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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Bert Fraussen on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Bert Fraussen on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lobbying in times of (Corona)-Crisis: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-d73cef18a268?source=rss-56d9ac6ccd91------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[lobbying]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-affairs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bert Fraussen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2020 20:26:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-20T11:10:02.715Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Politics and Lobbying</h4><p>The Ugly: While many groups are knocking on the door, usual suspects are already having dinner</p><p><em>Co-authored with Adria Albareda, Caelesta Braun, Moritz Muller &amp; Erin Sullivan (Leiden University)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*b_5eAIuejHmt7R-NPSP4lg.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/OBmBHmrc3pw">https://unsplash.com/photos/OBmBHmrc3pw</a></figcaption></figure><p>Clearly, every interest group wants to be involved in policy discussions, as all professions and industries are severely affected by the current crisis. Yet policymakers cannot possibly engage with all these groups. They need short-cuts to process information in order to decide which groups are legitimate representatives and therefore are granted a seat at the table.</p><p>As a result, policymakers have to make difficult choices, as spaces at the table are limited and competition between groups about who is a legitimate spokesperson for professionals or workers related to a specific industry can be fierce. For instance, in Germany <a href="https://www.verdi.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/++co++eab5d8f2-73f2-11ea-8e26-525400b665de">the largest services trade union ver.di negotiated the working conditions for employees in the ‘profit-oriented’ public service institutions such as municipal symphony orchestras, public transportation, and museums</a>. However, the individual interest representation groups of employees in these sectors (such as the <a href="https://www.buehnengenossenschaft.de/gemeinsame-erklaerung-von-dov-gdba-und-vdo-kurzarbeit-bei-oeffentlich-finanzierten-theatern-und-orchestern,">German Orchestra Union</a>) did not agree with the negotiated outcome, leading to <a href="https://musik.verdi.de/themen/nachrichten/++co++82225c4a-704e-11ea-9338-525400f67940">conflict</a> between the different interest associations about who has the right to negotiate on the behalf of these constituencies, and how arrangements to resume work under the conditions of social distancing (i.e corona-proof ) should look like.</p><p>If policymakers use heuristics and short-cuts to decide which groups are being heard, and are prone to confirmation bias and availability bias, it is likely that they will prioritize contact with groups they are familiar with and trust. These groups are likely to be organizations that have also enjoyed regular access to policymakers in the past. Hence, policy insiders are at a big advantage, while policy outsiders, groups that less frequently meet with policymakers, will have a hard time making their voices heard, even though their perspectives and solutions might be equally relevant and much-needed (and we know that policymakers have great difficulties taking into account voices they do not hear).</p><p>For instance, following a corporatist tradition, the Government of Spain is mainly meeting and discussing the effects of Covid-19 with the two main business associations and the two largest labor unions to discuss some of the major policy measures implemented during the crisis. Moreover, the Spanish parliament has created a commission to discuss with social actors potential measures to rebuild the country. The largest labor unions are of course invited in this commission, yet one of the major umbrella organizations representing the elderly people was left out and had to formally request membership of the committee as it was not formally invited. A prime example of overlooking normally irregular partners, which are now one of the key target audiences for the Covid-19 measures.</p><p>As access to policymakers is often biased towards economic interests, civil society organizations are at a disadvantage here, and interest groups representing vulnerable segments in society (such as people struggling with various mental and health issues) will face even greater challenges to be on the radar of policymakers than in normal times (even though they are among the people who are most affected by the crisis).</p><p>Yet, patterns of access and attention attributed to different professions and industries will also be severely biased. In fact, some groups might disproportionately benefit from this situation. For instance, groups that are highly prominent or “top of mind” among policymakers, are still able to negotiate interesting deals during these times and use other salient topics to ensure their interests are not ignored. This might even open new avenues of negotiations that were previously unattainable for certain organized interests.</p><p>Think for instance the recent deal with Air-France/KLM in the Netherlands/France, who secured a total of 10 billion euros in aid from the French and Dutch governments, under the condition that their carbon footprint will reduce once Corona has ‘settled.’ Other prominent groups such as Greenpeace have also weighed in on this, claiming this an optimal moment to leverage promises with big businesses, in return for relaxing certain regulations or state aid.</p><p><strong>Crisis lobbying: a chance for the Good to offset the Bad and the Ugly?</strong></p><p>These prevailing status-quo tendencies described above also characterize policymaking in normal times, yet are likely to be exacerbated during a major crisis. Research indicates that highly salient policy issues with confusing and complex patterns (i.e. Corona), are often resolved with pragmatism, and trusted relationships derived from previous interactions. As a consequence, public officials may be (even more) susceptible to confirmation biases, paying closer attention to groups that endorse them. While this may facilitate perceived order or control during the policy process, it could hamper the ability to comprehensively tackle policy issues conclusively.</p><p>At the same time, a crisis also presents opportunities for ‘resets’ (or reconfigurations) of existing systems. Previously closed roads might be opened, enabling formerly non-existent or underrepresented actors to get a seat at the table or open up new negotiations on policy issues. These times truly are unique, as both policymakers and interest groups will make decisions with long-lasting societal repercussions in the following weeks and months.</p><p><em>This is the 4th and final part of a blog series of lobbying in times of (Corona)-crisis. Read the previous posts below.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-3290d7ec30ea">Part 1: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@fraussen_b/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-5e35cf12293a">Part 2: The Good: This crisis demonstrates the societal and political relevance of membership federations</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@fraussen_b/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-611313b9764b">Part 3: The Bad: The challenge of looking beyond narrow, private and short-term interests</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d73cef18a268" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-d73cef18a268">Lobbying in times of (Corona)-Crisis: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lobbying in times of (Corona)-Crisis: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-611313b9764b?source=rss-56d9ac6ccd91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/611313b9764b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[public-affairs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lobbying]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bert Fraussen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2020 20:11:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-18T19:43:15.839Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Lobbying and Politics</h4><p>The Bad: The challenge of looking beyond narrow, private and short-term interests</p><p><em>Co-authored with Adria Albareda, Caelesta Braun, Moritz Muller &amp; Erin Sullivan (Leiden University)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/639/1*73rXdawsbZNPpJMQa62ahw.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/j9nEtaHsNkw">https://unsplash.com/photos/j9nEtaHsNkw</a></figcaption></figure><p>Despite these initial assurances, interest groups must also buckle up as global economic activity becomes increasingly turbulent. Policymaking is in equal pandemonium, with new inputs and solutions implemented almost on a daily basis. Consequently, this equally creates great opportunities for policy change or for maintaining the status quo. This brings us to the bad, understood here as instances where interest groups focus on short-term benefits exclusively focused on the narrow interest of their constituency, to the detriment of the public good and long-term policy solutions.</p><p>However, aligning the specific interests of their members and the broader public interest is hard, and the contrast between rhetoric and action might be quite strong. Balancing private and public interests is even more challenging at a time when your members are facing great difficulties and some of them are fighting for their survival (think of the tourism industry).</p><p>The prime focus of many groups is now limiting the damage done by this crisis, and ensuring their members are able to sail through these stormy weathers (reopening borders for travel within Europe is likely to help a lot in that regard). As a result, their lobby requests might only focus on short-term measures that satisfy the specific demands and needs of their members, while only paying lip service to more long-term and sustainable policy solutions.</p><p>Paul Pierson argued that <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691117157/politics-in-time">“the long term is essentially beyond the political horizon”</a>, a statement that might be even more applicable in a crisis situation like the one we are currently experiencing on a global scale. For instance, when the European lobby group for plastic converters requested that the European Commission would delay upcoming plastic regulations and lift all bans on single-use plastics, they stated that in the current pandemic, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/26/timmermans-dismisses-call-to-lift-single-use-plastic-bans-281751">“<em>plastics is the material of choice for ensuring hygiene, safety as well as preservation from contamination</em>.”</a></p><p>If policymakers follow their requests, this implies policy measures yield minimal attention to the common good, and relate to particular short-sighted demands of specific industries and professions.</p><p>As a result, a variety of policy measures will emerge, with little integration across policy domains, a lack of coherence, and unfortunately, unintended consequences. These negative repercussions are perhaps most easily observed in the discussion about how the lock-down could be gradually loosened, as well as the so-called exit-strategies with multiple phases that are now being formulated and implemented in various countries.</p><p>Are these measures the result of a careful balancing of economic and health-related concerns, or the consequence of varying degrees of lobbying intensity by different segments of society, resulting in a series of disjoint policy asks, with only limited reflection about the broader public interest?</p><p>Why are shops in some industries allowed to re-open soon, while others who work in very similar conditions have to wait?</p><p>What determines the level of financial support certain industries receive, and which firms or professions should be granted state aid?</p><p>Illustrative for the disjoint nature of various policy asks is for instance the case of ‘dismissal fees’ the Dutch government initially used to fine business entrepreneurs for firing employees for purely economic reasons rather than to survive the lockdown period. Removing such fees from the state-aid packages resulted in political upheaval as it left employees less protected in case of layoffs. Yet the upheaval also underlines the major trade-offs policymakers face, to address competing claims and to best serve the public interest.</p><p>Another good example of disjoint decision-making is school closures around the world. As scientific evidence on the role of children in this pandemic was and is limited, results point in the direction of a limited role of children in spreading the disease. Why, then, did some governments decide to keep schools closed while others kept them open? And why are some countries going back to (new) normality by opening cafes, terraces, and bars, while maintaining schools closed? Long school closures are said to contribute to diverging social-economic cleavages within countries and around the world.</p><p>Importantly, the repercussions of these decisions will be a long-lasting, as well as the consequences of not being represented. Already in the first responses to the spread of the virus, attention of policymakers in most countries was centered on the situation in hospitals, while other crucial segments of the health sector (such as nursery homes and care for disabled people) were somehow overlooked. It matters who has a seat at the table and is being heard, which brings us to the most “ugly” aspect, the large risks associated with systematic overlooking or ignoring certain societal voices.</p><p><em>This is part 3 of a blog series of lobbying in times of (Corona)-crisis</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-3290d7ec30ea">Part 1: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@fraussen_b/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-5e35cf12293a">Part 2: The Good: This crisis demonstrates the societal and political relevance of membership federations</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@fraussen_b/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-d73cef18a268">Part 4:The Ugly: While many groups are knocking on the door, usual suspects are already having dinner</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=611313b9764b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-611313b9764b">Lobbying in times of (Corona)-Crisis: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lobbying in times of (Corona)-Crisis: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-5e35cf12293a?source=rss-56d9ac6ccd91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5e35cf12293a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[public-affairs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lobbying]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crisis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bert Fraussen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2020 20:02:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-18T05:07:44.350Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>lobbying</h4><p>The Good: This crisis demonstrates the societal and political relevance of membership federations</p><p><em>Co-authored with Adria Albareda, Caelesta Braun, Moritz Muller &amp; Erin Sullivan (Leiden University)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2emNFVHbgnjtWeBJec7MUQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/geM5lzDj4Iw">https://unsplash.com/photos/geM5lzDj4Iw</a></figcaption></figure><p>To say this is not an easy time for policymakers, is probably the understatement of the year. Unfolding events have not only occurred inconsistently, but at times, with dramatic pace. Take for instance relaxing restrictions on particular economic activities, <a href="https://twitter.com/DToshkov/status/1258029050850881537?s=20">or tracking the number of infected and deceased persons</a>; reliable information remains hard to come by, heightening the levels of uncertainty that concern both the effectiveness and societal legitimacy of proposed policy measures.</p><p>More than ever, this foregrounds core assumptions that elected policymakers and civil servants require and seek input from various actors and organizations. Information necessary need not only to be highly accurate but provided promptly to account for specific political realities and societal needs. While a lot of attention has focused on policy involvement of academic experts (and their (lack of) substantive diversity), the role of other key societal actors in this process — namely interest groups, are often overlooked, or at best, severely misunderstood.</p><p>When we use the label interest groups, we refer to a diverse set of organizations, such as NGOs, civil society organizations (such as patients), industry federations (for instance hospital industry) and professional groups (e.g. nurses). All are considered crucial intermediary organizations, who have the capacity to form a crucial bridge or <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11266-018-00051-x">‘transmission belt’</a> between citizens and policymakers. More specifically, they provide input and preferences from their members (citizens, professionals or companies) to policymakers, and ensure that information and details about new government measures reaches the target population and is implemented in an adequate way by their members.</p><p>While the contemporary relevance of these intermediary organizations is often questioned, in times like these, membership organizations, and so-called umbrella groups that have a broad policy orientation and other associations as members (think of Chamber of Commerce, or Federations of NGOs) continue to show their relevance.</p><p>Two simultaneous processes seem to confirm and reinforce their central role. First, as clarified above, the demand for information from policymakers is very high and unremitting on a variety of issues, ranging from questions of how to support certain industries and companies in these dire economic times, to insight into the effectiveness of certain treatments for people infected with the Corona-virus. Second, countless professionals and companies are equally dependent on information provided by interest groups. Many industry, NGO, and professional federations have seen a high increase in member involvement or donations in the last few weeks, as their members (or supporters) look for a reliable source of information, and are keen to remain fully up-to-date with policy measures and the ways in which they need to be implemented.</p><p>Although this same dynamic occurs regardless of a crisis, interactions between members (such as companies, NGOs and professionals) and the umbrella groups that represent their interests, often intensify in turbulent times with high levels of (legal) uncertainty. Thanks to their intermediary position, interest groups are one of the few actors who can provide reliable information to their members about the repercussions of Covid19 for their working environments. For instance, through their contacts with policy and decision-makers, interest groups are better positioned to inform the firms they represent about the dates they will be allowed to return back to work, and the conditions and regulations they may have to comply with.</p><p>A prime example in this regard is the many <a href="https://www.coronaprotocollen.nl/">Corona-guidelines</a> professional and business associations in the Netherlands have developed on how to make companies corona-proof when restarting their business again after the lockdowns. Based on a collaborative effort by the national government and the main employers’ and business associations, different professions and sectors have collected Corona-guidelines and shared best practices via a dedicated website. This “other” side of the transmission belt is an important but mostly overlooked function of interest groups, as a transmission belt works in two directions: these organizations do not only aggregate and transfer the preferences of their members to policymakers, they also digest and communicate messages from policymakers to their membership and society at large.</p><p><em>This is part 2 of a blog series of lobbying in times of (Corona)-crisis</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-3290d7ec30ea">Part 1: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@fraussen_b/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-611313b9764b">Part 3: The Bad: The challenge of looking beyond narrow, private and short-term interests</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5e35cf12293a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-5e35cf12293a">Lobbying in times of (Corona)-Crisis: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lobbying in times of (Corona)-Crisis: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-3290d7ec30ea?source=rss-56d9ac6ccd91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3290d7ec30ea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[public-affairs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lobbying]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lobby]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bert Fraussen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2020 20:25:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-22T05:40:03.273Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Lobbying</h4><p>They say a crisis brings out the best and the worst in people. Lobbyists are no exception.</p><p><em>Co-authored with Adria Albareda, Caelesta Braun, Moritz Muller &amp; Erin Sullivan (Leiden University)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wCWGtCy0lpRNAQw0U7jbrA.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/-TRcaFMV5vk">https://unsplash.com/photos/-TRcaFMV5vk</a></figcaption></figure><p>They say a crisis brings out the best and the worst in people. Lobbyists are no exception. In fact, the famous saying “never let a good crisis go to waste” might be most applicable to them. In many countries, and perhaps most notably the <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/04/corona-new-lobbying-activity/">US</a>, the Corona-crisis has triggered an explosion of lobbying activities. The European Union is no exception to this trend, with a recent report by Corporate Europe Observatory warning for “<a href="https://corporateeurope.org/en/2020/04/coronawash-alert">Coronawashing</a>” as various business interests attempt to capitalize on the pandemic to advance their particular interests, by proposing new policy measures (for instance supporting or (de)regulating new digital technologies) or suggesting to delay certain proposals (such as initiatives related to the Green Deal).</p><p>In this way, the Corona-crisis might be the best recent example of a “<em>bandwagon</em>” (Baumgartner and Leech 2001), an issue that attracts attention and activity from a very large and diverse number of organizations, who all aim to shape policy measures and government decisions related to this crisis.</p><p>Even in normal times, policymakers struggle to sift through the information offered by interest groups, and interest groups face difficulties to effectively voice and represent their interests. A severe and ongoing crisis, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, puts even more pressure on both the speed and quality of information provision and processing. Such a crisis reveals the many faces of lobbying and we highlight three of them: the good, the bad and the ugly.</p><p>In what follows over several blog posts, we clarify these dynamics in more detail, based on long-standing research in interest group politics, as well as our own research and experiences from five countries where we (currently) live or originate from (Belgium, Canada, Germany, Spain, and The Netherlands).</p><p>The <strong>good</strong>, <a href="https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-5e35cf12293a">‘this crisis demonstrates the societal and political relevance of membership federations’</a>, shows us that the transmission belt function of interest groups is a unique organizational asset that, when properly organized, connects societal interests with public decision-making and vice versa. Professional and business associations disseminating guidelines and sharing best practices of how individual entrepreneurs can make their business corona-proof is a good example of such a transmission-belt function.</p><p>The <strong>bad</strong>, <a href="https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-611313b9764b">‘the challenge of looking beyond narrow, private and short-term interests’</a>, demonstrates that the outcome of such a lobby frenzy is likely to result in various disjointed policy outcomes that usually do not offer consistent, coherent and balanced policy packages for a sustainable recovery. It is hard to reconcile bars opening up and schools remaining closed in several countries with a coherent package to address the public interest in the long run.</p><p>The same applies to the suggested exclusion of students from public transport in The Netherlands during certain times of the day to make public transport corona-proof. It will allow public transport to open up after the lockdown, but is likely to yield <a href="https://www.volkskrant.nl/columns-opinie/studenten-uit-spits-weren-kent-verborgen-prijskaartje~bfd9e734/">serious negative consequences</a> in terms of quality of education; side-effects that are not considered in this proposal.</p><p>Third, the <strong>ugly face of lobbying</strong>, <a href="https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-d73cef18a268">‘when many groups are knocking on the door, the usual suspects are already having dinner’</a>, indicates a lobby tragedy that goes beyond the disjointed policy package outcomes, revealing “the bad face” of lobbying in times of crises. Unheard, often vulnerable, voices in society often go unnoticed, because of the many blind spots organized into public decision-making by the (in)formal and institutionalized arrangements of consulting interest groups. The situation of nursing homes during the height of the first corona-wave in many countries, and the exclusion of the elderly from a parliamentary committee in Spain to design regulatory measures, are examples of the ugly face of lobbying, when unheard voices are not being taken into account.</p><p>No lobbying is only good, bad, or ugly. When and how its different faces surface, depend on the policy and decision-making context and the way interest groups are engaged by public decision-makers. Research again and again confirms the highly contextualized nature of lobbying behavior, and a crisis is likely to exaggerate these three faces of lobbying. Examining lobbying dynamics under pressure might reveal how we can stimulate the good face of lobbying to potentially mitigate the bad and ugly ones.</p><p>In the next several posts, we will cover, in turn, The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly.</p><p><em>This is part 1 of a blog series on lobbying in times of (Corona)-crisis</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-5e35cf12293a">Part 2: The Good: This crisis demonstrates the societal and political relevance of membership federations</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3290d7ec30ea" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/lobbying-in-times-of-corona-crisis-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-3290d7ec30ea">Lobbying in times of (Corona)-Crisis: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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