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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Farnam Partners on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Corporate Finance Concepts For Tech Businesses]]></title>
            <link>https://farnampartners.medium.com/corporate-finance-concepts-for-tech-businesses-29ff104dff8?source=rss-fc48a5960ddf------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[amazon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[warren-buffett]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Farnam Partners]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2020 05:40:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-20T05:40:28.023Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>This memo addresses some critical mental models in thinking about valuation for internet business models</strong></p><h3>Question: How are the following intangibles addressed in a traditional DCF?</h3><p>One of the most important questions in corporate finance is how should we correctly account for the qualitative factors which are often difficult (or impossible) to quantify but important in assessing an organisation’s ability to generate a growing stream of free cashflows. These include:</p><ul><li><strong>Pricing power </strong>— Effectively untapped earning potential that is unaccounted for</li><li><strong>Industry structure / competitive dynamics</strong></li><li><strong>Network / flywheel effects</strong></li><li><strong>‘Management &amp; culture’</strong> — Superior organizational culture, founder led mentality, management team aligned with shareholders, and strategic/shareholder friendly capital allocation</li><li><strong>Availability of new high NPV projects — provides high return on incremental invested capital</strong></li><li><strong>Size of (high ROIC) TAM </strong>— Determines duration of (high ROIC) growth</li></ul><p>Understanding these concepts is critical to correctly forecasting free cashflows and just as important (if not more so) than determining the intrinsic value on the basis of multiple of near-term earning. We must understand that accounting is just an abstraction of reality, it is a financial map that we have come up with to make sense of the world around us.</p><ul><li>We must remember that the <a href="https://fs.blog/2015/11/map-and-territory/">map is not the territory</a>, but a mere reductive abstraction of reality. Using a map requires us to understand the assumptions that underly such abstraction and under what circumstances such <a href="https://a16z.com/2019/10/02/map-terrain-cfo-and-ceo-relationship/">map is no longer an accurate abstraction of reality</a></li><li>Using the accounting ‘map’ that was drawn up centuries ago to navigate the current landscape of corporations means we are blind to the hidden ‘intangible value’ that play an increasing role in corporate outcomes</li></ul><h3>Concept 1: Positive feedback loops and the flywheel effect</h3><p>Traditionally, a flywheel is a spinning rotor used for storing kinetic energy. It takes a relatively large amount of energy to get started, but very little to keep it moving once it gets going.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/565/1*ChLu5ERPwiTkmxnOoHQQfQ.png" /><figcaption>Old School vs. New Flywheel (Courtesy of Hayden Capital)</figcaption></figure><p>In business, the “flywheel effect” concept is used to explain the notion of positive-feedback loops. The idea is once the business model gets momentum, output of the business (such as increased volume) directly leads to positive inputs (lower costs per unit), which leads to better outputs (lower costs = lower prices = more volume). This creates a “virtuous cycle”, with very little energy wasted and is very hard to stop once it gets going.</p><p>Hence the forward momentum of a business that is benefiting from a flywheel effect is often underappreciated, where upfront investment yields very little profit but once a critical point is reached the impact is quite large. The energy expended by a company in starting up a flywheel should be capitalised as an investment, rather than immediately expensed</p><p>For a company like Amazon, we have seen multiple inflection points in Amazon’s history:</p><ul><li>Investment in books allowed optionality to expand into broader eCommerce retail</li><li>Investment in 1P retail allowed Amazon to reach scale and expand into more profitable 3P retail</li><li>Investment in 3P retail allowed creation of advertising business</li><li>Investment in lean and scalable tech structure leading to Amazon Web Services</li><li>Investment in fulfilment is about to deliver significant value</li></ul><p>Whereas certain ‘traditional industrials’ type businesses were capital intensive and characterised by decreasing returns to scale, many tech-enabled internet business models are capital light and benefit from increasing returns to scale. The <a href="https://hbr.org/1996/07/increasing-returns-and-the-new-world-of-business">seminal work</a> by the father of complexity economics Brian Arthur (published in 1996) is helpful to understand this dynamic. Under a paradigm where a higher proportion of market capitalisation falls under this new paradigm of increasing returns to scale, the traditional ‘value investing’ framework of mean reversion (when applied to the aggregate market) become less effective</p><ul><li>Perhaps this explains the underperformance of ‘value’ as a stylistic factor, especially when applied to the US market where ‘tech/platform’ business models with increasing return to scale dynamics account for &gt; 1/3 of the capitalisation</li><li>In a market like Japan (and Europe?), where ‘traditional industrial’ companies are the majority, mean reversion is likely still a pertinent dynamic. Here, I would expect the ‘value’ factor and mean reversion framework to be faring much better (and continue to do so)</li></ul><h3>Concept 2: Pricing power and reinvestment rate</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/623/1*aFBjHPvaMn5avadRoHYR_Q.png" /><figcaption>Pricing Power and Return on Invested Capital Rate (Courtesy of Hayden Capital)</figcaption></figure><p>Amongst the myriad of qualitative factors that are overlooked by practitioners of ‘legacy value investing’, there are two that are of utmost importance worth highlighting:</p><p><strong>#1 — Pricing power:<br> <br> </strong><em>The </em><strong><em>single</em></strong><em> </em><strong><em>most</em></strong><em> important decision in evaluating a business is pricing power. If you’ve got the power to raise prices without losing business to a competitor, you’ve got a very good business. And if you have to have a prayer session before raising the price by a tenth of a cent, then you’ve got a terrible business.</em></p><p>- <strong>Warren Buffett</strong></p><ul><li>A commodity business may structurally only earn its cost structure difference vs the next most efficient competitor. Alternatively, a one-of-kind, mission-critical software provider (think Microsoft in 90’s) has enormous pricing power. They could raise prices up to the point where new customers = lost customers. For the last marginal customer in this scenario, the Price = Customer’s Marginal Utility</li><li>A company could be pricing its product far below the value-add to the customer in order to win market share and customer goodwill. But as customers start to depend upon a company’s products or services, the company has the ability to ask for more over time.</li><li>What if by raising the price, you can actually widen / increase the value for the customer (i.e. the Customer Value to Price ratio)? Such a price increase would actually accelerate the company’s growth. You can get “double benefits”, as price increases give the company more cash flow to reinvest into increasing the customer value, which attracts more customers / speeds up the growth rate, and thus generates even more cash (notice the flywheel effect in play here)</li><li>Growth through volume (because you provide the best product) is more sustainable than growth through pricing. And consistently reinvesting pricing increases into generating more customer value is the most sustainable “moat” of them all</li></ul><p><strong>#2 — Return on incremental invested capital / reinvestment rate:</strong></p><p><em>“Over the long term, it’s hard for a stock to earn a much better return than the business which underlies it earns. If the business earns 6% on capital over 40 years and you hold it for that 40 years, you’re not going to make much different than a 6% return — even if you originally buy it at a huge discount. Conversely, if a business earns 18% on capital over 20 or 30 years, even if you pay an expensive looking price, you’ll end up with a fine result.”</em></p><p>- <strong>Charlie Munger</strong></p><p><em>“The </em><strong><em>ideal business</em></strong><em> is one that generates very high returns on capital and can invest that capital back into the business at equally high rates … Coke has high returns on capital, but incremental capital doesn’t earn anything like its current returns. We love businesses that can earn high rates on even more capital than it earns. Most of our businesses generate lots of money, but can’t generate high returns on incremental capital”</em></p><p><em>…</em></p><p><em>“Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of incremental capital at very high rates of return.”</em></p><p>- <strong><em>Warren Buffet</em></strong></p><ul><li>The concept of ‘moats’ in investing is often misleading, there are actually two very distinct sets of moats — Legacy and Reinvestment.</li><li>Businesses with a Legacy Moat (i.e. Coke / See’s Candy) possess a solid competitive position that results in healthy profits and strong returns on invested capital. However because there are no reinvestment opportunities offering those same high returns, whatever cash the business generates needs to be deployed elsewhere or shipped back to the owners.</li><li>Their high ROIC reflects returns on prior invested capital rather than incremental invested capital. A high reported ROIC today is not worth as much if there are no more 20% ROIC opportunities available to direct the profits.</li><li>There is a second group of companies that have all the benefits of a Legacy Moat, but also have opportunities to deploy incremental capital at high rates because they have a Reinvestment Moat (Amazon is the poster child here). These companies have their current profits protected by a Legacy Moat, so the core earnings power should be maintained. But the vast majority of the potential earnings are reinvested and deployed into opportunities that stand a high likelihood of producing high returns.</li><li>If a company has unlimited opportunities to earn 25% returns, management better be plowing every cent back into the company (<em>potentially via artificially low pricing as per #1</em>).</li></ul><p>The best companies are those that have elements of high return on incremental invested capital, high reinvestment rate and untapped pricing power. These companies typically show very little accounting profits, especially when investment is through the opex line and shows up in the form of lower prices, higher S&amp;M, higher R&amp;D etc.</p><p>A company with this type of opportunity should be taking profits from highly profitable lines of business, and investing them into newer lines of business. This makes the overall margins seem very low, or even negative (especially in an environment of income statement investing)</p><p>However the fair value ‘multiple’ (over <em>earnings power/maintainable earnings</em> not <em>reported earnings</em>) that can be paid for these two types of opportunities are vastly different</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/384/1*QqP2myNGLTcpjJt3OMax4Q.png" /><figcaption>Reinvestment Corp vs. Typical Corp</figcaption></figure><h3>Concept 3: Why earnings capitalisation benchmarking is a flawed heuristics in judging the ‘value’ of a business</h3><p><em>“Cash is a fact, profits is an opinion”</em></p><p>- <strong><em>Alfred Rappaport</em></strong></p><p><em>“The discounted cash flow (DCF) model, while analytically sound, demands a number of judgments. The model’s output varies greatly based on the inputs. There are ways to deal with this challenge, but most practitioners avoid a DCF model altogether and instead use shorthands in the form of multiples. It is crucial to acknowledge that multiples are not valuation but rather a summary of the valuation process.”</em></p><p><em>– </em><strong><em>Michael Mauboussin</em></strong></p><p>Buying a company is like buying a bond, when we buy a company, we are investing in the future cashflows that it generates, hence the common discount cashflow model in the case of industrials companies or a dividend discount model in the case of a bank / levered financial institution</p><p>If this is how we derive our fundamental valuation under a DCF, then why is FCF yield and / or EV / FCF not the primary multiple to be utilised in comparable companies analysis?</p><p>There are major flaws with relying purely on earnings capitalisation as a heuristic for intrinsic value:</p><ul><li>If accounting standards were re-written today, how should we best capture financial performance of information based companies ?</li><li>Why do we exclude capital expenditure from ‘earnings’ whilst including research and development?. This results in unequal treatment in an ‘intangibles’ driven economy</li><li>In the same way that Berkshire had been a frequent critic of the investment management industry’s focus on ‘EBITDA’, which ignored capex/reinvestment, the fact that capex and R&amp;D are treated differently by the majority of the investment community today is similarly flawed</li><li>These are both ‘investment activities’ that detract from a company’s ‘mature’ cashflows and should be treated the same way in an investment process, regardless of how it is accounted for</li><li>Furthermore, how do we account for the vastly differing reinvestment rate of companies even in physical assets. Depreciation expense is an increasingly poor measure of the future maintenance capex requirement of a company. Accounting useful life can be very different from real world useful life, and companies very frequently adjust these to massage earnings. For example, the accounting useful life for Intel’s PPE is higher than TSMCs, while in real life TSMC’s equipment last 2–3x the time compared to Intel. In this example, Intel significantly overstates earnings while TSMC understates earnings. This dynamic is inadequately captured in current accounting standards.</li></ul><p>The overreliance on earnings capitalisation valuation with no regard for cashflows may be of the most striking errors in the investment management industry.</p><ul><li>Earnings capitalisation methods (EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, P/E) should only be used to the extent that it approximates EV/ FCF</li><li>This statement is a logical by-product from the first principals deduction of a DCF valuation model</li></ul><p>To evaluate the cheapness of high quality businesses (i.e. comparison against their more standard counterparts), we have to look at the sustainable earning power. Sustainable earnings power is what the business would theoretically earn if it stopped growing, there is no set “formula” for calculating this, it’s going to be industry &amp; business model dependent and requires the critical judgment of the analyst.</p><h3>Concept 4: Understanding the shortcomings of the traditional DCF analysis</h3><p><em>“Warren often talks about these discounted cash flows, but I’ve never seen him do one. If it isn’t perfectly obvious that it’s going to work out well then he tends to go on to the next idea.”</em></p><p><em>- </em><strong><em>Charlie Munger</em></strong></p><p>The DCF is a very powerful tool in the investment toolbox, however, contrary to popular belief, a DCF is completely unnecessary (and rarely the basis for) stellar investment performance. The strict overreliance on the model as a substitution for clear headed thinking is a major hinderance to prudent allocation of capital in finance. I want to explore two shortcomings in how the DCF is typically used in practice:</p><p><strong>Shortcoming #1 — What is the correct terminal growth rate?</strong></p><p>When financial analysts perform a DCF, we explicitly assumes most companies suddenly grow at the same rate at the end of a 10-year period.</p><p>The ‘fade’ that is implicit in most DCF models perennially understate the growth prospects of positive feedback loop / winner take all business models with strong organizational culture and open ended TAM. This is an extremely flawed assumption that ignores business quality and unfairly penalises companies that are long term compounders, and similarly rewards businesses with deteriorating moats / business models.</p><p>In an information age the gravity that prevents companies from perpetual growth (mean reversion) have become much lighter, allowing some companies to continue growing for much longer than commonly believed possible.</p><p>In other words, the frequency of ‘outliers’ unaffected by mean reversion are becoming more and more prevalent (and they’re becoming a bigger portion of indices), this dynamic can be seen in the charts below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/452/1*Smnk9kF7QqwM9HzbzqTMVg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/456/1*vgUng63ZI2bw6MLYtbWqAA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/443/1*NAGdSxFB9ZTCT7AEsrN61A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/435/1*oYRa2AIqewMeuMqNRaQArA.png" /></figure><p>There are multiple factors behind this including:</p><ul><li>Globalisation associated delocalisation / enlargement of markets</li><li>Improved communication efficiency driven by technology and digitisation</li><li>Modern management practices</li><li>Zero marginal cost and zero distribution cost business models</li></ul><p>10 year forecast / GDP terminal growth may be prudent for most ‘traditional industrials’ companies (where mean reversion / decreasing returns to scale dynamics are pervasive), but applying this to ‘platform / tech’ companies where winner take most / positive feedback loop dynamics persist can lead to incorrect assessment of the intrinsic value of genuine structural growth opportunities</p><p>Can this continue forever? Do we indiscriminately have a bullish view on all high profile tech/platform business models? No, but greater scrutiny is required on the longevity of duration of growth in our estimate of intrinsic value</p><p><strong>Shortcoming #2 — Over-reliance on modern portfolio theory / CAPM results in lack of appreciation of true purpose of a discount rate</strong></p><p>What is discount rate that one should apply to a set of cashflows ? 10% ? I don’t think its that simple.Discount rate measures the rate of return required for bearing a set of risks. For equities this is typically the RFR + equity risk premium.</p><p>How do you calculate stock level equity risk premium ? Beta x market ERP</p><ul><li>What is beta? Ultimately, it is a measure of risk. How to define risk is the most contentious subject in corporate finance. My view is that as a long term investor risk is the potential for PERMANENT LOSS OF CAPITAL rather than TEMPORARY DRAWDOWNS in the share price.</li></ul><p>It follows from this argument that the appropriate discount rate you apply to a set of unlevered cashflow is directly related to the level of confidence that its cash generation potential will be maintained into perpetuity</p><p>We can mathematically prove this, if a set of cashflows generate more stable income streams, we can apply leverage to increase the rate of return we receive. This is the core tenant of the Modigliani-Miller’s theorem on corporate capital structure — This logic can also be extended to the shareholder level</p><p>Why do infrastructure companies trade at such high multiples? They are bond proxies because they have very limited risk due to its relatively guaranteed cashflow generation potential</p><p>In the case of Amazon, what is the riskiness of its ‘mature’ cashflows. Is it above the market average ?</p><ul><li>Amazon is building a global digital infrastructure, and the cashflows generated by its mature businesses should be valued with a ‘bond like’ discount rate</li><li>Once we can appreciate the longevity of Amazon’s business model, it should be clear that the stream of cashflows it generates should be considered significantly less risky than the market average</li><li>As such, it logically follows that Amazon deserves a beta meaningfully below market average, this is a markedly different from the conclusion derived from the still-pervasive philosophy on Wall Street where we are led to believe that Amazon’s cashflows are ~37% riskier than the market average (<em>Bloomberg beta of 1.366</em>)</li></ul><p>Using volatility as a proxy for risk / beta explicitly assumes that the strong form of efficient market hypothesis is correct. The EMH as proposed by the Chicago School of Economics have long gone out of favour in academia, however it appears that a significant portion of the finance industry are still stuck in the 1980s</p><h3>Musings on the contemporary practice of value investing</h3><p><em>“There’s a rule of fishing that’s a very good rule. The first rule of fishing is “fish where the fish are,” and the second rule of fishing is “don’t forget rule number one.” And in investing it’s the same thing. Some places have lots of fish, and you don’t have to be that good a fisherman to do pretty well. Other places are so heavily fished that no matter how good a fisherman you are, you aren’t going to do very well.”</em></p><p><em>…</em></p><p><em>“They don’t catch a lot of cod, but they keep on fishing in the same waters. That’s what’s happened to all these value investors. Maybe they should move to where the fish are.”</em></p><p><strong>- Charlie Munger</strong></p><p><em>“If you buy something because it’s undervalued then you have to think about selling it when it approaches your calculation of its intrinsic value. That’s hard. But if you buy a few great companies, then you can sit on your ass. That’s a good thing.”</em></p><p><strong>- Charlie Munger</strong></p><p><em>“I think one of the frustrations you hear with a lot of value managers today is, what I did 20 years ago isn’t working anymore. I think that’s always been the case. What worked 20 years ago very rarely still works today. <br> Twenty years ago you could just buy low P/E, low price to book value stocks, and that was enough to be attractive. Now, you can do that for almost no fee and the computers have gotten smarter about combining low P/E, low price to book with some positive characteristics — book value growth, earnings growth. The simple, obvious stocks that look cheap generally deserve to be cheap.</em></p><p><em>…</em></p><p><em>“Today, the more interesting ideas, to me, at least, are these ideas where a P/E ratio misses it, or there’s a non-earning asset. We talked about cash. We talked about unrelated investments. We talked about income statement investing where you’re offering the customer an unusual bargain to grow scale and grow the size of your moat”</em></p><p>- <strong>Bill Nygren (Oakmark Funds)</strong></p><p>My emphasis on value investing stems from the long term risk adjusted track record of its practitioners, which seems to suggest that appears value investing is the most effective investment philosophy. I must stress that value investing is not the only way to make money in the markets, there are many investment styles / philosophies that can and have produced great results</p><p>Most investors only pay lip service to the ‘value investing’ philosophy (as it is extremely difficult to perform in an institutional setting). However, over time, it becomes increasingly easy to separate the charlatans (and dogmatic puritans) from the true value investing disciples</p><p>Berkshire’s investment in Amazon is a watershed moment in the value investing community. Although the investment was not done by Buffett himself, it should be seen as tactic endorsement that Berkshire is participating in the gradually evolving value investing mindset</p><p>‘Value’ and ‘growth’ as <em>stylistic factor</em> has nothing to do with value investing as an investment philosophy or analytical framework, the ‘value factor’ (low P/E, P/B) is at best a crude approximation that condenses a bastardised version of the ‘legacy value investing’ framework into a quantitative model that can be easily applied.</p><p>All intelligent investing is value investing, our goal is to buy businesses for less than its intrinsic value. I believe the artificial distinction between what is typically referred to a ‘growth’ approach and a ‘value’ approach stems from whether an investor prioritises value now (easier to see) compared to value later (harder to see)</p><p>The traditional securities analysis framework as utilised by the <em>‘</em><a href="https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/sites/valueinvesting/files/files/Buffett1984.pdf"><em>Superinvestors of Graham &amp; Doddville</em></a><em>’</em> and popularised by a subsequent generation of Buffett watchers to great success is now ageing and increasing irrelevant</p><p>I believe, in today’s climate, it is becoming much harder to consistently outperform by relying on the tried and true — the traditional ‘value’ investments. Investors often forget that the market is a dynamic beast, what has worked in the past may not work in the future, and continued success requires striving for (and acting on) persistently differential (and correct) insights</p><p>Ben Graham was an innovator of investing in his day, and brought creative new ways of thinking to the field. It’s a disservice to Graham that many of his devotees refuse to do anything but emulate his investing style, when they should be emulating his creativity instead</p><p>We know that near-term earnings forecasting accuracy has been on the rise, thanks to the ubiquity of information and improving company disclosure, which together has helped reduce informational asymmetry and promoted market efficiency. An additional, albeit more subtle change in the investment landscape is the proliferation of value investing framework and finance expertise amongst even the most junior market participants — W<em>ho hasn’t read the Intelligent Investor</em>? As the sophistication of the ‘average’ investor increases over time, it comes more difficult to generate alpha using yesterday’s techniques.</p><p>Buying cheap P/E or P/B stocks is not value investing, it is simply an easy mental heuristic that made it easier to apply the value investing framework without much mental resources</p><p>True value investing is simply buying dollars for 50c. Buying at below intrinsic value with an appropriate margin of safety. But what does this mean in practice?</p><ul><li>1) correctly/conservatively forecasting cashflow generation potential perpetuity and discounting this back to get intrinsic value at an appropriate discount rate</li><li>2) investing only when the market price is at a significant discount to intrinsic value</li></ul><p>The secrets to successful value investing can be compressed to two simple formulas:</p><ul><li>1) having a LASER FOCUS on the most accurate understanding where the range of intrinsic value for a company may be; and</li><li>2) maintaining conviction on your personal assessment of intrinsic value by having a rational, unemotional mindset towards investing and being willing to stand apart from the crowd</li></ul><p>I remember a famous investors once said that he does not allow himself to have a position in a company unless he believes he is in the top 1% of knowledge for any company / industry amongst investors. This is not possible without investing in a significant amount of time in deep primary research. Without this depth of research, it is impossible to have a degree high conviction in understanding of intrinsic value</p><p>Intrinsic value is a reflection of total possible cashflows that an asset/security can generate, thus the focus ought to be on best approximating a cashflow forecast <strong>INTO PERPETUITY </strong>rather than the next 1,3,5 or even 10 years …</p><ul><li>It is for this reason that for true value investors, the correct time horizon is decades, not months or years.</li><li>Given uncertainty increases as forecasting horizons increase, understanding the long term, qualitative and intangible factors become increasing critical to developing a variant perception to enable us to assess intrinsic value with a greater confidence interval than the average investor</li></ul><p>Headline benchmarking of cheapness around multiples of various flavours of accounting earnings often do not adequately account non-traditional business models and hence render the typical ‘P/E value investor’ as largely incapable of correctly projecting the future cash flow profile of businesses with ‘flywheel’ business models such as Amazon</p><ul><li>The current dilemma around ‘P/E value investors’ is reminiscent of the slow death of ‘liquidation/book value or P/B investors’ starting from the 60s</li></ul><p>Buffett was the most famous practitioner of this style of ‘cigar butt’ investing, the evolution of Buffett’s investment framework beyond this Graham / Dodd practice of investing paved the way for Berkshire Hathaway’s legacy</p><p>To remain ahead of the market, we must similarly evolve the value investment framework to look beyond the immediate (and predictable) future. We have moved from an environment where assessment of intrinsic value have been based on the clearly visible into the more relative unknown, this requires a superior ability to perform long term forecast in order to identify under-priced opportunities</p><p>Like Warren and Charlie, smart investors must remain pragmatic about where to find value, by fishing where the fish are.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=29ff104dff8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The importance of company culture]]></title>
            <link>https://farnampartners.medium.com/the-importance-of-company-culture-81994a002fec?source=rss-fc48a5960ddf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/81994a002fec</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elon-musk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Farnam Partners]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2020 03:56:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-20T03:56:22.058Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Introduction, and words of wisdom from the investment masters</strong></h3><p><em>“Culture, more than rule books, determines how an organization behaves.” </em><strong><br> </strong><br> <em>“Having first-rate people on the team is more important than designing hierarchies and clarifying who reports to whom … If each of us hires people who are smaller than we are, we shall become a company of dwarfs. But, if each of us hires people who are bigger than we are, we shall become a company of giants.”</em></p><p><em>- </em><strong><em>Warren Buffett</em></strong></p><p><em>“Show me the incentive and I’ll show you the outcome”</em> <strong><em><br> <br> </em></strong><em>“The great defect of scale, of course, which makes the game interesting — so that the big people don’t always win — is that as you get big, you get the bureaucracy. And with the bureaucracy comes the territoriality — which is again grounded in human nature. And the incentives are perverse. For example, if you worked for AT&amp;T in my day, it was a great bureaucracy. Who in the hell was really thinking about the shareholder or anything else? And in a bureaucracy, you think the work is done when it goes out of your in-basket into somebody else’s in-basket. But, of course, it isn’t. It’s not done until AT&amp;T delivers what it’s supposed to deliver. So you get big, fat, dumb, unmotivated bureaucracies…. The constant curse of scale is that it leads to big, dumb bureaucracy — which, of course, reaches its highest and worst form in government where the incentives are really awful. That doesn’t mean we don’t need governments — because we do. But it’s a terrible problem to get big bureaucracies to behave.”</em></p><p><em>“Sears had layers and layers of people it didn’t need. It was very bureaucratic. It was slow to think. And there was an established way of thinking. If you poked your head up with a new thought, the system kind of turned against you. It was everything in the way of a dysfunctional big bureaucracy that you would expect.”</em></p><p>- <strong><em>Charles Munger</em></strong></p><p>A corporation is a system by which labour and assets are organised to achieve the desired outcome — typically producing a product or providing a service. Culture defines the overt and implicit standards by which labour and assets are mobilized and determine the effectiveness the constituent parts achieve its stated outcome.</p><p>Culture and quality of management are imperceptible, ephemeral and does not exist on financial statements, and the value of a modern organisation derives its value more so from intangible and immeasurable qualities than what is recorded by accountants. In the digital age, output is often not constrained by physical assets like factories and equipment but more by intangibles elements such as intellectual property and creativity. This is one of the biggest structural shifts in our modern economic history and elevates the importance of culture in driving the competitive position of a corporation. Over time, superior culture can often allow a firm to be more resilient to external shocks and allow her to outmaneuver competitors while utilising fewer resources.</p><p>Our psychological bias for what is directly measurable means that we overweight the observable. This is especially acute in the context of ephemeral variables such as culture. As a result of this bias, corporate culture is perennially under-researched and underappreciated by investors, especially relative to the critical role it ought to play in long term stock selection.</p><h3><strong>Corporate competition and warfare</strong></h3><p>The importance of morale, tactics, strategy in warfare cannot be overstated. Military feats of strength prove the importance of intangible variables in warfare. An observer solely focused quantitative metrics such as the number of troops, the number of tanks etc. will be utterly confused by the outcome of the majority of military campaigns in history. Corporate competition is very analogous to warfare, and It&#39;s helpful to think of the corporate economy as a perpetual state of war between organisations.</p><p>In China, where corporations exist in a perpetual state of intense competition, it is common practice for business leaders to use war analogies to describe their day to day operation. In the same sense, focusing solely on what is recorded on financial statements and models prove to be grossly inadequate to predict winners of corporate warfare. In this context, the outcomes of competitive games between corporate belligerents can be much better understood by overlaying analysis of strategy and culture.</p><p>The success of Meituan best embodies the importance of war-like mentality on corporate culture. Meituan was the sole survivor of the ‘thousand Groupon war’ where over ~5,000 companies with identical business models were whittled down to a single survivor. The intense competition the company experienced during its formative years helped instil a culture of military efficiency. Meituan pioneered the practice of hiring ex-soldiers to train its delivery riders, Meituan riders start each day with a ‘morning drills’, intended to boost morale and discipline. The company inducts hires with boxing training to increase aggression, and its delivery staff are sometimes reported to get into physical altercations with riders from competing companies. Much of Meituan’s success against a far better funded Alibaba can be explained by the efficiency advantage it gained as a result of its ruthlessly spartan culture.</p><h3><strong>Culture and the anti-fragile organisation</strong></h3><p>Companies are not static entities, but instead, naturally age over time. The age of a company determines its ability to respond to shocks and an intuitive grasp of where a company stands in its lifecycle is critical to input understanding its business risk and assessing optimal capital allocation strategy. Old organisations are often fragile, they are not adaptive and often negatively affected by changes in their external environment. On the other hand, ‘young’ organisations can often be ‘antifragile’, that is, external shocks can have a positive impact owing to the ability to react to change and adapt faster than their peers. Antifragility is a term coined by Nassim Taleb:</p><p><em>“Some things benefit from shocks; they thrive and grow when exposed to volatility, randomness, disorder, and stressors and love adventure, risk, and uncertainty. In spite of the ubiquity of the phenomenon, there is no word for the exact opposite of fragile … Antifragility is beyond resilience or robustness. The resilient resists shocks and stays the same; the antifragile gets better”</em></p><p>Most corporations become more fragile over time. But a strong culture ensures a company remains robust, resilient or perhaps even anti-fragile. An anti-fragile organisation can exploit and ultimately benefit from changing economic climate while their fragile counterparts become disrupted. From a corporate finance perspective anti-fragility is like having a negative beta and assembling a portfolio of resilient (or better yet, anti-fragile) companies is an effective way to reduce risk.</p><p>Well funded, but subscale startups possess an element of anti-fragility, often having the ability to ‘pivot’, create new business model by way of rapid experimentation to product-market fit. On the opposite ends of the spectrum sits Japanese conglomerates, typically plagued by decades of technical debt and legacy IT systems, bureaucratic reporting structures, inflexible labour laws, rigid cost structures and a strong preference to maintain the status quo. These are frail entities, any change in the operating environment and competitive dynamics will send them into decline and accelerate their death spiral.</p><p>The average American enterprises, at least compared to their Japanese counterparts, tend to be more robust and perhaps resilient. In the technology space, this framework is a good guide to understand the rapid descent into irrelevance of most Japanese tech titans and the corresponding rise of American giants around the turn of the 21st century.</p><h3><strong>Identifying good corporate culture:</strong></h3><p>It&#39;s difficult to introduce a simple framework for identifying good culture, multiple books can be written on this topic, but I will try and distil my thoughts into a few important questions:</p><h4>Question: How agile and adaptable is the organisation, what is it’s the corporate age?</h4><p><em>“The problem is that at a lot of big companies, the process becomes a substitute for thinking. You’re encouraged to behave like a little gear in a complex machine. Frankly, it allows you to keep people who aren’t that smart, who aren’t that creative.” — </em><strong><em>Elon Musk</em></strong></p><p><em>“Willingness to change is a strength, even if it means plunging part of the company into total confusion for a while … An organisation’s ability to learn, and translate that learning into action rapidly, is the ultimate competitive advantage.” — </em><strong><em>Jack Welch</em></strong></p><p>Managing a firm is very much like maintaining a machine. Just as firms incur capital expense for the upkeep of machinery, they also need to invest in their culture and processes to remain relevant in the context of the changing external environment. A firm that underinvests in its culture will age over time. The age of an organisation should be a tenant of our assessment of an organisations’ risk profile to withstand external shocks and withstand disruption. The thickness of employee manuals and written policies are typically inversely correlated with the ability of the company to react to its surroundings. We must ask ourselves if this is a company that is coordinating via shared purpose / vision or rigid rules / processes.</p><p>When a company scales, co-ordination becomes increasingly difficult, so we put in place rules and bureaucratic processes. Growth creates complexity and also reduces the proportion of high performing talent in the company, this creates chaos, which is often remedied with the process, more process drives out high-performance employees which means the corporation is now governed by existing process rather than first principals of what should be done.</p><p>A corporation’s processes and structure are typically optimised to maximise efficiency at achieving a certain outcome. When the external environment does not change, these rules appear healthy. However, changes in external environments require a redesign in processes and organisational structures, this is difficult for older organisations with a weaker culture. In this instance, bureaucratic and formalised decision making makes the firm fragile to disruption and changes in the external environment unleashes the latent risk.</p><p>Managers often must run the organisation based on prescribed processes and often face pressure to maintain the status quo. Given the propensity for executives to underestimate the difficulty of changing corporate culture engage in risky strategies, we should be sceptical of turnaround that is not supported by a corresponding cultural change. For companies that are old, often the right thing to do for shareholders is to put the company under “run-off’ rather than try and compete against more agile competitors.</p><p>Companies operated by strong founders and/or owners can overcome organisational inertia by hitting reset, they generally have a much easier time of uprooting the status quo and re-engineering legacy processes. Correspondingly, we should be willing to pay a premium for companies that are run by founder/owners and require a discount for organisations run by professional managers, especially ones without significant ownership stake to signal ‘skin in the game’.</p><p>A successful digital transformation is another way for organisations to revitalize itself. Digital transformation not only results in efficiency gains from migrating legacy processes, but it also requires a company to examine from a first principals basis whether old processes are still valid for the current environment, but this also requires an examination of accumulated bureaucracies and are often accompanied by a reorganisation which improves firm agility. From this lens, digital transformation is akin to a much-needed oil change for a clogged machine, and can often reverse the aging process. A firm that has undertaken the painful step digital transformation process has likely shaved years if not decades off its corporate age and are likely in better shape to tackling changing external environments.</p><p>Examples of this framework in action:</p><p>- Amongst tech companies, Google and Apple are relative dinosaurs, they have become bureaucratic and are left without the visionary founder. On the other hand, Amazon and Netflix are laser-focused on this culture and remains extremely young relative to despite its size.</p><p>- Microsoft under Bill Gates was young, it aged under the reign of Steve Ballmer and became revitalised when Satya came onboard</p><p>- Outside of the technology space, General Electric provides a good case study on the importance of managing bureaucracy. General Electric, after aging for most of the 20th century, was famously revitalised under Jack Welch. However, under Jeff Immelt, bureaucracy eventually reared its head and the company subsequently began to stagnate</p><p>- More recently, the cultural stagnation at Baidu and Intel provided excellent leading indicators of their demise</p><h4>Question: What is the proportion of A players, B players and C players in this company?</h4><p><em>I noticed that the dynamic range between what an average person could accomplish and what the best person could accomplish was 50 or 100 to 1. Given that, you’re well advised to go after the cream of the cream … A small team of A+ players can run circles around a giant team of B and C players</em></p><p><em>I’ve built a lot of my success on finding these truly gifted people, and not settling for “B” and “C” players, but really going for the “A” players. And I found something… I found that when you get enough “A” players together, when you go through the incredible work to find these “A” players, they really like working with each other. Because most have never had the chance to do that before. And they don’t work with “B” and “C” players, so it’s self-policing. They only want to hire “A” players. So you build these pockets of “A” players and it just propagates.</em></p><p><strong><em>– Steve Jobs</em></strong></p><p>Most things in life have a dynamic range in which the ratio of “average” to “best” is at most 2:1. For example, if you go to New York City and get an average taxi cab driver, versus the best taxi cab driver, you’ll probably get to your destination with the best taxi driver 30% faster. However, the range of productivity between an ‘information worker’ and ‘labour worker’ is enormous. Under this context, Bill Gates and Steve Wozniak during the halcyon years of Microsoft and Apple likely produced more in terms of output than hundreds of hundreds of ‘average’ engineers.</p><p>Unlike the earliest days of technology, we operate in a world where it’s nearly impossible to accomplish anything great as an individual. We are the product of an education system, a healthcare system, luck, roads, the internet and so much more, and at work, the most important achievements require a team of people working together. The boom in productivity when a group of creatives are combined produces a self-reinforcing compounding and non-linear effect that feeds upon the collective intellect and drive of individuals. It is this reason why a few hundred Apple or Microsoft engineers can be more productive than the combined engineering team at Nokia or IBM for a fraction of the cost.</p><p>Another way to think about this is in terms of energy. If you have 12 people on a team and they each have 10 units of energy, you would expect to get 120 units of output. That’s what an average team will do. Worse teams will do worse. A great team will take the same inputs and get a non-linear outcome. The result won’t be 120; it’ll be 360. No matter the objective, great teams will produce outcomes multiple times faster and better than average teams.</p><p>Which company today has the most brilliantly efficient engineering teams from output per dollar perspective? — SpaceX and Tesla come to mind. Elon Musk has assembled a collection of brilliant engineers and created a platform for them to tackle the worlds toughest problems. The few thousand engineers working under Musk are collectively outpacing the output of the entire aerospace and automotive industry combined in launch technology and electric cars respectively. The value of the innovation pipeline from this group of individuals remains grossly underappreciated.</p><p>In a digital age, where technology has an increasing impact on competitive advantage, evaluating the quality of staff becomes critical in understanding the trajectory of organisations. How do we think about R&amp;D efficiency in this context? R&amp;D dollars only measure the number of people that are designated to be engaging in R&amp;D and gets us only a tiny fraction of the way in understanding the R&amp;D output of the company, which is what truly matters.</p><p>Because of the importance of maintaining the highest proportion of A-players in an organisation is critical, a rising stock price and high stock-based compensation are critical to maintaining the competitive advantage of a high-tech firm. This is one of the reasons why positive share price momentum is a good predictor of future outperformance in the technology space.</p><h4>Question: Do this company and its employees have a shared vision of the future? What purpose are they trying to solve?</h4><p><em>“You have to have a very compelling goal for the company. If you put yourself in the shoes of someone who’s talented at a world level, they have to believe that there’s potential for a great outcome and believe in the leader of the company, that you’re the right guy to work with. That can be a difficult thing, especially if you’re trying to attract people from other companies.”- </em><strong><em>Elon Musk</em></strong></p><p><em>“Good business leaders create a vision, articulate the vision, passionately own the vision, and relentlessly drive it to completion.” — </em><strong><em>Jack Welch</em></strong></p><p><em>“I truly believe that each of us must find meaning in our work. The best work happens when you know that it does not just work, but something that will improve other people’s lives” — </em><strong><em>Satya Nadella</em></strong></p><p>Somewhat related to the prior point, the collective purpose that drives the firm’s employees to work together and the shared values that connect them to the organisation is just as important as the skillset and intelligence of the people themselves.</p><p>I believe that the best, high achieving companies should have a set of unconventional and well-defined values as well as a mission which, from the outside make the company appear like a cult</p><p>· A company’s <strong>values </strong>are the<strong> </strong>behaviours and skills that the company particularly desire in fellow employees. They form the guiding principals behind what is important, what is not important, and how priorities are weighted</p><p>· A company’s <strong>mission </strong>provide a light at the end of the tunnel and answer the very important question of <em>why, </em>which becomes exceptionally acute for boosting employee productivity</p><p>Shared values and mission allow the company to do away with rules and rigidity and empower employees to become collective problem solvers. Having a stronger mission, culture and vision can actually save a company by allowing the organization to provide non-monetary benefits higher up the Maslow’s hierarchy of needs stack.</p><p>Monetary compensation is often secondary for the best employees, they know they can get paid much more in a traditional job, but people are often looking for more than compensation from their place of work. It’s important to ask, beyond compensation, what is the reason that employees in this company go to work and seek to accomplish every day. Well-motivated staff will be significantly more productive, put in more hours, and accept lower compensation if they feel that their work is imbued with meaning.</p><p>For example, Netflix’s product mission, although compelling, is not solving a mission-critical problem to attract the best talent. The attempts to counteract this by providing a best in class environment for employees and paying them top market rate. Compensation at Netflix is benchmarked such that no employee at Netflix should be able to get a higher compensation elsewhere.</p><p>Some questions to evaluate the strength of a company’s mission and values:</p><p>- Do people work for paycheck and demand to be paid overtime or are employees have genuine passion towards their work that feels compensated by the impact of their labour and / or the comraderies they form with their colleagues ?</p><p>- Do employees look at the clock at 5 PM and wish to clock off. Or, do they wish there were more hours in the day for them to take on more projects ?</p><p>- Are all employees trying to solve problems together, or are they simply there to follow orders? Is there a clear hierarchical distribution of tasks, or do employees wish to be more flexible, strive to innovate and challenge the status quo ?</p><h3><strong>Concluding thoughts</strong></h3><p>We are programmed to analyse and overweight what is directly observable — but often — in investing and in life, the most important things are often intangible and unmeasurable. We must fight to overcome our susceptibility to the availability heuristic and weight our decision making towards what is important, not what is observable.</p><p>As long-term investors, it’s important to remain laser-focused to the leading indicators of a corporation’s operating performance. As such having the right framework to identify a good corporate culture is an evergreen tool in the investment arsenal. For example, Microsoft under Nadella will go likely down be remembered as one of the most spectacular turnarounds in corporate history, but to have invested ahead of time, we must have appreciated the cultural renaissance that preceded the company’s financial revival.</p><p>This memo barely scratches the surface behind the topic of culture, there are far more variables to consider, but I will end here. One of the best examples of excellent corporate culture is <a href="https://jobs.netflix.com/culture">Netflix</a> — I invite everyone to read this to develop your individual perspectives of what makes a winning culture.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=81994a002fec" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On the rise of the Tech Titans]]></title>
            <link>https://farnampartners.medium.com/on-the-rise-of-the-tech-titans-2c2f05b9a5a3?source=rss-fc48a5960ddf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2c2f05b9a5a3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[facebook]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baidu]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[amazon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech-titans]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[google]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Farnam Partners]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 May 2018 09:25:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-26T03:23:30.020Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am often asked for my views on the best long term investments. I find myself recommending a group of companies commonly referred to as the Tech Titans.</p><p>The Tech Titans are an emergent category of businesses who have begun to dominate the consumer and (to a lesser extent) corporate services landscape. The label is commonly applied to the FANGs in the US (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, Alphabet/Google), the BATs in China (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) and a lesser extent other technology companies such as Apple, Microsoft, Salesforce, Ebay, Tesla, and JD.com.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/728/1*OOu6uv1a3zir0b3pp4GSjQ.png" /><figcaption>The Tech Titans</figcaption></figure><p>I am confident that the majority of investors recognise the quality of the Tech Titans, but most (especially those with a fundamentalist value investing philosophy) baulk at their exorbitant valuation. Indeed, there is considerable risk that changes in market sentiment could decimate the share prices of companies trading at high valuation multiples like the Tech Titans. As such, an overweight position in the Tech Titans will be seen as the antithesis of prudent risk management for investors with a short-term horizon (e.g. benchmark aware fund managers). However, investors with sufficiently long investment horizons or those with investment mandates that are relatively insensitive to short-term volatility (e.g. retail investor with strong stomachs, endowment funds, family offices), the Tech Titans offers a highly compelling value with minimal long term risk.</p><p>I believe the Tech Titans are on a trajectory to become an ever more dominant force in our society. Looking forward to the next decade, I have little doubt that the Tech Titans will be able to continue to extend its influence and capture a more significant share of consumer wallet.</p><p>I believe this scenario is not yet reflected in the Tech Titan’s market values. Even in today’s bull market, most investors adhere to the conventional wisdom is that it is imprudent to pay up for growth that is still far into the horizon. I expect, on the contrary, that not owning a piece the Tech Titans will prove to be one of the most critical errors in capital allocation.</p><p><strong>What drives the success of the Tech Titans?</strong></p><p>The fundamental driver of value creation is for companies to utilise the capital they raise from investors to generate future cash flows at rates of return exceeding the cost of capital (Cash Return on Invested Capital&gt; Cost of Capital). The faster companies can increase their revenues and deploy more capital at attractive rates of return, the more value they create. The combination of growth and return on invested capital relative to its cost is what drives value for shareholders. Companies can sustain strong growth and high returns on invested capital only if they have a distinct competitive advantage.</p><p>The basic idea is this: in certain situations, as companies get bigger, they can earn higher margins and returns on capital because their product becomes more valuable with each new customer. In most industries, competition forces returns back to reasonable levels. However, in sectors with increasing returns, competition is kept at bay by the low and decreasing unit costs incurred by the market leader (hence the “winner takes all” tag given to the tech industry).</p><p>Take Microsoft’s Office software, as the installed base of Office users expanded, it became ever more attractive for new customers to use Office as well, because they could share their documents, calculations, and images with so many others. Potential customers became increasingly unwilling to purchase and use competing products. Because of this advantage, during its peak in 2009, Microsoft made profit margins of more than 60 percent and earned operating profits of approximately $12 billion on Office software — making it one of the most profitable products of all time.</p><p>Rapid growth and a stellar return on capital underpinned by an unassailable competitive advantage are the are the modus operandi of the Tech Titans — These businesses have created a business model with a moat so strong that they can sustain high growth and return on capital for the foreseeable future.</p><p><strong>What are the lessons from history?</strong></p><p>The share price momentum and high valuation exhibited by FANGs stocks in the US are oft-compared to the dot-com bubble of the 2000s.</p><p>The history of innovation shows how difficult it is to earn monopoly-sized returns on capital for an extended length of time except in exceptional circumstances. This fact was lost on the commentators around the turn of the century who ignored history in their indiscriminate recommendations of Internet stocks. The dot-com bubble left a sorry trail of intellectual shortcuts taken to justify absurd prices for technology company shares. Those who questioned the new economics were branded as just “not getting it”. When the laws of economics prevailed, as they always do, it was clear that many internet businesses did not have the sustainable business models required to earn even modest ROIC.</p><p>Many of the companies born in this era, including Amazon.com, eBay, and Priceline, have created and are likely to continue generating substantial profits and value. However, for every innovative, new business idea, there were dozens of companies that turned out to have virtually no ability to generate revenue or value in either the short or the long term. The initial stock market success of these flimsy companies represented a triumph of hype over experience.</p><p>Many commentators compare the current rally of the Tech Titans to the Dot-Com bubble and I find this to be a gross oversimplification. The proponents of this thesis do not appreciate the vast differences of today’s internet companies compared to the Dot-Com era.</p><p>Low margins of many tech names cause commentators to question whether the path to profitability will ever materialise. These commentators show a lack of understanding of business fundamentals of the Tech Titans and are in my mind, blinded by their steadfast faith to archaic accounting practices. A majority of the Tech Titans expenditures are incurred to acquire customers and improve technology which should be deemed as investment activities and not be treated as business as usual expenses. In the hypothetical scenario that these investment activities cease (or are fully capitalised rather than expensed), and products are repriced to market levels reflective of their intrinsic value to customers, the underlying profitability of the Tech Titans’ businesses will be significantly higher. The Tech Titan’s willingness to forgo near-term profitability and invest for the future is an advantage over traditional competitors and considered as a strength rather than a weakness.</p><p><strong>Have we finally found trees that can grow to the sky?</strong></p><p>Prudence dictates that investors should discount a company’s ability to sustain growth as it increases in size. As addressable market declines and the firm expand outside of its core competency, competitive pressures become an increasing burden on growth and margins.</p><p>The argument against paying for high growth is that throughout history, it has been difficult to sustain a momentum of high margin and high growth. Businesses naturally reach the limit of their addressable market, and must expand into other areas in order to grow. This resulting sprawling empire results in a loss of focus on the core business. Burdened by complexity, bureaucracy and rigidity, diseconomies of scale eventually rear its head to make these lumbering giants uncompetitive, causing them to eventually buckle under its own weight.</p><p>The Tech Titans, however, are not the conglomerates of yesteryear but agile Online Technology Platforms (OTP).</p><p>The platform model has long been one of the great business models. But by implementing this model in software — which results in an effective zero cost of marginal production; and online — which results in a near-zero cost of global distribution: owners of successful OTPs can generate enormous economic profits stemming from powerful and sustainable advantages.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/495/1*-XbVoOpBf_5aWsWsKamcUA.png" /><figcaption>The Online Technology Platform</figcaption></figure><p>The OTP model has never occurred in history before. The scale disadvantage that plagues the traditional conglomerate model does not affect the OTP. Rather, there is no limit to the scale benefits that OTP model can provide resulting in businesses that remain unencumbered by natural constraints on size.</p><p>The advantage that the Tech Titans accumulated has already made their position almost unassailable. I will devote the rest of the memo to explore the drivers underpinning their ability to outperform.</p><p><strong>Winning in customer loyalty …</strong></p><p>In an individualistic society and rising expectations, customers flock to the businesses that understand them and can provide the most personalised services. The more extensive interactions a company have with its users, the better it can build individual profiles and offer superior, cheaper, and more effective services.</p><p>The two ways to steal customers from an incumbent requires the new firm to provide the same service for cheaper or a better service at the same price. For this to be successful, the difference between the new offering and incumbent offering needs to be higher than the switching cost in order overcome the inherent customer stickiness.</p><p>The key driver of Apple’s success is its ability to monopolise the consumer electronics market. With the purchase of a MacBook or iPhone, Apple customers become entrenched within the iOS ecosystem. Owing to the inconvenience, customers are loathed to switch to competitor’s products, even when they offer a meaningful discount. The perception of a high switching cost affords Apple a wide competitive moat and the ability to generate high margins. It is this customer stickiness and low price elasticity that is Apple’s greatest asset.</p><p>OTPs do not provide a single service. Instead, companies like Google, Amazon, Alibaba and Tencent are looking to build a comprehensive suite of services for its users. The stickiness of this relationship increases exponentially as a provider widens its product bundle. Due to the cross-subsidisation, technology scale and enhanced user insights, once a user becomes entrenched within an existing platform it will be almost impossible for a competitor to offer any single services better or cheaper.</p><p>The network effects from within the Tech Titans’ platforms have become so significant it would not be controversial to suggest that their assets are, in effect, impossible for a competitor to replicate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/570/1*B0tLuoTHw1U90CIKwZ6zdw.png" /><figcaption>The Microsoft, Google and Apple ecosystems</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/601/1*uUy8ku-aVmqMn9ZfYdsHjA.png" /><figcaption>Amazon is leveraging its scale and customer insights to compete against incumbents in a number of new areas</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Winning in artificial intelligence …</strong></p><p>Data analytics is becoming the norm in most industries. Companies with access to good and unique datasets are able to leverage them to improve revenues (e.g. by understanding customers better, segmenting demand more precisely), reduce costs (e.g. minimising manufacturing down time, lowering error rates), make better decisions (e.g. hiring, pricing) or allocate resources more efficiently. With the advent of new deep learning techniques and improvements in computer power, we have seen a burgeoning in the value of data as an enabler of artificial intelligence (“AI”).</p><p>What many don’t realise is that data is the building block of powerful AI systems. AI requires an extended, iterative training process, and the efficacy of AI is dependent on both quality and quantity of its data inputs. The more data fed into AI, the better it gets at a solving a task. Once an AI-enabled system receives a steady flow of data optimised for machine learning, it can continually upgrade its decision making and self-improve in ways that allow them to be significantly more potent than traditional systems or even human experts.</p><p>AI system applied to a technology-enabled firm is capable of automating tasks that will traditionally require an army of employees to perform — thus radically lowering costs and improving efficiency. AI is expected to produce a positive, self-reinforcing feedback loop of increasing customer satisfaction, reduced cost of customer servicing, and reduced cost of customer acquisition.</p><p>Data is an essential source of competitive advantage, especially when it is exclusive, hard to replicate and can be transformed into insight by powerful analytics. The rising use of data works in the favour of large companies with vast installed equipment bases or customer bases because larger and deeper datasets allow for better pattern recognition, more efficient resource allocation or demand-supply matching. The Big in Big data really matters.</p><p>The benefits of deploying data-driven insights are also not linear. Bigger firms with more complex operations often see higher returns from more efficient solutions. Large incumbents with access to bigger datasets are more likely to raise entry barriers or sustain a growth/margin advantage over their smaller competitors.</p><p>The owner of the OTP has sole access to the data generated by all of its users. Eventually, the volume of customer data and quality of AI will become the main point of competitive advantage of most enterprises.The ability to leverage its scale and vast troves of user data to apply AI adds to the unassailable competitive position of the Tech Titans.</p><p><strong>Winning from broad-based acceleration in innovation …</strong></p><p>Many structural trends suggest the pace of change in today’s society will be markedly more significant compared to what we have witnessed in the preceding decades.</p><p>• Exponential growth in computing power increases the incremental return on investment in computing and automation</p><p>• Cloud computing allows computing power to be ‘rented’ by smaller and medium corporations, allowing the proliferation of AI-driven computing power across the economy</p><p>• Open source platforms reduce the barrier to entry and allow start-ups to compete against large multinationals, and encouraging more innovative ways of doing business</p><p>• Greater venture capital funding encourages a more vibrant start-up community and encourages innovation</p><p>• Corporations, recognising the changing landscape are establishing tech labs’ as well as venture capital arms to partner with and invest in disruptors — Increasing the speed with which legacy business models are revolutionised</p><p>The acceleration of broad-based change makes it difficult to understand the ultimate winners and losers within the economic landscape. I believe, the firms with the best infrastructure, most diverse operating models and deepest customer reach will be best placed to capture the benefits of a more innovative society.</p><p>The Tech Titans’ open platform and massive user base provide the best use cases of emerging technologies. The ability of the Tech Titans to capitalise on the positive externalities of an increasingly innovative society provides an additional advantage over traditional competitors.</p><p><strong>Winning in organisational structure …</strong></p><p>With the exception of Berkshire Hathaway and Alphabet, few examples of highly successful conglomerate come to mind. Traditional conglomerates often lose its competitiveness as their rigid governance and bureaucracy culture hinders organisational agility. Over time, incrementalism and risk aversion overcome the desire to improve. As organisations become larger, they become increasingly conservative and are unable to capitalise on new opportunities, eventually resulting in decline and stagnation.</p><p>In the technology industry, where revolutionary ideas are the primary drivers of growth, to remain successful require a deeply rooted commitment to stay experimental. Tech Titans succeed because a ‘startup’ or ‘day one’ mentality permeates their organisation, sustaining the culture of innovation that has made these companies so successful. Despite their scale, Tech Titans still cherish their roots as a start-up and wherever possible empower employees to act on great ideas regardless of their role or function within the company.</p><p>In this sense, Tech Titans cannot be defined by product verticals, as their business model fundamentally commands them to continually explore other areas that add value. In the same way that the market valuation of Berkshire significantly exceeds the fair value of its constituent assets — I believe Tech Titans deserve a substantial innovation premium owing to an organisational structure that facilitates growth.</p><p>The Tech Titans recognise the dangers of standing still, and the unique culture of the Tech Titans is a critical factor which underwrites their ability to continue growing far into the future.</p><p><strong>Winning in stifling emerging competitors …</strong></p><p>A common argument against expectations of sustained long-term growth is that competition invariably arises and reduces the ability for incumbents to sustain growth. Throughout history, there have not been many firms capable of maintaining its high growth rates for an extended period.</p><p>The advent of the OTP model has radically altered these dynamics. For the owner of the OTP, the benefits of acquired technology are shared across a broader base of businesses, applications and services. Therefore, newly developed technology is more valuable to platform owners than to any other owner. Platform owners can, in turn, rationally outbid competing suitors for the same target.</p><p>The ability defeat any competitive threat is a critical competitive advantage, any emerging players that have developed new IP or customer following will be at first small and hence capable of being acquired before it becomes a threat (e.g. FB / WhatsApp). If an acquisition offer is refused, a Plan B is always available to replicate the competing product and utilise its platform advantage to defeat the original (e.g. FB &amp; Instagram / Snapchat).</p><p>The oligopolies that will carve up large swathes of the economy are already well known to us, new players looking to enter will find that they are already far too late to the party.</p><p><strong>Concluding thoughts</strong></p><p>With technology and customer insights becoming a critical source of competitive advantage in nearly all forms of business activity, there is real possibility that our society will be dominated by oligopolistic Tech Titans. By the middle of the century, their control will be widespread, with power akin to the corporations in dystopian sci-fi movies.</p><p>Since the beginning of 2017, the market appears to have grasped the long-term growth potential of the Tech Titans, resulting in substantial share price rally across the sector. However, in my opinion, the market-implied expectations for many of the Tech Titans remain unreasonably conservative and do not reflect the significance of their role they are likely to play in our society.</p><p>Despite the phenomenal rally, many investors still sit on the side-lines, waiting for the right entry point. Given the impact of sentiment changes on their prices, I believe this cautious approach has merit. The recent regulatory concerns around data utilisation and platform weaponisation as a result of the Cambridge Analytica scandal have brought regulatory risk to be front of mind. Regulators are only starting to recognise the power of these companies over the society. Although regulatory momentum is picking up, the impacts on profit and growth from regulatory changes are not likely to be material over the short to medium term.</p><p>I see the most significant risk of investing in this sector as the acceleration in competition between the Tech Titans. Recognising the importance of omni-dominance across product lines, the Titans have begun to compete in peripheral areas which will further pressure margins. An all-out war on all fronts appears unlikely, the Titans have much to go and can grow the pie by taking share from traditional players as they enter new markets. Still, this is a possibility that cannot be ruled out and in this dynamic environment I struggle to pick the winners.</p><p>The critical question for investors in this space is how to selecting the Facebook, Google and Amazon avoid picking the Twitters, MySpace and Yahoos. The solution is to give up the pursuit of alpha and instead construct a balanced portfolio.</p><p>The Tech Titans are likely to generate very high risk-adjusted return over the long term. Investors focused on long-term wealth creation will do well by committing a meaningful portion of their portfolio to a well-constructed Tech Titan Index.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2c2f05b9a5a3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The evolution of value investing]]></title>
            <link>https://farnampartners.medium.com/what-is-value-investing-a89188a82e88?source=rss-fc48a5960ddf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a89188a82e88</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[warren-buffett]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[value-investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Farnam Partners]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2018 14:49:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-26T03:02:57.530Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>People often wonder how I can call myself a value investor when I hold many technology stocks with elevated price/earnings ratio in my portfolio. I want to address this apparent hypocrisy in this memo, and present my framework on what it means to be a value investor.</p><p>Market commentators often describe investment styles as ‘growth’ or ‘value’, I find these nomenclatures to be both misleading and often misused. In my mind, the core philosophy of value investing is buying something for less than its intrinsic value — thus all investing can trace its roots to the value philosophy. I believe the major distinction between what is typically referred to a ‘growth’ approach and a ‘value’ approach stems from whether an investor prioritises value now compared to value later.</p><p>I believe, in today’s climate, it is becoming much harder to consistently outperform by relying on the tried and true — the traditional ‘value’ investments. Investors often forget that the market is a dynamic beast, what has worked in the past may not work in the future, and continued success requires striving for (and acting on) persistently differential (and correct) insights.</p><p>We know that near-term earnings forecasting accuracy has been on the rise, thanks to the ubiquity of information and improving company disclosure, which together has helped reduce informational asymmetry and promoted market efficiency. An additional, albeit more subtle change in the investment landscape is the proliferation of value investing framework and finance expertise amongst market participants. As the sophistication of the ‘average’ investor increases over time, it comes more difficult to generate alpha using yesterday’s techniques.</p><p>The evolution of Buffett’s investment framework beyond the Graham / Dodd practice of ‘cigar butt’ investing marked the awakening of the Sage of Omaha and paved the way for Berkshire Hathaway’s legacy. To remain ahead of the market, we must similarly evolve the value investment framework to look beyond the immediate (and predictable) future. We must learn to divert our eyes away from the rear-view mirror and towards the windshield.</p><p>Here is where most investors stumble, they either stick with the tried and true or gravitate towards companies with well-understood prospects, which are often crowded with even long-term value fully baked into the current share price.</p><p>The disruptive force of technology heralds one of the greatest periods of upheaval in modern economic history. The advent of radically transformational business models has shattered traditional barriers to entry and competitive edge of incumbents. As new competitors increasingly come from beyond existing boundaries, I expect historical extrapolation to become even less predictive and investors relying on rear-view mirror investing to fade into irrelevance.</p><p>Investors nowadays must expending their effort to more deeply understand industries in the midst of flux. The new generation of value investors will be individuals who seek to understand companies in the infancy of their transformation, and correctly divine its prospects before the rest of the market catches on.</p><p>There is however, no free lunch in the world of investing and extending our investment horizons is not without risk. We must remain vigilant to ensure we do not stray from the core value philosophy — that is to buy securities for cheaper than their intrinsic value and be steadfast in our insistence for a margin of safety.</p><p>Having the foresight on the probability and timeline of disruption isn’t easy, and even if we get that right, understanding the impact of disruption is harder still. Sometimes, incidentally, it’s much easier in the midst of disruption to figure out the losers.</p><blockquote>You could have grasped the importance of the auto when it came along but still found it hard to pick companies that would make you money. But there was one obvious decision you could have made back then–it’s better sometimes to turn these things upside down–and that was to short horses</blockquote><blockquote>- Warren E. Buffett (Fortune Magazine — November 1999)</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a89188a82e88" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On identifying quality]]></title>
            <link>https://farnampartners.medium.com/on-identifying-quality-7d5fc88b10cc?source=rss-fc48a5960ddf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7d5fc88b10cc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Farnam Partners]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Apr 2018 00:57:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-02T01:02:51.990Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The primary objective of investing is to optimally position a portfolio for the future, therefore an important skill in the investor’s toolkit is having the foresight to identify businesses which will thrive over time whilst avoiding those that decline into irrelevance. The successful investor must possess a keen eye to distinguish quality businesses from their less worthy counterparts, indeed this is one of the most critical skills of successful practitioners.</p><p>In my mind quality is a straightforward, albeit often misunderstood concept. The average investor applies the quality label liberally, most often to companies perceived to be operating in attractive industries, as well as to entire industries that appear to be presently benefiting from favourable trends. History is littered with investors who are burned by investing in companies on the throes of favourable industry dynamics, only for these tailwinds to turn. Indeed, hyped up industries have more than their fair share of losers whilst patient investors often find valuable gems in businesses facing secular decline.</p><p>Well performing businesses often share many common factors that facilitate consistently outsized returns. I believe these factors to be transcendent and applicable across multiple business models and industries — having a keen eye for the common threads shared by great companies is a critical component that makes up alpha.</p><p>To explore the factors that separate high quality businesses from their counterparts, I will introduce a hypothetical study of two simple chocolate businesses operating in the same industry. I hope the lessons will be valuable as the building blocks in your framework for identifying quality.</p><p><strong><em>Startup</em></strong></p><p><em>Two identical twins Milan and Felix each inherited $10 million from their father — a famous proprietor of an artisan chocolatier in Bruge, Belgium. His dying wish was for Milan and Felix to expand the family business so that the entire country may enjoy the fruits of his labours.</em></p><p><em>The brothers, rather than joining forces as their father intended, amicably disagreed on the best approach to promote his legacy. Instead, each decide to open separate companies (here on referred to as MilanCo and FelixCo) to pursue their own vision of the family legacy.</em></p><p><em>Both brothers purchased plants &amp; equipment worth $8 million. Milan, conscious of the uniqueness of the quality of his father’s chocolates decides to follow the family recipe to the letter and devote $2 million to marketing its merits. Felix, who always questioned the inefficiency and meticulousness of his father’s approach, opts to remove certain processes and optimise costs whilst investing the remaining $2 million to upgrade his production equipment.</em></p><p><strong><em>Growth</em></strong></p><p><em>Following the product launch, MilanCo and FelixCo’s chocolates were both well received. FelixCo’s was able to sell more than MilanCo owing to the superior manufacturing capacity and simplicity of distributing through supermarket channels. His customers were especially attracted to the affordability and convenience. Milan however, decided to sell his products directly through MilanCo branded stores styled in the décor of his father’s original shop. Milan produced fewer chocolates compared to his brother, but was able to sell them at a higher price due to its premium brand.</em></p><p><em>Despite the differences in strategy, both Brothers enjoy healthy profits and eventually become the two largest chocolate companies in Belgium. KitBury a chocolate multinational takes notice of the popularity of Belgian varieties and the strong margins these products commanded relative to KitBury’s brands. Before long, the company announces plans to enter the Belgian chocolate market with a mass-market variety also distributed through supermarket channels, sharing the same shelf space as FelixCo’s chocolates.</em></p><p><strong><em>Maturity</em></strong></p><p><em>Over time, Felix finds that he must continuously upgrade to newer equipment and reduce prices to maintain his revenues. Milan, protected by loyal customers that buy his product because of superior quality and taste, requires relatively little capital investment and instead is able to gradually raise prices.</em></p><p><em>During Christmas, both the Brothers take the opportunity to tell the family about their success in fulfilling their father’s dream. Milan speaks of the steady growth of his earnings, occasionally raising prices to pass on inflation of production costs, with margins boosted by new premium varieties. Meanwhile Felix professes of frequent needs to appease his distributor, who complain at the first sign of any mention of increasing prices and threatening to bring their business to KitBury. However, Felix tells of his plans for bigger factories with newer and faster equipment, which will reduce his costs, expand his business and deliver higher profits.</em></p><p><em>When the Brothers talk of their achievements on the 10th Christmas since founding their companies, they were surprised to find that both generate identical profits of $5 million per annum. However the family found that FelixCo was much larger in size and generated double the revenues.</em></p><p><em>Despite more KitBury products on supermarket shelves, and rising cost of raw materials, Felix remains confident on his success, and views FelixCo’s larger clout as a source of strength. Milan, keen to win back the spotlight, mentioned that he was able to pay himself 80% of the profits he has generated since founding the company as dividends whilst his brother could only afford a 50% pay-out rate. The rest of the family members, amused by the tableside banter, viewed the brother’s achievements on equal merit.</em></p><p><em>However, as KitBury ramped up its presence in Belgium as the years rolled on. Felix found himself struggling to keep up with MilanCo’s profits. Eager to keep face at the annual Christmas gatherings, he secured a large loan from Goldman Stanley to invest in state of the art robotic equipment which doubled production and reduced costs. As a result, the profits of FelixCo were able to grow in line with MilanCo. However the company was burdened with increasing debt load from the need to invest in newer equipment and bigger factories. By this point, a sizeable portion of FelixCo’s cashflows went to servicing debt repayments.</em></p><p><strong><em>Consolidation and decline</em></strong></p><p><em>Not long after, Belgium is hit by a recession, discretionary spending on food slows impacting chocolate sale. FelixCo’s sales declines drastically as supermarkets consolidate their chocolate varieties and with help from KitBury, introduce private label product to cater to the budget conscious consumer. With debt servicing costs coinciding with declining sales, profits dip into the red and cashflows dry up. Felix finds that banks are unwilling to roll over his debt and is forced to declare bankruptcy.</em></p><p><em>MilanCo’s sales also decline but by less than FelixCo and was able to maintain profitability with the benefit of higher margins and limited leverage. Milan was able to cut costs and continued to focus on premium products. MilanCo emerged from the crisis as a leaner luxury chocolatier. With less competition from his brother, he now generates higher profits than ever before.</em></p><p>The story of MilanCo’s survival over FelixCo illustrates a number of lessons for investors:</p><h4>Quality is … having a competitive moat</h4><p>Warren Buffett, arguably the world’s preeminent investment mind, described the qualities that enabled certain companies to withstand external as a ‘<em>competitive moat</em>’ — akin to waters around castles that prevent attackers from breaching its walls. MilanCo is a business with a strong competitive moat, it has loyal customers who purchase its product on the basis of quality and not for its price. Customers less sensitive to price allows a business to raise margins or pass on cost increases without adversely affecting revenues. Customers with a strong loyalty to the brand are much more difficult for competitors to steal.</p><p>On the opposite end of the spectrum, FelixCo’s lack of brand power and limited relationship with end customers meant that it was unable to mitigate the increased competitiveness of the Belgian chocolate market following KitBury’s entry. Without a competitive moat, FelixCo’s castle fell swiftly under KitBury’s attack. Success brings competition, it is imperative that investors seek shelter in the safety of businesses capable of defending itself against this ever lurking threat.</p><h4>Quality is … limited exposure to commodities</h4><p>Commodities are products that are substantially fungible, largely equivalent to products from other producers or have close substitutes. Commodities are a spectrum, the further along the spectrum the less reactive consumers are to the price.</p><p>Investor can go a fairway in determining the sustainability of high profit margins of a company or industry by ascertaining the position of the product on the commodity spectrum. FelixCo’s produced reasonably commoditised products and as such the Company had limited pricing power. When KitBury entered the market, FelixCo found limited completive avenues other than lowering price.</p><p>At the extreme end on the commodity spectrum, such as oil or metals, individual producers, or indeed even a large group of producers have no ability whatsoever to influence prices. The long run price of a fully commoditised product is the marginal cost of the highest cost producer that is required to meet demand. Thus, the only competitive tool for commoditised industries is reducing cost of production, often by increasing volume to achieve superior economies of scale.</p><p>Companies competing purely on price are unable to sustainably generate high returns or profit margins. The industries relegated to engaging in pure price competition results in little economic profit. The result is increasing consolidation as companies seek to increase its scale and reduce costs. Investors focused on quality must stay vigilant for companies that are trending towards commoditisation and have discipline to stick with investments in companies with ample pricing power.</p><h4>Quality is … owning the customer relationship</h4><p>A company’s relationship with its<strong> </strong>customers is a critical asset, and often far more valuable than its fixed assets. MilanCo’s strategy was to pursue a vertically integrated operation with direct product distribution gave the company control of the entire value chain from production all the way to sale to the end customer. This incurred higher costs but allowed the company to develop an important intangible asset — its customer relationship.</p><p>On the other hand, FelixCo pursued a more concentrated strategy focusing primarily on production, instead choosing to have limited role in interacting with its end customers. FelixCo’s made a conscious choice to simplify his operation by first selling to supermarket and wholesalers who on-sold it to consumers. By relying on the middle man, Felix reduced the complexity of his operations and freed up management resources in order to focus on efficiency and volumes. However this resulted in a loss of the economic margin and most importantly reduced his revenue security.</p><p>FelixCo’s vulnerability to the changing preferences of the distributor was the ultimate nail in the coffin. Investors looking for quality would do well to identify companies with a strong connection to its end customers.</p><h4>Quality is … being capital light</h4><p>Market commentators often look to earnings and earnings growth as the primary drivers of value. In the previous example, a financial analyst may see two chocolate companies growing earnings at similar rates and extrapolate that they ought to be valued at similar multiples of earnings. The willingness for some investors to rely on earnings growth as a sole factor justifying higher valuations is one of the most critical investment follies.</p><p>To illustrate the folly of why earnings growth alone is an insufficient metric, let’s assess the following scenario:</p><p><em>A proprietor of Blockbusters video rental stores looking to grow earnings could opt to open new stores . However, new video rental stores will never generate sufficient profits to justify its initial investment whilst requiring the foolish proprietor to stump up more capital. Does the higher rate of growth here justify a premium valuation?</em></p><p>As prudent investors, we must pay attention to the quality of earnings and only attribute higher valuation to organic growth — that is, growth that is not dependent on additional capital injection. We must be attentive and ascertain whether a company was able to achieve its stellar growth due to it’s the inherent strengths or by deploying greater capital.</p><p>FelixCo’s business required ever greater investments on property, plant and equipment to sustain its profits. Because of the different investment requirements, it is imprudent to attribute the same value to FelixCo even though it was able to grow profits at the same rate as MilanCo. MilanCo, retaining 20% of its earnings for reinvestment is a far superior business compared to FelixCo which generated similar earnings growth but required 50% of all earnings to be retained.</p><h4>Quality is … maintaining low leverage</h4><p>Capital structure and leverage varies among industries. For example, utilities can and typically take on massive leverage, they are able to do this as their earnings are inherently stable, and are often protected by minimum return hurdles agreed upon with government. On the other hand, companies whose revenues are exposed to exogenous cyclical movements such as consumer discretionary or mining typically do not rely on debt as they must ensure cashflows are sufficient to service debts in during cyclical troughs.</p><p>The extent to which a company can safely employ debt is contingent on the predictability of its earnings. Leverage amplifies the magnitude of results, capable of turning low returns into high returns. However, it is a double-edged sword, equally capable of turning periods of poor returns from bad to fatal. Evaluating the profitability and earnings power of companies must be with due consideration to the extent to which results were amplified by leverage.</p><p>Some companies, including those in cyclical industries seek to employ leverage to amplify mediocre returns. Although FelixCo’s business was able to generate similar profits to MilanCo, it required far greater amount of leverage to do so. The leverage the company employed ultimately proved to be excessive owing to its exposure to discretionary purchasing habits.</p><p>The astute investor should mindful of management that employ excessive leverage and make necessary adjustments to strongly performing but highly levered companies to account for the increased risk profile.</p><h4>What makes a business truly great?</h4><p>The common denominator of all quality businesses is that they create value for shareholders. They do this by using capital they raise from investors to generate future cash flows at rates of return exceeding the cost of capital (the rate investors require as payment). The faster companies can increase their revenues and deploy more capital at attractive rates of return, the more value they are able to create.</p><p>The combination of growth and return on invested capital (ROIC) relative to its cost is what drives value and provides outsized return on investment. The holy grail of investing is to identify companies capable of generating consistently healthy returns on investment not just in the near term but consistently in the future.</p><p>Most companies experience periods of accelerated value creation or economic profit in the short run, however greater prosperity invariably brings additional competition.</p><p>In a traffic jam, the perception of a particular lane going faster than the others brings more cars, more traffic in the faster lane eventually results in the lane slowing down. Therefore, a typical driver can only expect to be in a fast lane for a brief moment before it slows down again. Extending this analogy, companies or industries seen to be generating out sized profits brings new entrants which increases competition, reducing margins and thus quickly eliminating the ability for incumbents to generate excess profits.</p><p>In the scenario of the chocolatiers, Milan and Felix’s healthy profits entices KitBury to also produce Belgian chocolate which erodes the profitability of the incumbents. Companies can sustain strong growth and high returns on invested capital only if they have a well-defined competitive advantage making them better contenders in their respective markets.</p><p>Knowing the winners is only one side of the coin, once we’re able to correctly identify quality, the next step is to work out what’s a fair price to pay for a piece of them. That is undoubtedly the hardest part of investing and where most stumble…</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7d5fc88b10cc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Steadfast Insurance Group]]></title>
            <link>https://farnampartners.medium.com/steadfast-insurance-group-88a53432239e?source=rss-fc48a5960ddf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/88a53432239e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[valuation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance-and-banking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Farnam Partners]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Apr 2018 12:15:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-01T12:24:20.689Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Inflection point in a technological transformation, platform growth imminent</h4><h4>PDF Link:</h4><p><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1T8xIOaX7BsqfAupWmZt4JGlD1aN51TXE/view?usp=sharing">https://drive.google.com/file/d/1T8xIOaX7BsqfAupWmZt4JGlD1aN51TXE/view?usp=sharing</a></p><h4>Model Link:</h4><p><a href="https://drive.google.com/open?id=1IlYgbMoiNeU7mZ13rWfi-EbPnSwPTSC4">https://drive.google.com/open?id=1IlYgbMoiNeU7mZ13rWfi-EbPnSwPTSC4</a></p><h3><strong>Portfolio Manager Summary</strong></h3><p>Steadfast Insurance Group (“<strong>Steadfast</strong>” or the “<strong>Company</strong>”) is the largest general insurance brokerage network and underwriting agencies group in Australasia, with growing operations in Asia and Europe.</p><ul><li>The Company operates a franchise structure for general insurance brokers who aggregates purchasing power and also provides common marketing, branding, back office services and IT infrastructure (“<strong>Steadfast Network</strong>” or the “<strong>Network</strong>”).</li><li>The Company also earns income through underwriting agencies and selective ownership of some brokers within the Network.</li></ul><p><strong>What is the equity story?</strong></p><ul><li>Steadfast is in the process of embedding itself within the Australasian commercial insurance ecosystem via its proprietary tech platform</li><li>Steadfast has directed substantial investment and management resources since IPO towards building its technology platform. This technology is world leading and is a significant IP for the Company however is not yet revenue generating (and not valued by the market).</li><li>Steadfast’s technology is highly disruptive to the status quo in SME insurance distribution. The Company hopes to achieve this via digitising and automating manual processes whilst at the same time controlling information flow, creating an option value to monetize its data monopoly.</li><li>Steadfast’s long term growth potential is underappreciated by the market because:</li><li>Technology initiatives are just starting to be deployed and are expected to substantially elevate operating efficiency and deliver additional SaaS based income.</li><li>Steadfast has largely completed the build out of its core platform in Australasia and is now looking to export its business model internationally. This is expected to deliver a step change in growth momentum whilst delivering additional economies of scale.</li></ul><p><strong>Why the equity story is not priced in?</strong></p><ul><li>The market is not attributing value to Steadfast’s long term growth potential. Steadfast trades at similar multiple (~13x 1Yr Forward EV/EBITDA) to both international and its closest competitor (AUB Group), which is ~40% of Steadfast’s size, has a much narrower business focus and is a number of years behind Steadfast on technology investments.</li><li>Steadfast’s multiple has traded in line with historical levels, the business has not experienced re-rating in the last 2 years. This is inconsistent with improvements in fundamental drivers including maturing technology development, increased economies of scale and revenue synergies from business unit integration which should result in improved outlook for growth and ROIC in the intermediate term.</li><li><strong>Weighted DCF valuation of ~2.9bn implies ~39% upside on current value.</strong></li></ul><p><strong>What is the catalyst?</strong></p><ul><li>The Company is at an inflection point in its growth cycle. The recommended investment horizon is 2 years, this should allow sufficient runway for Steadfast’s existing strategies to deliver tangible benefits and be reflected in the consensus valuation.</li><li>Short term catalysts for earnings include:</li><li>Insurance pricing is in the midst of a bull cycle, which is providing a growth tailwind.</li><li>Tangible financial benefits gaining momentum as technology investments and integration of Steadfast businesses reach completion.</li><li>Technology developments will be largely complete by FY18, at which point earnings will benefit from both increased revenues and reduced technology development costs.</li><li>Greater guidance on go forward international expansion strategy including disclosure of growing earnings contributions.</li></ul><h3>Company Overview</h3><p><em>Note: The company overview is extended to provide adequate detail on Steadfast’s various business units for the benefit of readers unfamiliar with the insurance broking / underwriting industry.</em></p><p><strong>A. Steadfast CoreCo — What the consensus sees</strong></p><p><strong>Overview</strong></p><ul><li>Steadfast is a consolidator of insurance brokers and underwriting agencies. The company acts as the client interfacer connecting SMEs to insurers.</li><li>Steadfast is the market leader with ~31% market share across Australia, its nearest competitor is AUB Group (“<strong>AUB</strong>”) with the rest of the market comprised of fragmented independent practices which are being consolidated by both Steadfast and AUB.</li></ul><p>Figure 1: Overview of the Steadfast Ecosystem</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/319/1*VRY4pBYfAn9spx14ZKhvFw.png" /></figure><p>Figure 2: Australian insurance market by GWP</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/314/1*qPX6S5FVRD3OjPvhqtrtow.png" /></figure><ul><li>There are 4 key components of the core Steadfast business:</li></ul><p><strong>1. Steadfast Network (Franchise business)</strong></p><ul><li>Insurance brokers assist SME clients in sourcing the insurance product most suitable to their specific business requirements and assist insurers in policy servicing and claims management. Insurance brokers are paid a fixed or percentage based commission and upfront origination fee.</li><li>The insurance broking business model is similar to mortgage broking, it is conceptually appropriate to compare the Steadfast Network to mortgage broking franchises such as Aussie Homeloans, RAMS etc.</li><li>A insurance broking network is a collection of individual brokers who work together and pool their Gross Written Premium (“<strong>GWP</strong>”) under a mutual banner to increase bargaining power over insurance manufacturers (such as QBE, IAG, Suncorp etc.), this allows the aggregated group to have greater bargaining power as a whole compared to operating as independent entities.</li><li>There are currently 365 brokers in the Steadfast Network, enjoying the benefits of the Steadfast brand, purchasing power, IT systems and back office support.</li><li>Steadfast Network brokers receive improved market access, exclusive products and services as well as access to Steadfast IT systems.</li><li>The Steadfast Network receives marketing and administration fees (“<strong>M&amp;A Fees</strong>”) from insurers for policy distribution, a portion of which is rebated back to Steadfast insurance brokers.</li><li>Steadfast also charges fees for the suite of services it provides to it’s the Network (defined as “<strong>Franchisee fees</strong>” for the purposes of this memo) including technology, marketing, branding, back office services etc.</li><li>Steadfast currently generates a negligible portion of revenues from franchisee fees, instead its strategy has been to aggressively compete for market share by offering added services below market rates<em>.</em></li><li>Management has chosen tactically to not reprice its franchise fees in line with the step up in quality of its service offering. As brokers become entrenched within the Steadfast Network, they become increasingly price inelastic, creating the opportunity for the Company to call upon a pricing lever as an enduring driver of earnings.</li><li>The cost base of the Steadfast Network is largely fixed with very attractive unit economics. Each additional member brings direct revenues in the form of M&amp;A Fees and Franchisee Fees and indirect benefits from improvement in collective bargaining power over insurers whilst incurring minimal marginal cost.</li><li>The Steadfast Network’s sole competitor in Australia is AUB Group which operates a legacy business model which provides less sophisticated technology and offers minimal efficiency benefits from automation. There are no international competitors with comparable value proposition for insurance brokers.</li><li>The Steadfast Network also provides network benefits to other Steadfast’s business units, which will be explored below.</li></ul><p><strong>2. Steadfast Equity Brokers (Company owned stores)</strong></p><ul><li>Steadfast selectively purchases equity stakes ranging from 25%-100% in brokers within the Steadfast Network. Of the 365 brokers within its network, Steadfast has equity stakes in 62 (or ~17% of the Network).</li><li>Consolidation of brokers within the Steadfast Network has been the primary driver of growth over the last few years.</li><li>Steadfast is also the natural acquirer for insurance brokers within its network seeking a liquidity event upon retirement.</li><li>Because of the transparency provided by the Steadfast Network, the Company is able to gather data on the long term financial performance of brokers within the Network. Steadfast utilises this information advantage and selectively purchases high performing network brokers at attractive prices.</li><li>Because of its informational advantage, Steadfast is relatively insulated from risk of overpaying for broker acquisitions within the Network, which facilitates a steady avenue of low risk and acquisition targets to supplement organic growth.</li><li>Steadfast acquires new brokers in their network based on strict acquisition criteria including cultural fit, strategic alignment and financial performance.</li><li>Steadfast combines the back office functions within brokers that it holds a controlling interest in to achieve cost synergies and economies of scale , a practice the company refers to as <strong>“Hubbing”</strong> which will be a continued source of margin improvements going forward.</li><li>Steadfast had historically been able to purchase brokers for low multiples and benefit from both the multiple arbitrage as well as cost synergies, however independent brokers within the Steadfast Network have recognised this and asking prices have been increasing, reducing the attractiveness of broker acquisitions as primary source of growth.</li></ul><p>Figure 3: Steadfast’s network split by GWP</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/406/1*ZVJXzfRVHsuUCxPWTOa24A.png" /></figure><p><strong>3. Underwriting agencies (Distribution for highly specialised insurance products)</strong></p><ul><li>An underwriting agency distributes specialised insurance products through insurance brokers (and through direct channels for personal lines business) on behalf of insurers.</li><li>Insurer typically utilises underwriting agencies to service specialised risk categories which are too cost prohibitive to assess internally. Underwriting agencies utilises specialised market knowledge to offer products in niche areas of insurance.</li><li>Steadfast operates a collection of 25 underwriting agencies, each specialising in a different insurance product.</li><li>Steadfast has automated technology link within its network (through the Steadfast Client Trading Platform) into the Lloyds of London marketplace via the London Superbinder.</li><li>Lloyds of London is a marketplace that facilitates purchaser (insurer) and sellers (insured) of niche risk to transact. Lloyd participants include global insurers, reinsurers, underwriting agencies and underwriting agents.</li><li>Each of Steadfast’s underwriting agencies traditionally interfaced with the Lloyds of London marketplace on an individualised basis. The London SuperBinder is a Steadfast initiative which aggregates communication from all classes of underwriting agencies into a single point of contact in the Lloyds of London market.</li><li>This substantially improves turn-around time, operating efficiencies and lowers costs.</li><li>Steadfast underwriting agencies benefits from revenue synergies from the Steadfast Network.</li></ul><p>Figure 4: Snapshot of Steadfast’s underwriting agencies:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/672/1*mzYyJCkC9b37m9Ip8SlkPQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>4. Ancillary services</strong></p><ul><li>Ancillary services refer to the 7 businesses supporting the Steadfast Network and underwriting agencies. These include:</li><li><strong>Premium funding</strong> — Provides financing for clients taking out insurance policies.</li><li><strong>Back office solutions / consulting</strong> — Provides services to brokers looking to optimise back office functions.</li><li><strong>Reinsurance</strong> — Specialised reinsurance broking which services insurers and Network brokers, bringing Lloyds capabilities within the Network.</li><li><strong>Direct insurance</strong> — Provides life insurance and wealth management related policies for SME clients within the Network.</li><li><strong>Technology services</strong> — <em>outlined separately below.</em></li><li>Steadfast’s Network brokers, as the largest aggregated pool of commercial insurance purchasers in Australasia, are the primary customers for Steadfast’s ancillary services.</li></ul><p>Figure 5: Snapshot of Steadfast’s Ancillary Services</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/540/1*iqVHi_uYlKEDeSuR-1t4LQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>B. Steadfast TechCo — Hidden gem unappreciated by the consensus</strong></p><ul><li>Steadfast has leveraged its long history in the SME insurance broking industry to identify frictional inefficiencies in insurance distribution and policy servicing.</li><li>The Company has had the unique opportunity to utilise its scale and deploy technology driven solutions to automate large portions of processes traditionally performed manually.</li><li>Steadfast’s technology platform has been developed in-house to specifically cater to insurance brokers; this technology is globally relevant and has the potential to be massively disruptive to the insurance broking industry.</li><li>Steadfast has invested in these technologies to deliver better client outcomes, operational performance and cost efficiencies. These technologies are an enabler for superior customer service and strengthens Steadfast’s competitive moat.</li><li>Steadfast’s technologies provide a substantial competitive advantage to brokers in the Steadfast Network vs. competitors or operating as an independent broker.</li><li>The technology is applicable internationally in jurisdictions wherever an independent insurance broking model operates such as countries in EMEA and Asia.</li><li>Steadfast’s Technology delivers:</li><li><strong>Reduced cost to insurance brokers</strong> whilst improving the appeal of the Steadfast Network, as well as increasing profits for Steadfasts’ equity brokers;</li><li><strong>Reduced cost to insurers</strong> and incentivises insurers to write policies through Steadfast’s platform. Insurers rebate a portion of their cost savings for using Steadfast Technologies to Steadfast in the form of increased M&amp;A commissions rate (vis-a-vis commissions paid for the same policy originated via a traditional manual underwriting process); and</li><li><strong>Superior outcome for clients </strong>such as faster turnaround time, ability to cost effectively deliver best in class policies specifically tailored to client needs.</li></ul><p>Figure 6. Overview of the Steadfast Technology Ecosystem</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/290/1*hvgW5O24x6u1WQGYlF4VZA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Insight</strong></p><ul><li>INSIGHT is the core IT system for insurance brokers designed to improve efficiency and reduce back office costs.</li><li>INSIGHT is a content management system with search engine based software which gives brokers a single view of their customers and their business.</li><li>Next generation cloud based business management / CRM tool which allow brokers to remove their dependence on legacy software.</li><li>INSIGHT controls, analyses and aggregates all data into a single platform with an open interface that plug into other data sources including accounting programs.</li><li>Brokers that transition to the INSIGHT platform reduces their IT costs by up to 40% along with other indirect and yet unmeasured reduction in back office costs.</li><li>37 brokers have been transitioned to date (out of total network brokers of ~350). Revenues from INSIGHT are expected to commence in FY18 with further uplift expected in FY19.</li></ul><p><strong>Underwriter Central</strong></p><ul><li>Underwriter Central is a cloud based core IT platform for underwriting agencies.</li><li>Allows underwriters to manage the full policy lifecycle including implementing policy rules, ratings and claims management.</li><li>Underwriting Central is the first platform in the world to directly interface with Lloyds of London, essentially allowing Steadfast underwriting agencies to automate quote seeking from Lloyds of London, generating superior pricing, expedites policy turnaround, improves efficiency, and massively reduce costs for all parties</li><li>Currently in 8 underwriting agencies, 3 conversions planned for FY18</li><li>Evidence of margin acceleration for underwriting agencies following implementation of Underwriter Central</li></ul><p><strong>Steadfast Client Trading Platform (“SCTP”)</strong></p><ul><li>SCTP is a policy trading and underwriting marketplace which provides an automated platform linking Steadfast brokers to participating underwriters (both direct insurers and Steadfast’s Underwriting Agencies).</li><li><strong>Benefits for clients:</strong> market leading policy wording, instant policy issuance, genuine contestable marketplace, triage claims service, most competitive pricing.</li><li><strong>Benefits for brokers:</strong> automated market access to leading policy providers, higher commission rates, complete data analytics, remove data entry and increases efficiency.</li><li><strong>Benefits for insurers:</strong> automated access to Steadfast Network for all policies placed on the platform, resulting in significantly reduced processing costs.</li><li>SCTP creates an ‘online contestable marketplace’ whereby insurers can bid’ in real time for commercial insurance policies that are put up ‘for sale’ by Steadfast brokers. Brokers will upload policy requirements and client details. The platform is integrated with the London Superbinder (via Underwriter Central) as well as the INSIGHT platform.</li><li>Shifts insurance quote pricing and policy maintenance to an online platform, eliminates manual data entry and greatly increases the efficiency of the insurance broking and underwriting process.</li><li>SCTP is a massively disruptive technology and will create an evolution in the insurance distribution process. The impact of the SCTP platform is comparable to the roll out of electronic trading for security exchanges (i.e. open outcry vs. electronic trading).</li><li>Binding contracts with insurer partners on 5 insurance lines, full rollout of these expected in early 2019. Partial revenue commences in FY18 with further uplift expected in FY19.</li></ul><p><strong>Data analytics</strong></p><ul><li>Steadfast generates the largest commercial insurance data set in Australasia and is building its data analytics capabilities.</li><li>Data analytics gives Steadfast an informational advantage over competitors and provides opportunity to offer superior client service and insights to the Steadfast Network as well as superior risk selection for its underwriting agencies.</li><li>Potential for data analytics to be a long term driver of durable competitive advantage with additional monetization benefit via sale of data driven insights to insurers to assist with underwriting and risk selection.</li></ul><h3>Investment Thesis</h3><p><strong>What is priced in?</strong></p><ul><li>The market views Steadfast’s core business as largely stable, medium growth and low risk whilst being able to rely on bolt-ons as a lever to accelerate growth.</li><li>The market recognises organic growth will improve, largely supported by the hardening insurance cycle.</li><li>The market understands the attractiveness of its business model in delivering low risk recurring revenues.</li><li>The Company has historically outlaid large sums on acquisitions and relied on multiple arbitrage and cost synergies as a primary source of value creation.</li><li>However, the upside from its technology investments and associated platform advantage / network effect remains sparely appraised by market participants.</li></ul><p><strong>What the market does not recognise?</strong></p><p>· <strong>The core thesis of this memo argues that the benefits from Steadfast’s investment in technology are not understood and ignored by the market.</strong></p><p>· Steadfast’s historical growth has been largely acquisition driven, however the Company has now built scale and demonstrated success in extracting value from tighter integration. Going forward, Steadfast will benefit symbiotic relationship between its various component businesses.</p><p>· The Company is at an inflection point in its lifecycle and is beginning to transition towards a tech-driven business model with the potential to be a monopoly in the SME insurance distribution market.</p><p>· As the Company has achieved sufficient scale, its future growth will be supported by network effects and durable competitive advantage.</p><p>· Steadfast should be viewed as a high growth business with defensible, highly recurring and capital light earnings.</p><p><strong>Steadfast’s technology platform is expected to result in earnings uplift by generating an additional SaaS-like revenue stream</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Higher franchise fees:</strong> Steadfast is not yet raising network fees to be in line with improvement in service, there is a potential for a significant uplift in franchise fees once the pricing policy is adjusted.</li><li>The benefits from utilising Steadfast Network currently outstrip the fees Steadfast charges.</li><li>IT systems are core to business operations and Network brokers will find it increasingly difficult to regress to legacy processes &amp; IT systems after it transitions to the Steadfast network.</li><li>High switching costs and lack of direct competitor to its service means Steadfast has immense bargaining power over its franchisees. As price elasticity is expected to be minimal, Steadfast will be able to re-price its services as an earnings lever.</li><li><strong>Higher M&amp;A fees: </strong>Insurers<strong> </strong>utilising the SCTP for policy distribution will incur lower costs, a portion of this cost savings will get passed down by insurers to Steadfast brokers</li><li>Steadfast has been able to negotiate increased commissions rates for brokers utilising the SCTP.</li><li>A growing Network allows Steadfast to have superior bargaining power over insurers, with potential for Steadfast to increase the share SCTP cost savings it enjoys in the via negotiating higher commissions.</li></ul><p><strong>Steadfast’s technology platform provides indirect benefits by substantially elevating the Company’s competitive advantage and ability to generate higher return on capital</strong></p><ul><li>Steadfast’s technology investments elevate its competitive position and become the enabler for ecosystem growth.</li><li><strong>Drivers for Steadfast Network growth:</strong> Improved service proposition encourages additional broker inflows into the Steadfast Network, delivering revenue uplift.</li><li><strong>Drivers for equity brokers and underwriting agencies growth: </strong>Above system organic growth by taking share from competitors, driven by improving customer service and value proposition.</li><li><strong>Drivers for higher margins: </strong>Reduction in operating costs and margin uplift as processes is increasing automated and back office operations are consolidated.</li></ul><p><strong>As the Steadfast ecosystem matures, network effects will drive acceleration in organic growth and ROIC uplift</strong></p><ul><li>Although Steadfast requires minimal capital to grow organically, it’s historical growth have primarily come from a ‘roll-up’ strategy, this growth is capital intensive and delivers high growth however reduces its ROIC.</li><li>Future growth is expected to be increasingly driven by organic, capital light sources. Notable new growth initiative includes:</li><li><strong>Private label / Direct Insurance:</strong> Steadfast is moving into distributing self-branded products through the client trading platform including life insurance.</li><li>Launched in FY16 and currently growing at ~100% CAGR.</li><li><strong>U/W Agencies:</strong> Underwriting agencies expanding organically into additional policy types. Steadfast brokers diverting premiums towards Steadfast’s underwriting agencies.</li><li><strong>Margin uplift:</strong> Driven by cost savings as technologies are deployed.</li></ul><p><strong>Acceleration of international expansion will expand addressable market and drive long term growth</strong></p><ul><li>Steadfast’s growth in core A&amp;NZ markets may become more laboured as the Company grows its market share. However, the globalisation of the Steadfast model opens up next leg of growth opportunities including additional fees in the short term as the Steadfast Network expands offshore.</li><li>Any incremental revenue requires minimal capex for Steadfast and is low risk.</li><li>Steadfast recently acquired unisonBrokers (for negligible consideration), one of the largest global network of general insurance brokers with 200 brokers across 130 countries and US$17 billion of GWP.</li><li>This is expected to be the first phase of Steadfast’s global expansion.</li><li>Potential for Steadfast to selectively purchase equity stakes in high quality brokers in international markets and rapidly grow with the benefits of larger addressable markets in Asia &amp; Europe.</li></ul><p><strong>What is the evidence for this?</strong></p><p>· Limited valuation premium compared to lower quality domestic and international peers</p><p>· Limited evidence of re-rating in forward multiple as Steadfast’s platform strategy reaches maturity</p><p>Figure 7: NTM EV/EBITDA valuation for domestic and international comparables</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/1*QT3-y4vxQUxcj5WXTJ3zlQ.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>Chart Commentary:</em></strong></p><p><em>Steadfast currently trades on a forward multiple of 12.9x, a slight discount to AUB (13.1x) and global peers.</em> <em>Steadfast’ valuation multiples have largely trended in line with peers, despite the progressive maturity in its technology strategy.</em> <em>The lack of valuation premium to peers as well as lack of recent re-rating provides support to the thesis that the market is largely not attributing value to Steadfast’s technology initiatives. Furthermore, the substantial correlation between AUB and Steadfast’s capitalisation multiple demonstrate the market’s perceived irrelevance to the</em> <em>divergence in Steadfast’s in long term potential relative to AUB.</em></p><p>Figure 8: Steadfast share price performance against AUB Group</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/448/1*0nCnGGcKT7zhdsoMLn-Sag.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>Chart Commentary:</em></strong></p><p><em>Steadfast’s share price has grown at a slightly higher rate than AUB, owing primarily to faster EPS growth. There is substantial correlation in their share price movements, which provides evidence that the market views the stocks as largely similar with both players primarily trading on macro fundamentals. Commentary from sell-side research and analysts Q&amp;A is supportive of this thesis.</em></p><p>What is the catalyst for a re-rating?</p><p><strong>Higher than expected earnings growth over FY18 / FY19.</strong></p><ul><li>Based on management commentary on implementation, benefits from TechCo should become more visible over FY18 / FY19, during this period Steadfast’s earnings is expected to benefit from the dual tailwinds of expense reduction and earnings increase.</li><li>Greater clarity on earnings uplift is expected to drive a re-rating in the stock as the consensus catches up with the emerging upside from Steadfast’s technology initiatives.</li></ul><p>Figure 9: Steadfast’s IT lifecycle</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/642/1*YmpWaxOcoKLyb_b46x2Agw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Declining capital intensity and step up in dividends.</strong></p><ul><li>Earnings growth will become increasingly less acquisition driven and require reduced capital investments.</li><li>Pivot towards organic growth will improve ROIC whilst facilitating a step up in capital returns.</li><li>Potential increase in dividend payout in the medium term may result in the consensus re-evaluating earnings quality and drive a re-rating.</li></ul><p><strong>Potential to be acquired by global insurance broker.</strong></p><ul><li>Steadfast’s platform has enormous strategic value to a global insurance broker such as Aon, Jardine etc.</li><li>Acquisition of Steadfast’s technology IP will allow global insurance brokers to deploy it across their international network.</li></ul><h3>Risks</h3><h4><strong>Short Term</strong></h4><p><strong>Insurance Cycle</strong> — Insurance prices drives top line growth for Steadfast and an abrupt downturn in the cycle will negatively affect revenues</p><p><em>Mitigants:</em></p><ul><li>Historically insurance market pricing moves on a predictable cyclical pattern dependent on the level of capital in the insurance system.</li><li>The current upturn in the insurance cycle has been ~2 years and there is limited risk in an immediately downturn in the short to medium term.</li><li>Steadfast is also able to rely on internal commission / pricing levers also able to increase fees to somewhat offset pressures in the industry top line.</li></ul><p><strong>Valuation </strong>— Trading at an expensive valuation (~20x 1 Yr Fwd. P/E), may take time before the market appreciates the recurring revenue and risk free growth pipeline. In the meantime any short term shocks may result in a multiple contractions.</p><p><em>Mitigant:</em></p><ul><li>Long-term investment horizon.</li></ul><h4><strong>Long Term</strong></h4><p><strong>Competitor replication of tech strategy </strong>— Steadfast’s emerging technology platform is a principal driver of the investment thesis. Global competitors may look to replicate Steadfast’s business model whilst it has yet to reach full maturity.</p><p><em>Mitigant:</em></p><ul><li>It is more cost effective for competitors simply acquire Steadfast and its IP rather than replicate Steadfast’s technology. The size of Steadfast relative to global peers means that it is a viable acquisition target.</li><li>Competitors of scale are primarily US based and operate in a corporatised market (i.e. no franchise model) and would only look to replicate Steadfast’s technology as a means to expand their offshore presence, in which case an acquisition of Steadfast is a more reasonable strategy.</li></ul><p><strong>Changes in bargaining power between insurers </strong>— Structural decline in commission rates paid to brokers and / or SMEs going direct to insurers for policies rather than via a broker</p><p><em>Mitigant:</em></p><ul><li>Industry landscape is unlikely to change in the short term, bargaining power is expected to shift towards Steadfast rather than insurers given Steadfast’s increasing scale and buying power.</li><li>Commercial insurance policies are non-commoditised and require holistic understanding of a client’s which is best performed under a broker model. It is unlikely in the short term that direct distribution will be able to offer comparative policy objectives or cheaper price especially for more niche policies.</li></ul><p><strong>Acquisition risk </strong>— Always the risk with high growth acquisitive businesses. Going forward Steadfast may make large acquisitions or expansion that is value destructive or valuations for acquisitions may increase which will reduce the relative attractiveness of pursuing M&amp;A</p><p><em>Mitigant:</em></p><ul><li>Historically acquisitions have occurred at average 7.0x EV /EBITA and have generated ~10% return after tax.</li><li>Management have been very successful with integration previous acquisitions, Steadfast’s executive team are long-time industry veterans with a history of prudent M&amp;A.</li><li>Recent declines in acquisitions vendor valuation expectation increasing is a positive and indicative of management discipline.</li><li>Steadfast is a natural acquirer for the businesses within its broker network due to information advantages and substantial synergies available.</li></ul><p><strong>Execution of international strategy </strong>— The overseas insurance broking market may be different to Australasia, Steadfast may overestimate its ability to execute on international strategy. Management team may stretch itself too thin in managing a global business.</p><p><em>Mitigant:</em></p><ul><li>International growth likely to be low risk — Initial rollout into new regions is based on brokers joining its network and will be capital light.</li><li>Given previous M&amp;A track record Steadfast will likely take a ‘wait and see’ approach and gather data on its network brokers before making targeted acquisitions.</li></ul><p><strong>Accounting </strong>— Steadfast’s financial statements are extremely opaque with limited disclosures especially on a number of recurring non-cash adjustments. Ongoing acquisitions distort ability to reliably estimate organic P&amp;L and complicate assessment of organic cost reduction / top line growth</p><p><em>Mitigant:</em></p><ul><li>Limited fraud risk given long term management alignment.</li><li>No history of ambitious guidance, healthy cash conversion and no recent increase in gearing.</li><li><strong>Financial performance of ancillary services </strong>— Ancillary services margin compression declining despite growth, want to understand the drivers for this including potential of any non-recurring items\</li></ul><p>Mitigant:</p><ul><li>Small proportion of overall earnings and may not be material.</li></ul><h4><strong>Major follow up diligence areas:</strong></h4><p><strong>Commercial</strong></p><p><strong>Quantify value creation from Technology </strong>— Interview brokers in the Steadfast Network and AUB Network to compare and contrast differences in service offering, pricing etc.</p><p>o <strong>Internal value creation</strong> — Quantify cost savings under status quo vs. Steadfast automated model, facilitates an estimation of potential steady state margins under new operating model</p><p>o <strong>External value creation</strong> — Quantify benefits to customers under status quo vs. Steadfast automated model. Measure total value uplift under the new system which will facilitate estimation of Steadfast’s share of this value creation along the eco-system</p><p><strong>International applicability — </strong>Deep dive in insurance<strong> </strong>broking business model in offshore regions to identify compatibility with Steadfast’s business model</p><p>o Similarities and differences in the broking model offshore, how difficult will international expansion be?</p><p>o Is it plug and play? Or material changes to the infrastructure required adapting to each region.</p><p>o Are there differences in bargaining power and competitive dynamics in offshore markets?</p><p>o Are there different regulatory regimes or broking practices in foreign regions?</p><p><strong>Insurance broking model</strong> — Conduct commercial due diligence on emerging distribution strategies in this industry</p><ul><li>Assess the long term staying power for insurance broking.</li><li>Identify emerging areas in direct distribution that may disintermediate the current broking model.</li></ul><p><strong>Accounting</strong></p><p><strong>Accounting diligence </strong>— Gain comfort on the standalone performance of Steadfast segments with a particular emphasis on:</p><ul><li><strong>Ancillary service units: </strong>Understand the revenue drivers and dynamics behind ancillary businesses, are there benefits to scale in these businesses. Is there shrinking take-up or is Steadfast instead choosing to engage in a loss leader strategy and provide these services at a low price to encourage independent brokers to join the Steadfast Network.</li><li><strong>NCI / Intercompany transactions: </strong>Understand flow of funds between Steadfast equity brokers and underwriting agencies including proportion of intercompany transactions and composition of non-controlling interest.</li><li><strong>Steadfast Network: </strong>Economics of M&amp;A fees and franchise fees including terms between Steadfast, insurance partners and network brokers.</li><li><strong>Organic growth / cost out:</strong> Estimate business as usual / organic performance.</li></ul><h3>Valuation / Business Drivers:</h3><p><strong>Valuation Summary</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*hzt9XoYlbP1fW1SRY1pFUg.png" /></figure><ul><li>Business modelled on a sum of the parts basis with a 10 year projection.</li><li>Top line drivers based on projection of the Australian commercial insurance GWP and Steadfast’s share of this GWP.</li><li>Margin assumptions driving EBITA — Substantial operating leverage inherent within this business with EBITA margins modelled to increase, with platform bolt-on and network effects driving top line revenue.</li><li>No discretionary capex projected outside of bolt on acquisitions, with maintenance capex assumed to be consistent with historical depreciation rates.</li><li>Weighted DCF valuation of ~2.9bn implies ~39% upside on current value and is based on base, bull, down and worst case with 50%, 20%, 20%, and 10% probability respectively.</li><li>All cases assume discount rate of 10.0% and terminal growth rates of 3%.</li></ul><h4>Overview of Model Drivers</h4><p><strong>Steadfast Network</strong></p><ul><li>Number of brokers in the network / $ generated by the Steadfast Network.</li><li>Also drives revenues for other segments.</li><li>Marketing and administration fees per $ of premium.</li><li>Projected to increase due to:</li><li>Steadfast’s strengthening bargaining power as its premium pool grows.</li><li>Cost savings passed down by insurers for utilising the SCTP.</li><li>Franchise fees per $ of premium.</li><li>Projected to increase due to:</li><li>Roll out of INSIGHT &amp; SCTP.</li><li>Ongoing repricing of fees to be in line with the benefit of utilising the Steadfast Network.</li><li>Margins driven by expenses including labour, consumables and software depreciation as well as ongoing network maintenance and improvement expenses:</li><li>Costs assumed to be largely fixed, with rapid improvement in margins as the system is deployed over the forecast period.</li></ul><p><strong>Steadfast Equity Brokers</strong></p><ul><li>The number of equity brokers in the network is assumed to be constant in order to maintain model integrity:</li><li>Difficult to project changes in non-controlling interest / Steadfast increasing stakes in existing equity brokers.</li><li>Non-controlling interest is only reported at a group level and not disclosed on a segmental basis.</li><li>Premium per broker:</li><li>Projected to increase in line with commercial rates with additional growth driven by the Steadfast network.</li><li>Cost / margins:</li><li>Margins projected to improve slowly as overall cost to income projected to decline over time as Steadfast build scale, increases hubbing and reduce overheads.</li><li>Broker acquisitions:</li><li>Currently assumes a proportion of the network GDP is purchased at a set LTM EBITA multiple and added to core earnings.</li></ul><p><strong>Underwriting agencies</strong></p><ul><li>Flow of premiums:</li><li>Varies with economic condition</li><li>Based on projected commercial rates plus a premium to capture revenue synergies from the Network.</li><li>Margin on premiums:</li><li>Increases over time driven by operating leverage benefits and technology.</li></ul><p><strong>Premium Funding</strong></p><ul><li>Revenues driven by total GWP written through network:</li><li>Revenues per network GWP projected to be stable.</li><li>Margins:</li><li>Projected to be stable from FY17 base.</li><li>Margins have historically been declining, driver for this decline is uncertain.</li></ul><p><strong>Ancillary Services</strong></p><ul><li>Revenues driven by total GWP written through network:</li><li>Revenues per network GWP projected to be stable.</li><li>Margins:</li><li>Projected to be stable from FY17 base.</li><li>Margins have historically been declining, potentially due to issues with the White Outsourcing business which has now been divested / closed.</li></ul><p><strong>International</strong></p><ul><li>Currently international contribution is small and not separately disclosed</li><li>Earnings contribution will become more meaningful as Steadfast expands through network expansions and targeted broker acquisitions.</li><li>International earnings are difficult to project given limited disclosures given for contribution of international segments.</li><li>Overseas segment currently model as assumption on % of domestic cash flows with contribution growing over time.</li><li>Capital investment / market entry costs modelled as a multiple of incremental cash flow from international operations.</li></ul><h3>Appendix</h3><p>Figure 10: Financial Profile since IPO</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/641/1*ePn86_jHaHzjz-72ww4p_A.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Base Case </strong>— 2.8bn (~32% upside on current valuation)</h4><p><strong>Overview</strong></p><p>· Commercial lines GWP grows at 5% for 2 years before reverting back to historical mean of 2%.</p><p>· Steadfast grows market share at ~1% p.a., below historical mean of 2% p.a. allowing for a degree of market saturation, eventually reaching ~50% market share in Australia by terminal year.</p><p>· Growth in M&amp;A fees per GWP continues at ~3% in line with historical average.</p><p>· Growth in franchise fees per GWP at ~15% driven by increasing uptake of Steadfast technologies and re-pricing initiatives.</p><p>· Steadfast Network margins improve by 5% per annum as investments decline and operating leverage begins to accelerate — up to 65% margin in terminal year.</p><p>· Equity broker margins improve by 1% per annum driven by benefits of Steadfast technologies and hubbing initiatives.</p><p>· Steadfast grows inorganically via acquisition of equity stakes in ~1% of its network per annum at a purchase multiple of 7x LTM EBITA.</p><p>· Underwriting agencies achieve 2.5% premium over growth in commercial lines GWP driven by revenue synergies from the Steadfast Network.</p><p>· Underwriting agencies achieve 2% increase in EBITA margins per annum, achieving steady state at ~50% in year 4 driven by technological initiatives and operating leverage.</p><p>· Premium funding and ancillary services grows in line with Steadfast Network GWP whilst maintaining historical margins.</p><p>· Steadfast’s international business grows at 2.5% per annum, eventually comprising 25% of total group earnings by the end of the forecast period. International investment requires one time investments of ~2x incremental earnings growth.</p><p><strong>Key Assumptions</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/558/1*4XLzkDMdDKrgtvl4-tO7JQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Segmental Split &amp; Cashflow Profile</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/284/1*sE83ZDaZITg1o8xt8VUnVA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/352/1*G6Hkxivggn-s42BbrhkNCQ.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Bull Case </strong>— 5.3bn (~150% upside on current valuation)</h4><p><strong>Overview</strong></p><p>· Commercial lines GWP grows at 5% for 4 years before reverting back to historical mean of 2%.</p><p>· Steadfast grows market share at ~3.0% p.a., greater than with historical mean of 2% p.a. driven by greater takeup of Steadfast Network internationally</p><p>· Growth in M&amp;A fees per GWP continues at ~5%, a slight premium over historical average driven by greater bargaining power over insurers.</p><p>· Growth in franchise fees per GWP at ~15% driven by increasing uptake of Steadfast technologies and re-pricing initiatives.</p><p>· Steadfast Network margins improve by 7.5% per annum as investments decline and operating leverage begins to accelerate, reaching steady state at 87.5% in terminal year.</p><p>· Equity broker margins accelerate by 1.5% per annum driven by benefits of Steadfast technologies and hubbing initiatives.</p><p>· Steadfast grows inorganically via acquisition of equity stakes in ~1.5% of its network per annum at a purchase multiple of 5x LTM EBITA.</p><p>· Underwriting agencies achieve 3% premium over growth in commercial lines GWP driven by revenue synergies from the Steadfast Network.</p><p>· Underwriting agencies achieve 2% increase in EBITA margins per annum driven by higher than expected operating leverage, achieving steady state at ~60% in terminal year.</p><p>· Premium funding and ancillary services fees per network revenue grows at 10% per annum whilst achieving higher margins than historical levels driven by increased take up and operating leverage.</p><p>· Steadfast’s international business grows at 5% per annum, eventually comprising 50% of total group earnings by the end of the forecast period. International investment requires one time investments of ~2x incremental earnings growth.</p><p><strong>Key Assumptions</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/579/1*ZTOxBrxGzebyJ61oOtN-7Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Segmental Split &amp; Cashflow Profile</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/268/1*VkSEXULWmnX0R_S5jcmoag.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/371/1*MLQCmDKMuRHlSMGOg47r_A.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Bear Case </strong>— 1.8bn (~15% downside on current valuation)</h4><p><strong>Overview</strong></p><p>· Commercial lines GWP grows at 5% for 1 year before reverting back to historical mean of 2%.</p><p>· Steadfast grows market share at ~0.5% p.a., materially below historical mean of 2% p.a., reaching ~45% market share in Australia by the end of the forecast period.</p><p>· Growth in M&amp;A fees per GWP continues at ~3%, in line with historical average.</p><p>· Growth in franchise fees per GWP at ~7.5% driven by increasing uptake of Steadfast technologies and however with limited repricing by Steadfast.</p><p>· Steadfast Network margins improve by 7.5% per annum as investments decline and operating leverage begins to accelerate, reaching steady state at 50% margin in the year 5.</p><p>· Equity broker margins accelerate by 1.0 % per annum driven by benefits of Steadfast technologies and hubbing initiatives, reaching steady state at 35% in year 5.</p><p>· Steadfast grows inorganically via acquisition of equity stakes in ~0.5% of its network per annum at a purchase multiple of 8x LTM EBITA.</p><p>· Underwriting agencies achieve 0.5% premium over growth in commercial lines GWP with lower than expected revenue synergies from the Steadfast Network.</p><p>· Underwriting agencies achieve 1% increase in EBITA margins per annum, achieving steady state at ~50% in year 6 with lower than expected operating leverage.</p><p>· Premium funding and ancillary services grows in line with Steadfast Network GWP and whilst maintaining lower than expected margins compared to historical levels.</p><p>· Steadfast’s international business grows at 0.5% per annum, eventually comprising 5% of total group earnings by the end of the forecast period. International investment requires one time investments of ~2x incremental earnings growth.</p><p><strong>Key Assumptions</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/589/1*IOd6myASyP99WlyzpMUX7Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Segmental Split &amp; Cashflow Profile</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/273/1*ZFjP3wrQmgPe6YJBGelkKg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/359/1*GRyipNZtccbotliGDGSmVw.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Worst Case </strong>— 1.1bn (~45% downside on current valuation)</h4><p><strong>Overview</strong></p><p>· Commercial lines GWP grows at 5% for 1 year before reverting back to sub GDP 1% growth, below historical means of 2%.</p><p>· Steadfast Network market share fails to grow from current levels.</p><p>· Steadfast Network fees grow in line with Steadfast Network growth.</p><p>· Steadfast Network margins improve by 5% per annum as investments decline, reaching steady state at 40% margin in the 5th year.</p><p>· Equity broker margins remains stable with no operating leverage benefits.</p><p>· Steadfast ceases inorganic growth and stops acquiring brokers within its network.</p><p>· Underwriting agencies achieve 0.5% premium over growth in commercial lines GWP driven by lower than expected revenue synergies from the Steadfast Network.</p><p>· Underwriting agencies margins remains stable with no technology or operating leverage benefits.</p><p>· Steadfast shuts down its premium funding and ancillary services businesses or provides them at no profits.</p><p>· Steadfast’s international expansion fails to contribute to group profits.</p><p><strong>Key Assumptions</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/636/1*Pg8hsb6uXP8bdkwWQ71deQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Segmental Split &amp; Cashflow Profile</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/270/1*_372bnmjLpKx_2P6_TVU9Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/352/1*5dk2mi5Jcdx0BYealsM-kw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=88a53432239e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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