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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Fatih Ümit Çetin on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Fatih Ümit Çetin on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Fatih Ümit Çetin on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Seeing Like A State by James Scott]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/commentarist/seeing-like-a-state-by-james-scott-30862fe4ebd6?source=rss-5109278c5828------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/30862fe4ebd6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[scientific-knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[state-planning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[high-modernism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[utopia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fatih Ümit Çetin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Feb 2017 21:41:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-24T04:37:31.846Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/432/1*OCRe3A5AtaasvhdHqgqbmg.png" /></figure><p>Scott’s ‘Seeing Like A State’ is one of my favorite social science texts. It is a passionately written essay with full of interesting facts and deep observations on dizzying diversity of topics ranging from 19th century German forestry to compulsory villagization in Tanzania. Scott discusses how well-intentioned utopian projects to improve human condition brought about totally reverse destructive outcomes like huge number of death and disruptions of lives of millions (p, 4). Scott argues that state-initiated social engineering projects culminated with unintended tragic consequences due to pernicious combination of four factors. The first element is ‘the administrative ordering of nature and society — the transformative state simplifications’. The second element is what Scott calls ‘high modernist ideology’, which is best understood as a powerful self-confidence ‘about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws’. The third element is ‘an authoritarian state’ which is willing and capable to deploy its utmost coercive power to materialize these high-modernist designs. And finally the forth element is ‘a prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these plans’ (p, 4–5). Although all these points should be elaborately discussed to do justice to this appealing study, given the limited scope of the text I will just focus on second and third elements in the context of utopian dimensions inherent in this high-modernist ideology and how this utopian look guided the state interventions.</p><p>The concept of utopia was coined by Thomas Moore for his novel about fictional island society in Atlantic Ocean in published in 1516. Utopia etymologically refers to non-existing place. Nevertheless, its homophonous, Eutopia, refers to good place. This linguistic trick might have caused the change in meaning because after Moore’s work, utopia is understood as a perfect system or society designed based on ultimately-right principles and ideals where human happiness, improvement, and equality is fully achieved. This fictive imagination seems much more attainable together with enlightenment. Ultimate belief in the progression of science promoted the sanguine expectations regarding escalating capacity of human mind and its inevitable outcome as the ultimate victory of people against nature. Past has been viewed as the signifier of darkness, mystery, and the space of supernatural forces as apparent in the pejorative conception of tradition in a way which only involves parochialism, bigotry, superstition, and submission to nature. Taken as a constitutive other, tradition is amount to what modern man should transcend with his technical capabilities and scientific knowledge so as to cultivate a better, more prosperous, more regimented, and improved society. Scott talks about such efforts to redesign society in order to make it legible to state authority and state intervention.</p><p>Utopian ideas and ideals quintessentially involves totalitarian and authoritarian dimensions. Envisioned idealized perfect societies cannot stand fluidity, locality, and criticism. When a perfect society is created, it should be protected against change or fluidity because anything like this is bound to ruin the purity of perfection. Perfect society should be a homogenous collectivity where everything should be organized around certain ideas and norms and display standardized semblance since perfect is unique, stable, and applicable across time and space. And, perfect society is kept immunized against any criticism because there is no better than perfect and no superior way of doing than the one already employed; and thus there is no need for criticism. Hence, it is not surprising to see such totalitarian and authoritarian dimension in utopian social engineering projects what Scott calls as high modernity projects.</p><p>What is high modernism? It is an adamantine ’self-confidence about continued linear progress, the development of scientific and technical knowledge, the expansion of production, the rational design of social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, and, not least, an increasing control over nature (including human nature) commensurate with scientific understanding of natural laws’. Hence, high modernism is a specific mentality of how the benefits of scientific progress can be applied in every domain of human activity through state. High-modern state aims to improve its society’s health, education, longevity so and so forth (p, 91). It starts with extensive prescriptions for a new society, and intends to impose them (p, 89–90). This transformation requires the discovery of society as scientifically-describable reified object. In this regard, statistical knowledge, reflecting the snapshot of the society, is generated in order to characterize the population in elaborate new ways. When the society becomes an object that the state might manage and transform for its perfection, then the scope of intervention becomes unbounded. High-modernist state endeavor to engineer its society in accordance with the most advanced technical standards of the new moral sciences. In high modernist vision, it is believed to be possible to conceive an artificial and engineered society designed based on conscious, rational, scientific criteria (p, 90–92).</p><p>Although everything might be seen quite positive so far, the troubling features of high modernism are about ‘its claim to speak about the improvement of the human condition with the authority of scientific knowledge and its tendency to disallow other competing sources of judgment’. High modernism means a completely radical rupture from history and tradition. Since rational reasoning and scientific laws are capable of providing the unique solution to any empirical problem, all human habits and practices, which are developed through non-scientific sources like structure of family, moral values, should be redesigned. Scientifically designed schemes for production and social life are taken to be superior to received tradition. This infallible belief in the supremacy of planned social order over the deposit of historical and traditional practice breeds two authoritarian premises. First, only the ones who have the scientific expertise to design the superior social order should rule. Second, those ignorant, who refuse to succumb to the scientific plan, need to be educated to its benefits or else be swept aside. Therefore, high modernist mentality is prone to denigrate politics because political interests can only ruin the social solutions formulated by specialists with scientific tools adequate to their analysis (p, 94–95).</p><p>Needless to say, high modernism is a totally future oriented ideology. The past is the realm of myths and superstition and thus it should be overcome. The present is no more than a platform for launching plans for a better future. A fundamental feature of the discourse of high modernist states is ‘a heavy reliance on visual images of heroic progress toward a totally transformed future’. Since the attainability of a better future is believed to be quite certain, most high modernists think that this certainty legitimizes the short term sacrifices necessary to get there (p, 96).</p><p>High modern state, in order to bring its objectives into practice, needs to make its society legible to arrange the population and social milieu in a way that permits and facilitates state function of governing its people and improving their conditions (p, 2). This task inevitably entails a series of state interventions. Then, state constitute social order, which it wants to intervene, in a fashion which is not compatible with the objectives of the state, so as to justify the necessity of intervention. This designed social order is ineluctably schematic. It always disregards essential aspects of any real, functioning social order. In other words, complexity of existing functioning order is reduced to simplified formal schemas. This simplification invites standardized grid for its recreation in accordance with intended outcomes. This process of designing and planning social order is carried out with an imperial high-modernist mentality, which prioritizes only objective scientific knowledge and excludes the vital role of local knowledge and know-how. <br>Authoritarian, high-modernist schemes are potentially so destructive since they overlook or suppress the practical skills underwriting any complex activity. The majority of high modernist projects deny any possibility of valuable collaboration between epistemic knowledge and practical knowledge, also known as knowhow or metis, and they acquired an “imperial” scientific view dismissing the latter ‘as insignificant at best and as dangerous superstitions at worst’. Here scientific knowledge refers to abstract, general knowledge deployed by states and its technical agencies whereas metis refers to the form of knowledge embedded in local experience. The relation between these two dialectics of knowledge is part of a political struggle for institutional hegemony by experts and their institutions. Exclusive focus on scientific knowledge at the expense of disregarding metis is not just a strategy of production, but also a strategy of control and appropriation (p, 311).</p><p>The overlook of metis by and large culminates with destructive outcomes, which are very different from initial intentions, because general, abstract scientific knowledge have little applicability in diverse and complex settings. Metis is thoroughly applicable to broadly similar but never identical contexts where a quick and practiced adoption is entailed. Although the skills of metis might include some of rule of thumb, they are acquired through practice not through book learning. Metis is almost second nature to the practitioner and thus hard to codify. Thus, codified rules cannot replace metis. One can learn to bike through practicing but it is hard to achieve that by following codified sequence of procedures. Metis resists ‘simplification into deductive principles which can successfully be transmitted through book learning, because the environments in which it is exercised are so complex and non-repeatable that formal procedures of rational decision making are impossible to apply’. All of state simplifications and utopian schemes, which Scott examines throughout his study, are about activities like forestry, revolution, urban planning, agricultural etc. that are carried out in spatially and temporally unique settings. Thus, someone should understand the particularities of these unique settings so as to talk about these activities. Any agricultural activity is done on a unique space with different constellation of soil and crops and at a unique time of weather pattern or seasonal cycles and for unique ends like the particular needs of the family. A mechanical deployment of general rules of thumb, which overlook these specificities, results with no more than a practical failure and social disillusionment. The generic formula cannot compensate ’the local knowledge that will allow a successful translation of the necessarily crude general understandings to successful, nuanced, local applications’ (p, 318).</p><p>All in all, high modernist, utopian state sponsored projects start with highly excessive ambitions since they assume that they are equipped with unflappable, generic rules supplied by scientific and technical expertise. The application of these superior rules is bound to cultivate positive outcomes in the understanding of high modernist state officials. The projects carried out via scientific techniques should inevitably help them transcend the bigotry of the past and parochiality of the locality. Since the utilized rules and techniques are ultimately right and since the perfect is unique regardless of spatiotemporal domain, then there is no need to consider our sources of knowledge and no room for diverse semblances. However, standardized grid and formal schemes lack something essential for their successful application. This missing link is the local knowledge embedded in the experiences of the practitioners. This overlook causes destructive, even distopian, failures of these utopian projects.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=30862fe4ebd6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/commentarist/seeing-like-a-state-by-james-scott-30862fe4ebd6">Seeing Like A State by James Scott</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/commentarist">Commentarist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Anti-Politics Machine by James Ferguson]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/commentarist/anti-politics-machine-by-james-ferguson-dbe8f366efd1?source=rss-5109278c5828------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainable-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[anti-politics-machine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[james-ferguson]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fatih Ümit Çetin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Feb 2017 21:26:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-23T21:26:36.053Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*14pnGR89vrLut0HUlhOHUg.png" /></figure><p>As Ferguson describes, his anthropological study titled ‘Anti-Politics Machine’ is “not principally a book about the Basotho people, or even about Lesotho; it is principally a book about the operation of the “international development” apparatus in a particular setting” (Ferguson, 17). In this brief essay, I will touch upon some of the interesting points which captivated my attention during reading this influential study. The issues which I will discuss below make up only a tiny portion of appealing points in whole book.</p><p>Immediately after World War II, economic development was adopted as a policy objective in and for the “underdeveloped” countries of the world. (Arndt, 2) GDP per capita income has been selected as the chief measure of development. 70% of the world was deemed under poverty based on this criterion. Economic growth was viewed necessary to uphold the standards of these people and make them advanced like western countries (Escobar, 283). This situation pave the way for the emergence of a literature on development. The first strand of thought called as modernization school became the orthodoxy of development studies in 1950s. Borrowing from Marx’s famous metaphor, they portrayed the current situation of developed countries as the mirror of the future of today’s ‘backward’ countries. This overly-optimistic and ethnocentric view supports the implementation of certain policies like the transfer of capital or technical expertise to foster this assumed modernization of ‘backward’ societies by expanding the capitalist mode of production in these territories. As a critique to this tenet, Latin American theorists like Gunderfranke developed the theory of dependency by arguing that international exchange actually widens the gap between rich and poor in international system contrary to expectations of modernization school. Although these scholars reinforce the idea of development, they criticize the recipe imposed by orthodox scholars and policy agencies. Just like these two schools of thought, subsequent frameworks like development economics popularized by Hirschman and ultra modernists mainly associated with the studies of Deepek Lal agree upon the appeal of development as an idea and objective but put forward diverging paths for the attainment of this idealized objective. Nevertheless, this commonsensical understanding has eventually been challenged by postmodernist studies of development. For postmodernists, development discourse functions as nothing more than an apparatus of control and surveillance. Development is a knowledge-power regime, which serves to universalize Western experience and project into all parts of the world (Cooper, 2–3). Ferguson’s important study is one of the most well-known and exemplary pieces of postmodernist literature.<br>Development institutions create their own form of discourse, and this discourse constructs the target society (Lesotho in this study) as a particular kind of object of knowledge. This objectification invites a structure of knowledge, on the basis of which interventions over these societies are organized (Ferguson, xiv-xv). These intrusions generate huge schism between the intentionality of planning in a development project in Lesotho and the strategic intelligibility of its outcomes, which turn out to be unintended. Tabatsika development project fail to bring about development in two alternative conceptions of the term. It neither reduced poverty level in the region nor introduced any new capitalist relation of production (Ferguson, 15–16). Rather, this project instrumentally expanded and entrenched bureaucratic state power and, at the same time, depoliticized the power by denying politics.</p><p>Ferguson combines anthropological approach with Foucaultian discourse analysis through close scrutiny of how what-could-be-called forth face of power is deployed in a development project. The approach of three faces of power, developed by Steven Lukes and eloquently utilized by his student John Gavanta in his study of Power and Powerlessness, actually relies upon the clear-cut recognition of power-exercising subjects. Thus, tracing the intentions of power-holder is key to understand the process and predict the outcome of power relations. Nevertheless, the approach, Ferguson deploys in his analysis, is decentered and it locates the intelligibility of a series of transformations not in the intentions of one or more acting subjects, but in the systematic nature of the social reality which those actions generate (Ferguson, 18–19). Viewing Tabastika project through the projection of intentions of World Bank, which is seemingly the most powerful subject, would end up in a quagmire of striking incompatibility between initial policy objects and its unintended outcomes. What development apparatus does has actually happened against the will of knowing and powerful actor. This ostensible contradiction does not negate the exercise of power or represent the failure of all exerted power in this interaction but rather it demonstrates that power does not have to be embodied in the person of a powerful subject. In examined development project, intentional plans interacted with unacknowledged structures and ended up incorporated anonymous constellation of power by becoming an instrument to serve to subjectless power resulting with the expansion of bureaucratic state power (Ferguson, 20). Ferguson’s analysis not only enriches the understanding of power exercise but also provides a fruitful perspective to evaluate the consequences of seemingly failed enterprises of any kind.</p><p>Another interesting part of Ferguson’s study is his discussion about the constitution of Lesotho as a less developed country by World Bank. Process of defining entails to drawing of boundaries dividing the things being included in the definition and the ones being excluded. This culminates with prioritization or attribution of certain features and downplay or disregard of certain others. When an object is defined and constituted, it loses its dynamic nature and it is reduced to a static ontology. All its complexities are blurred and it is reduced to a simple, mono-color picture. If an object is constituted to alter its assumed form of being, this process becomes much more complex. Certain reasons are taken as the sources of current situation and specific treatments and actors are put forward as the remedies and agencies to rectify its problematic situation. Lesotho is poor because it is still an aboriginal agricultural economy, virtually untouched by modern economic development and not yet brought into modern world economy (Ferguson, 56). Lesotho is a stagnated national economy due to the inaction of government arising from its lack of technical expertise (Ferguson, 34, 60, 66). Thus, technical expertise of development apparatus together with the state machine, which will implement the development programs, can effectively struggle with the backwardness of Lesotho. This theoretical construction culminates with Lesotho’s representation in development discourse as “a nation of farmers, but not wage laborers; a country with a geography, but no history; with people, but no classes; values, but no structures; administrators, but no rulers; bureaucracy, but no politics.” Lesotho’s poverty problem is exclusively reduced to technical matter with the dismissal of political and structural underpinnings. This presentation based on the assumed superiority of technical expertise of the development agent turns out to be biased towards constructing it as less developed than it actually is when local knowledge is incorporated into the analysis. Ferguson’s critique of this presentation in light of field research, local documents, and academic studies relying on local knowledge reveals that Lesotho is more modern, industrial, and capitalistic than it is portrayed in development discourse. Based on the aforementioned construction of Lesotho, obstacles in front of development are determined as “lack of roads and markets, lack of training and education, lack of agricultural inputs, unfamiliarity with a money economy, lack of credit” at the expense of disregard of “structural unemployment, influx control, low wages, political subjugation by South Africa, parasitic bureaucratic elites”, which loom largest in other context-sensitive accounts predicated upon local knowledge (Ferguson, 66).</p><p>Why has the constitution of Lesotho by the highly skillful experts of World Bank happened that biased? World Bank report made no reference to local politics of Lesotho or to the unpopularity of incumbent regime not because the authors of the report are oblivious of these facts but because these are likely to be found unhelpful and useless in the discourse of a development agency. There is no place in development discourse for the analysis focusing on political and structural roots of the problem and suggesting the government as a part of problem because these agencies are not interested in fostering revolutionary struggles (Ferguson, 68–69). Thus, the process of constituting an object is shaped by the needs of defining agent. Lesotho should be constructed in a way which permits development agencies can intervene by using its capabilities. These agencies exploit highly standardized packages of development, which they try to sell and export from country to country (Ferguson, 69–70). Therefore, the process of defining or constituting an object is carried out based not on impartial, comprehensive, and context-sensitive evaluation but on an institutionalized production of ideas suggesting compatible interventions within a discursive regime.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dbe8f366efd1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/commentarist/anti-politics-machine-by-james-ferguson-dbe8f366efd1">Anti-Politics Machine by James Ferguson</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/commentarist">Commentarist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Can the Muslim Women Speak?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/commentarist/can-the-muslim-women-speak-f639030a298d?source=rss-5109278c5828------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f639030a298d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[islamophobia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[muslim-women]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gender]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[france]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[burkini]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fatih Ümit Çetin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Nov 2016 05:27:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-12T06:38:04.859Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3nlNXIvp1jCSRuYCuIRihg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Islam has been the distant other for the West for a very long time. However, since the last few decades, millions of Muslims migrated to these territories and settled there. Therefore, the West has faced these people as the integral part of their societies.(1) A new public culture has emerged as a corollary of this encounter. Islam is no longer an external reference point as in the age of classical orientalism. Conversely, it stands as a non-negligible internal reference utilized for the self-recognition of the West and becomes a vital determinant of Western domestic and foreign politics.(2)</p><p>Increasing visibility of Muslims in the Western public sphere in last a few decades has been accompanied by the diversified forms of self-expression in these realms. Muslims brought the religious discourses, symbols, and practices to these settings and the demands of Muslim citizens for the reformulation of consensual principles and homogenized structures constituting the public sphere triggers highly heated public discussion about the boundaries and meaning of these secular settings. The most apparent example of these debates is the one revolving around the dresses of Muslim women.(3)</p><p>The most recent instance is the ban of burkini in France. After the ban in many districts, a woman wearing burkini was ticketed in Cannes since she didn’t wear “an outfit respecting good morals and secularism,” according to AFP. Other beachgoers witnessing this ticketing reinforced this discrimination by shouting “Go home” and applauding the police.(4) Socialist Prime Minister Manuel Valls announced his support to local bans by describing burkini as a “provocation” and “an expression of a political project, a counter-society, based notably on the enslavement of women”.(5) Although France’s Council of State, the country’s supreme administrative authority, suspended the ban and this is totally a positive development, the mindset producing these bans is still there and needs to be examined critically. To deconstruct this mindset, in this essay, I briefly outline the representations of Muslim women from the age of classical orientalism to contemporary days of surging Islamophobia.</p><p>As relevant in other segments of scientific guild during the modern period, Orientalism was a completely masculine province and all the members of this discipline were males. Orientalism developed a sexist and parochial Weltanschauung as apparent in the essays of Orientalist travelers and novelists. In these texts, women are the instruments for the Orientalist male to fulfill his desires of power-fantasy. They possess eternal eroticism. They are foolish and more importantly, they are desirous and avid. The most well-known figure of this caricature is Flaubert’s Kuchuk Hanem.(6)</p><p>Flaubert encountered Kuchuk Hanem, an Egyptian dancer, and courtesan, during is Oriental travel. He watched her kinky dance before sleeping with her.(7)</p><blockquote>As for me, I scarcely shut my eyes. Watching that beautiful creature asleep (she snored, her head against my arm: I had slipped my forefinger under her necklace), my night was one long, infinitely intense reverie — that was why I stayed. I thought of my nights in Paris brothels — a whole series of old memories came back — and I thought of her, of her dance, of her voice as she sang songs that for me were without meaning and even without distinguishable words.(8)</blockquote><p>Kuchuk Hanem was so influential over him that she was definitely the inspiration for him while his creation of female characters in his subsequent novels. He qualified her as a lady with unbounded sensuality, grace, and mindless impudence. However, what captivated him most is that she seemed to fully submit herself to him without having any demand from him.</p><p>Flaubert’s encounter with Kuchuk Hanım encouraged him to develop a general model of Oriental women. After finishing his Oriental journey, Flaubert wrote Louise Colet cavalierly that “the oriental woman is no more than a machine: she makes no distinction between one man and another man”.(9)</p><p>Apart from Flaubert’s totalizing and erotic representation of the Oriental woman, the other striking dimension of his narration is the overall silence of Oriental woman except for her snore or meaningless songs. She never spoke for herself. She by no means represented her feelings or existence. She was just the passive signifier of all Oriental women. She was a simple spectacle in an Oriental exhibition. Conversely, Flaubert spoke for herself; he observed and represented her; he speculated over her. He was Western, powerful, relatively affluent, and male. He embodied all the dominating characteristics of the history. Therefore, he could inevitably have her physically, speak for herself, and tell in what sense she is typically Oriental.(10)</p><p>Flaubert’s account is not an aberration or his evaluations are not the mere reflection of his subjective thoughts. Rather, his representation is an ordinary instance of the Orientalist tradition which creates a uniform association between Oriental woman and sex. Close scrutiny of recent Islamophobic discourses over Muslim women, however, reveals that these women are not represented as the objects of desires, or unbounded sexual experiences any longer. Thus, this version of Orientalist representation seems to remain in the dusty pages of history and we can be happy for this discontinuity. Nevertheless, we see the revival of some of the earlier Orientalist representations in current Islamophobic discourses as evident in the discussion revolving around traditional dresses of Muslim women.</p><p>As mentioned above, Muslim women’s dresses are stigmatized as a traditional symbol of man’s oppression of Muslim woman. Several laws were enacted to ban them in public sphere in various parts of the West with the claim of liberating these women from the subjugation of so-called patriarchal Muslim tradition. There are three complementary thinking styles operating behind this logic. First, all the traditional symbols inherently contradict with the ideals constituting Western civilization. Second, an agent should be opposing to traditional norms and if they don’t, they need to be emancipated. And third, people having the knowledge should be making a judgment about these two situations. Now, I briefly examine these propositions in their relations with classical Orientalist frameworks.</p><p>Space has never been a completely partial domain. It includes and normalizes some form of expressions, performative acts, symbols while excluding and demonizing others. After the production of the space through the homogenizing forces wiping out any sort of difference, these constitutive structures are internalized and turn into taken-for-granted facts.(11) A non-negligible presence of different people, acting, thinking, or wearing differently from accustomed norms, disquiets this peaceful coalition and ignites new debates revolving around conception and boundaries of this domain. In the same vein, visibility of Muslims in Western public sphere explicates both the exclusionary boundaries of this space and common, secular imaginaries and feminist premises determining the public mindset of the West. Secular narratives of the modernity expect the religion to retreat to the private sphere and wait for its death there. All the definitions of freedom, agency or citizenship rights like equal participation to public space, freedom of expression etc. are supposed to be derived from liberal individualism and secular formations of the governments.(12) Therefore, veil, or other dresses as a religious symbol, contradicts with the secular meta-narrative of modernity and thereby triggers reactionary discourses and policies aiming the defense of secular modernity. Compared to classical Orientalist era, problematization of Muslim women as a challenge to Western modernity is a totally novel fact. During the times of Orientalism, there was no serious interlocution between the West and the Orient in the Western homeland. Because there was no source of threat perception coming from the Muslim woman to the Western civilization, there was no need for questioning the Muslim symbols.</p><p>Additionally, Muslim woman’s appearance in the Western public domain with her veil is in a severe contradiction with the fundamental assumptions of liberal individualism and secular feminism whose ideas became the most influential force in the conceptualization of Western public sphere. Both of these theories argue that Muslim women are oppressed by the patriarchal customs of Islam. Thus, they assume that “here is something intrinsic to women that should predispose them to oppose the practices, values, and injunctions that the Islamist movement embodies”.(13) This shared assumption brings us to the definition of who the agent is. In these theoretical frameworks, agency is attributed to the people who question or re-signify the traditional norms.(14) Because the Muslim woman, by wearing a veil, conforms to and reinforces a group of traditional values and norms deemed as oppressive by these liberal progressivists and secular feminists, the Muslim woman can not be an agent. Thus, they think that state authority and these intellectuals, without considering what the Muslim woman really thinks, can act to liberate her despite her own will.(15) This is paradoxical in the sense that they demand the cultural assimilation of the woman whom they appear to be saving.(16) This sub-alternization and infantalization of Muslim woman evoke the silencing of the Oriental woman by Orientalists. In both cases, women can not speak for herself. Whereas in Orientalist era the woman is represented as an object of sex, today the woman is represented as on object to be saved from her destiny. However, in both of these settings, no one pays attention to what this woman really wants or thinks. Therefore, there is a very evident parallel between the discourses of Orientalism and Islamophobia in that sense.</p><p>Furthermore, with references to two points above, public intellectuals play a very effective role in determining which of the symbols should be deemed as problematic and what it is to be done next. After a long lasting and a very salient public discussion, France banned any form of head covering in public schools by claiming the incongruity of these symbols with French laicize ideals. The recommendation of Stasi Commission, an expert committee of male savants involving social scientists and the leading leftist social theorist like Alain Touraine in favor of the ban of all conspicuous symbols has been instrumentalized for the legitimization of this decision. This landmark event is so vital in the sense that it demonstrates the apparent convergence between state policies and scholarly expertise, namely power and knowledge, both in determining the normative definition of rights and in defining what a dangerous symbol is.(17) This understanding seems like the contemporary chain of historical sequences beginning with Plato and, by passing through Orientalism, reaching to the current times. As Jacques Ranciere elegantly puts it, ever since Plato, politics has tended to categorize people into two artificial groups of who is supposed to know and who is assumed to be not knowing. The former group is qualified as educated, sage (Stasi Commission is also called as the Committee of Male Sages), competent, and they were welcomed to rule and decide what is best. Conversely, the ordinary people, who are the victims of their incapacity, are destined to be ruled and obey what is decided as best for them.(18) This reasoning fully resonates with the fundamental logic of Orientalism, that is, “Power and knowledge are mutually productive for the rule of the Orient”. Therefore, this association between power and knowledge stands as a continuity from Orientalism to Islamophobia.</p><p>Intense politicization of such dresses also turns Muslims women sometimes into open targets for hate crimes, discrimination or physical attacks to their bodily integrity since they make these women visible among others. Contrary to the primary assumption concerning the demographics of hate crimes that “men are disproportionately targeted in hate crimes”, empirical records surprisingly show the reverse case. For instance, an Australian Community Relations Commission released the data stating that in hate crimes against Muslims after 9/11, 50.4% of the victims were women, whilst only 44.4% were male (the remaining ones were institutions/buildings).(19) Githens-Mazer and Lambert’s London study found the same trend for the UK by arguing that whereas the men are the general targets of racist violence, Muslim women are more vulnerable to religiously motivated hate crimes.(20) Furthermore, Abu-Ras and Suarez’s American study of the PTSD effects on Muslims after 9/11 suggests that 86.3% of the Muslim females were subjected to hate crimes, whereas 54.6% of Muslim males were targeted in such crimes.(21)(22)</p><p>This gendered and criminalized representation of Muslim woman prompted her being positioned both as the target for racist violence and discriminative discourses and, more interestingly, as an object to be saved from herself and her destiny of oppression under patriarchal Muslim culture. Even some feminists, without considering the insights of women with a veil, deemed headscarf as the signifier of backwardness and woman submission to man.(23) Some politicians assert that wearing hijab is not a free choice, rather the outcome of social pressure over women, and thus unless veil is forbidden by the laws, the social pressure will make it compulsory for the women.(24) Amidst all these tumults, however, no one seems to care about what these women really think and say. This interpretation implies the ultimate belief of these people in the superiority of Western understanding of gender and identity and framing of Muslim women as inferior.</p><h4>Sources</h4><p>1)Kepel, G., &amp; Milner, S. (1997). Allah in the West: Islamic movements in America and Europe. LIT Verlag Münster.<br>2)Göle, N. (2009). Turkish delight in Vienna: Art, Islam, and European public culture. Cultural Politics, 5(3), 278.<br>3)Göle, N. (2002). Islam in public: New visibilities and new imaginaries. Public Culture, 14(1), 173–174.<br>4)<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/24/french-police-make-woman-remove-burkini-on-nice-beach">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/24/french-police-make-woman-remove-burkini-on-nice-beach</a><br>5)<a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-court-overturns-a-burkini-ban-but-not-its-mindset">http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-court-overturns-a-burkini-ban-but-not-its-mindset</a><br>6)Said, Edward. (1979). Orientalism. Vintage. p 201–226<br>7)Said, Edward. Ibid. 166–200<br>8)Said, Edward. Ibid. 166–200<br>9)Said, Edward. Ibid. 166–200<br>10)Said, Edward. Ibid. 1–31<br>11)Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space (Vol. 142). Blackwell: Oxford.<br>12)Göle, N. (2010). European Self-Presentations and Narratives Challenged by Islam: Secular Modernity in Question. Decolonising European Sociology. Transdisciplinary Approaches, pp-102.<br>13)Mahmood, S. (2011). Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject. Princeton University Press. p 2.<br>14)Mahmood, S. (2011). Ibid. p 21<br>15)Mahmood Watson, Mike. “Jacques Ranciere: The Front National’s Useful Idiots”. Versobooks. Publication Date December 10, 2015. Access Date December 24, 2015: <a href="http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1936-jacques-ranciere-the-front-national-s-useful-idiots">http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1936-jacques-ranciere-the-front-national-s-useful-idiots</a><br>16)Delphy, C. (2015). Separate and Dominate: Feminism and Racism after the War on Terror. Verso Books.<br>17)Salvatore, A. (2013). Islam and the Quest for a European Secular Identity: From Sovereignty through Solidarity to Immunity. Politics, Religion &amp; Ideology, 14(2), 257–258.<br>18)Rancière, J. (1995). On the shores of politics. Verso.<br>19)Dreher, T. (2006). ‘Targeted’: Experiences of Racism in NSW After September 11, 2001.<br>20)Githens-Mazer, J., &amp; Lambert, R. (2010). Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime: a London case study. University of Exeter, European Muslim Research Centre.<br>21)Abu-Ras, W. M., &amp; Suarez, Z. E. (2009). Muslim men and women’s perception of discrimination, hate crimes, and PTSD symptoms post September 11. Traumatology.<br>22)Perry, B. (2014). Gendered Islamophobia: hate crime against Muslim women. Social Identities, 20(1), 79–80.<br>23)Bilge, S. (2008). 5 Between Gender and Cultural Equality. Recasting the social in citizenship, 100.<br>24)Alain Madelin: “Certainly, one can hope that the prohibition of the Islamic veil in school will be dissuasive and that many young women will find in the application of this law a way to escape the social pressure more or less against their will.” (“Le Monde”, 7 February 2004)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f639030a298d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/commentarist/can-the-muslim-women-speak-f639030a298d">Can the Muslim Women Speak?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/commentarist">Commentarist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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