resistance, while others have collaborated with governments. The key point is not that every Sardar has always supported Islamabad. Instead, the overarching pattern is structural: governments often find it politically advantageous to rely on selected intermediaries rather than develop institutions that could eventually bypass them.</p><p>This pattern goes beyond typical politics and into counterinsurgency. Over the past twenty years, Pakistan has sometimes relied not only on cooperative tribal leaders but also on rival local elites, politically connected businessmen, contractors, and other influential figures who can gather intelligence, influence local communities, or oppose insurgents. From a tactical standpoint, this makes sense. Local actors have insights that distant government agencies and security forces often miss. However, focusing on immediate tactical gains can lead to strategic drawbacks.</p><p>When authority relies more on patronage, political protection, or coercion than on accountable institutions, weakening one intermediary often leads to the rise of another. Instead of replacing hereditary power with democratic governance, the political scene splinters into competing centers of influence — tribal chiefs, politicians, contractors, businessmen, armed groups, and security-linked figures. The state may diminish a Sardar without enhancing citizenship, and this distinction is significant. It also reveals the flaw in the widespread narrative that blames Balochistan’s issues mainly on tribal leadership.</p><p>If Sardars alone explain the province’s underdevelopment, how does one account for persistent deprivation in areas where traditional Sardari structures are relatively weak? Why has insurgency spread to regions where classical tribal organization is less dominant? And why have successive governments continued to rely on influential tribal and non-tribal intermediaries if such politics supposedly belongs only to the past?</p><p>These questions indicate that the issue extends beyond the actions of individual Sardars and is rooted in institutions. The true alternative to the Sardari system is not a different elite, whether bureaucratic, military, commercial, or partisan, but the development of democratic institutions. Strong local governments, a professional civilian administration, independent courts, transparent development spending, universal education, merit-based public employment, and broader economic opportunities would gradually reduce citizens’ dependence on hereditary patrons and politically connected intermediaries. History shows that entrenched systems rarely disappear because governments resist them; rather, they decline when the institutions that support them are replaced.</p><p>The tragedy of Balochistan is not only that hereditary elites have endured colonial rule but also that the political logic that supports them persists. For more than a century, governments have repeatedly relied on governing through intermediaries, which they considered easier than empowering citizens directly. British officials called this approach indirect rule. Even after independence, Pakistan has frequently used similar methods, publicly denouncing these structures while continuing to implement them in practice.</p><p>Until that contradiction is addressed, attributing Balochistan’s democratic shortcomings solely to Sardars offers only a partial explanation. The real issue is no longer why Sardars continue to hold influence; it is why the institutions meant to supplant them have not yet done so.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f0df650b40b4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Jäger’s Hyperpolitics, Pakistan and the Case for Balochistan.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@faridoonkasi/j%C3%A4gers-hyperpolitics-pakistan-and-the-case-for-balochistan-e057d69660c5?source=rss-892e5bc914c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e057d69660c5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Farid Kasi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2026 05:26:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-09T05:47:03.711Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>Farid Kasi</strong></h4><p>Pakistan is hardly an apolitical society; politics enters drawing rooms, universities, workplaces, tea shops, and family WhatsApp groups. Elections are fiercely contested, and political rallies can draw enormous crowds. Television programs dissect politicians’ statements every evening, while YouTube, TikTok, WhatsApp, and X allow political arguments to continue long after television screens are switched off. Political leaders become cultural figures; speeches become memes; court hearings become national spectacles; arrests become political events; and controversies that might once have remained within parliamentary or journalistic circles can become national conversations within hours.</p><p><strong>Anton Jäger’s Hyperpolitics: Extreme Politicization without Political Consequences opens with a paradox that feels strikingly familiar in contemporary Pakistan: politics seems to be everywhere, yet meaningful political change often seems extraordinarily difficult to achieve.</strong></p><p>Jäger describes a historical transition from an earlier era of mass politics, in which political participation was embedded in durable organizations such as political parties, trade unions, and civic associations, to a hyperpolitical age marked by intense yet fragmented mobilization. In this new environment, politics is emotionally charged and constantly visible, yet the organizational structures that translate political passion into lasting power have weakened. Public life becomes saturated with protest, spectacle, culture wars, and viral outrage, while collective action often struggles to achieve institutional durability.</p><p>Consider the experience of an ordinary, politically engaged Pakistani citizen. A person may begin the day by reading political messages on WhatsApp, encounter a politician’s speech on TikTok, watch a YouTube commentator discuss the establishment or the opposition, argue about politics with colleagues, follow developments from a court hearing on X, watch a television talk show in the evening, and end the day discussing the government with family members. That person has spent a considerable portion of the day being politically engaged. But this does not necessarily mean they belong to a political organization; they may never attend a local party meeting, join a trade union, contact their elected representative, follow the proceedings of a parliamentary committee, examine their provincial budget, attend a municipal meeting, or join an organized civic association. This distinction is crucial. Political consumption is not necessarily political organization.</p><p>Pakistan’s digital transformation has dramatically lowered the cost of political participation. A citizen no longer needs membership in a political organization to enter political debate; a smartphone is enough. This has democratizing potential: individuals previously excluded from mainstream media can communicate, criticize, and organize. But it can equally produce a political culture in which expressing an opinion begins to substitute for building an institution.</p><p>The rise of PTI demonstrates both sides of this transformation quite clearly. PTI and its supporters developed a highly sophisticated digital political ecosystem; X, TikTok, YouTube, WhatsApp, and other platforms became mechanisms through which political narratives could circulate, supporters could maintain political identification, and information could move beyond traditional media structures. This shows why online politics should not be dismissed as “slacktivism.” Digital networks can mobilize voters, raise funds, coordinate activists, and maintain political identities under difficult circumstances.</p><p><strong>But Jäger’s deeper question remains relevant: can this intensity be institutionalized to withstand individual personalities, electoral cycles, and moments of political crisis?</strong></p><p>The same question extends beyond PTI. Pakistan’s political parties frequently demonstrate impressive abilities to mobilize voters and supporters, yet comparatively less emphasis is placed on internal party democracy, continuous membership structures, policy development, and institutionalized participation between elections. Politics consequently becomes more personalized. Instead of debates over institutional design, political discussion often centers on Imran Khan, Nawaz Sharif, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the government, the judiciary, or the military leadership. Complicated structural questions are reduced to conflicts between personalities. Issues such as education reform, tax collection, local-government capacity, water management, judicial delays, police reform, and energy-sector governance require sustained institutional work over many years. Hyperpolitical media environments, however, reward immediacy.</p><p>A controversial statement appears in the morning. By afternoon, it is trending. By evening, television programs and YouTube channels are discussing it. Supporters and opponents mobilize around competing interpretations. Within days, another controversy replaces it. Pakistan therefore experiences something close to Jäger’s central paradox:</p><p><strong>High political attention does not automatically produce high institutional capacity.</strong></p><p><strong>From Mass Politics to Mobilization.</strong></p><p>Pakistan’s history offers useful contrasts. Earlier political movements often relied on organizational infrastructures that extended beyond the immediate political moment. The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy during General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule relied on political parties and activists capable of sustaining resistance over time. The Lawyers’ Movement of 2007–09 likewise relied on bar associations, professional networks, and physical organization. These movements were certainly influenced by personalities and the media, but they also had institutional anchors.</p><p><strong>The distinction lies between mobilization and organization.</strong> Mobilization can happen quickly. A speech, arrest, election result, or controversial decision can bring thousands of people into the streets. Organization is slower and requires membership, leadership development, resources, local structures, decision-making procedures, continuity, and the ability to remain active even when public attention shifts elsewhere.</p><p>This gives us a useful sequence.</p><p><strong>Political grievance → public attention → mobilization → organization → bargaining power → institutional change.</strong></p><p>Hyperpolitics can greatly accelerate the first three stages while doing much less to ensure the final three. This distinction becomes even more important as we move away from Pakistan’s political center toward its peripheries. Nowhere is the framework more complicated than in Balochistan.</p><p><strong>Balochistan: Beyond the Social-Media Explanation</strong></p><p>Applying Hyperpolitics to Balochistan requires caution.</p><p>The province cannot be understood simply as another example of citizens becoming overly political on social media. Its contemporary conflicts are rooted in a much longer history that encompasses Baloch nationalism, questions of accession and federal integration, provincial autonomy, natural resources, development, political representation, and the relationship between the province and Pakistan’s central and security institutions. Baloch nationalist insurgencies have occurred in several historical periods since Pakistan’s creation, and the current phase dates to the early 2000s. Even the Balochistan provincial government’s historical account identifies uprisings in 1948, 1958–59, 1962–63, and 1973–77, followed by the current insurgency that began in the early twenty-first century. Therefore, contemporary Baloch political discontent cannot be explained by TikTok, X, or twenty-first-century polarization alone.</p><p><strong>Rather, Jäger’s framework proves useful at a different level: the relationship between political expression and political consequence.</strong></p><p>Balochistan contains multiple forms of politics simultaneously. There is parliamentary politics through provincial and national institutions. There are mainstream and nationalist political parties. There is student activism. There are peaceful protest movements. There are campaigns addressing enforced disappearances and human rights violations. There are tribal and local political structures. There is digital activism. And separately, there is an armed separatist insurgency. These categories must not be collapsed into each other. A peaceful activist seeking information about a missing relative is not automatically affiliated with an armed organization. A Baloch nationalist participating in constitutional politics is not automatically an insurgent. Similarly, recognizing political grievances does not require legitimizing militant violence against civilians. Maintaining these distinctions is essential to serious analysis.</p><p><strong>Voice, Visibility and Political Power</strong></p><p>Balochistan introduces another dimension to hyperpolitics: <strong>political attention is unevenly distributed.</strong> Pakistan may be saturated with politics nationally while still paying relatively little sustained attention to political questions from peripheral regions. A statement by a major national political leader can dominate television and social media for days. Meanwhile, questions about water, employment, education, border trade, local government, resource distribution, or infrastructure in a Baloch district may struggle to attract sustained national attention. This creates an unusual paradox: <strong>there can be simultaneously too much politics and too little attention.</strong></p><p>From Islamabad or Lahore, Pakistan can seem hyperpoliticized. In parts of Balochistan, the problem may instead be that certain political concerns become nationally visible only during a major protest, security incident, or militant attack. Digital media can partially disrupt this imbalance. A smartphone allows activists in Turbat, Gwadar, or Quetta to reach audiences far beyond their immediate geographic surroundings. Political movements no longer depend entirely on national television networks for visibility. But visibility and power are not the same thing. A viral video can attract attention. A hashtag can foster solidarity. A protest can express anger. None of these automatically produces institutional bargaining power. This is where Jäger’s distinction is particularly valuable.</p><p><strong>When Mobilization Meets Securitization</strong></p><p>In Balochistan, however, the gap between mobilization and institutional consequences has an additional dimension: <strong>Security.</strong></p><p>The province has experienced a protracted armed insurgency, and militant organizations have attacked security forces, infrastructure, and civilians. The conflict remains active. Recent attacks and counterinsurgency operations demonstrate that separatist militancy continues to pose a serious security challenge. The insurgency therefore cannot be reduced to “hyperpolitics.” It predates Jäger’s contemporary political condition and has its own history, organizations, ideologies, and strategic objectives. Nevertheless, hyperpolitics helps illuminate one aspect of the environment surrounding the conflict.</p><p>Imagine a recurring political sequence:</p><p><strong>Grievance → protest → confrontation → public attention → limited perceived resolution → another grievance → another protest.</strong></p><p><strong>If communities repeatedly experience political mobilization without believing that institutions produce meaningful outcomes, confidence in institutional politics can erode.</strong></p><p>This does not mean that a grievance automatically creates an insurgency. The overwhelming majority of people experiencing political frustration do not become militants. Nor does the existence of legitimate grievances justify violence against civilians. However, insurgent organizations can exploit environments of alienation.</p><p>The dangerous question therefore becomes:</p><p><strong>What happens when some citizens cease to believe that conventional political institutions can produce meaningful political consequences?</strong></p><p>Possible responses vary widely. Some people withdraw from politics. Others become more active in constitutional parties. Some join peaceful protest movements. Some embrace stronger forms of nationalism. A much smaller number may become receptive to armed organizations.</p><p>The challenge is that insurgent violence can trigger a self-reinforcing political cycle.</p><p><strong>Political grievance→ declining institutional trust→ mobilization→ perceived repression or lack of resolution→ deeper alienation→ militant groups exploit grievances→ insurgent violence→ stronger security response→ greater securitization→ further mistrust and grievance.</strong></p><p>Once established, this cycle becomes extremely difficult to break.</p><p>The state faces a genuine security problem in Balochistan. Armed organizations have carried out serious attacks, including attacks against civilians and security personnel. Recent reporting indicates that some insurgent organizations have expanded their tactical capabilities. No state can simply ignore organized political violence. But a predominantly security-centered response carries its own political risks. When peaceful dissent, nationalist politics, human-rights activism, and armed separatism blur together in public discourse, the political middle can shrink. People who might otherwise participate through constitutional mechanisms can become more distrustful of those institutions.</p><p>This is why maintaining a clear distinction between dissent and militancy matters. The state faces the challenge of simultaneously protecting citizens from insurgent violence and preserving political space for nonviolent disagreement. In theoretical terms, the objective should be to increase the political consequences of peaceful politics. If citizens believe that peaceful organization, elections, courts, local government, journalism, parliamentary representation, and protest can produce meaningful results, institutional politics acquires credibility. If those mechanisms are widely perceived as ineffective, political frustration can accumulate outside institutions.</p><p><strong>Balochistan Changes Jäger’s Argument</strong></p><p>Jäger’s hyperpolitics is fundamentally concerned with societies in which political expression has become extraordinarily intense while organization has become thin. Balochistan suggests a more complicated formulation.</p><p>Here the issue is not simply:</p><p><strong>Too much politics + Too little organization.</strong></p><p>It can involve:</p><p><strong>Historical grievance + Intense political mobilization + Uneven national visibility + Weak institutional trust + Questions of representation + Securitization + Insurgent violence + Limited mechanisms for political settlement.</strong></p><p>The difference is important.</p><p>In a conventional hyperpolitical environment, the danger may be political exhaustion: people argue constantly but accomplish little. In a conflict-affected peripheral region, the gap between expression and consequence can have far more serious implications. If institutional politics loses credibility while armed organizations remain active, political alienation can intersect with insurgency.</p><p>At the same time, insurgency itself makes democratic politics more difficult. Militant attacks produce fear, justify increased security measures, constrain economic activity, and reinforce perceptions in the rest of Pakistan that Balochistan is primarily a security problem. The province can therefore become trapped between two narratives.</p><p>From one perspective:</p><p><strong>Balochistan is a security problem requiring state control.</strong></p><p>From another:</p><p><strong>Balochistan is a political problem requiring justice and representation.</strong></p><p>In reality, it encompasses both security and political dimensions and treating either as the entire story obscures the other.</p><p><strong>From Political Attention to Political Consequence</strong></p><p>This brings us back to Hyperpolitics. The central lesson for Pakistan is not that Pakistanis should become less political. Nor is the lesson for Balochistan that protest should disappear. The deeper question concerns the institutions that exist between anger and outcome.</p><p>For Pakistan, this generally means strengthening political parties as membership organizations rather than personality-based electoral machines; improving local government; encouraging meaningful parliamentary oversight; strengthening professional and civic associations; creating mechanisms for youth participation; and developing institutions capable of sustaining policy agendas beyond the lifespan of a trending controversy.</p><p>For Balochistan, the stakes are higher. The province requires credible mechanisms through which political disagreements over development, representation, resources, rights, provincial autonomy, and center-province relations can enter institutional politics and yield visible outcomes. Peaceful political participation needs to demonstrate that it can achieve tangible results.</p><p>This is ultimately where Jäger’s concept is most useful.</p><p><strong>Balochistan’s problem is certainly not an absence of political consciousness. Both are intensely political. The problem is the uncertain relationship between political voice, political organization and political power”.</strong></p><p>A society may contain millions of political opinions without strong political institutions. A province may mobilize on a large scale without gaining corresponding influence over decision-making. A movement may become internationally visible without achieving its immediate objectives. And a state may suppress individual manifestations of political instability without resolving the conditions that repeatedly reproduce them.</p><p>Hyperpolitics therefore gives us a vocabulary for describing a central contradiction in Pakistani politics:</p><p><strong>“Politics can become louder while institutions remain weak”.</strong></p><p>Balochistan pushes that argument further. There, the distance between political expression and political consequence coexists with historical grievances and an active insurgency. This makes institutional failure potentially more consequential. When peaceful politics is perceived as meaningful, disagreement can remain within politics. When political mechanisms lose credibility, the space for alienation, radicalization, and violent alternatives can expand — even though grievance itself should never be confused with support for militancy. The challenge, therefore, is not to depoliticize Pakistan or Balochistan. It is to institutionalize politics.</p><p>Pakistan needs mechanisms that can transform citizens from audiences into participants, supporters into members, outrage into organization, and mobilization into sustained democratic bargaining. Balochistan needs this even more urgently. The long-term question is whether its considerable political energy — particularly among younger generations — can find credible pathways through representation, accountable government, peaceful organization, and meaningful federal negotiation rather than repeatedly cycling between grievance, protest, securitization, and violence.</p><p>Perhaps the most useful way to translate Jäger’s thesis into the Pakistani context is as follows:</p><p><strong>“Pakistan suffers not from too little politics but from a recurring inability to translate enormous political intensity into durable institutional transformation. In Balochistan, this contradiction is even sharper: when longstanding grievances, limited institutional trust, and intense political mobilization coexist with insurgency and securitization, the gap between political voice and political consequence can become not merely frustrating but destabilizing. The answer to hyperpolitics is therefore not silence. It is the construction of institutions capable of making politics consequential”.</strong></p><h4><strong>The writer is a Storyteller and can be reached at faridoonkasi@gmail.com</strong></h4><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e057d69660c5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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