<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by fugabi on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by fugabi on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@fugabite?source=rss-8a1bd90144d9------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 20:28:20 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@fugabite/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Give Me a Name]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fugabite/give-me-a-name-6b8b34a2db61?source=rss-8a1bd90144d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6b8b34a2db61</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cortázar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fiction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[authors]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[fugabi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2015 20:51:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-11-19T08:04:15.903Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Playing with Cortazar’s <em>Continuity of Parks</em> &amp; Vonnegut’s <em>Breakfast of Champions</em>. Oh, and Mark Strand’s <em>Keeping Things Whole</em>.</p><p>Look at all these books. Run your delicate fingers over their spines, feel the tiny glue lumps underneath the surface, feel the knots of thread binding all those pages. Look at this desk. It still feels new, white as a sheet of paper, smooth as an eel’s skin. Now, look out the window, beyond the screen. You see yellowing trees scattering the feeble late afternoon light, and you see a couple of barren greenhouses, down to your left. Farther ahead there’s a retirement home, three rows of square windows on a long white wall. Some rooms have the lights on already but from where you are you can only discern thin, moving shadows. Try to imagine the odd old man smoking his cigarette by the window, the odd old woman chatting with her friend while perming her hair. Now come back here in the room with the books and the desk. There is something I want you to know.</p><p>“What is this? Who speaks here?”</p><p>Yes, I can hear you, dear reader. You are curious, you surely want to know what is going on and where will this story lead. But first, how are you? How was your day? Or is? Don’t worry, appearances don’t matter. You don’t have to straighten up your hair or check your breath just because I mention them here. I am the author, I’ve seen perhaps more than you can imagine. I make worlds, I handle people and their deeds.<br>Just read ahead.<br>Something is about to happen.<br>The character does not yet know about it, but today might be his lucky day.<br>Or maybe not.<br>Do you remember that passage, right at the end of the <em>Breakfast of Champions</em>, where the author starts talking to Mr. Kilgore Trout? At first, Mr. Trout does not believe that the person talking to him is the author or that what he says makes any sense. Who could blame him? Any lunatic could tell us he is our creator, but that’s not enough reason to believe them, is it? Then, all of a sudden, the author transports poor Kilgore all the way to the Taj Mahal, then to Venice and to Dar es Saalam and even to the Sun (protecting him all the while from the blazing heat). When he’s back, he falls to his knees, wordless and shattered. He is then set free.</p><p>“Where is the character in this story? Why am I dragged into this? I’m just the reader”, you protest.</p><p>The character is here, with us, in the room with the white desk and the rows of books. He now hears the little bell of the graveyard church up the road letting visitors know that the gates will soon close. He stares at the screen, fingers hovering over the keyboard, ready to grab that thought, that idea and make words out of it. He starts typing, sharing with us the inner workings of his mildly intricate mind.</p><p><em>“I feel a little awkward writing about this”,</em> he tells us<em>. “Usually, I couldn’t care less about this kind of things, but now it is different. Since we moved into this apartment I tried to find my spot, a place where I could work without being disturbed, where I could just sit down and write. What’s strange about it is… Well, I feel as if I am constantly being watched. I feel, if I were to turn around suddenly, there will be a congregation of people behind me. I remember having the same kind of feeling almost a decade ago, in that cabin on the shore of Lake Superior. A huge body of water before me, frigid and murky, the thickness of a forest unraveling behind me, the night, black and bleak as a Munch etching. I was counting my days, brokenhearted, sure there is little left to live for. I could not see myself growing old or being loved again. And everywhere I turned I felt I did not belong. A poet used to say: “Wherever I am, I am what is missing.… I move to keep things whole”. I felt the opposite. Wherever I was, I was redundant. Whenever I moved, I shattered wonders. And all the while, I was being watched. The trees, the cormorants, the spirits of the land, whatever native gods happened to cut through around there, they would all assemble and partake in following me. Silent but determined. Each evening and every night. During the day, I wanted to disappear. At night, I would be afraid I really would.”</em></p><p>The character will go on writing, or trying to write, dreaming of becoming culturally significant, of earning a spot in the timeline of history. Through his writing, he would hope to free himself from his demons or free them onto the world, whichever brought him more satisfaction.<br>This is where you come in, dear reader.<br>Don’t worry, it has all been taken care of. <em>Alibis, unforeseen hazards, possible mistakes</em>, it’s all been carefully planned. He actually wanted to spend this weekend alone. It will be only a quiet little affair. The neighbors won’t hear a thing. After all, I am the author.<br>But… yes, you will have to do it!<br>Perhaps he’ll see your reflection in the window, by the desk.<br>Perhaps he’ll turn to you in the last second. Don’t be afraid or sorry: he’s just a character.<br>Just don’t look him in the eyes!<br>Can you feel the dagger warming itself up against your chest?<br>Can you feel relief pounding underneath it?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b8b34a2db61" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[God help the Child]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fugabite/god-help-the-child-58997ea083c6?source=rss-8a1bd90144d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/58997ea083c6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[children]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[parenting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[fugabi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2015 08:49:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-22T08:49:42.108Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A little while ago I <a href="http://www.npr.org/2015/04/20/400394947/i-regret-everything-toni-morrison-looks-back-on-her-personal-life">heard</a> Toni Morrison speak about her latest book, <em>God help the Child</em>, a book in which a mother has a hard time dealing with the fact that her daughter is of a much darker skin color than herself. A sort of a twist on the whole idea of racism about which, however, I am not going to write here now. What prompted me to write is something else: how well do we understand children? In the interview, Morrison also talked a bit about herself in her role as a mother and said that she thinks <em>everything</em> she did and said back then (she’s now 84) was wrong. Writing this book, she said, made her re-live past events and she was not happy with how she dealt with them.</p><blockquote><em>“When I’m not creating or focusing on something I can imagine or invent, I think I go back over my life — I don’t recommend this, by the way — and you pick up, ‘Oh, what did you do that for? Why didn’t you understand this?’ Not just with children, as a parent, but with other people, with friends. … It’s not profound regret; it’s just a wiping up of tiny little messes that you didn’t recognize as mess when they were going on.” </em><strong><em>Morrison</em></strong></blockquote><p>I think I cannot agree more with her. With adults, it might be a bit easier to understand what they think and feel just by paying close attention to their body language, to their choice of words and slips of the tongue. Adults are more like oneself than one would be ready to accept. And those adults around whom one spends most of his time (at work, at home, or during leisure) are even more so. It is a common fact that we tend to associate with those who mirror our own way of life. Of course, sporadically, you might pretend you do not understand what they mean, just to hear them say infuriating things out loud, things you all might end up regretting. Or otherwise you all switch the knob all the way back to MUTE just so that you avoid any <em>conflict welcoming</em> remarks. Which is, again, not a very good strategy and might not bring you very far. But with children it is a tad more complicated. You cannot <em>read</em> them as you usually would an adult because their signifying luggage is still rather flimsy. Their body language is rough and rudimentary. Their <em>thesaurus</em> quite thin. They are not very good at lying or at being subtle. I think it would be wrong to expect them to mold onto your expectations of what it means to reasonably communicate thoughts, feelings or emotions. Not being able to make sense of how a child reacts does not necessarily imply that <em>they have an evil plan</em>, or that they <em>defy</em> you or that they have a purpose when they proceed in doing the opposite of what you ask them to do. No. They simply cannot express what they think/feel in a way you, the adult, can understand. The triangle that should be formed between the child, the world and the adult fails to close. Somewhere, one angle stays obtuse. Somewhere there is a meaning leak. How to get out of it, then? The way I see it, there are things that are immune to change, i.e., one cannot change the world, so much is certain. Thus, if there is a way out, it has to be through the two other parties left. But the child is too poorly equipped to grasp the nuances of their deeds, change accordingly and give an adequate response. It would be quite simply too much for them. The only one who’s left then is us: me, you, the adult. We could at least try to level off with the child. We should have the skills needed for this job. We should be able to take a deep breath (or two) and go against our impulse to rationally (or emotionally) argue or make a point. <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alison-gopnik/empathic-civilization-ama_b_473961.html">Empathy</a> should be the word. Empathy should save the day. Do you know what the child might be thinking about? Do you know what kind of connections she has made inside her head? Connections which could put the whole situation in a different light? Do you know what she might be thinking next? What is it she might want to achieve? Can you see the logic (her logic) she inadvertently makes use of? In a <a href="http://freakonomics.com/2014/05/22/think-like-a-child-a-new-freakonomics-radio-podcast/">Freakonomics</a> podcast, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alison_Gopnik">Alison Gopnik</a> says that we should:</p><blockquote><em>Think of the kids as being the research and development division of the human species. And we’re — adults — we’re production and marketing. So from the production and marketing perspective, it might look like the R&amp;D guys are really not doing anything that looks very sensible or useful. They sit around all day in their beanbag chairs playing Pong and having blue-sky ideas. And we poor production and marketing people, who are actually making the profits, have to subsidize these guys! But of course, one of the things that we know is that that kind of blue-sky, just pure, research actually pays off in the long run. Gopnik</em></blockquote><p>Yes, they are impatient, it’s true. Yes, very often their mind takes off in the least expected directions. But does that mean that they do not know how to behave? That they do not want to follow the rules upon which we built our society (sarcasm alarm)? That they find rebelling and challenging <em>fun</em> and they only do it to annoy you? I guess not. Perhaps you should try with (even) a little (more) patience. Perhaps you should try to put yourself in their shoes. Try to be a child yourself. You’ll understand them more than you think you can! Does “teaching them a lesson” ever work? I highly doubt it. That only makes them bitter, that only expands the unhappy time they have to go through. Perhaps a meaningful look would suffice. Perhaps a gesture could be more efficient than sending them in their room and let them swelter for a few hours. How much time are they really going to dedicate to re-considering whatever they did wrong and how much time will they spend recusing those who put them in this situation?</p><p>God help the child, indeed! They have to struggle hard in order to be understood. If we would only find the time to lower our ears and listen to what they really want to say or open our eyes and look at what they really want to do…</p><p>To go back to Morrison, perhaps we should step out of our routine for a while, at least when we try to spend some time with our offspring. Bringing up a child is a lot more work than babysitting! You have to stretch yourself backwards as well as forwards in time. In a split second you have to understand where a remark comes from, where a deed went wrong, where a fear was nested and try to guide the whole situation on a safe ground, to give an explanation, to raise a disapproving eyebrow, or to emanate calm and confidence.</p><p>Otherwise… God help the child!</p><p>They shouldn’t be really raising themselves, on their own. That’s why we, the adults, are here after all…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8E-8jk1rV1i1UPNV.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.cento.red/god-help-the-child/"><em>www.cento.red</em></a><em> on September 15, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=58997ea083c6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Another Other: the Foreigner]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fugabite/another-other-the-foreigner-4c49157ff6fd?source=rss-8a1bd90144d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4c49157ff6fd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[identity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreigner]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[fugabi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2015 09:11:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-22T08:35:30.879Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Gabriel Furmuzachi</p><h3>A Metaphor of Identity</h3><p>The metaphor to which we refer appears in a couple of letters written in May 1877.</p><p>On May 13th:</p><blockquote><em>[…] C’est faux de dire : Je pense : on devrait dire : On me pense. — Pardon du jeu de mots. — Je est un autre. Tant pis pour le bois qui se trouve violon, et nargue aux inconscients, qui ergotent sur ce qu’ils ignorent tout à fait!</em></blockquote><p>And then, two days later:</p><blockquote><em>Car Je est un autre. Si le cuivre s’éveille clairon, il n’y a rien de sa faute. Cela m’est évident: j’assiste à l’éclosion de ma pensée : je la regarde, je l’écoute : je lance un coup d’archet : la symphonie fait son remuement dans les profondeurs, ou vient d’un bond sur la scène.</em></blockquote><p>These two letters addressed, the first to Georges Izambard and the second to Paul Demeny, were written by Rimbaud and they were put together as being the “Lettres dites ‘du Voyant’”, “of the Visionary”. I am not going to delve here into an analysis of these letters. What I am only interested in is the metaphor itself — “Je est un autre”. From an aesthetic perspective, Rimbaud points out that the artistic, poetic production is not possible without digging into the most hidden places of one’s creative powers and give them a voice. The poet’s creativity is not to be regarded as a static although overflowing source of beauty. It needs to be challenged, to be shattered, to be shifted. These letters mark the drastic change in the way Rimbaud used language (noticeable already from 1871). From then on, Rimbaud’s poetry has a new tonality, it testifies to a sort of violence with which he charges against the vocabulary, against the syntax, etc. Language needs to be stripped down from anything that is not necessary — this is the motto of Rimbaud’s new approach. Now, from a philosophical perspective, “Je est un autre” is invoked not only because it expresses a condition of identity as a person but also of identity as a person among and with others. “Je est un autre” signifies a subjectivity crisis and an awareness of it as well. It combines a perspective from within with a perspective from without. It embodies a thought which points to the individual, the “Je”, through the community, the “autre”. It attempts to describe the individual, the “definite”, the “familiar” through the indefinite and the foreignness of the other.</p><h3>Toccata et Fugue pour l’Étranger</h3><p>For Julia Kristeva too the meaning of “Je est un autre” goes beyond the sphere of poetry and seems to play the role of a prophesy, announcing the exile, announcing the very condition of being a Foreigner, an Other.</p><blockquote><em>Vivre avec l’autre, avec l’étranger, nous confronte à la possibilité ou non d’être un autre. Il ne s’agit pas simplement — humanisant — de notre aptitude à accepter l’autre; mais d’être à sa place, ce qui revient à se penser et à se faire autre à soi-même. Le “Je est un autre” de Rimbaud n’était pas seulement l’aveu du fantôme psychotique qui hante la poésie. Le mot annonçait l’exil, la possibilité ou la nécessité d’être étranger et de vivre à l’étranger, préfigurant ainsi l’art de vivre d’une ère moderne, le cosmopolitisme des écorchés. […] Identité dédoublée, kaléidoscope d’identités: pouvons-nous être reçus comme fous ou comme faux? Sans mourir de la haine de l’étranger ou pour l’étranger? (Kristeva 1988, 25)</em></blockquote><p>Recognizing the other is significant not only inasmuch as the other is concerned but also inasmuch as the self is concerned because now, when one has to live with the other, one has to be ready to understand that one can become an Other oneself. Rimbaud’s metaphor gains a different perspective when applied to the way the modern world works, a world in which cultures meet and influence each other in manners until now very little possible. This is why the I is opened up to many more and deeper challenges and changes. Where does the I end and the Other begin? Is there a divided identity or a kaleidoscope of identities? Are we true to ourselves in being who we are? Are we fools or fakes? In <em>Étrangers a nous-mêmes</em>, Julia Kristeva takes us on a ride through the history of being a foreigner. The Greeks and the Barbarians, the Chosen People, St. Paul and St. Augustin, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, France and the European Union, these all are subjects of her inquiry. The opening chapter is titled “Toccata et Fugue pour l’Étranger” and it is, as it rightly suggests, an abrupt introductions into the subject. An introduction which mixes personal considerations, literary criticism and historical as well as political elements. Étrangeté, the “condition of being a foreigner”, Kristeva considers, is something which eludes analysis, something which somehow vanishes before it got the chance to even be acknowledged. This does not mean, however, that we deal here with a sort of efficient “melting pot” or a successful integration process. Rather, she seems to think that the evanescence of foreignness is due to an effacement of the self. She writes:</p><blockquote><em>C’est dire qu’établi en soi, l’étranger n’a pas de soi. Tout juste une assurance vide, sans valeur, qui axe ses possibilités d’être constamment autre, au gré des autres et des circonstances. Je fais ce qu’on veut, mais ce n’est pas “moi” — “moi” est ailleurs, “moi” n’appartient à personne, “moi” n’appartient pas à “moi”, … “moi” existe-t-il? (Kristeva 1988, 19)</em></blockquote><p>Once uprooted, the self loses its backbone; the I becomes too flexible, to the point of breaking off. With changing the space, a change in the way of perceiving time seems inevitable. In the new environment, one perceives time as a transition period and thus, one tends to live a transitory life, in which the past cannot be invoked and in which the future cannot be “designed”. But, in spite of this (or maybe because of this), the foreigner perceives herself as the only one who really is alive. Not being able to rely on the past, on their tradition, on their family and friends and, at the same time, not knowing how to cope with a shapeless future, they have to make decisions, to take risks.</p><blockquote><em>[…] l’étranger a tendance à estimer qu’il est le seul à avoir une biographie, c’est-à-dire une vie faite d’épreuves — ni catastrophes ni aventures (quoi qu’elles puissent arriver les unes autant que les autres), mais simplement une vie où les actes sont des événements, parce qu’ils impliquent choix, surprises, ruptures, adaptations ou ruses, mais ni routine ni repos. Aux yeux de l’étranger, ceux qui ne le sont pas n’ont aucune vie: à peine existent-ils, superbes ou médiocres, mais hors de la course et donc presque déjà cadavérisés. (Kristeva 1988, 16–17)</em></blockquote><p>The foreigner vacillates between a “loose” self and the pride of being the only one to have a biography, between an ungraspable past and a slippery future, between the weariness of freedom and solitude. As Kristeva put it, “[…] l’étranger est un rêveur qui fait l’amour avec l’absence, un déprimé exquis. Heureux?” (Kristeva 1988, 21) Happy? Perhaps. Ironical? Certainly! Critical? Doubtless! Skeptical? Maybe. But also hopeful! Coping with a new world can occur, Kristeva considers here, either as an acknowledgement of the change as a loss which would never be refilled, or as a chance to provoke change itself, as if putting one’s identity through a test and pushing it to the limit. What is stable, what we evaluate strongly, our character is what will endure these tests. And what’s more, since one holds together all these changes with the help of narratives, the language in which they are made up, told and retold becomes important.</p><h4>The Silence of Polyglots</h4><p>The short passage titled “The Silence of the Polyglots” (Kristeva 1988, 26–29) underlines the subtle, however significant role of language change and the influence it has on one’s identity. Kristeva considers that for someone living in a new linguistic community, the mother tongue, unusable, resembles a handicapped child: dear (because it is so intimately one’s own) but incapable of anything. It lacks the connections with the surrounding world because the “logic” of things has been altered: my words, do not refer to the world any longer, the way they used to. She writes:</p><blockquote><em>Habiter des sonorités, des logiques coupées de la mémoire nocturne du corps, du sommeil aigre-doux de l’enfance. Porter en soi comme un caveau secret, ou comme un enfant handicapé — chéri et inutile -, ce langage d’autrefois qui se fane sans jamais vous quitter.</em></blockquote><p>The language adopted, on the other hand, is regarded only as an instrument, as a tool which will always remain distinct, separated from oneself. But a priceless instrument, however, as it is the sole means through which one can express oneself. It has the power to give one a different skin and even more than that, another sex. Together with a new language comes the possibility or, better perhaps, the necessity to change. Because, Kristeva seems to say, hearing my own voice and listening to my choice of words, I do not find myself to be my usual self. There is a fault line between who I am and what I manage to convey to the others about who I am. My narrative identity suddenly seems to be the narrative of someone else, very similar to me but not exactly myself. That’s where the necessity of change comes in. How should I keep my word when my word is not understood? Should I be who I say I am or should I try to say who I am with the risk of being poorly understood? Wavering between two languages, one close but useless and one distant but necessary, it is not difficult to discover an affinity to silence. Instead of looking for the best approximation of one’s thoughts, one starts to question the importance of words altogether and then drifts away in silence. Kristeva mentions Hölderlin who, while learning Greek, writes in the first version (ältere Fassung) of Mnemosyne: “Ein Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos / Schmerzlos sind wir und haben fast /Die Sprache in der Fremde verloren“. She interprets these lines as being symptomatic for anyone who goes through the process of learning how to live in another linguistic community. Losing one’s language, in the sense of not being able to speak in the “usual” way, not being sure of using the right words in the right situations, we become immune to the world’s happenings, as if we were not a part of it any longer: an empty sign. Assuming this emptiness as the only way out, one tends to supplement the lack of words with deeds.</p><blockquote><em>Coincé dans ce mutisme polyforme, l’étranger peut essayer, au lieu de dire, de faire: de faire le ménage, du tennis, du football, de la voile, de la couture, du cheval, du jogging, des enfants… que sais-je? Le silence ne vous est pas seulement imposé, il est en vous: refus de dire, sommeil strié collé à une angoisse qui veut rester muette, propriété privée de votre discrétion orgueilleuse et mortifiée, lumière coupante que ce silence. Rien à dire, néant, personne à l’horizon. Et une complétude impénétrable: diamant froid, trésor secret, soigneusement protégé, hors d’atteinte. Ne rien dire, rien n’est à dire, rien n’est dicible. (Kristeva 1988, 26–29)</em></blockquote><p>But this silence, Kristeva thinks, is not something which is only imposed from outside. It comes also from within. “Nothing to say, abyss, nobody at the horizon”, she writes. In silence, the self is hidden away, as a “cold diamond”, as a “secret treasure”. The process of bringing up the self into a new language is a long and difficult process in which we get in touch with a different form of the other. This is also what we learn from Eva Hoffman, a Polish immigrant in the U.S.. Julia Kristeva gave us the framework; she sketched what it means to be a foreigner and pointed out the importance of language in our attempt to define ourselves in a new linguistic environment, while discovering ourselves as being somehow split: we are the other as well — “Je est un autre!” What follows is a detailed self-analysis of someone who had to go through this process and wrote about it: a first person account of the life of an immigrant, moving from one country to another and becoming oneself — a person — while changing languages.</p><h3>Leaving — Eva Hoffman</h3><p>Eva Hoffman’s autobiographical novel <em>Lost in Translation</em> starts with her departure from Poland, together with her family (mother, father and little sister), heading to Vancouver, Canada. She grows up in Canada (where she feels exiled and disappointed) and then moves to the U.S. to study and later teach (while trying to figure out where she stands in the confusing American Melting Pot). <em>Lost in Translation</em> stemmed out of her preoccupation with language and “self-translation”, as she calls it.</p><blockquote><em>What I wanted to talk about was not just language but the conjunction of language and identity, and that to do that I needed a case study — and the case study I knew best was myself. It needed to be done from within a subjectivity since it was so much about subjectivity. I decided to write it as a memoir — quite reluctantly because I am not a confessional person at all… (Zournazy, 1998)</em></blockquote><p>For Hoffman, language and subjectivity are tightly connected. Learning English and using this language in order to express herself, to make herself present not only to the others but also to herself, she has to undergo noticeable changes. It’s not only that she has to learn to express herself in another language, but she also has to change her looks, her way of walking, her hairdo, etc. She assists at the “emergence” of her own self. To keep a check on these changes, she begins to write. Of course, she vacillated between using English and using Polish. English, on the one hand, seemed to be far away from her intimate thoughts and feelings, unable to describe them best. Polish, on the other hand, seemed to be the echo of a vanishing world, with little reference in her own environment. Her decision to use English for her writing was a gamble and a hope.</p><blockquote><em>I learn English through writing, and, in turn, writing gives me a written self. Refracted through the double distance of English and writing, this self — my English self — becomes oddly objective; more than anything it perceives. It exists more easily in the abstract sphere of thoughts and observations than in the world. For a while, this impersonal self, this cultural negative capability, becomes the truest thing about me. When I write, I have a real existence that is proper to the activity of writing — an existence that takes place midway between me and the sphere of artifice, art, pure language. This language is beginning to invent another me. […] It seems that when I write in English, I am unable to use the word “I”. I do not go as far as the schizophrenic “she” — but I am driven, as by a compulsion, to the double, the Siamese-twin — “you”. (Hoffman 1997, 121)</em></blockquote><p>Writing makes possible an objectification. The written text, once on paper, becomes independent of the writer. It exists in the world much the same as our actions which, once done, begin a life of their own, transforming the world. But at the same time, it gives one the chance to face oneself as another, as an alterity, to get to know oneself as another. Somewhere else, Hoffman points out again the importance of writing in her attempt to come to terms with herself and with living in her new surroundings. Through writing she attempts…</p><blockquote><em>…to close the gap on the sense of being estranged from myself. In my case, this estrangement happened very much in daily perceptions and daily life. In a sense, writing is the attempt to find a language that is embedded in yourself and that somehow can express the self directly. I know that is a kind of dream and not completely attainable, but it is the attempt to find a language which sort of bubbles up directly. (Zournazi, 1998)</em></blockquote><p>Writing achieves this because it happens under the mark of the self. Hoffman considers that the new language is perceived more as a language qua system. Her first language, her mother tongue, appeared to be more attached to things, more absolute, in this perspective. However, with her arrival in Canada, she understood that Polish is not a language that “functions” in her new environment. For about a year she had to live through an acute transition period in which she could not break with Polish and in which she was not confident in her mastery of English. In any case, she could not entertain this status quo for too long and decided for English. The process she started then lasted for about twenty years, as she confesses in an interview. (Zournazy 1998) During these twenty years, she has been on a continuous search for words and phrases and for ways of improving her (almost sensuous) relationship with English, trying to bring herself in line with its peculiarities and with its numerous nuances.</p><blockquote><em>I’ve become obsessed with words. I gather them, put them away like a squirrel saving nuts for winter, swallow them and hunger for more. If I take in enough, then maybe I can incorporate the language, make it part of my psyche and my body. I will not leave an image unworded, will not let anything cross my mind till I find the right phrase to pin the shadow down. (Hoffman 1997, 216)</em></blockquote><p>She absorbs the language as if it were an essential substance without which she would not be able to subsist. Whether it is something she saw, something she read, something she thought about, something she overheard, she pours it through her ever growing net of words and sentences. A page further down she writes:</p><blockquote><em>I pounce on bits of colloquial idiom, those slivers of Americana in which the cultural sensibility is most vivid, as if they could give me America itself. “Hair of the dog that bit me”, I repeat to myself with relish; “pork-barreling”; “I’m from Missouri, show me”; “He swallowed it hook, line and sinker.” When I speak, I’m awkward in using such homely familiarities; I still feel the presumption in it. But in writing, I claim every territorial prerogative. Perhaps if I cast my net wide enough, it will cover the whole continent. (Hoffman 1997, 217)</em></blockquote><p>Words are one of the dominant themes in the third part (which deals with her attempt to integrate in the American culture) of <em>Lost in Translation</em>. Hoffman takes her time in pointing out how very important they are. Only a better grasp of the language in which she lives can give her a better picture of the world and thus a stronger sense of being here, among others like her and among the things which have names.</p><blockquote><em>The thought that there are parts of the language I am missing can induce a small panic in me, as if such gaps were missing parts of the world or my mind — as if the totality of the world and mind were coeval with the totality of language. Or rather, as if language were an enormous, fine net in which reality is contained — and if there are holes in it, then a bit of reality can escape, cease to exist. (Hoffman 1997, 217)</em></blockquote><p>The process of learning the new language came together with a re-discovery of her Self. Writing about her changes, she discovers how important it is to have the right word for the right thought or feeling. To find the right words, however, is a very demanding task.</p><blockquote><em>I love words insofar as they correspond to the world, insofar as they give it to me in a heightened form. The more words I have, the more distinct, precise my perceptions become — and such lucidity is a form of joy. Sometimes, when I find a new expression, I roll it on the tongue, as if shaping it in my mouth gave birth to a new shape in the world. Nothing fully exists until it is articulated. (Hoffman 1997, 28)</em></blockquote><p>Her Self needs to be articulated as well, put in a story, told to the others and told to herself. It is the same person who speaks English and teaches at Harvard and the Polish girl who just started to understand the world around her, although it may seem that the English Eva Hoffman is “arranged, shaped and articulated in quite another way”. It is as if one is given another opportunity to “make” one’s character anew and in tune with one’s environment. After running from one language to another, she realizes that, although Polish might come from a deeper place, with the passing of time it becomes fossilized.</p><blockquote><em>When I talk to myself now, I talk in English. English is the language in which I’ve become an adult, in which I’ve seen my favourite movies and read my favourite novels, and sung along with Janis Joplin records. In Polish, whole provinces of adult experience are missing. I don’t know the Polish word for “microchips”, or “pathetic fallacy”, or The Importance of Being Earnest. If I tried talking to myself in my native tongue, it would be a stumbling conversation indeed, interlaced with English expressions. (Hoffman 1997, 272)</em></blockquote><p>Immersed in the American culture, surrounded by the “American reality” she becomes more sensitive to things American. Undertaking therapy is one example. However, she discovers that for her,</p><blockquote><em>therapy is partly translation therapy, the talking cure a second-language cure. My going to a shrink is, among other things, a rite of initiations: initiation into the language of the subculture within which I happen to live, into a way of explaining myself to myself. But gradually, it becomes a project of translating backward. The way to jump over my Great Divide is to crawl backward over it in English. It’s only when I retell my whole story, back to the beginning, and from the beginning onward, in one language, that I can reconcile the voices within me with each other; it is only then that the person who judges the voices and tells the stories begins to emerge. (Hoffman 1997, 271–272)</em></blockquote><p>The talking-cure is her solution for “jumping over” her “Great Divide”. Slowly “translating” her Polish life into her English life she manages to go over the silence of which Kristeva talked above. This process proves to be very important. She could have chosen silence and could have attempted to live in an enclosed community, using a (petrified) language and speaking it with few people, hoping to maintain the idealized image of a paradise which only exists overseas, in her childhood Poland. Instead, she decided to come to terms with the new environment and acknowledge it as such.</p><blockquote><em>No, there’s no return to the point of origin, no regaining of childhood unity. Experience creates style, and style, in turn creates a new woman. Polish is no longer the one, true language against which others live their secondary life. Polish insights cannot be regained in their purity; there’s something I know in English too. The wholeness of childhood truths is intermingled with the divisiveness of adult doubt. When I speak Polish now, it is infiltrated, permeated, and inflected by the English in my head. Each language modifies the other, crossbreeds with it, fertilizes it. Each language makes the other relative. Like everybody, I am the sum of my languages — the language of my family and childhood, and education and friendship, and love, and the larger, changing world — though perhaps I tend to be more aware than most of the fractures between them, and of the building blocks. The fissures sometimes cause me pain, but in a way, they’re how I know that I’m alive. Suffering and conflict are the best proof that there’s something like a psyche, a soul; or else, what is it that suffers? Why would we need to suffer when fed and warm and out of the rain, where it not for that other entity within us making its odd, unreasonable, never fulfillable demands? (Hoffman 1997, 273)</em></blockquote><p>“Like everybody, I am the sum of my languages”, Hoffman writes. And these languages are what we speak. We learn a language with the others around us, whether these others are our family or friends, our teachers or simply, the landscape which surrounds us, the world. In time, our experience of the world increases and with it, our Weltanschauung, our grasp of the world and of ourselves is becoming more detailed, more nuanced. We make choices, we undergo changes and we follow opportunities. As narratives do with contingent events, bringing them together in a story, so our choices and our actions become integral parts of who we are.</p><p>In what follows we will try to explain why the language we speak and the stories we tell about ourselves are so important in shaping and maintaining the self and its relationship with the other. In his book on <em>The Sources of the Self</em>, Charles Taylor considers that the concept we have of ourselves (i.e., the concept of the self) depends on linguistic praxis and the interpretation of the facts in the history of our lives. When inquiring into concepts like those of self or person we are not to regard them as objects, or as parts of our body. We should talk about being a “self” in a different way than when we talk about being an organism. Having a “self” is quite different than having a heart or a liver. Although we need these organs to be alive, they are not involved in the process of self understanding or self interpretation. What matters here is a “subject of experience” who speaks, who interacts with the world around, who is involved in relationships. This is why the question of language is addressed and becomes acute in Taylor’s conception. As Taylor writes, “A language only exists and is maintained within a language community. And this indicates another crucial feature of a self. One is a self only among other selves”. (Taylor 1989, 35) From this perspective, persons can only be studied as beings who “only exist in, or are partly constituted by, a certain language”. (Taylor 1989, 35) One’s sense of self is acquired through a process of “growing and becoming”. It is not something instantaneous, something that occurs overnight. This process takes place in a certain language which one uses if one is to “reveal” oneself to oneself and to the others. We use our language in order to interpret ourselves, in order to define our standpoint, our Weltanschauung. Moreover, social life is impossible without language because culture and public space are created in language, and our values are accessible only through language. Figuring out where we stand as a self is an enterprise which has to take into account where we come from, the tradition from which we stem. Traditions, or as Taylor calls them — schematic historical narratives, have a tremendous force which springs from the fact that they give substance to one’s life, a material out of which one’s life is to be tailored. We relate our story to a greater pattern of history, Taylor considers, “whether it be the traditional Heilsgeschichte of Christianity, or that of the progress of mankind, or the coming Revolution, or the building of a peaceful world, or the retrieval or continuance of our natural culture”. (Taylor 1989, 97) Our lives are circumscribed to a set of frameworks, within a “strongly qualified horizon”. Frameworks are inescapable. As we cannot talk about language without using a language, so we cannot talk about identity without acknowledging the existence of frameworks. They come up whenever we attempt to articulate our histories and produce reasons and give meanings for/to our actions. To articulate a framework is to explicate what makes sense of our moral responses. That is, when we try to spell out what it is that we presuppose when we judge that a certain form of life is truly worthwhile, or place our dignity in a certain achievement or status, or define our moral obligations in a certain manner, we find ourselves articulating inter alia what I have been calling here “frameworks”. (Taylor 1989, 26) A person without frameworks is not really a person, since the space circumscribed by these “distinctions of worth” is essential to human agency. While practices relate to collective norms, frameworks operate at a more “local level”, relating closely to human agency and thus having a stronger hold on human identity. For example, being an Orthodox, or an environmentalist, or Flemish, these are all frames which determine where we stand on questions of importance for ourselves. Losing this identification or this commitment we would very likely end up spinning rudderless at sea. We would not be able to know anymore, Taylor considers, “for an important range of questions, what the significance of things was” for us. (Taylor 1989, 27) This amounts to an identity crisis, an inability to move within the moral and spiritual space. Without a framework which allows for things to have a stable significance, a marked position in relation to what is good or what has meaning or what is bad or meaningless, for that matter, comes the burden of “painful and frightening” experiences. (Taylor 1989, 28) This is how Kristeva’s silence becomes reality. This is why, in using English (her “adopted” language) as the language in which she tries to define herself, Hoffman assists at the emergence of a new self. Narratives function more or less like a prism: they disperse light into the spectrum making it possible for us to understand our moral options, our evaluations, our life course. Through narratives we are able to interpret ourselves, to see where “we stand“. Either we want to see where we are coming from or we want to know where we should go, we always find ourselves in need of a story, of our own story by which we have the chance to interpret ourselves and realize what is important for us, what defines us as selves in a community of selves. With such a drastic change as a language change this unity is disrupted, shattered and we try to pick up the pieces and paste them all together using words we still have to learn to trust, words we still have to bring closer to ourselves. Now, how are we to surpass this difficulty? In <em>The Politics of Recognition</em>, Charles Taylor points out that mainstream philosophy often overlooked an important feature of human life namely, its dialogical character. Human identity, Taylor considers, is created “dialogically”, in conjunction with the others. Because it is partly shaped by recognition, the withholding of recognition (or misrecognition) can be damaging to a person’s dignity. “We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression”. (Taylor 1995, 230) Understanding that one’s identity is not generated inwardly, monologically, is crucial in understanding the close connection between identity and recognition. It should be mentioned that Taylor does not take language to mean strictly the words we use when we are speaking. He broadens the view and takes into account other modes of expression such as art, gesture, love, etc., which we acquire in interaction with others and through which we not only communicate, but also define ourselves. Thus my discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others. That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives new importance to recognition. My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others. (Taylor 1995, 231) My identity depends on being recognized by the others. It is only then that my identity can be regarded as authentic. The “inwardly derived, personal, original identity” is not recognized as such apriori. Rather, it achieves that through interaction and exchange. It is a fragile project which can fail at any time because it depends on both interacting parties. One brings one’s story with oneself and tries to find one’s place within the new culture by building up one’s uniqueness in a continuous dialogue with the Other, attempting to find new ways to re-knot the threads of their own interrupted story.</p><h3>References</h3><p>Hoffman, Eva. 1989. Lost in Translation: a Life in a New Language. Penguin Books: New York.</p><p>— — — -. 1997. “The New Nomads” in. Letters of Transit. Reflections on Exile, Identity, Language and Loss. (Ed.) Anciman, Andre. New York: New Press in collaboration with New York Public Library</p><p>Kristeva, Julia (Ed.). 1982. Langue, discours, société: pour Émile Benveniste. Paris: Éd. du Seuil.</p><p>— — — -. 1988. Étrangers a nous-mêmes. Paris: Gallimard.</p><p>Laitinen, Arto. 2002. Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur on Self-Interpretations and Narrative Identity [<a href="http://goo.gl/DeEAwH">http://goo.gl/DeEAwH</a>]</p><p>Taylor, C.. 1989. Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.</p><p>— — — -. 1991. The ethics of authenticity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.</p><p>— — — -. 1995. “The Politics of Recognition” in Philosophical Arguments. Taylor, C. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.</p><p>Zournazi, Mary (Ed.). 1998 Foreign Dialogues: Memories, Translations, Conversations. Annandale, NSW: Pluto.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.cento.red/another-other-the-foreigner/"><em>www.cento.red</em></a><em> on July 24, 2014.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4c49157ff6fd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Humboldt, Gauss and… Daft Punk]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fugabite/humboldt-gauss-and-daft-punk-f6a68d487826?source=rss-8a1bd90144d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f6a68d487826</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[writing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[music]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[fugabi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2015 09:05:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-21T09:05:33.859Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>They have all talked about it. It is a very good <a href="http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Die_Vermessung_der_Welt">book</a>, they said. You have to read it!</p><p>And I did.</p><p>Kehlmann’s — <em>Die Vermessung der Welt</em>.</p><p>Yes, it does a very good job at portraying two great scientists: one running around the world, getting bitten by mosquitoes, crawling down narrow caves, almost growing a pair of sextants instead of eyes, the other one sporting a velvet cap and considering the act of crunching numbers as a vital dimension of one’s life, using his intellect as a weapon (both to get what he wants and to ward off anyone who’d dare to disagree with him). One has a chance to learn about these two people and about their great minds. Although… One can do something similar by reading the corresponding Wikipedia articles. Well, no! That was mean.</p><p>Almost…</p><p>The thing is, this is a book which is closer to David Sedaris’ kind of writing than to Philip Roth’s (just as a quick example). I do not mean to say it is bad (I do like Sedaris, after all). What I mean to say is that it is more funny and light, a sort of summer reading on the beach, than it is deep and serious (as both Humboldt and Gauss most probably thought we should all try to be). Measuring the world, at least as I see it, is not a leisurely activity. It is a sustained effort, it consists of breakthroughs as well as of failures, it needs time and support. In a word, it needs to be <em>human</em>.</p><p>The characters in the book, on the other hand, the way they talk and act and move have, curiously, something mechanical to it — it made me think, uncannily, of Daft Punk’s video Around the World. What you see in this clip are figures (human, but not quite) running about a small stage (in a circular manner) with robot-like gestures, following the music. They do go “around the world” but they do not wonder/wander. Kehlmann’s guys seem to be always in a hurry. If they have a reason to take it easy and if they attempt to ruminate, the scene comes rather abruptly to an end. He tells us that Humboldt saw the Aztec calendar and had a quick chat with a worker there about the number of people who were sacrificed when the temple was ready. Then, in the next scene, just like that, he has dinner with the viceroy. He does think about it a little bit. Just a little bit and then he’s done! Puff!</p><p>The four oarsmen, taking him and Bonpland through the jungle and on the Orinoco looked like interesting people, who’ve seen quite some things, but we never learn enough about them. If anything at all.</p><p>Gauss, on the other hand, flies with a balloon and sees the world from above. One might write a whole book only based on this happening. Gauss is in love with Johanna and wants to marry her but he is refused. He asks again and, fearing another refusal, he contemplates suicide. He almost kills himself. Again, there is so much stuff in here one could work with. The Gauss we meet through Kehlmann seems to be rolling on a beaten track. His actions do not need an explanation. Later on, he wants to kiss Weber’s wife on the shoulder (he only fantasizes about it). Why can the author not push it up a bit? Why does he not make it more appealing, playful, sexy? Why not? Because it’s not in the letters? How far do fiction and biography go hand in hand? And if they already seem to be so intertwined, why not take it a step further? Write more about less. So what if the epistolary exchange is not as rewarding in this regard as one would expect? You’re a writer, make it new!</p><p>Make it new!</p><p>But I guess I should not bring Pound to the mix. It might get (too) loud!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/576/0*45563Uyf_ZRcUzX0.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.cento.red/humboldt-gauss-and-daft-punk/"><em>www.cento.red</em></a><em> on January 30, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f6a68d487826" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[So, how does this work?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fugabite/so-how-does-this-work-bbf29fcc8cd5?source=rss-8a1bd90144d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bbf29fcc8cd5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[art]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[fugabi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2015 07:39:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-08T07:39:16.211Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Gabriel Furmuzachi</p><p>(a sketch on contemporary art)</p><p>I understand the fact that in (most) contemporary art one should not look for beauty.</p><p>This week I finished my tour in MUMOK and saw the Gender Check exhibition. The objects there are not beautiful. They are challenging, violent, sometimes funny, sometimes queer (sic!) but not beautiful. There is a lot about suffering and inequality there, about irony and rage, about one’s need to make oneself heard, about a quest to define oneself. You look/read/hear what goes on around you and you end up being moved, thinking about this stuff and, perhaps, wanting to do something about it. I can only guess that this is the message.</p><p>But… This is Warhol all over again!</p><p>Is Warhol beautiful? Is the Brillo box beautiful? This kind of ties up together with the stuff above. Therefore, I should elaborate. Today, instead of spending time perusing books in the library (which closed earlier because of the holidays!) I decided to see the Cars show at the Albertina. The museum itself was packed with people but most of them were there for the Impressionists. They’ll (also) close soon. Downstairs there was enough space. And music! Yeah, music from a huge boom-box (the kind one sees only on MTV’s Pimp my ride) with thumping sounds, meant to… you know… blend in… It did not really… I couldn’t concentrate. But then again, what should one try to focus for? It’s just Andy Warhol! Just the cool guy and his silkscreen stuff! The Dude… The Philosopher (I’ll come to this later). Indeed, the only thing one sees are silkscreen renderings of cars. First Benz and Daimler models, race Merzs in all sorts of background colors and with all sorts of colored squares stamped over the canvas.</p><p>In one of his essays in Philosophizing Art, Danto writes about The Philosopher as Andy Warhol, praising him for his genius (which, he mentions, almost cost him his friendship with Robert Motherwell). Andy Warhol, the Philosopher. I kept looking at the paintings hanged on the walls, trying to suppress the thumping noises coming from the boom-box and trying to think about the Brillo box (which, btw, was designed by an abstract expressionist — Steve Harvey). Where is the philosopher here? In the repetition? In the everydayness of the images of these objects which ceased to be means of transportation and became objects of lust and want?</p><p>Yes! That’s it!</p><p>Edmund White said that:</p><blockquote><em>Andy took every conceivable definition of the word art and challenged it. Art reveals the trace of the artist’s hand: Andy resorted to silk-screening. A work of art is a unique object: Andy came up with multiples. A painter paints; Andy made movies. Art is divorced from the commercial and the utilitarianism: Andy specialized in Campbell’s Soup Cans and Dollar Bills. Painting can be defined in contrast to photography: Andy recycles snapshots. A work of art is what an artist signs, proof of his creative choice, his intentions: for a small fee, Andy signed any object whatever.</em></blockquote><p>There you have it! Nothing other than a Nietzsche of Art, actually bringing painting to its knees and surrendering it to philosophy. According to Danto, anyway. The whole problem started while attempting to distinguish between the Brillo box that was not art and the Brillo box that was. Wherein lies the difference? What makes one art and the other a soap box? Well, the answer comes, they are, actually, both art. But one of them is commercial art and the other one is fine art. By doing what he did best, Warhol turned our world, our soap boxes and soup cans and whatever have you into art. Suddenly, the boundaries between art and the world became blurred. Danto considers that “unlike Duchamps, Warhol sought to set up a resonance not so much between art and real objects as between art and images, it having been his insight, that our signs and images are our reality”. Hmm… What did Baudrillard say? Didn’t he say that today there is no such thing as reality? That the world we live in is only a Simulacrum? That we live from images and only images? Images, surfaces, appearances. And then again, Wittgenstein and his language games… Returning to the ordinary language. If a lion would speak nobody would understand him! Warhol was no lion! And he spoke so that everyone understood him. “Pop art is a way of… liking things”. He rejoiced in his living in this world of images and multiplied them, brought them everywhere, made them more present than they otherwise would have been. Albertina’s Cars make no difference. Beauty is not an issue any longer. Multiplicity is. Commercialism is. Utilitarianism is.</p><p>Beauty… What on earth is that? I remember seeing last year in the same museum Richter’s watercolors and thinking I would really want to have one. Really, really… They were so beautiful. The vivid colors, the torn notebook papers… Would I think the same about a Warhol silk-screen? Don’t think so. As I wouldn’t think about the Gender Check exhibits in MUMOK. Warhol celebrated everydayness. Gender Check doesn’t celebrate much. It cries havoc. Leaving aside the communist era praise immortalized in oils and acrylics on the ground floor, the stuff on the upper floors does quite a good job at it. Tanja Ostojic is rather well represented. Just think about her homage to Malevich’s Black Sqare On White. Or about her installations. Or about her homage to Courbet’s L’origine du monde, also known as EU panties (well, this is not part of the exhibition, but nevertheless). Think about Katarzyna Kozyra’s Olympia. The body being brought forth, made brutally naked, pushed and pulled, exposed. Looking for an identity. Asking for an identity. Violently searching for normality. Would I hang something like this on the wall in my living room? I do not think so. If I understand and support the ideas behind these works I would try to do something about the world. I would try to change it. At least that’s what I feel I am being told through them. Do something! Putting them on the wall and regarding them only as art works would imply deserting their cause. Like Warhol, they play with images, they are philosophical and for them beauty is not something one should strive to achieve (of course, there are exceptions). Unlike Warhol, they do not celebrate the world but attempt to raise awareness about its hefty ways.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*_a2VPf301ZzQexg8.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.cento.red/so-how-does-this-work/"><em>www.cento.red</em></a><em> on February 6, 2010.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bbf29fcc8cd5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Carel Fabritius — The View in Delft]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fugabite/carel-fabritius-the-view-in-delft-48d247490524?source=rss-8a1bd90144d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/48d247490524</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[carel-fabritius]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[art]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[painting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[fugabi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2015 07:25:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-08T07:40:44.244Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Gabriel Furmuzachi</p><p>(a sketch)</p><h3>Abstract:</h3><p>Carel Fabritius left behind few but important works of art. We are concerned here with the View in Delft, and attempt to make two points about it. The first is that this small painting manages to break away from the classical perception of perspective, an endeavor informed mostly by new findings in the field of optics of the time. The second point, theoretically related to the first, stresses compositional elements that would bring View in Delft closer to a meditation on the fleetingness of life, making it a “town-scape” vanitas.</p><h3>I</h3><p>The View in Delft, by Carel Fabritius (1622–1654) is a small painting (15.5 x 31.7 cm) showing a street corner, at the back of the Nieuwe Kerk, in Delft in 1652. On the left side of the painting there is a man (perhaps a musical instruments seller) sitting in a stall at a table (on which we can see a lute and a viola da gamba) and seeming to be somehow lost in thoughts. As we look further to the right, our gaze is led inside the picture, then across the canal, acknowledging the tiny silhouette of the Delft town-hall, then come back, following the convex curvature of the Nieuwe Kerk (central to the painting) and then, again, down the road and along a second canal, our gaze travels all the way to the heart of Delft in order to finally come back again in the proximity of our instruments seller. The painting is on display at the National Gallery in London and, although it is presented flat (canvas mounted on wood) it is very likely that it was part of a perspective box.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lmvtt_yU489re6YA.jpg" /></figure><p>Carel Fabritius — View in Delft (1652) — 15.5 x 31.7 cm (Wikipedia)</p><p>Walter Liedtke in The Burlington Magazine (1976) brings convincing arguments supporting the fact that Fabritius not only made perspective boxes but also that he was some sort of authority in this respect. The View in Delft, Liedtke considers, was meant to be mounted at the back of a V-shaped box, in a hemicycle at 80° viewing angle. Presenting it this way would give one a much better sense of depth: the tree on the right would become almost detached from the picture (with some virtual space between itself and the houses behind it), the light and shadow play would become plausible, the church would lose its plumpness and receive taller proportions and the road on the right would be, as Liedtke puts it, “less reminiscent of Champs Élysées than of this little straatje in the actual town”. Moreover, the man on the left seems now “slimmer but rounder”, he “occupies space and gains his proper scale” closer to the viewer than to the church. The rest of the viola da gamba would be completed with a drawing on the floor of the perspective box, which would thus put it right “beneath the viewer’s nose”, below and in contrast to the church. Fabritius plays with our gaze in this small work. This does not mean, however, that he managed to pull a sophisticated trompe-l’oeil on us. Not because he were not capable of such a thing, but because he was less interested in “making the kind of illusionistic curio common in contemporary kunstkabinets than in testing the limits of mimesis in painting (an aim evidently consistent with his approach in other mature works).” (Liedtke, 1976) Liedtke also suggests that Fabritius might have come in contact, while being an apprentice in Rembrandt’s studio, with ideas on perspective present in a manuscript copy of the first edition of Leonardo’s Trattato della Pittura (published in Paris for the first time in 1651). We will never be able to know if that was the case, but illustrations of Leonardo’s thoughts on painting seem to inform Fabritius’ work. That the main aim of painting is to make a “plane surface display a body in relief, detached from that plane”, or that darker objects appear detached when put against a bright background are examples to be found in Fabritius’ work. “The View in Delft”, considers Liedtke, “is one of the greatest and historically most significant monuments of seventeenth-century Dutch painting not because it broke with the tradition in any way, but precisely because it represents a conscious effort to extend the established representational conventions in accord with a deepening interest in the physical environment.” (Liedtke, 1976) Fabritius’ painting seems to be more scientifically informed than other, similar works of his time in that, as we will see, it makes use of ideas at the confluence between philosophy, science and art. Fabritius was interested not only in painting the world but also in learning how we manage to see it at all. View in Delft is not only about a small square in a Dutch city. It is also about how our eyes work when we take in the world around us. But it is also not a celebration of the way we gain knowledge, rather a disenchantment. The closer to a truthful representation it gets, View in Delft implies the extent to which we could be deceived by our own eyes, leaving us wondering, as a prominent philosopher of the time does, about the certainty of knowledge.</p><h3>II</h3><p>We know very little about Fabritius. We know (Valentiner, 1932) that he was an apprentice in Rembrandt’s studio, that he married young and that by the summer of 1643 he lost both his wife and the twins she gave birth to. We also know that he remarried in 1650 and lived together with his second wife in Delft. We know that he was almost never able to run his financial life, as he seemed to have perpetually been in debt, even if he was recognized as a master artist during his time and had apprentices (one of them could have even been Vermeer himself). We know he died young (at 32 years of age) — two years after this painting was finished — in the great explosion of a gunpowder store in Delft, which also destroyed his atelier. Over a dozen paintings are known to be by his hand. It is also very likely that he painted several anamorphic murals but, sadly, none of them survived. Most of Liedtke’s considerations are about the painting as an object — how it should be looked at, how the perspective works, if Fabritius used a lens (a reversed telescope, for example, as other painters of the time did; and no, apparently he did not), etc. We are not going to challenge these findings here. What we would like to do now is to look at the painting as a painting, as a representation: to be its spectator.</p><h3>III</h3><p>How should we then look at the View in Delft? This is such a small painting but it manages to pack quite a lot in terms of artistic accomplishment, geometrical perspective, symbols and emotion. If we have Fabritius’ work mounted on the hemicycle and look at it through the peephole, we see it in a perspective that is almost Kafkaesque: a small bug sitting on the viola da gamba, watching the world unfold. This kind of perspective is not something we see very often in a painting. The view we are offered is not as simple nor as straightforward as we might first think. Our gaze is forced to jump from foreground to background as we watch, to focus on different subjects and at the same time keep all of them connected. Linear perspective, the only method used by painters for hundreds of years, does not inform the View in Delft. However, this was not something completely new: already in 1604 Karel van Mander offers a pictorial alternative to Alberti’s method of representation, departing from the latter’s ideas that the ultimate aim of the artist was to imitate nature. A painter, van Mander thinks, could make use of close views and combine them tactically with distant vistas thus realizing a “multifocal panoramic landscape, punctuated by multiple perspectives that mobilize the eye.” (Brusati, 2012) Vision becomes a guided process by carefully modifying and intensifying what the eye can see. Later, Samuel Dirksz van Hoogstraten in his Introduction to the Academy of Painting (1678) writes that perspective does not render things as they are in nature but only those aspects that can be re-created by the eye in an image-making process. This process is not unlike drawing itself, where “colored forms” make their way into the eye. A good painter is one who understands that seeking to represent nature in itself is not as important as representing how the world appears to the eye. Because the same way the eye is tricked in the process of seeing should be used in making a perspective painting. The box containing the View in Delft is not a play on the eye, it is not a trick, it is not a trompe l’oeil. By containing what the spectator is allowed to see, Fabritius attempts to concentrate and focus our gaze and, at the same time to encapsulate the “madness of seeing”, as Merleau-Ponty has called it. He creates a virtual space and compels the viewer to take part in it, even if only through the tiny peep hole. Merleau-Ponty pointed out in The Visible and the Invisible that when we see something we “possess” that thing, we bring the object at hand. “He who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is of it.” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 134) What Fabritius does with View in Delft is to have a go at bringing the landscape at hand, at “manipulating” it, taking it in, transferring it from something pertaining to the outside world into something happening inside, internalizing it, understanding it.</p><p>In What is Philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari (181–2) write that, throughout its history, painting actually only struggled for one thing, namely for painting forces, “forces of gravity, heaviness, rotation, the vortex, explosion, expansion, germination, and time”. Now if we look again at Fabritus’ painting we could notice the heaviness of the church, the revolving of feeling from the weariness of the instruments seller to the lightness of the woman in blue, from the explosion of the tree’s branches in foreground, to the play between the finite time of the music and the sign of eternity pointed out by the church, and filtered lightly by the silky clouds. And Fabritius takes it a step further: since the forces at work here tend to pull the gaze in multiple directions he proceeds, in an attempt to bring them back in a balance, to contain and level their dynamic. He seems to want to apply force to the canvas, as well. He stretches it on a hemicycle and boxes it, making it a world in itself.</p><h3>IV</h3><p>But let us go back to Hoogstraten’s idea, namely that perspective does not render things as they are in nature but only those aspects that can be re-created by the eye in an image-making process. Translating it in Aristotelian terms we could talk about a sort of mimesis at work here. Usually, mimesis is taken to mean “imitation” but it is actually closer to “actualization”, a process where “objects, events, or actions which, because they are divine, past or canonical, belong to a more valuable domain of reality than our quotidian lives but are therefore in some way remote from us, enjoin upon us the obligation to restore their actuality.” (Most 1998) Mimesis is, at least, an ambivalent term and it can both point out, depending on the circumstances, either the inferiority of actualization (as opposed to its superiror model) or, the other way around, the superiority “it acquires by its temporary participation in the model’s prestige”. (Most 1998). Perhaps Fabritius sensed this ambivalence and View in Delft is his answer to the question of mimesis. As we will see, it would aline very well with his understanding of vision, of what it meant for him to see the world. It was not his intention to reproduce reality in its minute details. Even if Fabritius went quite a way in “testing the limits of mimesis”, he did not intend to bring up an example of…, let’s call it photorealistic work (if the term were available in his time). Photorealism takes part in a different world altogether. Photorealism, as Frederic Jameson put it,</p><blockquote><em>“looked like a return to representation and figuration after the long hegemony of the aesthetics of abstraction until it became clear that their objects were not to be found in the “real world” either but were themselves photographs of that real world, this last now transformed into images, of which the “realism” of the photorealist painting is now the simulacrum.” (65)</em></blockquote><p>A photorealist painting is a painting of a photograph, which in turn is a copy of reality. Thus it appears that the simulacrum is a copy which has been removed twice from reality. After all, following Baudrillard who pointed out in his critique of postmodern society that the distinction between what is real or natural and what is artificial has been gradually lost, we could understand how the artifice managed to take over the real. Baudrillard distinguished three orders of simulacra. The first order corresponds historically to the pre-modern world where images were seen as merely illusions, faint copies of the reality. The second order is connected to the multitude, to the mass production of copies which was a typical phenomenon in the nineteenth century. The third order, of the post-modern world, brings in a kind of sovereignty of the simulacra, which go beyond copying reality, preceding and even determining it. This is where the inability to distinguish between reality and its representation comes in. If copying reality is what Fabritius struggles to achieve with View in Delft, we should place it into the first order of simulacra. However, one does not look at the world through a peephole, one cannot contain a copy of reality inside a box. For obvious reasons, the painting does not belong to the second order of simulacra either. What about the third? Does it precede the world, does the world take upon itself to follow Fabritius’ rendering? Obviously not. What kind of representation is it then, we might ask? In an essay aptly titled Realer than Real, Brian Massumi points out, following Deleuze’s thoughts on the idea of simulacrum (Plato and the Simulacrum), that we deal here with a difference in nature and not with a degree of replication: this difference “undermines” the distinction between copy and model.</p><blockquote><em>“The production and function of a photograph” writes Massumi, “has no relation to that of the object photographed; and the photorealist painting in turn envelops an essential difference. It is that masked difference, not the manifest resemblance, that produces the effect of uncanniness so often associated with the simulacrum. A copy is made in order to stand in for its model. A simulacrum has a different agenda, it enters different circuits.” (Massumi, 1987).</em></blockquote><p>We could say now that View in Delft does not copy reality, it does not make a reproduction of the little square overlooking the church. It goes beyond it. It opens for us a different world altogether, a world which slowly began to be investigated in Fabritius’ time, a world at the confluence of art, optics and philosophy. In his article, Massumi brings up a scene from Blade Runner, where the leading “replicant” (a bio-robotic being) tells the man who built his (mechanical) eyes: “if you could see what I have seen with your eyes”. View in Delft has, of course, nothing to do with the world of android robots from Blade Runner but it has very much to do with the idea of the seeing eye. Because Fabritius’ painting is the eye itself, and through it he tries to give us an insight into what the eye sees from within. The moment one looks through the peep-hole, one looks through the new eye, the one discovered by Descartes. With Descartes and his work on optics we (as well as the world of Rembrandt and Frans Hals and Fabritius and Vermeer) find out that the eye is not a window towards the world but, indeed, merely a screen.</p><p>In Dioptrics, Descartes considers that what affects the soul is not a picture representing the object we are looking at but an image of that object, an image that is not similar to the object itself but which would remind us rather of an etching — a bit imperfect, perhaps lacking in details, color, etc. Otherwise, if the object would resemble its image in all respects, we would not be able to distinguish between them anymore. The image of the object appears inside the eye even without the observer (for his experiment Descartes says one could use the “eye of a newly deceased man or of an ox or some other large animal” to make a projection of an object on the retina), even if there is nobody there to see it. Sight is no longer the substance of the eye, as it used to be for a philosopher like Aristotle. Thus, the observer is not required for the world to be seen. Already with Kepler, in 1602, the human observer starts to fade out. The eye itself becomes a sort of camera obscura, and the “pupil takes the place of the window”. The image we see on a piece of paper placed inside the camera obscura is the same as the image being formed on the retina. It is imperfect and the imperfection is caused by the “accidental shape of the aperture”. This means that we can trust the instrument (a device like camera obscura or the telescope) as much as we can trust the eye: science becomes henceforth the “guarantor” of vision’s “limited reliability”. (Gal and Chen-Morris, 2010) However, we should not forget that the reverse is, unfortunately, also true and that whatever flaws the instrument might have, could also be encountered as flaws in the eye itself. Visual errors, unlike the Aristotelian view where human imagination would intervene in seeing and consequently alter it, are now thought to happen due to the structure of vision itself. The images the eye would be able to offer are rather fuzzy as they are caused by light effects; they do not and cannot show a precise likeness to the objects focused on. Descartes points out that owing to the flawed way we see, the eye is not to be trusted. In order to develop his system he needed something like the eye but stable and trustworthy. His trouvaille was “the eye of the mind” which would see more clearly as long as the eye of the flesh would steer away from the abundance of sense perception. Thus, “he invented the eye of the mind, modeled on but completely independent from the eye of the flesh, and in this reversed the epistemological role of vision. From being the guarantor of our knowledge and a paradigm of direct acquaintance, vision became a metaphor for mediation. It was a paradoxical insight: by accepting that knowing is seeing and understanding how we see, Descartes was convinced that we may not know at all.” (Gal and Chen-Morris, 2010) That we may not know at all… Would it be possible that Fabritius somehow managed to grasp how serious the findings of the optics of his time and of the views philosophers held on light and color were for his own work and for painting in general? Would it be possible that he wanted to experiment for himself and in his own way and thus played with anamorphic murals and perspective boxes while at the same time continued to paint as his master did or, better still, as his master would? How much do we know when we look at View in Delft? How much do we understand of the world when we see it from the Kafkaesque perspective Fabritius is offering us? Do we see more if his manipulation is more dexterous? It seems, the longer one looks at this painting the less certain one becomes as to what one actually sees. In her book on the Rhethoric of Perspective (2006), Hanneke Grootenboer, writing about anamorphosis, brings forth some pictures of Dutch photographer Jan Dibbets who, in a series called Perspective Correction (1969), plays with our gaze quite like Fabritius did a few centuries earlier, although Dibbets presents us with an “anamorphosis in reverse”, as Grootenboer calls it (where we do not need to wade our way through lines and colors in order to find the hidden picture, as one normally does with anamorphosis representations). Watching Perspective Correction we wonder first where exactly is the correction. Something happened to the image, we can feel it, but we do not know what it could be or where.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/997/0*jYbwr1yBdyMA4XNq.jpg" /></figure><p>Jan Dibbets, Perspective Correction #3, 1969</p><p>For example, in #3 we see the inside corner of a studio, and we can follow the wall on the left hand side as it continues toward the vanishing point, merging with the other wall in the background at a right angle, clearly forming a perspectival structure. Now, on the wall on the left we can see a square which — and here comes the “Aha!” moment — seems to have been drawn on the photograph rather than on the wall itself, as it skips the perspective distortion altogether. It is still a perfectly good square and not an elongated geometrical structure, as if it escaped the laws of perspective. It is as if the square floats inside the picture, not affected by the forces at work in this representation, as if it would establish its own space, as if there were no model for it in the real world. Here we can see once again how vision becomes a metaphor for mediation between the eye of the mind and the eye of the flesh. Dibbets manages to show that what we see and what we expect to see are two different things, that the usual way we look at the world in perspective can be simply distorted, or as he put it, corrected. Fabritius paints a picture, which he distorts in order to bring it closer to a more faithful representation of the world. Dibbets takes a photograph (in other words, he makes a copy) of a world, part of which does not seem to fit in with the rest, like a ghost from another dimension. As if the truthful eye of the camera is corrected by a second, invisible eye. Dibbets corrects perspective by altering the real object, by changing the environment itself, whereas Fabritius changes the medium, the canvas and stretches it in an unusual though more faithful manner to the act of seeing.</p><h3>V</h3><p>Except, perhaps, for the light summer breeze slowly pushing the light clouds, there is no impression of sound, not even of noise or of something going on in the background. We could almost think of View in Delft as a still life with musical instruments. The quietness of the scene points out an intention to avoid a textual interpretation. Although describing it makes possible a linguistic approximation of this painting’s meaning, the trouble is, as soon as we are done describing and we rejoin its parts into a whole, we clash once more against its muteness. We still do not know what this painting is trying to say to us. The question is then, what if it does not want to say anything but instead only attempts to make us think, to make us connect with it visually and not verbally? Encapsulating it in a box, Fabritius made it available to only one viewer at a time. This means that View in Delft does not prompt us to interpretation but to seeing and thinking. In order to understand it, we need not reason about it verbally but look at it (and only at it) as close as the peephole allows us. How does a painting think? Drawing on an analysis of perspective, Grootenboer writes that “Painting is a kind of thinking and perspective serves as a rhetoric of the image. … The rhetoric of perspective convinces us of that which painting shows, while it provides a method for that which painting thinks” (Grootenboer, 10). Grootenboer’s idea to look at perspective as a method for thinking comes from Walter Benjamin who claimed in his thoughts about allegory that a philosophical writing is nothing but an allegory for truth. Benjamin does not regard philosophy as a privileged way of bringing up concepts or as a “trans-linguistic generation of principles” (Cowan, Bainard) but as allegorical literature. A philosophical treatise does not come up with proofs, according to Benjamin, but it only represents its object anew. The way a philosophical writing acts as an allegory for truth, so does in painting, perspective act as a rhetoric of the image. It does not produce reality, it only re-arranges our apprehension of it. Perspective has thus an epistemological relevance since it is a kind of thinking about the way we relate to representation itself. As Hubert Damisch put it in The Origin of Perspective:</p><blockquote><em>“In the art of painting the impact of perspective is not limited to the register of the imaginary; it not only facilitates the construction of images, it assumes a role, a function that we may properly designate as symbolic. Perspective, I repeat, is not a code, but it has this in common with language, that in and by itself it institutes and constitutes itself under the auspices of a point, a factor analogous to the ‘subject’ or ‘person’ in language, always posited in relation to a ‘here’ or ‘there’, accruing all the possibilities for movement from one position to another that this entails.” (Damisch, 53)</em></blockquote><p>In other words, a painting speaks to us quite in the same way a book speaks to us. If a book is a story told by a narrator, a painting is a story shown from a certain perspective. Through perspective a painting delineates its world, shows what should be shown and hides what should be guessed. Going back to Deleuze and Guattari, we could say now about perspective painting that it coordinates forces in relation to a subject and that it arranges them according to a logic of the space (where logic should be taken as a mode of reasoning). If we are right in our assumption that Fabritius tries to give us an account of seeing as it appears to the eye itself (we are talking here about the eye of the flesh) then, the perspective at work in View in Delft gives us the chance to also have a glimpse at the thinking eye, at the eye of the mind. We deal here with a painting which thinks it is an eye and which invites us to think about seeing as well, to see how we see.</p><h3>VI</h3><p>We could say now that View in Delft is not a landscape in the traditional sense of the word. Or not only. It shrinks its view field to just a street crossing but it also enlarges it by going deeper inside. It also paints a portrait (of the seller in his stall) albeit only partially. Fabritius managed to be one of the first painters to zoom in to a landscape and give us a townscape and, at the same time, zoom in to a person inside the townscape and give us a portrait. The townscape seems to quietly record life as it happened on a street in a generic Dutch city. A snapshot, much in the way tourists today take photos of places they visit. Looking at it this way, View in Delft could be just another piece in the portrait of Holland of the time, as is much of Dutch painting of the Golden Age, an observation which is in tune to Eugene Fromentin’s Les Maitres d’autrefois, where he suggested that Dutch painting was essentially a portrait. A portrait of Holland as:</p><blockquote><em>“des hommes et des lieux, des moeurs bourgeoises, des places, des rues, des campagnes, de la mer et du ciel, tel devait être, réduit à ses éléments primitifs, le programme suivi par l’école hollandaise, et tel il fut depuis le premier jour jusqu’à son déclin.”</em></blockquote><p>Fromentin celebrates a democratization of painting, where scenes were not laden with the heavy symbolism of classical antiquity but where the depicted subjects were easily recognizable and their deeds were easily placeable.</p><p>But then again, we should not forget that vision is madness and Fabritius seems to have been aware of it. The reality he makes visible compels us to assume his perspective and when we do, we find ourselves sharing this Kafkaesque point of view avant la date. We are, as spectators, a tiny speck of life as significant as the little peephole allows us to be, but from that vantage point we permeate inside the world with its people and houses and trees and fluffy clouds. In a different take on Dutch Golden Age, Paul Claudel considers that Dutch painting was actually focused on expressing feelings and not depicting events. Dutch landscape paintings express a sense of space, of our place in the cosmos; genre interiors depict aspects of time. “Claudel sees paintings by Vermeer, De Hooch, Metsu, Dou and Terborch as essentially abstract in theme even though they appear to show contemporary reality. A woman reading a letter evokes absence; a woman looking in a mirror, reflection; a figure in a window, the dialogue between interiority and the external world.” (Kelly, 2003) Claudel points out the invitation to meditation present in Dutch paintings, in reaching within ourselves and pondering on our own being here. The two worlds of the painting, as Fabritius shows, rather than being separated, are being brought together by the spectator. Fragmenting perspective, Fabritius manages to show something about both our place in the cosmos and about a fluid aspect of time. The playfulness of music (hinted at by the instruments) is stopped short by the pensive and (perhaps) gloomy attire of the man in the stall. Music (as also life) are transitory things. They both take place in time and they both expire as soon as nobody plays the instruments or as soon as our body gives up. The church, a sign of eternity and redemption, in the way it is depicted by Fabritius does not, however, bring us reassurance nor helps us transcend the feeling of insignificance which we have when we think about our place in the universe. It does not offer us a glorious moment of reconnection with eternity as it would were it shown from the front, in all its might. Would this be a way to point out eternity? By emphasizing death? The more one looks at this painting, the more one could see how it develops into a sort of (well) hidden vanitas painting. By the time Fabritius painted the View, the royal crypt of the Nieuwe Kerk (which actually is placed at the back of the church) was quite packed: William the Silent, Maurice of Nassau, Frederick Henry, William II, etc. Moreover, the tragic story of the William II who died of smallpox only three years after his father (Frederick Henry) must have been still fresh in the mind of the Delft people (Fabritius finished the View one year later, in 1652). We should not forget that, concurently, the Dutch of his time were extremely rich. After shaking Spanish control and the Union of Utrecht in 1579 led to the emergence of the Dutch Republic, the global trade and banking flourished and the Dutch upper class reigned over immense wealth. But however rich and powerful one could be, one would still not be able to achieve immortality. Death is always lurking around every bend. As a matter of fact, while the painting came into being, the Dutch were engaged in fighting the first of what will be known as the Anglo-Dutch wars a conflict spawning over more than a century.</p><h3>VII</h3><p>Transitory. This could be the word that best describes the scene Fabritius presents us with; a townscape vanitas, a meditation on the hollowness of earthly life which, however rich and wonderful can be, it is still ephemeral. Much like the hollow instruments on the table. The seller himself seems to have fallen into a melancholy state, pondering on the fleetingness of life, stalling for time. Vanitas means literally “emptiness”. As we noted above, View in Delft is a silent picture, without a message, hollow. Its rhetoric lies in perspective, in harnessing the forces of “gravity, heaviness, time…”. As with perspective, putting the painting in a box, trying to contain the madness of seeing, a vanitas tries to combine “complexities of the ontological difference between being and nothingness with the impenetrabile passing of time and the inevitability of death.” (Grootenboer, 137–138) Nonetheless, the vanitas of the View in Delft is considerably more refined when compared, for example, to David Bailly’s painting Vanitas: Still life with portrait of a Young Painter from 1651. Bailly’s work is packed with symbols ranging from a skull to a smoking candle, an hour glass and soap bubbles to portraits and sculptures, dying flowers and a musical instrument to the writing on a piece of paper: vanitas vanitum et omnia vanitas. As if Bailly wished to go over the dialectical polysemy by getting hold of as many symbols as possible in just one work.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*A15KW4ZQXS6gJge8.jpg" /></figure><p>David Bailly — Vanitas (1651) 65 x 97.5 cm (Wikipedia)</p><p>In comparison, Fabritius’ View is light and open. The symbols are present: the music instruments, the church, the washed out swan on the street sign, the gaze of the man, the washer woman looking at the church across the canal, the weathered wall with the painter’s name on it and, although it is almost a quarter in size compared to Bailly’s, and the symbols are by far less numerous, its invitation to meditation is perhaps more profound and longer lasting. In a sense, Bailly’s Vanitas would be a wonderful exemplification of Fromentin’s position on Dutch painting, whereas Fabritius’ View would side with Claudel’s. One of them going for the snapshot and for democratically giving each symbol its due, the other opting for a less obvious representation, using only pointers and manipulating the way we look at it. Transience, as we saw, is also part of the viewing process. Through the perspective box, the sight we are presented with is also transitory. One could only see it as long as one peeps through the hole. You cannot look at this picture in passing, have it hanging on a wall and, while going from a room into another, have another quick glance at it. You have to actively look at it in order to see it. As it is/was the case with music — you have to actively play it in order to hear it. Some think that the music instruments seller is actually a self-portrait, a Fabritius who somehow lost part of the exuberance and visceral features present in the self-portrait from 1645, for example. If true, the person painted not only deals with objects that make time palpable but is, simutaneously, the painter himself who makes space not only palpable but, as is the case with the View in Delft, also ephemeral.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/574/0*r-JkHKN7eM34S0vT.jpg" /></figure><p>Carel Fabritius — Self Portrait (1645) 65 x 49 cm (Wikipedia)</p><p>Fabritius is challenging the viewer and the idea we have of vision itself (at least for a viewer of his time). In a way, he offered us a chance to see “how we see”. View in Delft, even if it is just a “screen”, a piece of canvas mounted on a wall inside a box, is reminiscent of the screen that is the eye itself (the retina, to be more precise). The painter fixed the view on the canvas as the observer or the spectator fixes the view on the back of his eye. As Barthes once put it, “Depth is born only at the moment the spectacle itself slowly turns its shadow toward man and begins to look at him.” (Barthes, 12) And this is true not only about the depth as perspective in the painting but also about the depth as tradition from which Fabritius comes and which he manages to surpass. By inviting us to reconsider the way we look at the world, by questioning the reliability of vision and by pointing out doubt and transience where we hoped to find certainty and eternity, Fabritius’ View in Delft does become a metaphor not only for mediation but also for meditation.</p><h3>References</h3><p>Barthes, Roland — Critical Essays. Northwestern University Press. Evanston, Illinois, 1972 Brusati, Celeste — Viewing Dutch Pictures in Real Time. Art History. November, 2012 Damisch, Hubert — The Origin of Perspective, MIT Press 1995 Deleuze, Gilles — Plato and the Simulacrum: October, no. 27 (winter 1983) Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari Felix — What is Philosophy: Verso, London, 1994 Descartes, René — The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 1985 Fromentin, Eugene — Les maitres d’autrefois : Belgique-Hollande. Plon. Paris, 1877 Gal, Ofer and Chen-Morris, Raz — Baroque Optics and the Disappearance of the Observer: From Kepler’s Optics to Descartes’ Doubt. Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume 71, Number 2, 2010 Grootenboer, Hanneke — The Rhetoric of Perspective, University of Chicago Press, 2006 Holmes, Charles — Carel Fabritius: The New Portrait. The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs, Vol. 46, No. 264, 1925 Jameson, Frederic — Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Duke University Press, 1991 Kelly, Anthony — Paul Claudel on the poetry of seventeenth-century Dutch painting. Word and Image, Vol.19, NO. 3, 2003 Liedtke, Walter A. — The ‘View in Delft’ by Carel Fabritius. The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs, Vol. 118, No. 875, 1976 Massumi, Brian — Realer than Real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and Guattari. Copyright no.1, 1987 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice — The Visible and the Invisible, Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Evanston, Illinois, 1968 Most, Glenn W. — Mimesis in Craig, Edward — Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, 1998 Olds, Clifton — Wollheim’s Theory of Artist as Spectator: A Complication. Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1990 Valentiner, W. R. — Carel and Barent Fabritius. The Art Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1932 Wollheim, Richard — Art, Interpretation, and the Creative Process. New Literary History, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1984</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.cento.red/stalling-for-time/"><em>www.cento.red</em></a><em> on August 21, 2014.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=48d247490524" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Gerhard Richter Painting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fugabite/gerhard-richter-painting-93078a534867?source=rss-8a1bd90144d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/93078a534867</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[painting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[documentary]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gerhard-richter]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[fugabi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2015 07:59:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-11-03T10:58:27.652Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It snows. Violently. If these tiny snowflakes would be as heavy as they are sharp, we’d have a city in ruin. They whirl themselves through the air and stab with their microscopic daggers at buildings, pavement, cars, trees… Nothing is spared.</p><p>I have this image before my eyes — a young Gerhard Richter, with short, gently curly hair and blue eyes, saying that he cannot <em>talk about</em> his paintings. If he could talk <em>about</em> them, they would consequently not be paintings at all but objects wrapped in the mesh of language. Well, no he did not say it like that but that’s what he meant. The words “I don’t know how they happen” or “I don’t know what they mean” come up often in the interview episodes from his youth and later on during the documentary <em>Gerhard Richter Painting</em>. Throughout this film (made in 2011 by Corinna Belz) we can see Richter making paintings (a couple of them in more detail), going to openings, driving his car, meticulously planning exhibitions and dreamily or absent-mindedly watching his grandchildren playing and drawing.</p><p>I will pause a little on the couple of paintings we see taking shape before our eyes. One painting on the left side of the screen, the other one on the right. Between them, a door, through which the master makes his entrance. He makes a little bit of small talk. He then picks up his bucket of paint, a fairly broad brush, and slowly but firmly, goes towards the white canvas. He takes two steps up a ladder and starts painting. Thin layers of mild lemony yellow, spreading slowly on the white canvas. Then red. Then blue. How does he know where which color should go?, one would tempted to ask. I guess he does not know. He only does, he only paints and simultaneously he goes into himself and watches over his reactions to what his hands and eyes do. There is no particular path he chose to walk on, there is no aim he’s trying to reach. There is only discovery. A self-assertion that goes hand in hand with, that grows out of his dealings with the color.</p><p>I can only imagine how difficult it might have been for him trying to work while being filmed. He actually says so himself. “It is not right. It does not <em>feel</em> right.” After a while he stops and declares “It’s enough for today. We’ll stop here. We need a bit of space. They need to settle.”</p><p>Later in the movie he returns, this time equipped with something bigger than a brush and definitely meaner looking. I found the paintings nice enough as they were, as I could see them on the screen, as the camera sensor recorded them. The colors had a certain way of interacting with each other, which was not at all unpleasant. They reminded me of the small watercolors I say a few years ago in the Albertina. Vibrant. Perhaps a tad too vibrant. Nice. Perhaps too easily nice. And then it happened! Armed with his weapon of choice, this huge Plexiglas board, brimming with paint, he walks towards the canvas like an executioner would towards his helpless victim. He sticks this apocalyptic instrument on the innocent body of his creation and starts pulling it from left to right, flooding the world he just brought to light in a monochrome climax. Sometimes this display of absolute power would not be enough and a dagger, beg your pardon!, a spatula would too be put to work. Scraping the excess, digging, giving a hand to the painting underneath the painting. Strong but careful. No radical gestures (à la Lucio Fontana) since there is nothing behind the canvas — only behind layers of paint.</p><p>It almost hurt watching. Even if not for very long. Just think about it: minutes ago I just saw something coming into existence, a combination of colors arranged onto a two dimensional space in a particular way, having a certain relationship with the artist and with me, their (temporary) spectator. I was happy, as one tends to be (I should think) when one has the chance to see something being made, when out of a lump of nothingness something beautiful, useful or practical sees the light of day.</p><p>But these two paintings simply vanished. One swing of the <em>machine infernale</em> and they were history. Not even history, actually, had it not have been for the ever bothering eye of the camera. Here and there, wherever chance stuck its head (or was it its tail?) one could begin to guess what is underneath. Or what might have been. Hiding the obvious, the new layer opened another world, one of endless possibilities and combinations. Was it real or just a dream? Induced memories, anyone?</p><p>This is by no means a new idea but indeed the very idea on which painting as such is based. It does not need to resemble anything in the real world. It only needs to come to terms with the world of the painter. Through his work he would veil and unveil whatever he would think was necessary. Until it would get to a point where an invisible balance would be reached. That’s where he’d stop. That’s when the painting is done. The result is as good (or bad) as the idea/image animating the painter.</p><p>Looking at these paintings (and at paintings in general, actually), we not only see what is before our eyes but we also gain access to another sensibility. In Wollheim’s words, paintings somehow already contain a spectator and we are to see them through his or her eyes. There is a sort of triangulation at work here. Much in the same way Davidson thinks about learning a language. Richter’s paintings do not have anything to say and are not about <em>something</em> because they have nothing to do with language. But they do! Though not with the language as we know it but with anther one, a more richteresque language which we surreptitiously learn by looking at each of these paintings. Do not worry, though! We are not alone in this process. Not even Richter knows his language by heart. He discovers it with each new painting he paints, with each new painting he covers up and unveils for us.</p><p>And for himself.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/0*QUkCM9HL3jXvx4ET.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://cento.red/"><em>cento.red</em></a><em> on February 11, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=93078a534867" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Being Mortal]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fugabite/being-mortal-1ad670c61a05?source=rss-8a1bd90144d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ad670c61a05</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[being-mortal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[atul-gawande]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[fugabi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2015 07:56:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-11-03T10:38:13.908Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That’s the title of Atul Gawande’s latest <a href="http://atulgawande.com/book/being-mortal/">book</a>. A best seller on more than one list. A couple of days ago, drawn by Kottke’s <a href="https://twitter.com/jkottke/status/566688717591822337">sobs</a> on twitter, I watched the PBS documentary too. Gawande leaves the impression of a man who seems to know what he does even if, at times, he claims the opposite. He seems to be an Old Surehand of sorts. Which does not make the matter simpler, or easier to come to terms with (if at all) but helps, nevertheless. In the show, his story builds on the unfortunate fates of a handful of people (each nursing their own type of cancer). These people disappear like soap bubbles: now you see them, now you don’t. One day they declare they still have to take the kid to Disneyland and a couple of weeks later the only thing left of them is an image, a blurred face. You see them hoping, trying to stay positive, willing to have a fight and win it. And each time their enthusiasm invariably collapses. Hope is lost, being positive means opening your mouth to ask for water, having a fight is replaced by taking a couple of steps to the toilet and back. Some of them get thinner and need help getting into their slippers, others don’t even have the time to go through physical changes.</p><p>Mankind was and is being built on the ashes of scores of people who died anonymously. Mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, uncle and aunts, friends and acquaintances — gone. Just gone. Never to return. Never to walk on the face of the earth again. But perhaps dying is not the worst there is. Perhaps forgetting is what makes their disappearance to be as cruel as it seems to be. How, though, could one remember all the people who <em>need</em> remembering, who <em>need</em> to be brought up in discussions and memories, in thoughts and stories in order to preserve their exquisite even if dismal status as human beings who used to walk among us? How could one <em>be mortal</em> and still <em>be?</em></p><p>What <em>does</em> matter, in the end? Getting well again is not an option — there are no miracles. Nothing matters here. The path you find yourself to be on is leading you, unavoidably, towards the end. You did not choose it, and you are scared by its abruptness and loathsomeness. You cannot simply jump back a little and try again, you cannot fool anyone or anything. Bottom line — you are going to disappear. Your chair at the dinner table will remain forever empty. Your side of the bed will be left without a crease night after night. Nobody will have to wait for you to put your shoes on, or to walk a little bit faster, or to talk louder. Nobody will ask you for a story, for a comment, for an idea, for a kiss. Your children or grandchildren will keep thinking you are gone somewhere, perhaps on vacation, perhaps to the summer house by the sea, or to the bearded uncle who lives far, far away. They will ask about the time you will come back, get angry the moment they are told again that you will not return and then… slowly… they will begin to forget. Just a little bit at first. Perhaps only the birthmark on your left cheek, or those words you used to say at the end of a good movie. The kind of tea you used to drink or the way you made your sandwiches or answered your phone. Then, a little bit more. Your face, the color of your eyes, that gesture you used to make when you were startled, how you smelled, the touch of your hand, how smooth it was, how rough. The objects associated with your person would gradually slip away from the universe of those you loved and who loved you. Your books will get pushed more towards the back of the shelves, your clothes will be given away, your old wristwatch will be packed into a box and stored in the cellar, your pen — where is your pen? Nobody knows that anymore; nobody asks that anyway. Then, life tramples their lives around. If they’re lucky, they get out OK, if not… But you? You already ceased to be important. Just a whiff, a hint of fresh homemade bread one picks up walking through the city in the evening. A feeling… As if without direct association, summoning a botched reaction to a version of yourself so diluted, so fainted that it could have been anything: a tree, a laughter, a phrase in a book, a piece of music. But looking at it this way, you are actually back in the world. Forever, even if… incognito. They will all think they are their own masters and will never even suspect that you are in everything. From their blood and hair color to their tears and giggles.</p><p>They seem to have forgotten it, but they are you.</p><p>What matters then is this exchange, this barter — they take a bit of you, of your words or deeds, of your gaze and, in return, you give yourself back to the world, each atom, each shiver of energy. Yes, you are afraid to die but your heart jolts with silent joy when you see yourself in those around you. They don’t need to do anything special to show it to you: your grandchild only kisses you good night as he always does, the tree only shakes its leaves as it always does. They don’t expect anything but you are there already. Each day a little closer. Each day a little farther.</p><p>What they call dying with dignity is simply dying. The rest is just graceless, uncouth anguish.</p><p><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biutiful">Biutiful</a>! Isn’t it!</p><p>To meet your grandfather and walk with him through a forest in the winter. To hear the snow being crushed under your feet. To talk about owls and share a cigarette with him, this handsome guy, younger than yourself, this… grandfather! Sobbingly biutiful! Could there be something more human, more intimate, more emotional?</p><p>I just remembered this movie now and that knot in my throat is making its presence felt again. Don’t know who wrote it but it’s true about this Inarritu/Bardem feature: it is one of the best films you never ever want to see again. Whatever you do, never ever see it again!</p><p>In the end, what matters is the proximity of the others.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/441/0*fOTxm5zPIf-N4kKW.png" /></figure><p>(pic by <a href="http://www.kenhermann.com/">ken hermann</a>)</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://cento.red/"><em>cento.red</em></a><em> on February 16, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ad670c61a05" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Greece… et ailleurs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fugabite/greece-et-ailleurs-a6dfdd578cd3?source=rss-8a1bd90144d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a6dfdd578cd3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[marathon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tennyson]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[greece]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[fugabi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2015 07:55:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-05-04T07:55:54.891Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is the third week without running. I miss it. Whatever ruptured, inflamed, broke, fissured, fractured, disjointed, cracked… (whatever it was — I am not fond of seeing doctors) looks like it is about to get better. I took my running shoes with me to Greece for the weekend we spent there but never felt good enough to put them on and go exploring. I fantasized about coursing along the shore, taking in the salty smell of the air and the chilling wind. I thought about the flowering almond trees and about the waves of green grass — a view which I hardly ever experienced in this country. I confess, I have completely forgotten about the stray dogs fiercely defending their vagrancy, about the paths coming to an abrupt end in the middle of nowhere, and about the cars dashing on the small streets, fleetingly reminding those around how well Greek drivers can handle their vehicles.</p><p>Often I would try to imagine how would it be like to be in Greece in the winter, without the torpid heat. I can never get farther than a few black and white scenes from Zorba (how pathetically stereotypical, I know) or Eternity and a day — those mountain scenes, foggy and cold. I indulged in creating languorous images of warm indoors, a fire monologuing on the futility of life, cuddling up in a room overlooking the sea, bursting with inspiration, churning one page after another, squeezing in all the holiness the gods raffishly left behind.</p><p>Well, it’s damn cold in winter. Those houses are not meant to keep the heat inside. The rain pours down as mercilessly as it does here, the wind slashes your cheeks as thoroughly as back home. I concluded that I should do without. For Rachel Kushner it was a <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n02/rachel-kushner/diary">ferry ride</a> (“My aspiration to spend time at sea as requisite literary training died long ago, as a teenager, on a white-knuckled ferry ride to Elba during a torrential rainstorm.”). As for myself… I gave up (too quickly, perhaps) that long weekend in February, walking barefoot on icy marble floors, shoving my hands in the jeans pockets when out for cold walks along the beach, trying not to step on dog shit and trying not to trip over protruding pieces of metal encased in masses of concrete.</p><p>Murakami had ran a marathon from Athens to, well… Marathon, following the ancient route in reverse. I drove a couple of times along that road and I think I would still not be able to do it. OK, he was escorted by a whole crew, he had a car driving by his side the whole time, protecting him from the maddening traffic and whatever dangerous animals, people or cars were lurking in the heat. It was not the happiest run in his life, it was definitely one of his hottest (he ran in a morning in July), and it was one where he counted the highest number of flattened, scorched remains of dogs, cats and other roadkill paving the street.</p><p>Greece! Why do I like spending my summers there? Why do I engage in endless discussions with our Greek friends about how to change this country, about how to make it prosper, about how to get its people to see it for what it is, to find its place in the world today and stop dwelling in a past that happened hundreds or thousands of years ago?</p><p>Greece is like the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man_on_Wire">man on the wire</a> now: holding its balance while walking between the two World Trade towers. Down on the street people stare in disbelief. Should they rush away in case the moving speck will come down with a silent thud? Should they stay and watch the show (after all, how often would you have the chance to see something like this)? While Pettit seems to be stepping on very thin air so high up, nobody knows how it will go on. Not even him. Talking about <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/27/us-eurozone-greece-varoufakis-idUSKBN0LV26820150227">creative ambiguity</a>!</p><p>Help, Tennyson! You’re my only hope!</p><p>“Not in vain the distance beacons. Forward, forward let us range,</p><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Let_the_Great_World_Spin">Let the great world spin</a> for ever down the ringing grooves of change.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/0*JQ1e64gsSN-lCCx2.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://wpgf.wordpress.com/2015/03/09/greece-et-ailleurs/"><em>wpgf.wordpress.com</em></a><em> on March 9, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a6dfdd578cd3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Birdman]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@fugabite/birdman-2d6de06860c0?source=rss-8a1bd90144d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2d6de06860c0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[don-quixote]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tobias-wolff]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[birdman]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[fugabi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2015 07:54:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-11-03T10:56:30.810Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For this post, I would have liked <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_S%C3%A1nchez_(drummer)">Sanchez</a> to follow me.</p><p>With sticks and toms and all that brass…</p><p>Just like Panza.</p><p>And his Don.</p><p>For what else is <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birdman_(film)">Birdman</a> if not a Quixote of sorts? Who else could be more virtuous in exercising his ignorance than Don Quixote?</p><p>This movie took me by surprise. I heard people talking about it but I refrained from reading anything beforehand. Those long takes, the wide-angle close-up shots, the music… they all took me aback. Real and surreal at the same time. Here and there and now and then and loud and quiet and funny and dark…</p><p>Death, cultural legacy and cultural significance, a fear of having nothing to say to the world or of not being <em>able</em> to say anything, an all-encompassing anxiety each time one scrutinizes oneself are the sort of ideas often present and closely investigated by Inarritu’s movies. Birdman is not (why should it be?) any different. Riggan dwells in two worlds simultaneously: ours and a world of superheros, to which only he has access and which is, quite often, not a tranquil place. Except for the scene at the very beginning (where he seems to levitate) and for a “flying through NY in the good tradition of the Birdman” scene, there is mostly violence, broken furniture, a giant mechanical bird jumping on the roofs of buildings and squashing helicopters, a menacing baritonal voice pushing Riggan to choose. Yes, choose. He could have the whole world at his feet if he would go the Birdman way. Why does he need all the trouble he puts himself through with staging a play? He could have <em>action</em>, he could be a hero. Why not? What is there to lose?</p><p>Love, that’s what it is! The play talks about love. Riggan only wanted to be loved.</p><p>He was loved as Birdman, true. But was that all he could be? A character in a superhero franchise? That’s easy to love. Wasn’t he an actor too? And a writer? And a director? What about a father? Was he loved as a father? Did he find any love as a husband? Staging the play, he tried to be good, he tried to <em>matter</em> as a human being, not only as an image of a superhero.</p><p>His wife seems to have a special place for him, even if that place is also charged with fear. His daughter, I would think, is<em> his image</em> more than one would suspect at first. Spending time on the roof of the theater, wanting to be not only a daughter or an assistant, twitting on his behalf (only once, for first and last time), screwing Mike just because.</p><p>And then her looking up in that last scene, even if one could take it as a message of hope, testifying to the real superhero powers of the Birdman, it might just as well be a sign that she received the <em>baton</em> and she has started her own quirky race. Perhaps she’ll be even more quixotic than her father. After all, she’s always asked for “dare” in the “truth or dare” game. Never truth. Truth is so pettily predictable, isn’t it?</p><p>Thus, you are left on your own in the end and you can choose whichever conclusion you wish. Magical realism? Perhaps. But don’t forget the failures! Hope? Perhaps, as there is also a crushing evidence to the contrary.</p><p>Truth or dare, Don Quixote?</p><p>Certainly not truth!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/0*aedSGXVltpQ9P4Aq.jpg" /></figure><p>P.S.</p><p>But then… what if… he is already dead? What if he shot himself and what we see as the closing scene are only his terminus thoughts, à la Tobias Wolff’s <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/09/25/bullet-in-the-brain">Bullet in the brain</a>? What if the Birdman won in the end, but only by sacrificing Riggan, all for a flash life, a few nanoseconds long?</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://cento.red/"><em>cento.red</em></a><em> on March 11, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2d6de06860c0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>