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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Gabe Shootman on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Gabe Shootman on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Did NATO Push Russia into Invading Ukraine?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gabeshootman/did-nato-push-russia-into-invading-ukraine-66f96d151b3b?source=rss-44de1a5b93d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/66f96d151b3b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world-war-3]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gabe Shootman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 06 Mar 2022 18:05:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-08T00:11:23.171Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>They say there are two sides to every story, consider both before you form an opinion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1Jkb-7as4ueBlU6LnMnHpw.png" /></figure><p>Easier said than done. Look at the conflict in Ukraine, one side is dominating the global narrative, the other side has been proclaimed the Villain.</p><p>I’m talking about NATO and Russia, and while there’s a solid case against Russia here, this story too has another side.</p><p>President Putins aggression is being called out and rightly so, invading a sovereign country cannot be justified. But what led the world to the point of this invasion?</p><p>Leaders in Moscow say they are the aggrieved party. They are the victims of NATO’s eastward march, and they’re only acting in self defense.</p><p>Here’s why: over the past 25 years NATO has been creeping closer to the Russian Border, former soviet states have become NATO members. This military alliance has technically absorbed the entire security belt of Moscow. Russia sees this expansion as a provocation. It hurts their security interests, and won’t end well for either side.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KeelNfvL6oEDTHz_gbNBCA.png" /></figure><p>The warnings were clear, NATO ignored them, call it myopia or arrogance, they downplayed Moscows concerns, and kept proceeding with new rounds of expansion until things blew up in Ukraine.</p><p>Did NATO push Ukraine into this war? Why NATO cannot escape the blame for what’s happening in Ukraine.</p><p>First: What is NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is a security alliance between North America and Europe. It was formed after the second world war, the goal was to protect democratic freedom. On the 4th of April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, this treaty was simply an anti-soviet accord, aimed at countering any future aggression by the USSR.</p><p>It established a new balance of power in Europe, it promised all members collective security. That is a core principle laid out in article 5 of the NATO treaty, it obliges member states to protect each other in the case of a war.</p><p>Article 5 states: “An armed attack against one or more members in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”</p><p>This allowed NATO members to pool and share their military resources. They built up their defense capabilities. But there was more to NATO than just defense. It was an alliance of liberal countries, an engine of democratization that was supposed to promote common values and interests.</p><p>That common interest being, to push back against the rise of communism. Naturally Russia saw this alliance as a threat to its interest. In response, Russia created the WARSAW Pact in 1955. It was a counterweight of NATO. The Pact included East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria and of course, Russia.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*WvB1dATrAFWV3UOo0UuP-Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Their goal was the same, if one WARSAW Pact member was attacked, all others will defend it. In Russian historical memory, there were 5 reasons why such a pact was justified. 5 major invasions when the west checked against Russian interests. The polish occupation of the Kremlin in the 17th century, the Swedish invasion of Russia in the early 18th century, Napoleon’s invasion in the 19th century and the two wars with Germany in the 20th century.</p><p>In each case, the very essence of the Russian state was threatened. So suspicion and fear of the west took deep roots in Russia. Moscow began perceiving NATO as the tool of American imperialism and the assessment was not really off the mark.</p><p>in 1989 the Berlin wall collapsed in 1991 the soviet union disintegrated and the iron curtain was completely demolished. Europes regional order hinged on one question. Should Germany align itself with the U.S. and NATO, or should it join the Russians to the WARSAW Pact.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*udtxrhfWKpd2K2RP4_onRw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The U.S. government, under George H.W. Bush made an offer to Russian president Mikhail Gorbachev. It suggested, if German became a NATO member, NATO would stop expanding, not one more inch eastward, no new members.</p><p>Today the U.S. says, it made no such promise, that no such deal was ever struck. But hundreds of memo’s, meeting minutes, and transcripts from U.S. Archives indicate otherwise. Nevertheless, Moscow bought the offer. It demolished the Warsaw Pact in the hope that the west would follow suit, that NATO too would be dissolved. But that never happened.</p><p>NATO refused to cease operations, and to add insult to injury, they kept the door for membership open. Russia saw it as a stab in the back, and NATO kept pushing the dagger deeper. Look at this map, NATO started out with 12 founding members, but since the soviet union fell, it was drastically expanded eastward.</p><p>in 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO. In 2004 there was another wave of expansions, with 7 central and eastern European nations were made NATO members. Some of them were former soviet republics.</p><p>in 2009, Albania and Croatia joined NATO, and the most recent entries, were Montenegro and north Macedonia, both situated in Russias backyard. It does not end there, as of 2021 NATO officially recognized 3 more aspiring members. Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/730/1*-CPJJ6U-TTAY6mg0NAYddg.png" /></figure><p>Last we checked, NATO was also in talks with Sweden, Finland, and Serbia for membership. So to put it simply, much of eastern Europe which once was part of the Soviet Union, and then the Warsaw Pact, has now joined NATO, and this happened despite Russias protests and warnings.</p><p>The most recent friendly warning form Moscow came in 2007, Vladimir Putin addressed the annual Munich conference, where he said quote “NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, this expansion represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the WARSAW Pact?”</p><p>These sentiments have been echoed by a host of American strategists. I’ll give you a few examples, June 1997, 50 prominent foreign policy experts signed an open letter to president Bill Clinton, calling America’s efforts to expand NATO, a policy error of historic proportions.</p><p>George Kennan, the father of American Containment policy during the cold war. He said about NATO expansion quote “I think it is a tragic mistake, there was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EahLcpJJg3ZgLo0W2whfIg.png" /></figure><p>The warnings went on for decades, in 2008 William J Burns, the U.S. ambassador to Moscow wrote a letter to the state department where he said that Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all Red Lines for the Russian elite. Quote “from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics. I have yet to find one who views Ukraine in nato as anything other than a direct challenge to Russias interests.”</p><p>It does not end there, Robert M. Gates, the defense secretary for the Bush AND Obama administrations, wrote in his memoir that trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was purely over-reaching. Quote “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly over reaching. This move was a case of recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3DXrJtvLCGobPQmOoF81cw.png" /></figure><p>Then we have Strobe Albert, the former secretary of state. He described the Russian position in a similar way, how they considered NATO as a vestige of the cold war, and point out that if the WARSAW Pact was disbanded, why did the west not dismantle NATO?</p><p>So several voices in the western world have warned that Russias protests have merit, and that NATO expansion could spell serious trouble, yet, successive American administrations paid no heed to these warning, they kept widening NATO’s security umbrella.</p><p>Trying to safeguard the sovereignty is laudable indeed, but inviting a state right on Russias border into an anti-Russian alliance, is provocation. Especially when you send diplomats and statesmen like senator John McCain and Amy Klobuchar and to encourage anti-government protests like we saw in they maidan in 2013.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*s5qz-MbH6FNnXYUM-UOLkA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Ukraine is a sovereign country and has every right to want to join NATO, but what’s in it for NATO? Why did they push for it? The moves completely disregard the historical baggage between NATO and Russia. Many Russians were traumatized by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in an instant, they lost 1/3 of their territory, half of their population and most of their military might.</p><p>They found themselves much weaker before western unity. They felt that an unjust settlement had been imposed on them, and it was done in a moment of maximum weakness and vulnerability. So they looked at any state leaving Russias sphere of influence as both a strategic loss, and a matter of national humiliation.</p><p>When we analyze why Ukraine was attacked, all of this needs to be taken into account. Does this justify the war, absolutely not. Russias actions are criminal, no two ways about it. But the NATO is not innocent either. They did not do what they could’ve to avert this war.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=66f96d151b3b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Will the U.S. Intervene in Ukraine?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gabeshootman/will-the-u-s-intervene-in-ukraine-b37aa53e9384?source=rss-44de1a5b93d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b37aa53e9384</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine-collapse]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gabe Shootman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 06 Mar 2022 03:46:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-06T03:46:55.028Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Is this World War 3 or Cold war 2?</p><p>The entire world is already in conflict.</p><blockquote><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59900139">China</a> continues to push for unification with Taiwan, and faces tensions with Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines over the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_disputes_in_the_South_China_Sea">South China Sea</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2020/mapping-india-and-china-disputed-borders/index.html">India</a> is engaged in territorial disputes with China, over its borders near the Kashmir, with Pakistan also laying claims.</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Israel_proxy_conflict">Iran</a> is engaged with Israel, via Palestine, and ever presently, with the United States.</blockquote><blockquote>The <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-africa#:~:text=In%20Fiscal%20Year%202020%2C%20USAID,offices%20that%20support%20the%20missions.">United States</a> <em>and</em> <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/02/the-future-of-russia-africa-relations/">Russia</a> have conflicting interests on the Africa continent, with American allies France and Portugal, and Russian partner <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/26668/main-import-countries-sources-africa/">China</a>. Although mutual cooperation exists here.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/632/1*9veiAqTkevdOzWuW5FD3qA.png" /><figcaption>Countries in Red have ongoing territorial disputes, yellow dots represent armed conflict</figcaption></figure><p>Despite the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts">59 armed conflicts</a> currently ongoing, the top 17 accumulating 122,211 deaths in 2020, two world powers colliding over Ukraine could bring about a hot war between the east and west.</p><p>The Key element is who, if anyone, will step in to provide boots on the ground in Ukraine, to counter the Russian army.</p><p>Despite Ukraine’s fierce defense, and rapid growth of their armed service, the size of their army is only estimated to be 200,000 combat ready soldiers. This is not including the estimated <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-russia-shells-mariupol-as-cease-fire-attempts-stall-as-it-happened/a-61023653">60,000</a> Ukrainians living abroad who have returned in recent weeks, nor the <a href="https://www.firstpost.com/world/explained-who-are-the-16000-foreign-fighters-in-ukraine-joining-the-resistance-against-russia-10428101.html">16,000</a> foreign fighters that have allegedly signed up to fight against the Russians, For a total of <strong>276,000</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JQEVCIfAUebTTKE-TRXUXg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ukranian Special Forces in Training</figcaption></figure><p>This stands in stark contrast to Russias 1,030,000 combat ready soldiers, and 2,000,000 reservists. despite hotly debated claims that the bulk of the Russian fighting force currently mobilized are demoralized and under supplied reservists and conscripts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*VyO_B_Ru1sPr-m_L-fwUZg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Russian Special Forces in Training</figcaption></figure><p>While the United States is the ring leader, it is unlikely that American boots would find themselves above Balkan soil. The four countries with Nato membership sharing a border with Ukraine are Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*5bXFuEacEcskxYg5A1FKnw.jpeg" /><figcaption>If you’ve not figured out by now, Ukraine is right above the Black sea, Moldova is the country between Romania and Ukraine, and Belorus is above Ukraine.</figcaption></figure><p>As promised by President Jo Biden, The United States will only intervene if Russia forces completely annex Ukraine, and then move on to a Nato member, like Romania, or Slovakia. One could argue that even if Russian troops attacked Romanian or Slovakian border forces by accident, the United States would do her best to mediate any thoughts of retaliation.</p><p>This is because of a tricky thing called the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_first_use#:~:text=No%20first%20use%20(NFU)%20refers,an%20adversary%20using%20nuclear%20weapons.">“No-First-Use Policy”</a>. The tricky thing in international politics, is that we all have agreements with each-other, some dating back further than others.</p><p>A good example of one of these agreements, is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum_on_Security_Assurances">Budapest Memorandum</a>. Ironically, the Budapest Memorandum was signed in 1991, assuring Ukraine it would be kept safe from invading Russians by the United States, the United Kingdom and France. This has since been broken, spit on, and officially put through the shredder, since the “protection” offered by the was was merely symbolic in nature.</p><p>The No-First-Use policy, can only be described as a Gentleman’s agreement. Stating that no nuclear weapons will be launched first, the nukes will only be launched if some other nation launches theirs first. The United States and Russia, among others, have publicly stated that they will not honor such an agreement. If their borders are broken by foreign troops, or capitals are threatened by invasion, the nukes may-or-may-not-be launched as a last line of defense.</p><p>So to answer the question posed in the title, the United States is very unlikely to send troops to defend Ukraine. Despite it seeming like the ethical, noble and righteous thing to do, things will have to escalate a lot more over a time period a lot longer than has currently passed, if American troops rush in, take Ukraine, and push the Russians too fast or too hard. Well, then it will be time To Stop Worrying and Start Loving the Bomb.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NXm1I5TErpqfkeXEN8EZkA.png" /><figcaption>Screenshot from film, “DR. STRANGELOVE”</figcaption></figure><p>As for a Cold War 2? With Russia officially blocking Twitter and Facebook access from the state level, Americans pulling vodka from the shelves, Coca-Cola pulling out of Russia, Visa and Mastercard banning all operations from Russia. It certainly sounds like the old familiar clank of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_Curtain#:~:text=The%20Iron%20Curtain%20was%20a,West%20and%20its%20allied%20states.">Iron Curtain</a> is pulling closed. The Spy Games are back, baby. I’ll meet you in Berlin.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b37aa53e9384" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Mali is Rejecting France’s Aid]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gabeshootman/why-mali-is-rejecting-frances-aid-cfa8ef1b126d?source=rss-44de1a5b93d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cfa8ef1b126d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mali]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gabe Shootman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Feb 2022 23:01:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-02T23:01:35.127Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DJbOjUSPPnOc30q95fr9eQ.png" /><figcaption>French troops in Mali Foto: Finbarr O’Reilly / The New York Times / Redux / laif</figcaption></figure><blockquote><strong>“People Collected Severed Arms, Legs and Heads”</strong></blockquote><p>France initially deployed its military to Mali to hunt down jihadists. But reporting by DER SPIEGEL shows that its soldiers have repeatedly killed civilians there. Is the country turning into France’s Afghanistan?</p><p>A short time later, Diallo heard an explosion and then another. The next thing he remembers is lying on the ground, badly injured. His legs were bleeding. He saw people with limbs torn to shreds. One man’s entrails were seeping out of his body. Helpers who rushed to the site from the village took Diallo to the clinic in the nearest town.</p><p>Speaking of the attack several days later over the phone, he was still in a state of shock. His cousin, Mamoudou Diallo, also wounded in the attack, was lying in the bed next to him. Three of his nephews were dead. “People collected severed arms, legs and heads, threw them into a hole and buried them,” he said.</p><blockquote><strong>“They Came with Planes and Bombed Us”</strong></blockquote><p>Twenty-two people died in the French attack on Bounti. The French government insists that the victims were exclusively Islamist terrorists, against whom France is waging war in Mali. But Madabbel and Mamoudou Diallo as well as six other witnesses from Bounti contradict that account. “There weren’t any jihadists there,” says Madabbel Diallo. “No one had weapons, not even a knife.” Aliou Barry, a farmer, says: “We were celebrating a wedding. And they came with planes and bombed us.”</p><p>Investigators from the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali, known as MINUSMA, hold a similar view. Their investigation report states that although three of the victims belonged to the jihadist group Katiba Serma, all others were civilians. François Lecointre, chief of the French defense staff, speaks of “manipulation,” and says that drone footage would exonerate his soldiers. But the army is refusing to release those images on account of military secrecy.</p><p>The incident in Bounti sheds light on a conflict that is largely taking place far away from the public eye. The French military has been deployed in Mali for more than eight years. But what began in January 2013 as a targeted offensive against Islamist insurgents, primarily in northern Mali, has turned into one of the longest wars in France’s recent history.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i2HppuEjD5YU4iIKwne4Lg.png" /><figcaption>Civilians killed in Mali since 2018, presumably through <strong>Islamist attacks</strong> and <strong>military strikes</strong> by the Malian army and the French-led <strong>Operation Barkhane</strong></figcaption></figure><p>Paris has deployed more than 5,000 troops in Mali and neighboring countries — one-third of its total troops abroad — as part of Operation Barkhane. Despite their presence, the jihadists have managed to spread across much of the Sahel — in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. French President Emmanuel Macron has called on other countries, including Germany, to become more involved in the hunt for terrorists. After its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Mali will be the largest foreign deployment of the Bundeswehr, Germany’s armed forces, with around 1,000 German soldiers currently participating in the Minusma mission. The Germans are also training Malian soldiers on behalf of the European Union. The mandate granted by German parliament, though, explicitly excludes German forces from participating in active combat as part of Operation Barkhane.</p><p>The French government wants to stop the advance of the Islamists in Mali, and to stem the flow of irregular migrants to Europe. But when it comes to the details of the operation, Paris is tight-lipped, with even allies receiving but scant information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fvDhD3Z2BUlhyTcwpcxvHQ.png" /><figcaption>French President Emmanuel Macron welcomes Bah N’Daw, the temporary president of Mali.</figcaption></figure><blockquote>Research shows that, in some cases, French soldiers and their Malian allies may have violated international law.</blockquote><h3>Frustration with the Government</h3><p>Mali is to France what Afghanistan is to the United States — a seemingly endless war that is difficult to win — and one that repeatedly claims innocent victims. According to data from the NGO Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project (ACLED), around 8,000 civilians have been killed in attacks from various sides since 2013.</p><p>In Gossi, a town in northeastern Mali, French soldiers are patrolling alongside their Malian counterparts on an April afternoon. They are wearing bulletproof vests and carrying rifles as they stop vehicles to check documents. “We want to show presence,” says Benjamin, a French officer. A teenager starts shaking as he is stopped on his bicycle by the security forces. “What’s wrong?” Benjamin asks in French. “Why are you afraid?” The boy looks at him with uncertainty. The Malian soldiers are also at a loss. They come from different parts of the country and don’t speak the language of some of the people in Gossi. A local resident finally rushes to help. “He’s a kid, that’s why he’s scared,” he says. The soldiers scroll through the boy’s mobile phone and let him go.</p><p>In most cases, French soldiers are sent to Mali for three to four months as part of the Barkhane operation. Many of them are young, and they often find it difficult to properly assess the situation on the ground.</p><p>The French, with their armored vehicles, fighter jets and drones, are militarily superior to their opponents. But those are of little use when it comes to the everyday reality of war. As with the Americans and their allies in Afghanistan, the French repeatedly succeed in killing extremists, but not in bringing lasting peace to the region.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oTMAiuZkYmJGOOj3STG8Iw.png" /><figcaption>Displaced people in Mali. Foto: MICHELE CATTANI / AFP</figcaption></figure><p>Some of the Islamist groups that control parts of the Sahel have links to the Islamic State or al-Qaida. More importantly, the groups are firmly anchored within the population and are able to leverage the frustration that many Malians feel toward the central government.</p><p>The government in Bamako is considered weak and prone to corruption. Just recently, the military overthrew the government in a putsch for the second time in nine months. Mali is now being ruled by Army Colonel Assimi Goïta.</p><p>Criticism of the deployment is growing in both France and Germany, and politicians from several German parties are demanding the withdrawal of German troops. But German Chancellor Angela Merkel wants to continue the mission. “We believe that our presence on the ground is still important,” Merkel said last Monday, following a joint meeting of government ministers from Germany and France.</p><p>France’s involvement in Mali began with a 2013 request from the country’s rulers for help when jihadists closed in on Bamako. The French only intended to stay in the country for a few weeks, but the former colonial power was drawn deeper and deeper into the conflict. And the longer the fighting went on, the greater the losses. More than 50 French soldiers have died since the beginning of the war — as have an incomparably greater number of Malians.</p><p>Idrissa Maiga, a farmer from central Mali, lost his wife and three children in 2013 during a rocket attack that he attributes to the French. He has sought compensation, but in vain. Maiga turned to the authorities and media in Mali and France. “All they told me was that France is not responsible for deaths in Mali,” he says.</p><p>The government in Paris doesn’t like to talk about the civilian casualties of its war on terrorism. According to the French Defense Ministry, only seven civilians have been killed in direct attacks by French soldiers since 2013. However, reports from Mali indicate that the true death toll is many times higher. Investigations into these cases are difficult even for other nations stationed in Mali, such as Germany.</p><p>Since France is acting largely on its own with Operation Barkhane, it isn’t accountable to any of its UN partners. The Bundeswehr, for example, has “no knowledge of its own” regarding the attack on Bounti. And no one in Berlin, right up to German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer wants to comment on the critical UN report out of consideration for the government in Paris. The German Defense Ministry issued a terse statement on the matter, saying an evaluation of the incident is not possible. “A robust mission like Barkhane is needed to establish a basic level of security, even if some people in our country don’t like it,” Kramp-Karrenbauer said in a recent video chat with the Bundeswehr’s Mali commanders and members of the German parliament.</p><p>There is evidence, though, that the French military is deliberately keeping its civilian casualties a secret. One internal Barkhane document viewed by DER SPIEGEL reveals that French soldiers shot and killed a man on a motorcycle in a village in central Mali who they mistakenly believed to be a suicide bomber. Rather than holding the soldiers accountable, France paid money to the bereaved. Malian anthropologist and government adviser Bréma Ely Dicko warns that a failure to come to terms with possible war crimes is driving recruits into the arms of the jihadists.</p><p>Paris is trying to get the Malian military more involved in the operation. The French say they have trained 18,000 Malian soldiers since 2014. But Mali’s armed forces remain poorly equipped, disorganized and are often outmatched by the jihadists.</p><p>Observers regularly accuse Malian soldiers of human rights violations. The French military and the German armed forces claim they also want to train their Malian allies to improve their interactions with civilians. “We explain to them that you can’t clear dirt with dirt,” says Serge Camus, the Barkhane commander in Gossi. Still, it seems that more civilians were killed by security forces than by terrorists in the Sahel last year.</p><p>The Malian military maintains a base in Boulkessi, a village on the border with Burkina Faso — a base which has been fortified by the French army. And yet more civilians have died in and around Boulkessi than in any other region of Mali as a result of attacks by the Malian army — 153 people in the past three years alone, according to data from the NGO ACLED.</p><p>Tidiani Diallo, a teenager from Boulkessi, watched as Malian soldiers invaded his hometown in 2018, allegedly to avenge the death of a comrade. He claims that they shot people at random, arrested the village leader and the imam, and said: “We told you that if one of us died, we would kill 20 of you.”</p><h3>Protectors and Occupiers</h3><p>In January, French and Malian soldiers conducted a joint operation in villages near Boulkessi. They raided several houses, apparently on the search for terrorists. Four men were arrested. One witness claims that Malian soldiers threw the men “like a sack of rice” into a vehicle. A day later, two of them were found dead on the side of the road. A third returned home after two weeks in custody and the fourth is still missing. All of Boulkessi’s residents have since fled.</p><p>The dark side of the French mission in Mali is largely out of the public’s view. Meanwhile, the Malian armed forces are seldom held accountable for possible war crimes. And some people in Mali are growing increasingly angry about the military operation. Earlier this year protests against France were held in Bamako: Some no longer see the French soldiers as protectors, but as occupiers.</p><p>It’s likely that President Macron is looking for a way to at least reduce the deployment. In recent years, he has had to stand in front of the coffins of French soldiers again and again. Following the most recent putsch, it has been even more difficult to justify the mission politically. In a recent interview, Macron stated more clearly than he has before that he would not support a government that lacks democratic legitimacy.</p><p><strong>military strikes</strong> by the Malian army and the French-led »Operation Barkhane«</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cfa8ef1b126d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Congo’s Nuclear Secret]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gabeshootman/congos-nuclear-secret-54a14aa58d98?source=rss-44de1a5b93d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/54a14aa58d98</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[congo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hope]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gabe Shootman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Feb 2022 04:32:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-01T04:32:15.878Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>Uranium was first discovered in Shinkolobwe, in the south of what was then the Belgian Congo, in 1915</blockquote><p>Amid the market stalls, hawkers and gridlocked cars on the road out of Congo’s capital and into the Kinshasa hills there is nothing to mark the way to a nondescript clutch of buildings a few hundred yards down a side street.</p><blockquote>In 1939, Albert Einstein wrote to the then US president, Franklin Roosevelt, warning of the danger of Nazi Germany getting its hands on Congo’s uranium</blockquote><p>The dilapidated concrete compound is protected by little more than a low-slung rusted barbed-wire fence and a rickety gate sealed by a single padlock. It would be easy enough to slip through a hole in the fence but there is no need, as the main entrance to what is supposed to be one of the best guarded sites in Congo is often unmanned.</p><blockquote>As the single richest deposit in the world, uranium from Congo was a primary source for American research on nuclear weapons during the second world war</blockquote><p>The armed police assigned to watch the compound were not to be seen at the weekend as visitors wandered the corridors of what is Africa’s oldest nuclear reactor facility — and the storage place for dozens of bars of enriched uranium — until finally challenged by a man in a tracksuit who called himself “security”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*NVbGQ58jbIK8p560d_Kn3Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Outside the Reactor Facility</figcaption></figure><p>The International Atomic Energy Agency has long viewed Kinshasa’s experimental nuclear reactor as a disaster in the making, either through an accident that releases radiation into the city or because of lax security.</p><blockquote>Congo’s Belgian rulers shut the Shinkolobwe uranium mine shortly before independence in 1960, flooding its shafts with water and capping them with concrete</blockquote><p>There are now three locks to gain access to the reactor and uranium rods, because years ago the director handed over a set of keys to a stranger that included the only key required to get to the heart of the atomic plant. That carelessness is blamed for the disappearance of two rods of enriched uranium in the late 1970s. One is believed to have turned up in 1998 on its way to the Middle East via the mafia; the other was never found.</p><p>But new locks aside, there is little outward recognition of concern by the world’s nuclear watchdog and among western governments at the prospect of Kinshasa’s reactor catching the attention of terrorists scouring the globe for the right ingredients for a “dirty bomb”.</p><p>The US — which helped found the reactor because Congo provided the uranium used in the atom bombs dropped on Japan — cut off the supply of spare parts to the reactor nearly 20 years ago due to the plant’s decline. Washington has recently tried to persuade Congo to hand over the 98 bars of enriched uranium stored in triangular rods about 60cm (2ft) long and kept submerged in a circular pool underneath a padlocked metal grate or in the reactor.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/1*CX0iWwskLAiaQIskRlcpFQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Outside the Reactor Facility</figcaption></figure><p>But Congo’s nuclear scientists hope to fire up the reactor again so that it can be put to a range of uses from medical research to mine prospecting, eight years after it was placed on standby because of war and poor maintenance.</p><p>At least the facility has entered the computer age. Little more than a decade ago it didn’t have phones and technicians worked on blackboards.</p><p>“We had to shut the reactor down because of the war,” said Alphonse Thiband-a-Tshish, a member of Congo’s atomic energy commission. “But now we have had elections and the war is over we are very hopeful of starting it up again. All the uranium rods are there. Now we have inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency. They find problems and tell us about them.”</p><p>Congo’s nuclear plant was installed at the University of Kinshasa in 1958. A second reactor was built in 1972, the first one dismantled and its dozens of uranium fuel rods stored at the site.</p><p>The newer reactor was put on standby in 1998 at the behest of the IAEA, ostensibly because of the war with Rwanda. But the agency had watched the reactor deteriorate for years .</p><p>Diplomatic sources said the IAEA feared that an accident could send radiation into the city and contaminate the water supply. Agency officials have been particularly worried that the reactor is built in an area known for subsidence. Seven years ago one of the walls was pierced by a piece of metal that was variously identified as part of a missile or having fallen from a plane.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t-bwQtatgCysK_uMJYs7fw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Congolese Scientist&#39;s at the Facility in 1959</figcaption></figure><p>There is also concern that the Kinshasa plant could make an easy target for terrorists. While it would be difficult to use the uranium rods to manufacture a nuclear device, they would be useful in building a more rudimentary “dirty bomb” that would release radiation.</p><p>The disappearance of the uranium rods in the 1970s has never been fully accounted for. The reactor’s director, Professor Felix Malu Wa Kalenga, has said that a rod recovered from the Italian mafia in 1999 was probably the one stolen from Kinshasa. The Italian press reported that it was destined for an unnamed Middle Eastern government.</p><p>For all the concerns, Congo’s atomic energy commission sees a bright future. This month it signed an agreement with a British firm, Brinkley Mining, for the nuclear facility to be used in prospecting for uranium. Working conditions have improved since the IAEA was given access for inspections and programmes focused on safety. That has opened the way for funding from the agency for repairs and new control rooms, which are now being put in place, and from foreign universities for new laboratories.</p><p>But the IAEA’s own reports say that Congo’s atomic energy commission has failed to meet every target on security and safety issues, such as radiation protection. Mr Thiband-a-Tshish sees no security threat. “We have three keys with three people to get into the reactor. No one knows who has those keys. The building has walls one meter thick. I don’t think anyone could get through those,” he said.</p><p>The Russian nuclear giant Rosatom has made public the signing of a framework agreement with the Congolese government on the development of civilian nuclear power and the upcoming construction of a nuclear power plant. This new partnership, concluded Tuesday, February 13, 2018 in Moscow between ROSATOM and the Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovations of the Republic of Congo, will allow this Central African country to stabilize its electricity production and secure its supply.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=54a14aa58d98" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Burkina Faso coup: Why soldiers have overthrown The President]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gabeshootman/burkina-faso-coup-why-soldiers-have-overthrown-the-president-d5c05b943662?source=rss-44de1a5b93d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d5c05b943662</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[burkina-faso]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gabe Shootman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 31 Jan 2022 17:51:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-31T17:51:10.128Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Hundreds of people in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, have been celebrating after the military seized power on Monday.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/1*-siLKGJ4E_OJxqTB0gqsgA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Demonstrators in the capital, Ouagadougou on January 25th</figcaption></figure><p>The ousting of President Roch Kaboré was unsettling but not unexpected — and it is the fourth coup in West Africa in the last 17 months.</p><p>Neighboring Mali has seen two military interventions in that time, fueled by concerns over an inability to deal with growing militant Islamist violence.</p><h3>How serious is the Islamist threat?</h3><p>As in Mali, Mr Kabore’s removal was triggered by growing discontent among security forces over his alleged failure to adequately support them against militants linked to both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group.</p><p>On Sunday, mutinies were reported in several military camps, in the capital, Ouagadougou, and the northern towns of Kaya and Ouahigouya.</p><p>The unrest followed months of anti-government protests demanding the president’s resignation.</p><p>Militant attacks that began in 2015 have claimed more than 2,000 lives and forced 1.5 million people from their homes, <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2022/1/61e137ac4/decade-sahel-conflict-leaves-25-million-people-displaced.html"><strong>according to UN estimates</strong></a>. Schools are closed in large parts of the country because it is too dangerous for them to open.</p><p>Public confidence in the president’s management of the security crisis sharply fell after an attack in the northern village of Solhan in June 2021. More than 100 people were killed in the attack blamed on militants who had crossed from Mali.</p><p>The Solhan attack prompted opposition protests in the capital, forcing Mr Kaboré to reshuffle his government and appoint himself defense minister.</p><p>Another attack on the northern Inata military base in November 2021 heightened anger towards the government.</p><p>More than 50 members of the security forces were killed. Reports emerged that the base had sent a distress message asking for food rations and additional equipment two weeks before the attack, which never arrived.</p><p>The president sacked his government and appointed a new prime minister and defense minister ahead of national reconciliation talks with the opposition.</p><h3>How did militant violence spread to Burkina Faso?</h3><p>Despite West Africa’s security and political volatility, Burkina Faso enjoyed fragile stability until a popular uprising in 2014 that ousted former long-serving President Blaise Compaoré.</p><p>A coup attempt in 2015 left the military deeply divided. Mr Kaboré was first elected that year on a pledge to unify the country.</p><p>However, militants from neighboring Mali — where a separatist insurgency in 2012 was hijacked by jihadists — carried out an attack in the Burkinabè capital as Mr Kaboré prepared to take the helm.</p><p>Armed groups took advantage of a weak security presence in Burkina Faso’s exposed borderlands to mount more attacks and entrench their presence.</p><p>Jihadists have also triggered sectarian tensions between previously co-existing Christian and Muslim communities in Burkina Faso.</p><p>The militants have taken advantage of the sparse state presence and lack of humanitarian support, which have left communities both vulnerable and prone to recruitment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/1*AY8EXuQt8so4n1Rss1j3pg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Demonstrators holding a photo of the leader of Burkina Faso’s military separatists</figcaption></figure><h3>Who is the leader of the forces instigating the coup?</h3><p><strong>Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba</strong> has been at the forefront of the country’s fight against Islamist militants. The 41-year-old wrote a book on the subject last year — West African Armies and Terrorism: Uncertain Responses?</p><p>The lieutenant-colonel studied in France, at a military academy and a prestigious institution, where he got a Master’s in criminal sciences. He opposed a previous coup in 2015, which lasted seven days. He started his career in the presidential guard (RPS) — the now-disbanded unit was seen as powerful during the presidency of Blaise Compaoré, who was overthrown in 2014 amid protests.</p><p>Political participation has also been undermined by the militant presence.</p><p>In 2020, voters who had fled their homes in parts of the north and east were unable to participate in the presidential poll in which Mr Kaboré was re-elected with 58% of the vote.</p><p>Militant pressure on communities heightened public disgruntlement in the president’s second term.</p><h3>What are the parallels with Mali?</h3><p>There are concerns that a pattern is emerging.</p><p>The build-up to Burkina Faso’s coup bear similarities with events in Mali before its own military takeover in August 2020.</p><p>A series of deadly attacks on military and civilian targets was followed by mass protests sparked by a growing lack of faith in the government of Mali’s then President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta.</p><p>Burkina Faso’s main opposition leader, Eddie Komboigo, has tried to take advantage of the public discontent about insecurity to whip up anger.</p><p>But while the public in Mali broadly supported the military coup, Burkinabès may be wary of further instability with the army in charge.</p><h3>Did anti-French sentiment play a role?</h3><p>Both countries used to be French colonies and France has continued to maintain strong economic and security ties long after independence.</p><p>Like Mali, Burkinabè security forces depend on support from France which deployed 5,100 personnel in the region under what was called Operation Barkhane. This began when France sent troops to stop jihadists marching on Mali’s capital, Bamako in 2013.</p><p>But public backing for the French involvement has waned as the security situation deteriorated.</p><p>In December, residents of Kaya blocked a French military convoy delivering supplies to the Burkinabè army and instead accused Barkhane forces of working with jihadists.</p><p>France has further been pushed out of the Sahel region, which includes both countries, in a diplomatic row with Mali that triggered the withdrawal of nearly half of the Barkhane contingent.</p><p>The security vacuum could be exploited by jihadists, while persistent political instability could undermine defense cooperation under what is called the G5 Sahel force that includes troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.</p><p>While Mali is turning to Russia to fill this security gap, its Sahel partners — including Burkina Faso — have strongly opposed this controversial move.</p><h3>Should the region be wary?</h3><p>The coup in Burkina Faso suggest that putschists are not concerned about the reaction of the West African regional group ECOWAS. Recent sanctions against Mali and Guinea, which saw a coup last September, failed to curb the soldiers’ actions.</p><p>The president of neighboring Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, had a shaky start in office in 2021 with a coup attempt against a backdrop of deadly attacks against civilians and the army.</p><p>He has been a fierce critic of the political situation in Mali and its potential impact on the morale of regional defense forces.</p><p>The Nigerian president has been trying to quell any military discontent by visiting defense forces in volatile regions, which seems to be working for now.</p><p>The instability in Mali and Burkina Faso is also leading to security concerns in Ivory Coast, their neighbor to the south. There have been jihadist attacks there since June 2020 targeting security forces.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dt6f2UpkD4BZAAAOXyl82A.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d5c05b943662" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Sudanese Protesters Insist on End to Military Rule]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gabeshootman/why-sudanese-protesters-insist-on-end-to-military-rule-61b952fb98e7?source=rss-44de1a5b93d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/61b952fb98e7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gabe Shootman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 31 Jan 2022 03:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-31T03:38:28.286Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Sudanese Protesters Insist on End to Military Rule</h3><p>Sudanese pro-democracy protesters have been more resolute in calling for an unconditional end to military rule than many Western democracies, which have been all too willing to condone a return to the status quo.</p><p>As the fraught standoff in Sudan enters its fourth month, pro-democracy demonstrators persist in resisting the military officers that seized power in October. Their courage and determination deserve the world’s attention and support, as security services continue to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/sudan-security-forces-fire-on-anti-coup-protesters">use deadly force</a> against demonstrators, <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/women-s-rights-leader-detained-in-sudan-capital">arrest</a> human rights activists, and <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudanese-newspaper-ceases-publication-because-of-press-curbs">muzzle</a> the press.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*z0An7EY4AKtU6iY-wZLjEg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Protesters march during rall against military rule, January 24th 2022/ <em>Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah / </em>Reuters</figcaption></figure><p>At the heart of the impasse are two different ideas about how political legitimacy is derived. For the junta, the use of force is not just a means extinguish opposition: their capacity and willingness to use violent coercion is at the heart of their claim to leadership.</p><p>Military leaders <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e8560dab-c35d-4ed4-bca5-0aecb5bc930f">use paternalistic language</a> about “correcting the track” or being “guardians” of political developments, suggesting that their natural place is to judge developments in Sudan and bring out the guns as they see fit.</p><p>But the civilians that began calling for change in 2018 want governing authorities who derive their power from popular consent and are accountable to the demands of citizens.</p><p>They want democracy, and their patience for proposals that depend on the benevolence and support of the security forces has worn thin. In part because so many foreign countries with interests in Sudan have been reluctant to abandon the notion that civilians and the military should share in political power — despite the flaw in this formula having been made painfully clear by the October coup — their democratic vision is also increasingly nationalist in its tenor.</p><p>International intervention is viewed with suspicion, because the fundamental idea animating civilian protesters is that the Sudanese people, in all of their diversity and complexity, should be in the driver’s seat of fashioning Sudan’s future. This complicates the United Nations’ already precarious <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-un-proposal-sideline-army-opposition-unimpressed">attempts to facilitate dialogue</a> that could end the impasse.</p><p>Yet the economic realities that Sudan confronts mean that external actors still matter. Certainly, the security elites clinging to power are working assiduously to shore up international support and tamp down potential regional complications.</p><p>News that Sudan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/deprived-foreign-aid-sudan-expand-use-gold-exports-2022-01-24/">plans to ramp up</a> gold exports to cover necessary expenditures points to the difficulty the military has in governing without international assistance, which was frozen in the wake of the coup. It is a dubious proposal, not least because it threatens to squeeze the lucrative gold smuggling networks that elites in the security services have long used to enrich themselves.</p><h3>January 30th</h3><p>Defying a ban on protests, thousands of demonstrators marched in the streets of Khartoum and other cities on Sunday denouncing the October military takeover — calling for a fully civilian government to lead the country’s now-stalled transition to democracy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Kz7J8BYT-jZxg2rOmpQ2yw.png" /></figure><p>The coup has upended Sudan’s transition to democratic rule after three decades of international isolation under former President Omar al-Bashir.</p><p>The Biden Administration is right to <a href="https://twitter.com/USEmbassyKRT/status/1484152541667549184/photo/1">condition</a> any resumption of financial assistance on an end to the violence and wise to listen to a wide variety of civilian voices in Sudan — voices that should carry greater weight than the wishes of governments in Cairo, Abu Dhabi, or Riyadh. Greater clarity about the impossibility of a “return” to any framework giving the military the capacity to block reforms would also be constructive. There is no discernable value in the United States seeking simply to end the stalemate; it is the “how” that matters. Continued military dominance in Sudan is a bloody road to nowhere.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61b952fb98e7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[78 Dead So Far in Months Long Sudanese Protests]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gabeshootman/78-dead-so-far-in-months-long-sudanese-protests-c99d587d3be4?source=rss-44de1a5b93d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c99d587d3be4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gabe Shootman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 31 Jan 2022 00:05:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-31T00:05:20.189Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>A new round of demonstrations took place in Sudan, on Sunday. One protester was killed.</strong></p><p>In Khartoum or its twin city Omdurman, thousands demonstrators took to the streets. They called for the military to return in their barracks and let civilians rule the country.</p><p>The protests are called by the Sudanese Professionals Association and the Resistance Committees, which were the backbone of the uprising against al-Bashir and relentless anti-coup protests in the past three months.</p><p>According to a medical group, at least one person was killed when security forces violently dispersed protesters. In processions, people were beating drums and chanting anti-coup slogans when others carried photos of protesters reportedly slain by security forces.</p><p>Protesters are denouncing an October military coup that plunged the country into turmoil. Many are young like Lujain Hassan, and they are sure they want another future for their country:</p><blockquote>“<strong>We don’t like this government because we have like some problems and troubles in Sudan, and we want to get Sudan in a good way and good government right now.</strong>”</blockquote><p><a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/01/25/sudan-hundreds-mourn-at-funeral-of-26-year-old-protestor/?utm_medium=AfricanewsEN&amp;utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1643127223">Footage circulating online</a> showed protestors marching towards the presidential palace, an area in the capital that has seen deadly clashes between protesters and security forces in previous rounds of demonstrations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HuUKtuY3CNNKjOeYxueY8g.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/01/25/sudan-hundreds-mourn-at-funeral-of-26-year-old-protestor/?utm_medium=AfricanewsEN&amp;utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1643127223">screen shot from the video of protesters heading towards presidential palace</a></figcaption></figure><p>The Sudan Doctors Committee, a medical group tracking casualties among protesters, said a 27-year-old died in a Khartoum hospital after he sustained an unspecified injury in his chest.</p><p>Ahead of the protests, authorities stepped up security in Khartoum and Omdurman. They deployed thousands of troops and police and sealed off central Khartoum, urging protesters to assemble only in public squares in the capital’s neighborhoods. The United Nations mission in Sudan on Saturday warned that such restrictions could increase tensions, urging authorities to let the protests “pass without violence.”</p><p>In the months-long string of demonstrations, It is estimated that at least 78 people have died.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c99d587d3be4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Africa’s ‘Leaders for Life’]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gabeshootman/africas-leaders-for-life-15ecfdb9e08d?source=rss-44de1a5b93d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/15ecfdb9e08d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gabe Shootman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Jan 2022 23:58:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-30T23:58:22.634Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sub-Saharan Africa is home to many of the world’s longest-ruling heads of state. Pro-democracy advocates have at times successfully stopped presidents from extending their mandates, but the authoritarian trend could be accelerating.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O1S-XY-qDJ7ehntKgHvWug.jpeg" /></figure><p>Sub-Saharan Africa is home to many of the world’s longest-ruling heads of state. Some postcolonial leaders in the 1960s and 1970s sought to become “president for life,” with several managing to remain in power for three or more terms. By the turn of the twenty-first century, the trend of entrenched leadership had spread across the region, spurring corruption, instability, societal fractures, and economic stagnation.</p><p>The trend has been thwarted in some countries, in part due to sustained pressure by civil society groups and regional blocs, but a global rise in authoritarianism threatens to undo recent progress. The COVID-19 pandemic, meanwhile, has provided further openings for leaders to postpone elections and stay in power.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/1*AY8EXuQt8so4n1Rss1j3pg.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60141195">The Recent Coup in Burkina Faso</a></figcaption></figure><h3>How prevalent is this trend?</h3><p>Many African countries struggled with transfers of power in their first half century after independence. Leaders who gained recognition during national movements for independence consolidated power and bound their own positions in office with their countries’ national identities. In 2021, five sitting African heads of state had been in power for more than three decades each: Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in Equatorial Guinea, Paul Biya in Cameroon, Denis Sassou Nguesso in the Republic of Congo, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, and Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea. More than half a dozen other African heads of state have been in power for at least ten years.</p><p>However, several longtime leaders have been deposed or otherwise left office in recent years. In 2017, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos stepped down after thirty-eight years in office, and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe was forced from office after thirty-seven years by a military coup. Two years later, Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir was ousted after three decades in power. In 2021, Chad’s Idriss Deby, who also ruled for thirty years, died following a battlefield clash with rebels.</p><p><a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Economic%20Brief%20-%20Political%20Fragility%20in%20Africa%20Are%20Military%20Coups%20d%E2%80%99Etat%20a%20Never%20Ending%20Phenomenon.pdf">Military coups were once common</a> as a means to seize power, with both Mbasogo and Museveni entering their presidencies this way. They have declined during the last two decades; there were twenty-seven successful coups from 1970 to 1982, but only twelve from 2000 to 2012. Since 2012, there have been a handful, two of them in Mali within nine months of each other.</p><p>Strong correlations exist between sub-Saharan Africa’s entrenched leadership and its developmental and security challenges, including conflict or instability, stagnant or declining economies, and democratic backsliding. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2020 Democracy Index finds that <a href="https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index">two dozen countries</a> in sub-Saharan Africa have authoritarian governments. Rights abuses in the countries with the longest-serving leaders have included secret or arbitrary arrests and detentions, tight restrictions on freedom of expression, and police brutality, according to monitoring groups. Prominent examples include:</p><p><em>Zimbabwe</em>. Once one of the continent’s richest nations, Zimbabwe tumbled under Mugabe to a place of chronic underdevelopment with <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21596520-robert-mugabes-government-free-its-coalition-partner-risks-driving">a long-struggling economy</a>. Mugabe’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/03/world/africa/03zimbabwe.html">alleged misuse of federal funds</a> has been linked to underfunded and dysfunctional government departments and programs. In the wake of a slew of constitutional amendments granting Mugabe broad power, the country <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/ZWE.pdf">experienced drops</a> [PDF] in life expectancy and per capita income between 1990 and 2005. Two years after his ouster, Mugabe died in Singapore, where he had been receiving medical treatment. Economic instability and public unrest have continued under Mugabe’s successor, Emmerson Mnangagwa: fuel price hikes in 2019 prompted widespread protests, to which security forces responded with a brutal crackdown that killed at least twelve people.</p><p><em>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</em>. Under the three-decade-long dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko, the DRC suffered from gross corruption, embezzlement, and neglect of public infrastructure. An economy based almost exclusively on mineral extraction deteriorated as Mobutu forced out foreign-owned companies and embezzled government funds. Laurent Kabila overthrew Mobutu in 1997 but was assassinated in 2001; his son, Joseph, succeeded him, amassing a fortune by stealing state funds and effectively disregarding the provision of public services. A <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/eastern-congo#!/?cid=soc-at-interactive-the_eastern_congo_infoguide-121015">war in the country’s east</a>, considered the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II, continued under his presidency. Kabila stepped down after a December 2018 election, two years after his mandate was set to end, though election observers and many opposition leaders questioned the vote’s legitimacy.</p><p><em>Sudan</em>. Omar al-Bashir came to power in a 1989 military coup that ousted the democratically elected prime minister. He remained in office despite allegations by international and domestic observers of widespread electoral irregularities and fraud. He presided over a decades-long civil war that ended with the south seceding to become the new state of South Sudan in 2011. Bashir was indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2009 on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity for involvement in attacks on civilians in Darfur. Following months of protests sparked by the rising price of bread, the armed forces pushed Bashir out in April 2019 and established a transitional civilian-military council.</p><p><em>Burundi</em>. According to Human Rights Watch, the dire humanitarian situation in Burundi <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/burundi">remained largely unchanged</a> in 2020 following the June death of President Pierre Nkurunziza, who held power for almost fifteen years. He oversaw a brutal crackdown against protesters who rejected his bid for a third term in 2015. The security services and the ruling party’s youth league were again accused of widespread abuses around the 2020 presidential election, in which Nkurunziza declined to run and Evariste Ndayishimiye was declared the victor. Analysts note that Ndayishimiye has signaled a willingness to implement reforms, but that these gestures have so far been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/18/interview-reforms-not-gestures-are-needed-solve-burundis-human-rights-crisis#">largely symbolic</a>.</p><h3>Why has the problem persisted?</h3><p>Leaders are increasingly securing longer terms through “constitutional coups,” proposing amendments for approval by the legislature or judiciary, or in national referenda, that allow for additional terms in office. This practice grew more frequent after 2000, when many postcolonial leaders were nearing the ends of their constitutional term limits. The COVID-19 pandemic has given African leaders greater leverage, write CFR’s John Campbell and Nolan Quinn, using the health crisis as a pretext for postponing elections and stifling the opposition.</p><p>Since the turn of the century, at least two dozen heads of state have tried to remain in power by tweaking their countries’ constitutions or evading term limits. Guinean President Lansana Conte did so in 2001, followed by Gnassingbe Eyadema, president of Togo, in 2002. One year later, the Gabonese parliament voted to remove term limits from its constitution, allowing President Omar Bongo to run for a sixth term. Following these initial instances, attempts to extend terms became fairly regular occurrences, popping up every one to two years on the continent in countries including Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, and Uganda.</p><blockquote><em>Since the turn of the century, at least two dozen heads of state have tried to remain in power by tweaking their countries’ constitutions or evading term limits.</em></blockquote><p>Angola’s dos Santos and former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, among others, claimed they were eligible to run for additional terms because the constitutions containing term limits were passed during their mandates; they argued the limits should only apply to future presidential terms. Uganda’s Museveni paired the elimination of term limits with the introduction of multiparty politics to pass a constitutional amendment in 2005, and his party eliminated the presidential age limit in a 2017 amendment. Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara defied a two-term limit to run in the country’s 2020 election, which was boycotted by Ouattara’s main opponents and their supporters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QNMgWYDdN0LsdH1uy4gYrQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/05/angola-isabel-dos-santos-corruption/">Angola’s Dos Santos Heiress</a></figcaption></figure><p>Many experts say that countries lacking an effective political opposition are vulnerable to constitutional coups. Though several countries across sub-Saharan Africa tout themselves as multiparty states, some, including Cameroon and Rwanda, remain de facto one-party states. Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, who has effectively been the country’s leader since 1994, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/05/paul-kagame-secures-third-term-in-rwanda-presidential-election">secured another seven-year term</a> in August 2017, with the electoral commission reporting he had the support of almost 99 percent of voters.</p><p>Kleptocratic incumbents have even more incentives to stay in office; they could lose their wealth if they were to lose power and potentially face prosecution. The <a href="https://allthewealth.io/">network of businesses</a> that Kabila and his family built in and beyond the DRC has brought them hundreds of millions of dollars. Angola’s dos Santos was long <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/18118935">accused of funneling government funds</a> to a small group of elites, as well as to his own family. His daughter Isabel, who headed the state oil company in 2016–17, was considered the wealthiest woman on the continent; following the release of a trove of documents known as the Luanda Leaks in 2020, authorities froze her assets, and state prosecutors have <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-23/einst-reichste-frau-afrikas-hat-angolas-regierung-nun-gegen-sich">sought to bring her to trial</a> for alleged corruption and mismanagement.</p><p>During his tenure, Mugabe called the <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/10/05/how-and-why-term-limits-matter/">push for term limits</a> a Western attempt to “place a yoke around the necks of African leaders,” and some politicians who concur with him point to Western democracies, including the United Kingdom and Canada, that have no such provisions.</p><h3>When have leaders failed to extend their rule?</h3><p>Zambian President Frederick Chiluba’s and Malawian President Bakili Muluzi’s proposals to raise presidential term limits in 2001 and 2003, respectively, were stopped after opposition and civil society groups formed alliances with lawmakers from the countries’ ruling parties. In 2006, Nigeria’s senate rejected an amendment put forth by President Olusegun Obasanjo that would have allowed him to serve a third term.</p><p>Citizens have often opposed constitutional coup attempts through protest, at times successfully blocking them. In 2012, large protests in Senegal led to an electoral defeat for Wade, who was running for a disputed third term. After weeks of demonstrations in 2014, Burkinabe citizens stopped Blaise Compaore from repealing the constitutional provision on term limits and forced his resignation. Polling by Afrobarometer between 2016 and 2018 found that, on average, 75 percent of citizens surveyed in thirty-four African countries believed leaders should be limited to two terms in office.</p><p>Gambia’s small size and geography <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2017/01/gambia">conspired against</a> former President Yahya Jammeh, who ruled from 1994 until his ouster in 2017, argued Virginia Comolli, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The country is surrounded by Senegal, which supported opposition candidate and election winner Adama Barrow.</p><h3>How have regional and international actors responded?</h3><p>The African Union (AU) has prevented some military coups by threatening countries with suspension, sanctions, or military intervention. Most recently, it took punitive measures against Mali, including suspending its membership, in the wake of two coups in 2020–21.</p><p>But the bloc has been criticized for not taking similar actions against attempts at extending presidential terms. In 2012, the AU ratified the <a href="http://www.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf">African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</a> [PDF], which calls on its member states to identify illegal means of accessing power or staying in office, including refusals “to relinquish power after free, fair, and transparent elections” and constitutional amendments that infringe upon “the principles of democratic changes of power,” and sanction those responsible. Yet, the body “has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/27/the-african-unions-hypocrisy-undermines-its-credibility/">yet to seriously confront</a> an incumbent president for manipulating constitutional rules to entrench their regime,” writes Adem K. Abebe, an expert on constitution building.</p><p>The West African bloc ECOWAS <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/ecowas-risks-its-hard-won-reputation/">has taken action</a> in some cases. A military offensive by ECOWAS troops forced Jammeh to step down and leave Gambia in 2017. The body often deploys observers to help ensure free and fair elections in the region; in 2020, it sent observers to countries including Ghana, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast. However, experts say the bloc is increasingly challenged by leaders seeking to <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/features/west-african-leaders-attempt-cling-power-and-role-ecowas/">cling to power</a>, including Gambia’s Barrow, who has reneged on a promise to step down after three years.</p><p>The United Nations and European Union have imposed sanctions on several African countries, including Burundi, the DRC, and Zimbabwe, in response to impeded political transitions or fair elections. In the case of Gambia in 2017, the United Nations endorsed ECOWAS military action and threatened sanctions if Jammeh refused to leave. Millions in EU development aid to Gambia was frozen in 2014 due to human rights concerns under Jammeh; following Jammeh’s departure, the bloc released the funds.</p><h3>What is U.S. policy toward extended mandates?</h3><p>Democracy promotion has long been a U.S. priority in the region. President Barack Obama said in a 2012 brief on U.S. strategy in sub-Saharan Africa that the United States would “not stand idly by when actors threaten legitimately elected governments or manipulate the fairness and integrity of democratic processes.” In an address to AU leaders three years later, <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/text-of-president-obamas-remarks-at-the-african-union-/2881236.html">Obama urged the body</a> to ensure that heads of state comply with term limits.</p><p>President Donald Trump’s administration said it would not “subsidize corrupt leaders and abusers of human rights” on the continent, but a <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-africa-strategy-advances-prosperity-security-stability/">new Africa strategy</a> outlined in 2018 marked a shift in priority from democracy advancement to countering China and Russia in the region. Still, CFR’s John Campbell wrote that the Trump administration <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/trumps-africa-policy-better-it-looks">largely continued</a> the Africa policies of its predecessors and backed pro-democracy initiatives, such as in Sudan following Bashir’s overthrow.</p><p>Since taking office in 2021, President Joe Biden has sought to reinvigorate U.S. global leadership, including to combat democratic backsliding in Africa and other regions. As part of this effort, Biden announced plans to convene a Summit for Democracy, during which countries would be expected to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/01/22/biden-democracy-and-africa/">make concrete commitments</a> to combat corruption and authoritarianism, as well as advance human rights.</p><p>The United States has imposed economic sanctions, including bans on travel to the United States and business transactions with U.S. nationals, on individuals who “undermine democratic processes.” In 2003, the United States <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/zimbabwe-related-sanctions">issued sanctions</a> against the Zimbabwean government that remain in place today. The Obama and Trump administrations sanctioned top officials from the DRC over political repression and election delays that occurred around the time Kabila’s term was due to expire. Following elections in 2019 and 2020 in Nigeria, Washington <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-and-uk-deny-visas-nigerians-undermining-elections">imposed visa restrictions</a> on individuals accused of undermining voting.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ORswLzl3BzILN1mao8n49g.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://apnews.com/article/5c8fbab340a5030df0c58dfd9815e18a">President of Nigeria Muhammadu Buhari and UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson meet in UK-Africa Summit</a></figcaption></figure><p>At the same time, analysts contend that the United States has often prioritized security interests over concerns about prolonged rule. Washington has chosen not to penalize long-serving leaders of partners, such as Cameroon, Chad, and Uganda. And in the DRC, CFR’s Gavin <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/truth-about-united-states-complicity-drcs-fraudulent-election">points out</a>, Washington accepted disputed 2018 election results to avoid further instability. The U.S. military trains partner nations’ military forces, shares intelligence with them, and helps their troops combat Islamist rebel groups on the continent, including al-Shabab in Kenya and Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria. In 2021, the Biden administration announced it would deploy additional U.S. forces to Kenya, signaling a reversal of the Trump administration’s planned military drawdown in the region.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=15ecfdb9e08d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dozens sentenced to death over murders of U.N. experts in Congo]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gabeshootman/dozens-sentenced-to-death-over-murders-of-u-n-experts-in-congo-715546989892?source=rss-44de1a5b93d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/715546989892</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[congo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gabe Shootman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Jan 2022 23:30:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-30T23:30:18.448Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Africa</p><p>DAKAR, CONGO January 29, 2022</p><p>50 people were sentenced to death, many in absentia, in Democratic Republic of Congo on Saturday in connection with the murders of U.N. experts Zaida Catalan and Michael Sharp in 2017, a defence lawyer in the case said.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/1*n-1QXUQoIQyBsNpjKOBEKg.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60183952">Maya Catalan</a></figcaption></figure><p>A local immigration official was among those given death sentences while an army colonel was given 10 years in prison, said Tresor Kabangu, who represented several defendants in the trial. Congo has observed a moratorium on the death penalty since 2003 so those convicted will serve life sentences.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/850/1*G2rQloMqk-Y5bUK_GRhKhQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/12/still-no-justice-murders-un-experts-congo">Catalan and Sharp, left to right</a></figcaption></figure><p>Human rights groups say investigators have ignored the potential involvement of higher-level officials, and Catalan and Sharp’s families said they did not believe the ultimate masterminds had been brought to justice.</p><p>Catalan, a Swede, and Sharp, an American, were investigating violence between government forces and a militia in the central Kasai region in March 2017 when they were stopped along the road by armed men, marched into a field and executed.</p><p>Congolese officials have blamed the killings on the Kamuina Nsapu militia. They initially denied any state agents were involved but later arrested the colonel and several other officials who they said were working with the rebels.</p><p>After a nearly five-year trial marked by repeated delays and the deaths of several defendants in custody, a military court in the city of Kananga delivered its verdict on Saturday.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K7UKKX4v5qQdQhisJxvuNQ.png" /><figcaption>Members of the UN Mission Congo, MONUSCO <a href="https://www.passblue.com/2017/08/16/militia-most-likely-killed-two-un-experts-in-congo-a-un-report-finds/"><em>ABEL KAVANAUGH/UN PHOTO</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>Among those sentenced to death was Thomas Nkashama, a local immigration official who met with Catalan and Sharp the day before their fatal mission, Kabangu told Reuters. Others were alleged members of the militia.</p><p>Colonel Jean de Dieu Mambweni, who also met with Catalan and Sharp before their mission, was sentenced to 10 years, Kabangu said.</p><p>A number of the defendants were convicted in absentia because they were either never apprehended or escaped from custody.</p><p>Catalan’s sister, Elisabeth Morseby, said after the verdict that testimony in the case was of dubious reliability given how much time the defendants had spent together in prison and said the conviction of Mambweni was a smokescreen. “In order for the truth to emerge, all suspects, including those higher up in the hierarchy, need to be questioned, which has not yet been done,”</p><p>Sharp’s mother, Michele, said she was glad some perpetrators were being held accountable, but wondered who gave the orders.</p><p>“Surely someone in the upper echelons of power,” she said. “We await further developments.”</p><p>Congo’s chief military prosecutor was not immediately available for comment. Prosecutors have previously said that they followed the available evidence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xecy3GdyP4LzO_JRcbznVQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/dr-congo-security-council-condemns-attack-against-un-peacekeeping-mission">UN Forces in Congo</a></figcaption></figure><p>Sweden’s foreign minister, Ann Linde, urged Congolese authorities to cooperate with a U.N. mechanism involved in the investigation to shine further light on the matter.</p><p>“Crucial that investigation concerning others involved continues to further uncover truth and bring justice,” she said on Twitter.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=715546989892" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Shell Hits Oil and Gas in Namibian Offshore Well]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@gabeshootman/shell-hits-oil-and-gas-in-namibian-offshore-well-9e75c5b0e0b3?source=rss-44de1a5b93d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9e75c5b0e0b3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[namibia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oil]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stocks]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gabe Shootman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Jan 2022 23:13:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-30T23:13:43.883Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9zEfkjpxSlUFpUM2dmvc0A.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.upstreamonline.com/exclusive/updated-shell-finds-oil-with-closely-watched-namibian-wildcat/2-1-1142213">upstream</a></figcaption></figure><p>January 25th, 2022. Shell <a href="https://www.reuters.com/companies/RDSa.L">(RDSa.L)</a> has made a significant oil and gas discovery at speculative offshore well in Namibia which could spark a wave of investment in the southern African country, three industry sources told Reuters.</p><p>Namibia is not a fossil fuel producer, although northern neighbour Angola is a major oil and gas producer and a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.</p><p>It unclear if the discoveries are big enough for Shell to go ahead with the development of the country’s first deep water field, the sources said.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/774/1*blz7pjur8IM-t8Mzq1Vubg.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/namibias-fair-weather-friends-and-one-all-weather-friend">Namibian President Hage Geingob</a></figcaption></figure><p>The Namibian government is planning to make an announcement next week on the details of the discovery at the Graff-1 well which Shell started drilling last month, according to two of the sources.</p><p>Industry trade magazine Upstream <a href="https://www.upstreamonline.com/exclusive/updated-shell-finds-oil-with-closely-watched-namibian-wildcat/2-1-1142213">reported</a> on the discovery at the Graff-1 well earlier this month.</p><p>The well results have so far shown at least two reservoirs containing what one of the sources described as a significant amount of oil and gas.</p><p>According to a second source, the drilling results have shown one layer at least 60 metres deep of hydrocarbons, holding an estimated 250 to 300 million barrels of oil and gas equivalent.</p><p>Shell holds a 45% stake in the offshore Petroleum Exploration License 39 (PEL 39) with a 45% interest held by Qatar Petroleum and a 10% held by the National Petroleum Corporation of Namibia (NAMCOR). A Shell spokesperson said: “We continue to safely execute Graff-1 operations.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hvnLxn9l8SaT20j_uc2jGQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/africa/ep-africa/371919/shell-graff-namibia-orange/">Graff-1 Namibia Location</a></figcaption></figure><p>The Ministry of Energy and Mines said it was in the final leg of a process to collect quality data for the Graff-1 well, enabling a “thorough assessment of the prospect potential”.</p><p>“As soon as all the data have been analysed, the Ministry will issue a full results announcement,” a statement said.</p><p>The discovery comes as Shell begins winding down its oil production as part of a plan to shift to renewable energy and low-carbon fuels. But even so, the company could opt to develop a new field to replenish its reserves and replace production declines elsewhere.</p><p>Developing new oil and gas fields in a country with no existing energy infrastructure and regulation, similar to what has happened in Guyana on the other side of the Atlantic in recent years, is timely and costly. Namibia has sought to develop oil and gas fields for decades with no success.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GCCRaQhD9w7iOmuLlNrWeQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Namibian Capitol: <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-capital-of-namibia.html">World Atlas</a></figcaption></figure><p>But in recent years interests in its offshore prospects have attracted many foreign companies including Exxon Mobil <a href="https://www.reuters.com/companies/XOM.N">(XOM.N)</a> and TotalEnergies <a href="https://www.reuters.com/companies/TTEF.PA">(TTEF.PA)</a> following discoveries in neighbouring South Africa as well as Brazil and Guyana which share geological similarities.</p><p>“If successful, Graff-1 could spark significant international investment to a region which has had minimal E&amp;P exploration and production activity over the last 25 years,” IHS Markit analyst Hugh Ewan said in a note after Shell started drilling Graff-1 in December.</p><p>TotalEnergies started drilling in December the Venus-1 exploration well in the nearby Block 56 at a depth of 3,000 metres.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9e75c5b0e0b3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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